Republic of the Philippines acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.

In amplification of the above grounds it

SUPREME COURT was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal
Manila law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
EN BANC forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir- deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
LABRADOR, J.: property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the The most important assignments of error are as follows:
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
I
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
II
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
xxx xxx xxx

III
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency
per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted.. IV

xxx xxx xxx THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger V
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: .... CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen. in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S.
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in situated.
Sacramento, California.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may
Philippines the following year, 1939. be found.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to law"is used therein.
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p.
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of
his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
(pp. 2-3)

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California. California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29) Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
Laws. jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see
one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers.
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting
particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only law as the rule of reference.
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that
the Philippines, which is as follows: the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the xxx xxx xxx
choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts 1900, in the form of the following theses:
accepted the renvoi.
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question,
and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum,
but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by
the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.) as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin. (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws
as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the xxx xxx xxx
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with
is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts law.
the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the
to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same
cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here,
(16 C.J.S. 872.) also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and
the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent
Am. Jur. 296) than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below: citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
whole of its law.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the Republic of the Philippines
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the SUPREME COURT
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national Manila
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various EN BANC
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back vs.
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth Camus and Delgado for appellee.
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California ROMUALDEZ, J.:
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme
internal law of California..
of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
costs against appellees.
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
Adolfo Aznar vs Helen Christensen Garcia following:
7 SCRA 95 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Law – Nationality Principle – Internal
and Conflict Rule Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with
(illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
successional rights of his heirs. requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
rights under Philippine law only. be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having
been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according
to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective
it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs.

So ordered.