G.R. No.

L-16749

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF

EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First

Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named

MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living

ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch
of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my

well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that

the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen
Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was

filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section
946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was

a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are
to be governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac.
192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied.
Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE

DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST
SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING

AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE
OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION
OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO

RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
(1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a

citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by
the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to

probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was
on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the

United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was

in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the

foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was

interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
more to California shortly after the making of his last
will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March
5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City
of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the

deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California
and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades

of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the

citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided
in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be

taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And
he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides
his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in
it. But if he went on business which would require
his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with
the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Residence, however, is a term used with many
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not
safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary

dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property

is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions,

both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires

the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of

testamentary provisions in the United States, each state
of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other
than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California

governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate
of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where

personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law
of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's

opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of
the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following
the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of
the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by

various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the

Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The

Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of
the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling
logical reason why the original reference should be
the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a
merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the
renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the
renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always
to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the

objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views.
And still more strange is the fact that the only way
to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form
the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to
whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both
reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In
the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been brought in
the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two

instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule
of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus,
a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp.
13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a

Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls
for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly.
An examination of French law, however, would show
that if a French court were called upon to determine
how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is
to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute
of distributions, on the assumption that this is what
a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called
renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is

presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws
rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp.
523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign

law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules
as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a
few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated
by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be decided
according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",

has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of
renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining
the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur.
296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined

and the reasons for its application in a country explained
by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal,
Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of
the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the

rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country

as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the

contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which

disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
as regards their personal statute, and desires
that said personal statute shall be determined
by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of
the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign

systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree
in attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to

distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with
the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would
make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its

conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is
in accord with the general principle of American law that
the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one

or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the
state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property,
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere,
is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed
for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil
Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there

is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers
to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision
in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the
national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is
the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while
the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.

156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited
by appellees to support the decision can not possibly
apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e.,
the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that
there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen,
a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine
law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation