G.R. No.

L-16749             January 31, 1963 my death and which may have come to me from any
source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.  It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,  payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
vs. that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter,
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. Maria Lucy Christensen.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
LABRADOR, J.: declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will
which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child
of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named the time of her birth.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
and no descendants except my above named daughter, property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
xxx     xxx     xxx Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel,
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied.
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about Hence, this appeal. 
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way The most important assignments of error are as follows:
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in I
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
THE INHERITANCE. 
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
II
xxx     xxx     xxx
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
OF INTERNAL LAW.
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and III
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI

1
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in
IV New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
V

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California
he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until
1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in
the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New appears never to have intended to abandon his California
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict
board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of of Laws.
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
United States and stayed there for the following nine technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
was teaching school in Sacramento, California. place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again business which would require his presence for several
departed the Philippines for the United States and came weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years sufficient connection with the place to be called a
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939. settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
however, is a term used with many shades of meaning,
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned from the merest temporary presence to the most
by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC- The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.) as follows:

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
more to California shortly after the making of his last will subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the

2
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has
the national law of the person whose succession is so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
property and regardless of the country where said law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference
property may be found. back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be the internal law rather
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those
therein. who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
consistent for they look always to internal law as the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and
rule of reference.
in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.  objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine,
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against
which is as follows:
the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where would be for the woman. The same result would
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
domicile. the renvoi. 

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code instances: where the title to land is in question, and
and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of applied by the forum, but any further reference goes
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the
being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following
the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the intestate succession to movables calls for an application
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
rules?" corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan however, would show that if a French court were called
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the upon to determine how this property should be
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface
difficult to see why the reference back should not have of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
3
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve exists, the court shall respect:
itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is (a) The provisions of a foreign law which
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so- disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, as regards their personal statute, and desires
thus applying its own law. that said personal statute shall be determined
by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented of the place where the act in question
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a occurred.
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn,
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. (b) The decision of two or more foreign
This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term systems of law, provided it be certain that one
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard of them is necessarily competent, which agree
Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) in attributing the determination of a question
to the same system of law.
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the xxx     xxx     xxx
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of
been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters
his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption
English law — he must accept this reference back to his
of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
own law.
returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict
of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has
internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules
been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
that the court of the forum, in determining the question
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
before it, must take into account the whole law of the
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
and then apply the law to the actual question which the
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
generally been repudiated by the American authorities.
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
(2 Am. Jur. 296) 
which follow the person of the owner.

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
distribution of the property, the law of the state where
531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below: 
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a should determine the validity of an attempted
country' means the whole of its law. testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
xxx     xxx     xxx the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in in the case of intestate succession, is the general
the form of the following theses: convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
regards the application of foreign laws.
application. It had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this

4
age, when business intercourse and the process of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as
so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce
the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law

to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec.
946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the
national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially
as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to
or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity
of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..

5
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of

San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,

paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00
in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three
(3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the

executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.  Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.  $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors- Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each
appellants,  or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
vs. — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants. by his first and second marriages.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

BENGZON, J.P., J.: Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30,
1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
The facts of the case are as follows: final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom provide for legitimes.
he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and — Texas law or Philippine law.
finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
6
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in national law should govern.
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
to succeed. They provide that —  Amos G. Bellis.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
with respect to the order of succession and to the Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of

the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three,

of the Civil Code, stating that — 

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted  the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed
is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good

customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount  of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
7
prayed for. Because of the length of time that the subject estates
have been pending judicial settlement, the parties were enjoined
to exert all efforts to have the inventories of said estates finalized
and to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences. The
respondent court was likewise directed to expedite proceedings
and to close the same upon the payment of the corresponding
taxes due within three months from notice.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR

MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE NO NEW
MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE THE PREVIOUS
DECISION OF THE COURT. — Where the Court, upon consideration
of the motions filed in regard to a previously decided case, had
not found any new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to
induce a modification of its judgment, the previous decision is
reaffirmed and the motions for reconsideration and for
modification of its judgment are denied.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. JUDGMENTS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR

MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE NO NEW
MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE THE PREVIOUS
DECISION OF THE COURT; DIRECTIVE TO RESPONDENT COURT TO
EXPEDITE AND TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THREE
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.] MONTHS SUPERSEDES PRO TANTO THE DISPOSITION IN THE
ORIGINAL DECISION. — The resolution’s directive to respondent
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator court to expedite and terminate the protracted proceedings
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. within three months supersedes pro tanto the disposition in the
1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), Petitioner, v. THE original decision of March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, presiding Judge of the Court of minimum one-fourth of the community properties adjudged to be
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery and to exclusive
MAGNO, Respondents. administration by respondent as her estate’s administrator, with
the other one-fourth to remain under the joint administration of
[G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. September 30, 1975.] said respondent and petitioner and Charles Newton Hodges’ one-
half share to be administered by petitioner exclusively as his
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. estate’s administrator, since such physical segregation and
No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON separate administration could not possibly be accomplished
HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672) PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND before the more pressing and indispensable matters of submittal
INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant, v. LORENZO CARLES, of the two estates’ inventories and determination by respondent
JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, court within the limited three-month period given in the Court’s
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION resolution.
CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR,
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA RESOLUTION
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA MAGNO, the
last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
SYNOPSIS

In regard to a decision decided by the Supreme Court on March Motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion
29, 1974 the following pleadings were filed before the Court: a for reconsideration filed by petitioner-appellant Philippine
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the petitioner- Commercial and Industrial Bank and motion for modification filed
appellant, a motion for modification of the judgment by the heirs by Joe Hodges and "the other heirs of Charles Newton Hodges" in
of the testator, and a motion for the assessment of damages regard to the decision of this Court of March 29, 1974.
suffered by reason of the lifting of the preliminary injunction filed
by respondent-appellee Magno. Upon consideration of said motions, the Court has not found any
new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to induce a
The Supreme Court, not finding any new matter in the said modification of its judgment, for which reason, the Court, with its
motions sufficient to induce a modification of its judgment, members reaffirming their previous opinions and vote resolved
reaffirmed its previous opinion, denied the first two motion, and unanimously to DENY as it hereby DENIES the motions for
authorized the trial court to make the assessment to the damages reconsideration and modification above referred to.
8
writer’s separate opinion).
Anent the motion of respondent-appellee Avelina Magno 1 the
assessment of the damages she claims she and the Estate Linnie The remaining issues to be resolved by respondent court revolve
Jane Hodges have suffered by reason of the preliminary injunction on the two questions of renvoi and renunciation. In his separate
in this case which was lifted per resolution of 1 Court of opinion (at page 7 et seq.), as concurred in by the Chief Justice
September 8, 1972, the Court resolved to authorize trial court to and Justice Makasiar and Antonio, the writer urged that these two
make the assessment prayed for, subject to appeal, to this Court, questions should be resolved "preferentially and expeditiously" by
if necessary. respondent court, since aside from the time problem, these
proceedings have "apparently degenerated into running battle
Considering the substantial value of the subject estates the length between the administrators of the two estates to the common
of time they have already been pending judicial settlement and for prejudice of all the heirs." (at page 20).
the reason that the payment of the corresponding taxes thereon
are being unduly delayed, and because the properties of said Since respondent court is now again presided by still another
estates have to be disposed favor of Filipinos before May 27, judge in a long line of judges who have come and gone with even
1976, the Court enjoins the parties to exert all efforts to have the terminating the proceedings, and since as is clear from the
inventories of said states finalized without further delay, and if decision itself, no consensus on the best means of expediting the
possible to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences to closing of the estates was reached by a majority of the Court (see
further complications, expenses and unnecessary loss time. The pages 8 and 10, separate opinion), I trust that those who did not
respondent court is directed to expedite processing by giving due concur with the "suggested guidelines" in the writer’s separate
priority thereto, requiring the parties to submit the inventories opinion (at pages 8-20) either because they were not ready to
within thirty days from notice hereof, and to resolve the express their definite opinion thereon or because they felt that
remaining issues as delineated in the Court’s decision and to close respondent court should be given a free hand, will understand
the proceedings upon payment of the corresponding taxes within that the writer now commends anew to the new judge presiding
three months from notice hereof. Respondent judge is further respondent court the careful reading the said suggested
directed to report to this Court from time to time the action taken guidelines in the hope that they may lighten his work and help
by him hereon. find the appropriate measures and solutions to "expedite the
closing of the protracted estate proceedings below to the mutual
Castro, Acting C.J., Ferrando, Muñoz Palma, Aquino and satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party
Martin, JJ., concur. elevating his resolution of this only remaining issue once more to
this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings." (page
Makalintal, C.J. Esguerra and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave. 10, separate opinion), and thus enable him to comply timely with
the Court’s directive to close out the estates within three months
from notice.

Separate Opinions Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join in the resolution denying the motions f reconsideration for

the reasons and considerations already indicated in my separate
concurring and dissenting opinion of March 29, 1974.

I specially welcome the resolution’s directive to respondent court

to expedite and terminate these long-drawn proceedings (for over
18 years now since Linnie Jane Hodges’ death on May 23, 1957)
and to "resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court’s
decision" and to cause the payment in the estate and inheritance
taxes long overdue to the Government "within three months from
notice hereof." (See pp. 19-20, writer’s separate opinion).

I take it that the resolution’s directive to respondent court to

expedite and terminate the protracted proceedings three months
supersedes pro tanto the disposition original decision of March
29, 1974 for the segregation minimum one-fourth of the
community properties adjudged to be the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges for delivery to and exclusive administration by respondent
as her estate’s administrator, with the other one-fourth to remain
under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner
and Charles Newton Hodges’ one-half share to be administered by
petitioner exclusively as his estate’s administrator, since such
physical segregation and separate administration could not
possibly be accomplished before the more pressing and
indispensable matters of submittal of the two estates’ inventories
and determination by respondent court of the remaining issues
are attended to by respondent court within the limited three-
month period given in the Court’s resolution. (See pages 7-8,
9
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or
article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides
the following: 

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in

respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated. 

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he
did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.) 

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter. 

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and,
taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no
evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not
being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927 was not erroneous.

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
administrator, petitioner-appellee,  exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is
vs. one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says: 
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee. Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
in question in this case.  nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
court, however, approved it.  property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: 
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation
will favorable to the person or persons who fail to
in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by comply with this request.
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. 

10
the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-
Philippines.  five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee The Facts
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.3 
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary
to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:  On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4 
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
even should the testator otherwise provide. United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5 
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores
the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
one to govern his testamentary dispositions. issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6 
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited,
is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to
the herein oppositor.  visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his
wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8 
the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.  On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that the father’s name was left blank.9 
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law. 
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for
the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
administrator is approved in all other respects, without any they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
pronouncement as to costs.  proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
So ordered. life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous
act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate
from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,  Osabel.10 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California
DECISION in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
PARDO, J.: On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
The Case to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11 

The case raises a conflict of laws issue. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12 

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14 
11
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19 
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16 
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. trial court admitted the will to probate.20 
The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly
signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo Lorenzo died.21 
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to
wit:
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
therein; 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23 

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp.
and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and testamentary.24 
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at
Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25 
Camarines Sur;

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R.
newspaper "Bicol Star".26 
Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, thus:
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188,
both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines; "Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not
among themselves; entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the
status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole
executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or
incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of "On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
age, if of age; Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of
the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir,
substitute should served (sic) without bond;
Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal
testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal
published, by me; shares.

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine "Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true
Will and Testament."17  and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds
Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same,
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18  court; to render a true and just account of her administration to
the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when

12
required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by The Civil Code clearly provides:
her to be performed.
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of evidence could not be granted. of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"SO ORDERED."27  "Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28  "However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly property may be found." (emphasis ours)
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
portion of the estate.30  our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37 
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.31  While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of
Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in
wise: this case, Philippine law.

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38 
"SO ORDERED."32 
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
motion for reconsideration of the decision.33 
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to
lack of merit. no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of
Hence, this petition.35  the renvoi  doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The Issue
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s
various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
validity of the will of the deceased. acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

The Applicable Law

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard
of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
(2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is
duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily

governed by foreign law. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
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same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their is SET ASIDE.
national law.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing
There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
persons.
No costs.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by SO ORDERED.
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other

public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or

consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second

wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.
We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner,
not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity."44 

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever

public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45 

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other

issues raised.

The Fallo

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