SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

AZNAR VS GARCIA which may have come to me from any source

whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
LABRADOR, J.:
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First the executor in his final account and project of partition
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said 11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
provisions: Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), law that should govern the estate of the deceased
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight Christensen should not be the internal law of California
years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
and no descendants except my above named daughter, domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
xxx xxx xxx natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way California at the time of his death, the successional
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in are to be governed by the law of California, in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), of his property in the way he desires, because the right
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac.
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is motions for reconsideration, but these were denied.
exhausted.. Hence, this appeal.

xxx xxx xxx The most important assignments of error are as follows:

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well- I

beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

1
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

II later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and

came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
INTERNAL LAW. adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered
by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
III
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE the United States but returned to the Philippines in
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
PHILIPPINES.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
IV more to California shortly after the making of his last will
and testament (now in question herein) which he
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
LAWS.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
V deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP. considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
citizen of the United States and of the State of California Philippines and make home in the State of California.
at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
the executor himself in appellee's brief: permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence.
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, citizenship that he acquired in California when he
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of latter was a territory of the United States (not a state)
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered
1904. himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
United States and stayed there for the following nine intended to abandon his California citizenship by
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with
was teaching school in Sacramento, California. the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his
Conflict of Laws.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
departed the Philippines for the United States and came taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
2
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
which would require his presence for several weeks or person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient domicile.
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term the abovecited case, should govern the determination of
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest the validity of the testamentary provisions of
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
one. (Goodrich, p. 29) on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the testamentary provision in question should be
the Philippines, which is as follows: referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by
various authors, thus:
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
the national law of the person whose succession is under internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws
property and regardless of the country where said rules?"
property may be found.
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
The application of this article in the case at bar requires court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
the determination of the meaning of the term "national Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
law" is used therein. back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
There is no single American law governing the validity of difficult to see why the reference back should not have
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
of the Union having its own private law applicable to its resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has
citizens only and in force only within the state. The so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
than the private law of the State of California. original reference should be the internal law rather than
to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
The next question is: What is the law in California solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those
governing the disposition of personal property? The who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate reference and at that point applying internal law.
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But of reference.

3
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for
result from adoption of their respective views. And still this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against considered by the courts in but a few instances, has
the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
be for the woman. The same result would happen, descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
though the courts would switch with respect to which send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi. "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
instances: where the title to land is in question, and returning the main controversy to be decided according
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, that the court of the forum, in determining the question
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every before it, must take into account the whole law of the
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of and then apply the law to the actual question which the
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.) rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, Jur. 296)
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin. The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined
and the reasons for its application in a country
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent
succession to movables calls for an application of the law parts of the article are quoted herein below:
of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
examination of French law, however, would show that if laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
a French court were called upon to determine how this country' means the whole of its law.
property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus xxx xxx xxx
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So
on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to the form of the following theses:
resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If regards the application of foreign laws.
it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law. (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
4
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

personal statute, and desires that said personal statute application. It had its origin in that international comity
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this
by the law of the place where the act in question age, when business intercourse and the process of
occurred. accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law. Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
xxx xxx xxx internal law of California. But as above explained the
laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of We should enforce the California internal law prescribed
his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
English law — he must accept this reference back to his accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
own law. above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its abroad.
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in explained in the various authorities cited above the
the determination of matters with foreign element national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is
involved is in accord with the general principle of the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
most matters or rights which follow the person of the of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
owner. conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he can not and should not refer the case back to California;
was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to such action would leave the issue incapable of
in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as determination because the case will then be like a
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
should determine the validity of an attempted rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is decided, especially as the application of the internal law
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of of California provides no legitime for children while the
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at Philippines, makes natural children legally
the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
in the case of intestate succession, is the general them.
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider
5
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59

Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can
not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to
be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in
each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant
to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine
law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.

6
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997

and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying
BANK OF AMERICA VS CA petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Same; Conflict of Laws; In a long line of decisions, the Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an
Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our international banking and financing institution duly
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and
law; A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
as a fact.—BANTSA alleges that under English Law, California, United States of America while private
which according to petitioner is the governing law with respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a
regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does domestic corporation.
not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions
for sums of money. We rule in the negative. This Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the
argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to other hand, is a limited liability company organized and
rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at bench, existing under the laws of England.
Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence
presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several
matter. In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the occasions granted three major multi-million United
well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate
no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A.
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private
refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption. respondent. 3

Same; Same; When the foreign law, judgment or contract Due to the default in the payment of the loan
is contrary to a sound and established public policy of amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate borrowers
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As
not be applied.—In the instant case, assuming arguendo additional security for the restructured loans, private
that the English Law on the matter were properly respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20
132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid July 1984, over its parcels of land including
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San
would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by
law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign 78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally,
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the
property, and those which have for their object public payment of the restructured loans prompting petitioner
order, public policy and good customs shall not be BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign courts for
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, the collection of the principal loan, to wit:
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. The public policy sought to be protected a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's
in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No 2098)
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause against Liberian Transport Navigation S.A., Eshley
of action. Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona
Shipping Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A.,
BUENA, J.: Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan
Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose
the real estate mortgage constituted over a third party b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's
mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245)
an action for the collection of the principal loan before against El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company
foreign courts? S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan
Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High
decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley
7
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona

Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation, On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion
Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering for
(Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground
Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and that "it cannot exercise said right of redemption without
at the same time waiving or contradicting its contentions
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High in the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its
Court (Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona
Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation, In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court
Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering granted the private respondent's motion for suspension
(Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on after which a copy of said order was duly received by the
November 21, 1992. Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the
private respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, mortgaged properties at the foreclosure sale,
was private not impleaded as party-defendant. consolidated its ownership over the real properties,
resulting to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-
the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, 16472 in its name.
Philippines an application for extrajudicial foreclosure 6
of real estate mortgage. On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership
in its favor, ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, Investment Corporation for the amount of Thirty Nine
the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer
in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with Integrated Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-
Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest 187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued
bidder for the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos in the latter's name.
(P24,000.000.00). 7
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the favor of private respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the
Pasig Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for decretal portion of which reads:
damages 8 against the petitioner, for the latter's act of
foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts that the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of
for the collection of the principal loan. collection suits against the principal debtors operated as
a waiver of the security of the mortgages. Consequently,
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule the plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of the
prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761,
applicable in the present case, claiming that: all of the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
Philippines, were violated when the defendant caused
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted
not a party to the principal restructuring agreements, thereon.
was never made a party defendant in the civil cases filed
in Hongkong and England; Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the following sums, all with legal interest
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint up to
the Philippines since the civil actions were filed in the date of actual payment:
Hongkong and England. As such, any decisions (sic)
which may be rendered in the abovementioned courts 1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
are not (sic) enforceable in the Philippines unless a Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
separate action to enforce the foreign judgments is first
filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million
of the Revised Rules of Court. Pesos (P5,000,000.00); and

c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under 3) Costs of suit.
the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by filing civil actions for sums of money. SO ORDERED.
8
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments
decision of the lower court prompting petitioner to file a untenable and upholds the jurisprudence laid down in
motion for reconsideration which the appellate court Bachrach 15 and similar cases adjudicated thereafter,
denied. thus:

Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari In the absence of express statutory provisions, a
where herein petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
Appeals the following assignment of errors: debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may he may
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
doctrines laid down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the election, his cause of action can by no means be
cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in
Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will
promulgated on August 25, 1989 and Philippine leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
(1991 case), although said cases were duly cited, property itself. And, if he waives such personal action
extensively discussed and specifically mentioned, as one and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property,
of the issues in the assignment of errors found on page 5 an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the
of the decision dated September 30, 1997. right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all
the properties of the defendant, other than the
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
discretion when it awarded the private respondent actual satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy
and exemplary damages totalling P171,600,000.00, as of is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
July 12, 1998 although such huge amount was not advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other
asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right
is contrary to law and is totally unsupported by evidence of election. On the other hand, a rule that would
(sic). authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against
the debtor and simultaneously or successively another
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main action against the mortgaged property, would result not
issues: only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice
(Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404),
suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of
loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the being sued in the place of his residence or of the
remedy of foreclosure. residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place
where the property lies.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual
and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating
ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper. jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply
Co vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
The petition is bereft of merit. RFC, 18 invariably held:

First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, . . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may
petitioner submits that a waiver of the remedy of elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an
foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the
an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties
subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly of the debtor, including the subject matter of the
rendered therein. mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification that if he fails
in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal the remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)
action to collect the principal loan does not suffice; a
final judgment must be secured and obtained in the Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid
personal action so that waiver of the remedy of down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute
foreclosure may be appreciated. To put it differently, against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for
absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
is deemed not to have waived the remedy of foreclosure.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the
We do not agree. mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
9
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must
as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-
Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to Appellate Court, 23 a case relied upon by petitioner,
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had
by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection
with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage
of the province where the sale is to be made, in constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure.
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118. In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause
of action which is non-payment of the debt.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its
constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to
security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the
so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of rule against splitting a cause of action.
a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons
who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of
pledging or mortgaging their own property. 20 Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24

Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor.
person who secures the fulfillment of another's This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the
obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory creditor in his action may make two demands, the
to the principal contract—loan—remains to be primarily payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage.
bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-
creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute
foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 21 mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is
subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one
requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot
split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
the petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so,
suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage: the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
remedy of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage,
over the personal property as security for the debt or we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a
value of the promissory note when he seeks to recover in single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
the said collection suit. and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for
not foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel allegedly disregarding the doctrine enunciated in Caltex
mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly manifests his lack wherein this High Court relaxed the application of the
of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property general rules to wit:
as security for the promissory note . . . .
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate rule to the letter but declare that it is the collection suit
the rule, for clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of which was waived and/or abandoned. This ruling is
filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a more in harmony with the principles underlying our
waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the judicial system. It is of no moment that the collection
mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for suit was filed ahead, what is determinative is the fact
collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in that the foreclosure proceedings ended even before the
the present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
10
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to
context. We must stress that the Caltex case was never enforce payment of the 1.3 million promissory note
intended to overrule the well-entrenched doctrine secured by real estate mortgages and subsequently filed
enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule
applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach against splitting a cause of action.
is still good law.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits
present case, thus: before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy
to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein
than the rule, dictated by the peculiar circumstances private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil
obtaining therein. In the said case, the Supreme Court actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the
chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules
judicial system when it initially filed a collection suit against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in
then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed jurisprudence and our statute books.
extrajudicially the mortgaged property which secured the
indebtedness, and still pursued the collection suit to the In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the
end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", remedy of foreclosure after the collection suit was filed,
the collection suit had to be nullified because the considering that the creditor should not be afforded
foreclosure proceedings have already been pursued to "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For cause
their end and can no longer be undone. of action should not be confused with the remedy
created for its enforcement. 28
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the crucial but the efficacy of the remedy chosen in
defendant pursued to the end or are still pursuing the addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought
collection suits filed in foreign courts. There is no before a foreign court having competence and
occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception jurisdiction to entertain the action is deemed, for this
laid down by the Supreme Court in Caltex by nullifying purpose, to be within the contemplation of the remedy
the collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid available to the mortgagee-creditor. This pronouncement
collection suits are beyond the reach of this Court. Thus would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and
the only way the court may prevent the spector of a further discourage the noxious practice of splitting up a
creditor having "plural redress for a single breach of lone cause of action.
contract" is by holding, as the Court hereby holds, that
the defendant has waived the right to foreclose the Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law,
mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its properties which according to petitioner is the governing law with
originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does
78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions
pp., 10-11) for sums of money. 29

In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of We rule in the negative.
severe criticism, to say the least. 26
This argument shows desperation on the part of
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by petitioner to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at
citing the case of PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the
to fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be stressed evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law
that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in on the matter.
Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand
on this issue by declaring: In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-
imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
institute a personal action for the debt or a real action to properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the
foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot pursue both foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
PCIB in this case. as our local or domestic or internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of
xxx xxx xxx processual presumption.
11
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

opinions of men vary so much concerning the real value

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of
Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in the witnesses which the respective parties desire to
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony,
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of
applicability. Appeals for relying heavily on the valuation made by
Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is questions the act of the appellate court in giving due
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the weight to the appraisal report composed of twenty three
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and submitted as
be applied. 33 evidence by private respondent. The appraisal report, as
the records would readily show, was corroborated by the
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private
acts or property, and those which have for their object respondent.
public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments On this matter, the trial court observed:
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. 34 The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally
offered as evidence the appraisal report dated March 29,
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant 1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p. 409), consisting of twenty
case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction three (23) pages which set out in detail the valuation of
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. the property to determine its fair market value (TSN,
April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of P99,986,592.00
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with the corroborative
pertinent — testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an appraiser
and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN,
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the ibid., p. 3). The latter's testimony was subjected to
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment extensive cross-examination by counsel for defendant-
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
the dismissal of the others.
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its reiterates the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the
application would work undeniable injustice to the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. 40
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
most important function of law; hence, a law, or conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35 trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private the credibility of witnesses, principally because they are
respondent is entitled to the award of actual or in a better position to assess the same than the appellate
compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to
BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor
mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of of witnesses. 43
herein private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor. Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses rest primarily
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable with the trial court. 44 In the case at bar, we see no
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, reason that would justify this Court to disturb the
profession, job or occupation and the same must be factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non- Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual
substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the damages.
question of the value of property is always a difficult one
to settle as valuation of real property is an imprecise In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial
process since real estate has no inherent value readily court justified the award by presenting the following
ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. 37 The ratiocination in its assailed decision 45, to wit:
12
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did

Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of not confine itself to the appraisal report dated 29 March
valuation. The size of the subject real properties are (sic) 1993, and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo Flores,
set forth in their individuals titles, and the Court itself in determining the fair market value of the real property.
has seen the character and nature of said properties Above all these, the record would likewise show that the
during the ocular inspection it conducted. Based trial judge in order to appraise himself of the
principally on the foregoing, the Court makes the characteristics and condition of the property, conducted
following observations: an ocular inspection where the opposing parties
appeared and were duly represented.
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not Based on these considerations and the evidence
distant from Metro Manila — the biggest urban center in submitted, we affirm the ruling of the trial court as
the Philippines — and are easily accessible through well- regards the valuation of the property —
paved roads;
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos
2. The properties are suitable for development into a (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-hectare properties (sic)
subdivision for low cost housing, as admitted by translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty Four Pesos
defendant's own appraiser (TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 31); (P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the
court so holds, a better approximation of the fair market
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have value of the subject properties. This is the amount which
already been demolished. Houses of strong materials are should be restituted by the defendant to the plaintiff by
found in the vicinity of the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), way of actual or compensatory damages . . . . 48
and the vicinity is a growing community. It has even
been shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court
located adjacent to the property in question (Exh. 27), awarding an amount allegedly not asked nor prayed for
and the only remaining piggery (named Cherry Farm) in in private respondent's complaint.
the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away from the western
boundary of the property in question (TSN, November Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and
19, p. 3); compensatory damages by the lower court exceeded that
prayed for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the valid, subject to certain qualifications.
property, as indubitably shown by the fact that on
March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer during the foreclosure On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is
sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to pertinent:
Stateland Investment Corporation, in whose favor new
titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T- Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by
by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan; the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
Nine Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is more than to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
the Court cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid estimate any time, even after judgement; but failure to amend
(Decision, Records, p. 603). does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court
of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses command may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
great respect and consideration especially when the with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
conclusions are supported by the evidence on record. 46 action and the ends of substantial justice will be
Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance
the trial court committed no palpable error in giving to enable the amendment to be made.
credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who
according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker, The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay,
Inc. since 1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been Inc. 49 citing Northern Cement Corporation vs.
with the company for 26 years at the time of his Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
testimony.

13
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

There have been instances where the Court has held pleading had not been previously amended, so long as
that even without the necessary amendment, the no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse
amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded, as in party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis
Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if requirements of fair play had been met, as where
the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that litigants were given full opportunity to support their
asked for, no amendment to the complaint was respective contentions and to object to or refute each
necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised other's evidence, the court may validly treat the
the point on which recovery was based. The appellate pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the
court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the
the evidence although the pleadings were actually not evidence before it.
amended. Amendment is also unnecessary when only
clerical error or non substantial matters are involved, as In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was
we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 afforded the opportunity to refute and object to the
Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally
that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play
particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo
objecting party. And in the recent case of National Power Flores was put under scrutiny during the course of the
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the
held that where there is a variance in the defendant's court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and
pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the committed no reversible error in awarding actual
Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform damages the amount of which is higher than that prayed
with the evidence. for. Verily, the lower court's actuations are sanctioned by
the Rules and supported by jurisprudence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-
mentioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages
trial court should not be precluded from awarding an although the amount of Five Million Pesos
amount higher than that claimed in the pleading (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to
notwithstanding the absence of the required reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are
amendment. But it is upon the condition that the imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
evidence of such higher amount has been presented good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
properly, with full opportunity on the part of the compensatory damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it
opposing parties to support their respective contentions must be fair and reasonable in every case and should
and to refute each other's evidence. not be awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 52
In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to damages in the present case qualifies the test of
the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an reasonableness.
adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence
which may embody new issues not raised in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
damages. Although the pleading may not have been Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
amended to conform to the evidence submitted during amount awarded as exemplary damages. According,
trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent
on the basis of the issues alleged but also the basis of the sum of P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory
issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the
course of trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it costs of suit.
had been amended to conform to the evidence, although
it had not been actually so amended. Former Chief SO ORDERED.
Justice Moran put the matter in this way:

When evidence is presented by one party, with the

expressed or implied consent of the adverse party, as to
issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be
rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be
considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings.
There is implied consent to the evidence thus presented VALLES VS COMELEC
when the adverse party fails to object thereto.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Before the 1935
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the Constitution, what served as the Constitution of the
basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
14
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

United States governed the country.—Private respondent citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the citizenship—she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native well.
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Same; Dual Citizenship; Election Law; Public Officers;
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what Words and Phrases; The phrase “dual citizenship” in
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the R.A. 7160 and in R.A. 7854 must be understood as
principal organic acts by which the United States referring to “dual allegiance”—persons with mere dual
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.—In the
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
Same; Same; The signing into law of the 1935 IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
Constitution has established the principle of jus allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
citizenship.—The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
Constitution has established the principle of jus different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine Court explained that dual citizenship as a
citizenship, to wit: (1) Those who are citizens of the disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: “x x x the
Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, x x x 40 (d)
foreign parents who, before the adoption of this and in R.A. No. 7854, x x x 20 must be understood as
Constitution had been elected to public office in the referring to ‘dual allegiance.’ Consequently, persons with
Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of disqualification.”
the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are Same; Same; Same; Same; For candidates with dual
naturalized in accordance with law. So also, the principle citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private dual citizenship; A declaration in the certificate of
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, candidacy that one is a Filipino citizen and that he or
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her she will support and defend the Constitution and will
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, which is
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent foreign citizenship.—The fact that the private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
possession of dual citizenship. from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is
Citizenship; Renunciation; The mere fact a person is a enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the
holder of an Australian passport and has an alien filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate certificate of candidacy
against her claim of Filipino citizenship.—The mere fact
that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an herein private respondent filed her certificate of
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
The application of the herein private respondent for an Australian citizenship.
alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Requisites in Order
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian that the Doctrine of Res Judicata May be Applied in
15
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Citizenship Cases.—Petitioner is correct insofar as the that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a
general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
Republic, an exception to this general rule was significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino
of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a citizenship".1
person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue
in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental.
active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the
COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
PURISIMA, J.: citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed
by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant in EPC 92-54.
to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 The citizenship of private respondent was once again
and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental. On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came
out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in disposing as follows:
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native "Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. matters and incidents already passed upon by this
Since then, she has continuously participated in the Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth
as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to
she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, present petition follows as a matter of course.
Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No.
92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian xxx xxx xxx
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, "WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no
the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing
petition, ratiocinating thus: reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse
the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as
the impugned resolution shows that respondent was it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove SO ORDERED."2
her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding. aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was
denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged January 15, 1999.
important documents . . . no other evidence substantial
in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner
16
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
the present petition; questioning the citizenship of of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged
renunciation of Australian citizenship, private
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because Philippines; petitioner concluded.
(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and
by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata
(2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy
also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the "xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly whatever the corresponding court or administrative
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for demand. xxx"
the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private
respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
the admitted facts that: principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 the basis of place of birth.
dated September 19, 1988;
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year
March 3, 1988. before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and were the principal organic acts by which the United
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced States governed the country. These were the Philippine
her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
application for alien certificate of registration and August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to
subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill
Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
run for elective office.
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects
respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands,
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands
by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner and as such entitled to the protection of the United
argues that the said acts did not automatically restore States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
According to petitioner, for the private respondent to the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
the mandatory requirements for repatriation under eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private
17
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides: So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who subsequently retained under the 19734 and 19875
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
said Islands, and their children born subsequent born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli,
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in then at most, private respondent can also claim
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris citizenship.
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and
except such others as have since become citizens of Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of
cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
of the insular possessions of the United States, and such Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3,
citizens of the United States, or who could become 1988.
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein. (underscoring ours) Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship:
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 (1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
and resided therein including their children are deemed
to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, (2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, twenty-one years of age or more;
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.
By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein service of a foreign country;
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a
citizen of the Philippines. (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit: unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner
if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign country, she acquires his nationality.
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation,
Islands. such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s
contention that the application of private respondent for
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6 and in the more recent
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7
citizenship.
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
18
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

certificate of registration was not tantamount to IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. allegiance.9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
held that the fact that respondent Manzano was different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Court explained that dual citizenship as a
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality "xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx
before the termination of his American citizenship. 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood
as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and disqualification."
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled
citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate
The application of the herein private respondent for an of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. and that he/she will support and defend the
Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is
well. under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
has not been included as a ground for losing one’s
Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15
lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
claim that respondent must go through the process of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered
repatriation does not hold water. in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia
citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states: aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that
disqualified from running for any elective local position: private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is
(d) Those with dual citizenship; raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
xxx xxx xxx generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He
insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court threshed out anew.
clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
19
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is

concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic,13 an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in

a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative

took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of

Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of
prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance
may somehow be placed on these antecedent official
findings, though not really binding, to make the effort
easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient
basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner
is substantially the same evidence presented in these
two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of
such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition
cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and

the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and
January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby

adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MERCADO VS COMELEC

20
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
disqualification against private respondent is clear from omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
§6 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.—Nor is petitioner’s the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
interest in the matter in litigation any less because he some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
after private respondent had been shown to have result of an individual’s volition.
garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20
disqualification against private respondent is clear from must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In
§6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of
Reforms Lawof 1987. the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
proceedings for disqualification even after election if after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.— citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No.
Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
disqualification even after election if there has yet been allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
no final judgment rendered. citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to subject to strict process with respect to the termination
resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.—The candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant conflicting laws of different states.
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner’s MENDOZA, J.:
motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent’s alleged Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship. Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the
different from dual allegiance.—Dual citizenship is election were as follows:
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.For instance, Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and The proclamation of private respondent was suspended
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
considered a citizen of both states. certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain United States.
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship.—Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such running for any elective position. The COMELEC's
children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who Second Division said:
21
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the

What is presented before the Commission is a petition COMELEC en banc read:
for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as
candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was
the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US
ground that the respondent is an American citizen based citizenship by operation of the United States
on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines
with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of using an American passport as travel document. His
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a parents also registered him as an alien with the
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did
and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an
But notwithstanding his registration as an American oath of allegiance to the United States.
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
In other words, he holds dual citizenship. effectively renounced his US citizenship under American
law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is citizenship.
disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution
seeks to be elected? of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not
yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of
those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
running for any elective local position. eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest
rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a
respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City. votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four
thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
until after the election held on May 11, 1998. legal issues involving private international law which
may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
winner. adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the
case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to
opposed by private respondent. be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-
mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31,
1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City
Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties,
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 mayor of Makati City.

22
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the

board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or
of Makati. the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office rights may be fully protected in a separate action or
of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that — proceeding.

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that: Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither
legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-
citizen when he: mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; executory judgment."
and,
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before
registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of
1992, 1995 and 1998. the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest
for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the out only second to private respondent. The fact, however,
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati; is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,6
was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in
be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is which the election of the respondent is contested, and
disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice- the question is whether one who placed second to the
Mayor of the City of Makati. disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In
the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had
by private respondent Manzano — whether petitioner been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering purpose was precisely to have private respondent
that he was not an original party in the case for disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position"
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted. originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule
8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any
of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown
denying his motion for intervention: to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
intervene. — Any person allowed to initiate an action or disqualification against private respondent is clear from
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment
success of either of the parties, or an interest against to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
affected by such action or proceeding. candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
xxx xxx xxx receives the winning number of votes in such election,
23
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such
guilt is strong. children are citizens of that country;

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's
proceedings for disqualification even after election if country the former are considered citizens, unless by
there has yet been no final judgment rendered. their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
instead decided the merits of the case, the present possible given the constitutional provisions on
petition properly deals not only with the denial of citizenship.
petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondent's Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
alleged disqualification on the ground of dual situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
citizenship. some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether result of an individual's volition.
private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship
and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR by law." This provision was included in the 1987
DISQUALIFICATION Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F.
Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is
being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of . . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to
with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual
the Charter of the City of Makati. 8 allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the
as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil.
contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
local elective office." constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual
allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about
concurrent application of the different laws of two or 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the
national by the said states.9 For instance, such a fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented
situation may arise when a person whose parents are in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they
jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause European and Latin countries were represented, which
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also
dual citizenship: represented in that Overseas Council.

24
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens potentially great numbers of double citizens professing
who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a
said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking proposed amendment at the proper time that will
or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
been worried about minority claims on our natural maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
resources. after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual
this is already happening. Some of the great commercial citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila. subject to strict process with respect to the termination
It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
endure a capital famine which also means economic should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest. candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
TO LAW. have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the whether she is considered a citizen of another country is
problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11 something completely beyond our control." 12

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the Pimentel clearly shows: 13
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask
of course, the concern for national security. In the clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual
course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen On the assumption that this person would carry two
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a passports, one belonging to the country of his or her
genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with father and one belonging to the Republic of the
its attendant risk of double allegiance which is Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I to run for a local government position?
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be
left to the determination of a future legislature. But SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on means that at the moment when he would want to run
25
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

for public office, he has to repudiate one of his we would be applying not what our legislative
citizenships. department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
passport but the country of origin or the country of the means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
one can renounce. There are such countries in the people of this Republic.
world.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is CITIZENSHIP
running for public office would, in effect, be an election
for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino The record shows that private respondent was born in
citizen. San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States
Constitution does not require an election. Under the follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
claim the citizenship. banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in
1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so
President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does that now he is solely a Philippine national.
not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening
himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely
the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
one citizenship." alleged renunciation was made when private respondent
was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the have been made when he reached the age of majority.
viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic. respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided
he exercises acts that will prove that he also that "A person who is a national of the United States,
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
fall under this disqualification. nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be
naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the
of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy
of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held: when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of
naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly following statements made under oath:
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied 6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-
and compiled with. The determination whether such BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the xxx xxx xxx
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.
The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the 10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO.
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY
may or should interfere with its operation and OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law,
26
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR renunciation should have been made upon private
IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY. respondent reaching the age of majority since no law
requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE upon majority age.
ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in
THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY holds an American passport which he used in his last
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no
THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN the assertion of his American nationality before the
ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL termination of his American citizenship. What this Court
KNOWLEDGE. said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis
to private respondent in the case at bar:
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17 has a Certificate staring he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo that he is an American does not mean that he is not still
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
would disqualify him "from running for any elective local no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
position?" We answer this question in the negative, as consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
renounced his US citizenship but before he was that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
dated December 19, 1995: concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost as a dual citizen.
his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for On the other hand, private respondent's oath of
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
the Philippine Government. his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not
been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
or arbitrariness or abuse. declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry
that the oath of allegiance contained in private into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
27
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

commercial documents executed abroad that he was a

Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED

for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: PETITION FOR HC OF YU VS DEFENSOR

SANTIAGO

PADILLA, J.:

28
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

The present controversy originated with a petition for 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining
habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to
seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3)
After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of days from notice within which to explain and prove why
his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines
behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese
counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were passport.15
heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties
were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an
1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 earnest request for temporary release on 22 December
November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment
habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary
of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6
citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and January 1989.
detention of the same person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid
for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen
resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5 applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office
prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988. certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain
1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also Portuguese in commercial documents he signed,
filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
December 1988. Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 together constitute an express renunciation of
December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners
15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to
the lifting of the TRO. mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and
Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court represented himself as such in official documents even
will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen.
with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance
detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the of Philippine citizenship.
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release
dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending
argument dated 8 December 1988. 12 hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that
order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
29
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

citizenship. The material facts are not only established

by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due
process was obviated when petitioner was given by the
Court the opportunity to show proof of continued
Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person

has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court,
no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a

commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse
to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other
motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of
this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion

for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's
motion to lift the temporary restraining order is
GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

BENGSON VS HRET

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of

acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth and (2) by
naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
30
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

thereof.—There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized was not required by law to go through naturalization
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed
all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have of the House of Representatives.
become Filipino citizens through naturalization generally
under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—On the other KAPUNAN, J.:
hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
citizen. April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship
may be Reacquired by a Former Citizen.—Filipino On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
citizens who have lost their citizenship may however enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
of the original nationality.—Repatriation results in the
recovery of the original nationality. This means that a SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino ways and/or events:
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he xxx
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino. (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As respondent with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
Cruz was not required by law to go through not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his of the following circumstances is present:
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.—
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
enumeration of who are citizens under the present country; or
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of
a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, connection with his service to said foreign country; And
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
31
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

forces of a foreign country under any of the despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino
citizen x x x. Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those
service in the U.S. Marine Corps. who are from birth with out having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Respondent on the other hand contends that he
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he
the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article
in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is without merit.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz citizens as follow:
was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4 of the adoption of this Constitution;

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Philippines;
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated the age of majority, and
April 27, 2000.6
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth,
and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A
it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when his Philippine citezenship."10
it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
Philippine citizenship. have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927),
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13
32
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
when the court is satisfied that during the intervening restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2)
has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
Government announced policies.14 provides:

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) States, acquired United States citizenship, may
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15 reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. any other citizenship.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of have recovered his original status as a natural-born
C.A. 473.18 citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of
a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23 explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-
born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
As distinguished from the lengthy process of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
the place where the person concerned resides or last act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
resided.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held: considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2)
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino
place of his residence or where he had last resided in the mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippines. [Italics in the original.25 Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were
not considered natural-born obviously because they were
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were
33
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

likewise not considered natural-born because they also

had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines
citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those

born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining
who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds
a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would
either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the

Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over
the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of
the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for
that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
MARCOS VS COMELEC

Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases;

Residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification
for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the
COMELEC’S Second Division reveals a startling
34
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

confusion in the application of settled concepts of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law;
“Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the When the Constitution speaks of “residence ” in election
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The
proposition that for the purposes of election law, deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution qualification for certain elective positions have placed
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s only “domicile.”
qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of
it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
qualification for an elective position, has a settled which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
meaning in our jurisdiction. Same; Same; Same; Same; an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of qualification requirement.—It is the fact of residence, not
residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there be decisive in determining whether or not an individual
permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification
“[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil requirement. The said statement becomes material only
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
“permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that would lead to his or her disqualification.
they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in
physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, the certificate of candidacy regarding the period of
or the intention of returning there permanently. residency does not negate the fact of residence in a
congressional district if such fact is established by
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
Distinguished.—Residence, in its ordinary conception, paper.—Having been forced by private respondent to
implies the factual relationship of an individual to a register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
given area, community or country. The essential had jotted down her period of stay in her actual
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence in a space which required her period of stay in
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One entries in Item 7 and Item 8—the first requiring actual
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled
business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite writing down an unintended entry for which she could
perfectly normal for an individual to have different be disqualified. This honest mistake should not,
residences in various places. However, a person can only however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he First District if such fact were established by means
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and residences in different places.—We have stated, many
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.— domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
For political purposes the concepts of residence and in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political a factual relationship to a given place for various
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of
that residence for election purposes is used a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
synonymously with domicile. constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
35
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

her certificate of candidacy because she became a by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
resident of many places” flies in the face of settled from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for two concepts are well delineated.
election law purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor jurisprudence yields nothing which would suggest that
follows the domicile of his parents.—A minor follows the the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article
of the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing
domicile was not established only when she reached the which would suggest that the female spouse
age of eight years old, when her father brought his family automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.
averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to
change of domicile.—Domicile of origin is not easily lost. “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change physically together. This takes into account the
of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the situations where the couple has many residences (as in
former place of residence and establishing a new one; the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may “live
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and positive proof reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner
concurrence of all three requirements can the gained upon marriage was actual residence—she did not
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of
at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual place of
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr.
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
voluntarium). actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code;
Wife; The presumption that the wife automatically gains The common law concept of “matrimonial domicile”
the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil
“residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Code of 1950, into the New Family Code.—On the other
Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well hand, the common law concept of “matrimonial domicile”
delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has
concepts of “domicile” and “residence.” The presumption been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
36
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision

recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women’s rights in the intervening years by making the KAPUNAN, J.:
choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. A constitutional provision should be construed as to give
it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be
another thing in political law.—Without as much "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the
and obligations of husband and wife-the term residence possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
should only be interpreted to mean “actual residence.” the conditions and needs of a community and not
The inescapable conclusion derived from this identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that that community."3
when petitioner married the former President in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate
home, not a domicilium necessarium. of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
provisions; It is a settled doctrine that a statute information in item no. 8:4
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK
settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
judgment within a specified time is generally construed ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy
that if the statute had intended such result it would Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
have clearly indicated it.” District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory with the Commission on Elections alleging that
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
necessity.—The difference between a mandatory and a for residency. In his petition, private respondent
directory provision is often made on grounds of contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several one year residency requirement for candidates for the
American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations
held that: The difference between a mandatory and made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
directory provision is often determined on grounds of 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
the general public by disregarding than enforcing the disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
letter of the law.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no.
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
member of the House of Representatives.—As to the petitioner that:
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s [T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out
to say that HRET’S jurisdiction as the sole judge of all of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
contests relating to the elections return and already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should
candidate has become a member of the House of have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the deadline.9
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
37
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa
Office in Intramuros, Manila on and not residence of origin or domicile in the First
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's Legislative District, to which she could have responded
petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of
averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original the First District, to which she always intended to return
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
adding the words "since childhood" in her petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that has been a resident of the First Legislative District of
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she She asserts that she has always been a resident of
noted that: Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she
was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her
run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be
a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but a candidate for the District. However, this intention was
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and in Tolosa.
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest
opponent in the congressional election in the First misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same thought what was asked was her actual and physical
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is
along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
1995. 12 seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the persuasive.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest
respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's merit.
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of To further buttress respondent's contention that an
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v.
the validity of amending the original Certificate of COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on
Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
with the one year residency requirement, the Second result of the election, or deviations from provisions
Division held: intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct
of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a
an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The
part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently change in the number of years of residence in the place
38
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial

matter which determines her qualification as a This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, resident of the First District since childhood is nothing
accurate material representation in the original more than to give her a color of qualification where she
certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
detriment of the integrity of the election. studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959,
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
month period of her residency in order to prolong it by resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she
The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can representative of the City of Manila and later on served
be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have
Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which served these positions if she had not been a resident of
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in
A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. registration in the permanent list of voters that she may
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
documents show the respondent's consistent conviction Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been
that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on became a resident of many places, including Metro
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
in the respondent's contention that it was an error. Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

xxx xxx xxx In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of
intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected as a voter in different places and on several occasions
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
Commission. spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and
xxx xxx xxx reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur:
discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
with the one year residency requirement of the intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon
Constitution. the old domicile. In other words there must basically be
animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
considered as synonymous with "domicile" which Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient,
Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In there must likewise be conduct indicative of such
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she
in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has
39
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this
Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her court for relief.
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood." classified into two general areas:

To further support the assertion that she could have not I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more
than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided
in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. II. The Jurisdictional Issue
This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, a) Prior to the elections
Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of
the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
a resident of the district for six months only. 15 mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8,
1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied b) After the Elections
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April
24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral
for the position of Member of the House of Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8,
17 The Resolution tersely stated: 1995 elections.

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the I. Petitioner's qualification

Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re- A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second
examination of the resolution granting the petition for Division reveals a startling confusion in the application
disqualification. 18 of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution agreement with the general proposition that for the
allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
the canvass show that she obtained the highest number domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute
of votes in the congressional elections in the First or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As
be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
number of votes. 19 qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the
of the elections for the congressional seat in the First exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court
14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
Supplemental Petition. they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi,
from running for the congressional seat of the First or the intention of returning there permanently.
40
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual residence qualification for certain elective positions have
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
physical presence of a person in a given area, Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
community or country. The essential distinction between actually means only "domicile" to wit:
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. attempt to require residence in the place not less than
If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
normal for an individual to have different residences in residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive
various places. However, a person can only have a single residence?
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
distinction quite clearly: proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a
resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of
There is a difference between domicile and residence. not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in xxx xxx xxx
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7,
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times
but he may have numerous places of residence. His as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but
it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile. Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
For political purposes the concepts of residence and residence rather than mere intention to reside?
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact difficulty especially considering that a provision in the
that residence for election purposes is used Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
synonymously with domicile. living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term and not physical residence. 30
residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the the definition given to the term residence in election law,
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from In the light of the principles just discussed, has
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
registration as a voter other than in the place where one residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of
is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stating her residence in the First Legislative District of
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his Leyte as seven (7) months?
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
41
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

whether or not and individual has satisfied the fact were established by means more convincing than a
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The mere entry on a piece of paper.
said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
to his or her disqualification. Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for
the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
in the space provided for the residency qualification additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte.
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also
period of residence in the First district, which was "since registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban not, have served these positions if she had not been a
City to make her eligible to run in the First District, resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here
private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming is where the confusion lies.
that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban
City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual We have stated, many times in the past, that an
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
fact which she subsequently noted down in her and maintained residences in different places.
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
by the entry for residence in the constituency where a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary
candidate seeks election thus: or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
Leyte since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE [T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months. who has his own house wherein he lives with his family
in a municipality without having ever had the intention
Having been forced by private respondent to register in of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone
her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of or with his family in another municipality, has his
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding
had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence his having registered as an elector in the other
or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and municipality in question and having been a candidate for
Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the various insular and provincial positions, stating every
second requiring domicile — coupled with the time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. explained that:
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
"greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot,
42
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

and that, of course includes study in other places, [I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992,
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his respondent ran for election as President of the
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
absent himself from his professional or business registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has
the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
run the government especially in national elections. various residences for different purposes during the last
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of
of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds adulthood there and eventually established residence in
justification in the natural desire and longing of every different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
of attachment to the place of one's birth must be Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its personal milestones in her home province, instituting
above-cited statements supporting its proposition that well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of and hometown, and establishing a political power base
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various power either through the ballot or by appointment,
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing always with either her influence or consent. These well-
so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
Election Code (B.P. 881). 35 COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in
facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, Tacloban, Leyte.
which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second
Division's assailed Resolution: 36 Private respondent in his Comment, contends that
Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said
graduated from high school. She pursued her college place by merely expressing her intention to live there
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University again." We do not agree.
in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there established only when her father brought his family back
as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
when her husband was elected President of the Republic successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang demonstrate: 37
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

43
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
of residence and establishing a new one; and quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a
ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence.
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation
case at bench, the evidence adduced by private is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness translade su residencia" in the same provision which
required to convince this court that an abandonment of means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence,"
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed referring to another positive act of relocating the family
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the to another home or place of actual residence. The article
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile which is a fixed,
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the
possibility of transferring from one place to another not
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law move his family, a circumstance more consistent with
as a result of her marriage to the late President the concept of actual residence.
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in
of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles
the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a
concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, single place of actual residence.
writing on this specific area explains:
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
between a person and a place; but in residence, the Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40 Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: mutual help and support.

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living husband and wife are physically together. This takes
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the into account the situations where the couple has many
service of the Republic. residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
would suggest that the female spouse automatically "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband,
choice of residence upon marriage. for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence"
as used with reference to particular matters is
synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some
44
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution
a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court
at other times they are distinguished from one another. would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process
of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
xxx xxx xxx delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce
the physical presence of a person in a place. A person such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
can have two or more residences, such as a country decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High
living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English
without actually living in the place. The important thing law on the subject was not the same as that which
for domicile is that, once residence has been established prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
in one place, there be an intention to stay there equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal
permanently, even if residence is also established in rights in England, could be obtained by the injured
some other spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
place. 41 Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree
the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
where the spouses could not be compelled to live with alimony.
each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States,
or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of
In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
married woman may acquire a residence or domicile where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her
separate from that of her husband during the existence husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of
of the marriage where the husband has given cause for New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil
such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the
her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the
Court held that: In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of
Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the
that it is not within the province of the courts of this marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of money and effects then in her possession and to deliver
course where the property rights of one of the pair are to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be property, all income, rents, and interest which might
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the accrue to her from the property which she had brought
doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty
order can be effective for no other purpose than to than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he respect to the use and control of her property; and it
experience of those countries where the courts of justice does not appear that her disobedience to that order
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely for contempt.
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
45
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or
by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
several places of residence, among which were San domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the
lose her domicile of origin. wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

On the other hand, the common law concept of In the light of all the principles relating to residence and
"matrimonial domicile" appears to have been domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family First District of Leyte.
Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted
by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. II. The jurisdictional issue
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights had already lapsed considering that the assailed
in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46 (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
Without as much belaboring the point, the term contends that it is the House of Representatives
residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has
Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of the Constitution. This is untenable.
husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law of judgment within a specified time is generally
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment
and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium on the theory that if the statute had intended such
necessarium. result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only Adopting the same view held by several American
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that:
died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country 51
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by The difference between a mandatory and directory
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was provision is often determined on grounds of expediency,
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman the reason being that less injury results to the general
of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in law.
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them
livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered
living in her brother's house, an act which supports the without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim
46
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the

essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the

COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election
Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that
our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of

R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's

supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals

enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on
the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case.
Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating
power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these
sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of
law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves
in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to
repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner

possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

NORTHWEST VS CA
47
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and

Courts; Judgments; Jurisdiction; A foreign judgment is to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
which it comes, until the contrary is shown.—A foreign validity and regularity of the service of summons and the
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
country from which it comes, until the contrary is stand.
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Same; Same; Same; In the light of the absence of proof
regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or
Same; Same; Same; A court, whether of the Philippines similarity or the so-called processual presumption may
or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting be invoked.—Alternatively, in the light of the absence of
in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
performed its official duty.—Under Section 50, Rule 39 of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese
of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right Philippine law on service of summons on a private
as between the parties and their successors-in-interest foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of Same; Same; Same; The extraterritorial service of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only
law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, under the processual presumption but also because of
whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the the presumption of regularity of performance of official
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of duty.—Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. business in Japan through its four duly registered
branches at the time the collection suit against it was
Same; Same; Same; The party attacking a foreign filed, then in the light of the processual presumption,
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as
of its validity.—Consequently, the party attacking a such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said
presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly,
the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the
had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it presumption but also because of the presumption of
contends that the extraterritorial service of summons regularity of performance of official duty.
effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only
ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did PADILLA, JR., J.:
not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that matters of remedy the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
and procedure such as those relating to the service of dismissal of the petitioner's complaint to enforce the
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or judgment of a Japanese court. The principal issue here
the internal law of the forum.—It is settled that matters is whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction
of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the serving summons through diplomatic channels on the
lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila
the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
rendered that determines the validity of the failed.
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP.
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter
Same; Same; Same; It was then incumbent upon SHARP NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of
to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil
law is and to show that under it, the assailed Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
extraterritorial service is invalid.—As to what this law is Branch 54, Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a
is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp &
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation
any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules incorporated under Philippine laws.
of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official
publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
48
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged

decision of 10 November 1993, 1 the following are the On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer averring
factual and procedural antecedents of this controversy: that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to be
enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or
branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp.
Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the 41-45, Rec.).
latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on
on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, the merits. After the plaintiff rested its case, defendant
plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, on April 21, 1989, filed a Motion for Judgment on a
Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds:
ticket sales, with claim for damages. (1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null
and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy
36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan and rendered without due process of law. Plaintiff filed
against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, its opposition after which the court a quo rendered the
3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, now assailed decision dated June 21, 1989 granting the
Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons demurrer motion and dismissing the complaint
was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In granting the
person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed demurrer motion, the trial court held that:
to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila
and would be back on April 24, 1980. The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in
this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's the person of the defendant considering that this is an
office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to action in personam; the Japanese Court did not acquire
accept the same claiming that he was no longer an jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because
employee of the defendant. jurisprudence requires that the defendant be served with
summons in Japan in order for the Japanese Court to
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in
judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese
complaint and the writs of summons served at the head jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant
office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar.
Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Boudard versus Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff contends
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through that the Japanese Court acquired jurisdiction because
diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in the defendant is a resident of Japan, having four (4)
Manila. branches doing business therein and in fact had a
permit from the Japanese government to conduct
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy business in Japan (citing the exhibits presented by the
Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276, plaintiff); if this is so then service of summons should
Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to have been made upon the defendant in Japan in any of
appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court these alleged four branches; as admitted by the plaintiff
proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on the service of the summons issued by the Japanese
[January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the Court was made in the Philippines thru a Philippine
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen Sheriff. This Court agrees that if the defendant in a
and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign
August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed court such court could acquire jurisdiction over the
(pp. 12-14, Records). person of the defendant but it must be served upon the
defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy court. Such is not the case here because the defendant
Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not was served with summons in the Philippines and not in
having appealed the judgment, the same became final Japan.
and executory.
Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on July 11,
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, 1989 moved for reconsideration of the decision, filing at
hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the the same time a conditional Notice of Appeal, asking the
judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial court to treat the said notice of appeal "as in effect after
Court of Manila Branch 54.2
49
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

and upon issuance of the court's denial of the motion for

reconsideration." But even assuming a distinction between a resident
defendant and non-resident defendant were to be
Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration to adopted, such distinction applies only to natural persons
which a Reply dated August 28, 1989 was filed by the and not in the corporations. This finds support in the
plaintiff. concept that "a corporation has no home or residence in
the sense in which those terms are applied to natural
On October 16, 1989, the lower court disregarded the persons" (Claude Neon Lights vs. Phil. Advertising Corp.,
Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to the 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited by the defendant-appellee in
plaintiff's Notice of Appeal. 3 its brief:

In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural person,
court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon and can be predicated on an artificial being only by more
Boudard vs. Tait 4 wherein it was held that "the process or less imperfect analogy. Strictly speaking, therefore, a
of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no corporation can have no local residence or habitation. It
jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant has been said that a corporation is a mere ideal
by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state." To existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law — an
support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated: invisible being which can have, in fact, no locality and
can occupy no space, and therefore cannot have a
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant dwelling place. (18 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle
case, personal service of summons within the forum is v. Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v. Hartfold F. Ins.
required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the Co., 13 Conn 202)
defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA
230). To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or domestic
substituted service of summons on the defendant not character of a corporation is to be determined by the
extraterritorial service is necessary (Dial Corp vs. place of its origin where its charter was granted and not
Soriano, 161 SCRA 739). by the location of its business activities (Jennings v.
Idaho Rail Light & P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A
But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the collection corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of the state
suit filed is an action in personam, it is its theory that a in which it is incorporated and no other (36 Am. Jur. 2d,
distinction must be made between an action in p. 49).
personam against a resident defendant and an action in
personam against a non-resident defendant. Jurisdiction Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation duly
is acquired over a non-resident defendant only if he is organized under the Philippine laws. Clearly, its
served personally within the jurisdiction of the court and residence is the Philippines, the place of its
over a resident defendant if by personal, substituted or incorporation, and not Japan. While defendant-appellee
constructive service conformably to statutory maintains branches in Japan, this will not make it a
authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the resident of Japan. A corporation does not become a
defendant-appellee maintains branches in Japan it is resident of another by engaging in business there even
considered a resident defendant. Corollarily, personal, though licensed by that state and in terms given all the
substituted or constructive service of summons when rights and privileges of a domestic corporation
made in compliance with the procedural rules is (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co. vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render L ed. 248, 4 S Ct. 401).
judgment in personam.
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-resident
Such an argument does not persuade. corporation. As such, court processes must be served
upon it at a place within the state in which the action is
It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot brought and not elsewhere (St. Clair vs. Cox, 106 US
lawfully be served outside the territorial limits of the 350, 27 L ed. 222, 1 S. Ct. 354).5
jurisdiction of the court from which it issues (Carter vs.
Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201) and this is regardless of the It then concluded that the service of summons effected
residence or citizenship of the party thus served (Iowa- in Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan
Rahr vs. Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC, NS, was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo
292, Am. Case 1912 D680). There must be actual service District Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its
within the proper territorial limits on defendant or decision was void.
someone authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a
defendant, whether a resident or not in the forum where Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,
the action is filed, must be served with summons within NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending
that forum. that the respondent court erred in holding that SHARP
50
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

was not a resident of Japan and that summons on business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the
SHARP could only be validly served within that country. Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in
in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the no such resident agent, on the government official
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.6 designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a
judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and
same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the service of summons is without force and gives the court
parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent no jurisdiction unless made upon him. 11
title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. be made on the government official designated by law, to
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and
and has regularly performed its official duty. (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case
of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its is so made, the government office or official served shall
validity.7 Being the party challenging the judgment transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal
rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to proccess to the corporation at its home or principal
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of
attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the the service. 12
extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home
office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of
void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire process upon the Securities and Exchange Commission,
jurisdiction over it. the Superintendent of Banks, and the Insurance
Commissioner, as the case may be, presuppose a
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such situation wherein the foreign corporation doing business
as those relating to the service of process upon a in the country no longer has any branches or offices
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law within the Philippines. Such contention is belied by the
of the forum.8 In this case, it is the procedural law of pertinent provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128
Japan where the judgment was rendered that of the Corporation Code 13 and Section 190 of the
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of Insurance Code 14 clearly contemplate two situations:
process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of (1) if the corporation had left the Philippines or had
fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and ceased to transact business therein, and (2) if the
must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.9 corporation has no designated agent. Section 17 of the
Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court General Banking Act 15 does not even speak a
provide that it may be evidenced by an official corporation which had ceased to transact business in
publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy the Philippines.
thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having
to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service had a resident agent authorized to receive court
is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the least create an impression, that it had none. Hence,
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must service on the designated government official or on any
stand. of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed
of. The respondent, however, insists that only service of
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof any of its officers or employees in its branches in Japan
regarding Japanese could be resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so- respondent court, two attempts at service were made at
called processual presumption 10 may be invoked. SHARP's Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed the first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the
to be similar with the Philippine law on service of person authorized to accept court process, was in
summons on a private foreign corporation doing Manila. On the second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to
51
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

accept the summons because, according to him, he was It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc.
no longer an employee of SHARP. While it may be true vs. Nieto 19 and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 20 as well as the
that service could have been made upon any of the principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the
officers or agents of SHARP at its three other branches in 1911 case of Raher vs. Raher. 21
Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not
preclude service upon the proper government official, as The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard
stated above. involved the enforcement of a judgment of the civil
division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo Indo-China. The trial court dismissed the case because
District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP the Hanoi court never acquired jurisdiction over the
be served at its head office in the Philippine's after the person of the defendant considering that "[t]he, evidence
two attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo District adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the
Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause appellee [the defendant] nor his agent or employees were
the delivery of the summons and other legal documents ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased
to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard had never, at any time,
Court of Japan sent the summons together with the been his employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was
other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared invalid resulting in the failure of the court to
of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in
Japanese Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court an action in personam was the service of summons
processes were delivered to the Ministry (now through publication against non-appearing resident
Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to defendants. It was claimed that the latter concealed
the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now themselves to avoid personal service of summons upon
Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered them. In Dial, the defendants were foreign corporations
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on which were not, domiciled and licensed to engage in
SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is business in the Philippines and which did not have
equivalent to service on the proper government official officers or agents, places of business, or properties here.
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP was
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, doing business in Japan and was maintaining four
SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not branches therein.
valid under Philippine laws holds no water.17
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court thing of the past. In that case, a divided Supreme Court
sustained the trial court's reliance on Boudard vs. Tait of Iowa declared that the principle that there can be no
18 where this Court held: jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render a personal
judgment against anyone upon service made outside its
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam limits was applicable alike to cases of residents and non-
over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, residents. The principle was put at rest by the United
must be based upon personal service within the state States Supreme Court when it ruled in the 1940 case of
which renders the judgment. Milliken vs. Meyer 22 that domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach
xxx xxx xxx of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal
judgment by means of appropriate substituted service or
The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect, and personal service without the state. This principle is
no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the which allows service of summons on residents
state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the
against a resident of this country having no property in country. The rationale for this rule was explained in
such foreign country based on process served here, any Milliken as follows:
effect here against either the defendant personally or his
property situated here. [T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country state. The state which accords him privileges and affords
cannot run into another, and although a nonresident protection to him and his property by virtue of his
defendant may have been personally served with such domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of
process in the state or country of his domicile, it will not the privileges of residence within the state, and the
give such jurisdiction as to authorize a personal attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are
judgment against him. inseparable" from the various incidences of state
citizenship. The responsibilities of that citizenship arise
out of the relationship to the state which domicile
52
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere that in "all matters not specifically covered by special
absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the provisions applicable only to foreign banks, or their
rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not branches and agencies in the Philippines, said foreign
dependent on continuous presence in the state. One banks or their branches and agencies lawfully doing
such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within business in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws,
the state even during sojourns without the state, where rules, and regulations applicable to domestic banking
the state has provided and employed a reasonable corporations of the same class, except such laws, rules
method for apprising such an absent party of the and regulations as provided for the creation, formation,
proceedings against him. 23 organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix the
relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where members, stockholders or officers of corporation. [Sec.
it was incorporated. 24 In a strict technical sense, such 18].
domicile as a corporation may have is single in its
essence and a corporation can have only one domicile This court itself has already had occasion to hold
which is the state of its creation. 25 [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine Advertising
Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign corporation licitly
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant
certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident
in which it has offices and transacts business. This is within the scope of the legal provision authorizing
the rule in our jurisdiction and apropos thereto, it may attachment against a defendant not residing in the
be necessery to quote what we stated in State Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to Sec. 412 of
Investment House, Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit: Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule
59 of the Rules of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964]
The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units in other words, a preliminary attachment may not be
may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that
as that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do
Law . . . or residents of the state under the laws of which business in the Philippines — and is consequently and
they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines."
be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains no Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party
definition of the term, resident, or any clear indication of not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides
its meaning. There are however other statutes, albeit of out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered
subsequent enactment and effectivity, from which a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a
enlightening notions of the term may be derived. resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court
pointed out that:
The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the
term "'resident foreign corporation' applies to a foreign . . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
corporation engaged in trade or business within the assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do
Philippines," as distinguished from a "'non-resident business here, to the status of domestic corporations.
foreign corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs.
trade or bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec. 20, Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong Eng vs.
pars. (h) and (i)]. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely
out of line with this policy should we make a
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the
1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries, affiliation, petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
extension offices or any other units of corporation or seizure by attachment when it has complied not only
juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign with every requirement of law made specially of foreign
country operating in the Philippines shall be considered corporations, but in addition with every requirement of
residents of the Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)]. law made of domestic corporations. . . .

The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations
"branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the
banks . . . (which are) called Philippine branches," in the status of domestic corporations, subsumes their being
same category as "commercial banks, savings found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in
associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural the country.
banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have
been formed and organized under Philippine laws), The same principle is recognized in American law: that
making no distinction between the former and the latter the residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a
in so far as the terms "banking institutions" and "bank" residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate
are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the contrary functions . . .;" that it is considered as dwelling "in the
53
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

place where its business is done . . .," as being "located

where its franchises are exercised . . .," and as being
"present where it is engaged in the prosecution of the
corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation
licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any
country where it maintains an office or agent for
transaction of its usual and customary business for
venue purposes;" and that the "necessary element in its
signification is locality of existence." [Words and Phrases,
Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 493].

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in

Japan through its four duly registered branches at the
time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the
light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be
deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable
to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be
deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful
methods of serving process. 27

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it

by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the
processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees,

litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be
without merit. We find no evidence that would justify an
award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Nor is
an award for exemplary damages warranted. Under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code, before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory
damaged. There being no such proof presented by
NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be adjudged
in its favor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED,

and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but
REVERSED insofar as in sustained the trial court's
dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No.
83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered
ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY,
INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in
the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint
therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

54
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

substantive law explicitly granting foreign banks the

power to petition for the adjudication of a Philippine
corporation as a bankrupt. This is inconsequential, for
neither is there any legal provision expressly giving
STATE INC VS CITIBANK domestic banks the same power, although their capacity
to petition for insolvency can scarcely be disputed and is
Corporation Law; Foreign Corporation; Attachment; A not in truth disputed by petitioners. The law plainly
foreign corporation licitly doing business in the grants to a juridical person, whether it be a bank or not
Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not or it be a foreign or domestic corporation, as to natural
be considered a non-resident within the scope of the persons as well, such a power to petition for the
legal corporation authorizing attachment against a adjudication of bankruptcy of any person, natural or
defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.—This juridical, provided that it is a resident corporation and
Court itself has already had occasion to hold that a joins at least two other residents in presenting the
foreign corporation licitly doing business in the petition to the Bankruptcy Court.
Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not
be considered a non-resident within the scope of the NARVASA, J.:
legal provision authorizing attachment against a
defendant “not residing in the Philippine Islands;” in The chief question in the appeal at bar is whether or not
other words, a preliminary attachment may not be foreign banks licensed to do business in the Philippines,
applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands"
the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do within the meaning of Section 20 of the Insolvency Law
business in the Philippines—and is consequently and (Act No. 1956, as amended, eff. May 20, 1909) reading in
necessarily, “a party who resides out of the Philippines.” part as follows: 1
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party
not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides An adjudication of insolvency may be made on the
out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered petition of three or more creditors, residents of the
a party who does reside State Investment in the Philippine Islands, whose credits or demands accrued in
Philippines, who is a resident of the country. Be this as the Philippine Islands, and the amount of which credits
it may, this Court pointed out that: “x x Our laws and or demands are in the aggregate not less than one
jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign thousand pesos: Provided, that none of said creditors
corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the has become a creditor by assignment, however made,
status of domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. within thirty days prior to the filing of said petition. Such
1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance of
46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu; Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, the province or city in which the debtor resides or has
411) We think it would be entirely out of line with this his principal place of business, and must be verified by
policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign at least three (3) of the petitioners. . . .
corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property
to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has The foreign banks involved in the controversy are Bank
complied not only with every requirement of law made of America NT and SA, Citibank N.A. and Hongkong and
specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with Shanghai Banking Corporation. On December 11, 1981,
every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. they jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
xx.” a petition for involuntary insolvency of Consolidated
Mines, Inc. (CMI), which they amended four days later. 2
Same; Same; Insolvency Law; The law grants to a The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9263 and
juridical person as well as to natural persons the power assigned to Branch 28 of the Court.
to petition for the adjudication of bankruptcy of any
natural or judicial, provided it is a resident corporation. The petition for involuntary insolvency alleged:
—Neither can the Court accept the theory that the
omission by the banks in their petition for involuntary 1) that CMI had obtained loans from the three
insolvency of an explicit and categorical statement that petitioning banks, and that as of November/December,
they are “residents of the Philippine Islands,” is fatal to 1981, its outstanding obligations were as follows:
their cause. In truth, in light of the concept of resident
foreign corporations just expounded, when they alleged a) In favor of Bank of America (BA) P15,297,367.67
in that petition that they are foreign banking
corporations, licensed to do business in the Philippines, (as of December 10, 1981) US$ 4,175,831.88
and actually doing business in this country through
branch offices or agencies, they were in effect stating (b) In favor of Citibank US$ 4,920,548.85
that they are resident foreign corporations in the
Philippines. There is, of course, as petitioners argue, no (as of December 10, 1981)
55
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

4) the Court has no power to set aside the attachment

c) In favor of Hongkong & Shanghai Bank US$ issued in favor of intervenors-oppositors SIHI and SFCI.
5,389,434.12
CMI filed its Answer to the petition for insolvency,
(as of November 30, 1981); P6,233,969.24 asserting in the main that it was not insolvent, 4 and
later filed a "Motion to Dismiss Based on Affirmative
2) that in November, 1981, State Investment House, Inc. Defense of Petitioner's Lack of Capacity to Sue," echoing
(SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI) had the theory of SIHI and SFCI that the petitioner banks are
separately instituted actions for collection of sums of not "Philippine residents." 5 Resolution on the motion
money and damages in the Court of First Instance of was "deferred until after hearing of the case on the
Rizal against CMI, docketed respectively as Civil Cases merits" it appearing to the Court that the grounds
Numbered 43588 and 43677; and that on application of therefor did not appear to be indubitable. 6
said plaintiffs, writs of preliminary attachment had been
issued which were executed on "the royalty/profit SIHI and SFCI filed their own Answer-in-Intervention, 7
sharing payments due CMI from Benguet Consolidated and served on the three petitioner banks requests for
Mining, Inc;" and admission of certain facts in accordance with Rule 26 of
the Rules of Court, 8 receiving a response only from
3) that CMI had "committed specific acts of insolvency as Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 9
provided in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law, to wit:
SIHI and SFCI then filed a Motion for Summary
xxx xxx xxx Judgment dated May 23, 1983 "on the ground that,
based on the pleadings and admissions on record, the
5. that he (CMI) has suffered his (CMI's) property to trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate CMI
remain under attachment or legal process for three days insolvent since the petitioners (respondent foreign
for the purpose of hindering or delaying or defrauding banks) are not "resident creditors" of CMI as required
his (CMI's) creditors; under the Insolvency Law." 10 Oppositions to the motion
were filed, 11 to which a reply was submitted. 12
xxx xxx xxx
The Regional Trial Court 13 found merit in the motion
11. that being a merchant or tradesman he (CMI) has for summary judgment. By Order dated October 10,
generally defaulted in the payment of his (CMI's) current 1983, it rendered "summary judgment dismissing
obligations for a period of thirty days; . . . the . . . petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, with costs against petitioners." 14 It ruled that
The petition was opposed by State Investment House, on the basis of the "facts on record, as shown in the
Inc. (SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI). 3 It pleadings, motions and admissions of the parties, an
claimed that: insolvency court could "not acquire jurisdiction to
adjudicate the debtor as insolvent if the creditors
1) the three petitioner banks had come to court with petitioning for adjudication of insolvency are not
unclean hands in that they filed the petition for "residents" of the Philippines" — citing a decision of the
insolvency — alleging the CMI was defrauding its California Supreme Court which it declared "squarely
creditors, and they wished all creditors to share in its applicable especially considering that one of the sources
assets — although a few days earlier, they had "received of our Insolvency Law is the Insolvency Act of California
for the account of CMI substantial payments aggregating of 1895 . . . " And it declared that since petitioners had
P10,800,000.00;" been merely licensed to do business in the Philippines,
they could not be deemed residents thereof.
2) the Court had no jurisdiction because the alleged acts
of insolvency were false: the writs of attachment against The three foreign banks sought to take an appeal from
CMI had remained in force because there were "just, the Order of October 10, 1983. They filed a notice of
valid and lawful grounds for the(ir) issuance," and CMI appeal and a record on appeal. 15 SIHI and SFCI moved
was not a "merchant or tradesman" nor had it "generally to dismiss their appeal claiming it was attempted out of
defaulted in the payment of (its) obligations for a period time. The Trial Court denied the motion.
of thirty days . . . ;"
SIHI and SFCI filed with this Court a petition for
3) the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the certiorari and prohibition (G.R. NO. 66449), impugning
petition for insolvency because petitioners are not that denial. The Court dismissed the petition and
resident creditors of CMI in contemplation of the instead required the three banks to file a petition for
Insolvency Law; and review in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
16 This the banks did (their petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 66804). However, by Resolution dated May 16,
56
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

1984, the court referred the petition for review to the have been doing business in the Philippines for many
Intermediate Appellate Court, where it was docketed as years now;" that the authority granted to them by the
AC SP-03674. 17 Securities and Exchange Commission upon orders of the
Monetary Board "covers not only transacting banking
In the meantime, the Trial Court approved on May 3, business . . . but likewise maintaining suits "for recovery
1985 the banks' record on appeal and transmitted it to of any debt, claims or demand whatsoever," and that
this Court, where it was recorded as UDK-6866. As their petition for involuntary insolvency was "nothing
might have been expected, this Court required the banks more than a suit aimed at recovering a debt granted by
to file a petition for review under Rule 45, but they asked them to Consolidated Mines, Inc., or at least a portion
to be excused from doing so since they had already filed thereof;"
such a petition, which had been referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and was there pending as 4) that to deprive the foreign banks of their right to
AC-G.R. No. SP 03674, supra. This Court then also proceed against their debtors through insolvency
referred UDK-6866 to the Intermediate Appellate Court proceedings would "contravene the basic standards of
where it was docketed as AC-G.R. No. CV 07830. equity and fair play, . . . would discourage their
operations in economic development projects that create
Both referred cases, AC-G.R. No. SP 03674 and AC-G.R. not only jobs for our people but also opportunities for
No. CV 07830, were consolidated by Resolution of the advancement as a nation;" and
Court of Appeals dated April 9, 1986, and Decision
thereon was promulgated on July 14, 1987 by the 5) that the terms "residence" and "domicile" do not mean
Fifteenth Division of said Court. 18 the same thing, and that as regards a corporation, it is
generally deemed an "inhabitant" of the state under
The Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court's Order of whose law it is incorporated, and has a "residence"
October 10, 1983 and remanded the case to it for further wherever it conducts its ordinary business, and may
proceedings. It ruled: have its legal "domicile" in one place and "residence" in
another.
1) that the purpose of the Insolvency Law was "to convert
the assets of the bankrupt in cash for distribution SIHI and SFCI moved for reconsideration and then, when
among creditors, and then to relieve the honest debtor rebuffed, took an appeal to this Court. Here, they argue
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit that the Appellate Court's judgment should be reversed
him to start life anew, free from the obligations and because it failed to declare that —
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes;"
19 and that it was "crystal clear" that the law was 1) the failure of the three foreign banks to allege under
"designed not only for the benefit of the creditors but oath in their petition for involuntary insolvency that they
more importantly for the benefit of the debtor himself," are Philippine residents, wishing only to "be considered
the object being "to provide not only for the suspension Philippine residents," is fatal to their cause;
of payments and the protection of creditors but also the
discharge of insolvent honest debtors to enable them to 2) also fatal to their cause is their failure to prove, much
have a fresh start;" less allege, that under the domiciliary laws of the foreign
banks, a Philippine corporation is allowed the reciprocal
2) that the Trial Court had placed "a very strained and right to petition for a debtor's involuntary insolvency;
restrictive interpretation of the term "resident," as to
exclude foreign banks which have been operating in this 3) in fact and in law, the three banks are not Philippine
country since the early part of the century," and "the residents because:
better approach . . . would have been to harmonize the
provisions . . . (of the Insolvency Law) with similar a) corporations have domicile and residence only in the
provisions of other succeeding laws, like the Corporation state of their incorporation or in the place designated by
Code of the Philippines, the General Banking Act, the law, although for limited and exclusive purposes, other
Offshore Banking Law and the National Internal Revenue states may consider them as residents;
Code in connection with or related to their doing
business in the Philippines;" b) juridical persons may not have residence separate
from their domicile;
3) that in light of said statutes, the three banks "are in
truth and in fact considered as "residents" of the 4) actually, the non-resident status of the banks within
Philippines for purposes of doing business in the the context of the Insolvency Law is confirmed by other
Philippines and even for taxation matters;" laws;

4) that the banks had "complied with all the laws, rules 5) the license granted to the banks to do business in the
and regulations (for doing business in the country) and Philippines does not make them residents;
57
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

country operating in the Philippines shall be considered

6) no substantive law explicitly grants foreign banks the residents of the Philippines." 22
power to petition for the adjudication of the Philippine
corporation as a bankrupt; The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places
"branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign
7) the Monetary Board can not appoint a conservator or banks . . . (which are) called Philippine branches," in the
receiver for a foreign bank or orders its liquidation same category as "commercial banks, savings
having only the power to revoke its license, subject to associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural
such proceedings as the Solicitor General may thereafter banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have
deem proper to protect its creditors; been formed and organized under Philippine laws),
making no distinction between the former and the later
8) the foreign banks are not denied the right to collect in so far, as the terms "banking institutions" and "bank"
their credits against Philippine debtors, only the right to are used in the Act, 23 declaring on the contrary that in
"petition for the harsh remedy of involuntary insolvency" "all matters not specifically covered by special provisions
not being conceded to them; applicable only to foreign banks, or their branches and
agencies in the Philippines, said foreign banks or their
9) said banks have come to court with unclean hands, branches and agencies lawfully doing business in the
their filing of the petition for involuntary insolvency Philippines "shall be bound by all laws, rules, and
being an attempt to defeat validly acquired rights of regulations applicable to domestic banking corporations
domestic corporations. of the same class, except such laws, rules and
regulations as provided for the creation, formation,
The concept of a foreign corporation under Section 123 organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix the
of the Corporation Code is of "one formed, organized or relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of
existing under laws other than those of the Philippines members, stockholders or officers or corporations." 24
and . . . (which) laws allow Filipino citizens and
corporations to do business . . . ." There is no question This Court itself has already had occasion to hold 25
that the three banks are foreign corporations in this that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the
sence, with principal offices situated outside of the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not
Philippines. There is no question either that said banks be considered a non-resident within the scope of the
have been licensed to do business in this country and legal provision authorizing attachment against a
have in fact been doing business here for many years, defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands;" 26 in
through branch offices or agencies, including "foreign other words, a preliminary attachment may not be
currency deposit units;" in fact, one of them, Hongkong applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that
& Shanghai Bank has been doing business in the the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do
Philippines since as early as 1875. business in the Philippines — and is consequently and
necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines."
The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party
may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides
as that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law, out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered
supra, 20 or residents of the state under the laws of a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a
which they were respectively incorporated. The answer resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court
cannot be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which pointed out that:
contains no definition of the term, resident, or any clear
indication of its meaning. There are however other . . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
statutes, albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity, assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do
from which enlightening notions of the term may be business here, to the status of domestic corporations.
derived. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs.
Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu; Cong Eng vs.
The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely
term "'resident foreign corporation' applies to a foreign out of line with this policy should we make a
corporation engaged in trade or business within the discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the
Philippines," as distinguished from a " "non-resident petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
foreign corporation" . . . (which is one) not engaged in seizure by attachment when it has complied not only
trade or business within the Philippines." 21 with every requirement of law made specially of foreign
corporations, but in addition with every requirement of
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. law made of domestic corporations. . . . .
1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries, affiliation,
extension offices or any other units of corporation or Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations
juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the
58
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

status of domestic corporations," subsumes their being that they are resident foreign corporations in the
found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in Philippines.
the country.
There is, of course, as petitioners argue, no substantive
The same principle is recognized in American law: that law explicitly granting foreign banks the power to
the "residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a petition for the adjudication of a Philippine corporation
residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate as a bankrupt. This is inconsequential, for neither is
functions . . . ;" that it is .considered as dwelling "in the there any legal provision expressly giving domestic banks
place where its business is done . . . ," as being "located the same power, although their capacity to petition for
where its franchises are exercised . . . ," and as being insolvency can scarcely be disputed and is not in truth
"present where it is engaged in the prosecution of the disputed by petitioners. The law plainly grants to a
corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation juridical person, whether it be a bank or not or it be a
licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any foreign or domestic corporation, as to natural persons as
country where it maintains an office or agent for well, such a power to petition for the adjudication of
transaction of its usual and customary business for bankruptcy of any person, natural or juridical, provided
venue purposes;" and that the "necessary element in its that it is a resident corporation and joins at least two
signification is locality of existence." 27 Courts have held other residents in presenting the petition to the
that "a domestic corporation is regarded as having a Bankruptcy Court.
residence within the state at any place where it is
engaged in the particulars of the corporate enterprise, The petitioners next argue that "Philippine law is
and not only at its chief place or home office;" 28 that "a emphatic that only foreign corporations whose own laws
corporation may be domiciled in one state and resident give Philippine nationals reciprocal rights may do
in another; its legal domicil in the state of its creation business in the Philippines." As basis for the argument
presents no impediment to its residence in a real and they invoke Section 123 of the Corporation Code which,
practical sense in the state of its business activities." 29 however, does not formulate the proposition in the same
way. Section 123 does not say, as petitioners assert, that
The foregoing propositions are in accord with the it is required that the laws under which foreign
dictionary concept of residence as applied to juridical corporations are formed "give Philippine nationals,
persons, a term which appears to comprehend reciprocal rights." What it does say is that the laws of the
permanent as well as temporary residence. country or state under which a foreign corporation is
"formed, organized or existing . . . allow Filipino citizens
The Court cannot thus accept the petitioners' theory that and corporations to do business in its own country or
corporations may not have a residence (i.e., the place state," which is not quite the same thing. Now, it seems
where they operate and transact business) separate from to the Court that there can be no serious debate about
their domicile (i.e., the state of their formation or the fact that the laws of the countries under which the
organization), and that they may be considered by other three (3) respondent banks were formed or organized
states as residents only for limited and exclusive (Hongkong and the United States) do "allow Filipino
purposes. Of course, as petitioners correctly aver, it is citizens and corporations to do business" in their own
not really the grant of a license to a foreign corporation territory and jurisdiction. It also seems to the Court
to do business in this country that makes it a resident; quite apparent that the Insolvency Law contains no
the license merely gives legitimacy to its doing business requirement that the laws of the state under which a
here. What effectively makes such a foreign corporation foreign corporation has been formed or organized should
a resident corporation in the Philippines is its actually grant reciprocal rights to Philippine citizens to apply for
being in the Philippines and licitly doing business here, involuntary insolvency of a resident or citizen thereof.
"locality of existence" being, to repeat, the "necessary The petitioners' point is thus not well taken and need
element in . . . (the) signification" of the term, resident not be belabored.
corporation.
That the Monetary Board can not appoint a conservator
Neither can the Court accept the theory that the or receiver for a foreign bank or order its liquidation
omission by the banks in their petition for involuntary having only the power to revoke its license, subject to
insolvency of an explicit and categorical statement that such proceedings as the Solicitor General may thereafter
they are "residents of the Philippine Islands," is fatal to deem proper to protect its creditors, which is another
their cause. In truth, in light of the concept of resident point that petitioners seek to make, is of no moment. It
foreign corporations just expounded, when they alleged has no logical connection to the matter of whether or not
in that petition that they are foreign banking the foreign bank may properly ask for a judicial
corporations, licensed to do business in the Philippines, declaration of the involuntary insolvency of a domestic
and actually doing business in this Country through corporation, which is the issue at hand. The fact is, in
branch offices or agencies, they were in effect stating any event, that the law is not lacking in sanctions

59
SET 2 CASES CONFLICTS OF LAW

against foreign banks or powerless to protect the latter's other creditors of CMI." Non sequitur. It is in any case a
creditors. circumstance that the Bankruptcy Court may well take
into consideration in determining the manner and
The petitioners contend, too, that the respondent banks proportion by which the assets of the insolvent company
have come to court with unclean hands, their filing of shall be distributed among its creditors; but it should
the petition for involuntary insolvency being an attempt not be considered a ground for giving the petition for
to defeat validly acquired rights of domestic insolvency short shrift. Moreover, the payment adverted
corporations. The Court wishes to simply point out that to does not appear to be all that large. The total liabilities
the effects of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings of CMI to the three respondent banks as of December,
on all the creditors of the alleged bankrupt are clearly 1981 was P21,531,336.91, and US$14,485,814.85.
spelled out by the law, and will be observed by the Converted into Philippine currency at the rate of P7.899
Insolvency Court regardless of whatever motives — apart to the dollar, the average rate of exchange during
from the desire to share in the assets of the insolvent in December, 1981, 30 the dollar account would be
satisfying its credits — that the party instituting the P114,423,451.50. Thus, the aggregate liabilities of CMI
proceedings might have. to the banks, expressed in Philippine currency, was
P135,954,788.41 as of December, 1981, and therefore
Still another argument put forth by the petitioners is the payment to them of P6,010,800.00 constituted only
that the three banks' failure to incorporate their some 4.42% of the total indebtedness.
branches in the Philippines into new banks in
accordance with said Section 68 of the General Banking WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Act connotes an intention on their part to continue as challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is
residents of their respective states of incorporation and AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
not to be regarded as residents of the Philippines. The
argument is based on an incomplete and inaccurate SO ORDERED.
quotation of the cited Section. What Section 68 required
of a "foreign bank presently having branches and
agencies in the Philippines, . . . within one year from the
effectivity" of the General Banking Act, was to comply
with any of three (3) options, not merely with one sole
requirement. These three (3) options are the following:

1) (that singled out and quoted by the petitioners, i.e.:)

"incorporate its branch or branches into a new bank in
accordance with Philippine laws . . . ; or

2) "assign capital permanently to the local branch with

the concurrent maintenance of a 'net due to' head office
account which shall include all net amounts due to
other branches outside the Philippines in an amount
which when added to the assigned capital shall at all
times be not less than the minimum amount of capital
accounts required for domestic commercial banks under
section twenty-two of this Act;" or

3) "maintain a "net due to" head office account which

shall include all net amounts due to other branches
outside the Philippines, in an amount which shall not be
less than the minimum amount of capital accounts
required for domestic commercial banks under section
twenty-two of this Act."

The less said about this argument then, the better.

The petitioners allege that three days before respondent

banks filed their petition for involuntary insolvency
against CMI, they received from the latter substantial
payments on account in the aggregate amount of
P6,010,800.00, with the result that they were "preferred
in the distribution of CMI's assets thereby defrauding
60