Republic of the Philippines Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which

SUPREME COURT may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

Manila EN BANC
xxx     xxx     xxx
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
DECEASED.  residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,  property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
vs. character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: ....
LABRADOR, J.:
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
and contains the following provisions: that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent,
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
xxx     xxx     xxx States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, The most important assignments of error are as follows:
and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine

1
I In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States
and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in
II 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
III
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

IV In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California

shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951.
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp.
PHILIPPINE LAWS. 2-3)

V In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
(1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP. considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief: temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not
in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904. a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen
of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
2
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws. his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly the law of his domicile.
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
(Goodrich, p. 29) which is the Philippines.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
the country where it is situated. to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of
the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
property may be found. reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This
would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein. looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article but those who have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent
California. for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their
3
respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to?
whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a
doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by
would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi. cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title
to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, theory of the doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining
or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.) repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin. Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the
rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal
X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were xxx     xxx     xxx
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so- of foreign laws.
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law. (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-
laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind
which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.

4
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein,
law. and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article
xxx     xxx     xxx 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with
the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
accept this reference back to his own law. deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in them.
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New 946 of the California Civil Code.
York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is
one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) law of California..

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
5