The Wealth of Nations - Adam Smith PDF
The Wealth of Nations - Adam Smith PDF
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THE HARVARD CLASSICS
EDITED BY CHARLES W ELIOT LLD
WEALTH OF NATIONS
BY ADAM SMITH
EDITED BY C J BULLOCK PH D
Professor of Economics, Harvard University
VOLUME i0
CONTENTS
BOOK I
PAGE
Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Power of
Labour, and of the Order according to which its Prod
uce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks
of the People g
chap.
II.
I. Of the
the Division
Principleof Which
Labour Gives Occasion to the Division of, g
Labour ig
III. That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the
Market 24
IV. Of the Origin and Use of Money 29
V. Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities, or of Their
Price in Labour, and Their Price in Money 36
VI. Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities ... 50
VII. Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities .... 58
VIII. Of the bages of Labour 68
IX. Of the Profits of Stock 93
X. Of Wages and Profit in the Different Employments of Labour
and Stock i05
XL Of the Rent of Land i53
BOOK II
BOOK III
BOOK IV
III. Of the
of
Balance
Almost
Extraordinary
Is All
Supposed
Kinds,
Restraints
to
from
Be Those
Disadvantageous
upon the
Countries
Importation
with which
of Goods
the 370
BOOK V
of the people, or what has been the nature of those funds, which,
in different ages and nations, have supplied their annual con
sumption, is the object of these Four first Books. The Fifth and
last Book treats of the revenue of the sovereign, or common
wealth. In this book I have endeavoured to show; first. what
are the necessary expences of the sovereign, or commonwealth;
which of those expences ought to be defrayed by the general
contribution of the whole society; and which of them, by that
of some particular part only, or of some particular members of it :
secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole soci
ety may be made to contribute towards defraying the expences
incumbent on the whole society, and what are the principal
advantages and inconveniencies of each of those methods : and,
thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons and causes which have
induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part
of this revenue, or to contract debts, and what have been the
effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce
of the land and labour of the society.
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OP THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS
BOOK I
Of the Causes of Improvement In The Productive Power
of Labour And Of The Order According To Which
Its Produce Is Naturally Distributed Among
The Different Ranks Of The People.
CHAPTER I
Of the Division of Labour
THE greatest improvement in the productive powers of
labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and
judgment with which it is any where directed, or ap
plied,
The seem
effects
to of
have
the been
division
the of
effects
labour,
of in
thethe
division
generalofbusiness
labour.
weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all
join their different arts in order to complete even this homely
production. How many merchants and carriers, besides,
must have been employed in transporting the materials from
some of those workmen to others who often live in a very
distant part of the country ! how much commerce and navi
makers,
gation inrope-makers,
particular, how
must many
have been
ship-builders,
employed sailors,
in ordersail-
to
DIVISION OF LABOUR 17
bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer,
which often come from the remotest corners of the world !
What a variety of labour too is necessary in order to pro
duce the tools of the meanest of those workmen ! To say
nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the
sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver,
let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in
order to form that very simple machine, the shears with
which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder
of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the timber,
house,
the burner
the of
brick-maker,
the charcoalthe
to brick-layer,
be made use the
of inworkmen
the smelting-
who
r
20 WEALTH OF NATIONS
attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at
dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes
uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no
other means of engaging them to act according to his incli
nations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to
obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this
upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all
times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great
multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain
the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race
of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity,
is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion
for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has
almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it
is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their
self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their
own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes
to do this: Give me that which I want, and you shall have
this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer;
and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the
far greater part of those good offices which we stand in
need of.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves,
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk
to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. No
body but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benev
olence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not de
pend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people,
indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence.But
though this principle ultimately provides him with all the
necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does
nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them.
The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the
same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter,
and by purchase. With the money which one man gives
him he purchases food. The old cloaths which another bestows
ORIGIN OF DIVISION OF LABOUR 21
upon him he exchanges for other old cloaths which suit him
better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which
he can buy either food, cloaths, or lodging, as he has oc
casion.
As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we
obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual
good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same
trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the
division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a
particular person makes bows and arrows, for example,
with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He fre
quently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his
companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner
get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the
field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest,
therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his
chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another
excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts
or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this
way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner
with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest
to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become
a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third be
comes a smith or a brazier; a fourth a tanner or dresser of
hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages.
And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that
surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over
and above his own consumption, for such parts of the prod
uce of other men's labour as he may have occasion for,
encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occu
pation and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever
talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of
business.
The difference of natural talents in different men is, in
reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very dif
ferent genius which appears to distinguish men of different
professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many
occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of
labour. The difference between the most dissimilar char
acters, between a philosopher and a common street porter,
22 WEALTH OF NATIONS
for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as
from habit, custom, and education. When they came into
the world, and for the first six or eight years of their ex
istence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither
their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable
difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be
employed in very different occupations. The difference of
talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by
degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing
to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the
disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must
have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency
of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties
to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have
been no such difference of employment as could alone give
occasion to any great difference of talents.
As it is this disposition which forms that difference of
talents, so remarkable among men of different professions,
so it is this same disposition which renders that difference
useful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of
the same species, derive from nature a much more remark
able distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom
and education, appears to take place among men. By nature
a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different
from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a
greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's
dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all
of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another.
The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported
either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity
of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog.
The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want
of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, can
not be brought into a common stock, and do not in the
least contribute to the better accommodation and conven
iency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to sup
port and defend itself, separately and independently, and
derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents
with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among
men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of
ORIGIN OF DIVISION OF LABOUR 23
use to one another; the different produces of their respec
tive talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and
exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock,
where every man may purchase whatever part of the prod-
ace of other men's talents he has occasion for.
CHAPTER III
That the Division of Labour is Limited By The Extent
Of The Market
^
32 WEALTH OF NATIONS
and cheapest materials, which had, however, in their out
ward appearance, been made to resemble those metals. To
prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby
to encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has
been found necessary, in all countries that have made any
considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a pub
lic stamp upon certain quantities of such particular metals,
as were in those countries commonly made use of to pur
chase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of
those public offices called mints; institutions exactly of the
same nature with those of the aulnagers and stampmasters
of woollen and linen cloth. All of them are equally meant
to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity and
uniform goodness of those different commodities when
brought to market.
The first public stamps of this kind that were affixed to the
current metals, seem in many cases to have been intended
to ascertain, what it was both most difficult and most im
portant to ascertain, the goodness or fineness of the metal,
and to have resembled the sterling mark which is at present
affixed to plate and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which
is sometimes affixed to ingots of gold, and which being
struck only upon one side of the piece, and not covering the
whole surface, ascertains the fineness, but not the weight of
the metal. Abraham weighs to Ephron the four hundred
shekels of silver which he had agreed to pay for the field of
Machpelah. They are said, however, to be the current money
of the merchant, and yet are received by weight and not
by tale, in the same manner as ingots of gold and bars of
silver are at present. The revenues of the antient Saxon
kings of England are said to have been paid, not in money
but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts.
William the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying
them in money. This money, however, was, for a long time,
received at the exchequer, by weight and not by tale.
The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals
with exactness gave occasion to the institution of coins, of
which the stamp, covering entirely both sides of the piece
and sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain not
only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins,
ORIGIN: AND USE OF MONEY 33
therefore, were received by tale as at present, without the
trouble of weighing.
The denominations of those coins seem originally to have
expressed the weight or quantity of metal contained in them.
In the time of Servius Tullius, who first coined money at
Rome, the Roman As or Pondo contained a Roman pound
of good copper. It was divided in the same manner as our
Troyes pound, into twelve ounces, each of which contained
a real ounce of good copper. The English pound sterling
in the time of Edward I., contained a pound, Tower weight,
of silver of a known fineness. The Tower pound seems to
have been something more than the Roman pound, and some
thing less than the Troyes pound. This last was not intro
duced into the mint of England till the i8th of Henry VIII.
The French Iivre contained in the time of Charlemagne a
pound, Troyes weight, of silver of a known fineness. The
fair of Troyes in Champaign was at that time frequented by
all the nations of Europe, and the weights and measures of
so famous a market were generally known and esteemed.
The Scots money pound contained, from the time of Alex
ander the First to that of Robert Bruce, a pound of silver
of the same weight and fineness with the English pound ster
ling. English, French, and Scots pennies too, contained all
of them originally a real pennyweight of silver, the twen
tieth part of an ounce, and the two-hundred-and-fortieth part
of a pound. The shilling, too, seems originally to have been
the denomination of a weight. When wheat is at twelve shil
lings the quarter, says an antient statute of Henry III., then
wastel bread of a farthing shall weigh eleven shillings and
four pence. The proportion, however, between the shilling
and either the penny on the one hand, or the pound on the
other, seems not to have been so constant and uniform as
that between the penny and the pound. During the first race
of the kings of France, the French sou or shilling appears
upon different occasions to have contained five, twelve,
twenty, and forty pennies. Among the antient Saxons a
shilling appears at one time to have contained only five pen
nies, and it is not improbable that it may have been as varia
ble among them as among their neighbours, the antient
Franks. From the time of Charlemagne among the French.
34 WEALTH OF NATIONS
and from that of William the Conquerer among the English,
the proportion between the pound, the shilling, and the
penny, seems to have been uniformly the same as at present,
though the value of each has been very different. For in
every country of the world, I believe, the avarice and in
justice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confi
dence of their subjects, have by degrees diminished the real
quantity of metal, which had been originally contained in
their coins. The Roman As, in the latter ages of the Re
public, was reduced to the twenty- fourth part of its original
value, and, instead of weighing a pound, came to weigh only
half an ounce. The English pound and penny contain at
present about a third only ; the Scots pound and penny about
a thirty-sixth; and the French pound and penny about a
sixty-sixth part of their original value. By means of those
operations the princes and sovereign states which performed
them were enabled, in appearance, to pay their debts and to
fulfil their engagements with a smaller quantity of silver
than would otherwise have been requisite. It was indeed
in appearance only; for their creditors were really defrauded
of a part of what was due to them. All other debtors in the
state were allowed the same privilege, and might pay with
the same nominal sum of the new and debased coin what
ever they had borrowed in the old. Such operations,
therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor,
and ruinous to the creditor, and have sometimes pro
duced a greater and more universal revolution in the for
tunes of private persons, than could have been occasioned
by a very great public calamity.
It is in this manner that money has become in all civilized
nations the universal instrument of commerce, by the inter
vention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold, or
exchanged for one another.
What are the rules which men naturally observe in ex
changing them either for money or for one another, I shall
now proceed to examine. These rules determine what may
be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods.
The word value, it is to be observed, has two different
meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some par
ticular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other
ORIGIN AND USE OF MONEY 35
4'
64 WEALTH OF NATIONS
the extraordinary profit can last very little longer than they
are kept.
Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept
than secrets in trade. A dyer who has found the means of
producing a particular colour with materials which cost only
half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with
good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as
long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his pos
terity. His extraordinary gains arise from the high price
which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist
in the high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated
upon every part of his stock, and as their whole amount
bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are
commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the
effects of particular accidents, of which, however, the opera
tion may sometimes last for many years together.
Some natural productions require such a singularity of
soil and situation, that all the land in a great country, which
is fit for producing them, may not be sufficient to supply the
effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market,
therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to
give more than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land
which produced them, together with the wages of the labour,
and the profits of the stock which were employed in pre
paring and bringing them to market, according to their nat
ural rates. Such commodities may continue for whole cen
turies together to be sold at this high price ; and that part of
it which resolves itself into the rent of land is in this case
the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The
rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed
productions, like the rent of some vineyards in France of a
peculiarly happy soil and situation, bears no regular propor
tion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally well-cul
tivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour
and the profits of the stock employed in bringing such com
modities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their
natural proportion to those of the other employments of
labour and stock in their neighbourhood.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the
NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE 65
effect of natural causes which may hinder the effectual de
mand from ever being fully supplied, and which may con
tinue, therefore, to operate for ever.
A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trad
ing company has the same effect as a secret in trade or
manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market con
stantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual
demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price,
and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or
profit, greatly above their natural rate.
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest
which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free
competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be
taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any consid
erable time together. The one is upon every occasion the
highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which,
it is supposed, they will consent to give: The other is the
lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at
the same time continue their business.
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of appren
ticeship, and all those laws which restrain, in particular em
ployments, the competition to a smaller number than might
otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a
less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and
may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of
employments, keep up the market price of particular com
modities above the natural price, and maintain both the
wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed
about them somewhat above their natural rate.
Such enhancements of the market price may last as long
as the regulations of police which give occasion to them.
The market price of any particular commodity, though it
may continue long above, can seldom continue long below,
its natural price. Whatever part of it was paid below the
natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would
immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw
either so much land, or so much labour, or so much stock,
from being employed about it, that the quantity brought to
market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the
effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon
66 WEALTH OF NATIONS
The lowest class being not only overstocked with its own
workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes,
the competition for employment would be so great in it,
as to reduce the wages of labour to the most miserable and
scanty subsistence of the labourer. Many would not be able
to find employment even upon these hard terms, but would
either starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence either by
begging, or by the perpetration perhaps of the greatest enor
mities. Want, famine, and mortality would immediately pre
vail in that class, and from thence extend themselves to all
the superior classes, till the number of inhabitants in the
country was reduced to what could easily be maintained by
the revenue and stock which remained in it, and which had
escaped either the tyranny or calamity which had destroyed
the rest. This perhaps is nearly the present state of Bengal,
and of some other of the English settlements in the East
Indies. In a fertile country which had before been much
depopulated, where subsistence, consequently, should not be
very difficult, and where, notwithstanding, three or four
hundred thousand people die of hunger in one year, we may
be assured that the funds destined for the maintenance of the
labouring poor are fast decaying. The difference between
the genius of the British constitution which protects and
governs North America, and that of the mercantile company
which oppresses and domineers in the East Indies, cannot
perhaps be better illustrated than by the different state of
those countries.
The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the neces
sary effect, so it is the natural symptom of increasing na
tional wealth. The scanty maintenance of the labouring poor,
on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at
a stand, and their starving condition that they are going fast
backwards.
In Great Britain the wages of labour seem, in the present
times, to be evidently more than what is precisely necessary
to enable the labourer to bring up a family. In order to
satisfy ourselves upon this point it will not be necessary to
enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may
be the lowest sum upon which it is possible to do this. There
are many plain symptoms that the wages of labour are no
78 WEALTH OF NATIONS
f
88 WEALTH OF NATIONS
warded. As the colony increases, the profits of stock gradu
ally diminish. When the most fertile and best situated lands
have been all occupied, less profit can be made by the culti
vation of what is inferior both in soil and situation, and less
interest can be afforded for the stock which is so employed.
In the greater part of our colonies, accordingly, both the
legal and the market rate of interest have been considerably
reduced during the course of the present century. As riches,
improvement, and population have increased, interest has
declined. The wages of labour do not sink with the profits
of stock. The demand for labour increases with the increase
of stock whatever be its profits; and after these are dimin
ished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase
much faster than before. It is with industrious nations who
are advancing in the acquisition of riches, as with industrious
individuals. A great stock, though with small profits, gen
erally increases faster than a small stock with great profits.
Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got
a little, it is often easy to get more. The great difficulty is
to get that little. The connection between the increase of
stock and that of industry, or of the demand for useful
labour, has partly been explained already, but will be ex
plained more fully hereafter in treating of the accumulation
of stock.
The acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of
trade, may sometimes raise the profits of stock, and with
them the interest of money, even in a country which is fast
advancing in the acquisition of riches. The stock of the
country not being sufficient for the whole accession of busi
ness, which such acquisitions present to the different people
among whom it is divided, is applied to those particular
branches only which afford the greatest profit. Part of what
had before been employed in other trades, is necessarily with
drawn from them, and turned into some of the new and more
profitable ones. In all those old trades, therefore, the com
petition comes to be less than before. The market comes to
be less fully supplied with many different sorts of goods.
Their price necessarily rises more or less, and yields a
greater profit to those who deal in them, who can, therefore,
afford to borrow at a higher interest. For some time after
PROFITS OF STOCK 99
the conclusion of the late war, not only private people of
the best credit, but some of the greatest companies in Lon
don, commonly borrowed at five per cent. who before that
had not been used to pay more than four, and four and a half
per cent. The great accession both of territory and trade,
by our acquisitions in North America and the West Indies,
will sufficiently account for. this, without supposing any
diminution in the capital stock of the society. So great an
accession of new business to be carried on by the old stock,
must necessarily have diminished the quantity employed in a
great number of particular branches, in which the compe
tition being less, the profits must have been greater. I shall
hereafter have occasion to mention the reasons which dis
pose me to believe that the capital stock of Great Britain
was not diminished even by the enormous expence of the
late war.
The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of
the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, however,
as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of
stock, and consequently the interest of money. By the wages
of labour being lowered, the owners of what stock remains
in the society can bring their goods at less expence to market
than before, and less stock being employed in supplying the
market than before, they can sell them dearer. Their goods
cost them less, and they get more for them. Their profits,
therefore, being augmented at both ends, can well afford a
large interest. The great fortunes so suddenly and so easily '
acquired in Bengal and the other British settlements in the
East Indies, may satisfy us that, as the wages of labour are
very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined
countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In
Bengal, money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty,
fifty, and sixty per cent. and the succeeding crop is mortgaged
for the payment. As the profits which can afford such an
interest must eat up almost the whole rent of the landlord,
so such enormous usury must in its turn eat up the greater
part of those profits. Before the fall of the Roman republic,
a usury of the same kind seems to have been com
mon in the provinces, under the ruinous administration
of their proconsuls. The virtuous Brutus lent money in
100 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Cyprus at eight-and-forty per cent. as we learn from the
letters of Cicero.
In a country which had acquired that full complement of
riches which the nature of its soil and climate, and its situ
ation with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire;
which could, therefore, advance no further, and which was
not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the
profits of stock would probably be very low. In a country
fully peopled in proportion to what either its territory could
maintain or its stock employ, the competition for employ
ment would necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages
of labour to what was barely sufficient to keep up the number
of labourers, and, the country being already fully peopled,
that number could never be augmented. In a country fully
stocked in proportion to all the business it had to transact,
as great a quantity of stock would be employed in every par
ticular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would
admit. The competition, therefore, would every-where be
as great, and consequently the ordinary profit as low as
possible.
But perhaps no country has ever yet arrived at this degree
of opulence. China seems to have been long stationary, and
had probably long ago acquired that full complement of riches
which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institu
tions. But this complement may be much inferior to what,
with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, cli
mate, and situation might admit of. A country which neg
lects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the
vessels of foreign nations into one or two of its ports only,
cannot transact the same quantity of business which it might
do with different laws and institutions. In a country too,
where, though the rich or the owners of large capitals enjoy
a good deal of security, the poor or the owners of small
capitals enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence
of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the
inferior mandarines, the quantity of stock employed in all
the different branches of business transacted within it, can
never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business
might admit. In every different branch, the oppression of
ihe poor must establish the monopoly of the rich, who, by
PROFITS OF STOCK 101
engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to
make very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly is
said to be the common interest of money in China, and the
ordinary profits of stock must be sufficient to afford this
large interest.
A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of in
terest considerably above what the condition of the country,
as to wealth or poverty, would require. When the law does
not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts all bor
rowers nearly upon the same footing with bankrupts or
people of doubtful credit in better regulated countries. The
uncertainty of recovering his money makes the lender exact
the same usurious interest which is usually required from
bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who over-run the
western provinces of the Roman empire, the performance of
contracts was left for many ages to the faith of the con
tracting parties. The courts of justice of their kings seldom
intermeddled in it. The high rate of interest which took
place in those ancient times may perhaps be partly accounted
for from this cause.
When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not pre
vent it. Many people must borrow, and nobody will lend
without such a consideration for the use of their money as is
suitable, not only to what can be made by the use of it, but to
the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate
of interest among all Mahometan nations is accounted
for by Mr. Montesquieu, not from their poverty, but partly
from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the
money.
The lowest ordinary rate of profit must always be some
thing more than what is sufficient to compensate the occa
sional losses to which every employment of stock is ex
posed. It is this surplus only which is neat or clear profit.
What is called gross profit comprehends frequently, not only
this surplus, but what is retained for compensating such
extraordinary losses. The interest which the borrower can
afford to pay is in proportion to the clear profit only.
The lowest ordinary rate of interest must, in the same
manner, be something more than sufficient to compensate
the occasional losses to which lending, even with tolerable
102 WEALTH OF NATIONS
prudence, is exposed. Were it not more, charity or friend-
, ship could be the only motives for lending.
In a country which had acquired its full complement of
riches, where in every particular branch of business there
was the greatest quantity of stock that could be employed in
it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be very small,
so the usual market rate of interest which could be afforded
out of it, would be so low as to render it impossible for any
but the very wealthiest people to live upon the interest of
their money. All people of small or middling fortunes would
be obliged to superintend themselves the employment of their
own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every man
should be a man of business, or engage in some sort of trade.
The province of Holland seems to be approaching near to this
state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of business.
Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and
custom every where regulates fashion. As it is ridiculous
not to dress, so is it, in some measure, not to be employed,
like other people. As a man of a civil profession seems
awkward in a camp or a garrison, and is even in some danger
of being despised there, so does an idle man among men of
business.
The highest ordinary rate of profit may be such as, in the
price of the greater part of commodities, eats up the whole of
what should go to the rent of the land, and leaves only what
is sufficient to pay the labour of preparing and bringing them
to market, according to the lowest rate at which labour can
any-where be paid, the bare subsistence of the labourer. The
workman must always have been fed in some way or other
while he was about the work; but the landlord may not
always have been paid. The profits of the trade which the
servants of the East India Company carry on in Bengal may
not perhaps be very far from this rate.
The proportion which the usual market rate of interest
ought to bear to the ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily
varies as profit rises or falls. Double interest is in Great
Britain reckoned, what the merchants call, a good, moderate,
reasonable profit; terms which I apprehend mean no more
than a common and usual profit. In a country where the
ordinary rate of clear profit is eight or ten per cent., it may;
PROFITS OF STOCK 103
be reasonable that one half of it should go to interest,
wherever business is carried on with borrowed money. The
stock is at the risk of the borrower, who, as it were, insures
it to the lender ; and four or five per cent. may, in the greater
part of trades, be both a sufficient profit upon the risk of this
insurance, and a sufficient recompence for the trouble of
employing the stock. But the proportion between interest and
clear profit might not be the same in countries where the
ordinary rate of profit was either a good deal lower, or a
good deal higher. If it were a good deal lower, one half of
it perhaps could not be afforded for interest; and more might
be afforded if it were a good deal higher.
In countries which are fast advancing to riches, the low
rate of profit may, in the price of many commodities, com
pensate the high wages of labour, and enable those countries
to sell as cheap as their less thriving neighbours, among
whom the wages of labour may be lower.
In reality high profits tend much more to raise the price of
work than high wages. If in the linen manufacture, for ex
dressers,
ample, thethewages
spinners,
of the
the different
weavers, working
&c. should,
people,
all of the
them,
flax-
be
105
106 WEALTH OF NATIONS
PART I
Inequalities Arising From The Nature Of The Employments
themselves
r
108 WEALTH OF NATIONS
in the greater part it is quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour
to shew by and by. The laws and customs of Europe, there
fore, in order to qualify any person for exercising the one
species of labour, impose the necessity of an apprenticeship,
though with different degrees of rigour in different places.
They leave the other free and open to every body. During
the continuance of the apprenticeship, the whole labour of the
apprentice belongs to his master. In the mean time he must,
in many cases, be maintained by his parents or relations, and
in almost all cases must be cloathed by them. Some money
too is commonly given to the master for teaching him his
trade. They who cannot give money, give time, or become
bound for more than the usual number of years ; a considera
tion which, though it is not always advantageous to the
master, on account of the usual idleness of apprentices, is
always disadvantageous to the apprentice. In country labour,
on the contrary, the labourer, while he is employed about the
easier, learns the more difficult parts of his business, and his
own labour maintains him through all the different stages of
his employment. It is reasonable, therefore, that in Europe
the wages of mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, should
be somewhat higher than those of common labourers. They
are so accordingly, and their superior gains make them in
most places be considered as a superior rank of people. This
superiority, however, is generally very small; the daily or
weekly earnings of journeymen in the more common sorts
of manufactures, such as those of plain linen and woollen
cloth, computed at an average, are, in most places, very little
more than the day wages of common labourers. Their em
ployment, indeed, is more steady and uniform, and the su
periority of their earnings, taking the whole year together,
may be somewhat greater. It seems evidently, however, to
be no greater than what is sufficient to compensate the su
perior expence of their education.
Education in the ingenious arts and in the liberal profes
sions, is still more tedious and expensive. The pecuniary
recompence, therefore, of painters and sculptors, of lawyers
and physicians, ought to be much more liberal: and it is so
accordingly.
The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 109
easiness or difficulty of learning the trade in which it is em
ployed. All the different ways in which stock is commonly
employed in great towns seem, in reality, to be almost equally
easy and equally difficult to learn. One branch either of
foreign or domestic trade, cannot well be a much more intri
cate business than another.
Thirdly, The wages of labour in different occupations vary
with the constancy or inconstancy of employment.
Employment is much more constant in some trades than
in others. In the greater part of manufactures, a journey
man may be pretty sure of employment almost every day in
the year that he is able to work. A mason or bricklayer, on
the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul
weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon
the occasional calls of his customers. He is liable, in conse
quence, to be frequently without any. What he earns, there
fore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while
he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious
and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious
a situation must sometimes occasion. Where the computed
earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, accordingly,
are nearly upon a level with the day wages of common la
bourers, those of masons and bricklayers are generally from
one half more to double those wages. Where common
labourers earn four and five shillings a week, masons and
bricklayers frequently earn seven and eight ; where the former
earn six, the latter often earn nine and ten, and where the
former earn nine and ten, as in London, the latter commonly
earn fifteen and eighteen. No species of skilled labour, how
ever, seems more easy to learn than that of masons and
bricklayers. Chairmen in London, during the summer season,
are said sometimes to be employed as bricklayers. The high
wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the
recompence of their skill, as the compensation for the incon
stancy of their employment.
A house carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer
and more ingenious trade than a mason. In most places
however, for it is not universally so, his day-wages
are somewhat lower. His employment, though it depends
much, does not depend so entirely upon the occasional
110 WEALTH OF NATIONS
calls of his customers; and it is not liable to be interrupted
by the weather.
When the trades which generally afford constant employ
ment, happen in a particular place not to do so, the wages
of the workmen always rise a good deal above their ordinary
proportion to those of common labour. In London almost all
journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and dis
missed by their masters from day to day, and from week to
week, in the same manner as day-labourers in other places.
The lowest order of artificers, journeymen taylors, accord
ingly, earn there half a crown a day, though eighteen pence
may be reckoned the wages of common labour. In small
towns and country villages, the wages of journeymen taylors
frequently scarce equal those of common labour; but in
London they are often many weeks without employment, par
ticularly during the summer.
When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the
hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it some
times raises the wages of the most common labour above
those of the most skilful artificers. A collier working by the
piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about
double, and in many parts of Scotland about three times the
wages of common labour. His high wages arise altogether
from the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his
work. His employment may, upon most occasions, be as con
stant as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London exercise a
trade which in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness,
almost equals that of colliers; and from the unavoidable
irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of
the greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant. If
colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the
wages of common labour, it ought not to seem unreasonable
that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four and five times
those wages. In the enquiry made into their condition a
few years ago, it was found that af the rate at which they
were then paid, they could earn from six to ten shillings a
day. Six shillings are about four times the wages of com
mon labour in London, and in every particular trade, the
lowest common earnings may always be considered as those
of the far greater number. How extravagant soever those
NATURAL INEQUALITIES HI
earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to
compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business,
there would soon be so great a number of competitors as, in a
trade which has no exclusive privilege, would quickly reduce
them to a lower rate.
The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot effect
the ordinary profits of stock in any particular trade. Whether
the stock is or is not constantly employed depends, not upon
the trade, but the trader.
Fourthly, The wages of labour vary according to the small
or great trust which must be reposed in the workmen.
The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are every-where
superior to those of many other workmen, not only of equal,
but of much superior ingenuity; on account of the precious
materials with which they are intrusted.
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and
sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney.
Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a
very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such,
therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which
so important a trust requires. The long time and the great
expense which must be laid out in their education, when
combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still
further the price of their labour.
When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there
is no trust; and the credit which he may get from other
people, depends, not upon the nature of his trade, but upon
their opinion of his fortune, probity, and prudence. The
different rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches
of trade, cannot arise from the different degrees of trust re
posed in the traders.
Fifthly, The wages of labour in different employments
vary according to the probability or improbability of success
in them.
The probability that any particular person shall ever be
qualified for the employment to which he is educated, is very
different in different occupations. In the greater part of
mechanic trades, success is almost certain; but very uncer
tain in the liberal professions. Put your son apprentice to a
shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a
112 WEALTH OF NATIONS
pair of shoes : But send him to study law, it is at least twenty
to one if ever he makes such proficiency as will enable him to
live by the business. In a perfectly fair lottery, those who
draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who
draw the blanks. In a profession where twenty fail for one
that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have
been gained by the unsuccessful twenty. The counsellor at
law who, perhaps, at near forty years of age, begins to make
something by his profession, ought to receive the retribution,
not only of his own so tedious and expensive education, but
of that of more than twenty others who are never likely to
make any thing by it. How extravagant soever the fees
of counsellors at law may sometimes appear, their real retri
bution is never equal to this. Compute in any particular
place, what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely
to be annually spent, by all the different workmen in any
common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, and
you will find that the former sum will generally exceed the
latter. But make the same computation with regard to all the
counsellors and students of law, in all the different inns of
court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a
very small proportion to their annual expence, even though
you rate the former as high, and the latter as low, as can well
be done. The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from
being a perfectly fair lottery ; and that, as well as many other
liberal and honorable professions, is, in point of pecuniary
gain, evidently under-recompenced.
Those professions keep their level, however, with other
occupations and, notwithstanding these discouragements, all
the most generous and liberal spirits are eager to crowd into
them. Two different causes contribute to recommend them.
First, the desire of the reputation which attends, upon su
perior excellence in any of them; and, secondly, the natural
confidence which every man has more or less, not only in his
own abilities, but in his own good fortune.
To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at
mediocrity, is the most decisive mark of what is called genius
or superior talents. The public admiration which attends
upon such distinguished abilities, makes always a part of
their reward; a greater or smaller in proportion as it is
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 113
neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery;
or one in which the whole gain compensated the whole loss;
because the undertaker could make nothing by it. In the
state lotteries the tickets are really not worth the price which
is paid by the original subscribers, and yet commonly sell in
the market for twenty, thirty, and sometimes forty per cent.
advance. The vain hope of gaining some of the great prizes
is the sole cause of this demand. The soberest people scarce
look upon it as a folly to pay a small sum for the chance of
gaining ten or twenty thousand pounds ; though they know
that even that small sum is perhaps twenty or thirty per cent.
more than the chance is worth. In a lottery in which no
prize exceeded twenty pounds, though in other respects it
approached much nearer to a perfectly fair one than the
common state lotteries, there would not be the same demand
for tickets. In order to have a better chance for some of the
great prizes, some people purchase several tickets, and
others, small shares in a still greater number. There is not,
however, a more certain proposition in mathematics, than
that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more likely
you are to be a loser. Adventure upon all the tickets in the
lottery, and you lose for certain ; and the greater the number
of your tickets the nearer you approach to this certainty.
That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and
scarce ever valued more than it is worth, we may learn from
the very moderate profit of insurers. In order to make in
surance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at all, the com
mon premium must be sufficient to compensate the common
losses, to pay the expence of management, and to afford such
a profit as might have been drawn from an equal capital em
ployed in any common trade. The person who pays no more
than this, evidently pays no more than the real value of the
risk, or the lowest price at which he can reasonably expect
to insure it. But though many people have made a little
money by insurance, very few have made a great fortune;
and from this consideration alone, it seems evident enough,
that the ordinary balance of profit and loss is not more ad
vantageous in this, than in other common trades by which
so many people make fortunes. Moderate, however, as the
premium of insurance commonly is, many people despise the
NATURAL INEQUALITIES US
risk too much to care to pay it. Taking the whole kingdom
at an average, nineteen houses in twenty, or rather, perhaps,
ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from fire. Sea-risk
is more alarming to the greater part of people, and the pro
portion of ships insured to those not insured is much greater.
Many sail, however, at all seasons, and even in time of war,
without any insurance. This may sometimes perhaps be done
without any imprudence. When a great company, or even a
great merchant, has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they may,
as it were, insure one another. The premium saved upon
them all, may more than compensate such losses as they are
likely to meet with in the common course of chances. The
neglect of insurance upon shipping, however, in the same
manner as upon houses is, in most cases, the effect of no
such nice calculation, but of mere thoughtless rashness and
presumptuous contempt of the risk.
The contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of suc
cess, are in no period of life more active than at the age at
which young people chase their professions. How little the
fear of misfortune is then capable of balancing the hope
of good luck, appears still more evidently in the readiness
of the common people to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea,
than in the eagerness of those of better fashion to enter into
what are called the liberal professions.
What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. With
out regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never
enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war ; and though
they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to
themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions
of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These
romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their
pay is less than that of common laborers, and in actual serv
ice their fatigues are much greater.
The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous
as that of the army. The son of a creditable labourer or
artificer may frequently go to sea with his father's consent;
but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it. Other
people see some chance of his making something by the one
trade; nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing
by the other. The great admiral is less the object of public
116 WEALTH OF NATIONS
admiration than the great general, and the highest success
in the sea service promises a less brilliant fortune and repu
tation than equal success in the land. The same difference
runs through all the inferior degrees of preferment in both.
By the rules of precedency a captain in the navy ranks with
a colonel in the army : but he does not rank with him in the
common estimation. As the great prizes in the lottery are
less, the smaller ones must be more numerous. Common
sailors, therefore, more frequently get some fortune and pre
ferment than common soldiers; and the hope of those prizes
is what principally recommends the trade. Though their
skill and dexterity are much superior to that of almost any
artificer's, and though their whole life is one continual scene
of hardship and danger, yet for all this dexterity and skill,
for all those hardships and dangers, while they remain in
the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any
other recompence but the pleasure of exercising the one and
of surmounting the other. Their wages are not greater than
those of common laborers at the port which regulates the
rate of seamen's wages. As they are continually going from
port to port, the monthly pay of those who sail from all the
different ports of Great Britain, is more nearly upon a level
than that of any other workmen in those different places;
and the rate of the port to and from which the greatest
number sail, that is the port, of London, regulates that of
all the rest. At London the wages of the greater part of
the different classes of workmen are about double those of
the same classes at Edinburgh. But the sailors who sail from
the port of London seldom earn above three or four shil
lings a month more than those who sail from the port of
Leith, and the difference is frequently not so great. In time
of peace, and in the merchant service, the London price is
from a guinea to about seven-and-twenty shillings the cal
endar month. A common labourer in London, at the rate
of nine or ten shillings a month, may earn in the calendar
month from forty to five-and-forty shillings. The sailor,
indeed, over and above his pay, is supplied with provisions.
Their value, however, may not perhaps always exceed the
difference between his pay and that of the common labourer;
and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be clear
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 117
gain to the sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife
and family, whom he must maintain out of his wages at home.
The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adven
tures, instead of disheartening young people, seem frequently
to recommend a trade to them. A tender mother, among the
inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to send her son to
school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships and
the conversation and adventures of the sailors should entice
him to go to sea. The distant prospect of hazards, from
which we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and
address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the
wages of labour in any employment. It is otherwise with
those in which courage and address can be of no avail. In
trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages
of labour are always remarkably high. Unwholesomeness is
a species of disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages
of labour are to be ranked under that general head.
In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary
rate of profit varies more or less with the certainty or un
certainty of the returns. These are in general less uncertain
in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in some branches
of foreign trade than others; in the trade to North America,
for example, than in that to Jamaica. The ordinary rate of
profit always rises more or less with the risk. It does not,
however, seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as to com
pensate it completely. Bankruptcies are most frequent in
the most hazardous trades. The most hazardous of all trades,
that of a smuggler, though when the adventure succeeds it
is likewise the most profitable, is the infallible road to bank
ruptcy. The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here
as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many adven
turers into those hazardous trades, that their competition
reduces the profit below what is sufficient to compensate the
risk. To compensate it completely, the common returns
ought, over and above the ordinary profits of stock, not only
to make up for all occasional losses, but to afford a surplus
profit to the adventurers of the same nature with the profit
of insurers. But if the common returns were sufficient for
all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent in these
than in other trades.
118 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages
of labour, two only affect the profits of stock; the agree-
ableness or disagreeableness of the business, and the risk or
security with which it is attended. In point of agreeableness
or disagreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far
greater part of the different employments of stock; but a
great deal in those of labour; and the ordinary profit of
stock, though it rises with the risk, does not always seem
to rise in proportion to it. It should follow from all this,
that, in the same society or neighborhood, the average and
ordinary rates of profit in the different employments of stock
should be more nearly upon a level than the pecuniary wages
of the different sorts of labour. They are so accordingly.
The difference between the earnings of a common labourer
and those of a well employed lawyer or physician, is evi
dently much greater than that between the ordinary profits
in any two different branches of trade. The apparent dif
ference, besides, in the profits of different trades, is generally
a deception arising from our not always distinguishing what
ought to be considered as wages, from what ought to be con
sidered as profit.
Apothecaries' profit is become a bye-word, denoting some
thing uncommonly extravagant. This great apparent profit,
however, is frequently no more than the reasonable wages
of labour. The skill of an apothecary is a much nicer and
more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever;
and the trust which is reposed in him is of much greater
importance. He is the physician of the poor in all cases,
and of the rich when the distress or danger is not very great.
His reward, therefore, ought to be suitable to his skill and
his trust, and it arises generally from the price at which he
sells his drugs. But the whole drugs which the best em
ployed apothecary, in a large market town, will sell in a
year, may not perhaps cost him above thirty or forty pounds.
Though he should sell them, therefore, for three or four
hundred, or at a thousand per cent. profit, this may frequently
be no more than the reasonable wages of his labour charged,
in the only way in which he can charge them, upon the price
of his drugs. The greater part of the apparent profit is real
wages disguised in the garb of profit.
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 119
In a small sea-port town, a little grocer will make forty
or fifty per cent. upon a stock of a single hundred pounds,
while a considerable wholesale merchant in the same place
will scarce make eight or ten per cent. upon a stock of ten
thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for
the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of
the market may not admit the employment of a larger cap
ital in the business. The man, however, must not only live
by his trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which
it requires. Besides possessing a little capital, he must be
able to read, write, and account, and must be a tolerable
judge too of, perhaps, fifty or sixty different sorts of goods,
their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be
had cheapest. He must have all the knowledge, in short,
that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders
him from becoming but the want of sufficient capital. Thirty
or forty pounds a year cannot be considered as too great a
recompence for the labour of a person so accomplished. De
duct this from the seemingly great profits of his capital, and
little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits
of stock. The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this
case too, real wages.
The difference between the apparent profit of the retail
and that of the wholesale trade, is much less in the capital
than in small towns and country villages. Where ten thou
sand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade, the wages
of the grocer's labour make but a very trifling addition to
the real profits of so great a stock. The apparent profits of
the wealthy retailer, therefore, are there more nearly upon a
level with those of the wholesale merchant. It is upon this
account that goods sold by retail are generally as cheap and
frequently much cheaper in the capital than in small towns
and country villages. Grocery goods, for example, are gen
erally much cheaper; bread and butcher's meat frequently as
cheap. It costs no more to bring grocery goods to the great
town than to the country village ; but it costs a great deal
more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them
must be brought from a much greater distance. The prime
cost of grocery goods, therefore, being the same in both
places, they are cheapest where the least profit is charged
120 WEALTH OF NATIONS
upon them. The prime cost of bread and butcher's meat is
greater in the great town than in the country village; and
though the profit is less, therefore they are not always
cheaper there, but often equally cheap. In such articles as
bread and butcher's meat, the same cause, which diminishes
apparent profit, increases prime cost. The extent of the
market, by giving employment to greater stocks, diminishes
apparent profit ; but by requiring supplies from a greater dis
tance, it increases prime cost. This diminution of the one
and increase of the other seem, in most cases, nearly to
counter-balance one another; which is probably the reason
that, though the prices of corn and cattle are commonly very
different in different parts of the kingdom, those of bread
and butcher's meat are generally very nearly the same
through the greater part of it.
Though the profits of stock both in the wholesale and re
tail trade are generally less in the capital than in small towns
and country villages, yet great fortunes are frequently ac
quired from small beginnings in the former, and scarce ever
in the latter. In small towns and country villages, on account
of the narrowness of the market, trade cannot always be ex
tended as stock extends. In such places, therefore, though
the rate of a particular person's profits may be very high, the
sum or amount of them can never be very great, nor conse
quently that of his annual accumulation. In great towns, on
the contrary, trade can be extended as stock increases, and
the credit of a frugal and thriving man increases much faster
than his stock. His trade is extended in proportion to the
amount of both, and the sum or amount of his profits is in
proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual accumu
lation in proportion to the amount of his profits. It seldom
happens, however, that great fortunes are made even in
great towns by any one regular, established, and well-known
branch of business, but in consequence of a long life of in
dustry, frugality, and attention. Sudden fortunes, indeed,
are sometimes made in such places by what is called the
trade of speculation. The speculative merchant exercises
no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business.
He is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the
next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea merchant the year after.
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 121
He enters into every trade when he foresees that it is likely
to be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when
he foresees that its profits are likely to return to the level
of other trades. His profits and losses, therefore, can bear
no regular proportion to those of any one established and
well-known branch of business. A bold adventurer may
sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or three
successful speculations; but is just as likely to lose one by
two or three unsuccessful ones. This trade can be carried
on no where but in great towns. It is only in places of the
most extensive commerce and correspondence that the intel
ligence requisite for it can be had.
The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occa
sion considerable inequalities in the wages of labour and
profits of stock, occasion none in the whole of the advantages
and disadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different em
ployments of either. The nature of those circumstances is
such, that they make up for a small pecuniary gain in some,
and counter-balance a great one in others.
In order, however, that this equality may take place in the
whole of their advantages or disadvantages, three things are
requisite even where there is the most perfect freedom.
First, the employments must be well known and long estab
lished in the neighborhood; secondly, they must be in their
ordinary, or what may be called their natural state; and,
thirdly, they must be the sole or principal employments of
those who occupy them.
First, this equality can take place only in those employ
ments which are well known, and have been long established
in the neighbourhood.
Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are gen
erally higher in new than in old trades. When a projector
attempts to establish a new manufacture, he must at first
entice his workmen from other employments by higher wages
than they can either earn in their own trades, or than the
nature of his work would otherwise require, and a consid
erable time must pass away before he can venture to reduce
them to the common level. Manufactures for which the
demand arises altogether from fashion and fancy, are con
tinually changing, and seldom last long enough to be con
122 WEALTH OP NATIONS
sidered as old established manufactures. Those, on the con
trary, for which the demand arises chiefly from use or
necessity, are less liable to change, and the same form or
fabric may continue in demand for whole centuries to
gether. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be
higher in manufactures of the former, than in those of
the latter kind. Birmingham deals chiefly in manu
factures of the former kind ; Sheffield in those of the latter ;
and the wages of labour in those two different places, are
said to be suitable to this difference in the nature of their
manufactures.
The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new
branch of commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture,
is always a speculation, from which the projector promises
himself extraordinary profits. These profits sometimes are
very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they
are quite otherwise ; but in general they bear no regular
proportion to those of other old trades in the neighbourhood.
If the project succeeds, they are commonly at first very high.
When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly established
and well known, the competition reduces them to the level
of other trades.
Secondly, This equality in the whole of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different employments of labour and
stock, can take place only in the ordinary, or what may be
called the natural state of those employments.
The demand for almost every different species of labour
is sometimes greater and sometimes less than usual. In the
one case the advantages of the employment rise above, in
the other they fall below the common level. The demand
for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest, than
during the greater part of the year; and wages rise with the
demand. In time of war, when forty or fifty thousand sailors
are forced from the merchant service into that of the king,
the demand for sailors to merchant ships necessarily rises
with their scarcity, and their wages upon such occasions
commonly rise from a guinea and seven-and-twenty shillings,
to forty shillings and three pounds a month. In a decaying
manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rathel than
quit their old trade, are contented with smaller wages than
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 123
would otherwise be suitable to the nature of their employ
ment.
The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities
in which it is employed. As the price of any commodity
rises above the ordinary or average rate, the profits of at
least some part of the stock that is employed in bringing it
to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they
sink below it. All commodities are more or less liable to
variations of price, but some are much more so than others.
In all commodities which are produced by human industry,
the quantity of industry annually employed is necessarily reg
ulated by the annual demand, in such a manner that the
average annual produce may, as nearly as possible, be equal
to the average annual consumption. In some employments,
it has already been observed, the same quantity of industry
will always produce the same, or very nearly the same quan
tity of commodities. In the linen or woollen manufactures,
for example, the same number of hands will annually work
up very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth.
The variations in the market price of such commodities,
therefore, can arise only from some accidental variation in
the demand. A public mourning raises the price of black
cloth. But as the demand for most sorts of plain linen and
woollen cloth is pretty uniform, so is likewise the price. But
there are other employments in which the same quality of
industry will not always produce the same quantity of com
modities. The same quantity of industry, for example, will,
in different years, produce very different quantities of corn,
wine, hops, sugar, tobacco, &c. The price of such commodi
ties, therefore, varies not only with the variations of demand,
but with the much greater and more frequent variations of
quantity, and is consequently extremely fluctuating. But the
profit of some of the dealers must necessarily fluctuate with
the price of the commodities. The operations of the specu
lative merchant are principally employed about such com
modities. He endeavours to buy them up when he foresees
that their price is likely to rise, and to sell them when it is
likely to fall.
Thirdly, This equality in the whole of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different employments of labour and
124 WEALTH OF NATIONS
stock, can take place only in such as are the sole or principal
employments of those who occupy them.
When a person derives his subsistence from one employ
ment, which does not occupy the greater part of his time; in
the intervals of his leisure he is often willing to work at an
other for less wages than would otherwise suit the nature
of the employment.
There still subsists in many parts of Scotland a set of
people called Cotters or Cottagers, though they were more
frequent some years ago than they are now. They are a
sort of out-servants of the landlords and farmers. The usual
reward which they receive from their masters is a house, a
small garden for pot herbs, as much grass as will feed a
cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable land. When
their master has occasion for their labour, he gives them,
besides, two pecks of oatmeal a week, worth about sixteen
pence sterling. During a great part of the year he has little
or no occasion for their labour, and the cultivation of their
own little possession is not sufficient to occupy the time
which is left at their own disposal. When such occupiers
were more numerous than they are at present, they are said
to have been willing to give their spare time for a very small
recompence to any body, and to have wrought for less wages
than other labourers. In ancient times they seem to have
been common all over Europe. In countries ill cultivated
and worse inhabited, the greater part of landlords and
farmers could not otherwise provide themselves with the
extraordinary number of hands, which country labour re
quires at certain seasons. The daily or weekly recompence
which such labourers occasionally received . from their
masters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour.
Their small tenement made a considerable part of it. This
daily or weekly recompence, however, seems to have been
considered as the whole of it, by many writers who have
collected the prices of labour and provisions in ancient times,
and who have taken pleasure in representing both as wonder
fully low.
The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to
market than would otherwise be suitable to its nature. Stock
ings in many parts of Scotland are knit much cheaper than
NATURAL INEQUALITIES 125
they can any-where be wrought upon the loom. They are
the work of servants and labourers, who derive the principal
part of their subsistence from some other employment. More
than a thousand pair of Shetland stockings are annually im
ported into Leith, of which the price is from five pence to
seven pence a pair. At Learwick, the small capital of the
Shetland islands, ten pence a day, I have been assured, is a
common price of common labour. In the same islands they
knit worsted stockings to the value of a guinea a pair and
upwards.
The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly
in the same way as the knitting of stockings, by servants who
are chiefly hired for other purposes. They earn but a very
scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get their whole liveli
hood by either of those trades. In most parts of Scotland
she is a good spinner who can earn twenty pence a week.
In opulent countries the market is generally so extensive,
that any one trade is sufficient to employ the whole labour
and stock of those who occupy it. Instances of people's
living by one employment, and at the same time deriving
some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor
countries. The following instance, however, of something
of the same kind is to be found in the capital of a very rich
one.
rent isThere
dearer
is no
than
cityin inLondon,
Europe,and
I believe,
yet I know
in which
no capital
house-
PART II
Inequalities Occasioned By The Policy of Europe
Such are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages
and disadvantages of the different employments of labour
and stock, which the defect of any of the three requisites
above-mentioned must occasion, even where there is the most
perfect liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not leaving
things at perfect liberty, occasions other inequalities of much
greater importance.
It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by
restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller
number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them;
secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what it naturally
would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of
labour and stock, both from employment to employment and
from place to place.
First, The Policy of Europe occasions a very important
inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different employments of labour and stock, by restrain
ing the competition in some employments to a smaller num
ber than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them.
The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal
means it makes use of for this purpose.
The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade neces
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 127
sarily restrains the competition, in the town where it is
established, to those who are free of the trade. To have
served an apprenticeship in the town under a master properly
qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining
this freedom. The bye-laws of the corporation regulate
sometimes the number of apprentices which any master is
allowed to have, and almost always the number of years
which each apprentice is obliged to serve. The intention of
both regulations is to restrain the competition to a much
smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter
into the trade. The limitation of the number of apprentices
restrains it directly. A long term of apprenticeship restrains
it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing the ex-
pence of education.
In Sheffield no master cutler can have more than one ap
prentice at a time, by a bye-law of the corporation. In
Norfolk and Norwich no master weaver can have more
than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds
a month to the king. No master hatter can have more than
two apprentices any-where in England, or in the English
plantations, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a month,
half to the king, and half to him who shall sue in any court
of record. Both these regulations, though they have been
confirmed by a public law of the kingdom, are evidently
dictated by the same corporation spirit which enacted the
bye-law of Sheffield. The silk weavers in London had
scarce been incorporated a year when they enacted a bye-
law, restraining any master from having more than two
apprentices at a time. It required a particular act of par
liament to rescind this bye-law.
Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe,
the usual term established for the duration of apprentice
ships in the greater part of incorporated trades. All
such incorporations were anciently called universities; which
indeed is the proper Latin name for any incorporation what
ever. The university of smiths, the university of taylors, &c.
are expressions which we commonly meet with in the old
charters of ancient towns. When those particular incorpora
tions which are now peculiarly called universities were first
established, the term of years which it was necessary to
128 WEALTH OF NATIONS
'
130 WEALTH OF NATIONS
proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may
surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers whose
interest it go much concerns. The affected anxiety of the
law-giver lest they should employ an improper person, is evi
dently as impertinent as it is oppressive.
The institution of long apprenticeships can give no secur
ity that insufficient workmanship shall not frequently be ex
posed to public sale. When this is done it is generally the
effect of fraud, and not of inability ; and the longest appren
ticeship can give no security against fraud. Quite different
regulations are necessary to prevent this abuse, The sterling
mark upon plate, and the stamps upon linen and woollen
cloth, give the purchaser much greater security than any
statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks at these, but
never thinks it worth while to enquire whether the workmen
had served a seven years' apprenticeship.
The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to
form young people to industry. A journeyman who works
by the piece is likely to be industrious, because he derives a
benefit from every exertion of his industry. An apprentice
is likely to be idle, and almost always is so, because he has
no immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior em
ployments, the sweets of labour consist altogether in the
recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a condition
to enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest to conceive a
relish for it, and to acquire the early habit of industry, A
young man naturally conceives an aversion to labour, when
for a long time he receives no benefit from it. The boys who
are put out apprentices from public charities are generally
bound for more than the usual number of years, and they
generally turn out very idle and worthless.
Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients.
The reciprocal duties of master and apprentice make a con
siderable article in every modern code. The Roman law is
perfectly silent with regard to them. I know no Greek or
Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that there
is none) which expresses the idea we now annex to the word
Apprentice, a servant bound to work at a particular trade for
the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon condi
tion that the master shall teach him that trade.
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 131
Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The
arts, which are much superior to common trades, such as
those of making clocks and watches, contain no such mystery
as to require a long course of instruction. The first inven
tion of such beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of
some of the instruments employed in making them, must, no
doubt, have been the work of deep thought and long time,
and may justly be considered as among the happiest efforts
of human ingenuity. But when both have been fairly in
vented and are well understood, to explain to any young man,
in the completest manner, how to apply the instruments and
how to construct the machines, cannot well require more
than the lessons of a few weeks : perhaps those of a few days
might be sufficient. In the common mechanic trades, those
of a few days might certainly be sufficient. The dexterity
of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired
without much practice and experience. But a young man
would practise with much more diligence and attention, if
from the beginning he wrought as a journeyman, being paid
in proportion to the little work which he could execute, and
paying in his turn for the materials which he might some
times spoil through awkwardness and inexperience. His
education would generally in this way be more effectual,
and always less tedious and expensive. The master, indeed,
would be a loser. He would lose all the wage of the appren
tice, which he now saves, for seven years together. In the
end, perhaps, the apprentice himself would be a loser. In a
trade so easily learnt he would have more competitors, and
his wages, when he came to be a complete workman, would
be much less than at present. The same increase of com
petition would reduce the profits of the masters as well as
the wages of the workmen. The trades, the crafts, the mys
teries, would all be losers. But the public would be a gainer,
the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper
to market.
It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently
of wages and profit, by restraining that free competition
which would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations,
and the greater part of corporation laws, have been estab
lished. In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in
132 WEALTH OF NATIONS
ancient times was requisite in many parts of Europe, but that
of the town corporate in which it was established. In Eng
land, indeed, a charter from the king was likewise necessary.
But this prerogative of the crown seems to have been re
served rather for extorting money from the subject, than for
the defence of the common liberty against such oppressive
monopolies. Upon paying a fine to the king, the charter
seems generally to have been readily granted ; and when any
particular class of artificers or traders thought proper to act
as a corporation without a charter, such adulterine guilds,
as they were called, were not always disfranchised upon that
account, but obliged to fine annually to the king for permis
sion to exercise their usurped privileges. The immediate in
spection of all corporations, and of the bye-laws which they
might think proper to enact for their own government, be
longed to the town corporate in which they were established ;
and whatever discipline was exercised over them, proceeded
commonly, not from the king, but from that greater incor
poration of which those subordinate ones were only parts
or members.
The government of towns corporate was altogether in the
hands of traders and artificers; and it was the manifest in
terest of every particular class of them, to prevent the mar
ket from being over-stocked, as they commonly express it,
with their own particular species of industry; which is in
reality to keep it always under-stocked. Each class was
eager to establish regulations proper for this purpose, and,
provided it was allowed to do so, was willing to consent that
every other class should do the same. In consequence of
such regulations, indeed, each class was' obliged to buy the
goods they had occasion for from every other within the
town, somewhat dearer than they otherwise might have done.
But in recompence, they were enabled to sell their own just
as much dearer; so that so far it was as broad as long, as
they say; and in the dealings of the different classes within
the town with one another, none of them were losers by these
regulations. But in their dealings with the country they
were all great gainers; and in these latter dealings consists
the whole trade which supports and enriches every town.
Every town draws its whole subsistence, and all the ma
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 133
terials of its industry, from the country. It pays for these
chiefly in two ways: first, by sending back to the country a
part of those materials wrought up and manufactured; in
which case their price is augmented by the wages of the '
workmen, and the profits of their masters or immediate em
ployers : secondly, by sending to it a part both of the rude
and manufactured produce, either of other countries, or of
distant parts of the same country, imported into the town;
in which case too the original price of those goods is aug
mented by the wages of the carriers or sailors, and by the
profits of the merchants who employ them. In what is
gained upon the first of those two branches of commerce, con
sists the advantage which the town makes by its manufac
tures ; in what is gained upon the second, the advantage of its
inland and foreign trade. The wages of the workmen, and
the profits of their different employers, make up the whole
of what is gained upon both. Whatever regulations, there
fore, tend to increase those wages and profits beyond what
they otherwise would be, tend to enable the town to pur
chase, with a smaller quantity of its labour, the produce of
a greater quantity of the labour of the country. They give
the traders and artificers in the town an advantage over the
landlords, farmers, and labourers in the country, and break
down that natural equality which would otherwise take place
in the commerce which is carried on between them. The
whole annual produce of the labour of the society is annually
divided between those two different sets of people. By
means of those regulations a greater share of it is given to
the inhabitants of the town than would otherwise fall to
them ; and a less to those of the country.
The price which the town really pays for the provisions
and materials annually imported into it, is the quantity of
manufactures and other goods annually exported from it.
The dearer the latter are sold, the cheaper the former are
bought. The industry of the town becomes more, and that
of the country less advantageous.
That the industry which is carried on in towns is, every
where in Europe, more advantageous than that which is car
ried on in the country, without entering into any very nice
computations, we may satisfy ourselves by one very simple
134 WEALTH OF NATIONS
and obvious observation. In every country of Europe we
find, at least, a hundred people who have acquired great for
tunes from small beginnings by trade and manufactures, the
industry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has
done so by that which properly belongs to the country, the
raising of rude produce by the improvement and cultivation
of land. Industry, therefore, must be better rewarded, the
wages of labour and the profits of stock must evidently be
greater in the one situation than in the other. But stock and
labour naturally seek the most advantageous employment.
They naturally, therefore, resort as much as they can to the
town, and desert the country.
The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place,
can easily combine together. The most insignificant trades
carried on in towns have accordingly, in some place or other,
been incorporated ; and even where they have never been in
corporated, yet the corporation spirit, the jealousy of
strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to communi
cate the secret of their trade, generally prevail in them, and
often teach them, by voluntary associations and agreements,
to prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit
by bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number
of hands, run most easily into such combinations. Half a
dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary to keep a thou
sand spinners and weavers at work. By combining not to
take apprentices they can not only engross the employment,
but reduce the whole manufacture into a sort of slavery to
themselves, and raise the price of their labour above what is
due to the nature of their work.
The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places,
cannot easily combine together. They have not only never
been incorporated, but the corporation spirit never has pre
vailed among them. No apprenticeship has ever been
thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the great trade
of the country. After what are called the fine arts, and the
liberal professions, however, there is perhaps no trade which
requires so great a variety of knowledge and experience.
The innumerable volumes which have been written upon it
in all languages, may satisfy us, that among the wisest and
most learned nations, it has never been regarded as a matter
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 135
very easily understood. And from all those volumes we
shall in vain attempt to collect that knowledge of its various
and complicated operations, which is commonly possessed
even by the common farmer ; how contemptuously soever
the very contemptible authors of some of them may some
times affect to speak of him. There is scarce any common
mechanic trade, on the contrary, of which all the operations
may not be as completely and distinctly explained in a pam
phlet of a very few pages, as it is possible for words illus
trated by figures to explain them. In the history of the
arts, now publishing by the French academy of sciences,
several of them are actually explained in this manner. The
direction of operations, besides, which must be varied with
every change of the weather, as well as with many other
accidents, requires much more judgment and discretion, than
of those which are always the same or very nearly the same.
Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of
the operations of husbandry, but many inferior branches of
country labour, require much 'more skill and experience than
the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who works
upon brass and iron, works with instruments and upon ma
terials of which the temper is always the same, or very
nearly the same, But the man who ploughs the ground
with a team of horses or oxen, works with instruments of
which the health, strength, and temper, are very different
upon different occasions. The condition of the materials
which he works upon too is as variable as that of the in*
struments which he works with, and both require to be man
aged with much judgment and discretion. The common plough
man, though generally regarded as the pattern of stupidity
and ignorance, is seldom defective in this judgment and dis
cretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse
than the mechanic who lives in a town. His voice and lan
guage are more uncouth and more difficult to be understood
by those who are not used to them. His understanding,
however, being accustomed to consider a greater variety of
objects, is generally much superior to that of the other, whose
whole attention from morning till night is commonly occu
pied in performing one or two very simple operations. How
much the lower ranks of people in the country are really
136 WEALTH OF NATIONS
superior to those of the town, is well known to every man
whom either business or curiosity has led to converse with
both. In China and Indostan accordingly both the rank and
the wages of country labourers are said to be superior to
those of the greater part of artificers and manufacturers.
They would probably be so every-where, if corporation laws
and the corporation spirit did not prevent it.
The superiority which the industry of the towns has every
where in Europe over that of the country, is not altogether
owing to corporations and corporation laws. It is sup
ported by many other regulations. The high duties upon
foreign manufactures and upon all goods imported by alien
merchants, all tend to the same purpose. Corporation laws
enable the inhabitants of towns to raise their prices, with
out fearing to be under-sold by the free competition of their
own countrymen. Those other regulations secure them
equally against that of foreigners. The enhancement of
price occasioned by both is every-where finally paid by the
landlords, farmers, and labourers of the country, who have
seldom opposed the establishment of such monopolies. They
have commonly neither inclination nor fitness to enter into
combinations; and the clamour and sophistry of merchants
and manufacturers easily persuade them that the private in
terest of a part, and of a subordinate part of the society, is
the general interest of the whole.
In Great Britain the superiority of the industry of the
towns over that of the country, seems to have been greater
formerly than in the present times. The wages of country
labour approach nearer to those of manufacturing labour,
and the profits of stock employed in agriculture to those of
trading and manufacturing stock, than they are said to have
done in the last century, or in the beginning of the present.
This change may be regarded as the necessary, though very
late consequence of the extraordinary encouragement given
to the industry of the towns. The stock accumulated in
them comes in time to be so great, that it can no longer be
employed with the ancient profit in that species of industry
which is peculiar to them. That industry has its limits like
every other; and the increase of stock, by increasing the
competition, necessarily reduces the profit. The lowering of
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 137
profit in the town forces out stock to the country, where, by
creating a new demand for country labour, it necessarily
raises its wages. It then spreads itself, if I may say so,
over the face of the land, and by being employed in agricul
ture is in part restored to the country, at the expence of
which, in a great measure, it had originally been accumu
lated in the town. That every-where in Europe the great
est improvements of the country have been owing to such
overflowings of the stock originally accumulated in the towns,
I shall endeavour to show hereafter; and at the same time
to demonstrate, that though some countries have by this
course attained to a considerable degree of opulence, it is in
itself necessarily slow, uncertain, liable to be disturbed and
interrupted by innumerable accidents, and in every respect
contrary to the order of nature and of reason. The inter
ests, prejudices, laws and customs which have given occa
sion to it, I shall endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly
as I can in the third and fourth books of this inquiry.
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a con
spiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by
any law which either could be executed, or would be con
sistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot
hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling
together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies ;
much less to render them necessary.
A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a
particular town to enter their names and places of abode in
a public register, facilitates such assemblies. It connects
individuals who might never otherwise be known to one an
other, and gives every man of the trade a direction where to
find every other man of it.
A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax
themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick,
their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest
to manage, renders such assemblies necessary.
An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but
makes the act of the majority binding upon the whole. In a
free trade an effectual combination cannot be established
138 WEALTH OF NATIONS
but by the unanimous consent of every single trader, and it
cannot last longer than every single trader continues of the
same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-
law with proper penalties, which will limit the competition
more effectually and more durably than any voluntary com
bination whatever.
The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better
government of the trade, is without any foundation. The
real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a work
man is not that of his corporation, but that of his cus
tomers. It is the fear of losing their employment which
restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclu
sive corporation necessarily weakens the force of this dis
cipline. A particular set of workmen must then be em
ployed, let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account
that in many large incorporated towns no tolerable work
men are to be found, even in some of the most necessary
trades. If you would have your work tolerably executed, it
must be done in the suburbs, where the workmen, having
no exclusive privilege, have nothing but their character to
depend upon, and you must then smuggle it into the town as
well as you can.
It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restrain
ing the competition in some employments to a smaller num
ber than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them,
occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different employments
of labour and stock.
Secondly, The policy of Europe, by increasing the com
petition in some employments beyond what it naturally would
be, occasions another inequality of an opposite kind in the
whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
employments of labour and stock.
It has been considered as of so much importance that a
proper number of young people should be educated for cer
tain professions, that, sometimes the public, and sometimes
the piety of private founders have established many pen
sions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, &c., for this pur
pose, which draw many more people into those trades than
could otherwise pretend to follow them. In all christian
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 139
countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of
churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are
educated altogether at their own expence. The long, tedious,
and expensive education, therefore, of those who are, will
not always procure them a suitable reward, the church being
crowded with people who, in order to get employment, are
willing to accept of a much smaller recompence than what
such an education would otherwise have entitled them to;
and in this manner the competition of the poor takes away
the reward of the rich. It Would be indecent, no doubt, to
compare either a curate or a chaplain with a journeyman
in any common trade. The pay of a curate or chaplain, how
ever, may very properly be considered as of the same nature
with the wages of a journeyman. They are, all three, paid
for their work according to the contract which they ttiay
happen to make with their respective superiors. Till after
the middle of the fourteenth century, five merks, containing
about fts much silver as ten pounds of our present money,
was in England the usual pay of a curate or stipendiary
parish priest, as we find it regulated by the decrees of several
different national councils. At the same period four pence
a day, containing the same quantity of silver as a shilling of
our present money, was declared to be the pay of a master
mason, and three pence a day, equal to nine pence of our
present money, that of a journeyman mason. The wages of
both these labourers, therefore, supposing them to have been
Constantly employed, were much superior to those of the
curate. The wages of the master mason, supposing him to
have been without employment one third of the year, would
have fully equalled them. By the 12th of Queen Anne, c. 12,
it is declared, "That whereas for want of sufficient mainte
nance and encouragement to curates, the cures have in
several places been meanly supplied, the bishop is, there
fore, empowered to appoint by writing under his hand and
seal a sufficient certain stipend or allowance, not exceeding
fifty and not less than twenty pounds a year." Forty
pounds a year is reckoned at present very good pay for a
curate, and notwithstanding this act of parliament, there are
many curacies under twenty pounds a year. There are jour
neymen shoemakers in London who can earn forty pounds s
140 WEALTH OF NATIONS
year, and there is scarce an industrious workman of any kind
in that metropolis who does not earn more than twenty.
This last sum indeed does not exceed what is frequently
earned by common labourers in many country parishes.
Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of
workmen, it has always been rather to lower them than to
raise them. But the law has upon many occasions attempted
to raise the wages of curates, and for the dignity of the
church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more
than the wretched maintenance which they themselves might
be willing to accept of. And in both cases the law seems
to have been equally ineffectual, and has never either been
able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of labourers
to the degree that was intended : because it has never been
able to hinder either the one from being willing to accept of
less than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of
their situation and the multitude of their competitors; or
the other from receiving more, on account of the contrary
competition of those who expected to derive either profit or
pleasure from employing them.
The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities sup
port the honour of the church, notwithstanding the mean
circumstances of some of its inferior members. The respect
paid to the profession too makes some compensation even to
them for the meanness of their pecuniary recompence. In
England, and in all Roman Catholic countries, the lottery of
the church is in reality much more advantageous than is
necessary. The example of the churches of Scotland, of
Geneva, and of several other protestant churches, may sat
isfy us, that in so creditable a profession, in which educa
tion is so easily procured, the hopes of much more moderate
benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent,
and respectable men into holy orders.
In professions in which there are no benefices, such as
law and physic, if an equal proportion of people were edu
cated at the public expence, the competition would soon be
so great, as to sink very much their pecuniary reward. It
might then not be worth any man's while to educate his son
to either of those professions at his own expence. They
would be entirely abandoned to such as had been educated by
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 141
those public charities, whose numbers and necessities would
oblige them in general to content themselves with a very
miserable recompence, to the entire degradation of the now
respectable professions of law and physic.
That unprosperous race of men commonly called men of
letters, are pretty much in the situation which lawyers and
physicians probably would be in upon the foregoing suppo
sition. In every part of Europe the greater part of them
have been educated for the church, but have been hindered
by different reasons from entering into holy orders. They
have generally, therefore, been educated at the public ex-
pence, and their numbers are every-where so great as com
monly to reduce the price of their labour to a very paultry
recompence.
Before the invention of the art of printing, the only em
ployment by which a man of letters could make any thing
by his talents, was that of a public or private teacher, or by
communicating to other people the curious and useful knowl
edge which he had acquired himself: And this is still surely
a more honourable, a more useful, and in general even a
more profitable employment than that other of writing for a
bookseller, to which the art of printing has given occasion.
The time and study, the genius, knowledge, and application
requisite to qualify an eminent teacher of the sciences, are
at least equal to what is necessary for the greatest prac
titioners in law and physic. But the usual reward of the
eminent teacher bears no proportion to that of the lawyer or
physician; because the trade of the one is crowded with in
digent people who have been brought up to it at the public
expence; whereas those of the other two are incumbered
with very few who have not been educated at their own.
The usual recompence, however, of public and private
teachers, small as it may appear, would undoubtedly be less
than it is, if the competition of those yet more indigent men
of letters who write for bread was not taken out of the
market. Before the invention of the art of printing, a
scholar and a beggar seem to have been terms very nearly
synonymous. The different governors of the universities
before that time appear to have often granted licences to
their scholars to beg.
142 WEALTH OF NATIONS
In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been
established for the education of indigent people to the learned
professions, the rewards of eminent teachers appear to have
been much more considerable. Isocrates, in what is called
his discourse against the sophists, reproaches the teachers of
his own times with inconsistency. "They make the most
magnificent promises to their scholars, says he, and under
take to teach them to be wise, to be happy, and to be just,
and in return for so important a service they stipulate the
paultry reward of four or five minse. They who teach wis
dom, continues he, ought certainly to be wise themselves;
but if any man were to sell such a bargain for such a price,
he would be convicted of the most evident folly." He cer
tainly does not mean here to exaggerate the reward, and we
may be assured that it was not less than he represents it.
Four minse were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and
eight pence : five minse to sixteen pounds thirteen shillings
and four pence. Something not less than the largest of
those two sums, therefore, must at that time have been
usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isoc
rates himself demanded ten minse, or thirty-three pounds
six shillings and eight pence, from each scholar. When he
taught at Athens, he is said to have had an hundred scholars.
I understand this to be the number whom he taught at one
time, or who attended what we would call one course of
lectures, a number which will not appear extraordinary from
so great a city to so famous a teacher, who taught too what
was at that time the most fashionable of all sciences, rhetoric.
He must have made, therefore, by each course of lectures, a
thousand minse, or 3,333t. 6s. 8d. A thousand minse, accord
ingly, is said by Plutarch in another place, to have been his
Didactron, or usual price of teaching. Many other eminent
teachers in those times appear to have acquired great for
tunes. Gorgias made a present to the temple of Delphi of
his own statue in solid gold. We must not, I presume, sup
pose that it was as large as the life. His way of living, as
well as that of Hippias and Protagoras, two other eminent
teachers of those times, is represented by Plato as splendid
even to ostentation. Plato himself is said to have lived with
a good deal of magnificence. Aristotle, after having been
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES 143
tutor to Alexander, and most munificently rewarded, as it is
universally agreed, both by him and his father Philip, thought
it worth while, notwithstanding, to return to Athens, in order
to resume
ences were the
probably
teaching
in of
those
his times
school.lessTeachers
common ofthan
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sci-"
PART I
Or the Produce of Land which Always Affords Rent
As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in
proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always,
more or less, in demand. It can always purchase or
command a greater or smaller quantity of labour, and
somebody can always be found who is willing to do some
thing ia order to obtain it. The quantity of labour,
indeed, which it can purchase, is not always equal to what
it could maintain, if managed in the most ceconomical man
156 WEALTH OF NATIONS
ner, on account of the high wages which are sometimes given
to labour. But it can always purchase such a quantity of
labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which that
sort of labour is commonly maintained in the neighbourhood.
But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quan
tity of food than what is sufficient to maintain all the labour
necessary for bringing it to market, in the most liberal way
in which that labour is ever maintained. The surplus too is
always more than sufficient to replace the stock which em
ployed that labour, together with its profits. Something,
therefore, always remains for a rent to the landlord.
The most desert moors in Norway and Scotland produce
some sort of pasture for cattle, of which the milk and the
increase are always more than sufficient, not only to main
tain all the labour necessary for tending them, and to pay
the ordinary profit to the farmer or owner of the herd or
flock; but to afford some small rent to the landlord. The
rent increases in proportion to the goodness of the pasture.
The same extent of ground not only maintains a greater
number of cattle, but as they are brought within a smaller
compass, less labour becomes requisite to tend them, and to
collect their produce. The landlord gains both ways ; by the
increase of the produce, and by the diminution of the labour
which must be maintained out of it.
The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, what
ever be its produce, but with its situation, whatever be its
fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of a town gives a
greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the
country. Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate
the one than the other, it must always cost more to bring the
produce of the distant land to market. A greater quantity
of labour, therefore, must be maintained out of it; and the
surplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer
and the rent of the landlord, must be diminished. But in re
mote parts of the country the rate of profits, as has already
been shown, is generally higher than in the neighbourhood
of a large town. A smaller proportion of this diminished
surplus, therefore, must belong to the landlord.
Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing
the expence of carriage, put the remote parts of the country
RENT OF LAND FROM HUMAN BLOOD 157
more nearly upon a level with those in the neighbourhood of
the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all
improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the re
mote, which must always be the most extensive circle of the
country. They are advantageous to the town, by breaking
down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood.
They are advantageous even to that part of the country.
Though they introduce some rival commodities into the old
market, they open many new markets to its produce. Mo
nopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which
can never be universally established but in consequence of
that free and universal competition which forces everybody
to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. It is not
more than fifty years ago, that some of the counties in the
neighbourhood of London petitioned the parliament against
the extension of the turnpike roads into the remoter counties.
Those remote counties, they pretended, from the cheapness
of labour, would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper
in the London market than themselves, and would thereby
reduce their rents, and ruin their cultivation. Their rents,
however, have risen, and their cultivation has been improved
since that time.
A corn field of moderate fertility produces a much greater
quantity of food for man, than the best pasture of equal ex
tent. Though its cultivation requires much more labour, yet
the surplus which remains after replacing the seed and main
taining all that labour, is likewise much greater. If a pound
of butcher's-meat, therefore, was never supposed to be worth
more than a pound of bread, this greater surplus would
every-where be of greater value, and constitute a greater
fund both for the profit of the farmer and the rent of the
landlord. It seems to have done so universally in the rude
beginnings of agriculture.
But the relative values of those two different species of
food, bread, and butcher's-meat, are very different in the
different periods of agriculture. In its rude beginnings, the
unimproved wilds, which then occupy the far greater part
of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more
butcher's-meat than bread, and bread, therefore, is the food
for which there is the greatest competition, and which con-
158 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of the fathers of art, thought they did not act wisely who en
closed a kitchen garden. The profit, he said, would not com
pensate the expence of a stone wall; and bricks (he meant,
I suppose, bricks baked in the sun) mouldered with the rain,
and the winter storm, and required continual repairs. Colu
mella, who reports this judgment of Democritus, does not
controvert it, but proposes a very frugal method of enclosing
with a hedge of brambles and briars, which, he says, he had
found by experience to be both a lasting and an impene
trable fence ; but which, it seems, was not commonly known
in the time of Democritus. Palladius adopts the opinion of
Columella, which had before been recommended by Varro.
In the judgment of those ancient improvers, the produce of
a kitchen garden had, it seems, been little more than suffi
cient to pay the extraordinary culture and the expence of
watering; for in countries so near the sun, it was thought
proper, in those times as in the present, to have the command
of a stream of water, which could be conducted to every bed
in the garden. Through the greater part of Europe, a kitchen
garden is not at present supposed to deserve a better en
closure than that recommended by Columella. In Great
Britain, and some other northern countries, the finer fruits
cannot be brought to perfection but by the assistance of a
wall. Their price, therefore, in such countries, must be suffi
cient to pay the expence of building and maintaining what
they cannot be had without. The fruit-wall frequently sur
rounds the kitchen garden, which thus enjoys the benefit of
an enclosure which its own produce could seldom pay for,
i That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to
perfection, was the most valuable part of the farm, seems
to have been an undoubted maxim in the ancient agriculture,
as it is in the modern through all the wine countries. But
whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard, was
a matter of dispute among the ancient Italian husbandmen,
as we learn from Columella. He decides, like a true lover
164 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of all curious cultivation, In favour of the vineyard, and en
deavours to show, by a comparison of the profit and expense,
that it was a most advantageous improvement. Such com
parisons, however, between the profit and expense of new
projects, are commonly very fallacious ; and in nothing more
so than in agriculture. Had the gain actually made by such
plantations been commonly as great as he imagined it might
have been, there could have been no dispute about it. The
same point is frequently at this day a matter of controversy
in the wine countries. Their writers on agriculture, indeed,
the lovers and promoters of high cultivation, seem generally
disposed to decide with Columella in favour of the vineyard.
In France the anxiety of the proprietors of the old vineyards
to prevent the planting of any new ones, seems to favour
their opinion, and to indicate a consciousness in those who
must have the experience, that this species of cultivation is
at present in that country more profitable than any other.
It seems at the same time, however, to indicate another
opinion, that this superior profit can last no longer than the
laws which at present restrain the free cultivation of the
vine. In i73i, they obtained an order of council, prohibiting
both the planting of new vineyards,' and the renewal of those
old ones, of which the cultivation had been interrupted for
two years, without a particular permission from the king, to
be granted only in consequence of an information from the
intendant of the province, certifying that he had examined
the land, and that it was incapable of any other culture. The
pretence of this order was the scarcity of corn and pasture,
and the super-abundance of wine. But had this super-abun
dance been real, it would, without any order of council, have
effectually prevented the plantation of new vineyards, by re
ducing the profits of this species of cultivation below their
natural proportion to those of corn and pasture. With re-
' gard to the supposed scarcity of corn occasioned by the mul
tiplication of vineyards, corn is nowhere in France more
carefully cultivated than in the wine provinces, where the
land is fit for producing it ; as in Burgundy, Guienne, and the
Upper Languedoc. The numerous hands employed in the
one species of cultivation necessarily encourage the other,
by affording a ready market for its produce. To diminish
RENT OF LAND FROM HUMAN BLOOD 16S
the number of those who are capable of paying for it, is
surely a most unpromising expedient for encouraging the cul
tivation of corn. It is like the policy which would promote
agriculture by discouraging manufactures.
The rent and profit of those productions, therefore, which
require either a greater original annual expence of improve
ment in order to fit the land for them, or a greater annual
expence of cultivation, though often much superior to those
of corn and pasture, yet when they do no more than com
pensate such extraordinary expence, are in reality regulated
by the rent and profit of those common crops.
It sometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land
which can be fitted for some particular produce, is too small
to supply the effectual demand. The whole produce can be
disposed of to those who are willing to give somewhat more
than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages and profit
necessary for raising and bringing it to market, according to
their natural rates, or according to the rates at which they
are paid in the greater part of other cultivated land. The
surplus part of the price which remains after defraying the
whole expence of improvement and cultivation may com
monly, in this case, and in this case only, bear no regular
proportion to the like surplus in corn or pasture, but may
exceed it in almost any degree; and the greater part of this
excess naturally goes to the rent of the landlord.
The usual and natural proportion, for example, between
the rent and profit of wine and those of corn and pasture,
must be understood to take place only with regard to those
vineyards which produce nothing but good common wine,
such as can be raised almost any-where, upon any light,
gravelly, or sandy soil, and which has nothing to recommend
it but its strength and wholesomeness. It is with such vine
yards only that the common land of the country can be
brought into competition ; for with those of a peculiar quality
it is evident that it cannot.
The vine is more affected by the difference of soils than
any other fruit tree. From some it derives a flavour which
no culture or management can equal, it is supposed, upon
any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is sometimes
peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it
166 WEALTH OF NATIONS
extends through the greater part of a small district, and
sometimes through a considerable part of a large province.
The whole quantity of such wines that is brought to market
falls short of the effectual demand, or the demand of those
who would be willing to pay the whole rent, profit and wages
necessary for preparing and bringing them thither, according
to the ordinary rate, or according to the rate at which they
are paid in common vineyards. The whole quantity, there
fore, can be disposed of to those who are willing to pay
more, which necessarily raises the price above that of com
mon wine. The difference is greater or less, according as
the fashionableness and scarcity of the wine render the com-
' petition of the buyers more or less eager. Whatever it be,
the greater part of it goes to the rent of the landlord.
For though such vineyards are in general more carefully
cultivated than most others, the high price of the wine
seems to be, not so much the effect, as the cause of this
careful cultivation. In so valuable a produce the loss occa
sioned by negligence is so great as to force even the most
careless to attention. A small part of this high price, there
fore, is sufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary labour
bestowed upon their cultivation, and the profits of the
extraordinary
The sugar colonies
stock which
possessed
puts that
by the
labour
European
into motion.
nations in
Coals are a less agreeable fewel than wood: they are said
too to be less wholesome. The expence of coals, therefore,
at the place where they are consumed, must generally be
somewhat less than that of wood.
The price of wood again varies with the state of agricul
ture, nearly in the same manner, and exactly for the same
reason, as the price of cattle. In its rude beginnings the
greater part of every country is covered with wood, which is
then a mere incumbrance of no value to the landlord, who
would gladly give it to any body for the cutting. As agricul
ture advances, the woods are partly cleared by the progress
of tillage, and partly go to decay in consequence of the in
creased number of cattle. These, though they do not in
crease in the same proportion as corn, which is altogther
the acquisition of human industry, yet multiply under the
care and protection of men; who store up in the season of
plenty what may maintain them in that of scarcity, who
through the whole year furnish them with a greater quantity
of food than uncultivated nature provides for them, and who
RENT OF LAND FROM MATERIALS 177
by destroying and extirpating their enemies, secure them in
the free enjoyment of all that she provides. Numerous herds
of cattle, when allowed to wander through the woods, though
they do not destroy the old trees, hinder any young ones from
coming up, so that in the course of a century or two the
whole forest goes to ruin. The scarcity of wood then raises
its price. It affords a good rent, and the landlord sometimes
finds that he can scarce employ his best lands more advan
tageously than in growing barren timber, of which the great
ness of the profit often compensates the lateness of the re
turns. This seems in the present times to be nearly the state
of things in several parts of Great Britain, where the profit
of planting is found to be equal to that of either corn or
pasture. The advantage which the landlord derives from
planting, can no-where exceed, at least for any considerable
time, the rent which these could afford him ; and in an inland
country which is highly cultivated, it will frequently not fall
much short of this rent Upon the sea-coast of a well-
improved country, indeed, if coals can conveniently be had
for fewel, it may sometimes be cheaper to bring barren tim
ber for building from less cultivated foreign countries, than
to raise it at home. In the new town of Edinburgh, built
within these few years, there is not, perhaps, a single stick
of Scotch timber.
Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is
such that the expence of a coal-fire is nearly equal to that of
a wood one, we may be assured, that at that place, and in
these circumstances, the price of coals is as high as it can be.
It seems to be so in some of the inland parts of England,
particularly in Oxfordshire, where it is usual, even in the
fires of the common people, to mix coals and wood together,
and where the difference in the expence of those two sorts
of fewel cannot, therefore, be very great.
Coals, in the coal countries, are every-where much below
this highest price. If they were not, they could not bear
the expence of a distant carriage, either by land or by
water. A small quantity only could be sold, and the coal
masters and coal proprietors find it more for their interest
to sell a great quantity at a price somewhat above the lowest,
than a small quantity at the highest. The most fertile coal
178 WEALTH OF NATIONS
mine too, regulates the price of coals at all the other mines
in its neighbourhood. Both the proprietor and the under
taker of the work find, the one that he can get a greater rent,
the other that he can get a greater profit, by somewhat under-
Selling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are soon
obliged to sell at the same price, though they cannot so well
afford it, and though it always diminishes, and sometimes
takes away altogether both their rent and their profit. Some
works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent,
and can be wrought only by the proprietor.
The lowest price at which coals can be sold for any consid
erable time, is, like that of all other commodities, the price
which is barely sufficient to replace, together with its ordi
nary profits, the stock which must be employed in bringing
them to market. At a coal-mine for which the landlord can
get no rent, but which he must either work himself or let it
alone altogether, the price of coals must generally be nearly
about this price.
Rent, even where coals afford one, has generally a smaller
share in their price than in that of most other parts of the
rude produce of land. The rent of an estate above ground,
commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a third of the
gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and inde
pendent of the occasional variations in the crop. In coal
mines a fifth of the gross produce is a very great rent; a
tenth the common rent, and it is seldom a rent certain, but
depends upon the occasional variations in the produce. These
are so great, that in a country where thirty years purchase
is considered as a moderate price for the property for a
landed estate, ten years purchase is regarded as a good price
for that of a coal-mine.
The value of a coal-mine to the proprietor frequently de
pends as much upon its situation as upon its fertility. That
of a metallic mine depends more upon its fertility, and less
upon its situation. The coarse, and still more the precious
metals, when separated from the ore, are so valuable that
they can generally bear the expence of a very long land,
and of the most distant sea carriage. Their market is not
confined to the countries in the neighbourhood of the mine,
but extends to the whole world. The copper of Japan makes
RENT OF LAND FROM MATERIALS 179
an article of commerce in Europe; the iron of Spain in that
of Chili and Peru. The silver of Peru finds its way, not
only to Europe, but from Europe to China.
The price of coals in Westmorland or Shropshire can
have little effect on their price at Newcastle; and their price
in the Lionnois can have none at all. The productions of such
distant coal-mines can never be brought into competition
with one another. But the productions of the most distant
metallic mines frequently may, and in fact commonly are.
The price, therefore, of the coarse, and still more that of the
precious metals, at the most fertile mines in the world, must
necessarily more or less affect their price at every other in it.
The price of copper in Japan must have some influence upon
its price at the copper mines in Europe. The price of silver
in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other goods
which it will purchase there, must have some influence on its
price, not only at the silver mines of Europe, but at those of
China. After the discovery of the mines of Peru, the silver
mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, abandoned.
The value of silver was so much reduced that their produce
could no longer pay the expence of working them, or replace,
with a profit, the food, cloaths, lodging and other necessaries
which were consumed in that operation. This was the case
too with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo, and even with
the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of those of
Potosi.
The price of every metal at every mine, therefore, being
regulated in some measure by its price at the most fertile
mine in the world that is actually wrought, it can at the
greater part of mines do very little more than pay the ex-
pence of working, and can seldom afford a very high rent
to the landlord. Rent, accordingly, seems at the greater
part of mines to have but a small share in the price of the
coarse, and a still smaller in that of the precious metals.
Labour and profit make up the greater part of both.
A sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the
average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, the most fertile
that are known in the world, as we are told by the Rev. Mr.
Borlace, vice-warden of the stannaries. Some, he says, af
ford more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part
180 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of the gross produce is the rent too of several very fertile
lead mines in Scotland.
In the silver mines of Peru, we are told by Frezier and
Ulloa, the proprietor frequently exacts no other acknowl
edgment from the undertaker of the mine, but that he will
grind the ore at his mill, paying him the ordinary multure or
price of grinding. Till i736, indeed, the tax of the king of
Spain amounted to one-fifth of the standard silver, which till
then might be considered as the real rent of the greater part
of the silver mines of Peru, the richest which have been
known in the world. If there had been no tax, this fifth
would naturally have belonged to the landlord, and many
mines might have been wrought which could not then be
wrought, because they could not afford this tax. The tax of
the duke of Cornwall upon tin is supposed to amount to more
than five per cent. or one-twentieth part of the value; and
whatever may be his proportion, it would naturally too belong
to the proprietor of the mine, if tin was duty free. But if
you add one-twentieth to one-sixth, you will find that the
whole average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, was to the
whole average rent of the silver mines of Peru, as thirteen
to twelve. But the silver mines of Peru are not now able
to pay even this low rent, and the tax upon silver was, in
i736, reduced from one-fifth to one-tenth. Even this tax
upon silver too gives more temptation to smuggling than the
tax of one-twentieth upon tin ; and smuggling must be much
easier in the precious than in the bulky commodity. The
tax of the king of Spain accordingly is said to be very ill
paid, and that of the duke of Cornwall very well. Rent,
therefore, it is probable, makes a greater part of the price
of tin at the most fertile tin mines, than it does of silver at
the most fertile silver mines in the world. After replacing
the stock employed in working those different mines, together
with its ordinary profits, the residue which remains to the
proprietor, is greater it seems in the coarse, than in the
precious metal.
Neither are the profits of the undertakers of silver mines
( and
commonly
undertakes
well informed
very
to work
great
authors
a in
new
Peru.
acquaint
mine The
inus,Peru,
same
that he
when
most
is universally
respectable
any person
RENT OF LAND FROM MATERIALS 181
looked upon as a man destined to bankruptcy and ruin, and
is upon that account shunned and avoided by every body.
Mining, it seems, is considered there in the same light as
here, as a lottery, in which the prizes do not compensate the
blanks, though the greatness of some tempts many adven
turers to throw away their fortunes in such unprosperous
projects.
As the sovereign, however, derives a considerable part of
his revenue from the produce of silver mines, the law in
Peru gives every possible encouragement to the discovery
and working of new ones. Whoever discovers a new mine,
is entitled to measure off two hundred and forty-six feet in
length, according to what he supposes to be the direction of
the vein, and half as much in breadth. He becomes pro
prietor of this portion of the mine, and can work it without
paying any acknowledgment to the landlord. The interest
of the duke of Cornwall has given occasion to a regulation
nearly of the same kind in that ancient duchy. In waste
and uninclosed lands any person who discovers a tin mine,
may mark out its limits to a certain extent, which is called
bounding a mine. The bounder becomes the real proprietor
of the mine, and may either work it himself, or give it in
lease to another, without the consent of the owner of the
land, to whom, however, a very small acknowledgment must
be paid upon working it. In both regulations the sacred
rights of private property are sacrificed to the supposed in
terests of public revenue.
The same encouragement is given in Peru to the discovery
and working of new gold mines ; and in gold the king's tax
amounts only to a twentieth part of the standard metal. It
was once a fifth, and afterwards a tenth, as in silver; but
it was found that the work could not bear even the lowest
of these two taxes. If it is rare, however, say the same
authors, Frezier and Ulloa, to find a person who has made
his fortune by a silver, it is still much rarer to find one who
has done so by a gold mine. This twentieth part seems to
be the whole rent which is paid by the greater part of the
gold mines in Chili and Peru. Gold too is much more liable
to be smuggled than even silver ; not only on account of the
superior value of the metal in proportion to its bulk, but on
182 WEALTH OF NATIONS
account of the peculiar way in which nature produces it.
Silver is very seldom found virgin, but, like most other
metals, is generally mineralized with some other body, from
which it is impossible to separate it in such quantities as
will pay for the expence, but by a very laborious and tedious
operation, which cannot well be carried on but in work
houses erected for the purpose, and therefore exposed to the
inspection of the king's officers. Gold, on the contrary, is
almost always found virgin. It is sometimes found in pieces
of some bulk; and even when mixed in small and almost
insensible particles with sand, earth, and other extraneous
bodies, it can be separated from them by a very short and
simple operation, which can be carried on in any private
house by any body who is possessed of a small quantity of
mercury. If the king's tax, therefore, is but ill paid upon
silver, it is likely to be much worse paid upon gold ; and rent
must make a much smaller part of the price of gold, than
even of that of silver.
The lowest price at which the precious metals can be sold,
or the smallest quantity of other goods for which they can
be exchanged during any considerable time, is regulated by
the same principles which fix the lowest ordinary price of all
other goods. The stock which must commonly be employed,
the food, cloaths, and lodging which must commonly be con
sumed in bringing them from the mine to the market, deter
mine it. It must at least be sufficient to replace that stock,
with the ordinary profits.
Their highest price, however, seems not to be necessarily
determined by any thing but the actual scarcity or plenty of
those metals themselves. It is not determined by that of
any other commodity, in the same manner as the price of
coals is by that of wood, beyond which no scarcity can ever
raise it. Increase the scarcity of gold to a certain degree,
and the smallest bit of it may become more precious than a
diamond, and exchange for a greater quantity of other
goods.
The demand for those metals arises partly from their
utility, and partly from their beauty. If you except iron,
they are more useful, perhaps, than any other metal. As
they are less liable to rust and impurity, they can more easily
RENT OF LAND FROM MATERIALS 183
be kept clean; and the utensils either of the table or the
kitchen are often upon that account more agreeable when
made of them. A silver boiler is more cleanly than a lead,
copper, or tin one; and the same quality would render a
gold boiler still better than a silver one. Their principal
merit, however, arises from their beauty, which renders
them peculiarly fit for the ornaments of dress and furniture.
No paint or dye can give so splendid a colour as gilding.
The merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their
scarcity. With the greater part of rich people, the chief
enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in
their eye is never so complete as when they appear to pos
sess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can
possess but themselves. In their eyes the merit of an object
which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is greatly
enhanced by its scarcity, or by the great labour which it re
quires to collect any considerable quantity of it, a labour
which nobody can afford to pay but themselves Such ob
jects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than
things much more beautiful and useful, but more common.
These qualities of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are the orig
inal foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the
great quantity of other goods for which they can every
where be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and in
dependent of their being employed as coin, and was the
quality which fitted them for that employment. That em
ployment, however, by occasioning a new demand, and by
diminishing the quantity which could be employed in any
other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or
increase their value.
The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from
their beauty. They are of no use, but as ornaments; and
the merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scar
city, or by the difficulty and expence of getting them from
the mine. Wages and profit accordingly make up, upon most
occasions, almost the whole of their high price. Rent comes
in but for a very small share ; frequently for no share ; and
the most fertile mines only afford any considerable rent.
When Tavernier, a jeweller, visited the diamond mines of
Golconda and Visiapour, he was informed that the sovereign
184 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of the country, for whose benefit they were wrought, had1
ordered all of them to be shut up, except those which yielded
the largest and finest stones. The others, it seems, were to
the proprietor not worth the working.
As the price both of the precious metals and of the precious
stones is regulated all over the world by their price at the
most fertile mine in it, the rent which a mine of either can
afford to its proprietor is in proportion, not to its absolute,
but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its
superiority over other mines of the same kind. If new mines
were discovered as much superior to those of Potosi as they
were superior to those of Europe, the value of silver might
be so much degraded as to render even the mines of Potosi
not worth the working. Before the discovery of the Spanish
West Indies, the most fertile mines in Europe may have
afforded as great a rent to their proprietor as the richest
mines in Peru do at present. Though the quantity of sil
ver was much less, it might have exchanged for an equal
quantity of other goods, and the proprietor's share might
have enabled him to purchase or command an equal quan
tity either of labour or of commodities. The value both of
the produce and of the rent, the real revenue which they
afforded both to the public and to the proprietor, might have
been the same.
The most abundant mines either of the precious metals or
of the presious stones could add little to the wealth of the
world. A produce of which the value is principally derived
from its scarcity, is necessarily degraded by its abundance.
A service of plate, and the other frivolous ornaments of
dress and furniture, could be purchased for a smaller quan
tity of labour, or for a smaller quantity of commodities; and
in this would consist the sole advantage which the world
could derive from that abundance.
It is otherwise in estates above ground. The value both
of their produce and of their rent is in proportion to their
absolute, and not to their relative fertility. The land which
produces a certain quantity of foods, cloaths, and lodging,
can always feed, cloath, and lodge a certain number of
people ; and whatever may be the proportion of the landlord,
it will always give him a proportionable command of the
RENT OF LAND FROM MATERIALS 185
PART III
Of the Variations In The Proportion Between The Respective
Values Of That Sort of Produce Which Always Affords
Rent, And Of That Which Sometimes Does And
Sometimes Does Not Afford Rent
The increasing abundance of food, in consequence of
increasing improvement and cultivation, must necessarily
increase the demand for every part of the produce of land
which is not food, and which can be applied either
to use or to ornament. In the whole progress of im
provement, it might therefore be expected, there should be
only one variation in the comparative values of those two
different sorts of produce. The value of that sort which
sometimes does and sometimes does not afford rent, should
constantly rise in proportion to that which always affords
some rent. As art and industry advance, the materials of
cloathing and lodging, the useful fossils and minerals of the
earth, the precious metals and the precious stones should
gradually come to be more and more in demand, should
gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of
food, or in other words, should gradually become dearer and
dearer. This accordingly has been the case with most of
these things upon most occasions, and would have been the
case with all of them upon all occasions, if particular acci
dents had not upon some occasions increased the supply of
some of them in a still greater proportion than the demand.
The value of a free-stone quarry, for example, will neces
sarily increase with the increasing improvement and popu
lation of the country round about it; especially if it should
be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the value of a
silver mine, even though there should not be another within
a thousand miles of it, will not necessarily increase with the
improvement of the country in which it is situated. The
market for the produce of a free-stone quarry can seldom
extend more than a few miles round about it, and the de
mand must generally be, in proportion to the improvement
and population of that small district. But the market for
the produce of a silver mine may extend over the whole
known world. Unless the world in general, therefore, be
FOOD AND MATERIALS COMPARED 187
advancing in improvement and population, the demand for
silver might not be at all increased by the improvement even
of a large country in the neighbourhood of the mine. Even
though the world in general were improving, yet, if, in
the course of its improvement, new mines should be dis
covered, much more fertile than any which had been known
before, though the demand for silver would necessarily in
crease, yet the supply might increase in so much a greater
proportion, that the real price of that metal might gradually
fall; that is, any given quantity, a pound weight of it, for
example, might gradually purchase or command a smaller
and a smaller quantity of labour, or exchange for a smaller
and a smaller quantity of corn, the principal part of the
subsistence of the labourer.
The great market for silver is the commercial and civilized
part of the world.
If by the general progress of improvement the demand of
this market should increase, while at the same time the sup
ply did not increase in the same proportion, the value of
silver would gradually rise in proportion to that of corn.
Any given quantity of silver would exchange for a greater
and a greater quantity of corn ; or, in other words, the aver
age money price of corn would gradually become cheaper
and cheaper.
If, on the contrary, the supply by some accident should
increase for many years together in a greater proportion
than the demand, that metal would gradually become cheaper
and cheaper; or, in other words, the average money price of
corn would, in spite of all improvements, gradually become
dearer and dearer.
But if, on the other hand, the supply of the metal should
increase nearly in the same proportion as the demand, it
would continue to purchase or exchange for nearly the same
quantity of corn, and the average money price of corn '
would, in spite of all improvements, continue very nearly
the same.
These three seem to exhaust all the possible combinations
of events which can happen in the progress of improvement ;
and during the course of the four centuries preceding the
present, if we may judge by what has happened both in
188 WEALTH OF NATIONS
France and Great Britain, each of those three different
combinations seem to have taken place in the European
market, and nearly in the same order too in which I have
here set them down.
manure which the farm itself produces ; and this again must
be in proportion to the stock of cattle which are maintained
upon it. The land is manured either by pasturing the cattle
upon it, or by feeding them in the stable, and from thence
carrying out their dung to it. But unless the price of the
cattle be sufficient to pay both the rent and profit of culti
vated land, the farmer cannot afford to pasture them upon
it ; and he can still less afford to feed them in the stable. It
is with the produce of improved and cultivated land only,
that cattle can be fed in the stable ; because to collect the
scanty and scattered produce of waste and unimproved lands
would require too much labour and be too expensive. If the
price of the cattle, therefore, is not sufficient to pay for the
produce of improved and cultivated land, when they are al
lowed to pasture it, that price will be still less sufficient to
pay for that produce when it must be collected with a good
deal of additional labour, and brought into the stable to
them. In these circumstances, therefore, no more cattle
can, with profit, be fed in the stable than what are necessary
for tillage. But these can never afford manure enough for
keeping constantly in good condition, all the lands which
they are capable of cultivating. What they afford being
insufficient for the whole farm, will naturally be reserved for
the lands to which it can be most advantageously or con
veniently applied ; the most fertile, or those, perhaps, in the
neighbourhood of the farm-yard. These, therefore, will be
kept constantly in good condition and fit for tillage. The
rest will, the greater part of them, be allowed to lie waste,
producing scarce any thing but some miserable pasture, just
sufficient to keep alive a few straggling, half-starved cattle ;
the farm, though much under-stocked in proportion to what
would be necessary for its complete cultivation, being very
frequently overstocked in proportion to its actual produce.
A portion of this waste land, however, after having been
PRICE OF CATTLE, ETC. 193
pastured in this wretched manner for six or seven years to
gether, may be ploughed up, when it will yield, perhaps, a
poor crop or two of bad oats, or of some other coarse grain,
and then, being entirely exhausted, it must be rested and
pastured again as before, and another portion ploughed up
to be in the same manner exhausted and rested again in its
turn. Such accordingly was the general system of manage
ment all over the low country of Scotland before the union.
The lands which were kept constantly well manured and in
good condition, seldom exceeded a third or a fourth part of
the whole farm, and sometimes did not amount to a fifth or
a sixth part of it. The rest were never manured, but a cer
tain portion of them was in its turn, notwithstanding, regu
larly cultivated and exhausted. Under this system of man
agement, it is evident, even that part of the lands of Scot
land which is capable of good cultivation, could produce but
little in comparison of what it may be capable of producing.
But how disadvantageous soever this system may appear, yet
before the union the low price of cattle seems to have ren
dered it almost unavoidable. If, notwithstanding a great
rise in their price, it still continues to prevail through a con
siderable part of the country, it is owing, in many places, no
doubt, to ignorance and attachment to old customs, but in
most places to the unavoidable obstructions which the nat
ural course of things opposes to the immediate or speedy
establishment of a better system: first, to the poverty of the
tenants, to their not having yet had time to acquire a stock
of cattle sufficient to cultivate their lands more completely,
the same rise of price which would render it advantageous
for them to maintain a greater stock, rendering it more diffi
cult for them to acquire it ; and, secondly, to their not having
yet had time to put their lands in condition to maintain this
greater stock properly, supposing they were capable of ac
quiring it. The increase of stock and the improvement of
land are two events which must go hand in hand, and of
which the one can no-where much out-run the other. With
out some increase of stock, there can be scarce any improve
ment of land, but there can be no considerable increase of
stock but in consequence of a considerable improvement of
land; because otherwise the land could not maintain it.
194 WEALTH OF NATIONS
These natural obstructions to the establishment of a better
system, cannot be removed but by a long course of frugality
and industry ; and half a century or a century more, perhaps,
must pass away before the old system, which is wearing out
gradually, can be completely abolished through all the dif
ferent parts of the country. Of all the commercial advan
tages, however, which Scotland has derived from the union
with England, this rise in the price of cattle is, perhaps, the
greatest. It has not only raised the value of all highland
estates, but it has, perhaps, been the principal cause of the
improvement of the low country.
In all new colonies the great quantity of waste land, which
can for many years be applied to no other purpose but the
feeding of cattle, soon renders them extremely abundant,
and in every thing great cheapness is the necessary conse
quence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the
European colonies in America were originally carried from
Europe, they soon multiplied so much there, and became of
so little value, that even horses were allowed to run wild in
the woods without any owner thinking it worth while to
claim them. It must be a long time after the first establish
ment of such colonies, before it can become profitable to feed
cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The same causes,
therefore, the want of manure, and the disproportion between
the stock employed in cultivation, and the land which it is
destined to cultivate, are likely to introduce there a system
of husbandry not unlike that which still continues to take
place in so many parts of Scotland. Mr. Kalm, the Swedish
traveller, when he gives an account of the husbandry of
some of the English colonies in North America, as he found
it in i749, observes, accordingly, that he can with difficulty
discover there the character of the English nation, so well
skilled in all the different branches of agriculture. They
make scarce any manure for their corn fields, he says; but
when one piece of ground has been exhausted by continual
cropping, they clear and cultivate another piece of fresh
land; aud when that is exhausted, proceed to a third. Their
cattle are allowed to w?nder through the woods and other
uncultivated grounds, where they are half-starved; having
long ago extirpated almost all the annual grasses by crop*
PRICE OF CATTLE, ETC. 195
ping them too early in the spring, before they had time to
form their flowers, or to shed their seeds. The annual
grasses were, it seems, the best natural grasses in that part
of North America; and when the Europeans first settled
there, they used to grow very thick, and to rise three or four
feet high. A piece of ground which, when he wrote, could
not maintain one cow, would in former times, he was as
sured, have maintained four, each of which would have given
four times the quantity of milk that one was capable of giv
ing. The poorness of the pasture had, in his opinion, occa
sioned the degradation of their cattle, which degenerated
sensibly from one generation to another. They were prob
ably not unlike that stunted breed which was common all
over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and which is now
so much mended through the greater part of the low coun
try, not so much by a change of the breed, though that ex
pedient has been employed in some places, as by a more
plentiful method of feeding them. t
Though it is late, therefore, in the progress of improve
ment before cattle can bring such a price as to render it
profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them; yet
of all the different parts which compose this second sort of
rude produce, they are perhaps the first which bring thjs
price; because till they bring it, it seems impossible that im
provement can be brought near even to that degree of per
fection to which it has arrived in many parts of Europe.
As cattle are among the first, so perhaps venison is among
the last parts of this sort of rude produce which bring this
price. The price of venison in Great Britain, how extrava
gant soever it may appear, is not near sufficient to compen
sate the expence of a deer park, as is well known to all those
who have had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it
was otherwise, the feeding of deer would soon become an
article of common farming; in the same manner as the feed
ing of those small birds called Turdi was among the ancient
Romans. Varro and Columella assure us that it was a most
profitable article. The fattening of ortolans, birds of passage
which arrive lean in the country, is said to be so in some
parts of France. If venison continues in fashion, and the
wealth and luxury of Great Britain increase as they have
196 WEALTH OF NATIONS
done for some time past, its price may very probably rise
still higher than it is at present.
Between that period in the progress of improvement which
brings to its height the price of so necessary an article as
cattle, and that which brings to it the price of such a super
fluity as venison, there is a very long interval, in the course
of which many other sorts of rude produce gradually arrive
at their highest price, some sooner and some later, according
to different circumstances.
Thus in every form the offals of the barn and stables will
maintain a certain number of poultry. These, as they are
fed with what would otherwise be lost, are a mere save-all ;
and as they cost the farmer scarce any thing, so he can afford
to sell them for very little. Almost all that he gets is pure
gain, and their price can scarce be so low as to discourage
him from feeding this number. But in countries ill culti
vated, and, therefore, but thinly inhabited, the poultry, which
are thus raised without expence, are often fully sufficient to
supply the whole demand. In this state of things, therefore,
they are often as cheap as butcher's-meat, or any other sort
of animal food. But the whole quantity of poultry, which
the farm in this manner produces without expence, must
always
meat which
be much
is reared
smallerupon
than it;
the and
whole
in quantity
times ofofwealth
butcher's-
and
The third and last sort of rude produce, of which the price
naturally rises in the progress of improvement, is that in
which the efficacy of human industry, in augmenting the
PRICE OF WOOL, HIDES, ETC. 201
quantity, is either limited or uncertain. Though the real
price of this sort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends
to rise in the progress of improvement, yet, according as
different accidents happen to render the efforts of human
industry more or less successful in augmenting the quantity,
it may happen sometimes even to fall, sometimes to continue
the same in very different periods of improvement, and some
times to rise more or less in the same period.
There are some sorts of rude produce which nature has
rendered a kind of appendages to other sorts ; so that the
quantity of the one which any country can afford, is neces
sarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool or
of raw hides, for example, which any country can afford, is
necessarily limited by the number of great and small cattle
that are kept in it. The state of its improvement, and the
nature of its agriculture, again necessarily determine this
number.
The same causes, which, in the progress of improvement,
gradually raise the price of butcher's-meat, should have the
same effect, it may be thought, upon the prices of wool and
raw hides, and raise them too nearly in the same proportion.
It probably would be so, if in the rude beginnings of im
provement the market for the latter commodities was con
fined within as narrow bounds as that for the former. But
the extent of their respective markets is commonly extremely
different.
The market for butcher's-meat is almost every-where con
fined to the country which produces it. Ireland, and some
part of British America indeed, carry on a considerable trade
in salt provisions ; but they are, I believe, the only countries
in the commercial world which do so, or which export to
other countries any considerable part of their butcher's-meat.
The market for wool and raw hides, on the contrary, is in
the rude beginnings of improvement very seldom confined to
the country which produces them. They can easily be trans
ported to distant countries, wool without any preparation,
and raw hides with very little : and as they are the materials
of many manufactures, the industry of other countries may
occasion a demand for them, though that of the country
which produces them might not occasion any.
202 WEALTH OF NATIONS
In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly in
habited, the price of the wool and the hide bears always a
much greater proportion to that of the whole beast, than in
countries where, improvement and population being further
advanced, there is more demand for butcher's-meat. Mr.
Hume observes, that in the Saxon times, the fleece was esti
mated at two-fifths of the value of the whole sheep, and that
this was much above the proportion of its present estimation.
In some provinces of Spain, I have been assured, the sheep
is frequently killed merely for the sake of the fleece and the
tallow. The carcase is often left to rot upon the ground, or
to be devoured by beasts and birds of prey. If this sometimes
happens even in Spain, it happens almost constantly in Chili,
at Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of Spanish Amer
ica, where the horned cattle are almost constantly killed
merely for the sake of the hide and the tallow. This too
used to happen almost constantly in Hispaniola, while it was
infested by the Buccaneers, and before the settlement, im
provement, and populousness of the French plantations
(which now extend round the coast of almost the whole west
ern half of the island) had given some value to the cattle of
the Spaniards, who still continue to possess, not only the
eastern part of the coast, but the whole inland and mountain
ous part of the country.
Though in the progress of improvement and population,
the price of the whole beast necessarily rises, yet the price
of the carcase is likely to be much more affected by this rise
than that of the wool and the hide. The market for the car
case, being in the rude state of society confined always to the
country which produces it, must necessarily be extended in
proportion to the improvement and population of that country.
But the market for the wool and the hides even of a bar
barous country often extending to the whole commercial
world, it can very seldom be enlarged in the same proportion.
The state of the whole commercial world can seldom be
much affected by the improvement of any particular country;
and the market for such commodities may remain the same,
or very nearly the same, after such improvements, as before.
It should, however, in the natural course of things rather
upon the whole be somewhat extended in consequence of
PRICE OF WOOL, HIDES, ETC. 203
(hem. If the manufactures, especially, of which those com
modities are the materials, should ever come to flourish in
the country, the market, though it might not be much en
larged, would at least be brought much nearer to the place of
growth than before; and the price of those materials might
at least be increased by what had usually been the expence
of transporting them to distant countries. Though it might
not rise therefore in the 6ame proportion as that of butcher's-
meat, it ought naturally to rise somewhat, and it ought cer
tainly not to fall.
In England, however, notwithstanding the flourishing state
of its woollen manufacture, the price of English wool has
fallen very considerably since the time of Edward III. There
are many authentic records which demonstrate that during
the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the four
teenth century, or about i339) what was reckoned the mod
erate and reasonable price of the tod or twenty-eight pounds
of English wool was not less than ten shillings of the money
of those times, containing, at the rate of twenty-pence the
ounce, six ounces of silver Tower-weight, equal to about
thirty shillings of our present money. In the present times,
one-and-twenty shillings the tod may be reckoned a good price
for very good English wool. The money-price of wool,
therefore, in the time of Edward III, was to its money-price
in the present times as ten to seven. The superiority of its
real price was still greater. At the rate of six shillings and
eight-pence the quarter, ten shillings was in those ancient
times the price of twelve bushels of wheat. At the rate of
twenty-eight shillings the quarter, one-and-twenty shillings
is in the present time the price of six bushels only. The pro
portion between the real prices of ancient and modern times,
therefore, is as twelve to six, or as two to one. In those
ancient times a tod of wool would have purchased twice the
quantity of subsistence which it will purchase at present;
and consequently twice the quantity of labour, if the real
recompence of labour had been the same in both periods.
This degradation both in the real and nominal value of
wool, could never have happened in consequence of the nat
ural course of things. It has accordingly been the effect of
violence and artifice: First, of the absolute prohibition of
204 WEALTH OF NATIONS
INTRODUCTION
IT has been shewn in the First Book, that the price of the
greater part of commodities resolves itself into three
parts, of which one pays the wages of the labour, an
other the profits of the stock, and a third the rent of the
land which had been employed in producing and bringing
them to market: that there are, indeed, some commodities
of which the price is made up of two of those parts only,
the wages of labour, and the profits of stock : and a very few
in which it consists altogether in one, the wages of labour:
but that the price of every commodity necessarily resolves
itself into some one, or other, or all of these three parts;
every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to wages,
being necessarily profit to somebody.
Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard
to every particular commodity, taken separately; it must be
iso with regard to all the commodities which compose the
whole annual produce of the land and labour of every coun
try, taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable
value of that annual produce, must resolve itself into the
same three parts, and be parcelled out among the different
inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their
labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of their land.
But though the whole value of the annual produce of the
land and labour of every country is thus divided among and
constitutes a revenue to its different inhabitants; yet as in
the rent of a private estate we distinguish between the
gross rent and the neat rent, so may we likewise in the
revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country.
The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever
233
234 WEALTH OF NATIONS
is paid by the farmer; the neat rent, what remains free to
the landlord, after deducting the expence of management,
of repairs, and all other necessary charges; or what, without
hurting his estate, he can afford to place in his stock re
served for immediate consumption, or to spend upon his
table, equipage, the ornaments of his house and furniture,
his private enjoyments and amusements. His real wealth is
in proportion, not to his gross, but to his neat rent.
The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great coun
try, comprehends the whole annual produce of their land
and labour ; the neat revenue, what remains free to them after
deducting the expence of maintaining; first, their fixed; and,
secondly, their circulating capital ; or what, without en
croaching upon their capital, they can place in their stock
reserved for immediate consumption, or spend upon their
subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. Their real
wealth too is in proportion, not to their gross, but to their
neat revenue.
The whole expence of maintaining the fixed capital, must
evidently be excluded from the neat revenue of the society.
Neither the materials necessary for supporting their useful
machines and instruments of trade, their profitable buildings,
&c. nor the product of the labour necessary for fashioning
those materials into the proper form, can ever make any
part of it. The price of that labour may indeed make a
part of it ; as the workmen so employed may place the whole
value of their wages in their stock reserved for immediate
consumption. But in other sorts of labour, both the price
and the produce go to this stock, the price to that of the
workmen, the produce to that of other people, whose sub
sistence, conveniencies, and amusements, are augmented by
the labour of those workmen.
The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the pro
ductive powers of labour, or to enable the same number of
labourers to perform a much greater quantity of work. In a
' farm where all the necessary buildings, fences, drains, com
munications, &c. are in the most perfect good order, the
same number of labourers and labouring cattle will raise a
much greater produce, than in one of equal extent and
equally good ground, but not furnished with equal conveni
MONEY 23S
encies. In manufactures the same number of hands, assisted
with the best machinery, will work up a much greater quan
tity of goods than with more imperfect instruments of trade.
The expence which is properly laid out upon a fixed capital
of any kind, is always repaid with great profit, and increases
the annual produce by a much greater value than that of
the support which such improvements require. This sup
port, however, still requires a certain portion of that produce.
A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain
number of workmen, both of which might have been imme
diately employed to augment the food, clothing and lodging,
the subsistence and conveniencies of the society, are thus
diverted to another employment, highly advantageous indeed,
but still different from this one. It is upon this account
that all such improvements in mechanics, as enable the same
number of workmen to perform an equal quantity of work
with cheaper and simpler machinery than had been usual
before, are always regarded as advantageous to every so
ciety. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a
certain number of workmen, which had before been em
ployed in supporting a more complex and expensive ma
chinery, can afterwards be applied to augment the quantity
of work which that or any other machinery is useful only
for performing. The undertaker of some great manufac
tory who employs a thousand a-year in the maintenance of
his machinery, if he can reduce this expence to five hundred,
will naturally employ the other five hundred in purchasing
an additional quantity of materials to be wrought up by
an additional number of workmen. The quantity of that
work, therefore, which his machinery was useful only for
performing, will naturally be augmented, and with it all the
advantage and conveniency which the society can derive
from that work.
The expence of maintaining the fixed capital in a great
country, may very properly be compared to that of repairs
in a private estate. The expense of repairs may frequently
be necessary for supporting the produce of the estate, and
consequently both the gross and the neat rent of the land
lord. When by a more proper direction, however, it can be
diminished without occasioning any diminution of produce,
236 WEALTH OF NATIONS
the gross rent remains at least the same as before, and the
neat rent is necessarily augmented.
But though the whole expence of maintaining the fixed
capital is thus necessarily excluded from the neat revenue of
the society, it is not the same case with that of maintaining
the circulating capital. Of the four parts of which this
latter capital is composed, money, provisions, materials, and
finished work, the three last, it has already been observed,
are regularly withdrawn from it, and placed either in the
fixed capital of the society, or in their stock reserved for
immediate consumption. Whatever portion of those con
sumable goods is not employed in maintaining the former,
goes all to the latter, and makes a part of the neat revenue
of the society. The maintenance of those three parts of
the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no portion of
the annual produce from the neat revenue of the society, be
sides what is necessary for maintaining the fixed capital.
The circulating capital of a society is in this respect dif
ferent from that of an individual. That of an individual is
totally excluded from making any part of his neat revenue,
which must consist altogether in his profits. But though the
circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that
of the society to which he belongs, it is not upon that ac
count totally excluded from making a part likewise of their
neat revenue. Though the whole goods in a merchant's shop
must by no means be placed in his own stock reserved for
immediate consumption, they may in that of other people,
who, from a revenue derived from other funds, may regu
larly replace their value to him, together with its profits,
without occasioning any diminution either of his capital or
of theirs.
Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capi
tal of a society, of which the maintenance can occasion any
diminution in their neat revenue.
The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital
which consists in money, so far as they affect the revenue
of First,
the society,
as those
bear
machines
a very and
great
instruments
resemblance
of totrade,
one another.
&c., re
&c. which compose the fixed capital, bear this further resem
blance to that part of the circulating capital which consists
in money; that as every saving in the expence of erecting
and supporting those machines, which does not diminish the
productive powers of labour, is an improvement of the neat
revenue of the society; so every saving in the expence of
collecting and supporting that part of the circulating capital
which consists in money, is an improvement of exactly the
same kind.
It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly too been ex
plained already, in what manner every saving in the expence
of supporting the fixed capital is an improvement of the neat
revenue of the society. The whole capital of the undertaker
of every work is necessarily divided between his fixed and
his circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the
same, the smaller the one part, the greater must necessarily
be the other. It is the circulating capital which furnishes
the materials and wages of labour, and puts industry into
motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expence of main
taining the fixed capital, which does not diminish the pro*
ductive powers of labour, must increase the fund which
puts industry into motion, and consequently the annual
produce of land and labour, the real revenue of every society.
The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver
money, replaces a very expensive instrument of commerce
with one much less costly, and sometimes equally convenient.
Circulation comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which it
costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one.
But in what manner this operation is performed, and in what
manner it tends to increase either the gross or the neat rev
enue of the society, is not altogether so obvious, and may
therefore require some further explication.
There are several different sorts of paper money; but the
circulating notes of banks and bankers are the species which
MONEY 241
is best known, and which seems best adapted for this purpose.
When the people of any particular country have such con
fidence in the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular
banker, as to believe that he is always ready to pay upon
demand such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at
any time presented to him; those notes come to have the
same currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence
that such money can at any time be had for them.
A particular banker lends among his customers his own
promissory notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hun
dred thousand pounds. As those notes serve all the purposes
of money, his debtors pay him the same interest as if he had
lent them so much money. This interest is the source of
his gain. Though some of those notes are continually
coming back upon him for payment, part of them continue
to circulate for months and years together. Though he has
generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of a
hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold
and silver may, frequently, be a sufficient provision for
answering occasional demands. By this operation, therefore,
twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform all the
functions which a hundred thousand coild otherwise have
performed. The same exchanges may be made, the same
quantity of consumable goods may be circulated and dis
tributed to their proper consumers, by means of his promis
sory notes, to the value of a hundred thousand pounds, as by
an equal value of gold and silver money. Eighty thousand
pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can, in this manner, be
spared from the circulation of the country; and if different
operations of the same kind should, at the same time, be
carried on by many different banks and bankers, the whole
circulation
the gold andmay silver
thus bewhich
conducted
wouldwith
otherwise
a fifth part
haveonly
been
of ,
requisite.
Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating
money of some particular country amounted, at a particular
time, to one million sterling, that sum being then sufficient
for circulating the whole annual produce of their land and
labour. Let us suppose too, that some time thereafter, dif
ferent banks and bankers issued promissory notes, payable
242 WEALTH OF NATIONS
to the bearer, to the extent of one million, reserving in their
different coffers two hundred thousand pounds for answer*-
ing occasional demands. There would remain, therefore, in
circulation, eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and
silver, and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thou
sand pounds of paper and money together. But the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country had before
required only one million to circulate and distribute it to its
proper consumers, and that annual produce cannoi be imme
diately augmented by those operations of banking. One mil
lion, therefore, will be sufficient to circulate it after them.
The goods to be bought and sold being precisely the same as
before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient for
buying and selling them. The channel of circulation, if I
may be allowed such an expression, will remain precisely the
same as before. One million we have supposed sufficient to
fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is poured into it be
yond this sum, cannot run in it, but must overflow. One
million eight hundred thousand pounds are poured into it.
Eight hundred thousand pounds, therefore, must overflow,
that sum being over and above what can be employed in the
circulation of the country. But though this sum cannot be
employed at home, it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle.
It will, therefore, be sent abroad, in order to seek that profit
able employment which it cannot find at home. But the
paper cannot go abroad; because at a distance from the
banks which issue it, and from the country in which payment
of it can be exacted by law, it will not be received in com
mon payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to the amount of
eight hundred thousand pounds will be sent abroad, and the
channel of home circulation will remain filled with a million
of paper, instead of the million of those metals which filled
it before.
But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus
sent abroad, we must not imagine that it is sent abroad fcr
nothing, or that its proprietors make a present of it to for
eign nations. They will exchange it for foreign goods of
some kind or another, in order to supply the consumption
either of some other foreign country, or of their own.
If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign coun
MONEY 243
try in order to supply the consumption of another, or in
what is called the carrying trade, whatever profit they make
will be an addition to the neat revenue of their own country.
It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade;
domestic business being now transacted by paper, and the
gold and silver being converted into a fund for this new
trade.
If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home
consumption, they may either, first, purchase such goods as
are likely to be consumed by idle people who produce noth
ing, such as foreign wines, foreign silks, &c. ; or, secondly,
they may purchase an additional stock of materials, tools,
and provisions, in order to maintain and employ an addi
tional number of industrious people, who re-produce, with
a profit, the value of their annual consumption.
So far as it is employed in the first way, it promotes prodi
gality, increases expence and consumption without increasing
production, or establishing any permanent fund for support
ing that expence, and is in every respect hurtful to the
society.
So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes
industry; and though it increases the consumption of the so
ciety, it provides a permanent fund for supporting that con
sumption, the people who consume re-producing, with a profit,
the whole value of their annual consumption. The gross
revenue of the society, the annual produce of their land and
labour, is increased by the whole value which the labour of
those workmen adds to the materials upon which they are
employed; and their neat revenue by what remains of this
value, after deducting what is necessary for supporting the
tools and instruments of their trade.
That the greater part of the gold and silver which, being
forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in
purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, is and must
be employed in purchasing those of this second kind, seems
not only probable but almost unavoidable. Though some
particular men may sometimes increase their expence very
considerably though their revenue does not increase at all,
we may be assured that no class or order of men ever does
so; because, though the principles of common prudence do
244 WEALTH OF NATIONS
not always govern the conduct of every individual, they al
ways influence that of the majority of every class or order.
But the revenue of idle people, considered as a class or order,
cannot, in the smallest degree, be increased by those opera
tions of banking. Their expence in general, therefore, cannot
be much increased by them, though that of a few indi
viduals among them may, and in reality sometimes is. The
demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods, being
the same, or very nearly the same, as before, a very small
part of the money, which being forced abroad by those opera
tions of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for
home consumption, is likely to be employed in purchasing
those for their use. The greater part of it will naturally be
destined for the employment of industry, and not for the
maintenance of idleness.
When we compute the quantity of industry which the cir
culating capital of any society can employ, we must always
have regard to those parts of it only, which consist in pro
visions, materials, and finished work : the other, which con
sists in money, and which serves only to circulate those three,
must always be deducted. In order to put industry into
motion, three things are requisite; materials to work upon,
tools to work with, and the wages or recompence for the
sake of which the work is done. Money is neither a ma
terial to work upon, nor a tool to work with ; and though the
wages of the workman are commonly paid to him in money,
his real revenue, like that of all other men, consists, not in
the money, but in the money's worth ; not in the metal pieces,
but in what can be got for them.
The quantity of industry which any capital can employ,
must, evidently, be equal to the number of workmen whom
it can supply with materials, tools, and a maintenance suit
able to the nature of the work. Money may be requisite for
purchasing the materials and tools of the work, as well as
the maintenance of the workmen. But the quantity of in
dustry which the whole capital can employ, is certainly not
equal both to the money which purchases, and to the ma
terials, tools, and maintenance, which are purchased with it;
but only to one or other of those two values, and to the latter
more properly than to the former.
MONEY 24S
When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver
money, the quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance,
which the whole circulating capital can supply, may be in
creased by the whole value of gold and silver which used to
be employed in purchasing them. The whole value of the
great wheel of circulation and distribution, is added to the
goods which are circulated and distributed by means of it.
The operation, in some measure, resembles that of the under
taker of some great work, who, in consequence of some im
provement in mechanics, takes down his old machinery, and
adds the difference between its price and that of the new to
his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnishes
materials and wages to his workmen.
What is the proportion which the circulating money of any
country bears to the whole value of the annual produce cir
culated by means of it, it is, perhaps, impossible to determine.
It has been computed by different authors at a fifth, at a
tenth, at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth part of that value.
But how small soever the proportion which the circulating
money may bear to the whole value of the annual produce,
as but a part, and frequently but a small part, of that prod
uce, is ever destined for the maintenance of industry, it
must always bear a very considerable proportion to that part.
When, therefore, by the substitution of paper, the gold and
silver necessary for circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth
part of the former quantity, if the value of only the greater
part of the other four-fifths be added to the funds which are
destined for the maintenance of industry, it must make a
very considerable addition to the quantity of that industry,
and, consequently, to the value of the annual produce of land
and labour.
An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty
or thirty years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection
of new banking companies in almost every considerable town,
and even in some country villages. The effects of it have
been precisely those above described. The business of the
country is almost entirely carried on by means of the paper
of those different banking companies, with which purchases
and payments of all kinds are commonly made. Silver very
seldom appears except in the change of a twenty shillings
246 WEALTH OF NATIONS
bank note, and gold still seldomer. But though the conduct
of all those different companies has not been unexceptionable,
and has accordingly required an act of parliament to regu
late it; the country, notwithstanding, has evidently derived
great benefit from their trade. I have heard it asserted, that
the trade of the city of Glasgow, doubled in about fifteen
years after the first erection of the banks there; and that the
trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first
erection of the two public banks at Edinburgh, of which the
one, called The Bank of Scotland, was established by act of
parliament in i695; the other, called The Royal Bank, by
royal charter in i727. Whether the trade, either of Scot
land in general, or of the city of Glasgow in particular, has
really increased in so great a proportion, during so short a
period, I do not pretend to know. If either of them has in
creased in this proportion, it seems to be an effect too great
to be accounted for by the sole operation of this cause. That
the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased
very considerably during this period, and that the banks have
contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be doubted.
The value of the silver money which circulated in Scot
land before the union, in i707, and which, immediately after
it, was brought into the bank of Scotland in order to be re
coined, amounted to 41 1,117l. 10s. 9d, sterling. No account
has been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient
accounts of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold
annually coined somewhat exceeded that of the silver. There
were a good many people too upon this occasion, who, from a
diffidence of repayment, did not bring their silver into the
bank of Scotland: and there was, besides, some English coin,
which was not called in. The whole value of the gold and
silver, therefore, which circulated in Scotland before the
union, cannot be estimated at less than a million sterling. It
seems to have constituted almost the whole circulation of
that country; for though the circulation of the bank of Scot
land, which had then no rival, was considerable, it seems
to have made but a very small part of the whole. In the
present times the whole circulation of Scotland cannot be
estimated at less than two millions, of which that part which
consists in gold and silver, most probably, does not amount to
MONEY 247
half a million. But though the circulating gold and silver of
Scotland have suffered so great a diminution during this
period, its real riches and prosperity do not appear to have
suffered any. Its agriculture, manufactures, and trade, on
the contrary, the annual produce of its land and labour, have
evidently been augmented.
It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by
advancing money upon them before they are due, that the
greater part of banks and bankers issue their promissory
notes. They deduct always, upon whatever sum they ad
vance, the legal interest till the bill shall become due. The
payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the
bank the value of what had been advanced, together with a
clear profit of the interest. The banker who advances to the
merchant whose bill he discounts, not gold and silver, but
his own promissory notes, has the advantage of being able
to discount to a greater amount by the whole value of his
promissory notes, which he finds by experience, are com
monly in circulation. He is thereby enabled to make his
clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum.
The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very
great, was still more inconsiderable when the two first bank
ing companies were established; and those companies would
have had but little trade, had they confined their business to
the discounting of bills of exchange. They invented, there
fore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by
granting, what they called, cash accounts, that is by giving
credit to the extent of a certain sum (two or three thousand
pounds, for example), to any individual who could procure
two persons of undoubted credit and good landed estate to
become surety for him, that whatever money should be ad
vanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been
given, should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal
interest. Credits of this kind are, I believe, commonly
granted by banks and bankers in all different parts of the
world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch banking
companies accept of re-payment are, so far as I know,
peculiar to them, and have, perhaps, been the principal cause,
both of the great trade of those companies, and of the benefit
which the country has received from it.
248 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those com
panies, and borrows a thousand pounds upon it, for example,
may repay this sum piece-meal, by twenty and thirty pounds
at a time, the company discounting a proportionable part of
the interest of the great sum from the day on which each
of those small sums is paid in, till the whole be in this man
ner repaid. All merchants, therefore, and almost all men of
business, find it convenient to keep such cash accounts with
them, and are thereby interested to promote the trade of
those companies, by readily receiving their notes in all pay
ments, and by encouraging all those with whom they have
any influence to do the same. The banks, when their cus
tomers apply to them for money, generally advance it to
them in their own promissory notes. These the merchants
pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers
to the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to
their landlords for rent, the landlords repay them to the
merchants for the conveniencies and luxuries with which
they supply them, and the merchants again return them to
the banks in order to balance their cash accounts, or to
replace what they may have borrowed of them; and thus
almost the whole money business of the country is trans
acted by means of them. Hence the great trade of those
companies.
By means of those cash accounts every merchant can, with
out imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwise
could do. If there are two merchants, one in London, and
the other in Edinburgh, who employ equal stocks in the
same branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without
imprudence, carry on a greater trade, and give employment
to a greater number of people than the London merchant.
The London merchant must always keep by him a consid
erable sum of money, either in his own coffers, or in those
of his banker, who gives him no interest for it, in order to
answer the demands continually coming upon him for pay
ment of the goods which he purchases upon credit. Let the
ordinary amount of this sum be supposed five hundred
pounds. The value of the goods in his warehouse must
always be less by five hundred pounds than it would have
been, had he not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed.
MONEY 249
Let us suppose that he generally disposes of his whole stock
upon hand, or of goods to the value of his whole stock upon
hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep so great
a sum unemployed, he must sell in a year five hundred pounds
worth less goods than he might otherwise have done. His
annual profits must be less by all that he could have made
by the sale of five hundred pounds worth more goods; and
the number of people employed in preparing his goods for
the market, must be less by all those that five hundred pounds
more stock could have employed. The merchant in Edin
burgh, on the other hand, keeps no money unemployed for
answering such occasional demands. When they actually
come upon him, he satisfies them from his cash account with
the bank, and gradually replaces the sum borrowed with the
money or paper which comes in from the occasional sales of
his goods. With the same stock, therefore, he can, without
imprudence, have at all times in his warehouse a larger quan
tity of goods than the London merchant; and can thereby
both make a greater profit himself, and give constant em
ployment to a greater number of industrious people who
prepare those goods for the market. Hence the great benefit
which the country has derived from this trade.
The facility of discounting bills of exchange, it may be
thought, indeed, gives the English merchants a conveniency
equivalent to the cash accounts of the Scotch merchants.
But the Scotch merchants, it must be remembered, can dis
count their bills of exchange as easily as the English mer
chants ; and have, besides, the additional conveniency of their
cash accounts.
The whole paper money of every kind which can easily
circulate in any country never can exceed the value of the
gold and silver, of which it supplies the place, or which (the
commerce being supposed the same) would circulate there,
if there was no paper money. If twenty shilling notes, for
example, are the lowest paper money current in Scotland,
the whole of that currency which can easily circulate there
cannot exceed the sum of gold and silver which would be
necessary for transacting the annual exchange of twenty
shillings value and upwards usually transacted within that
country. Should the circulating paper at any time exceed
250 WEALTH OF NATIONS i
The gold coin which was paid out either by the bank of
England, or by the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part
of their paper which was over and above what could be em
ployed in the circulation of the country, being likewise over
and above what could be employed in that circulation, was
sometimes sent abroad in the shape of coin, sometimes
melted down and sent abroad in the shape of bullion, and
sometimes melted down and sold to the bank of England at
the high price of four pounds an ounce. It was the newest,
the heaviest, and the best pieces only which were carefully
picked out of the whole coin, and either sent abroad or
melted down. At home, and while they remained in the
shape of coin, those heavy pieces were of no more value
than the light: But they were of more value abroad, or when
melted down into bullion, at home. The bank of England,
notwithstanding their great annual coinage, found to their
astonishment, that there was every year the same scarcity
of coin as there had been the year before; and that notwith
standing the great quantity of good and new coin which was
every year issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead
of growing better and better, became every year worse and
worse. Every year they found themselves under the neces
sity of coining nearly the same quantity of gold as they had
coined the year before, and from the continual rise in the
price of gold bullion, in consequence of the continual wear
ing and clipping of the coin, the expence of this great annual
coinage became every year greater and greater. The bank
of England, it is to be observed, by supplying its own coffers
with coin, is indirectly obliged to supply the whole kingdom,
into which coin is continually flowing from those coffers in
a great variety of ways. Whatever coin therefore was wanted
to support this excessive circulation both of Scotch and
English paper money, whatever vacuities this excessive circu
lation occasioned in the necessary coin of the kingdom, the
bank of England was obliged to supply them. The Scotch
banks, no doubt, paid all of them very dearly for their own
imprudence and inattention. But the bank of England paid
very dearly, not only for its own imprudence, but for the
much greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch banks.
The over-trading of some bold projectors in both parts
|
254 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of the united kingdom, was the original cause of this ex
cessive circulation of paper money.
What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant
or undertaker of any kind, is not either the whole capital
with which he trades, or even any considerable part of that
capital; but that part of it only, which he would otherwise
be obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money
for answering occasional demands. If the paper money
which the bank advances never exceeds this value, it can
never exceed the value of the gold and silver, which would
necessarily circulate in the country if there was no paper
money; it can never exceed the quantity which the circula
tion of the country can easily absorb and employ.
When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of ex
change drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and
which, as soon as it becomes due, is really paid by that
debtor; it only advances to him a part of the value which
he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed
and in ready money for answering occasional demands. The
payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the
bank the value of what it had advanced, together with the
interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are
confined to such customers, resemble a water pond, from
which, though a stream is continually running out, yet an
other is continually running in, fully equal to that which runs
out; so that, without any further care or attention, the pond
keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little or
no expence can ever be necessary for replenishing the cof
fers of such a bank.
A merchant, without over-trading, may frequently have
occasion for a sum of ready money, even when he has no
bills to discount. When a bank, besides discounting his bills,
advances him likewise upon such occasions, such sums upon
his cash account, and accepts of a piece meal repayment as
the money comes in from the occasional sale of his goods,
upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland;
it dispenses him entirely from the necessity of keeping any
part of his stock by him unemployed and in ready money
for answering occasional demands. When such demands
actually come upon him, he can answer them sufficiently from
MONEY 2S5
his cash account. The bank, however, in dealing with such
customers, ought to observe with great attention, whether
in the course of some short period (of four, five, six, or
eight months, for example) the sum of the repayments which
it commonly receives from them, is, or is not, fully equal to
that of the advances which it commonly makes to them. If,
within the course of such short periods, the sum of the re
payments from certain customers is, upon most occasions,
fully equal to that of the advances, it may safely continue to
deal with such customers. Though the stream which is in
this case continually running out from its coffers may be
very large, that which is continually running into them must
be at least equally large ; so that without any further care or
attention those coffers are likely to be always equally or very
nearly equally full ; and scarce ever to require any extraor
dinary expence to replenish them. If, on the contrary, the
sum of the repayments from certain other customers falls
commonly very much short of the advances which it makes
to them, it cannot with any safety continue to deal with such
customers, at least if they continue to deal with it in this
manner. The stream which is in this case continually run
ning out from its coffers is necessarily much larger than that
which is continually running in ; so that, unless they are re
plenished by some great and continual effort of expence,
those coffers must soon be exhausted altogether.
The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for
a long time very careful to require frequent and regular re
payments from all their customers, and did not care to deal
with any person, whatever might be his fortune or credit,
who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular
operations with them. By this attention, besides saving
almost entirely the extraordinary expence of replenishing
their coffers, they gained two other very considerable ad
vantages.
First, by this attention they were enabled to make some
tolerable judgment concerning the thriving or declining cir
cumstances of their debtors, without being obliged to look
out for any other evidence besides what their own books
afforded them; men being for the most part either regular
or irregular in their repayments, according as their circum
256 WEALTH OF NATIONS
stances are either thriving or declining. A private man
who lends out his money to perhaps half a dozen or a dozen
of debtors, may, either by himself or his agents, observe and
enquire both constantly and carefully into the conduct and
situation of each of them. But a banking company, which
lends money to perhaps five hundred different people, and
of which the attention is continually occupied by objects of
a very different kind, can have no regular information con
cerning the conduct and circumstances of the greater part of
its debtors beyond what its own books afford it. In requir
ing frequent and regular repayments from all their custom
ers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this
advantage in view.
Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from
the possibility of issuing more paper money than what the
circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ.
When they observed, that within moderate periods of time
the repayments of a particular customer were upon most
occasions fully equal to the advances which they had made
to him, they might be assured that the paper money which
they had advanced to him, had not at any time exceeded the
quantity of gold and silver which he would otherwise have
been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional de
mands; and that, consequently, the paper money, which they
had circulated by this means, had not at any time exceeded
the quantity of gold and silver which would have circu
lated in the country, had there been no paper money. The
frequency, regularity and amounts of his repayments would
sufficiently demonstrate that the amount of their advances
had at no time exceeded that part of his capital which he
would otherwise have been obliged to keep by him unem
ployed and in ready money for answering occasional de
mands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his
capital in constant employment. It is this part of his capital
only which, within moderate periods of time, is continually
returning to every dealer in the shape of money, whether
paper or coin, and continually going from him in the same
shape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded
this part of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repay
ments could not, within moderate periods of time, have
MONEY 257
equalled the ordinary amount of its advances. The stream
which, by means of his dealings, was continually running
into the coffers of the bank, could not have been equal to
the stream which, by means of the same dealings, was con
tinually running out. The advances of the bank paper, by
exceeding the quantity of gold and silver which, had there
been no such advances, he would have been obliged to keep
by him for answering occasional demands, might soon come
to exceed the whole quantity of gold and silver which (the
commerce being supposed the same) would have circulated
in the country had there been no paper money; and conse
quently to exceed the quantity which the circulation of the
country could easily absorb and employ ; and the excess of
this paper money would immediately have returned upon the
bank in order to be exchanged for gold and silver. This
second advantage, though equally real, was not perhaps so
well understood by all the different banking companies of
Scotland as the first.
When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and
partly by that of cash accounts, the creditable traders of any
country can be dispensed from the necessity of keeping any
part of their stock by them unemployed and in ready money
for answering occasional demands, they can reasonably ex
pect no farther assistance from banks and bankers, who,
when they have gone thus far, cannot, consistently with
their own interest and safety, go farther. A bank cannot,
consistently with its own interest, advance to a trader the
whole or even the greater part of the circulating capital
with which he trades; because, though that capital is con
tinually returning to him in the shape of money, and going
from him in the same shape, yet the whole of the returns
is too distant from the whole of the outgoings, and the sum
of his repayments could not equal the sum of its advances
within such moderate periods of time as suit the conveniency
of a bank. Still less could a bank afford to advance him any
considerable part of his fixed capital; of the capital which
the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in
erecting his forge and dwelling-house, his work-houses and
ware-houses, the dwelling-house of his workman, &c. ; of
the capital which the undertaker of a mine employs in sink
258 WEALTH OF NATIONS
ing his shafts, in erecting engines for drawing out the water,
in making roads and waggon-ways, &c. ; of the capital which
the person who undertakes to improve land employs in clear
ing, draining, enclosing, manuring and ploughing waste and
uncultivated fields, in building farm-houses, with all their
necessary appendages of stables, granaries, &c. The returns
of the fixed capital are in almost all cases much slower than
those of the circulating capital; and such expenses, even
when laid out with the greatest prudence and judgment, very
seldom return to the undertaker till after a period of many
years, a period by far too distant to suit the conveniency of a
bank. Traders and other undertakers may, no doubt, with
great propriety, carry on a very considerable part of their
projects with borrowed money. In justice to their creditors,
however, their own capital ought, in this case, to be sufficient
to ensure, if I may say so, the capital of those creditors; or
to render it extremely improbable that those creditors should
incur any loss, even though the success of the project should
fall very much short of the expectation of the projectors.
Even with this precaution too, the money which is borrowed,
and which it is meant should not be repaid till after a period
of several years, ought not to be borrowed of a bank, but
ought to be borrowed upon bond or mortgage, of such private
people as propose to live upon the interest of their money,
without taking the trouble themselves to employ the capital ;
and who are upon that account willing to lend that capital
to such people of good credit as are likely to keep it for sev
eral years. A bank, indeed, which lends its money without
the expence of stampt paper, or of attornies fees for draw
ing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of repayment
upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland;
would, no doubt, be a very convenient creditor to such
traders and undertakers. But such traders and undertakers
would, surely, be most inconvenient debtors to such a bank.
********
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by
rendering a greater part of that capital active and productive
than would otherwise be so, that the most judicious opera
tions of banking can increase the industry of the country.
That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep
MONEY 259
by him unemployed, and in ready money for answering occa
sional demands, is so much dead stock, which, so long as it
remains in this situation, produces nothing either to him or
to his country. The judicious operations of banking enable
him to convert this dead stock into active and productive
stock; into materials to work upon, into tools to work with,
and into provisions and subsistence to work for; into stock
which produces something both to himself and to his coun
try. The gold and silver money which circulates in any
country, and by means of which the produce of its land and
labour is annually circulated and distributed to the proper
consumers, is, in the same manner as the ready money of the
dealer, all dead stock. It is a very valuable part of the cap
ital of the country, which produces nothing to the country.
The judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper
in the room of a great part of this gold and silver, enables
the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into
active and productive stock ; into stock which produces some
thing to the country. The gold and silver money which cir
culates in any country may very properly be compared to a
highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all
the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single
pile of either. The judicious operations of banking, by pro
viding, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort of
waggon-way through the air: enable the country to convert,
as it were, a great part of its highways into good pastures
and corn-fields, and thereby to increase very considerably
the annual produce of its land and labour. The commerce
and industry of the country, however, it must be acknowl
edged, though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be
altogether so secure, when they are thus, as it were, sus
pended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money, as when
they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and silver.
Over and above the accidents to which they are exposed
from the unskilfulness of the conductors of this paper
money, they are liable to several others, from which no pru
dence of will of those conductors can guard them.
An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got
possession of the capital, and consequently of that treasure
which supported the credit of the paper money, would occa-
260 WEALTH OF NATIONS
J —HC X
290 WEALTH OF NATIONS
a great deal wasted and abused. But if the expence of this
entertainment had been employed in setting to work masons,
carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, &c. a quantity of pro
visions, of equal value, would have been distributed among a
still greater number of people, who would have bought them
in penny-worths and pound weights, and not have lost or
thrown away a single ounce of them. In the one way, be
sides, this expence maintains productive, in the other unpro
ductive hands. In the one way, therefore, it increases, in
the other, it does not increase, the exchangeable value of
the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.
I would not, however, by all this be understood to mean,
that the one species of expence always betokens a more
liberal or generous spirit than the other. When a man of
fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality, he shares
the greater part of it with his friends and companions; but
when he employs it in purchasing such durable commodities,
he often spends the whole upon his own person, and gives
nothing to any body without an equivalent. The latter
species of expence, therefore, especially when directed
towards frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress and
furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws, frequently indicates,
not only a trifling, but a base and selfish disposition. All
that I mean is, that the one sort of expence, as it always
occasions some accumulation of valuable commodities, as it
is more favourable to private frugality, and, consequently,
to the increase of the public capital, and as it maintains pro
ductive, rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than
the other to the growth of public opulence.
CHAPTER IV
Of Stock Lent at Interest
CHAPTER I
Of the Natural Progress of Opulence
Of Systems
INTRODUCTION
of Political (Economy
325
CHAPTER I
Of the Principle Of The Commercial or Mercantile
System
********
The importation of gold and silver is not the principal,
much less the sole benefit which a nation derives from its
foreign trade. Between whatever places foreign trade is
rarried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from
Jt. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their
And and labour for which there is no demand among them,
and brings back in return for it something else for which
there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by
exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a
part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. By
means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not
hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art
or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection.
By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of
the produce of their labour may exceed the home consump
tion, it encourages them to improve its productive powers,
and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby
to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These
great and important services foreign trade is continually
occupied in performing, to all the different countries between
which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it,
though that in which the merchant resides generally derives
the greatest, as he is generally more employed in supplying
the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his own,
than of any other particular country. To import the gold
and silver which may be wanted, into the countries which
PRINCIPLE OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM 343
have no mines, is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign
commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant part of it.
A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this
account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a
century.
It is not by the importation of gold and silver, that the
discovery of America has enriched Europe. By the abun
dance of the American mines, those metals have become
cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about
a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which
it would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same
annual expence of labour and commodities, Europe can an
nually purchase about three times the quantity of plate
which it could have purchased at that time. But when a
commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what had
been its usual price, not only those who purchased it
before can purchase three times their former quantity, but
it is brought down to the level of a much greater number of
purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than
twenty times the former number. So that there may be in
Europe at present not only more than three times, but more
than twenty or thirty times the quantity of plate which would
have been in it, even in its present state of improvement,
had the discovery of the American mines never been made.
So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency,
though surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and
silver renders those metals rather less fit for the purposes of
money than they were before. In order to make the same
purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of
them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket where a groat
would have done before. It is difficult to say which is most
trifling, this inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency.
Neither the one nor the other could have made any very essen
tial change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America,
however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening
a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of
Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and im
provements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the ancient
commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market
to take off the greater part of their produce. The pro
344 "WEALTH OF NATIONS
ductive powers of labour were improved, and its produce
increased in all the different countries of Europe, and to
gether with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants.
The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America,
and many of those of America were new to Europe. A new
set of exchanges, therefore, began to take place which had
never been thought of before, and which should naturally
have proved as advantageous to the new, as it certainly did
to the old continent. The savage injustice of the Europeans
rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to
all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate
countries.
The discovery of a passage to the East Indies, by the Cape
of Good Hope, which happened much about the same time,
opened, perhaps, a still more extensive range to foreign
commerce than even that of America, notwithstanding the
greater distance. There were but two nations in America,
in any respect superior to savages, and these were destroyed
almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages.
But the empires of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as sev
eral others in the East Indies, without having richer mines
of gold or silver, were in every other respect much richer,
better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and manu
factures than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should
credit, what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated ac
counts of the Spanish writers, concerning the ancient state
of those empires. But rich and civilized nations can always
exchange to a much greater value with one another, than
with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto
derived much less advantage from its commerce with the
East Indies, than from that with America. The Portuguese
monopolized the East India trade to themselves for about a
century, and it was only indirectly and through them, that
the other nations of Europe could either send out or receive
any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the be
ginning of the last century, began to encroach upon them,
they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive
company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes, have all
followed their example, so that no great nation in Europe
has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East
PRINCIPLE OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM 345
Indies. No other reason need be assigned why it has never
been so advantageous as the trade to America, which, be
tween almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies,
is free to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those
East India companies, their great riches, the great favour
and protection which these have procured them from their
respective governments, have excited much envy against
them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as
altogether pernicious, on account of the great quantities of
silver, which it every year exports from the countries from
which it is carried on. The parties concerned have replied,
that their trade, by this continual exportation of silver, might,
indeed, tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the
particular country from which it was carried on; because, by
the exportation of a part of the returns to other European
countries, it annually brought home a much greater quantity
of that metal than it carried out. Both the objection and
the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have
been just now examining. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
say any thing further about either. By the annual exporta
tion of silver to the East Indies, plate is probably somewhat
dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been ; and
coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of
labour and commodities. The former of these two effects is
a very small loss, the latter a very small advantage ; both too
insignificant to deserve any part of the public attention. The
trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the com
modities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing1,
to the gold and silver which is purchased with those com
modities, must necessarily tend to increase the annual pro
duction of European commodities, and consequently the real
wealth and revenue of Europe. That it has hitherto in
creased them so little, is probably owing to the restraints
which it every-where labours under.
I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedi
ous, to examine at full length this popular notion that wealth
consists in money, or in gold and silver. Money in common
language, as I have already observed, frequently signifies
wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered this
popular notion so familiar to us, that even they, who are
346 WEALTH OF NATIONS
convinced of its absurdity, are very apt to forget their own
principles, and in the course of their reasonings to take it
for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. Some of the
best English writers upon commerce set out with observing,
that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and
silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods
of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings,
however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods seem to
slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument
frequently supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver,
and that to multiply those metals is the great object of na
tional industry and commerce.
The two principles being established, however, that wealth
consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be
brought into a country which had no mines only by the
balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it
imported; it necessarily became the great object of political
oeconomy to diminish as much as possible the importation of
foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as
much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic
industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country,
therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encourage
ments to exportation.
The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.
First, Restraints upon the importation of such foreign
goods for home consumption as could be produced at home,
from whatever country they were imported.
Secondly, Restraints upon the importation of goods of
almost all kinds from those particular countries with which
the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous.
Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high du
ties, and sometimes in absolute prohibitions.
Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks,
sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties
of commerce with foreign states, and sometimes by the es
tablishment of colonies in distant countries.
Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When
the home manufacturers were subject to any duty or excise
either the whole or a part of it was frequently drawn back
upon their exportation; and when foreign goods liable to a
PRINCIPLE OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM 347
duty were imported in order to be exported again, either
the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back
upon such exportation.
Bounties were given for the encouragement either of some
beginning manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of
other kinds as were supposed to deserve particular favour.
By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privi
leges were procured in some foreign state for the goods and
merchants of the country, beyond what were granted to
those of other countries.
By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not
only particular privileges, but a monopoly was frequently
procured for the goods and merchants of the country which
established them.
The two sorts of restraints upon importation above-men
tioned, together with these four encouragements to exporta
tion, constitute the six principal means by which the com
mercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold
and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in
its favour. I shall consider each of them In a particular
chapter, and without taking much further notice of their
supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I shall
examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of
them upon the annual produce of its industry. According
as they tend either to increase or diminish the value of this
annual produce, they must evidently tend either to increase
or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.
CHAPTER II
Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign
Countries of Such Goods as Can Be
Produced at Home
BY restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute pro
hibitions, the importation of such goods from foreign
countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly
of the home market is more or less secured to the domestic
industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition
of importing either live cattle or salt provisions from foreign
countries secures to the graziers of Great Britain the
monopoly of the home market for butcher's meat. The high
duties upon the importation of corn, which in times of mod
erate plenty amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage
to the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the
importation of foreign woollens is equally favourable to the
woollen manufacturers. The silk- manufacture, though alto
gether employed upon foreign materials, has lately obtained
the same advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet ob
tained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other
sorts of manufacturers have, in the same manner, obtained
in Great Britain, either altogether, or very nearly a mo
nopoly against their countrymen The variety of goods of
which the importation into Great Britain is prohibited, either
absolutely, or under certain circumstances, greatly exceeds
what can easily be suspected by those who are not well ac
quainted with" the laws of the customs.
That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives
great encouragement to that particular species of industry
which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employ
ment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the
society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be
doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general
348
RESTRAINTS OP PARTICULAR IMPORTS 349
industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous
direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident.
The general industry of the society never can exceed what
the capital of the society can employ. As the number of
workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular
person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the
number of those that can be continually employed by all
the members of a great society, must bear a certain pro
portion to the whole capital of that society, and never can
exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can in
crease the quantity of industry in any society beyond what
its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it
into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone ;
and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is
likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into
which it would have gone of its own accord.
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out
the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he
can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not
that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of
his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him
to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to
the society.
First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital
as near home as he can, and consequently as much as he
can in the support of domestic industry; provided always
that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal
less than the ordinary profits of stock
Thus, upon equal or nearly equal profits, every wholesale
merchant naturally prefers the home-trade to the foreign
trade of consumption, and the foreign trade of consumption
to the carrying trade In the home-trade his capital is never
so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign
trade of consumption He can know better the character
and situation of the person whom he trusts, and if he should
happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the coun
try from which he must seek redress. In the carrying trade,
the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between
two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily
brought home, or placed under his own immediate view and
350 WEALTH OF NATIONS
command. The capital which an Amsterdam merchant em
ploys in carrying corn from Konnigsberg to Lisbon, and
fruit and wine from Lisbon to Konnigsberg, must generally
be the one-half of it at Konnigsberg and the other half at
Lisbon. No part of it need ever come to Amsterdam. The
natural residence of such a merchant should either be at
Konnigsberg or Lisbon, and it can only be some very par
ticular circumstances which can make him prefer the resi
dence of Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he
feels at being separated so far from his capital, generally
determines him to bring part both of the Konnigsberg goods
which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the
Lisbon goods which he destines for that of Konnigsberg, to
Amsterdam; and though this necessarily subjects him to a
double charge of loading and unloading, as well as to the
payment of some duties and customs, yet for the sake of
having some part of his capital always under his own view
and command, he willingly submits to this extraordinary
charge ; and it is in this manner that every country which
has any considerable share of the carrying trade, becomes
always the emporium, or general market, for the goods of
all the different countries whose trade it carries on. The
merchant, in order to save a second loading and unloading,
endeavors always to sell in the home-market as much of the
goods of all those different countries as he can, and thus,
so far as he can, to convert his carrying trade into a foreign
trade of consumption. A merchant, in the same manner, who
is engaged in the foreign trade of consumption, when he
collects goods for foreign markets, will always be glad, upon
equal or nearly equal profits, to sell as great a part of them
at home as he can. He saves himself the risk and trouble
of exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts his
foreign trade of consumption into a home-trade. Home is
in this manner the center, if I may say so, round which trie
capitals of the inhabitants of every country are continually
circulating, and towards which they are always tending,
though by particular causes they may sometimes be driven off
and repelled from it towards more distant employments. But
a capital employed in the home-trade, it has already been
shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of do-
RESTRAINTS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTS 351
PART I
Of the Unreasonableness
Principles Of The
Of Those
Commercial
Restraints
System
Even Upon thb
PART II
Of the Unreasonableness Of Those Extraordinary Restraints
Upon Other Principles
\
,:
304
diminished. But WEALTH
the very OF
reason
NATIONS
for which it has been.
this principle.
But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the
industry of the great body of the people, in order to support
that of some particular class of manufacturers; yet in the
wantonness of great prosperity, when the public enjoys a
greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give
such bounties to favourite manufacturers, may, perhaps, be
406 WEALTH OF NATIONS
as natural, as to incur any other idle expence. In public, as
well as in private expences, great wealth may, perhaps, fre
quently be admitted as an apology for great folly. But there
must surely be something more than ordinary absurdity, in
continuing such profusion in times of general difficulty and
distress.
What is called a bounty is sometimes no more than a
drawback, and consequently is not liable to the same objec
tions as what is properly a bounty. The bounty, for example,
upon refined sugar exported, may be considered as a draw
back of the duties upon the brown and muscovado sugars
from which it is made. The bounty upon wrought silk ex
ported, a drawback of the duties upon raw and thrown silk
imported. The bounty upon gunpowder exported, a draw
back of the duties upon brimstone and saltpetre imported.
In the language of the customs those allowances only are
called drawbacks, which are given upon goods exported in
the same form in which they are imported. When that form
has been so altered by manufacture of any kind, as to come
under a new denomination, they are called bounties.
Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacttf /ers
who excel in their particular occupations, are not liable to
the same objections as bounties. By encouraging extraordi
nary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve to keep up the emu
lation of the workmen actually employed in those respective
occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn towards
any one of them a greater share of the capital of the country
than what would go to it of its own accord. Their tendency
is not to overturn the natural balance of employments, but to
render the work which is done in each as perfect and com
plete as possible. The expence of premiums, besides, is very
trifling; that of bounties very great. The bounty upon corn
alone has sometimes cost the public in one year more than
three hundred thousand pounds.
Bounties are sometimes called premiums, as drawbacks
are sometimes called bounties. But we must in all cases at
tend to the nature of the thing, without paying any regard
to the word.
CHAPTER VI
Of Treaties of Commerce
PART I
Of the Motives for Establishing new Colonies
graziers.
Restraints, either by prohibitions or by taxes, upon the
exportation of goods which are partially, but not completely
manufactured, are not peculiar to the manufacture of
leather. As long as any thing remains to be done, in order
to fit any commodity for immediate use and consumption,
our manufacturers think that they themselves ought to have
the doing of it. Woollen yarn and worsted are prohibited
to be exported under the same penalties as wool. Even while
cloths are subject to a duty upon exportation, and our
dyers have so far obtained a monopoly against our clothiers.
Our clothiers would probably have been able to defend them
selves against it, but it happens that the greater part of our
principal
cases, clock-cases,
clothiers are
and themselves
dial-plates likewise
for clocks
dyers.
and watches
Watch-
CHAPTER I
Of The Expenses Of The Sovereign or Commonwealth
PART I
Of The Expense Of Defence
THE first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the
society from the violence and invasion of other inde
pendent societies, can be performed only by means of
a military force. But the expence both of preparing this
military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time
of war, is very different in the different states of society, in
the different periods of improvement.
Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of
society, such as we find it among the native tribes of North
America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. When
he goes to war, either to defend his society, or to revenge
the injuries which have been done to it by other societies,
he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner
as when he lives at home. His society, for in this state of
things there is properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth,
or
is at
to no
maintain
sort ofhim
expence,
while he
either
is intoit.prepare him for the field,
**********
When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a
militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any
barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood.
The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia
by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural superi-
468
EXPENCE OF DEFENCE 469
ority, which the militia of a barbarous, has over that of a
civilized nation. A well-regulated standing army is superior
to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be maintained
by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such
a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neigh
bour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore,
that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or
even preserved for any considerable time.
As it is only by means of a well-regulated standing army
that a civilized country can be defended; so it is only by
means of it, that a barbarous country can be suddenly and
tolerably civilized. A standing army establishes, with an
irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the re
motest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree
of regular government in countries which could not other
wise admit of any. Whoever examines, with attention, the
improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the
Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve them
selves into the establishment of a well-regulated standing
army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all
his other regulations. That degree of order and internal
peace, which that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether
owing to the influence of that army.
Men of republican principles have been jealous of a stand
ing army as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever
the interest of the general and that of the principal officers
are not necessarily connected with the support of the consti
tution of the state. The standing army of Caesar destroyed
the Roman republic. The standing army of Cromwel turned
the long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign
is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry
of the country the chief officers of the army ; where the mili
tary force is placed under the command of those who have
the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, be
cause they have themselves the greatest share of that
authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty.
On the contrary, it may in some cases be favourable to lib
erty. The security which it gives to the sovereign renders
unnecessary that troublessome jealousy, which, in some mod
ern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and
470 WEALTH OF NATIONS
to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.
Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by
the principal people of the country, is endangered by every
popular discontent ; where a small tumult is capable of bring
ing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole
authority of government must be employed to suppress and
punish every murmur and complaint against it. To a sov
ereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only
by
regulated
the natural
standing
aristocracy
army, the of
rudest,
the country,
the most groundless,
but by a well-
and
PART II
Of the Expence of Justice
The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as
far as possible, every member of the society from the in
justice or oppression of every other member of it, or
the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice
periods
requires of
toosociety.
very different degrees of expence in the different
* * * * * * * * * *
Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis
in any country. Lawyers and attornies, at least, must al
ways be paid by the parties ; and, if they were not, they would
perform their duty still worse than they actually perform it.
The fees annually paid to lawyers and attornies amount, in
472 WEALTH OF NATIONS ,
PART III
Of The Expense of Public Works and Public Institutions
The third and last duty of the sovereign or common
wealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public
institutions and those public works, which, though they
may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society,
474 WEALTH OF NATIONS
are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never
repay the expence to any individual or small number of indi
viduals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any
individual or small number of individuals should erect or
maintain. The performance of this duty requires too very
different degrees of expence in the different periods of
society.
After the public institutions and public works necessary
for the defence of the society, and for the administration of
justice, both of which have already been mentioned, the other
works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for
facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for pro
moting the instruction of the people. The institutions for
instruction are of two kinds ; those for the education of the
youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages.
The consideration of the manner in which the expence of
those different sorts of public works and institutions may
be most properly defrayed, will divide this third part of the
present chapter into three different articles.
ARTICLE I
Of the Public Works and Institutions for Facilitating the
Commerce Of The Society
And, First, of Those Which are Necessary for Facilitating
Commerce in General
That the erection and maintenance of the public works
which facilitate the commerce of any country, such as
good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, &c.
must require very different degrees of expence in the differ
ent periods of society, is evident without any proof. The
expence of making and maintaining the public roads of any
country must evidently increase with the annual produce of
the land and labour of that country, or with the quantity
and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to fetch
and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must
be suited to the number and weight of the carriages which
are likely to pass over it. The depth and the supply of
water for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the num
COMMERCE IN GENERAL 475
ber and tonnage of the lighters, which are likely to carry
goods upon it; the extent of a harbour to the number of the
shipping which are likely to take shelter in it.
It does not seem necessary that the expence of those pub
lic works should be defrayed from that public revenue, as it
is commonly called, of which the collection and application
are in most countries assigned to the executive power. The
greater part of such public works may easily be so managed,
as to afford a particular revenue sufficient for defraying their
own expence, without bringing any burden upon the general
revenue of the society.
A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may
in most cases be both made and maintained by a small toll
upon the carriages which make use of them : a harbour, by a
moderate port-duty upon the tunnage of the shipping which
load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for
facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays
its own expence, but affords a small revenue or seignorage
to the sovereign. The post-office, another institution for the
same purpose, over and above defraying its own expence,
affords in almost all countries a very considerable revenue
to the sovereign.
When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge,
and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll
in proportion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for
the maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion
to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems
scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintain
ing such works. This tax or toll too, though it is advanced
by the carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it
must always be charged in the price of the goods. As the
expence of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means
of such public works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll,
come cheaper to the consumer than they could otherwise have
done ; their price not being so much raised by the toll, as it is
lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The person who
finally pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application, more
than he loses by the payment of it. His payment is exactly
in proportion to his gain. It is in reality no more than a part
of that gain which he is obliged to give up in order to get
476 WEALTH OF NATIONS
the rest. It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable
method of raising a tax.
When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches,
post-chaises, &c. is made somewhat higher in proportion to
their weight, than upon carriages of necessary use, such as
carts, waggons, &c. the indolence and vanity of the rich is
made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the
poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods
to all the different parts of the country.
When high roads, bridges, canals, &c. are in this manner
made and supported by the commerce which is carried on by
means of them, they can be made only where that commerce
requires them, and consequently where it is proper to make
them. Their expence too, their grandeur and magnificence,
must be suited to what that commerce can afford to pay.
They must be made consequently as it is proper to make them.
A magnificent high road cannot be made through a desart
country where there is little or no commerce, or merely be
cause it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant
of the province, or to that of some great lord to whom the
intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A great
bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where no
body passes, or merely to embellish the view from the win
dows of a neighbouring palace : things which sometimes hap
pen, in countries where works of this kind are carried on by
any other revenue than that which they themselves are
capable of affording.
In several different parts of Europe the toll or lock-duty
upon a canal is the property of private persons, whose pri
vate interest obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not
kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases alto
gether, and along with it the whole profit which they can
make by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the manage
ment of commissioners, who had themselves no interest in
them, they might be less attentive to the maintenance of the
works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc cost
the king of France and the province upwards of thirteen mil
lions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of
silver, the value of French money in the end of the last cen
tury) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds
COMMERCE IN GENERAL 477
sterling. When that great work was finished, the most likely
method, it was found, of keeping it in constant repair was to
make a present of the tolls to Riquet the engineer, who
planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute at
present a very large estate to the different branches of the
family of that gentleman, who have, therefore, a great in
terest to keep the work in constant repair. But had those
tolls been put under the management of commissioners,
who had no such interest, they might perhaps have been
dissipated in ornamental and unnecessary expences, while
the most essential parts of the work were allowed to go
to ruin.
The tolls for the maintenance of a high road, cannot with
any safety be made the property of private persons. A high
road, though entirely neglected, does not become altogether
impassable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the
tolls upon a high road, therefore, might neglect altogether the
repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the
same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the
maintenance of such work should be put under the manage
ment of commissioners or trustees.
**********
Even those public works which are of such a nature that
they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves,
but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to some par
ticular place or district, are always better maintained by a
local or provincial revenue, under the management of a local
and provincial administration, than by the general revenue
of the state, of which the executive power must always have
the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted
and paved at the expense of the treasury, is there any prob
ability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they
are at present, or even at so small an expence? The ex-
pence, besides, instead f being raised by a local tax upon
the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district
in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general
revenue of the state, and would onsequently be raised by a
tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the
greater part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and
paving of the streets of London.,
478 WEALTH OF NATIONS
The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and pro
vincial administration of a local and provincial revenue, how
enormous soever they may appear, are in reality, however,
almost always very trifling, in comparison of those which
commonly take place in the administration and expenditure
of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much
more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial admin
istration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six
days labour which the country people are obliged to give to
the reparation of the highways, is not always perhaps very
judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any
circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France, under the
administration of the intendants, the application is not always
more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel
and oppressive. Such Corvees, as they are called, make one
of the principal instruments of tyranny by which those of
ficers chastise any parish or communeaute which has had the
misfortune to fall under their displeasure.
ARTICLE II
Of the Expence Of The Institutions For The Education
of Youth
ARTICLE III
Of the Expence Of The Institutions For The Instruction of
People Of All Ages
The institutions for the instruction of people of all
ages are chiefly those for religious instruction. This is a
species of instruction of which the object is not so
much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to
prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come.
The teachers of the doctrine which contains this instruction,
in the same manner as other teachers, may either depend al
together for their subsistence upon the voluntary contribu
tions of their hearers ; or they may derive it from some other
fund to which the law of their country may entitle them;
such as a landed estate, a tythe or land tax, an established
salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and industry,
are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in
the latter. In this respect the teachers of new religions have
always had a considerable advantage in attacking those
ancient and established systems of which the clergy, reposing
themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the
fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people ;
and having given themselves up to indolence, were become al
together incapable of making any vigorous exertion in de
fence even of their own establishment.
PART IV
Of the Expence of Supporting the Dignity Of The Sovereign
Over and above the expence necessary for enabling
the sovereign to perform his several duties, a certain
expence is requisite for the support of his dignity. This
expence varies both with the different periods of improve
ment, and with the different forms of government.
In an opulent and improved society, where all the different
orders of people are growing every day more expensive in
their houses, in their furniture, in their tables, in their dress,
and in their equipage; it cannot well be expected that the
CONCLUSION 487
sovereign should alone hold out against the fashion. He
naturally, therefore, or rather necessarily becomes more ex
pensive in all those different articles too. His dignity even
seems to require that he should become so.
As in point of dignity, a monarch is more raised above his
subjects than the chief magistrate of any republic is ever
supposed to be above his fellow-citizens ; so a greater expence
is necessary for supporting that higher dignity. We nat
urally expect more splendor in the court of a king, than in
the mansion-house of a doge or burgo-master.
CONCLUSION
PART I
Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue Which May Peculiarly
Belong To The Sovereign or Commonwealth
the lands, from that of all the houses, and from the interest
of all the capital stock, that part of it only excepted which
is either lent to the public, or employed in the cultivation of
land, does not exceed ten millions sterling a year, the or
dinary revenue which government levies upon the people even
in peaceable times. The estimation by which Great Britain
is rated to the land-tax is, no doubt, taking the whole king
dom at an average, very much below the real value ; though
in several particular counties and districts it is said to be
nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands alone, ex
clusive of that of houses, and of the interest of stock, has by
many people been estimated at twenty millions, an estimation
made in a great measure at random, and which, I apprehend,
is as likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands
of Great Britain, in the present state of their cultivation, do
not afford a rent of more than twenty millions a year, they
could not well afford the half, most probably not the fourth
part of that rent, if they all belonged to a single proprietor,
and were put under the negligent, expensive, and oppressive
management of his factors and agents. The crown lands of
Great Britain do not at present afford the fourth part of the
rent, which could probably be drawn from them if they were
the property of private persons. If the crown lands were
more extensive, it is probable they would be still worse
managed.
The revenue which the great body of the people derives
from land is in proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce
of the land. The whole annual produce of the land of every
496 WEALTH OF NATIONS
country, if we except what is reserved for seed, is either
annually consumed by the great body of the people, or ex
changed for something else that is consumed by them. What
ever keeps down the produce of the land below what it would
otherwise rise to, keeps down the revenue of the great body
of the people, still more than it does that of the proprietors
of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which
belongs to the proprietors, is scarce anywhere in Great
Britain supposed to be more than a third part of the whole
produce. If the land, which in one state of cultivation affords
a rent of ten millions sterling a year, would in another afford
a rent of twenty millions ; the rent being, in both cases, sup
posed a third part of the produce; the revenue of the pro
prietors would be less than it otherwise might be by ten mil
lions a year only; but the revenue of the great body of the
people would be less than it otherwise might be by thirty
millions a year, deducting only what would be necessary for
seed. The population of the country would be less by the
number of people which thirty millions a year, deducting al
ways the seed, could maintain, according to the particular
mode of living and expence which might take place in the
different ranks of men among whom the remainder was
distributed.
Though there is not at present, in Europe, any civilized
state of any kind which derives the greater part of its public
revenue from the rent of lands which are the property of the
state; yet, in all the great monarchies of Europe, there are
still many large tracts of land which belong to the crown.
They are generally forest; and sometimes forest where, after
travelling several miles, you will scarce find a single tree ; a
mere waste and loss of country in respect both of produce and
population. In every great monarchy of Europe the sale of the
crown lands would produce a very large sum of money,
which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would
deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any
which those lands have ever afforded to the crown. In coun
tries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, and
yielding at the time of sale as great a rent as can easily be
got from them, commonly sell at thirty years purchase; the
unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands might
FUNDS OF THE SOVEREIGN 497
well be expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years pur
chase. The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue
which this great price would redeem from mortgage. In the
course of a few years it would probably enjoy another rev
enue. When the crown lands had become private property,
they would, in the course of a few years, become well im
proved and well cultivated. The increase of their produce
would increase the population of the country, by augmenting
the revenue and consumption of the people. But the revenue
which the crown derives from the duties of customs and ex
cise, would necessarily increase with the revenue and con
sumption of the people.
The revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown
derives from the crown lands, though it appears to cost noth
ing to individuals, in reality costs more to the society than
perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys.
It would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society to
replace this revenue to the crown by some other equal rev
enue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could
not well be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them
to public sale.
Lands, for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence,
parks, gardens, public walks, &c., possessions which are
every where considered as causes of expence, not as sources
of revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in a great and
civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.
Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources
of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or
commonwealth, being both improper and insufficient funds
for defraying the necessary expence of any great and civi
lized state; it remains that this expence must, the greater
part of it, be defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the
people contributing a part of their own private revenue in
order to make up a public revenue to the sovereign or com
monwealth.
498 WEALTH OF NATIONS
PART I
Of Taxes
The private revenue of individuals, it has been shewn
in the first book of this Inquiry, arises ultimately from
three different sources: Rent, Profit, and Wages. Every
tax must finally be paid from some one or other of
those three different sorts of revenue, or from all of them
indifferently. I shall endeavour to give the best account I
can, first, of those taxes which, it is intended, should fall
upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is intended, should
fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended, should
fall upon wages ; and, fourthly, of those which, it is intended,
should fall indifferently upon all those three different sources
of private revenue. The particular consideration of each of
these four different sorts of taxes will divide the second
part of the present chapter into four articles, three of which
will require several other subdivisions. Many of those taxes,
it will appear from the following review, are not finally paid
from the fund, or source of revenue, upon which it was in
tended they should fall.
Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes,
it is necessary to premise the four following maxims with
regard to taxes in general.
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards
the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in pro
portion to their respective abilities ; that is, in proportion to
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protec
tion of the state. The expence of government to the indi
viduals of a great nation, is like the expence of manage
ment to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged
to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in
the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim
consists, what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.
Every tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls
finally upon one only of the three sorts of revenue above
mentioned, is necessarily unequal, in so far as it does not
affect the other two. In the following examination of dif
ferent taxes I shall seldom take much further notice of this
TAXES 499
sort of inequality, but shall, in most cases, confine my obser
vations to that inequality which is occasioned by a particular
tax falling unequally even upon that particular sort of pri
vate revenue which is affected by it.
II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought
to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the
manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be
clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.
Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put
more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can
either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or
extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or
perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encour
ages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of
men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are
neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each in
dividual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great
importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality,
it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is
not near so great an evil as a very small degree of un
certainty.
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the
manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the
contributor to pay it A tax upon the rent of land or of
houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are
usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to
be convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is
most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such
consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally
paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very
convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he
has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too, either
to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault
if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such
taxes.
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out
and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as pos
sible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury
of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the
pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into
500 WEALTH OF NATIONS
the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the
levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose
salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the
tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional
tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry
of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain
branches of business which might give maintenance and em
ployment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to
pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the
funds which might enable them more easily to do so.
Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which
those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuc
cessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin
them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the
community might have received from the employment
of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great
temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling
must rise in proportion to the temptation. The law, con
trary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates
the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and
it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to
the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it,
the temptation to commit the crime. Fourthly, by subjecting
the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination
of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unneces
sary trouble, vexation, and oppression ; and though vexation
is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent
to the expence at which every man would be willing to re
deem himself from it. It is in some one or other of these
four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more
burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the
sovereign.
The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims
ARTICLE I
Taxes upon Rent. Taxes Upon The Rent of Land.
ARTICLE II
Taxes upon Profit, Or Upon The Revenue Arising From Stock
the country, which in most places has raised very much the
value of all these, has rendered those inequalities of still
less importance now. The rate too upon each district con
tinuing always the same, the uncertainty of this tax, so far
as it might be assessed upon the stock of any individual,
has been very much diminished, as well as rendered of much
less consequence. If the greater part of the lands of Eng
land are not rated to the land-tax at half their actual value,
the greater part of the stock of England is, perhaps, scarce
rated at the fiftieth part of its actual value. In some towns
the whole land-tax is assessed upon houses; as in West
minster, where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in
London.
In all countries a severe inquisition into the circumstances
of private persons has been carefully avoided.
At Hamburgh every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the
state, one-fourth per cent. of all that he possesses; and as
the wealth of the people of Hamburgh consists principally
in stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock.
Every man assesses himself, and, in the presence of the
magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain
sum of money, which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth
per cent, of all that he possesses, but without declaring what
it amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that
subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with
great fidelity. In a small republic, where the people have
entire confidence in their magistrates, are convinced of the
necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe
that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such con
scientious and voluntary payment may sometimes be ex
pected. It is not peculiar to the people of Hamburgh.
The canton of Underwald in Switaerland is frequently
ravaged by storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed
to extraordinary expences. Upon such occasions the people
assemble, and every one is said to declare with the greatest
frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly.
At Zurich the law orders, that, in cases of necessity, every
one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue; the amount
of which, he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no
suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow-citizens will
TAXES ON PROFITS IN GENERAL 523
deceive them. At Basil the principal revenue of the state
arises from a small custom upon goods exported. All the
citizens make oath that they will pay every three months
all the taxes imposed by the law. All merchants and even
all inn-keepers are trusted with keeping themselves the ac
count of the goods which they sell either within or without
the territory. At the end of every three months they send
this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the tax
computed at the bottom of it. It is not suspected that the
revenue suffers by this confidence.
To oblige every citizen to declare publicly upon oath the
amount of his fortune, must not, it seems, in those Swiss
cantons, be reckoned a hardship. At Hamburgh it would
be reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the hazard
ous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being
obliged at all times to expose the real state of their circum
stances. The ruin of their credit and the miscarriage of
their projects, they foresee, would too often be the conse
quence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers
to all such projects, do not feel that they have occasion for
any such concealment.
In Holland, soon after the exaltation of the late prince of
Orange to the stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent. or the
fiftieth penny, as it was called, was imposed upon the whole
substance of every citizen. Every citizen assessed himself
and paid his tax in the same manner as at Hamburgh; and
it was in general supposed to have been paid with great
fidelity. The people had at that time the greatest affection
for their new government, which they had just established
by a general insurrection. The tax was to be paid but once ;
in order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was,
indeed, too heavy to be permanent. In a country where the
market rate of interest seldom exceeds three per cent., a tax
of two per cent. amounts to thirteen shillings and fourpen'ce
in the pound upon the highest neat revenue which is com
monly drawn from stock. It is a tax which very few people
could pay without encroaching more or less upon their capi
tals. In a particular exigency the people may, from great
public zeal, make a great effort, and give up even a part of
their capital, in order to relieve the state. But it is im
524 WEALTH OF NATIONS
possible that they should continue to do so for any con
siderable time; and if they did, the tax would soon ruin
them so completely as to render them altogether incapable
of supporting the state.
The tax upon stock imposed by the land-tax bill in Eng
land, though it is proportioned to the capital, is not intended
to diminish or take away any part of that capital. It is
meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money pro
portioned to that upon the rent of land; so that when the
latter is at four shillings in the pound, the former may be at
four shillings in the pound too. The tax at Hamburgh, and
the still more moderate taxes of Underwald and Zurich, are
meant, in the same manner, to be taxes, not upon the capi
tal, but upon the interest or neat revenue of stock. That of
Holland was meant to be a tax upon the capital.
ARTICLE III
Taxes Upon The Wages of Labour
ARTICLE IV
Taxes Which, It Is Intended, Should Fall Indifferently Upon
Every Different Species Of Revenue
,,
544 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it is
compensated by a proportionable rise in the wages of labour,
must necessarily diminish more or less the ability of the poor
to bring up numerous families, and consequently to supply
the demand for useful labour ; whatever may be the state of
that demand, whether increasing, stationary, or declining;
or such as requires an increasing, stationary, or declining
population.
Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price
of any other commodities except that of the commodities
taxed. Taxes upon necessaries, by raising the wages of
labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all manufac
tures, and consequently to diminish the extent of their sale
and consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by
the consumers of the commodities taxed, without any retri
bution. They fall indifferently upon every species of reve
nue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, and the rent
of land. Taxes upon necessaries, so far as they affect the
labouring poor, are finally paid, partly by landlords in the
diminished rent of their lands, and partly by rich consumers,
whether landlords or others, in the advanced price of manu
factured goods; and always with a considerable over-charge.
The advanced price of such manufactures as are real neces
saries of life, and are destined for the consumption of the
poor, of coarse woollens, for example, must be compensated
to the poor by a farther advancement of their wages. The
middling and superior ranks of people, if they understood
their own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon
the necessaries of life, as well as all direct taxes upon the
wages of labour. The final payment of both the one and the
other falls altogether upon themselves, and always with a
considerable over-charge. They fall heaviest upon the land
lords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that of land
lords, by the reduction of their rent ; and in that of rich con
sumers, by the increase of their expence. The observation
of Sir Matthew Decker, that certain taxes are, in the price
of certain goods, sometimes repeated and accumulated four
or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon the
necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example,
you must pay, not only for the tax upon the leather of your
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 545
own shoes, but for a part of that upon those of the shoe
maker and the tanner. You must pay too for the tax upon
the salt, upon the soap, and upon the candles which those
workmen consume while employed in your service, and for
maker,
the tax and
uponthethecandle-maker
leather, which
consume
the salt-maker,
while employed
the soap-
in
their service.
In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries
of life are those upon the four commodities just now men
tioned, salt, leather, soap, and candles.
. Salt is a very ancient and a very universal subject of tax
ation. It was taxed among the Romans, and it is so at pres
ent in, I believe, every part of Europe. The quantity an
nually consumed by any individual is so small, and may be
purchased so gradually, that nobody, it seems to have been
thought, could feel very sensibly even a pretty heavy tax
upon it. It is in England taxed at three shillings and four-
pence a bushel; about three times the original price of the
commodity. In some other countries the tax is still higher.
Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders
soap such. In countries where the winter nights are long,
candles are a necessary instrument of trade. Leather and
soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a pound;
candles at a penny; taxes which, upon the original price of
leather, may amount to about eight or ten per cent.; upon
that of soap about twenty or five and twenty per cent.,
and upon that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per
cent.; taxes which, though lighter than that upon salt, are
still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real
necessaries of life, such heavy taxes upon them must in
crease somewhat the expence of the sober and industrious
poor, and must consequently raise more or less the wages of
their labour.
In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great
Britain, fuel is, during that season, in the strictest sense of
the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose of
dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of
many different sorts of workmen who work within doors;
and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has
so important an influence upon that of labour, that all over
546 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Great Britain manufactures have confined themselves prin
cipally to the coal countries ; other parts of the country, on
account of the high price of this necessary article, not being
able to work so cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal
is a necessary instrument of trade; as in those of glass, iron,
and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be rea
sonable, it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of
coals from those parts of the country in which they abound,
to those in which they are wanted. But the legislature, in
stead of a bounty, has imposed a tax of three shillings and
three-pence a ton upon coal carried coastways; which upon
most sorts of coal is more than sixty per cent. of the original
price at the coal-pit. Coals carried either by land or by
inland navigation pay no duty. Where they are naturally
cheap, they are consumed duty free; where they are nat
urally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty.
Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and
consequently the wages of labour, yet they afford a consid
erable revenue to government, which it might not be easy to
find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good rea
sons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation
of corn, so far as it tends in the actual state of tillage to
raise the price of that necessary article, produces all the like
bad effects ; and instead of affording any revenue, frequently
occasions a very great expense to government. The high
duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which in years
of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition; and the abso
lute prohibition of the importation either of live cattle or of
salt provisions, which takes place in the ordinary state of
the law, and which, on account of the scarcity, is at present
suspended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the
British plantations, have all the bad effects of taxes upon the
necessaries of life, and produce no revenue to government.
Nothing seems necessary for the repeal of such regulations,
but to convince the public of the futility of that system in
consequence of which they have been established.
Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in
many other countries than in Great Britain. Duties upon
flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon bread
when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 547
Holland the money price of the bread consumed in towns is
supposed to be doubled by means of such taxes. In lieu of
a part of them, the people who live in the country pay every
year so much a head, according to the sort of bread they are
supposed to consume. Those who consume wheaten bread,
pay three guilders fifteen stivers; about six shillings and
ninepence halfpenny. These, and some other taxes of the
same kind, by raising the price of labour, are said to have
ruined the greater part of the manufactures of Holland.
Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the
Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the dutchy of Modena,
in the dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and in
the ecclesiastical state. A French author of some note has
proposed to reform the finances of his country, by substitut
ing in the room of the greater part of other taxes, this most
ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd, says
Cicero, which has not sometimes been asserted by some
philosophers.
Taxes upon butchers meat are still more common than
those upon bread. It may indeed be doubted whether
butchers meat is any where a necessary of life. Grain and
other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheese, and butter,
or oil, where butter is not to be had, it is known from ex
perience, can, without any butchers meat, afford the most
plentiful, the most wholesome, the most nourishing, and the
most invigorating diet. Decency no where requires that any
man should eat butchers meat, as it in most places requires
that he should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes.
Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries,
may be taxed in two different ways. The consumer may
either pay an annual sum on account of his using or con
suming goods of a certain kind; or the goods may be taxed
while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they
are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods which
last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether,
are most properly taxed in the one way. Those of which
the consumption is either immediate or more speedy, in the
other. The coach-tax and plate-tax are examples of the
former method of imposing: the greater part of the other
duties of excise and customs, of the latter.
548 WEALTH OF NATIONS
The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of
home produce destined for home consumption. They are
imposed only upon a few sorts of goods of the most general
use. There can never be any doubt either concerning the
goods which are subject to those duties, or concerning the
particular duty which each species of goods is subject to.
They fall almost altogether upon what I call luxuries, ex
cepting always the four duties above mentioned, upon salt,
soap, leather, candles, and, perhaps, that upon green glass.
The duties of customs are much more ancient than those
of excise. They seem to have been called customs, as de
noting customary payments which had been in use from time
immemorial. They appear to have been originally consid
ered as taxes upon the profits of merchants. During the
barbarous times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like all the
other inhabitants of burghs, were considered so little better
than emancipated bondmen, whose persons were despised, and
whose gains were envied. The great nobility, who had con
sented that the king should tallage the profits of their own
tenants, were not unwilling that he should tallage likewise
those of an order of men whom it was much less their in
terest to protect. In those ignorant times, it was not under
stood, that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable
directly; or that the final payment of all such taxes must
fall, with a considerable over-charge, upon the consumers.
The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more un
favourably than those of English merchants. It was nat
ural, therefore, that those of the former should be taxed more
heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between
the duties upon aliens and those upon English merchants,
which was begun from ignorance, has been continued from
the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants
an advantage both in the home and in the foreign market.
With this distinction, the ancient duties of customs were
imposed equally upon all sorts of goods, necessaries as well
as luxuries, goods exported as well as goods imported. Why
should the dealers in one sort of goods, it seems to have been
thought, be more favoured than those in another? or why
should the merchant exporter be more favoured than the
merchant importer?
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 549
The ancient customs were divided into three branches.
The first, and perhaps the most ancient of all those duties,
was that upon wool and leather. It seems to have been
chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen
manufacture came to be established in England, lest the king
should lose any part of his customs upon wool by the ex
portation of woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon
them. The other two branches were, first, a duty upon wine,
which, being imposed at so much a ton, was called a ton
nage; and, secondly, a duty upon all other goods, which,
being imposed at so much a pound of their supposed value,
was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Ed
ward III. a duty of sixpence in the pound was imposed upon
all goods exported and imported, except wools, wool-fells,
leather, and wines, which were subject to particular duties.
In the fourteenth of Richard II this duty was raised to one
shilling in the pound; but three years afterwards, it was
again reduced to sixpence. It was raised to eight-pence in
the second year of Henry IV. ; and in the fourth year of the
same prince, to one shilling. From this time to the ninth
year of William III. this duty continued at one shilling in
the pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were gen
erally granted to the king by one and the same act of par
liament, and were called the Subsidy of Tonnage and Pound
age. The subsidy of poundage having continued for so long
a time at one shilling in the pound, or at five per cent.; a
subsidy came, in the language of the customs, to denote a
general duty of this kind of five per cent. The subsidy,
which is now called the Old Subsidy, still continues to be
levied according to the book of rates established in the
twelfth of Charles II. The method of ascertaining, by a
book of rates, the value of goods subject to this duty, is said
to be older than the time of James I. The new subsidy im
posed by the ninth and tenth of William III , was an addi
tional five per cent. upon the greater part of goods. The
one-third and the two-third subsidy made up between them
another five per cent. of which they were proportionately
parts. The subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon
the greater part of goods ; and that of 1759, a fifth upon some
particular sorts of goods. Besides those five subsidies, a
550 WEALTH OF NATIONS
great variety of other duties have occasionally been imposed
upon particular sorts of goods, in order sometimes to relieve
the exigencies of the state, and sometimes to regulate the
trade of the country, according to the principles of the mer
cantile system.
That system has come gradually more and more into
fashion. The old subsidy was imposed indifferently upon
exportation as well as importation. The four subsequent
subsidies, as well as the other duties which have since been
occasionally imposed upon particular sorts of goods, have,
with a few exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation.
The greater part of the ancient duties which had been im
posed upon the exportation of the goods of home produce
and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away
altogether. In most cases they have been taken away.
Bounties have even been given upon the exportation of some
of them. Drawbacks too, sometimes of the whole, and, in
most cases, of a part of the duties which are paid upon the
importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their
exportation. Only half the duties imposed by the old subsidy
upon importation are drawn back upon exportation : but the
whole of those imposed by the latter subsidies and other im
posts are, upon the greater part of goods, drawn back in the
same manner. This growing favour of exportation, and dis
couragement of importation, have suffered only a few excep
tions, which chiefly concern the materials of some manufac
tures. These, our merchants and manufacturers are willing
should come as cheap as possible to themselves, and as dear
as possible to their rivals and competitors in other countries.
Foreign materials are, upon this account, sometimes allowed
to be imported duty free; Spanish wool, for example, flax,
and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of
home produce, and of those which are the particular produce
of our colonies, has sometimes been prohibited, and some
times subjected to higher duties. The exportation of Eng
lish wool has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of
beaver wool, and of gum Senega, has been subjected to higher
duties ; Great Britain, by the conquest of Canada and Senegal,
having got almost the monopoly of those commodities.
That the mercantile system has not been very favourable
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 551
to the revenue of the great body of the people, to the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, I have en
deavoured to shew in the fourth book of this Inquiry. It
seems not to have been more favourable to the revenue of the
sovereign; so far at least as that revenue depends upon the
duties of customs.
In consequence of that system, the importation of several
sorts of goods has been prohibited altogether. This pro
hibition has in some cases entirely prevented, and in others
has very much diminished the importation of those commodi
ties, by reducing the importers to the necessity of smuggling.
It has entirely prevented the importation of foreign woollens ;
and it has very much diminished that of foreign silks and
velvets. In both cases it has entirely annihilated the reve
nue of customs which might have been levied upon such
importation.
The high duties which have been imposed upon the im
portation of many different sorts of foreign goods, in order
to discourage their consumption in Great Britain, have in
many cases served only to encourage smuggling; and in all
cases have reduced the revenue of the customs below what
more moderate duties would have afforded. The saying of
Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the customs two and two,
instead of making four, make sometimes only one, holds per
fectly true with regard to such heavy duties, which never
could have been imposed, had not the mercantile system
taught us, in many cases, to employ taxation as an instru
ment, not of revenue, but of monopoly.
In order that the greater part of the members of any
society should contribute to the public revenue in proportion
to their respective expence, it does not seem necessary that
every single article of that expence should be taxed. The
revenue, which is levied by the duties of excise, is supposed
to fall as equally upon the contributors as that which is levied
by the duties of customs; and the duties of excise are im
posed upon a few articles only of the most general use and
consumption. It has been the opinion of many people, that,
by proper management, the duties of customs might likewise,
without any loss to the public revenue, and with great ad
vantage to foreign trade, be confined to a few articles only.
552 WEALTH OF NATIONS
The foreign articles, of the most general use and consump
tion in Great Britain, seem at present to consist chiefly in
foreign wines and brandies; in some of the productions of
America and the West Indies, sugar, rum, tobacco, cocoa-
nuts, &c. and in some of those of the East Indies, tea, coffee,
china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, several sorts of piece-
goods, &c. These different articles afford, perhaps, at pres
ent, the greater part of the revenue which is drawn from
the duties of customs. The taxes which at present subsist
upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few
contained in the foregoing enumeration, have the greater
part of them been imposed for the purpose, not of revenue,
but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an advantage
in the home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by
subjecting all foreign manufactures to such moderate taxes,
as it was found from experience afforded upon each article
the greatest revenue to the public, our own workmen might
still have a considerable advantage in the home market, and
many articles, some of which at present afford no revenue
to government, and others a very inconsiderable one, might
afford a very great one.
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of
the taxed commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smug
gling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government
than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.
When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the di
minution of consumption, there can be but one remedy, and
that is the lowering of the tax.
When the diminution of the revenue is the effect of the
encouragement given to smuggling, it may perhaps be reme
died in two ways ; either by diminishing the temptation to
smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of smuggling. The
temptation to smuggle can be diminished only by the lower
ing of the tax; and the difficulty of smuggling can be in
creased only by establishing that system of administration
which is most proper for preventing it.
The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience,
obstruct and embarrass the operations of the smuggler much
more effectually than those of the customs. By introducing
into the customs a system of administration as similar to
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 553
that of the excise as the nature of the different duties will
admit, the difficulty of smuggling might be very much in
creased. This alteration, it has been supposed by many
people, might very easily be brought about.
The importer of commodities liable to any duties of cus
toms, it has been said, might at his option be allowed either to
carry them to his own private warehouse, or to lodge them in
a warehouse provided either at his own expence or at that of
the public, but under the key of the customhouse officer, and
never to be opened but in his presence. If the merchant car
ried them to his own private warehouse, the duties to be
immediately paid, and never afterwards to be drawn back ;
and that warehouse to be at all times subject to the visit and
examination of the customhouse officer, in order to ascertain
how far the quantity contained in it corresponded with that
for which the duty had been paid. If he.carried them to the
public warehouse, no duty to be paid till they were taken out
for home consumption. If taken out for exportation, to be
duty-free ; proper security being always given that they
should be so exported. The dealers in those particular com
modities, either by wholesale or retail, to be at all times sub
ject to the visit and examination of the customhouse officer;
and to be obliged to justify by proper certificates the pay
ment of the duty upon the whole quantity contained in their
shops or warehouses. What are called the excise-duties
upon rum imported are at present levied in this manner, and
the same system of administration might perhaps be ex
tended to all duties upon goods imported; provided always
that those duties were, like the duties of excise, confined to
a few sorts of goods of the most general use and consump
tion. If they were extended to almost all sorts of goods, as
at present, public warehouses of sufficient extent could not
easily be provided, and goods of a very delicate nature, or of
which the preservation required much care and attention,
could not safely be trusted by the merchant in any warehouse
but his own.
If by such a system of administration smuggling, to any
considerable extent, could be prevented even under pretty high
duties; and if every duty was occasionally either heightened
or lowered according as it was most likely, either the one
554 WEALTH OF NATIONS
way or the other, to afford the greatest revenue to the state ;
taxation being always employed as an instrument of revenue
and never of monopoly; it seems not improbable that a reve
nue, at least equal to the present neat revenue of the cus
toms, might be drawn from duties upon the importation of
only a few sorts of goods of the most general use and con
sumption; and that the duties of customs might thus be
brought to the same degree of simplicity, certainty, and pre
cision, as those of excise. What the revenue at present loses,
by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods which
are afterwards relanded and consumed at home, would under
this system be saved altogether. If to this saving, which
would alone be very considerable, were added the abolition
of all bounties upon the exportation of home-produce; in all
cases in which those bounties were not in reality drawbacks
of some duties of excise which had before been advanced ; it
cannot well be doubted but that the neat revenue of customs
might, after an alteration of this kind, be fully equal to what
it had ever been before.
If by such a change of system the public revenue suffered
no loss, the trade and manufactures of the country would
certainly gain a very considerable advantage. The trade in
the commodities not taxed, by far the greatest number, would
be perfectly free, and might be carried on to and from all
parts of the world with every possible advantage. Among
those commodities would be comprehended all the necessaries
of life, and all the materials of manufacture. So far as the
free importation of the necessaries of life reduced their aver
age money price in the home market, it would reduce the
money price of labour, but without reducing in any respect
its real recompence. The value of money is in proportion to
the quantity of the necessaries of life which it will purchase.
That of the necessaries of life is altogether independent of
the quantity of money which can be had for them. The
reduction in the money price of labour would necessarily be
attended with a proportionable one in that of all home-manu
factures, which would thereby gain some advantage in all
foreign markets. The price of some manufactures would be
reduced in a still greater proportion by the free importation
of the raw materials. If raw silk could be imported from
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 555
China and Indostan duty-free, the silk manufacturers in
England could greatly undersell those of both France and
Italy. There would be no occasion to prohibit the importa
tion of foreign silks and velvets. The cheapness of their
goods would secure to our own workmen, not only the pos
session of the home, but a very great command of the foreign
market. Even the trade in the commodities taxed would be
carried on with much more advantage than at present. If
those commodities were delivered out of the public warehouse
for foreign exportation, being in this case exempted from all
taxes, the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carry
ing trade in all sorts of goods would under this system enjoy
every possible advantage. If those commodities were deliv
ered out for home-consumption, the importer not being
obliged to advance the tax till he had an opportunity of sell
ing his goods, either to some dealer, or to some consumer, he
could always afford to sell them cheaper than if he had been
obliged to advance it at the moment of importation. Under
the same taxes, the foreign trade of consumption even in the
taxed commodities, might in this manner be carried on with
much more advantage than it can at present.
It was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Rob
ert Walpole to establish, with regard to wine and tobacco, a
system not very unlike that which is here proposed. But
though the bill which was then brought into parliament, com
prehended those two commodities only ; it was generally sup
posed to be meant as an introduction to a more extensive
scheme of the same kind. Faction, combined with the in
terest of smuggling merchants, raised so violent, though so
unjust, a clamour against that bill, that the minister thought
proper to drop it ; and from a dread of exciting a clamour of
the same kind, none of his successors have dared to resume
the project.
The duties upon foreign luxuries imported for home-con
sumption, though they sometimes fall upon the poor, fall
principally upon people of middling or more than middling
fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign
wines, upon coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, &c.
The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home-produce
destined for home-consumption, fall pretty equally upon
556 WEALTH OF NATIONS
people of all ranks in proportion to their respective expense.
The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and ale, upon
their own consumption : The rich, upon both their own con
sumption and that of their servants.
The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people,
or of those below the middling rank, it must be observed, is
in every country much greater, not only in quantity, but in
value, than that of the middling and of those above the
middling rank. The whole expence of the inferior is much
greater than that of the superior ranks. In the first place,
almost the whole capital of every country is annually dis
tributed among the inferior ranks of people, as the wages of
productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue
arising from both the rent of land and the profits of stock,
is annually distributed among the same rank, in the wages
and maintenance of menial servants, and other unproductive
labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock be
longs to the same rank, as a revenue arising from the em
ployment of their small capitals. The amount of the profits
annually
tailers of made
all kinds,
by small
is every
shopkeepers,
where very
tradesmen,
considerable,
and an
re
***********
Besides such duties as those of customs and excise above-
mentioned, there are several others which affect the price of
goods more unequally and more indirectly. Of this kind are
the duties which in French are called Peages, which in old
Saxon times were called Duties of Passage, and which seem
to have been originally established for the same purpose as
our turnpike tolls, or the tolls upon our canals and navigable
rivers, for the maintenance of the road or of the navigation.
Those duties, when applied to such purposes, are most prop
erly imposed according to the bulk of weight of the goods.
As they were originally local and provincial duties, appli
cable to local and provincial purposes, the administration of
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 559
them was in most cases entrusted to the particular town,
parish, or lordship, in which they were levied; such com
munities being in some way or other supposed to be account
able for the application. The sovereign, who is altogether
unaccountable, has in many countries assumed to himself the
administration of those duties; and though he has in most
cases enhanced very much the duty, he has in many entirely
neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of Great
Britain should ever become one of the resources of govern
ment, we may learn, by the example of many other nations,
what would probably be the consequence. Such tolls are no
doubt finally paid by the consumer; but the consumer is not
taxed in proportion to his expence when he pays, not accord
ing to the value, but according to the bulk or weight of what
he consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according
to the bulk or weight, but according to the supposed value of
the goods, they become properly a sort of inland customs or
excises, which obstruct very much the most important of all
branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the country.
In some small states duties similar to those passage duties
are imposed upon goods carried across the territory, either
by land or by water, from one foreign country to another.
These are in some countries called transit-duties. Some of
the little Italian states, which are situated upon the Po, and
the rivers which run into it, derive some revenue from duties
of this kind, which are paid altogether by foreigners, and
which, perhaps, are the only duties that one state can impose
upon the subjects of another, without obstructing in any re
spect the industry or commerce of its own. The most im
portant transit-duty in the world is that levied by the king of
Denmark upon all merchant ships which pass through the
Sound.
Such taxes upon luxuries as the greater part of the duties
of customs and excise, though they all fall indifferently upon
every different species of revenue, and are paid finally, or
without any retribution, by whoever consumes the commodi
ties upon which they are imposed, yet they do not always fall
equally or proportionably upon the revenue. of every indi
vidual. As every man's humour regulates the degree of his
consumption, every man contributes rather according to his
560 WEALTH OF NATIONS
humour than in proportion to his revenue; the profuse con
tribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper pro
portion. During the minority of a man of great fortune, he
contributes commonly very little, by his consumption, towards
the support of that state from whose protection he derives a
great revenue. Those who live in another country con
tribute nothing, by their consumption, towards the support
of the government of that country, in which is situated the
source of their revenue. If in this latter country there should
be no land-tax, nor any considerable duty upon the transfer
ence either of moveable or of immoveable property, as is the
case in Ireland, such absentees may derive a great revenue
from the protection of a government to the support of which
they do not contribute a single shilling. This inequality is
likely to be greatest in a country of which the government is
in some respects subordinate and dependent upon that of
some other. The people who possess the most extensive
property in the dependent, will in this case generally chuse
to live in the governing country. Ireland is precisely in this
situation, and we cannot therefore wonder that the proposal
of a tax upon absentees should be so very popular in that
country. It might, perhaps, be a little difficult to ascertain
either what sort, or what degree of absence would subject a
man to be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the
tax should either begin or end. If you except, however,
this very particular situation, any inequality in the contribu
tion of individuals, which can arise from such taxes, is much
more than compensated by the very circumstance which oc
casions that inequality; the circumstance that every man's
contribution is altogether voluntary; it being altogether in
his power either to consume or not to consume the com
modity taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are properly
assessed and upon proper commodities, they are paid with
less grumbling than any other. When they are advanced by
the merchant or manufacturer, the consumer, who finally pays
them, soon comes to confound them with the price of the
commodities, and almost forgets that he pays any tax.
Such taxes are or may be perfectly certain, or may be
assessed so as to leave no doubt concerning either what ought
to be paid, or when it ought to be paid; concerning either
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 561
the quantity or the time of payment. Whatever uncertainty
there may sometimes be, either in the duties of customs in
Great Britain, or in other duties of the same kind in other
countries, it cannot arise from the nature of those duties,
but from the inaccurate or unskilful manner in which the
law that imposes them is expressed.
Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be,
paid piecemeal, or in proportion as the contributors have oc
casion to purchase the goods upon which they are imposed.
In the time and mode of payment they are, or may be, of all
taxes the most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes,
therefore, are, perhaps, as agreeable to the three first of the
four general maxims concerning taxation, as any other.
They offend in every respect against the fourth.
Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the pub
lic treasury of the state, always take out or keep out of the
pockets of the people more than almost any other taxes.
They seem to do this in all the four different ways in which
it is possible to do it.
First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the
most judicious manner, requires a great number of custom
house and excise officers, whose salaries and perquisites are a
real tax upon the people, which brings nothing into the treas
ury of the state. This expence, however, it must be ac
knowledged, is more moderate in Great Britain than in most
other countries. In the year which ended on the fifth of
July i775, the gross produce of the different duties, under
the management of the commissioners of excise in England,
amounted to 5,507,308/. 18s. 8%d. which was levied at an ex-
pence of little more than five and a half per cent. From
this gross produce, however, there must be deducted what
was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the exporta
tion of exciseable goods, which will reduce the neat produce
below five millions. The levying of the salt duty, an excise
duty, but under a different management, is much more ex
pensive. The neat revenue of the customs does not amount
to two millions and a half, which is levied at an expense of
more than ten per cent. in the salaries of officers, and other
incidents. But the perquisites of customhouse officers are
every where much greater than their salaries; at some ports
f
562 WEALTH OF NATIONS
more than double or triple those salaries. If the salaries of
officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to more than
ten per cent. upon the neat revenue of the customs ; the whole
expense of levying that revenue may amount, in salaries and
perquisites together, to more than twenty or thirty per cent.
The officers of excise receive few or no perquisites : and the
administration of that branch of the revenue being of more
recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than that of
the customs, into which length of time has introduced and
authorized many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole
revenue which is at present levied by the different duties upon
malt and malt liquors, a saving, it is supposed, of more than
fifty thousand pounds might be made in the annual expence
of the excise. By confining the duties of customs to a few
sorts of goods, and by levying those duties according to the
excise laws, a much greater saving might probably be made
in the annual expence of the customs.
Secondly, such taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction
or discouragement to certain branches of industry. As they
always raise the price of the commodity taxed, they so far
discourage its consumption, and consequently its production.
If it is a commodity of home growth or manufacture, less
labour comes to be employed in raising and producing it. If
it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increases in this
manner, the price, the commodities of the same kind which
are made at home may thereby, indeed, gain some advantage
in the home market, and a greater quantity of domestic in
dustry may thereby be turned toward preparing them. But
though this rise of price in a foreign commodity may en
courage domestic industry in one particular branch, it neces
sarily discourages that industry in almost every other. The
dearer the Birmingham manufacturer buys his foreign wine,
the cheaper he necessarily sells that part of his hardware
with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price
of which he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore,
becomes of less value to him, and he has less encouragement
to work at it. The dearer the consumers in one country pay
for the surplus produce of another, the cheaper they neces
sarily sell that part of their own surplus produce with which,
or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which
TAXES UPON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES 563
they buy it. That part of their own surplus produce becomes
of less value to them, and they have less encouragement to
increase its quantity. All taxes upon consumable commodi
ties, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive
labour below what it otherwise would be, either in preparing
the commodities taxed, if they are home commodities; or in
preparing those with which they are purchased, if they are
foreign commodities. Such taxes too always alter, more or less,
the natural direction of national industry, and turn it into a
channel always different from, and always less advantageous
than that in which it would have run of its own accord.
Thirdly, the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling gives
frequent occasion to forfeitures and other penalties, which
entirely ruin the smuggler; a person who, though no doubt
highly blameable for violating the laws of his country, is fre
quently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and
would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had
not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature
never meant to be so. In those corrupted governments where
there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary ex-
pence, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the
laws which guard it are little respected. Not many people
are scrupulous about smuggling, when, without perjury, they
can find easy and safe opportunity of doing so. To pre
tend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods,
though a manifest encouragement to the violation of the rev
enue laws, and to the perjury which almost always attends it,
would in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic
pieces
body, serve
of hypocrisy
only to which,
expose instead
the person
of gaining
who affects
credittowith
practise
any
greater part of the taxes imposed during the war. These are
mortgaged for the interest of the debt contracted in order
to carry it on. If, over and above paying the interest of this
debt, and defraying the ordinary expence of government, the
old revenue, together with the new taxes, produce some sur
plus revenue, it may perhaps be converted into a sinking
fund for paying off the debt. But, in the first place, this
sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to. no other
purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the
course of any period during which it can reasonably be ex
pected that peace should continue, the whole debt contracted
during the war; and, in the second place, this fund is almost
always applied to other purposes.
The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of pay
ing the interest of the money borrowed upon them. If they
582 WEALTH OF NATIONS
produce more, it is generally something which was neither
intended nor expected, and is therefore seldom very consid
erable. Sinking funds have generally arisen, not so much
from any surplus of the taxes which was over and above
what was necessary for paying the interest or annuity orig
inally charged upon them, as from a subsequent reduction
of that interest. That of Holland in i655, and that of the
ecclesiastical state in 1685, were both formed in this manner.
Hence the usual insufficiency of such funds.
During the most profound peace, various events occur
which require an extraordinary expence, and government
finds it always more convenient to defray this expense by
misapplying the sinking fund than by imposing a new tax.
Every new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people.
It occasions always some murmur, and meets with some op
position. The more taxes may have been multiplied, the
higher they may have been raised upon every different sub
ject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every
new tax, the more difficult it becomes too either to find out
new subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes
already imposed upon the old. A momentary suspension of
the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people,
and occasions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of
the sinking fund is always an obvious and easy expedient for
getting out of the present difficulty. The more the public
debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may
have become to study to reduce them, the more dangerous, the
more ruinous it may be to misapply any part of the sinking
fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to any
considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is
the sinking fund to be misapplied towards defraying all the
extraordinary expences which occur in time of peace. When
a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the
necessities of a new war, nothing but either the animosity of
national vengeance, or the anxiety for national security, can
induce the people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new
tax. Hence the usual misapplication of the sinking fund.
**********
The public funds of the different indebted nations of Eu
rope, particularly those of England, have by one author
PUBLIC DEBTS 583
been represented as the accumulation of a great capital super
added to the other capital of the country, by means of which
its trade is extended, its manufactures multiplied, and its
lands cultivated and improved much beyond what they could
have been by means of that other capital only. He does not
consider that the capital which the first creditors of the public
advanced to government, was, from the moment in which they
advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce turned
away from serving in the function of a capital, to serve in
that of a revenue; from maintaining productive labourers to
maintain unproductive ones, and to be spent and wasted, gen
erally in the course of the year, without even the hope of any
future reproduction. In return for the capital which they
advanced they obtained, indeed, an annuity in the public
funds in most cases of more than equal value. This annuity,
no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to
carry on their trade and business to the same or perhaps to
a greater extent than before ; that is, they were enabled either
to borrow of other people a new capital upon the credit of
this annuity, or by selling it to get from other people a new
capital of their own, equal or superior to that which they had
advanced to government. This new capital, however, which
they in this manner either bought or borrowed of other
people, must have existed in the country before, and must
have been employed as all capitals are, in maintaining pro
ductive labour. When it came into the hands of those who
had advanced their money to government, though it was in
some respects a new capital to them, it was not so to the
country ; but was only a capital withdrawn from certain
employments in order to be turned towards others. Though
it replaced to them what they had advanced to government,
it did not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced
this capital to government, there would have been in the
country two capitals, two portions of the annual produce, in
stead of one, employed in maintaining productive labour.
When for defraying the expence of government a revenue
is raised within the year from the produce of free or unmort
gaged taxes, a certain portion of the revenue of private people
is only turned away from maintaining one species of un
productive labour, towards maintaining another. Some part
584 WEALTH OF NATIONS
of what they pay in those taxes might no doubt have been
accumulated into capital, and consequently employed in main
taining productive labour; but the greater part would prob
ably have been spent and consequently employed in main
taining unproductive labour. The public expence, however,
when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders more or
less the further accumulation of new capital ; but it does not
necessarily occasion the destruction of any actually existing
capital.
When the public expence is defrayed by funding, it is de
frayed by the annual destruction of some capital which had
before existed in the country; by the perversion of some
portion of the annual produce which had before been destined
for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of
unproductive labour. As in this case, however, the taxes are
lighter than they would have been, had a revenue sufficient
for defraying the same expence been raised within the year ;
the private revenue of individuals is necessarily less bur
dened, and consequently their ability to save and accumulate
some part of that revenue into capital is a good deal less im
paired. If the method of funding destroy more old capital,
it at the same time hinders less the accumulation or acquisi
tion of new capital, than that of defraying the public expence
by a revenue raised within the year. Under the system of
funding, the frugality and industry of private people can
more easily repair the breaches which the waste and ex
travagance of government may occasionally make in the
general capital of the society.
It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the
system of funding has this advantage over the other system.
Were the expence of war to be defrayed always by a revenue
raised within the year, the taxes from which that extraordi
nary revenue was drawn would last no longer than the war.
The ability of private people to accumulate, though less dur
ing the war, would have been greater during the peace than
under the system of funding. War would not necessarily have
occasioned the destruction of any old capitals, and peace
would have occasioned the accumulation of many more new.
Wars would in general be more speedily concluded, and less
wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during the con
PUBLIC DEBTS 585
tinuance of the war, the complete burden of it, would soon
grow weary of it, and government, in order to humour them,
would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer
than it was necessary to do so. The foresight of the heavy
and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from
wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid in
terest to fight for. The seasons during which the ability of
private people to accumulate was somewhat impaired, would
occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance. Those on
the contrary, during which that ability was in the highest
vigour, would be of much longer duration than they can well
be under the system of funding.
When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the
multiplication of taxes which it brings along with it some
times impairs as much the ability of private people to ac
cumulate even in time of peace, as the other system would
in time of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts
at present to more than ten millions a year. If free and un
mortgaged, it might be sufficient, with proper management
and without contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on
the most vigorous war. The private revenue of the inhabi
tants of Great Britain is at present as much encumbered in
time of peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired
as it would have been in the time of the most expensive war,
had the pernicious system of funding never been adopted.
In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has
been said, it is the right hand which pays the left. The money
does not go out of the country. It is only a part of the rev
enue of one set of the inhabitants which is transferred to
another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This
apology is founded altogether in the sophistry of the mer
cantile system, and after the long examination which I have
already bestowed upon that system, it may perhaps be unnec
essary to say any thing further about it. It supposes, besides,
that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the
country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well
as several other foreign nations, having a very considerable
share in our public funds. But though the whole debt were
owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon
that account be less pernicious.
586 WEALTH OF NATIONS
Land and capital stock are the two original sources of all
revenue both private and public. Capital stock pays the
wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture,
manufactures, or commerce. The management of those two
original sources of revenue belongs to two different sets of
people ; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers
of capital stock.
The proprietor of land is interested for the sake of his own
revenue to keep his estate in as good condition as he can, by
building and repairing his tenants houses, by making and
maintaining the necessary drains and enclosures, and all those
other expensive improvements which it properly belongs to
the landlord
taxes the revenue
to make
of and
the landlord
maintain.may
Butbebysodifferent
much dimin
land-