G.R. No.

L-16749             January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente
N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen
entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of
death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants

except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx     xxx     xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now

married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx     xxx     xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all
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the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come
to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE

SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO

RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

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III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF

DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that
at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following
facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in
New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese

Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
Page 3 of 10
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly

after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home
in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in

California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not
a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen
of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was
a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The
man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

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ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in

the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is

situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

Page 5 of 10
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept
the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in
the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems
no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-
law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both
reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the
choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would
switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to

land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile
of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized
by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving

movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of
the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
Page 6 of 10
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn,
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as

governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to
the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them
as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and
the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the
question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction,
but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law
of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to
this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law,
at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.

Page 7 of 10
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even
by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be

certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate
of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law
of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he
finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law
of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to
his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a
will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding
legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Page 8 of 10
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein,
and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article
16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict
of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back
to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because
the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in
the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of

California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

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Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

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