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AREA HANDBOOK
for
MOROCCO
AREA HANDBOOK
for
MOROCCO

Co - Authors
Richard F. Nyrop

Beryl Lieff Benderly

William W. Cover
Hany H. Makhlouf
Newton B. Parker
Suzanne Teleki

Research and writing were completed October 1971

Published 1972

( This handbook supersedes DA Pam 550-49, November 1965)

DA PAM 550-49
:

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number : 72-600025

1
‫ܙ‬.

݁‫ܚܪܝܠܢ̈ܬ‬

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 — Price $ 3.25
916.4
Am 3 a Map and Gera
1972

FOREWORD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign

Area Studies ( FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful
to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of
basic facts about the social, economic, political , and military
institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on
objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of
possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future.
The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated
exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was
compiled from information available in openly published material. An
extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other
published sources for more detailed information. There has been no
attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy
recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work
of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the
United States government.
An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive
as possible . It can be expected, however, that the material ,
interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the
light of new information and developments. Such corrections ,
additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as
readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.
Comments may be addressed to :
The Director
Foreign Area Studies
The American University
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
map

iii
PREFACE

In late 1971 Morocco continued to be strategically important, in

part because of its location in the northwest corner of Africa and its
proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar and in part because of its role as
an Arabic and African state with close historic ties to France and
Spain . In addition, during the late 1960s and early 1970s Morocco
successfully maintained cordial economic and diplomatic relations
with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic
of China .
In 1970 King Hassan II promulgated a new constitution, pursuant
to which a single chamber legislature was elected and assumed its
duties. Despite an attempted coup d'etat in July 1971, the king in late
1971 was continuing to delegate increased responsibility to the
legislature and to his Council of Ministers, but the limits on royal
power were largely self-imposed and could therefore be removed at
any time .
The present Area Handbook for Morocco is the second revision of a
1958 study . The first revision was researched and written in 1965 by a
team composed of Frederick R. Eisele, Allison Butler Herrick,
Howard J. John, Dennis H. Morrissey, and Suzanne Teleki , under the
chairmanship of Norman C. Walpole. Although the present handbook
incorporates some of the material in the earlier studies, it is a
substantial revision, and most of the chapters were totally rewritten .
The handbook is an attempt to provide a comprehensive study of
the dominant social, economic, and political aspects of Moroccan
society . Sources of information used included scholarly studies ,
official reports of governments and international organizations, and
newspapers, periodicals, and journals. Relatively up-to-date economic
data were available; the demographic statistics used were, for the
most part, estimates used by the Population Reference Bureau, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the United
Nations ; and various official publications of the governments of
Morocco and the United States .
Two weeks after research and writing were completed on October
15, 1971, the Moroccan government released some preliminary data
from a census reportedly completed on July 20, 1971. According to
these data, the population as of July 20, 1971 , was 15,379,359, and the
annual growth rate was between 2.6 and 2.7 percent. These figures
vary sharply from the estimates used by the sources cited above that
V
as of mid-1971 the population was about 16.2 million, and the growth
rate was about 3.2 or 3.3 percent a year. The Moroccan census report
contained neither an explanation for the discrepancy between these
figures and earlier government estimates nor a description of the
methodology of the census. As of early 1972, it seems probable that
both the Moroccan census figures and the estimates used in this book
should be viewed as provisional and subject to revision .
The authors wish to express their gratitude to persons in various
agencies of the United States government who gave of their time,
documentary possessions, and special knowledge to provide data and
perspective . In addition, the staff of the Joint Library of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development were particularly helpful.
The literature on Morocco-academic and popular alike-is
frequently confusing because of the indiscriminate mixing of English
and French transliterations of Arabic words and phrases. For example,
the more common transliterations of the Arabic words for stream and
troops are, respectively, oued and guich , whereas a transliteration of
those words according to the system recommended by the Library of
Congress is wadi and jaysh . In an effort to reduce this confusion, the
authors adhered to the Library of Congress system, but without
diacritical markings, and indicated in the Glossary the more common
French transliterations that a reader may encounter in other works.
The place names used are those established for Morocco by the
United States Board on Geographic Names in June 1970.

vi
COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. COUNTRY: Kingdom of Morocco. Located at the northwest corner

of Africa, separated from Europe by the Strait of Gibraltar. Regained
independence on March 3, 1956, after forty -four years of French and
Spanish rule . Capital, Rabat.
2. POPULATION : About 16.2 million in mid- 1971, with Moroccan
Muslims accounting for over 98 percent of the population . Estimated
annual population growth rate, 3.3 percent. Population is densest in
the coastal plains north and west of the Atlas ranges (more than 100
per square mile; overall density, eighty -eight per square mile) .
3. SIZE AND TOPOGRAPHY : About 174,000 square miles of
mountains, plains, and desert. Topographically the country divides
into an open, agriculturally rich plains area in the northwest and
economically poor mountains and plateaus in the eastern and
southern portions.
4. LANGUAGES : Arabic is the official language and the native
language of about 60 percent of the population . Estimated 40 percent
of the population speaks one of several dialects of Berber; French
widely used in government and modern sector. Bilingualism and
trilingualism common.
5. RELIGION : Observance of Sunni Islam nearly universal. Islam is
official religion, with king known as commander of the faithful (amir
al muaminin ).
6. EDUCATION : Enrollment levels rising, but public demand
continues for more facilities and government scholarships. School
system, adapted from French models, consists of a five- year primary,
a four-year lower secondary, and a three-year upper secondary
(academic or vocational) education . Five -year primary cycle
compulsory by law, but in 1970 only 53 percent of school age children
enrolled. Severe shortage of secondary school teachers. Main official
efforts aimed at strengthening technical education on secondary and
higher levels to meet manpower demands. In 1970 literacy estimated
to be between 15 and 20 percent.
7. HEALTH : Gastrointestinal infections, tuberculosis, trachoma,
typhoid, and malaria are widespread . Major contagious diseases
(smallpox, cholera, and bubonic plague) controlled. Severe shortage of
medical and paramedical personnel. Physician to population ratio one
to 7,000 in cities, one to 60,000 in rural areas.

vii
8. GOVERNMENT : A monarchy since independence in 1956.
Constitution of 1970 reserves paramount power to king but provides
for elected 240-member House of Representatives. Prime minister and
the Council of Ministers appointed and dismissed by king.
9. JUSTICE : Civil and criminal codes adopted in 1958 and 1959
combine French and traditional Islamic law. Judiciary, appointed by
king, constitutionally separate from executive and legislature.
Supreme Court located at Rabat; four courts of appeal and numerous
courts of first instance. Military justice, under separate code, revised
July 25, 1971 .
10. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS : Local government organized
under nineteen provinces and two urban prefectures ( Rabat and
Casablanca) having status of provinces. Basic unit is urban or rural
constituency of one or more communes; above the constituency is the
circle, then the province. In 1971 seven higher entities called
administrative regions, encompassing two or more provinces each,
were being formed . All governors and lower executive heads appointed
by royal authority; whole system administered under minister of
interior. Elected provincial and communal councils since 1963 have
had advisory role .
11. ECONOMY : Gross domestic product (GDP) increased at better
than 5 percent annually (at constant prices) between 1967 and 1970.
Throughout period largest contributions to the gross domestic product
were made by agriculture ( 28 percent) and commerce (20 percent) ;
manufacturing industry contributed about 12 percent per year.
12. EXPORTS : Export earnings increased at an average rate of over
3.5 percent per year from 1967 to 1970. Major exports ( 1970) were
phosphate rock, citrus fruits, fresh vegetables, and canned fish .
13. IMPORTS: Imports (cost, insurance, freight) increased at an
average rate of over 9 percent from 1967 to 1970. Major imports ( 1970 )
were industrial equipment, automotive vehicles and parts ,
nonelectrical metal products, petroleum products, sugar, and soft
wheat.
14. INDUSTRY: Industry represented about 20 percent of gross
domestic product in 1969-70 period. Mining accounted for about 3
percent; energy , about 5 percent; and manufacturing, about 12
percent. The relative importance of the sector in the gross domestic
product remained essentially static throughout the decade. Among
manufactures the most important categories were foodstuffs and
beverages, metal transformation, textiles, chemicals, and construction
materials.
15. FINANCE : Public. Expenditures (budgeted) of the central
government increased about 9 percent per year from 1967 to 1970. In
1970 they represented around 24 percent of gross domestic product
about 17.5 percent for current expenditures and 6.5 percent for
investment . Private. Money supply increased about 9.8 percent per

viii
year from 1967 to 1970. The major contribution to the increase was
made by the central government.
16. LABOR : Work force estimated at over 5.5 million out of a total
population of about 14.5 million in 1968. About 70 percent engaged in
agriculture; 8.9 percent, in industry and handicrafts; 5.9 percent, in
commerce ; 4.6 percent, in services; 4.4 percent, in public sector; 2.2
percent, in transportation; and 4.3 percent, in other occupations.
Unemployment, estimated at 12.4 percent in 1968, was rising rapidly.
Severe shortage of skilled laborers, technicians, and managerial and
professional personnel.
17. COMMUNICATIONS: Nine dailies in 1970 ; one a government
newspaper, the rest published privately by Moroccans and foreign
publishers. No prepublication censorship, but frequent bans and
seizures of newspapers critical of government. Radio and television
government owned and controlled . Radio most important medium.
About 1 million radio receivers and some 173,000 television sets in
1970 .
18. RAILROADS: Government-owned system of over 1,000 miles.
Modernization program scheduled for completion during 1970s.
19. ROADS: Well -developed network in 1971 of about 31,000 miles, of
which nearly 15,000 miles paved.
20. AIR TRANSPORT: Two national airlines — Royal Air Maroc
( RAM) and Royal Air Inter (RAI) . Majority of stock in both
companies either directly or indirectly state owned . Over fifty civil
airports, of which eight can handle international flights. In 1970
sixteen foreign airlines had regularly scheduled flights into and out of
the country .
21. PORTS: Four major and thirteen lesser ports. Casablanca by far
the largest, accounting for 75 percent of freight handled by all ports in
1969.
22. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND MEMBERSHIPS :
Member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the
Organization of African Unity, and the League of Arab States.
23. AID PROGRAMS: During late 1960s Morocco received about
DH2,500 million (5.06 dirham equal US$1) in grants and loans (grants
about 25 percent) from the United States, France, West Germany, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other
groups. In addition, substantial amounts of training and technical
assistance secured from a number of the specialized agencies of the
United Nations .
24. NATIONAL DEFENSE : Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées
Royales — FAR ) composed of a nearly 50,000 -man army, a small air
force and navy, and small special detachments. Sûreté Nationale
( 16,000 -man police force) has primary responsibility for internal
security. In addition, Auxiliary Forces and Royal Gendarmerie
perform police work. All forces responsible to the king.

ix
MOROCCO

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD iii

PREFACE v

COUNTRY SUMMARY vii

SECTION I. SOCIAL

Chapter 1. General Character of the Society 1

2. Geography and Population 7

Geography — Population - Living Conditions

3. Historical Setting 31
Early History — The Coming of Islam and the
Arabs — The Medieval Berber Empires — The Shari
fian Dynasties- Morocco in European Diplomacy
Colonialism : The French and Spanish Protecto
rates — The Struggle for Independence The First
Years of Independence, 1956–65 — The Emergency
Period : 1965–70

4. Ethnic Groups and Languages 71

The Peoples of Morocco — Language and Society
5. Religious Life 85
Islam - Folk Beliefs and Folk Religion Minority
Religions
6. Social Structure 99

Structure of Society — The Individual, the Family,

and the Sexes
7. Education , Communication , and the Arts and Sciences
Education — The Arts and Sciences — Communi
cation 119

SECTION II. POLITICAL

Chapter 8. The Governmental System and Political Dynamics
Constitutional System The Monarchy - Govern
ment and Executive Agencies — Legal System ,
Judiciary, and Courts — Legislative Arm and the
Electoral System Local Government - Parties, In
terest Groups, and Elections — Political Stress and
Crisis - National Goals 157

xi
Page
9. Foreign Relations 195
Relations with the States of the Maghrib
Relations with Other African States - Relations
with Other Arab States - Relations with West
European States - Relations with the United States
-Relations with the Communist States — The
United Nations and Other International Organiza
tions — Mechanics of Foreign Policy
10. Political Values 213

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

Chapter 11. Character and Structure of the Economy 217
Resources and Problems - Gross Domestic Prod
uct — Consumption and Investment Role of the
Government - Development Planning — Public Sec
tor Finances — Banking and Currency
12. Agriculture and Industry 245
Agriculture - Industry – Labor
13. Trade and Transportation 277
Domestic Trade - Transportation and Telecom
munication Tourism - Balance of Payments
Foreign Trade - Foreign Investment — Foreign Aid
SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY
Chapter 14. National Defense and Internal Security 307
The Armed Forces — The Place of the Military in
National Life - Weapons and Equipment Organi
zation of the Armed Forces — Internal Security
Forces - Prisons
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE NOVEMBER 1965 EDITION 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR REVISED EDITION 357
GLOSSARY 383
INDEX 387

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1 Morocco xiv
2 Geographic Regions of Morocco, 1971 8
3 17
Rivers, Dams, and Irrigated Areas of Morocco, 1971
4 Rainfall and Temperature in Morocco 19
5 Mineral Resources of Morocco , 1971 22
6 Languages of Morocco 72
7 Jewish Population of Morocco , Selected Years, 1948–70 78
8 Schematic Representation of a Typical Segmentary System
in Morocco 103
9 Railroads, Principal Highways, Ports, and Airports of
282
Morocco, 1970
10 Defense and Security Forces of Morocco, 1971 308
11 Organization of the Moroccan Sûreté Nationale 322
12 Organization of : Police Region in Morocco 324

xii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1
Administrative Regions, Provinces, and Prefectures of
Morocco, 1971 177
2 Gross Domestic Product of Morocco, by Industrial Origin at
1960 Market Prices, Selected Years, 1960–69 221
3
Morocco's Five Year Development Plan, 1968–72, at Con
226
stant ( 1967 ) Prices, by Sectors and Investing Agencies
4 Budget Estimates of the Current Expenditures of the Cen
tral Government of Morocco, 1966–71 231
5 Budget Estimates of the Investment Outlays of the Central
Government of Morocco, 1966–71 232
6 Budget Estimates for Financing of Current and Investment
Outlays of Morocco, 1966–71 234
7
Changes in and Sources of Money Supply in Morocco, 1965–70 241
8
Estimated Land Utilization in Morocco, Mid-1960s 247
9 Estimated Distribution of Agricultural Land in Morocco,
by Ownership, Mid-1960s 249
10 Output of Principal Agricultural Commodities in Morocco,
Average 1961–65, Annual 1966–70 252
11 Index of Industrial Production in Morocco, by Sector,
Selected Years, 1963–69 260
12 Mineral Production in Morocco, Selected Years, 1964–70 263
13 Manufacturing Production in Morocco, Selected Commodi
ties, 1965-69 267
14 Distribution of Work Force in Morocco, 1964, 1968, and 1973 268
15 Balance of Payments of Morocco, 1969 291
16 Foreign Trade of Morocco, 1966–69 294
17 296
Principal Suppliers and Customers of Morocco, 1969

xiii
10 6
SPAIN
Note--Provinces or prefectures are the same as their
capitals except Ton Ton which is in Tarfaya Province.
36 Robat and Casablanca are prefectures. MEDITERRANEAN SEA 1361
TANGIER

TETOUAN AL HOCEIMA

NADOR

OUJDA

SKENITRA TAZA
RABA
FES
ATLANTIC MEKNES
CASABLANCA

AL JADIDA
OCEAN KHOURIBGA
SETTAT

SAFI
32 BENI MELLAL 1321
• KSAR AL SOUK

smil MARRAKECH

ted
rca
OUARZAZATE
ema
(Und )
AGADIR

ALGERIA

TAN TAN
28 28
TARFAYA 100
0 25 50
MILES

SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 6 2

Figure 1. Morocco.

xiv
SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

The Kingdom of Morocco regained its independence on March 3,

1956, after forty -four years of French and Spanish rule. The lasting
influence of the Spanish, whose control was limited to small areas in
the northern and southern extremities of the country, was negligible,
but that of the French, who ruled the rest of the country, was of
considerable importance. The military, the civil service, the modern
sector of the economy, the political parties, and the general structure
of the governmental apparatus are patterned on the French models.
Of perhaps more significance, the French language continues to be
widely used by the king, the governing elite , and commercial
interests, despite the fact that by 1962 Arabic had been
constitutionally designated as the official language.
The Moroccan people derive from the indigenous Berber stock and
the waves of Arab immigration after the seventh century A.D. It was
not possible in 1971 to distinguish sharply between them. About 60
percent of the population was estimated to speak Moroccan Arabic as
the first language. Of the approximately 40 percent remaining who
spoke Berber as a first language, about half also spoke Arabic . In
modern Morocco, differences between the two groups were more
recognizable in terms of rural (Berber) and urban ( Arab) politics than
as ethnic divisions. A small, but historically prominent, Jewish
community was, by 1971, rapidly dwindling in numbers.
The institution of the monarchy was changed only slightly by
French domination, and that change was an increase in the popularity
and acceptance of the Alawite dynasty that had ruled , as well as
reigned, from the seventeenth century until the imposition of foreign
rule in 1912. Internal criticism of the government increased somewhat
during the 1960s, chiefly in the opposition national bloc parties. In
1971, however, King Hassan II ruled in a fashion virtually as
traditional and authoritarian as that of his predecessors, although in a
modernized style, and he continued to command the loyalty and
apparent veneration of a decisive majority of the population (see ch. 8,
The Governmental System and Political Dynamics). The Alawite
dynasty traces its descent from the Prophet Muhammad , and Hassan
1

|
was accepted as the spiritual, as well as secular, leader of the
Moroccan people, almost all of whom are Muslims (see ch. 5,
Religious Life). The king's traditional and constitutional title of
commander of the faithful (amir al muaminin) emphasizes his unique
role as the Islamic religious leader and mentor of his people.
This traditional hold upon the emotions and loyalties of Moroccans
was greatly intensified by Hassan's father, Sultan (later King)
Mohammed V, who in 1953 was sent into exile by the French because
of his refusal to act as a French puppet. Mohammed V at once
became the key issue and focal point of the independence movement
and, by the time independence was achieved, the institution of the
monarchy had become popularly identified as the symbol of Moroccan
nationalism and of independence from alien non-Muslim rule. When
Mohammed died in 1961, Hassan, the designated and unchallenged
successor, inherited not only the throne but also his father's
popularity and the nationalist symbolism associated with him (see ch.
3, Historical Setting ).
Hassan has, on occasion, experimented with democratic institutions
and constitutional procedures, but his rule has been an essentially
personal one. Only rarely has he delegated power and responsibility,
and ministerial, civil service, and military appointees know that they
are, in the most literal sense, servants of the king. Until mid-1971 the
king relied heavily upon military officers as personal advisers and
aides and as government administrators. In June 1971, for example,
several generals served in cabinet or senior advisory positions, and
almost all of the nineteen provincial governors were military officers.
In addition, several hundred military officers were serving in the
Ministry of Interior as local government administrators, and other
officers were active in various government development programs (see
ch. 14, National Defense and Internal Security).
By late 1971, however, Hassan had reduced the number of military
officers in senior government posts, presumably as a result of an
unsuccessful coup attempt on July 10, 1971 (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics). The abortive coup, a
singularly inept, clumsy but bloody affair, was launched by five
generals and several colonels who apparently desired to force the king
to purge his government of corruption and to restore to government
the presumed purity and dignity of the hallowed past. The
conspirators were, with perhaps one or two exceptions, apolitical
reactionaries; the armed forces as a whole were not involved , and
there was no indication that any politicians were a party to the
conspiracy.
One of the first acts of the king in the aftermath of the coup
attempt was to increase the power and responsibility of General
Mohammed Oufkir, who had long been considered the most powerful
man in the nation apart from the king himself (see ch. 8, The
2
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) . Since 1964 Oufkir
had served as the minister of interior, and under his direction the
Ministry of Interior became known as a “ super-ministry.” On August
6, 1971, the king designated an Oufkir associate as minister of interior
and another as minister of agriculture and national development ;
Oufkir was appointed minister of defense and chief of staff of the
Royal Armed Forces ( Forces Armées Royales — FAR ). Hassan retained
his traditional and constitutional role as supreme commander, but he
delegated to Oufkir a degree of power and responsibility not
previously granted to anyone .
The most important element of the FAR is the army, which in 1971
had nearly 50,000 officers and men. Before the coup attempt, the
country had been divided into six military zones, each headed by a
general officer, who served as a link between the brigade and battalion
commanders and the army chief of staff and the king. Perhaps
because three of the five conspirator generals had been zone
commanders and because nine of the sixteen general officers of the
FAR had been killed or executed, Oufkir abolished the zone system .
In late 1971 all brigade and battalion commanders reported directly to
Oufkir, as did the commanding officers of the small air force, navy,
and Royal Gendarmerie (which is both a military and a police force),
with about 4,000, 1,000, and 7,000 men, respectively (see ch. 14,
National Defense and Internal Security) . The only armed forces over
which Oufkir did not have direct control were those of the 16,000 men
of the Sûreté Nationale (national police force), whose commander
reported directly to the king, and the 20,000-man paramilitary
Auxiliary Forces, whose commander was responsible to the minister of
interior.
In addition to this move to improve his control over his defense and
security forces, the king reacted to the coup attempt by promising his
people that corruption would be eliminated. He also promised that
the gap between the rich and the poor would be narrowed, that the
educational system would be improved, and that the administration
of government and the dispensation of justice would be made more
equitable. On August 6, 1971, the king appointed a new fifteen
member Council of Ministers to which he assigned the task of
formulating and implementing a program to fulfill his promises. The
king stipulated that the ministers had from twelve to eighteen months
to accomplish the task (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and
Political Dynamics) .
The tasks thus assigned to the Council of Ministers mirrored with
accuracy the nation's most critical social and economic problems. In
mid- 1971 the population was estimated to exceed 16.2 million and to
be increasing at an annual rate of between 3.2 and 3.3 percent (see ch.
2, Geography and Population) . Unemployment was a serious problem
nationally and a critical one in the rapidly growing metropolitan
3
areas. The estimates of unemployment ranged from a probably
conservative 13 percent to informed estimates of 25 to 30 percent; all
observers agreed that urban unemployment was in excess of 25
percent. The urban unemployed were largely unskilled migrants from
the rural areas, but the group also included a relatively large but
unknown number of college and university graduates ( see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry ). The occasional coincidence of complaints
and goals of the urban proletariat and of unemployed intellectuals has
in the past resulted in serious problems for the king. The 1965 urban
riots, for example, were a major determining factor in the king's
decision to suspend his experiment in representational government
( see ch . 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
In common with many other developing nations, Morocco's
problems with education include seeming contradictions. On the one
hand, in 1971 less than 20 percent of the adult population was literate.
As a corollary to the high illiteracy rate there is a fairly critical
shortage of skilled workers and technicians, and to meet this shortage
foreigners, mostly French, must be employed (see ch. 12, Agriculture
and Industry). On the other hand, a significant increase in the number
of liberal arts college graduates since independence has resulted in far
more lawyers, for example , than the society can use and far more
applicants than there are civil service jobs (see ch . 7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences) .
The country's known natural resources include excellent tourist
attractions, reasonably good cropland and water, and large deposits of
phosphate rock. The government has made large investments and has
encouraged private foreign investment in a generally successful effort
to stimulate and expand tourism. In 1971 it was the second largest
earner of foreign currency ( see ch . 11 , Character and Structure of the
Economy; ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ).
The most important export, and therefore the primary earner of
foreign exchange, was phosphate rock, of which Morocco was the
world's largest exporter and one of the major producers. In 1971 the
phosphate rock reserve, most of which was of high quality, was
estimated to exceed 40 billion metric tons ( see ch. 12, Agriculture and
Industry) .
The most important resource is the cropland, and agriculture
continues to be the key element in the economy. In 1971 about 80
percent of the population was dependent on agriculture, and about 70
percent of the economically active population was directly involved in
some form of agriculture.
Of the country's roughly 174,000 square miles, only about 18
percent are considered arable. In the early 1970s about 8 percent of
this arable land was under irrigation, and another 8 to 10 percent was
described as potentially irrigable. About 70 percent of the irrigated
land and perhaps 90 percent of all arable land were under traditional
4
agriculture; that is, the farm implements, the methods of seed
selection, and the use of fertilizers were relatively primitive, and
landholdings were frequently small and fragmented. These farmers,
even in good years, tend to consume most of what they produce, and
the rapid growth of the urban slums has been caused in large part by a
continuing exodus of farmers from the rural areas in search of
employment ( see ch . 12, Agriculture and Industry) .
The modern sector, however, with only 10 percent of the land under
cultivation , accounted during the late 1960s for over 85 percent of
commercialized agricultural output and for almost all citrus fruits,
vegetables, and other export crops. The very high productivity of the
modern sector in comparison with the traditional sector reflected the
fact that, in addition to including some of the best agricultural land,
the farmers in the modern sector utilized modern techniques of seed
selection, fertilizer use , plant care, and modern machinery use on
economically viable landholdings.
Since independence, but particularly since the mid- 1960s, a
primary economic goal of the government has been to increase the
output of the agricultural sector. The 1968-72 Five Year Plan, for
example, provides relatively large amounts of money for the
construction of multipurpose dams, the construction of irrigation
canals, and the preparation of farms for irrigation (see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry) . In addition, various governmental
programs provide incentives to farmers in the traditional sector to use
high yield seeds and to purchase fertilizers at a subsidized price . In
late 1971 there were indications that, as part of the king's program to
narrow the economic gap between the rich and the poor, more royal or
government land—including land formerly held by French settlers
and “ recuperated ” or recovered from them by the government - will
be distributed to landless farmers.
In late 1971 Morocco's major activities in the field of foreign
relations reflected its continuing need for foreign economic aid and
technical assistance to implement its domestic development efforts.
The government has secured and, in general, skillfully utilized
significant amounts of economic assistance, particularly from France,
the United States, and the many specialized agencies of the United
Nations (see ch . 11 , Character and Structure of the Economy ; ch . 13,
Trade and Transportation ).
Morocco's other foreign policy activities are in harmony with its
view of itself as expressed in the 1970 Constitution and various royal
pronouncements as an African nation that is both part of the Arabic
Islamic world and a link between these worlds and the West,
particularly Europe . Morocco is a member of the Organization of
African Unity, the League of Arab States, and the United Nations,
and in 1971 it enjoyed a profitable association with the European
5
Economic Community (see ch. 9, Foreign Relations; ch. 13, Trade and
Transportation ).
By 1970 Morocco had renounced its earlier irredentist claims to
parts of Mauritania , and in May 1970 Morocco and Algeria resolved
their longstanding dispute over a long section of their common border.
By late 1971 the section formerly in dispute had not yet been
demarcated, but a joint commission had held a number of meetings as
a prelude to eventual demarcation (see fig. 1) .

6
CHAPTER 2

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

The location of the Kingdom of Morocco at the northwest corner of

the African continent has contributed to the country's international
character. The country is, as the Constitution of 1970 notes, an
African state . More specifically, however, it is a part of that section of
North Africa called the Maghrib that includes Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia (see fig. 1) . Although the country's official name is the
Kingdom of Morocco, it has been, and sometimes still is, called Al
Mamlaka al Maghribia or Al Maghrib al Aqsa, meaning, respectively,
the Kingdom of the West or the Kingdom of the Far West-west and
far west, that is, of the Arabic, Islamic heartland. In addition, the
country's proximity to Western Europe has contributed to a
continuation of the European, particularly French, cultural and
economic orientation that was established during the French and
Spanish protectorates (see ch . 3, Historical Setting; ch. 4, Ethnic
Groups and Languages; ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ).
The country, about 850 miles long along a northeast -southwest axis
and a little over 300 miles wide at its greatest inland depth from the
Atlantic Ocean, includes perhaps 174,000 square miles of mountains,
plains, and desert. Topographically, it is sharply divided into an open,
agriculturally rich plains area in the northwest and economically poor
mountains and plateaus in the eastern and southern portions. The
coastal plains and plateaus, fronting for about 350 miles on the
Atlantic Ocean , are almost completely cut off from the interior by the
encircling mountains of the High Atlas and Middle Atlas ranges and
the Rif Massif. The coastal plains are the most densely populated,
economically advanced, and Arabized part of the country. Almost all
the major cities are located in this area.
Beyond the mountains, Eastern Morocco is a series of arid, rolling
plateaus that form a continuation of the Algerian High Plateaus in the
northeast and gradually drop into the Sahara Desert in the south and
southeast. Population in these areas is sparse and concentrated in
scattered oases along the Draa and Ziz rivers . These cases have
spawned numerous migrations across the mountains into inner
Morocco, and from them have risen several of the ruling dynasties,
including the existing Alawi dynasty (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
The three Atlas ranges—the High Atlas, the Middle Atlas, and the
Anti -Atlas - and the Rif Massif, which fronts on the Mediterranean

7
coast, have historically been the retreats of the indigenous Berber
population . The narrow Taza Pass between the Rif Massif and the
Middle Atlas has been the main overland access route into inner
Morocco since the Arab invasions, beginning in the late seventh
century . In 1971 it formed the most important east -west access route
connecting the coastal cities of Casablanca and Rabat with Eastern
Morocco and Algeria (see fig. 2) .
10 6 2
SPAIN

36 MEDITERRANEAN SEA 136

RIF MASSIF N
L IO
TEL REG
RHARB
PLAIN

LEY
A S
TAZ PAS

VAL
ATLANTIC
TA
L YA HIGH
AS AI
N MIDDLE ATLAS LOU PLATEAU
OCEAN CO PL MOU
MESETA
(PLATEAU )

32 1321
H AS
HIG ATL

ted
marca
Tu nde )
SOUS
PLAIN ANTI -ATLAS

RA ALGERIA
PRE -SAHA
ALGERIAN SAHARA

28 1281
25 50 100
MILES

SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 6 2

Figure 2. Geographic Regions of Morocco, 1971 .

Arable land, relatively abundant water, minerals ( particularly

phosphates) , and a scenic beauty that has made possible a vigorous
and growing tourist trade are the country's most important natural
resources. In the late 1960s and early 1970s rivers were being
harnessed through an extensive, multipurpose dam-building program .
Some mineral resources, notably oil, were near depletion in 1971, but
a systematic search for new deposits was in progress (see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry ).
According to estimates by Moroccan officials and foreign
population experts, the population in mid-1971 totaled about 16.2
million . Data published in 1970 show that Moroccan Muslims
accounted for more than 98 percent of the population. There has been
8
a sharp numerical decline in the country's formerly sizable Jewish and
foreign communities. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of foreign
residents decreased by more than one-half, and that of Jews, by three
quarters (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages ).
Experts agree that the population is growing at a rate of at least 3.3
percent annually and is expected to double by 1991. The high rate of
growth has been a source of serious official concern . A family planning
program was launched by the government during the mid - 1960s,
despite objections from conservative Islamic leaders and from the
political opposition. A reduction of the high birth rate an estimated
50 per 1,000 in 1969 — represents one of the official goals of the Five
Year Plan ( 1968–72). The government also encourages the emigration
of Moroccan workers to foreign countries.
The majority of the population is rural but, because of massive
migration from the countryside, the urban population rose from about
10 to 30 percent of the total between 1900 and 1970. During the late
1960s the urban population increased at an average rate of over 5
percent annually. In the major cities, especially in Casablanca and
Rabat, the rural influx precipitated the rise of large enclaves of
substandard housing ( bidonvilles-see Glossary) , compounded
unemployment, and strained municipal services.
Until at least 1968 the high growth rate outpaced development
programs and the expansion of social services, and living standards of
the majority of the population barely meet the subsistence level. Low
income urban groups, constituting 30 percent or more of the urban
population, live in dilapidated or crowded dwellings, and much of
rural housing has also deteriorated. Perhaps 20 percent of the
population is inadequately nourished because of poor distribution and
local shortages of food . Health standards, however, have improved
with the increasing availability of vaccinations and government
sponsored medical services.

GEOGRAPHY

Boundaries

The country's land borders do not follow natural boundaries and

have caused occasional complications in maintaining good relations
with neighboring countries. Moroccan territorial claims to neighboring
areas were based on territory gained by ancient conquests. The
Moroccans also assert that, because the Muslims of those areas name
the Moroccan ruler in their Friday prayers, they are tacitly
recognizing his suzerainty. The northern section of the border with
Algeria was established between 1845 and 1901 , but the line
separating Morocco from the Algerian Sahara was the subject of
recurrent controversies and was not formally resolved until May 1970.
9
Territorial claims against Mauritania were relinquished in 1969 after
the Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat, but by late 1971 the
country still upheld its territorial claims to the Spanish Sahara (see
ch. 9, Foreign Relations).
The Treaty of Lalla Marhnia in 1845 between France and Morocco
fixed the border with Algeria from the Mediterranean coast sixty
miles southward to Teniet al Sassi. In 1901 a protocol established the
border southward to Figuig and thence westward to a point on the
Guir River about eight miles north of Igli. South and west of this
point the border was undefined and, although twice during the period
of French rule ( 1912–56) France attempted to delineate the line
separating the responsibilities of the administrators in Algeria from
those in Morocco, no firm line was established.
Border clashes in 1963 between Algeria and Morocco over this line
ended with a cease -fire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone
near the town of Tindouf, which is noted for its iron ore deposits (see
ch. 3, Historical Setting) . The dispute erupted again in 1966 when
Algeria nationalized its mines, including those in the demilitarized
zone. The conflict was resolved in a meeting on May 27, 1970,
between King Hassan II and President Houari Boumedienne of
Algeria, and a commission was appointed to delineate the frontier.
This delineation confirms the formerly tentative line running west of
Bechar through over 600 miles of Saharan desert to a tripoint formed
by the Spanish Sahara, Algeria, and Morocco just north of Tindouf.
The disputed Ghara Djebillet region remained in the possession of
Algeria, but it was agreed that its iron ore resources would be utilized
jointly by a Moroccan -Algerian Company ( see ch . 9 , Foreign
Relations) .
The border between Morocco and the Spanish Sahara was first set
along the Draa River by a French-Spanish convention of 1912. The
same convention recognized Spanish control over a small enclave of
about 300 square miles around Ifni. In the 1956 treaty between
Morocco and Spain that restored independence to Spanish Morocco,
Spain agreed to move the border with the Spanish Sahara southward
to 27 ° 40' north latitude from the Atlantic to the eastern border of the
Spanish Sahara, at a point about 275 miles inland and about 30 miles
west of Tindouf. Thus, about 15,000 square miles of the Spanish
Sahara, now known as the province of Tarfaya, were restored to
Morocco. Ifni remained a Spanish enclave until 1969, when it was
returned to Morocco by the signing of the Treaty of Fes by Spain and
Morocco on January 4 of that year.
The Moroccan -Spanish Sahara boundary itself is not disputed, but
Morocco continues to claim all of the Spanish Sahara. These claims
acquired added significance since the 1963 discovery of extensive
phosphate deposits in the Seguiet el Hamra, the northernmost portion
of the Spanish Sahara. In late 1971 Moroccan -Spanish negotiations
10
regarding the future of the Spanish Sahara were still in progress (see
ch. 9, Foreign Relations) .

Geographic Regions
Several mountain chains fragment Morocco into five geographic
regions: the Rif coastal massif that borders the Mediterranean from
Ceuta to Melilla; the Atlantic coastal plains and plateaus west of the
Atlas ranges; the great High Atlas and Middle Atlas ranges; the pre
Saharan area, including the Anti -Atlas range and the arid plateaus
southeast of the High Atlas; and the plateaus of Eastern Morocco.
The Rif Massif

The Rif Massif, a complex and rugged chain of mountains, is the

southern extension of the Alpine system of Europe. The main crest
parallels the Mediterranean coast from the Strait of Gibraltar to south
of Al Hoceima, at which point it forms a number of lower ridges that
meet the coast both at Melilla and west of the mouth of the Moulouya
River. The mountains are not particularly high (with one exception,
their highest peaks are only slightly over 7,000 feet above sea level) ,
but erosion has created deep ravines, particularly on the seaward
northern slopes, making them difficult to penetrate.
The southern slopes of the Rif are also steep, though the valleys are
broader . Whereas the seaward slopes are largely denuded, the
southern flank is forested , mainly in Aleppo pine. In the Rif rise the
northern tributaries of the Sebou River, which empties into the
Atlantic north of Rabat. The crest is less than twenty miles from the
sea , and the rivers drop suddenly and rapidly towards an inhospitable
coast. There are no good natural harbors along the Mediterranean,
and those that have been improved at Ceuta, Tetouan, Al Hoceima,
Melilla, and Nador are isolated from the interior.
Atlantic Coastal Plains and Plateaus

The coastal plains of western Morocco stretch from Tangier south

to Essaouira. South of Essaouira the plains are interrupted by a spur
of the High Atlas that reaches the sea at that point. There are small,
enclosed coastal plains south of Agadir and around the mouth of the
Draa River. The coast between Tangier and Essaouira is flat and
bordered with sand dunes or marshes; the plain is uninterrupted,
although its depth from the coast varies widely and at places narrows
to only a few miles .
The population is concentrated in this area, which contains the
major cities, most of the urban areas, and much of the manufacturing
and processing industries (see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry ).
Because of the richness of its agriculture and the ease of access, the
Atlantic plains and plateaus have been the focal point for invasions
11
and have formed a base for the rulers of Morocco throughout history
(see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ).
The lower drainage basin of the Sebou River, which drops out of the
Taza corridor and spreads over a large marshy area northeast of
Kenitra, forms the deepest part of the coast, the Rharb Plain. The
Rharb is the richest and most important agricultural area in Morocco.
Immediately south of the Rharb, around Casablanca, the plain
broadens again into another rich agricultural area known as the
Chaouia . South of the Chaouia the fertile plain extends still further
inland in the Doukkala. These areas are the most densely populated
and most intensely cultivated in the country.
Inland from the plains rises a large, open , but irregular plateau
between 1,800 and 3,000 feet above sea level that covers tens of
thousands of square miles between the Atlantic plains region and the
Atlas ranges. The northern line of the plateau lies along the cork oak
covered highlands of the Zaër and the Zaiane, which form an
outcropping of the Middle Atlas jutting towards the sea southeast of
Rabat. The area is barren and the soil is poor. It is of marginal use for
agriculture. The area around Khouribga is known as the “ phosphates
plateau” and is the center of the richest phosphates deposits in the
country . It is connected by rail with Casablanca. Rivers course over
the plateau through deep ravines on their way from the Atlas ranges
to the Atlantic plain .
Two major inland plains of agricultural importance lie between the
plateau and the Atlas ranges. One, the Tadla Plain, is centered on
Kasba Tadla on the Oum al Rbia River, which has deposited rich soil
over the plain . The other, the Haouz, is the basin of the Tensift River
around Marrakech . Water for agriculture is supplied primarily by
irrigation from the rivers flowing out of the Atlas .
The entire area of the Atlantic plains and plateaus is relatively
open and easily accessible. Transportation within the area faces few
obstacles and is well developed. Though low and regular, the coast
offers few natural harbors. Until the construction of the manmade
harbors at Agadir, Essaouira, Al Jadida, Casablanca, and Rabat,
landings had to be made by small boats through heavy surf. Under the
French and Spanish protectorates, however, extensive facilities were
built, particularly at Casablanca, which has since become one of the
major ports of the world .
High Atlas and Middle Atlas Mountains
The High Atlas mountain range extends some 450 miles in length
and forty miles in depth and divides the country into two well
delineated climatic zones—one that receives the westerly winds from
the Atlantic and one that is influenced by the proximity of the
Sahara . The range begins at the Atlantic coast, where its first spurs
come down to an abrupt shoreline between Essaouira and Agadir, and

12
disappears in the high plateaus west of Bou Arfa. This range
reappears in Algeria as the Saharan Atlas.
The western High Atlas looms up south of Marrakech - a solid
granite wall with a white top that is tabular rather than jagged. In
stark contrast to this is the tremendous depth of the eroded valleys.
These features are common to the Rif and Middle Atlas chains also
but, because of the greater height and permanent snow of the High
Atlas, they are here more accentuated .
All the peaks of the western High Atlas are at least 10,000 feet high ;
some are over 13,000 feet and, consequently, are snow covered year
round . Some of the most notable ones are Toubkal ( 13,500 feet), the
highest mountain in North Africa, and Ouanoukrim ( 13,300 feet), the
second highest. In this area also there are several high passes, all over
7,000 feet.
East of the Tichka Pass, the mountains drop down to 8,400 feet.
The eastern High Atlas is less symmetrical than the western , with
slopes and declivities that are sharper in the northern region than in
the southern , where they form high, intermontane plateaus that
provide passage from the rivers flowing toward the desert .
Nevertheless, isolated mountains are almost as high as those in the
west. One of these, west of Boulemane, reaches 13, 200 feet. At a lower
level, the Ayachi Mountains extend for thirty miles northeastward
without a break, dominating the whole upper Moulouya Valley. East
of the Ayachi massif the mountains terminate in high plateaus which ,
mixed with isolated peaks, begin to tie in with the Saharan Atlas of
Algeria.
To the south of the Rif and the Sebou River basin is the Middle
Atlas, separated from the eastern extension of the High Atlas further
south by the valley of the Abid River. Neither the beginnings nor the
end of the Middle Atlas range is clearly definable . There is great
variation in its composition, as the terrain is old, chalky, and
eruptive. It actually comprises the whole central Moroccan region
with an altitude of 4,000 feet or over. Mountains reaching above
10,000 feet are interspersed with elevated tablelands. In the northeast,
where it attains its greatest altitude in the parallel peaks of Bou
Nasser and Bou Iblane, the Middle Atlas is separated from the
southeastern extremities of the Rif by the Taza Pass and the plains of
the Msoun River and middle Moulouya Valley. In the northwest,
however, its limits are less simple to define, for it gradually slopes
away .
In the east the Middle Atlas is clearly demarcated as it rises up
5,000 to 6,000 feet from the Moulouya plains as a seemingly
impenetrable wall. In the west the mountains are bordered by the
Tadla Plain. In the southwest it runs parallel to the eastern High
Atlas but ceases at the east of the region encompassing the source of
the Al Abid and Moulouya rivers. Here, the Middle Atlas branches off

13
1

to the northeast to end near Taza and the plain around Guercif. The
mountains are lowest in the central part, but in the northeast Bou
Nasser and Bou Iblane are covered with snow for half the year.
Anti - Atlas Mountains and Pre - Saharan Plateaus

The Anti-Atlas, south of the western High Atlas, is connected with

the High Atlas by means of the volcanic massif of Siroua. A large part
of this range backs the High Atlas, being clearly separated from it
only in the westernmost region, where the Sous Valley lies between
the extremities of both chains . The Anti-Atlas has no peaks as high as
those of the Middle Atlas and, up to the course of the Draa River near
Ouarzazate, it takes on the appearance of a high, denuded platform .
Beyond the bed of the Draa, to the east of the Siroua massif, the
range reappears in the Sarho Mountain , which is actually a massif of
old rocks with an elevation of over 8,000 feet. East of the Sarho the
land drops gradually to the pre -Saharan hamaidiya — rocky, desert
areas, which range from 1,600 to 3,200 feet above sea level . South of
the Anti-Atlas is a rocky and sandy steppe parallel to the mountains
1
and only some 600 to 1,000 feet above the level of the stony, dry lands
on the northern bank of the Draa. The dry lands extend to the elbow
of the river, marking the point at which they lose what water remains
to it in the process of contact with the hamaidiya.
The pre -Sahara is the region to the south of the Anti-Atlas, the
High Atlas, and the eastern plateaus and consists of hamaidiya
bisected by depressions formed by riverbeds that descend from the
massifs of the great mountain chains and form narrow valleys. On the
alluvial lands created by the valleys are scattered date palm oases
that contrast with the arid emptiness of the neighboring hamaidiya.
The western extreme of the sand dunes of the Sahara reach into
Morocco in this region .
Eastern Morocco

Eastern Morocco is the large area between the Middle Atlas and
Algeria, divided geographically into three regions—the upper
Moulouya Valley, the eastern High Plateau, and the Taza Pass.
The upper Moulouya Valley is a steppe area along the eastern slope
of the Middle Atlas from east of Kasba Tadla to Guercif. The eastern
High Plateau is a monotonous tableland with an elevation of 3,500
feet, containing a number of depressions that are the remnants of
former lakes, connected in the east with the Algerian plateaus. The
Taza Pass is what is left of the ancient South Rifian Strait and
continues to serve as a vital line of communication between Algeria
and Morocco. The city of Taza is in the center of this main artery.
The gap itself is relatively high , almost 2,000 feet above sea level.
West of Taza, the Inaouene River flows into the Sebou, which empties

14
into the Atlantic ; east of Taza, the Msoun flows into the Moulouya,
which empties into the Mediterranean .

Rivers

The country has the most extensive system of rivers in North

Africa. In a predominantly agricultural economy, where climatic
conditions frequently lead to seasonal droughts, the rivers are of great
importance for crop irrigation . Intensive projects were underway in
1971 to develop the country's water resources. The Five Year Plan
earmarked 15 percent of its agricultural allocations for the
construction of dams , and the prime minister announced in
November 1970 that a total of twenty -two major dams will be
operating by 1972 (see fig. 3) (see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry).
The Moulouya is one of the major rivers emptying into the
Mediterranean. The Mohammed V Dam ( formerly known as the
Mechra Klila Dam) is located on this river some sixty -two miles west
of Oujda. Completed in 1968, it represents the core of an extensive
development project of the lower Moulouya Valley and irrigates
approximately 173,000 acres. The Mechra Homadi Dam, about ten
miles downstream , irrigates the plains on the river's left bank and a
plain south of Nador. The water supply of the city of Tetouan is
drawn from a dam on the Nakhla River, which empties into the
Mediterranean south of that city.
The rivers born in the Atlas ranges show at their sources the same
characteristics as those of the Rif, but by the time they reach the
plains they have lost much of their force and volume. Even so, floods
can be disastrous and, as many of these Atlantic-oriented rivers
converge before reaching the ocean , the danger of flooding is great .
The Loukkos River, which empties into the Atlantic about thirty
miles north of Meknès, will be used to irrigate the Loukkos River
Valley. The T'fer Dam, located southeast of the port city of Larache,
was nearing completion in 1971.
The Sebou River and its tributaries account for some 45 percent of
the country's water resources, and in 1971 dam construction and
irrigation projects were in progress to develop the agricultural
economy of the Sebou basin. Official plans called for the construction
of three major dams by 1972 to irrigate an estimated 617,000 acres in
the Rharb Plain-which, essentially, is the valley of the Sebou and of
its tributaries-and to furnish hydroelectric power. The construction
of the first of these dams, the Idris I (or Arabat) Dam on the Inaouene
River, a tributary joining the Sebou north of Fes, was in progress in
mid- 1971 . The Al Kansera Dam, twenty -four miles northwest of
Meknès on the Beth River, another Sebou tributary, was completed in
1969, bringing 75,000 acres under irrigation. Waters of the Grou and
the Bou Regreg, two other rivers emptying into the Atlantic, are to be
15
used to irrigate the plains in the hinterland of Rabat and to improve
that city's water supply. Work on the Bou Regreg Dam, north of
Rabat, began in June 1971 .
The Oum al Rbia, which empties into the Atlantic about fifty -two
miles south of Casablanca, has been subjected to extensive irrigation
and flood control projects. Three dams on the lower Oum al Rbia were
built before independence, and a fourth dam was under construction
in 1970 .
The Bin al Ouidane Dam, the country's largest, and the Ait Ouarda
Dam on the Al Abid River, a tributary of the Oum al Rbia, irrigate
the Tadla Plain . The Moulay Youssef Dam is located about forty
miles northeast of Marrakech on the Tessaout River, another affluent
of the Oum al Rbia . Opened in October 1970, it irrigates some 75,000
acres of the Haouz Plain. In 1971 another dam was in the planning
stage east of Marrakech on the Lakhdar River, a tributary of the
Tessaout. The Cavagnac Dam, twenty miles south of Marrakech on
the N'fis River, a tributary of the Tensift, was completed in 1968.
Waters of the Massa River, the southernmost of the major rivers
emptying into the Atlantic, are being utilized to irrigate the western
foothill area of the Anti-Atlas. The Youssef ben Tahi Dam, thirty
seven miles south of Agadir and also on the Massa, was nearing
completion in 1971 .
The Saharan rivers, also born in the Atlas, usually thin out because
of heat and evaporation by the time they reach the hamaidiya,
disappearing completely in the dry season and showing water only
spasmodically during the winter rainy season. Another source of water
loss is through the intensive irrigation in the pre -Saharan oases.
Waters of the Ziz, one of the major rivers of this region , and of its
tributary, the Rheris, are important sources for the irrigation of the
Tafilalt Plain southeast of the Atlas chain on the fringes of the
Sahara . The Hassan Addakhil Dam, north of Ksar al Souk, represents
the core of the Ziz River Valley development. Designed to protect the
region from floods and to irrigate more than 50,000 acres, the dam was
completed in early 1971 ; a hydroelectric plant is also planned on the
site. Another irrigation dam is in the planning stage on the Guir River
to water the desert acres southeast of Ksar al Souk.
In the western portion of the pre -Saharan region , the Draa River
and its tributary, the Dades, are the main water resources of the
region of Ouarzazate. The Mansour Dahbi Dam, at the confluence of
1 the two rivers, was near completion in 1971, and a hydroelectric
powerplant at the same site was in the planning stage.
Climate
Western and northern Morocco has a Mediterranean climate that is
strongly modified by local factors ( see fig. 4 ). There is a lack of
16
10 6 2
T SPAIN
DAMS 10 Moulay Youssef
1 Mohammed V 11 Ait Ouarda

36 2 Mechra Homadi 12 Bin al Ouidane 136

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
3 T'fer 13 Hassan Addakhil
Tangieri Ceuta (Sp . )
4 Al Kansera 14 Cavagnac etouan
5 Nakhla DAMS UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 Melilla (Sp. )
6 Bou Regreg 15 Idris 1 (Arabat) Larache Nador MOULOUYA
7 Sidi Machou 16 Sidi Checo
8 Im fout 17 Youssef ben Tahi Oujda
18 Mansour Dahbi
RHARB
au ene
Daourat
9
Ino
Sobou R. ( 15

babay
Rabat

nog

y
lou
Fes
ATLANTIC Meknès

Mou
Casablanca

А
{ Grou R.,
OCEAN © Settat
TADLA
ra
DOUKKALA Ou Rbi .
m
Safi 16
32 ( 112 ) 32
Tens

Ther
t Ri kech
ifMarra Kakhdar R; Ksar al Souk

es

ista
Dad
HAOUZ TAFILALT

14 Ouarzazate
N'fis R. d
098 Ora
g
rc ate
Agadir ema
Sous R. U( nd )

ss
OUARZAZATE ALGERIA
Ma
Legend
MASSA
Major cities
* Existing dams
+ Dams under construction
EĆ Irrigation and cultivation
28 . 28
o 25 50 100
MILES

SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 6 2

Source : Adapted from " Maroc, " Monde Diplomatique ( Supplement ) [ Paris] , 30112046477920-001
XVIII , No. 192, March 25, 1970, p. 34 ; and Maghreb : Etudes et
Documents [Paris] , No. 34, November 1967- December 1967, p. 28.
Figure 3. Rivers, Dams, and Irrigated Areas of Morocco, 1971 . FLDOO100030
17
uniformity in the climate and, in this, the mountain ranges play a
primary role. The Rif and Atlas chains act as a barrier between
western and eastern parts of the country. The majority of the westerly
winds that come off the Atlantic in the winter bring with them snow
and rain to the western flanks of the mountains, leaving little for the
eastern steppes and plains. A winter of raw cold and excessive rain,
with heavy snow in the mountains, accompanied by a continually
overcast sky and an agitated ocean may, perhaps, be followed the next
year by one in which the sky stays blue, there is little rain, and the
farmer's harvest is meager. Cold, stormy winters, however, are the
rule.
10 6 2

36 36
TANGIER MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Under 4 inches

4 to 10 inches

10 to 16 inches
FES

16 to 20 inches
CASABLANCA

20 to 30 inches

30 to 40 inches

32 p " . Precipitation in inches 32

ESSAOUIRA MARRAKECH

ated
marc
(Unde )
ATLANTIC OCEAN

ALGERIA
25 50 100
O

28 28
MILES

10 6 2

TANGIER CASABLANCA ESSAOUIRA F MARRAKECH FO FES F

Elev . 282 F Elev. 180 F Elev . 26 Elev . 1528 Elev. 1368 80
80 80 80 80
P"
60 60 60 60 60
P"
All

40 4 40 40 40 4 40
P" P"
2 2 2
M

o 0
JA J OD JO OD D OD

Source : Adapted from William A. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa,

New York, 1964, p. 78.
Figure 4. Rainfall and Temperature in Morocco .
In summer the climate is more uniform - hot and dry - except for
the Mediterranean coast, where it is humid, and in the Rif and Atlas
ranges, where temperatures are cool although the sun may be fierce.

19
Rain in summer occurs only in the mountains, where in June and July
there may be violent storms . The heat and dryness that pervade the
country in summer are largely the results of the anticyclone from the
Azores and the winds from the northeast ( levante) . The heat is
intensified by the occasional Saharan winds, such as the sirocco,
which howl in off the desert in midsummer and make even the Rifian
seaports almost unbearable for days at a time.
In spring and fall precipitation is slight and irregular. For at least
two months but generally four, and sometimes five or six, the mean
temperature is above 68 ° F. In winter it is nowhere colder than 46° F
except in the Middle Atlas, which often has registered temperatures
below zero. August is generally the hottest month , and January, the
coldest.
The coast in general has a more stable climate than the interior,
and on the Atlantic side, particularly around Casablanca, it is fresher
and less humid than on the Mediterranean. Nowhere, except in
Tangier, in parts of the Rif, and in parts of the Middle Atlas, does
annual rain exceed thirty-two inches. Tangier, because of its location
at the entrance to the straits, has a freakish climate and is subjected
to local winds and rains but to no snow. The cedar forests of the
Middle Atlas and the Rif are the wettest spots in the country.
Elsewhere, annual means are usually less than twenty inches .
Summer rainfall is never more than 20 percent of the total anywhere,
even in the mountains, and elsewhere it is less than 10 percent.

Soils , Flora, and Fauna

Some soils of good quality with satisfactory humus content are
found between the Atlas and Rif ranges and in the valleys of the
Atlas. The soils, however, are thin and calcareous, causing decrease of
the humus content under intensive cultivation . Alluvial plains are
scarce ; the principal ones are located in the Rharb Plain and the Sous
Valley. Other soils of good quality are found in the Chaouia and
Doukkala plains. Elsewhere, as on the plateau east of Midelt or on the
eastern High Plateau near the Algerian border, the soils are poor, with
considerable acidity and much leaching of nutrients.
The dominant vegetation of the Atlantic plains and the plateaus
include asphodels, fennels, and dwarf palm. The plateau is dominated
by grasses, such as esparto or alfa grass, not found on the Atlantic
plain. Vegetation in the desert region is limited to date palms in the
oases ; these also exist to an extent north of the Atlas, and the palm
trees of Marrakech are famous. The pre -Saharan plateaus are almost
completely bare of plants .
It is only in the mountains that there is any real floral
diversification . There are fewer forests on the mountains than before,
as a result of soil erosion , woodcutting, and the destructive influence

20
of wild goats. The vegetation in the Rif, more denuded than in the
Middle Atlas, consists primarily of tough , low bushes. Along the
riverbeds in the western part of the Rif, oleanders predominate, and
in the central part there are canebrakes. Cedars are restricted to the
middle slopes of the highest mountains of the Middle Atlas. To the
west, cork oak predominates, and the wild olive is found throughout
the chain . Aleppo pine and evergreen oak occur in the central Rif.
In the Atlas chains are the thuja ( a tree related to the cypress)
forests of the High Atlas, the argan trees of the Sous Valley, and the
cork oak forests of the Mamora. The most beautiful Moroccan forests
are those of the evergreen oaks and conifers that cover the Middle
Atlas. The cedar forests of this region are particularly impressive,
especially those of the region around Ifrane, south of Meknès.
Outside the actual forest area isolated trees are found, and
hardwoods — poplars, elms, and ash - as well as tamarisk and oleander
adorn the riverbanks. In the less watered regions, as in the Rif,
lentiscus and rockrose thickets are fairly common .
There are few species of large animals in Morocco. The striped
hyena roams the eastern steppes, jackals and foxes are everywhere,
and mountain cats live in the Atlas ranges. Ferrets are used in the Rif
to hunt rabbits. Wild boar abound in all the higher mountains. They
are hunted by the Berbers because of the damage they do to
cultivated plots of land and because their hides may be sold and their
tusks can be used for magical purposes.
Rabbits and hares are everywhere. Barbary apes live in the northern
foothills of the Rif but not in the Rif proper or in the Atlas ranges.
The porcupine and the hedgehog are abundant. The Barbary sheep
live in the Atlas, and gazelle inhabit the pre -Saharan steppes.
Hawks, small eagles, and owls abound in the Rif, as they do in the
Atlas ranges, where the white vulture is also found. Partridges and
doves are found in great numbers in the mountains. Ravens are
everywhere, as are cowbirds and sparrows.
Snakes are not common , but some poisonous varieties, such as
vipers, puff adders, and Egyptian cobras, exist in the south.
Mineral Resources

Mineral resources are varied, and some of them are of major

importance (see fig. 5) . In addition to phosphates, other important
mineral deposits include anthracite, iron, manganese, lead, zinc, and
cobalt, and there are minor deposits of petroleum, antimony, copper,
silver, barite, asbestos, tungsten, gypsum , fluorite, beryl, mica, and
graphite. The country is self-sufficient in salt ; potash has been
discovered near Khemisset, about thirty - five miles south of Rabat.
Phosphate reserves, of undetermined size but estimated at several
billion tons, are among the largest in the world . The highest grade of

21
10 6 2
SPAIN

KEY
36 MEDITERRANEAN SEA 436
Capital Tangier Couto ( Sp .)
• Cities Tetouan
Nodor
Laroche Loukkos Melilla ( Sp .)
• Mining localities
River
* Iron Beni Bou Jatrun Oujda
Manganese Bou Beker
Copper Tovissit
Jeroda
O lead -Zinc Kenitra
X Silver Rabat Fes
. Cobalt Maknas
Casablanca
Phosphates
Ait
Petroleum Ammar
Settat
Khouribga Bou Artan
Rb
el ia Khenifra Tazenzout
Riv
er

32 Youssoufia
432
Ksar ol Souk
Tonsift River Rhe
Riv ri
Marrakech er
Essaouirajo
ATLANTIC Ouorzazate
Bou Kerzia
Sous River
Bou Azzers
OCEAN Agadir
Ma
ss ALGERIA
a
Riv
er
rcated
(Undema )

28| 28
Tarfaya 0 25 50 100

MILES

SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 2

Source : Adapted from " Maroc,” Monde Diplomatique ! Supplement) [ Paris ) ,

XVII , No. 192 , March 25, 1970, p . 34 .
Figure 5. Mineral Resources of Morocco, 1971 .

phosphate rock comes from Khouribga , but the second major

producing area at Youssoufia, fifty miles east of the port of Safi, has
much larger reserves (see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry).
The Jerada mine, in the Oujda region near the eastern border with
Algeria, is the only anthracite field in the Mediterranean area. The
coal is generally of high quality but is fragile and occurs in thin
seams . Iron deposits and mines are spread throughout the country ,
but few of them are located near existing transportation facilities. The
principal mines are the two near Nador on the Mediterranean coast ;
others are near Ait Ammar, about seventy miles inland from
Casablanca. A large deposit, but with a low iron content, is located at
Khenifra in the Middle Atlas .
There are two principal manganese fields with high -grade reserves:
one at Bou Arfa in Eastern Morocco and another on the Imini River
in the High Atlas southeast of Marrakech . Lead and zinc are mined at
Bou Beker and Touissit near the Algerian border but, according to
information in 1965, reserves in this area were nearly exhausted.
There is another lead-zinc mine near Tazenzout, in the upper
Moulouya Valley. Cobalt is found at Bou Azzer, about twenty miles
22
south of Ouarzazate. According to information published in 1965, the
quality of the ore from the principal mines has declined, but
surveying for new and apparently rich reserves was in progress in
1970. In 1971 prospecting for silver was underway fifty miles west of
Ouarzazate, and prospecting for copper was being conducted in the
region between Casablanca and Khouribga and at Bou Kerzia.
Limited oil and natural gas resources are located along the Atlantic
shore and on the Rharb Plain about twenty miles east of Kenitra.
Wells in the Kenitra area were near exhaustion during the late 1960s,
but those near Essaouira on the southern shore yielded significant
quantities. In 1970 intensive offshore prospecting for oil, mostly by
foreign companies, was in progress in several places ( see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry) .

POPULATION

According to Moroccan and foreign demographers, the country's

population is increasing at an annual rate in excess of 3 percent.
Assuming a growth rate of about 3.3 percent annually, experts
estimated the population in mid- 1970 at 15.7 million and, in mid
1971, at 16.2 million. Increasing at this rate, the population is
expected to reach almost 22 million by 1980 and to double by 1991 .
Fluctuations in the number of people in the country at any given
time are related to tourist traffic and to the emigration of Moroccan
workers to European countries and Libya. Workers' emigration has
been officially encouraged and supported by the government. During
the mid- 1960s an estimated average of 10,000 workers emigrated each
year, mostly to France and Libya (see ch. 12, Agriculture and
Industry ).
Since the mid- 1960s the government has officially advocated birth
control. In 1965 King Hassan publicly urged the adoption of policies
to check the rapid population growth. In 1966 the High Commission
on Population was created to disseminate family planning
information and publicity, and a birth control program was launched
with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation . Earlier legislation
that prohibited the use of contraceptive devices was abolished in 1968.
In 1970, however, many population experts expressed doubts
regarding the practicability of birth control in the country. Opposition
was forthcoming from conservative Islamic leaders, and members of
the political opposition attacked the program in the context of general
criticism of official social policies .
Birth control has found response mostly among urban groups. A
limited survey conducted in 1966 among urban women showed that a
majority, especially the wives of middle -level government
functionaries and skilled workers, were interested in acquiring more
23
birth control information and in limiting the size of their families to
four children . According to reports published in 1970, birth control
information reached only about 5 percent of the population in 1968 ,
and about 114,500 women used contraceptive devices.

Characteristics

According to the census of June 1960 — the country's first and, as of

mid- 1971 , only unified population count—the population was
11,627,000, of which 11,071,000, or slightly over 95 percent, were
Moroccan Muslims . Also included as Moroccans were about 160,000
Moroccan Jews . The non -Moroccan minority of about 396,000
included 173,000 French, 97,000 Spanish, 95,000 Algerian refugees,
and 31,000 others. Comparable estimated figures for early 1970 show
Muslims accounting for 98.6 percent of the total . The policy of
Moroccanization and the Jewish exodus had markedly diminished the
number of the Moroccan Jews and of the foreign community ; in 1971
there were 40,000 Jewish Moroccans and some 170,000 non -Moroccan
foreign residents (see ch . 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The latter
group included 90,000 French, 45,000 Spanish, and 35,000 others.

Age, Sex , and Vital Statistics

The country's high growth rate is reflected in the overwhelming

youthfulness of its population . According to a Moroccan official
source, children under fifteen years of age accounted for nearly half of
the total population in 1970. A population survey of the city and
prefecture of Casablanca in 1968 showed that 60 percent of the
residents were less than twenty years old.
Estimates published by the United Nations, based on a total
population of 15,050,000 in 1969, show that there were about 14,000
more women than men . Men constituted a slight majority in the age
groups from one to twenty, but there was some excess of women in
the age group from twenty to twenty-nine and among persons fifty
years and older.
The absence of earlier data prevents the establishment of a trend in
vital statistics, but demographers generally agree that during the late
1960s, as environmental health conditions improved and medical
facilities became available in some rural areas , the birth rate
remained high and the death rate fell. In 1969 the United Nations
estimated the birth rate among Moroccan Muslims at 46.1 per 1,000
and the death rate at 18.7 per 1,000. Other population experts
calculated the death rate at 19 per 1,000 in 1968 and predicted that
the rate would decrease to 10 per 1,000 by 1972. The minister of
public health reported in 1971 that the birth rate was 50 per 1,000 and
the death rate was 17 per 1,000. He urged an intensification of family
24
planning efforts to achieve a reduction of the birth rate to 45 per 1,000
by the end of the Five Year Plan .

Density , Settlement, and Mobility

Because of the country's relatively broad and adequately watered
coastal plains and plateaus, the population is spread over a larger
portion of the country than is the case in the rest of North Africa,
where it is concentrated in a narrow strip along the coast. According
to United Nations estimates, the country's overall population density
in 1969 was . 88 per square mile, but there were wide regional
variations. The major portion of the population is concentrated north
and west of the Atlas ranges; throughout much of this area the density
exceeds 100 per square mile, and it reaches more than 1,000 in the
highly urbanized, intensively farmed coastal strip centering on
Casablanca. These areas are in sharp contrast with the sparsely
populated region south of the High Atlas (where the population is
concentrated in oases lining the Draa River Valley southeast of
Ouarzazate) and the Tafilalt Plain south of Ksar al Souk.
The settled agricultural population lives mainly in the relatively
well watered northern portion of the Atlantic lowlands, southward
along the coast, and inland at the foot of the Atlas mountains where
irrigation is practiced. In the late fall families in the Middle Atlas in
search of pasture move to the plains surrounding Fes and Meknès, to
the Tadla Plain of the upper Oum al Rbia, and to the steppe of the
Moulouya River. In the spring they return to their mountain villages
to resume sedentary cultivation. Similar localized movements in
search of grazing land are also common in the semiarid steppe areas
of the southeast.
The sedentary Arab, or Berber, population lives in one -room
dwellings built of sun -baked clay, with roofs of clay tiles. In the
mountainous areas the dwellings are staggered on the slopes, rising in
tiers so that one family's rooftop becomes another's roadway .
Traditional Berber military fortresses, called casbahs, are typical of
the southern Atlas region where, together with the mosque, they
constitute the core of many rural towns.
Market towns, scattered throughout the rural areas, serve as local
centers of administration and trade. They are noted for the weekly
market (souk), which serves as a gathering point for farmers and
nomadic herders from the surrounding areas to buy, sell, conduct
business with the government, and exchange news and gossip.
Rural -to -urban migration has been rapidly increasing since the
nineteenth century. In 1900 urban residents accounted for 10 percent
of the population; the comparable proportion in 1970 was about 30
percent. According to the census of 1960, 32 percent of the Muslims in
urban areas were born in the countryside. An estimated 100,000

25
persons migrate to the cities each year. Urban populations have
been growing at an average rate of more than 5 percent annually and,
according to most projections, will total some 10 million by 1980.
Casablanca, the country's largest city, receives between 25,000 and
40,000 immigrants each year. Its population is growing at a rate of
almost 7 percent annually and is expected to reach nearly 4 million by
1980 .

The majority of rural migrants are farmers or sharecroppers from

the coastal and central plains and from the pre -Saharan region who
come to the cities in search of employment and to ease family
pressures on the land. To discourage this rural exodus the government
has, on occasion , returned migrants to their places of origin; in other
cases they were refused identity cards, a prerequisite for qualifying for
the services of government labor exchanges. These measures, however,
proved to be largely ineffective.
In 1968 one city, Casablanca, had a population of over 1.5 million
(compared to 20,000 in 1900 ). In seven other cities, Rabat, Marrakech ,
Fes, Mèknes, Tangier, Oujda, and Tetouan, the population exceeded
100,000; twenty - five other cities had populations in excess of 25,000.
The coastal cities of Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Kenitra, and Safi,
all of which were developed by the French and Spanish, are centers of
industry and commerce. They have large foreign populations and are
also the favorite destinations of rural migrants (see ch. 6, Social
Structure). The modern sections of these cities are laid out on a
rectangular plan with broad avenues, parks, and high buildings. The
neighboring ancient Muslim and Jewish quarters (called, respectively,
madina and mallah ), are usually extremely crowded, with low, mud
brick stone houses along narrow , twisting alleys. The poor ventilation
of dwellings and inadequate sewage and waste disposal facilities pose
serious health hazards. In the madina of Casablanca, densities range
between 3,000 and 3,700 persons per acre. Although originally there
was some separation between the madina and the modern sector, the
two have grown together in most cities, and frequently the modern
city surrounds the madina.
Close around the modern cities are bidonvilles, agglomerations of
makeshift shacks, frequently built of flattened oil drums, bits of
lumber, and corrugated iron, in which are crowded the poorest and
most recent migrants from the rural areas. Although sanitation
facilities, electricity, and potable water are either entirely lacking or
inadequate in the bidonvilles, their populations reportedly increased
from 600,000 in 1965 to nearly 1 million in 1970. In Casablanca some
300,000 persons lived in bidonvilles in 1968, and the density in these
areas was about 2,500 persons per acre.

26
LIVING CONDITIONS

Standards of Living and Health

Rapid population growth, low agricultural production, urban
crowding, and widespread unemployment have kept the general living
standard near or at subsistence level. The surge to the cities has
aggravated the job shortage and has led to the disruption of
traditional social patterns and forms of mutual assistance (see ch. 6,
Social Structure). The scope of official social services is limited in
relation to the needs of the large number of poor and destitute
persons.
A small urban and rural minority, constituting some 5 to 10 percent
of the population, derives its existence from the modern economic
sector and receives more than half of the national income . The uneven
distribution of wealth has been extensively criticized by leaders of the
political opposition and by the press (see ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) . The average per capita income
increased from the equivalent of US$150 in 1964 to US$ 190 in 1968.
The rural average per capita income, generally lower than the national
average, was estimated at below the equivalent of US$ 150 in 1967.
The figures, however, fail to show the large proportion of minimal
incomes. During the late 1960s, for example, more than half of the
urban population had annual incomes below the equivalent of
US $ 100. Income differentials are most marked in the cities where
many persons with high earnings or private wealth live in proximity
with unemployed residents of bidonvilles. Disparities in wealth are
less noticeable in the countryside, although a few rural families have
been able to accumulate surplus products or cash .
The cost of living during the late 1960s rose despite government
controls on some prices, notably on those of bread, cereals, and flour.
At the same time wages and salaries remained stationary in
accordance with official efforts to check inflation . Between September
1968 and March 1969 the cost of living index rose from 126 to 131,
reflecting increases in rents and in the prices of services, recreation,
and some food items.
The food supply is sufficient but, because of uneven distribution
and varying availability, about 20 percent of the population,
especially young children and pregnant women, are inadequately fed .
Most affected by shortages are people in poorly irrigated rural areas
and in the bidonvilles. Many foods are not available because they are
exported or because they deteriorate through inadequate preservation
and storage.
Caloric intake varies from 800 calories per day among the poor rural
population to more than 3,500 calories among wealthy groups.
Nutritional deficiency diseases are widespread: in 1967 approximately
27
2 million people suffered from diseases related to shortages of
calcium, vitamin D, and protein in the diet. Rickets and kwashiorkor
(a serious form of malnutrition caused by a shortage of protein ) were
especially common among infants and young children.
The diet is based on cereals—barley, wheat and, to a lesser extent,
corn-and oil. Vegetables and fruit are consumed for variation .
Legumes are consumed in minimal amounts, and about half of the
population does not eat meat. Milk production and consumption are
low; when available, it is taken in the form of yogurt and, less
frequently, as cheese.
Contagious diseases, such as smallpox, bubonic plague, and cholera,
have been controlled and no longer reach epidemic proportions, but
intestinal infections, tuberculosis, trachoma, typhoid , and malaria
remained widespread in 1971. Parasitic ailments and infectious
diseases of childhood were the principal causes of death in 1970,
according to the Ministry of Public Health. Lack of sanitation, poor
personal hygiene, and the prevalence of disease -carrying insects
contribute to their high incidence. Curative and preventive medical
services are offered by the Ministry of Public Health free of charge. In
1968 public health physicians examined more than 5 million persons
visiting health centers operated by the ministry ; during the same year
330,000 persons were treated in government hospitals, 2.6 million
children were vaccinated, and more than 5 million tubes of
ophthalmic ointment were distributed. The minister of public health
stated in 1970 that there were 650 public health physicians and 632
physicians in private practice. The physician -to - population ratio was
1 to 7,000 in the cities and 1 to 60,000 in the rural areas. The Medical
School of the University of Rabat (also known as Mohammed V
University) graduates about 50 physicians annually.

Government Welfare Activities

In 1971 welfare and social services were administered by the

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Youth and
Recreation, and the Ministry of Public Health. Official agencies
dealing with public housing were under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Interior. These included the Office of Urban Planning and
Housing with regional offices in Rabat, Casablanca, Fes, and
Marrakech . The office conducted studies of crowded urban areas,
directed low-interest housing loan programs, and supervised the
preparation of lots. The Center of Experimentation, Research and
Training, also within the Ministry of Interior, encouraged and
coordinated research in areas earmarked for physical and social
development.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs directed two major public
welfare programs: social security and the National Development
28
Program ( Promotion Nationale). The latter was created in 1961 to
provide temporary jobs to the unemployed on public work projects for
food rations and a small cash wage (see ch. 12, Agriculture and
Industry ). The ministry also operated day care centers, maternal and
child clinics, and homes and centers for orphaned children, the aged,
and handicapped persons and administered vacation centers .
Social security was introduced in 1961 ; in 1971 it was operated by
the National Social Security Bank under the supervision of the
ministry. The scope of the system was modest, extending coverage
only to regularly employed salary and wage earners in industry and
commerce . In 1965 these workers accounted for about 15 percent of
the labor force. Farmers, farmworkers, and domestic workers were not
covered. Artisans, public servants, and self-employed professionals
and businessmen were also ineligible, but some of these groups,
notably public servants, have pension plans that pay appreciably
higher benefits than social security.
Allowances and pensions under the social security system in 1970
offered benefits in minimal amounts for old age, sickness, accident,
maternity, and death ; family allowances were paid at the rate of
DH24 ( 5.06 dirham equal US$ 1—see Glossary) for each child.
Employers contributed 13 percent of each worker's salary, and
workers, 2.5 percent of their wages. Information on the number of
workers covered by social security in 1971 was not available.
According to data published in 1968 the monthly average during that
year of workers contributing social security payments was 242,884;
other data for the same year indicated that the majority of persons
benefiting from social security were recipients of family allowances
(see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry).
Most of the country's voluntary social welfare societies were
subsidized by the government and coordinated by the central and
regional offices of the National Mutual Aid (Entr’Aide Nationale
EAN), which was organized in 1957. Its central office, located in
Rabat, was headed by King Hassan's sister, Princess Lala Aisha. The
primary activity of EAN was the distribution of food and clothing and
fuel to the needy on religious holidays and royal birthdays. To be
eligible for aid, men must be over sixty years old, and women must be
widowed or divorced with children .
Private charitable organizations affiliated with EAN included the
1 Moroccan League for the Protection of Children and the Red
Crescent. The latter was an affiliate of the International Red Cross
and provided service in all spheres of social service governed by
international conventions, notably in the assistance to soldiers and
their dependents, the sick, and victims of disaster.
Government initiative in public housing between 1956 and 1965
took the form of direct construction of low-cost dwellings; some
13,000 housing units were built during the period under official
29
auspices. A major shift in public housing policies occurred during the
mid - 1960s when the focus of government development activities
changed from social programs to agricultural and industrial
development, and public housing funds were substantially reduced
(see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry). Government -owned land in
urban areas , however, was divided into lots, cleared , and supplied
with roads, water pipes, and sewers . More than 1,000 such lots were
developed during 1966 and 1967, and 850 were sold at modest prices
to individuals in need of housing; the recipients were also granted
low -interest building loans. In selecting recipients for lots and loans,
priority was given to residents of bidonvilles and to families with
many children . In the course of the Five Year Plan the government
has planned to make available some 20,000 developed lots. Loans for
housing construction have been granted to private builders and to
industrial enterprises prepared to use the lots to build workers'
housing.

30
CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL SETTING

In July 1970 King Hassan II promulgated and secured electoral

endorsement of a new constitution . Elections were held in August for
a new legislature, and limited parliamentary government was restored
after a five -year emergency period of direct royal rule. The position of
the king, however, remained paramount. The traditional dual and
patriarchal role of the monarch as both temporal ruler and as Muslim
religious leader ( amir al muaminin , or commander of the faithful) was
strengthened by King Mohammed V (before 1957, titled Sultan
Mohammed; also known as Sidi Mohammed) , the venerated hero of
post-World War II independence. His son, King Hassan II,
maintained this role after his accession in 1961, pursuing the goals of
modernization in a constitutional monarchy visualized by his father.
Moroccans take pride in their country's distinctiveness and its role
as the center of several medieval empires that at various times
controlled much of North Africa and Spain. Unlike the rest of North
Africa, the country did not fall under Ottoman Turkish sovereignty in
the sixteenth century. In perspective, the relatively brief period of the
French and Spanish protectorates ( 1912–56) , during which tribal
resistance was succeeded by Moroccan nationalism generated by such
leaders as Allal al Fassi, may be seen simply as a hiatus in the long
history of independent Morocco. The country's ethnic and cultural
identification with North Africa and the Arab and Islamic world areas
antedated the European protectorates by thirteen centuries or more.
The effects of the colonial protectorate period, however, were
profound. During this time the country was unified under central
control, industrial and economic development was initiated,
government administration was reorganized, and notable
improvements were made in transportation and communications. The
colonial legacy, however, left severe postindependence problems in
regard to language and education and the replacement of the French
bureaucracy in government and commerce (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups
and Languages; ch. 7, Education, Communication, and the Arts and
Sciences) .
In world affairs Morocco after 1956 followed a policy of
nonalignment in the bipolar confrontations of the post-World War II
era, but its foreign association, by custom and experience, was
oriented mainly to the West. In regional African and Arab affairs
31
Morocco played an important, moderate role and strengthened its
position by several diplomatic successes in the 1969–70 period,
notably, in reaching agreement with Algeria on their longstanding
border dispute. Foreign policy questions in late 1970 thus appeared to
be less significant than domestic problems of the economy, political
factionalism , runaway population growth , effectiveness of government
machinery, and education .

EARLY HISTORY

Indigenous tribal peoples of Mediterranean stock, speaking a

language belonging to the broad Afro -Asiatic classification , have
inhabited North Africa from before the recorded history of the area.
Eventually, they became known to Europe and the Middle East as
Berbers. Except for the Tuareg peoples in the southern Sahara, they
had no separate alphabet and no written language; apparently, they
also had no specific name either for the geographical region they
inhabited or for their society and identified themselves primarily in
local terms of tribe and family. Collectively, they referred to
themselves simply as imazighan , or “free men ” (see ch. 4, Ethnic
Groups and Languages).
In the region of present-day Morocco, independent tribes roved the
Rif and Atlas mountains or settled in the plains, struggling with each
other for control of limited, local areas . Phoenician traders, who
reached the western Mediterranean as early as the twelfth century
B.C., founded seaports at Tangier, Ceuta, and other points. Carthage,
founded in what is now Tunisia by Phoenician colonists probably in
the eighth century B.C., extended its dominion over the North
African coast. Neither the Phoenicians nor the Carthaginians
colonized the hinterland but traded with the Berber herders and
farmers at coastal points.
After the defeat of Carthage in 146 B.C., Rome gained a firm
foothold on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and pushed the
boundaries of Roman Africa westward , bringing northern Morocco
securely under its administration in the first century A.D. For the
next two centuries Rome administered the area generally north of a
line through present-day Rabat, Fes, and Taza, calling it the province
of Mauretania Tingitana, with its capital at Tingis (Tangier) . The
Latin word Mauretania meant the land of the Maures, or Moors, and
from this designation the name Morocco derived.
Beginning in the third century the Roman Empire, gradually
eroded by political crises at home, also encountered increasing
pressure from the peoples along the imperial frontiers. In the face of
increasing Berber encroachment, Rome withdrew to a reduced
province centered on Tangier and administered by the Roman
32
authority in Spain . During this period Christianity gained a number
of converts among the Berbers, who utilized the new religion as an
organizational means for opposing the Romans. After the empire
adopted Christianity as the state religion in the fourth century,
schismatic and heretical movements among the Berbers continued as
forms of protest and resistance.
Gothic Vandals, overrunning the crumbling empire's frontiers,
crossed from Spain into North Africa in 429. Although they destroyed
Roman authority, they did not eliminate the Roman cultural
influence or Christianity. In 534 the Byzantine successors to the
Roman empire drove out the Vandals and attempted to reestablish
imperial dominion, but with only limited success . Neo-Latin influence
returned weakly to North Africa for about a century. The independent
Berber tribes, some having a well-developed political organization,
successfully resisted reassimilation into an imperial system whose
authority was restricted to scattered cities and fortified outposts. By
the seventh century, as European political ties loosened and
attenuated, North Africa in effect turned away from primary
identification with the neo-Latin European world . The determinant
synthesis that then took place was that of the meeting of the native
Berber peoples with the culture of Islam and the Arabs from the east.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ARABS

By the time of his death in 632 the Prophet Muhammad and his
followers had brought most of the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula
under the banner of the new monotheistic religion of Islam
( " submission ” ), uniting the individual, state, and society under the
all -powerful will of God. True Islamic rulers therefore exercised both
temporal and religious authority ; conversely, to them the much later
Western idea of separation of church and state would have appeared
not only heretical but fundamentally illogical . Adherents of Islam,
called Muslims, collectively formed the Dar al Islam (House of Islam) ;
all others lay outside, awaiting their opportunity to choose
enlightenment (see ch. 5, Religious Life).
By the middle of the seventh century the Prophet's successors
carried the conquests of Islam north and east from the Arabian
Peninsula and also westward into North Africa. There, stubborn
Berber resistance prevented them from pressing into the area in force
until the last quarter of the century . The first Arab raids through the
Taza Gap and into the Moroccan plains are traditionally dated from
684, but firm Arab control and permanent conversion to Islam did not
occur until later.
In 710 Arab armies under the leadership of Musa Ibn Nusayr, the
governor of Islamized Ifriquiya (present -day Tunisia) , conquered the
33
Moroccan area and succeeded in converting the Berbers of the plains
and northern cities . New converts to Islam formed the bulk of the
forces sent into Spain beginning in 711. So successful were the
Muslim Moorish armies that within a few years most of the Iberian
Peninsula (known as the province of Andalusia) was under Muslim
control, with allegiance to the Umayyad dynasty, whose capital was
Damascus .
Although Islam as a religion was firmly implanted in large areas of
Morocco, assimilation to Arab rule and language was slower. The
Berbers found the Arabs ’ way of life compatible and respected the
effective organization and mobility of their forces but became
dissatisfied with the treatment accorded by them after Berber
acceptance of Islam . Contrary to the tenets of the Quran, the Islamic
scripture, which prescribed preferential treatment for all Muslims,
Arab rulers continued to levy heavy taxes on the Berber converts and
treated them as conquered inferiors.
The Berbers utilized an early schism in Islam as a rallying point for
resistance to Arab domination, as they had earlier used Christianity
against the Romans. The Islamic Kharidjite heresy had arisen in the
mid-seventh century over the question of the choice of caliph, or the
successor of Muhammad as supreme earthly leader of Islam. This
conflict between the supporters of rival claimants split Islam into two
great branches — the Sunni and the Shia — which continued thereafter
as the basic division among Muslims. The Shia supported the claim of
the descendants of Ali, son - in -law of Muhammad and fourth caliph,
whereas the Sunni supported that of Ali's rival, Muawiya, a leader of
a collateral branch of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca . The
Kharidjites refused to accept either choice, insisting that the caliph
should be elected from among any suitable Muslim candidates
without regard to race, station , or direct descent from , or tribal
connection with, the Prophet.
The reduction of the Arab monopoly on the supreme leadership of
Islam inherent in the Kharidjite position appealed to the
independence-minded Berbers; and in 740 Berbers across North
Africa revolted in the name of this heresy against Arab political and
religious domination . In Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa the
intensity of commitment to doctrinal or ideological quarrels for their
own sake was less than in the central Middle East. The Berber revolt,
although utilizing the Kharidjite heresy of the great Islamic dynastic
wars, was animated pragmatically by local motivations rather than
abstract ideas and aimed primarily at relief from the onerous
constraints of Arab rule.
The revolt was suppressed , but the Arab caliphate was unable to
sustain its temporal authority. During the period of autonomy that
followed, several small Berber kingdoms of Kharidjite sectarians
arose. In the mid -eighth century a second struggle among rival
34
claimants to the central caliphate in Damascus had important
consequences for Morocco . When the Abbasid faction overthrew the
Umayyads of Damascus in 750, the only surviving scion of the
Umayyad line fled to Morocco, where he gained support for a new
incursion into Spain . In 756 he succeeded in establishing an
independent kingdom at Cordova, often called the Umayyad caliphate
of the West. This western caliphate became a cultural island during
the European Dark Ages, as scholars from Europe and the Middle
East illuminated the court at Cordova .
In 785 further wars between Shia and Sunni in the east led to the
establishment of Morocco's first independent Arab dynasty . Idris Ibn
Abdullah, a great -great -grandson of Ali, fled to Morocco after defeat
by the Sunni Abbasids in Arabia. Idris succeeded in gaining
acceptance as ruler by the tribes of northern Morocco and in 808
founded the city of Fes. Idris was a sharif because he was a
descendant of the Prophet . His line, from about 788 to 974, was thus
the first sharifian dynasty; it was also the first and only Shia rule. An
identifiable central government structure was introduced, and the
conversion of northern Morocco's Berbers was virtually completed.
Idris and his son, Idris II, continue in modern times to be among the
most revered of the country's rulers. In the city of Fes, many of the
old aristocratic families trace their descent from the Idrisids .

Although weakened by struggles over succession, Idrisid hegemony

over most of northern Morocco continued into the tenth century.
Supported by Sanhaja Berbers of Kabylia ( in present -day Algeria) , the
Shia Fatimid dynasty, originating in Qairwan in present-day Tunisia ,
destroyed the Kharidjite kingdom in 958 and threatened the Idrisids.
They established their authority over western North Africa to the east
of Fes but turned their primary attention eastward toward Egypt.The
Sunni Umayyads of Cordova, at the height of their power, moved into
northern Morocco to oppose the Fatimids. They established
themselves at Ceuta, gained suzerainty of most of northern Morocco,
and overthrew the remnant Idrisid dynasty in 974.
Until the tenth and eleventh centuries one major group or “ family ”
of Berber tribes, the Masmuda, had formed the dominant population,
particularly in the more densely settled plains of northwest Morocco.
The Sanhaja group , the western mainstay of Fatimid forces, settled
the eastern frontiers of Morocco along the Moulouya River and the
southern oases. In opposing the Fatimids, the Umayyads allied
themselves to a third major Berber group, the Zanata confederations
of Bani Ifran and Maghrawa, who were traditional enemies of the
Sanhaja and encouraged them to move into the northern plains.
Rivalry among the small kingdoms of these Berber confederations
colored the entire early medieval period of Moroccan history. The
Zanata were Sunni and initiated the return to this branch of Islam.

35

1
Even more important to the future of Morocco was the large-scale
Arab immigration that began in the eleventh century. Before that
time the Arabs in Morocco consisted mainly of the descendants of the
relatively small numbers of initial invaders and of the Idrisids, who
had married Berber women . Many of these early arrivals had been
aristocrats from Arabia who settled in the cities . The character of the
Arab migrations of the eleventh century was distinctly different. The
Fatimids, at this time ruling from their capital in Cairo and infuriated
by Berber refusal to acknowledge their hegemony, encouraged masses
of beduin Arabs of the Beni Hilal and Beni Salim tribes to migrate
into North Africa. Over a long period, they displaced the Berbers from
some of the best lands or settled among them. This immigration
introduced for the first time comparatively large numbers of Arabs
into the Moroccan population and quickly spread use of the Arabic
language.

THE MEDIEVAL BERBER EMPIRES

The Almoravids

While the northern rim of the Maghrib was being subjected to these
Arab invasions, veiled nomadic Sanhaja Berber tribes of the Sahara
were being united under the banner of an Islamic religious
brotherhood, which had originated early in the eleventh century and
matured, according to older references, in a ribat (Berber religious
retreat) along the Senegalese coast . Recent historians have
increasingly discounted the notion of the island fortress or coastal
enclave . The region centered in the present-day junction of
Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco seems more likely as the area of
maturation of this movement. About 1050 the warrior monks, who
came to be known as the Almoravids (a Spanish corruption of al
murabitun - men of the ribat) , began to push northward and
northeastward, conquering in the name of their Sunni form of Islam.
Their crusade was directed also against the Zanata, who had
encroached on Sanhaja control of Saharan oases and trade routes.
They moved into Morocco through the Tafilalt south - central area
and founded Marrakech in 1062 as their capital. Forcibly converting
Moroccan Jews and the remaining Christians, the Almoravids swept
north to the Mediterranean ; by 1082 they had conquered the whole of
the Maghrib as far east as Algiers. For the first time, under the
Almoravid sultan Yusif Ibn Tashfin, all of present-day Morocco was
unified . The conservative interpretation of the Sunni Malikite rite
was adopted and endured as the official form of Islam in Morocco.
In 1085 the Almoravids responded to a request for assistance from
the petty Muslim princes of southern Spain, who earlier in the
century had succeeded to the ruins of the Umayyad dynasty and were
36
being threatened by the Christians in the Iberian Peninsula . They
pushed back the Christians and in 1090 conquered their erstwhile
allies and established their empire north as far as the Tagus River.
The leaders of the Almoravids settled in Seville and came greatly to
admire the good life of Andalusia. Under their aegis, this mixture of
Berber, Arab, and Spanish culture was introduced into Morocco.
Marrakech became one of North Africa's largest cities and a widely
admired center of Islamic art and learning. Under the Almoravids,
Morocco and Spain acknowledged the spiritual authority of the
Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, reuniting Morocco temporarily with
the Islam of the Middle East .

The Almohads

As the initial puritanism of the Almoravids quickly dissolved in the

sophistication of the Andalusian culture, the military power on which
their authority rested was dissipated. As a result, a new Islamic
reform movement, based on a tribal confederation of the Masmuda
Berbers centered in the Atlas , was able to defeat the Almoravids
before the middle of the twelfth century, finally taking Marrakech in
1147. The new rulers were known as Almohads (a Spanish corruption
of al muwahidinmunitarians) because of their strict monotheistic
belief in the unity of a nonanthropomorphic god.
The founder of the Almohad movement, Muhammad bin Tumart,
was a personality cult leader, recognized by his disciples in 1121 as
the mahdi, or lord of the end of time. He died in 1130, but under him
and his successors the empire in Spain and North Africa pushed its
borders as far north as Castile and as far east as Tripoli. These early
rulers established a strong central government, or makhzan (see
Glossary) that lasted for about half a century.
The Almohad empire lasted little longer than had that of the
Almoravids, however. The Almohad leaders accepted beduin Arabs
into their army and settled the beduins in the plains of northern
Morocco, seriously weakening the internal fabric of the empire. The
disastrous defeat of Almohad forces by the Christian king of Castile in
1212 began the drawn-out final ebb of Muslim power in Spain.
Almohad religious reforms did not take hold, and the Malikite
orthodoxy of the Almoravids persisted in the makhzan, whereas
emotional Islamic Sufi mysticism , the veneration of saints, and the
power of the marabouts ( Islamic holy men) grew among the masses.
The growth of folk religion, the revival of the Malikite rite among the
elite, and the flowering of North African Arab art and literature that
occurred in the middle and late Almohad era, while seeming
paradoxes, were antidotal to the dry severity of early Almohad ways.
37
The Marinids

The third great Berber empire was based on the Zanata tribes led
by the Bani Marin . Called upon by the Almohads to help defend the
eastern frontier against Arab incursions, the Bani Marin took
advantage of waning Almohad power to migrate westward through the
Taza Gap into Morocco proper in 1216. In 1269 they captured
Marrakech and ended the Almohad empire. Basing their power on
tribal unity rather than on religious reform as their predecessors had
done, the Marinid dynasty lasted until the middle of the fifteenth
century. Of necessity, the Marinids compromised with the widespread
cults of Sufi folk mysticism . Moroccan Islam thus took shape as a
coexistent and partial blend of the scrupulous intellectualism of the
ulama (religious scholars) of Fes and the sometimes frenzied
emotionalism of the masses .
The Marinids never succeeded in reestablishing the frontiers of the
Almohad empire ; in Spain they were forced to withdraw to the area
around Granada, while their eastern frontier in North Africa was
withdrawn to approximately the position of the present Moroccan
Algerian frontier. Gradually, the unsettling influence of the beduin
Arabs in the plains undermined traditional sedentary Berber
agriculture. City life also deteriorated, and the previous high cultural
level sharply declined. Increasingly, the more remote tribes refused to
acknowledge the authority of the makhzan and looked to the
marabouts as sources of political power.
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Marinids had spent
their strength in efforts to rebuild the empire and in internal
struggles. They were replaced by a related Zanata tribe, the Bani
Wattas, who assumed control of the government in Fes in 1465 and,
until the end of their dynasty in 1549, prevented the growing anarchy
of the countryside from destroying a semblance of central authority.
As Muslim power declined, the Christian kingdoms of northern
Spain and Portugal were growing steadily stronger. Although the
Marinids and the Bani Wattas were able to prolong Muslim control
over the reduced province of Granada, this last foothold was overrun
by the armies of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, and the Spanish and
Portuguese then looked toward the north coast of Africa. The triumph
of Christianity in Spain was accompanied by the persecution of
Muslims and the expulsion of Jews . Thousands of Muslims (also
known as Moriscos) and Sephardic (Spanish-Oriental) Jews fled to
North Africa, where they gained great influence in government,
commerce, and urban culture. Settled in Rabat and Salé, the
Moriscos for a time in the seventeenth century formed an
independent republic. The pirates of the North African coastal states
and enclaves, who became known as Barbary pirates, included some
of these seagoing Moriscos (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).
38
Loss of effective political control by the makhzan, the growth of
piracy off the Moroccan coasts, and the increasing tensions in
Muslim -Christian relations provided the Europeans with pretexts for
intervention in Morocco. The Spanish occupied Tetuán ( in modern
times known as Tetouan) in 1399 but shortly thereafter recognized
Portugal's sole right to occupy the Moroccan coasts west of Peñon de
Velez. The Portuguese occupied Ceuta in 1415 and by 1471 were in
control of Tangier and other northern Moroccan ports. In the early
sixteenth century they established a number of fortified ports along
the Atlantic coasts, including Agadir ( 1505), Safi ( 1508 ), Azemmour
( 1513) , and Mazagan ( 1514) . The Spanish occupied Melilla in 1471 .
Neither the Portuguese nor the Spaniards were able permanently to
occupy the hinterland around their ports, however, because of
stubborn resistance by the population . Moroccan forces drove the
Portuguese out of some of their coastal holdings, including Agadir, by
1550. The Portuguese, however, retained control of some locations,
including Tangier and Ceuta. They ceded the latter port to the
Spaniards in 1668 and Tangier to the English, who in turn ceded it
back to the Moroccans in 1684. The Spanish ports of Ceuta and
Melilla were under recurring attack until the twentieth century. The
reason that the European powers did not more actively press the
occupation of Morocco in the sixteenth century is not certain .
Historians have observed that the effort was probably limited by the
appearance elsewhere of richer targets for colonial expansion.

THE SHARIFIAN DYNASTIES

Popular adherence to strict Sunni Islam had declined in step with

the decadence of the makhzan during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. Sufic mysticism and the cult of saints was prevalent. The
rise of the power of the marabouts and the religious brotherhoods
(zawiyiin ) was associated with the spread of a belief in baraka
(spiritual power), which was considered to stem from God and to
reside in its strongest form in saints, holy men, and descendants of
Muhammad (see ch. 5, Religious Life ). Several Arab tribes that had
settled in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the oases of the
Tafilalt and the sub -Saharan steppes along the Draa River claimed
direct descent from Muhammad. Called shurfa (noble) tribes, they
were accepted by many Moroccans as possessing baraka. When the
Marinids and Bani Wattas proved impotent to oust the infidel
Portuguese, the marabouts of the Sous plains south of Agadir called
upon the shaykh (tribal leader) of the shurfa tribe of Saad, from the
present -day Zagora region along the Draa River, to lead a holy war in
1511 against the Portuguese.

39
The Saads

Although initially unsuccessful, the Saadian sharif and his

successors led the southern tribes against the cities of Marrakech ,
Meknès, and Fes, still held by the Bani Wattas. The capture of Fes in
1549 is considered to mark the beginning of the Saad dynasty.
Thenceforth, the period of this line and its successor, the Alawis, is
often called that of the Sharifian dynasties. In 1550 Saadian forces
succeeded in forcing the Portuguese to relinquish most of their
Moroccan strongholds.
Subsequent Portuguese attempts to exploit rivalries among Saadian
claimants to the throne resulted in the deaths in battle in 1578 of the
leaders of the warring factions and the rise of Sultan Mulay Ahmad al
Mansur, who is regarded as the greatest of the Saadian sultans. The
title -name of Mulay is reserved for Islamic nobility who are
descendants of the Prophet in the male line. Mansur prevented the
Ottoman Turks, who were firmly established as far west as Tlemcen,
from expanding into Morocco - a notable achievement for Moroccan
history . Successful but costly expeditions to Timbuktu and the
surrounding region in what is now Mali and Mauritania established
Morocco as a leading slave-trading power and laid the basis of later
Moroccan claims to the south. Morocco's prestige in European courts
was high, and Mansur was treated with great respect by the European
powers .
Much is owed to Sultan Mansur for the basic structure of the
makhzan in the twentieth century. He reactivated many of the forms
developed under the Berber dynasties and added elements borrowed
from Ottoman practice, particularly in his rule of holdings to the
south through pashas, or local governors . His policy of relying for
military support on certain tribes, which in return were exempted
from taxation, was followed by all his successors . These were called
jaysh (see Glossary) tribes. He placed a caid, or local administrator, as
tax collector and general representative of the makhzan in all tribes
that submitted to his power.
Although the concept of the universal Islamic state persisted in
theory, the Islamic world of North Africa and the Middle East early
divided into political societies essentially tribal-military -authoritarian
in nature. Fixed rules of succession were not firmly established, and
the Islamic polities, veering between hereditary and consensus
electoral monarchies, became characterized by frequent and violent
successional struggles. On Mansur's death the question of succession
again divided the country, and the power and authority of the
Saadians waned . Outside the limited areas in which the authority of
the rival cities of Fes and Marrakech was recognized , a large number
of marabouts held local power. Amid the chaos, another shurfa Arab
tribe from the southern oases around Tafilalt was gaining a
40
commanding position. This tribe, known both as the Alawi and the
Filali, had come to Morocco from the Arabian Peninsula in Marinid
times.

The Alawis

The new Alawite dynasty rode to power on the cause of unity,

reform , and orthodoxy about 1660. Mulay Rashid, the first strong
ruler, became sultan in 1664 and by 1670 brought all of Morocco
under his control. Everywhere, he sought to suppress the marabouts
and to enforce the will of the makhzan . His successor, Mulay Ismail,
who came to the throne in 1672, struggled for eighteen years to
consolidate his power and put down tribal revolts. Although he
succeeded in restoring Moroccan sovereignty over Larache and
Tangier, as well as in pacifying the plains and isolating the dissident
Berber tribes of the Atlas, he was unable to unite the whole country.
Ismail added to the Moroccan army further contingents of slaves
brought from the Sudan . When not involved in war the abid ( slave)
troops, numbering at least 50,000 by the end of his reign , were used in
constructing the many casbahs ( fortresses) from which the troops
maintained peace in the countryside. Ismail brought Morocco into
closer commercial contact with the European powers, and various
embassies were exchanged. He sent envoys to Louis XIV of France,
whose court he admired, and sought to be recognized on an equal
footing with his rival, the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul .
Wars of succession raged for thirty years after Ismail's death .
Finally, in 1757 Sultan Mohammed was able to suppress the Berber
revolts and gain acceptance by the tribes. He wished to establish
diplomatic relations with European powers, and a treaty in 1767 gave
the French freedom of commerce, the right to open a consulate at
Salé, and concessions in favor of French nationals. Treaties of amity
and commerce were also signed with Denmark, Sweden, and, toward
the end of his reign , with the United States.
In 1787 Morocco and the United States signed the Treaty of
Marrakech , which settled outstanding difficulties resulting from the
seizure by Moroccan pirates of American ships and seamen and
established commercial relations favorable to the United States . The
United States agreed to pay Morocco an annual tribute of US $ 10,000,
a common term of relationship between the North African, or
Barbary, states and European powers at the time. Mohammed's
immediate successors were involved in further Berber revolts in
central Morocco that the central power never succeeded in putting
down completely. The division of the country into the bilad al
makhzan ( land under the central government - see Glossary) and the
bilad al siba (land of dissidence-see Glossary) became a long-lasting
feature.

41
A new treaty, the Treaty of Meknès, signed in 1836, modified
earlier commercial agreements to give the United States certain
economic advantages in addition to the most -favored -nation
treatment agreed to in 1824. It also accorded to United States citizens
certain capitulatory rights, such as the right to be tried only by courts
established by United States consulates in Morocco, similar to
privileges assumed by other Western governments in the country and
elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East .

MOROCCO IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

European Interests in Morocco
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the acceleration of
colonialist expansion by Great Britain, France, and Germany.
Morocco, isolated from the social, political, and economic upheavals
that were reshaping European society, was seen by each of the
European powers as a threat in the hands of any of the others, as a
prize to be added to empire, and as an area that held possibilities for
profitable economic penetration.
Although Great Britain had some economic interest in Morocco, its
main concern since obtaining Gibraltar in 1704 had been to protect
the strait, a key point on the route to the Levant. Great Britain
therefore regarded Morocco as an area that must remain out of the
hands of rival powers .
France and Morocco came into direct conflict over the French
seizure of Algeria in 1830, a date that marks the beginning of a long
period during which the threat of French intervention was added to
the internal troubles of the country . For years Moroccan sultans had
sought to control the Tlemcen area, which was sometimes under
Moroccan hegemony but nominally part of the enfeebled Ottoman
Empire. When the French first entered the area, the people of
Tlemcen appealed to Moroccan Sultan Mulay Abdul Rahman for aid,
but though he sent an envoy to Tlemcen to rule in his name, he
agreed under French pressure not to use armed force.
The situation became more confused when the Algerian leader,
Abdul Qadr, claiming to be the agent of Abdul Rahman, led the
Berber tribes in a holy war against the French. When driven back by
the French, Abdul Qadr took refuge in eastern Morocco. Accused of
harboring the rebel, the Moroccan sultan contended accurately that
his control of northeastern Morocco was insufficient for him to enforce
his will in the matter. After French attacks on Morocco involving the
bombardment of Tangier, the occupation of Mogador, and a Moroccan
military defeat at Isly, Abdul Rahman in 1844 agreed to cooperate
with the French in hunting down Abdul Qadr. The following year the
Convention of Lalla Marhnia defined the northern part of the
Moroccan -Algerian frontier (see ch. 2, Geography and Population ).
42
Spanish interest derived from geographical propinquity and the
long historical connection between the two countries. The only power
that directly controlled territory in Morocco at the end of the
nineteenth century , Spain held the presidios of Ceuta, Melilla, Al
Hoceima, and Peñon de Velez and had established a claim to the
Atlantic coastal enclave of Ifni. Until the last quarter of the century,
Spain had enjoyed a limited success in keeping scattered footholds in
Morocco, but a continued power decline in relation to the rest of
Europe made it difficult to press these interests.
French policy rested on a desire to protect France's Mediterranean
trade, increase economic and political interest in North Africa, and
control border raids from Morocco into Algeria. When in 1881 France
established a protectorate over Tunisia, Morocco was already
accepted by French imperialists as the next objective of empire and as
part of their self- assumed task of spreading French culture and its
benefits under the French concept of mission civilisatrice (civilizing
mission) .
Spain and Great Britain, fearful that France would press its
interests in Morocco, discussed means of preserving the status quo.
Spain then called the Madrid Conference of 1880. At the conference,
twelve European nations, the United States, and Morocco agreed that
Morocco should remain independent. An agreement to limit the
longstanding capitulatory rights exercised by European consuls to
interfere in internal Moroccan affairs had little effect, however.
Foreign intervention continued to weaken the power of the makhzan
and to present the threat of international conflict in Morocco.
The Madrid Conference was the first of several instances in which
the European powers considered jointly the problem of Morocco and
agreed not to intervene. It was important as the precedent for the
guarantee of Morocco's status by international treaty, but it acted as
a check on French interests for only a short time .

The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Morocco in 1900 was little different from the Morocco of 1700 .
Because of no fixed rule of succession, the death of a sultan usually
led to long periods of instability. The country was not a unitary
political community; the government's influence over the tribes
varied according to the strength of its army and the accessibility of
the tribe. To finance the government, the sultan had each year to call
out his army, drawn from the jaysh tribes, and to travel with them
throughout the kingdom, extracting levies from each tribe. Often force
was necessary; many of the tribes denied the sultan's right to tax
them and resented having to support his huge entourage in their
territory . Still, a sultan with a strong personality could create a
43
relatively strong government during his reign , though he could not
ensure that his successor would be able to keep it.
The government, composed initially of a small group of palace
officials, became by the nineteenth century a highly centralized
machine. Absolute power was vested in the sultan, and all legislation
was embodied in his dahirs ( decrees) . The grand wazir, as the sultan's
highest executive official, was in effect premier and minister of
interior. He held the responsibility for tax collection and the
maintenance of order, and under him the pashas ( governors of the
cities) and caids ( governors of the tribes) exercised their authority. At
the end of the nineteenth century, the government comprised five
ministries-interior, justice, finance, war, and foreign affairs - and
various other high offices of the sultan's court . The offices of pasha
and caid were more or less hereditary and were restricted to families
powerful in a given locality. As long as revenues continued to come in
and order prevailed, the sultan placed no restrictions on their actions.
The sharifian makhzan relied on personal relationships rather than
rigid procedures and was organized on the basis of tribal, rather than
territorial, divisions . The traditional differences between the bilad al
makhzan and the bilad al siba did not alter the existing social and
* political structure; the people continued to live within the traditional
framework - family, village, and tribe—and these institutions and
attitudes are still important in the framework of the modern state (see
ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics).
Sultan Hassan developed a strong, stable government during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century and tried, with little success, to
introduce modernizing reforms. On his death in 1894 he was
succeeded by fourteen -year-old Abdul Aziz. For six years Morocco was
ruled by a regent who maintained an iron rule but made no effort to
continue Hassan's modernization program . When Abdul Aziz took the
throne in his own name, he proved to be anxious to modernize the
country but, under a variety of pressures , was easy prey to
unscrupulous adventurers.
During the critical first decade of the twentieth century, Morocco
was practically without a government; the country's financial position
deteriorated to the point where the country was in bondage to foreign
lenders. The sultan's popularity plummeted and with it the central
government's authority. The government's impotence to put down
two outlaws—an adventurer, Raisuli, and a pretender to the throne,
Bou Hamara—had serious international repercussions.
In 1904 the bandit Raisuli boldly penetrated Tangier and
kidnapped a United States citizen, and the event quickly became a
lively international ' incident . The Moroccan government was
powerless to act, however, and was forced to conciliate Raisuli with a
large ransom and an appointment as governor of the districts
44
surrounding Tangier. Raisuli continued his extortions even after he
had helped overthrow Abdul Aziz in 1908 and placed Aziz's brother,
Mulay Hafid , on the throne. Bou Hamara established a fiefdom in the
Rif Massif early in the century and gathered a sizable body of
supporters behind his claim to the sharifian throne. Although he was
unsuccessful in pressing his claim , Bou Hamara contributed to the
growth of anarchy, which became the major pretext for European
intervention .

The Diplomacy of Protection

After 1880 Morocco received constant European attention in the
form of treaties between the European powers and Morocco, and
among the powers concerning Morocco, in which the Europeans
reiterated their intent to guarantee its independence and territorial
integrity. The early years of the twentieth century witnessed a rush of
open and secret diplomatic maneuvers through which the European
states, and particularly France, furthered their interests in North
Africa. In 1901 France secretly agreed to allow Italy a free hand in
Tripolitania (present -day Libya) in return for the same freedom in
Morocco. In 1904 a major part of the basic agreement between France
and Great Britainthe Entente Cordiale - dealt with Morocco. The
published agreement stated once more the intention to respect the
territorial and economic integrity of Morocco. In settlement of their
century -long differences, however, the primacy of Great Britain's
influence in Egypt was recognized in exchange for recognition of
France's primary influence in Morocco. A secret clause provided that
if Morocco were occupied, the Mediterranean ports of Morocco would
go to Spain. Later in 1904, France and Spain reached a secret
agreement that incorporated the principles of the entente and
outlined the territory to be under Spanish administration .
Proceeding along the partially cleared path, France in 1905
presented Morocco with a series of reform proposals to be carried out
under French tutelage. Angered by France's failure to consult
Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II made a dramatic appearance in Tangier
during which he publicly endorsed the internationally agreed policies
of territorial integrity and equal access to trade, and referred
pointedly to the sultan as an independent sovereign. Two months
after the kaiser's visit, the sultan answered the French demands by
saying that the reforms should be carried out not solely with French
help, but with the aid of all the nations that were parties to the
Madrid Conference of 1880. With United States and German backing,
he called for an international meeting .
At the Algeciras Conference in Spain, which followed in early 1906 ,
the major European powers and the United States reaffirmed the
principle that Morocco's sovereignty and independence should be
45
respected and that all foreign states should have equal rights in the
country. Working to preserve equal commercial access by all countries
to Morocco, the United States ambassador effectively mediated the
differences between France and Germany.
The Act of Algeciras granted to France and Spain the right to help
develop Morocco's police force in order to strengthen the authority of
the government; and, to France the right to help create a state bank
of Morocco. No single country was granted any special privileges, and
all were guaranteed equal access to Morocco. Conclusion of an
international agreement could not, however, alter the realities of
France's and, to a lesser extent, Spain's active influence in the
country.
In 1904 French forces had occupied several oases in the Figuig area
along the Moroccan -Algerian frontiers about 180 miles south of Oujda.
In the absence of an agreed boundary with Algeria these oases had
been included nominally in the Moroccan realm ; at the same time,
France assumed responsibility for policing the Moroccan -Algerian
frontier. Also in 1904 Morocco's debt of £ 800,000 to British, French,
and Spanish interests was assumed by France; France then took
control of Moroccan customs administration . Further loans from
France in 1905 and 1906 were used to purchase arms in France, and
after 1910 the entire customs income was collected by France. The
murder of a French citizen in Marrakech led to reprisal in the
occupation of Oujda in 1907. After similar incidents, Casablanca and
Rabat were occupied . In these actions, and even more in the
occupation of Fes in 1911, the Committee of Morocco ( Comité du
Maroc) , an organization of French economic interests, constituted the
major pressure group urging the Paris government to take strong
measures .
Hafid , who in 1908 obtained recognition as sultan by the powers of
Algeciras, was unable to fulfill his obligation and his desire to enforce
order; local revolts increased in frequency and intensity, and finally,
in 1911, when the sultan was besieged in Fes itself, he appealed to
France for military assistance. French troops occupied Fes; the
Spanish countered by seizing Alcazarquivir and Larache in northern
Morocco, south of Tangier. Germany, having obtained little from
Algeciras, reacted against the French presence in Fes by dispatching a
gunboat to Agadir, ostensibly to protect German interests, but
withdrew the gunboat in exchange for a gift of French territory in the
Congo. The establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco was
agreed upon by all of the signatories to the Act of Algeciras except the
United States, which did not recognize the French Protectorate until
it entered World War I in 1917 .
The Franco-Moroccan Protectorate Treaty of Fes of March 30, 1912,
provided that the French government would establish in cooperation
with the sultan “ a new regime comprising the administrative, judicial,
46
educational, economic, financial and military reforms which the
French government may see fit to introduce within the Moroccan
territory.” While preserving the religious status and traditional
prestige of the sultan, the French would organize a reformed sharifian
makhzan . Measures of the new regime would be established by decree
of the sultan upon the proposal of the French government,
represented by a resident general, who was empowered to act as the
sole intermediary between the sultan and foreign representatives.
France would thus control Morocco's foreign relations and,
specifically, its foreign borrowing. France was permitted to station
troops in Morocco, to exercise police powers, and to reorganize with
the sultan's approval the finances of the central government.
Sultan Hafid was caught between accepting foreign intervention or
facing increasing chaos within his country. He signed the treaty but
tried to refuse to put it into effect. The French forced him to abdicate
in favor of his younger brother, Mulay Yusif, who had been selected
by the French but ratified in the traditional manner by a consensus of
the ulama of Fes .
The treaty specified that Spanish interests and possessions in
Morocco would be recognized in special Franco -Spanish negotiations,
without Moroccan participation, and accepted the existing special
international status of Tangier. The Franco -Spanish Treaty of
November 27, 1912, established the Spanish Protectorate in a
northern, coastal zone and over a desert area south of the Draa River.
The sultan remained nominally sovereign and was represented in the
zone by a khalifa (agent) under the control of a Spanish high
commissioner. The Spanish zone of Morocco was recognized as an
independent protectorate, though in fact it was “ sublet” to Spain by
France as a recognition of the validity of Spanish claims in the area of
the Strait of Gibraltar. The Atlantic coastal enclave of Ifni, where
Spain had established treaty rights with Morocco in 1860 and 1883,
was recognized in the 1912 Franco -Spanish Treaty as sovereign
Spanish territory distinct from the protectorate zones. Spain also
claimed exclusive sovereignty over several coastal towns - Ceuta,
Melilla, Villa Sanjurjo (Al Hoceima), and Peñon de Velez — where
Spanish presidios had been established as early as the sixteenth
century .
The special status of the city of Tangier was recognized by the Fes
treaty and by the Franco -Spanish Treaty of 1912. Tangier became an
international zone under a regime of permanent neutrality in 1923 ; in
1924 it was placed under an international administration in which
foreign relations were reserved to the French and religious authority
over Moroccan subjects was reserved to the mandub, or sultan's
delegate.

47
COLONIALISM : THE FRENCH AND SPANISH
PROTECTORATES

From a strictly legal point of view, the Treaty of Fes did not
deprive Morocco of its status as a sovereign state, even though all
external prerogatives and most of the internal jurisdiction had been
transferred to the French. Theoretically, the sultan remained the sole
source of sovereignty in the three separate zones of Morocco. He
reigned but did not rule; in the respective zones the real authority and
the source of legislative, executive, and judicial powers ( in matters
other than religious) rested with the French resident general in Rabat,
the Spanish high commissioner in Tetuán , and the International
Committee of Control in Tangier.

Pacification

The first French resident general, Marshal Louis Lyautey ( 1912–25),

attempted to implement a limited interpretation of the role of France
in its protectorate. His view was that France had undertaken to act in
the name of the sultan in order to modernize the government while
respecting the sultan's sovereignty and the Moroccan culture. In
pursuit of this goal, his first task was the pacification of the dissident
tribes and the assertion of central government authority throughout
the country .
Within weeks of the promulgation of the protectorate treaty, riots
broke out in Fes protesting the sultan's surrender to what were
termed foreign infidels, Marrakech was seized by a marabout, and
other large areas escaped from the control of the sultan . In the first
two years of the protectorate, Lyautey succeeded in establishing a
working relationship with the makhzan, reorganizing the Moroccan
army and pacifying central Morocco between Fes and Marrakech and
the High Atlas and the Taza Gap. During this period he won over the
Berber leaders of the Atlas, including the important Thami al Glaoui,
pasha of Marrakech .
In 1919, after World War I, Lyautey resumed his pacification
campaign only to be interrupted again in 1924 by the threat to French
Morocco of a revolt of Berber tribes in the Rif Massif in the Spanish
zone under Abdul Karim. For three years the Berber rebel leader
steadily undermined Spanish rule in its protectorate. By the end of
1924, Lyautey was convinced that French forces would have to be
used to put down the rebellion. During the last year of his residency,
therefore, Lyautey was forced to devote himself largely to the problem
of the Rif War, which was not finally put down until a year after he
had been replaced. It required a combined French -Spanish military
force of over 300,000 men, with tanks and aircraft, to pacify the Rif
conflict. Between 1926 and 1932 the French forces gradually subdued
48
the Middle Atlas, the Sous and Draa valleys, the Anti-Atlas, and the
sub -Saharan plateaus. Thus, by 1934 all the area within the present
day state of Morocco was brought under central control for the first
time in centuries.

Administration Under the Protectorates

Under the terms of the Treaty of Fes, the resident general acted in
a dual role; he was the supreme representative of the French
Republic; also, he was the sultan's minister of war and foreign affairs
and his supreme representative in control and supervision of the
government. Lyautey's policy was to preserve the traditional
institutions and provide guidance for Morocco in the economic and
political spheres. “Govern ,” he said, “with the makhzan, not against
it. Do not offend a single tradition, do not change a single habit.”
Even in Lyautey's time, however, official French circles were
beginning to favor the policy of assimilation rather than tutelage, and
the drive toward direct administration proved impossible to check.
Lyautey’s dual position as both resident general and commander in
chief of the French forces in Morocco opened him to attack from both
left and right in the French political spectrum . The liberals opposed
his combination of civil and military leadership ; the nationalists
resented his resistance to colonization . By July 1925 the French
government agreed, under heavy pressure, to replace him . In
September Lyautey resigned as resident general, and during the next
two decades Morocco was reduced , for all practical purposes, to the
status of a French colony.
Under Lyautey's successors, direct French administration was
progressively introduced . Although care was taken to preserve the
paraphernalia of authority, the sultan became a mere figurehead. The
makhzan had no real powers, and the caids and pashas became merely
the executive officials of the French regional administrators. The
influx of French officials into Morocco started on a large scale under
Lyautey's successor.
The bureaucracy became a political power when protectorate
officials allied themselves with the colons (French settlers) in Morocco
and with their supporters in France to prevent any moves in the
direction of Moroccan autonomy. The process of legislation passed
fully into the hands of the resident general and his staff. Dahirs, or
decree laws, were drawn up and approved by the resident general and
submitted in final form for the sultan's seal . The French
administration promulgated and executed the new laws. Decrees
issued by the resident general in administrative matters did not need
the sultan's approval and were widely used in times of strained
relations between the palace and the residency.

49
The central government was composed of the grand wazir, who was
nominally the sultan's premier and minister of interior insofar as he
had de jure supervision over pashas and caids; the minister of Muslim
justice, who supervised the sharia (Islamic law) courts; and the
minister of the religious endowments, or habus. The French -staffed
residency services were divided into the directorates of sharifian
affairs, the interior, and public security. In addition, the residency
had a number of other regulatory and supervisory agencies: political,
economic, administrative, and military .
The regional administration divided the country into civil regions
under appointees of the French foreign ministry and military regions
under military officers from the Bureau of Native Affairs. Cities were
controlled by French chiefs of municipal services. The pashas and
caids were retained as collectors of taxes, supervisors of public order,
and judges in civil and criminal cases. All their regulations, however,
required the countersignature of an appropriate French official, and
all their reports and communications to the makhzan were routed
through French regional offices. After World War II the sultan was
forbidden to initiate informal meetings with the pashas and caids.
The most important representative of the residency in the rural areas
was the district officer, who was the chief contact between the French
administration and the local Moroccan population, represented by the
caid .
In reorganizing the judicial system, the French asserted the right to
administer justice in cases involving non-Moroccans. By 1916 all
foreign states except the United States and Great Britain renounced
their longstanding capitulatory rights. Great Britain renounced its
rights in 1937, but the United States retained its rights until 1959 (see
ch. 9, Foreign Relations).
Local consultative bodies were established under the protectorate,
ostensibly to voice popular interests and demands but in fact to act as
sounding boards for French policies. The highest of these was the
Council of Government with French and Moroccan sections, each
composed of representatives of the local consultative bodies and
administration officials who belonged ex officio. The major task of the
council was the discussion of the proposed budget, but members had
no vote. After 1945 the French tried to develop consultative bodies on
a wider basis, but since all attempts were made on the premise that
the French minority should have representation equal to that of the
Moroccan majority, Sultan Mohammad V, and the growing
nationalist movement with which he was allied, refused to cooperate.
The French gave support to the secret, mystical religious
brotherhoods and the antisultan pashas and caids. The Glaoui family
in the south , as well as several other tribal chiefs, having become
enemies of the ruling family by supporting rebellions against it, allied
early with the French. In return for his assurance of peace in a large
50
area around Marrakech, the French authorities left the Glaoui chief
alone to multiply his landholdings and to exercise a nearly absolute
control over administration, commerce, and agriculture in
southwestern Morocco. Some of the religious brotherhoods cooperated
with the French for their own protection. They had earlier opposed
any contact with the Europeans, whom they regarded as infidels. The
French allowed considerable freedom of operation to cooperative
marabouts and brotherhoods, since they seemed to represent a
religious counterweight against extension of the orthodox Malikite
sultan's authority through his role as religious leader.
The government and power relationship in the Spanish zone
developed on much the same patterns as in the French zone.
Nominally, executive power in the zone resided in the appointed
representative of the sultan. In practice, the highest authority was
exercised by the Spanish high commissioner and the Spanish
administration. Ifni was governed as a Spanish colony, and the high
commissioner in Tetuán was the highest civil and military authority .
In 1946 the administration of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara was
integrated with that of Spanish West Africa and placed under a
military governor.
The sovereignty of the sultan in Tangier was recognized by all the
treaties regulating the special status of the city, and the international
administration was legally based on delegated powers. The mandub, a
personal representative of the sultan, had powers similar to those of a
pasha with respect to the Moroccan population of Tangier but was
subject to the same limitations in the discharge of his duties as was
his sovereign. The highest supervisory body of the international
administration of Tangier was the Committee of Control, composed of
the consular representatives of the signatory powers of the Algeciras
Conference .

Economic and Social Developments

European, and particularly French, private commercial interests

were active in Morocco long before the establishment of the
protectorate . As pacification proceeded, the French government
pushed economic development, particularly the exploitation of
Morocco's mineral wealth, the creation of a modern transportation
system, and the creation of a modern agricultural sector geared to the
export market. Under Lyautey's administration, Casablanca was
converted into a great seaport, and work was begun on several other
ports. A railroad system , begun before the protectorate, was extended
initially for military purposes but also with a view to opening the
interior to economic exploitation ; an extensive road network was also
begun. Agricultural timber surveys were undertaken , mineral
prospecting was encouraged and regulated , industrialization was
51

1
stimulated, an electrification program and irrigation projects were
initiated, chambers of commerce were opened, and a start was made
toward modernizing the tax system .
Lyautey opposed, but could not stem, the influx of French settlers
and exploitative commercial interests. Thousands of colons entered
Morocco and bought up large acreages of the rich agricultural lands of
the plains (see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry). Under his successor,
private and officially sponsored colonization doubled in three years,
and by the late 1930s, colons owned about 2.5 million acres of the best
agricultural land . In 1936 about 200,000 non -Moroccans, including
about 150,000 French, lived in Morocco and controlled the economy.
Interest groups formed among these elements continually pressured
the residency to increase its controls over Morocco and promote
French economic penetration .
Beginning in the 1920s, modern European cities mushroomed.
Modern sanitation , hygiene, and medical facilities were introduced for
the French population and gradually extended to the Moroccan
population as well. This development was hastened by the growth of
shantytowns ( bidonvilles) around the European cities as Moroccans
migrated to the industrialized urban areas in search of work (see ch. 6,
Social Structure; ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry) .
The French educational system was introduced intact for the
children of the colons. As the educational facilities expanded, the
number of Moroccan children attending the French - administered
schools steadily increased. These developments were to have serious
future consequences. The French colonials used and promoted their
own language. Arabic became relegated to classical studies, religion,
ceremonial use, and the common dialectical speech of the people. A
modernized school system in Arabic was not developed. The
educational system and the practical operations of government and
the larger economy were thus tied to French (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups
and Languages). Although relatively few Moroccans achieved
university educations , a small Western -educated elite, oriented
toward the French culture, came into existence (see ch. 7, Education,
Communication , and the Arts and Sciences) . It was among this group,
however, that the nationalist movement first took root in the mid
1920s .

Origins of the Nationalist Movement

Moroccan nationalism stemmed from the merger of two reform
movements that had appeared in the early 1920s and whose aims,
originally unrelated , later became blended. The first was a religious
purification reform movement, known as Salafiya, which grew up
among the ulama and students associated with the ancient Karaouine
University at Fes and was imbued with the fundamentalist ideals

52
originally preached by Islamic reformers in the late nineteenth
century . The Salafiya sought the spiritual and intellectual revival of
an independent Islam stripped of its mystical accretions and adapted
to the requirements of the modern world by using the tools of Western
technology while retaining the essential spiritual and moral values of
Islam . Its main attacks were aimed at the marabouts and the religious
brotherhoods. By 1925 Salafiya schools were operating in several cities
to spread knowledge of Arabic and Islamic culture, which were
ignored by the French schools.
The first truly nationalist movement arose in 1925 among French
educated students in Rabat who founded secret societies to spread
opposition to the growing intervention of the French administration.
By 1927 these two movements were in contact. Societies combining
the aims of religious reform and the assertion of Morocco's political
independence formed throughout the country. In Paris the Association
of North African Muslim Students was formed . By 1930 the future
leaders of the nationalist movement were already becoming well
known . Allal al Fassi had assumed leadership of the Salafiya
movement ; Ahmed Balafrej, one of the founders of the Rabat group ,
was in Paris where he was gaining support by French Socialists.
Mohammed Hassan Quezzani was a university student in Paris and in
contact with Shakib Arslan, the mentor of Arab nationalists
throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
The French promulgation in 1930 of the so-called Berber dahir
converted what had been an isolated elite -based movement into a
popular force strongly opposed to continued French rule. The French
claimed that the dahir was intended to help modernize the complex
Moroccan legal system by ending the judicial powers formerly
exercised over the Berber tribes by the caids and pashas appointed by
the makhzan and granting these powers to the traditional
representative Berber community councils. The effect of this step,
however, would have been to reduce further the authority of the
makhzan and to strengthen the autonomy of the Berber tribes.
Nationalists saw in it still another, and particularly odious, attempt
by the French to divide the Berber and Arab elements of the
population in order more easily to impose French control through
deliberately reviving the old divisions of bilad al makhzan and bilad
al siba under French overall authority. The supporters of Islamic
orthodoxy were incensed by what they took to be a threat to Islam in
the strengthening of Berber customary law at the expense of sharia
law. Public demonstrations against the dahir rapidly spread through
all Moroccan cities and were suppressed by the arrest of nationalist
leaders .
In the Berber dahir of 1930 the French managed to bring together in
a unity of opposition all diverse strands of Moroccan politics at the
time. Indignant protests against the measure were manifested all over

53
the Muslim world in response to the publicity given the dahir by
Arslan and the Moroccan nationalists in Paris . The French
government reacted by instructing the resident general not to enforce
it .
Although the dahir protest movement then quickly subsided, the
proof it had given of the breadth and depth of potential Moroccan
national unity against the French encouraged the nationalists to
organize on a more ambitious scale. In 1932 the anti-French Spanish
Muslim Association was formed in Madrid . Two nationalist
newspapers were suppressed by the French in mid- 1934 after a wild
demonstration in honor of Sultan Mohammed during his visit to Fes.
From that time, the young sultan, who had taken the throne in 1927
at the age of sixteen, became the symbol of the nationalist movement
and increasingly supported its aims.
In December 1934 a small group of nationalist leaders issued in the
name of the newly formed Moroccan Action Committee ( Comité
d'Action Marocaine - CAM ) the long, detailed Plan of Reforms, which
they submitted simultaneously to the sultan, the resident general, and
the French foreign ministry. The plan called for a return to indirect
rule as envisaged by the Treaty of Fes, unification of the judicial
systems of Morocco, the admission of Moroccans to government
positions, the elimination of the judicial functions of caids and
pashas, and the establishment of representative councils . The
signatories included the recognized leaders of Moroccan nationalism :
Allal al Fassi, Ahmed Balafrej, Mohammed Lyazidi, Mohammed
Ouezzani, Mekki Naciri , Mohammed Douiri, Abdelaziz ben Driss,
Ahmed Cherkaoui, and Ahmed Mekouar.
The means used by the CAM to obtain reforms - petitions, letters,
newspaper editorials, and individual pressure- proved inadequate.
The Plan of Reforms created a stir in Morocco but was rejected by the
French government . The tensions created in the CAM caused it to
split ; Quezzani withdrew from the movement and took with him most
of the traditionalists, that is, those who had originally pursued
religious reforms. The rump CAM led by Fassi was reconstituted as a
political party—the National Party — to gain mass support for its
radical demands . A number of violent incidents occurred in
September 1937 that led the French administration to suppress the
party. Fassi and several of his supporters were placed under arrest; he
was exiled to Gabon until 1946. Quezzani's splinter Popular
Movement was also proscribed, and Ouezzani was sent into exile.
In the Spanish zone, the creation of a nationalist movement more
or less paralleled events in the French Protectorate. Groups similar to
the Rabat nationalist movement were formed in Tetouan in 1926 and
in Tangier in 1927. After the suppression by the French of nationalist
demonstrations in 1930, Tetouan became a nationalist center. Shortly
after the Spanish Republic was formed in late 1930, Abdel Torres
founded a nationalist movement in Tetouan . Nationalists in the
northern zone followed the reactions of their allies in the south to the

54
Berber dahir and the Plan of Reforms. Torres and Mekki Naciri
formed a branch of the CAM in the north . In 1937 the northern
nationalist movement split, as Torres founded the National Reform
Party and Naciri, the Moroccan Unity Party.

World War II

During World War II the badly split Moroccan nationalist

movement regained cohesion and new hope . The French defeat, the ✓
Atlantic Charter, and the promises of independence to Syria and
Lebanon led a wide segment of the Moroccan educated population to
consider the feasibility of political change. At the outbreak of war,
Sultan Mohammed pledged Moroccan support to France and the
Allies. Gradually, however, he began to express his views more
independently. After the fall of France, he continued to give his
personal loyalty to the Allies and refused to see the German
representatives in Morocco. He declined to issue a Vichy-initiated
decree aimed at persecution of Jews and refused to join the pro-Vichy
resident general in his attempted resistance to the American landings
in November 1942 .
The French community was divided in its loyalties, the majority of
the French administration supporting the Vichy regime; the majority
of the Moroccans, however, followed the sultan in his loyalty to the
Allies. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met
with the sultan separately from the French . Two letters from
Roosevelt after the conference strengthened the sultan's belief that
the United States would support Moroccan demands for
independence .
Although the nationalists had assumed that the Allied landings
would lead to a modification of French rule in Morocco, this was not
the case. The continued suppression of their activities led the
nationalists to the conviction that independence must precede
political reform . Balafrej and Lyazidi led a group of veteran
nationalists joined by young urban intellectuals and middle-class
Moroccans in forming the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. At its first
conference in Rabat in January 1944, the Istiqlal issued a manifesto
demanding full independence, national reunification , and a
democratic constitution . The sultan had received and approved the
manifesto prior to its submission to the resident general and the
Allied government. The resident general answered that while political
and social reforms would be granted, no basic change in the
protectorate status would be considered. The general principles of
reform that he voiced were categorically rejected by the Istiqlal.
When, a few days later, eighteen Istiqlal leaders, including Balafrej
55
and Lyazidi, were arrested on a slim charge of collaboration with the
Germans, violent demonstrations broke out against the French.
Other nationalist parties were formed during this period and
immediately after the end of the war. On his return from exile,
Ouezzani formed the Democratic Independence Party ( Parti
Démocratique de l'Indépendance-PDI), thus preserving the split in
the nationalist movement created in the mid - 1930s.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

By the end of World War II, some 300,000 Moroccans had fought
with the Allies in the North African campaigns, the invasions of Italy,
and the liberation of France. The general sympathy of the sultan with
the nationalists had become evident, although he still hoped to see
independence reached gradually . Public opinion was much more
aware of and behind the nationalists than in 1939. On the other hand,
the residency, supported by the French economic interests and
vigorously backed by most of the colons, defended a concept of
permanent French right to the position in Morocco and refused all
concessions .
Intransigence intensified the split between the nationalists and the
colons and gradually between the sultan and the resident general . In
1946 a liberal resident general proposed a series of reforms aimed at
improving living standards and giving Moroccans a greater voice in
their government, but by then nothing short of independence would
satisfy the nationalists . In deference to them the sultan withheld his
signature from the dahirs that would implement the reforms. Each
side accused the other of obstructing solutions to the conflict.
In this atmosphere the sultan's trip to Tangier, in the spring of
1947, an event of considerable importance since neither he nor his
father had been permitted to visit the city, proved the final blow to
hopes of cooperation . A riot in Casablanca during the visit brought
French -Moroccan tension to a new high. Angered by the apparently
unnecessary firing on Moroccans by the French police, the sultan in
his major Tangier speech on April 10, 1947, called for national unity
and eventual self- government, omitting his planned mention of
Franco-Moroccan friendship and the benefits of French rule. French
reaction to the Tangier visit was to designate General Alphonse Juin,
the choice of the most conservative interests among the colons, as the
new resident general .
Juin quickly decreed reorganization aimed at further weakening the
makhzan, made statements intended to discredit the sultan, and
encouraged the religious brotherhoods. He refused to promulgate a
decree issued by the sultan limiting the activities of the brotherhoods.
The sultan in turn refused to sign most of the decrees presented by

56
Juin, nearly all of which were intended to limit the sultan's authority.
This veto power, established by the 1912 Treaty of Fes, proved to be
the nationalists' major weapon as the Istiqlal intensified its public
condemnation of the absence of basic liberties, the denial of union
rights, and the tightening of press censorship.

Mounting Tensions, 1950–53

During the next four years, the French repeatedly proposed
measures that would further reduce the power of the sultan, who
doggedly refused to sign them . The nationalists boycotted the Council
of Government in July 1950. In October 1950 the sultan went to Paris
to discuss the growing Moroccan crisis directly with the French
government. His proposals for greater Moroccan autonomy were
ignored, but on his return the Moroccan population gave him a great
show of support. In January 1951 Juin demanded that the sultan sign
the dahirs and denounced the Istiqlal. Mohammed refused, and Juin
national let
threatened to depose him . party

At the same time, Thami al Glaoui, pasha of Marrakech , who had

supported the French from the early days of the protectorate , openly
attacked the sultan for his support of the nationalists . After being
exiled from the palace, Glaoui garnered support from some dissident
Berber tribal caids with the help of the French administrators . Late in
January 1951, on various pretexts, Glaoui and Juin called the tribes to
move on Fes and Rabat. It is probable that few of the tribal leaders or
their followers understood the crisis or the way they were being used
in it. The result was, however , that the sultan agreed under duress to
sign the dahirs, though making clear that he did not consider them to
be valid.

Although the humiliation of the sultan and the accompanying

arrests of the Istiqlal leaders ended one crisis, another was
precipitated. Moroccans, particularly among the rural population who
cared little about the Istiqlal, were furious at the insult to the sultan
by the foreigners whose mission civilisatrice apparently had not, after
all, changed Moroccans into Frenchmen. The various splintered
nationalist parties joined with the Istiqlal in a Moroccan National
Front to oppose the protectorates. The parties pledged to refuse to
negotiate without a proclamation of independence, to keep Morocco
out of the French Union, to remain loyal to Sultan Mohammed, to
collaborate with the Arab League, and to refrain from forming any
alliance with the new Moroccan Communist Party.
The Casablanca riots of December 1952, arising from proletarian
nationalist reaction to the murder of a Tunisian labor leader, began a
new era in Moroccan politics. In clashes between Moroccan rioters
and police, hundreds were killed and wounded . After this the
57
Moroccan Communist Party and the Istiqlal were outlawed
completely by the French .

Exile of Sultan Mohammed V

In early 1953 Glaoui, with the support of the resident general, once
more mobilized his supporters among the Berber tribes against the
sultan . In August 1953 the events of 1951 were repeated almost
exactly, but this time overthrow , rather than temporary submission,
was the object. When, after tribal horsemen were massed around
Rabat and tanks around his palace, the sultan still refused to sign
over his powers, the resident general deposed him, immediately
arrested him, and sent him and his family into exile to Madagascar on
August 20, 1953. A new sultan was installed in the traditional fashion .
The French summoned the ulama to choose a new sultan, Mohammed
Mulay Ben Arafa, an aged member of the Alawi house ; two members
of the ulama who failed to comply were arrested.
The deposition offended not only the nationalists but all those who
recognized the sultan as the religious leader of the country . Never was
the country so solidly united behind the sultan or was national
sentiment so aroused. French attempts to bolster Ben Arafa by
enacting reforms in his name only led to a further deterioration of the
situation . Immediately after his accession on August 20, he not only
signed over most of his powers to a French -appointed council but also
signed a decree creating French-dominated municipal councils that
Mohammed had refused to sign for six years.
By 1952 the Istiqlal had developed a mass organization of some
80,000 members. After December 1952 nearly all of the Istiqlal leaders
were in exile or in prison. Control of the party passed into the hands
of younger men more willing than the earlier leaders to use violent
methods to attain their goals, and dispersal of the illegal party's
organization left the chiefs of local sections free to determine local
policy. In the cities many of them took to terrorist activity. Beginning
in August 1953, incidents of terrorism occurred with increasing
frequency. Unofficial French counterterrorist vigilantes operated
virtually in the open. Both Moroccan and European terrorists chose
victims largely from among their own communities . Moroccan
shopkeepers who did not voluntarily abide by boycotts of European
goods were often threatened with terrorist retribution. By mid-1955
the guerrillas were organized by a kinsman of Istiqlal leader Allal al
Fassi into the Army of National Liberation (Armée de Liberation
Nationale—ALN) , numbering several thousand, and were openly
active against French troops and settlers. It was estimated that during
the two years of the sultan's exile 6,000 acts of terrorism were
committed, and over 700 persons killed . Religious opposition also
continued.

58
On August 20, 1955, the second anniversary of Ben Arafa's
accession to the throne, Berber tribesmen of the Middle Atlas
descended on a village and murdered every Frenchman present, thus
shattering any remaining notion of Berber solidarity behind Glaoui. In
addition, Berbers of the Rif Massif revolted against the French in
sympathy with the growing rebellion in Algeria. As the French
negotiated with various Moroccans in the hope of finding a solution in
the form of a council of the throne, Berber attacks in the Middle Atlas
and the Rif continued. Finally, Glaoui himself announced that Sultan
Mohammed must return . Glaoui's supporters followed him in
declaring their loyalty. Faced with the united Moroccan demand for
the return of the sultan, the rising violence of the revolt, and the
simultaneous deterioration of their situation in Algeria and Indochina,
the French government decided to bring Mohammed back to
Morocco .
In August 1955 French Premier Edgar Faure called a Franco
Moroccan conference at Aix-les-Bains at which it was decided that
Ben Arafa should abdicate in favor of a four-man regency council. As
a step toward a representative government, the Regency Council was
instructed to form a cabinet, but the Istiqlal Party refused to
participate, reiterating its demands for the return of Mohammed and
the abrogation of the Treaty of Fes. On October 30 Ben Arafa
renounced the throne, and on November 2 the Regency Council
resigned to make way for the restoration of Mohammed V.

Attainment of Independence
A policy of Moroccan “ independence with interdependence ” was
adopted by the French National Assembly in October 1955. At the
same time the assembly affirmed that the Treaty of Fes should
remain the basis of Franco -Moroccan relations; the principle of
Moroccan sovereignty was restated, and it was agreed that Morocco
should exercise fully all the powers and authority stipulated by the
treaty. It was insisted, however, that France should continue its
responsibility for Moroccan defense and foreign policy and that the
French presence in Morocco should be permanent and acknowledged
by a French settler -representation in Moroccan affairs.
Mohammed was received in Paris with full honors on October 31 .
He rejected the French position, and negotiations continued until
agreement was reached on November 6. Although the Treaty of Fes
still was not formally abrogated, provision was made for a gradual
restoration of Moroccan independence within the framework of a
guarantee of mutual rights and permanent ties of Franco -Moroccan
interdependence. The sultan agreed to institute reforms to transform
Morocco into a democratic state under a constitutional monarch . He
reentered Morocco in triumph on November 16, 1955 , and, after
59
consultation with spokesmen of the several political parties, the labor
movement, and other groups, entrusted a nonparty politician ,
Embarek Bekkai, with the task of forming a cabinet. The old
ministerial system was abandoned, and a council of ministers was
formed on the basis of the administrative structure created by the
French . The new cabinet was sworn in on December 7 , and
government functions were transferred gradually from the French
administration.
On February 11, 1956, limited home rule was restored to Morocco in
a protocol implementing the November 6 declaration . Further
negotiations for full independence culminated in the French
Moroccan Agreement signed in Paris on March 3, 1956. As of this
date, Morocco again became an independent state and later that year,
was admitted to the United Nations .
The French -Moroccan Agreement abrogated the 1912 Treaty of Fes.
France recognized the independence and the territorial integrity of
Morocco. Both governments undertook to conclude new agreements in
order to define their interdependence on a free and equal basis in
fields of common interest, especially in matters of defense, foreign
relations, economy, and culture, and to guarantee the rights and
liberties of Frenchmen in Morocco and Moroccans in France. A
protocol annexed to the agreement defined the new relations between
France and Morocco. The full exercise of legislative power reverted to
the sultan. The sultan was empowered to create a national army with
French assistance. The French resident general was replaced by a high
commissioner who two months later became an ambassador.

Reunification Agreements

Spain did not participate in the Franco -Moroccan negotiations .

During the reign of Ben Arafa, Spain had continued to recognize
Mohammed as the rightful sultan and imam (spiritual leader-see
Glossary) in the northern zone. Once France had accepted the
principle of Moroccan independence, the nationalists expected Spain
to follow suit . Spain hesitated, and when rumors circulated that a
separate government under the khalifa might be established in the
northern zone, Spain lost much of the popularity it had cultivated. In
the northern zone the nationalists held that Spain had no right to
adopt a policy toward independence different from that of France.
The abolition of the Spanish Protectorate and the recognition of
Moroccan independence by Spain were negotiated separately in
Madrid between the sultan and Generalissimo Francisco Franco and
made final in a Joint Declaration of April 7, 1956. The declaration
provided for “ free collaboration ” between Spain and Morocco,
granted the sultan immediate legislative powers in the northern
60
Spanish zone, and provided for the stay of Spanish troops on
Moroccan soil in the period of transition .
The Moroccan -Spanish agreement did not include the Tarfaya area
south of the Draa River and the areas under exclusive Spanish
sovereignty. A Spanish -Moroccan clash over Ifni in late 1957 raised
the question of the transfer to Moroccan sovereignty of that enclave
and the southern protectorate zone. Spain agreed to return the
southern protectorate zone to Morocco, and the transfer became
effective in April 1958. Spain continued to maintain at this time,
however, that Ifni was ceded in perpetuity by the treaty of 1860. The
sultan's sovereignty in Tangier was restored, and the international
status of the city was officially ended at the Conference of Fedala in
October 1956 .

THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE , 1956–65

Policies, Problems, and Progress Under Mohammed V

In his first major speech following his restoration in November
1955, the sultan announced a policy for independent Morocco
predicated on liberty and democracy for his people and recognition of
the country's continued interdependence with France in terms of its
needs for economic and technical support, while it trained its own
citizens to assume administrative and technical positions formerly
occupied by the French . The Bekkai government installed by the
sultan in December 1956 included nine members of the most powerful
nationalist · party, the Istiqlal ; six from the more conservative PDI;
and six nonparty independents loyal to the sultan , including Prime
Minister Bekkai himself. The Istiqlal leaders resented the sultan's
failure to name a clearly predominant Istiqlal government but
continued to support the sultan's basic policies while gradually
moving into a role of “ loyal opposition .”
Mohammed's general popularity was high . He enjoyed the unusual
position of being a royal figure who was hero of an independence
struggle. Under him, the dual Moroccan monarchical role as
simultaneous temporal head of state and imam was strengthened as it
had not been for many centuries. In the latter capacity the monarch's
title continued to include the ancient designation of amir al
muaminin . The restored sultan's status and the popular veneration in
which he was held gave him the balance of power among all
institutions, factions, and parties. This enabled him to act in terms of
consolidated loyalty to the crown rather than being dependent upon
any particular party, including the Istiqlal—which, in essence, needed
him more than he needed it .
In the months after independence, the sultan moved with
deliberation to develop a modern governmental structure under a
61
constitutional monarchy. His aim was to proceed cautiously in order
to avoid loosing potentially uncontrollable forces seeking to divert or
accelerate the course of development he had planned. Social and
economic reforms were part of his program for independent Morocco,
but he had no intention of permitting the more radical younger
elements in the nationalist movement to overthrow the established
social order and introduce a socialist system. He was also intent on
preventing the Istiqlal from consolidating its control and establishing
a single -party state.
The problems confronting the new regime were imposing. It was
faced with the need to train people to head the ministries ; fill the
ranks of the civil service; assume judicial functions, establish central
government control over localized, often recalcitrant tribes and rural
localities; and form an independent foreign service, police, and
national army. In addition, many of the local governors who had
supported Ben Arafa fled their posts after Mohammed returned to
Rabat.
On April 9, 1957, Mohammed named his son, Prince Mulay Hassan
(later King Hassan II) , as crown prince and chief of staff of the new
Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales - FAR ), which the
French and Spanish agreed to support when they signed the treaty of
independence. At the same time, the French army remained at
stations in Morocco under the terms of the treaty. During the months
following independence, the ALN resistance forces grew in strength,
as it attracted Moroccans determined to push the French out of
Morocco and all of North Africa. It became increasingly irresponsible,
conducting a running terrorist campaign against the French and
against former Moroccan collaborators with the French Protectorate.
In August 1956 the bulk of the ALN was incorporated into the
Royal Moroccan Army, but dissident elements continued to operate
independently, particularly around Oujda and Figuig along the
Algerian border, where they supported the Algerian National
Liberation Front, and in the south around Agadir. Units of these
irregular forces attempted unsuccessfully to force the Spanish out of
Ifni in late 1957. It was not until 1958 that combined French and
Moroccan army operations succeeded in suppressing the remaining
ALN units and imprisoning their leaders, including a number of
former governors and officials who had opposed the sultan (see ch. 14,
National Defense and Internal Security) .
Another source of resistance to the independent government came
from Berber tribes in the Rif and the Middle Atlas. With the
foreigners' colonial rule abolished, ancient internal quarrels could be
resumed . Several times during 1957 and 1958 tribes rose against local
government officials to demonstrate their animosity toward what they
considered the overly Arab-dominated central government. Whatever
the cause, the Berber uprisings were readily put down and, by the
62
beginning of 1959, the central government had successfully asserted
its control throughout the state.
Suppression of these disturbances by no means solved the
government's problems, however. New political parties and unions
quickly formed to assert interests not directly served by the Istiqlal or
the other nationalist parties. The first of these was the Popular
Movement (Mouvement Populaire—MP) , formed originally as a
semiclandestine group in the Rif mountains among dissident Berber
groups but, by 1959, established as a political party claiming to
represent the rural population against the mainly urban nationalist
parties. The Istiqlal itself became divided into radical and
conservative wings by 1958. By early 1959 the radical wing broke away
from the party, forming in September 1959 a separate political group,
the National Union of Popular Forces ( Union Nationale des Forces
Populaires — UNFP ) under a second - generation nationalist leader,
Mehdi Ben Barka. This split, which was reflected in the governmental
coalition, forced a crisis on the unstable government that led
Mohammed , who had taken the title of king on August 15, 1957, to
assume direct leadership of the government in May 1960 (see ch. 8,
The Governmental System and Political Dynamics ).
In order to assure his people that he was not instituting a
dictatorial regime, King Mohammed promised to promulgate a
written constitution by the end of 1962. Early efforts at representative
government, attempted through the appointed Consultative Assembly,
failed, largely because the bodies were given no real authority to
legislate and the parties had little experience in parliamentary
politics . Local communal councils were created in the new country's
first national elections in 1960, but the effective power of these new
councils in local government was slow in appearing.
In foreign relations Mohammed followed a mildly radical policy in
his effort to establish Morocco's independent position. In October
1958 Morocco was admitted as a member of the Arab League and
supported the general Arab causes but without excessive polemics.
Mohammed insisted on renegotiating the 1950 treaty under which
France had given to the United States the right to maintain airbases
in Morocco for the defense of Europe. The whole question of French ,
Spanish, and United States military or quasi-military bases in
Morocco formed a major political issue in the years following
independence and by mid- 1971, although diminished, had still not
been finally resolved (see ch. 9, Foreign Relations).
In January 1961 Mohammed called a conference in Casablanca of
several of the radical independent states of Africa, including Ghana,
Guinea, the United Arab Republic ( UAR) , and the Provisional
Government of the Algerian Republic in exile. At this conference he
negotiated support for Morocco's claims to Mauritania in return for
his support of the neutralist and anticolonialist policies of the other
63
states. The so-called Casablanca group failed to attain its goals of
close coordination in foreign policy, however, and gradually withered.
Morocco's stand on Mauritania isolated the country from most of the
newly independent countries of Africa and from the Arab states, since
most of these had recognized Mauritania when it became independent
of France in 1960 .

Hassan II and the Constitution

Mohammed died suddenly and unexpectedly on February 26, 1961,
following minor surgery, and the nation was plunged into deep
mourning. Some initial doubts were expressed as to the ability of
Prince Hassan, then thirty -two years old, to hold the country
together; but he acted speedily and decisively to take command and
to assure his people that he would follow the domestic policies of his
father.
In foreign policies, however, Hassan did not show the same interest
in militant neutralism as had Mohammed but turned increasingly
toward the West (see ch . 9, Foreign Relations). Hassan took control of
the government as prime minister and in June 1961 named a new
cabinet. After an unsuccessful attempt at drafting a constitution by
means of an appointed Constituent Assembly, the king drew up his
own constitution, which he presented to the people in the form of a
referendum in December 1962. The Istiqlal, the MP, and other
governmental parties supported the constitution; the UNFP led a
vehement, but ineffectual, campaign to boycott the referendum ,
complaining of undue government intervention in this and later
electoral actions .
The results of the referendum on December 7 , 1962, were
overwhelmingly in favor of the draft constitution and it was
promulgated. Under it the king remained the central figure in the
executive branch of the government, but legislative power was vested
in a two-house parliament, and an independent judiciary was
guaranteed . Elections by universal suffrage to the parliament and to
local governmental councils were held in 1963. In these elections
substantial majorities were secured by the royalist government Front
for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions ( Front pour la Défense
des Institutions Constitutionnelles — FDIC ), formed in March 1963.
On November 18, 1963, the king formally opened the first session of
Parliament .

The Border War of 1963

The historical concept of unity among the North African states of

the Maghrib revived after these states individually regained
independence following World War II; political union, however, did
64
not come about because there were extensive differences, as well as
similarities, among them. Morocco supported the Algerian revolt
against the French but soon thereafter was embroiled in a border
dispute with Algeria. Under the French no border delineations had
been made southwest of Bechar across some 600 miles of desert to
Tindouf. Both countries had claims and maintained mobile military
forces in this region .
As 1963 advanced , relations between the countries worsened .
During the summer and early fall, Morocco charged Algeria with a
sequence of unfriendly acts, chief of which was an allegation of
support to a radical antigovernment conspiracy uncovered in Morocco
in July. Starting October 1 and continuing throughout the month,
Moroccan and Algerian forces fought a series of small-scale but sharp
engagements in the disputed desert area. A cease -fire was arranged
October 30, 1963, through the mediation of Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali (see ch. 9, Foreign
Relations) .

Strengthening Regional Relationships

During 1964 a number of important actions were taken to
strengthen the country's regional relationships in the Arab and
African worlds. The king attended a significant Arab summit meeting
in January at Cairo, and on February 2 it was announced that
diplomatic relations between Morocco and the UAR, broken because
of the latter's support of Algeria in the border dispute, were being
resumed. Prisoners were exchanged between Algeria and Morocco in
April, and normal relations were resumed in May. Also in May,
diplomatic connections were restored with Tunisia - broken because
of Tunisian recognition of Mauritania in 1960 in the face of Moroccan
claims in that area. In July an understanding was reached to end
radio propaganda attacks between the last two, and the relationship
became more amicable, although Moroccan recognition of Mauritania
was not yet extended.

Western -Oriented Nonalignment

By the end of 1964 Morocco's relations with the Communist world
were numerous, giving credence to the official policy of nonalignment
between East and West. Recognition had been exchanged with the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in 1958, but these
connections were not deep seated. Small numbers of Soviet military
aircraft had been accepted in 1960, and Soviet tanks, trucks, and
artillery arrived in 1962, but Morocco's primary economic and policy
connections continued to be French and Western oriented. During a
visit to the United States in 1963, Hassan observed, “Because I have

65
relations with the Soviet Union does not mean I am a communist, any
more than my relations with France mean I am a Catholic.”

The Casablanca Riots of March 1965 and Their Aftermath

In August 1964 Hassan reorganized the government with Ahmad

Bahnini, head of the Democratic Socialist Party ( Parti Socialist
Democrate - PSD ), as prime minister and a cabinet mostly from the
FDIC group of loyalist parties. This change was presented as a trend
toward broadening the basis of government and allowing for easier
cooperation by the opposition Istiqlal and UNFP parties.
Internal political tensions, however, dominated the first half of
1965. In March the Ministry of Education issued a directive requiring
all students over seventeen years of age to include in their education
some degree of technical training. Large numbers of students
apparently believed that implementation of this directive would
exclude them from certain professional and civil service jobs, and
student demonstrations occurred in Casablanca on March 25 .
! Starting as a peaceful and apolitical protest against the curriculum
change, the student movement soon attracted participation by
laborers and other urban poor, among whom dissatisfaction had been
growing for at least a year because of rising prices and increasing
unemployment. For three days widespread rioting and looting spread
out control through Casablanca and, although in lesser degree, in
other major cities. The police, assisted by the army, restored order but
at high cost. According to reliable observers, about 400 were killed
some estimates were higher - and a chain of political actions was
initiated .
During the riots, on March 27, fourteen antiregime Moroccan
nationals previously convicted of subversively introducing arms into
the country were executed as evidence of the government's
determination to maintain public order. On March 29, in a broadcast
to the nation, however, King Hassan dismissed rumors that the
Casablanca riots had been caused by foreign provocation. He stated
that the real cause lay in the internal economic and educational
difficulties, and he placed chief blame on bickering politicians and
factions which, he said , had paralyzed legislation. He then announced
that he would immediately endeavor to form a government of national
union .

In April the king declared an amnesty for political prisoners,

including certain UNFP leaders who had earlier been condemned to
death for participation in the conspiracy of July 1963. In addition, he
consulted jointly with the leaders of all parties and unions and laid
before them a proposed program of administrative, educational,
economic , landholding, and social reforms ( including birth -rate
limitation ) that covered almost all the current dissatisfactions and
66
might have served as a basis for a new government. He reiterated
these proposals in opening the Parliament on May 3, 1965.
These efforts, however, were unavailing. A consensus could not be
reached because the counterproposals were unacceptable either to the
king or to one or more of the parties ; also, the king's plan did not
allow for the dominance of any one party, and the FDIC government
grouping had been divided since 1964. Prime Minister Bahnini
resigned on June 4, 1965.
On June 7 King Hassan proclaimed a “ state of exception ,” or
national emergency, under his powers contained in Article 35 of the
Constitution of 1962 and the precedent of royal control in the 1960–63
period. On the next day he assumed full legislative and executive
powers and named a new government with himself as prime minister.
He indicated that new elections would be held at an unspecified later
date, after a new constitution had been drafted and submitted to a
referendum . In the meantime, normal political and trade union
activity was allowed, and government operations were resumed under
the king and his cabinet of loyal technician - administrators.

THE EMERGENCY PERIOD : 1965-70

The Ben Barka Affair

The internal turbulence of mid - 1965 was quieted by the king's
decisive action in installing the emergency government. If no great
changes were immediately forthcoming, the trend to political
disintegration was, at least, arrested . Soon thereafter, however, severe
strains developed in the relations between Morocco and France
because of a cause celebre that became known as the Ben Barka
affair.
On October 25, 1965, Mehdi Ben Barka, a leader of the UNFP who
had been living in exile because of alleged complicity in the July 1963
conspiracy, was abducted in Paris and never appeared again to public
view . This disappearance roused vehement protests and outcry among
the left-wing opposition parties in Morocco. As the French authorities
pursued their investigations, a tangled picture emerged, which was
widely publicized but never fully clarified in public. A number of
French as well as Moroccan nationals were involved . French
authorities issued international warrants for the arrest of General
Mohammed Oufkir — then the Moroccan minister of interior — and for
Ahmad Dlimi, then chief of security services and, in 1971, director of
the national police forces, or Sûreté National until September 1, when
he became chief aide-de-camp to the king (see ch. 14, National
Defense and Internal Security) . The Moroccan government
maintained that the warrants were in violation of the French
Moroccan judicial convention of 1957 and hence invalid. Each country
67
withdrew its ambassador, although diplomatic relations were not
broken .
At the trial, which opened in Paris on September 5, 1966, Oufkir
and Dlimi were listed among those being tried in absentia. Later,
Dlimi unexpectedly appeared in France and was arrested. The
delayed trial ended June 5, 1967. The French court's action, approved
by President Charles de Gaulle, acquitted Dlimi but sentenced two
French officials to terms of imprisonment and Oufkir, in absentia, to
life imprisonment for complicity in Ben Barka's abduction. Hassan
subsequently made scores of changes in his cabinet but up to mid
1971 retained Oufkir as minister of interior without interruption until
August 6, 1971, when he was made minister of defense (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .

The North African Arms Race

Moroccan -Algerian relations were disturbed again in 1966 and 1967

by what became known as the North African Arms Race. Alarmed by
the mounting flow of Soviet arms into Algeria, some of which were
alleged to have been deployed in the Tindouf desert border region, in
November 1966 Hassan secured a number of new military aircraft
from the United States; in addition , he visited Moscow in the fall of
that year and the United States in February 1967. From both of these
visits, new military and economic aid agreements resulted. In March
1967 the king urged Algeria to abandon the arms race and enter new
discussions directly with Morocco or under the aegis of the United
Nations. These developments had an ameliorating effect on relations
between the two countries, and attention was soon attracted
eastward .

The Arab - Israeli War of 1967

✓ In the Arab -Israeli War of June 1967, Hassan placed three of his
best battalions at the disposal of the United Arab Republic ( Egypt);
these forces were not committed and, in any case, probably could not
have been committed because of the war's short duration. After the
defeat of the Arab forces, some public demonstrations occurred in
Morocco. An unofficial commercial boycott of the Moroccan Jewish
community set in, and about 7,000 of the estimated 70,000 Jews
remaining in Morocco quickly left the country. Others followed , so
that by 1971 the total had declined to about 40,000 and was still
falling.
The government proclaimed an anti- Zionist, anti- Israeli policy in
support of the general Arab cause but condemned both the
commercial boycott and acts of terrorism against Moroccan Jewish
citizens. This attitude was not well received among the Moroccan
68
trade unions, where radical Arab nationalist ideology has generally
been stronger than elsewhere in the society, and the government was
challenged on this issue by the secretary general of the Moroccan
Labor Union ( Union Marocain du Travail-UMT) , Mahjub Ben
Sadiq. He was promptly arrested and sentenced to eighteen months
in jail for undermining respect due to the state.

Domestic Tranquillity Restored

In July 1967 the king took a major step in the direction of ending
the emergency period by personally withdrawing from the post of
prime minister, to which he designated Mohammed Benhima. During
the balance of 1967 and in 1968 political party and union activity was
gradually resumed although still under close royal scrutiny. In
general, the internal political scene after mid- 1967 to mid - 1970, at
least on the surface, was comparatively tranquil . Municipal and rural
communal elections were conducted in October 1969. The opposition
parties boycotted these local elections, and the successful candidates
were mostly identified as of independent ( nonparty) affiliation .
Noteworthy disturbances or problems in the conduct of the elections,
however, did not arise. Soon afterwards, the king again modified the
cabinet, naming Ahmed Laraki , who as foreign minister had
ncy
participated in various successful diplomatic ventures, toerbegeprime
minister in place of Benhim em ponad
End of the Emergency Period
In mid- 1970 the Istiqlal and UNFP continued to maintain a joint
front of opposition to the government, and the economic questions of
price and wage dissatisfactions were again coming to the fore. The
national situation , however, particularly in view of the foreign policy
successes of the two previous years, was such as to enable Hassan to
move toward ending the “ state of exception ,” or emergency period,
which he had decreed in 1965. In a speech to the nation on May 18,
1970, on the occasion of the annual celebration of the birthday of the
Prophet Muhammad, the king gave a strong indication that a change
was imminent. This was confirmed in his speech of July 9, 1970, on
the occasion of his forty -first birthday. He announced that a new
constitution had been prepared and would be submitted to a popular
referendum . This referendum was conducted July 24, 1970. Its results,
by 98.7 percent, accepted the revised constitution ; elections for a new
unicameral legislature followed in August, and the emergency period
ended ( see ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
The role of the king, as in 1965, remained dominant, and internal,
rather than external, stresses remained as the principal problem
areas .

69
CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

Modern Moroccans are , for the most part, descendants of

indigenous tribal peoples who have lived in the area at least since
Phoenician times. Beginning in the seventh century, successive waves
of Arabic -speaking conquerors and settlers gradually but decisively
replaced the local language and religion with their own ; by modern
times Arabic was predominant and Islam, nearly universal (see ch. 3,
Historical Setting; ch. 5, Religious Life ). A similar, though much less
extensive, penetration by French culture began in the late nineteenth
century and continues, in much attenuated form , to the present day .
Although they have no collective name for themselves, the
indigenous tribesmen are known to others as Berbers, a term
apparently derived from the Latin barbarus . Their unwritten
language, composed of several substantially differing dialects, is
widely spoken in the mountainous regions beyond the range of
conquerors and colonizers and remains the native tongue of perhaps
40 percent of the people. Arabic, which has steadily gained ground at
the expense of Berber, dominates the plains and the western coast
(see fig. 6) . More persons speak Arabic than any other language; it is
the native tongue of some 60 percent of the total population and a
second language of possibly as many as half the Berber speakers. It is
the official language of the kingdom, and government policy
ostensibly favors its exclusive use.
The vehicle of French penetration, the community of urban
Europeans, has decreased in size since independence in 1956 but
retains significant cultural and economic, if not political, influence.
The resident Europeans, even those born in the country, are not
considered Moroccan by the government, the only non -Muslim
Moroccans being the small, but significant and very ancient, Jewish
community. At present concentrated in Casablanca and other cities,
the Jews previously lived in many rural places as well. Since the
founding of Israel in 1948, however, and especially since the June 1967
Arab -Israeli War, in which Moroccan forces were not engaged, large
numbers of Jews have emigrated. Most observers agree that members
of the Jewish community will continue to leave the country, as did
many in the aftermath of the attempted coup in July 1971 (see ch. 8,
The Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
71
10 6
TSPAIN

| 36 | MEDITERRANEAN SEA 136

TANGIER TETOUAN

RIF
RIFI
TAZA
FES
RABAT
ATLANTIC LE S
DD LA
CASABLANCA
MI AT GHT
AZI
OCEAN TAM
32

32H 321
S
GH TLA T
MARRAKECH HI A LHI
H I
TAS
ated
marc
(Unde )
AS
ANTI-ATL
ALGERIA

A Berber
Arabic
28 28
o 25 50 100

MILES

SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 6 2

Source : Adapted from Marvin W. Mikesell, Northern Morocco : A Cultural

Geography, Berkeley, 1961 ; and Bernard G. Hoffman , The Structure
of Traditional Moroccan Rural Society, The Hague, 1967.
Figure 6. Languages of Morocco.
Despite the relatively short duration of the French Protectorate
( 1912–56), the French language made important inroads. France's
colonial policy, based on the concept of the mission civilisatrice
(civilizing mission), resulted in the formation of a French -educated
native elite which, in 1971, dominated all aspects of the modern
sector of society-government, economic life, education , and most
other positions of importance (see ch. 7, Education, Communication,
and the Arts and Sciences) . As a consequence , access to higher
education, to the government, and to important avenues of social
mobility has been severely limited for persons of modest or rural
background, who have been largely unable to learn French.
Since independence, the stated policy both of the government and
opposition parties has been the prompt Moroccanization and
Arabization of education and the civil service. By the late 1960s,
however, it had become apparent that these goals were impossible of
early attainment and in fact contradictory; the shortage of Arabic
trained teachers, bureaucrats, and technicians has required the
continued use of French -educated Moroccans, as well as of French
72
nationals, a substantial number of whom were training yet another
French-speaking generation.
French therefore remains a language of prestige, essential for
advancement in many fields and the medium of most higher
education . Bilingualism and even trilingualism are com mon .

Financial constraints have, however, prevented an expansion of

educational and other facilities sufficient to offer equal access to
French -language education to all children . For a number of years,
therefore, the growing body of non-French-speaking Moroccans has
demanded access to employment and prosperity, whether through
Arabization or through equal access to French training. Language
remains a crucial and highly volatile political issue (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .

THE PEOPLES OF MOROCCO

Except for the Jews and the Harratine, Berber-speaking Negro

nomads, the ethnic communities in Morocco are distinguished by
language. Arabic encroached gradually, spreading through the plains
areas most accessible to migrants and conquerors . With minor
exceptions, Berber remains the mother tongue in the mountains .
Because the present-day Berbers and substantial numbers of Arabs
are descendants of largely the same indigenous stock, physical
distinctions carry little or no social connotation and are, in any case,
ordinarily impossible to make systemically. Identification with the
Berber or Arab community is largely a matter of personal behavior
rather than of membership in discrete and bounded social entities.
Many adult Berbers also speak Arabic, and for centuries Berbers have
entered the general society and melded, within a generation or two,
into the Arab group. In some cases Arabic -speaking tribes adopted
Berber.
Within his own territory the Berber is a tribesman deriving his
primary social identity from membership in a specific tribal section.
As long as he retains his connection with the tribe, whether physically
present or not, he may be considered a Berber. It is unlikely, however ,
that an individual settled with his family away from the tribal home
conveys to his children either a firm place in a specific tribal section
or an adequate command of the Berber tongue. Berberhood may in
this fashion be lost ; the person considered a Berber either is or was
formerly a member of a tribe .
This permeable boundary between the two major ethnic groups
permits a good deal of movement and, along with other factors,
prevents the development of rigid and exclusive ethnic blocs. It
appears that whole tribal groups will in the future, as they have in the
past, slip across the ethnic “ boundary.” In areas of linguistic
73
contiguity, bilingualism is common, and in most cases Arabic
eventually comes to predominate. This process has been noted in
many places, such as in the foothills of the Rif.

Arabs

Arabs, or native speakers of Arabic , probably constituted

approximately 60 percent of the 16.2 million people of Morocco in
mid- 1971 ; reliable statistics were not available. More than 2 million
others speak it as a second language, although what level of mastery
constitutes “ speaking” is not known.
The earliest Arabs arrived in the mid-seventh century (see ch. 3,
Historical Setting) . Primarily soldiers, explorers, and Islamic
proselytizers, they probably numbered no more than 150,000. Few
women accompanied the invaders, so that many men married locally,
hastening the introduction of Arabic culture and Islamic religion. The
eleventh century brought a second wave of Arabs, this time nomadic
beduins of the Beni Hilal and other tribes that had been displaced
farther to the east. Their movement represented the migration of
whole tribes spreading through the rural plains, diffusing their
language, their religion and, to some extent, their nomadic way of life.
Although some authorities estimate that the beduins could not have
accounted for more than 2 percent of the population of North Africa,
they exerted an important cultural influence on the peasants they
encountered .
The fall of southern Spain to the Christians brought a third large
scale migration during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Significant numbers of Moriscos, Andalusian Muslims, mostly
descended from Berber converts to Islam who had conquered parts of
Spain in the eighth century , took refuge in Morocco . Largely
urbanites, artisans, merchants, and intellectuals, they settled in Fes
and other cities in large numbers. This migration heavily Arabized the
coastal highlands near the Strait of Gibraltar, the route between
Spain and the Moroccan plains . During the years between the three
great migrations, Arabs also arrived as individuals or in small groups.
Authorities nevertheless estimate that the total number of Arabs
who arrived in North Africa in the first two migrations could not have
exceeded 700,000 persons. In the twelfth century population of 6 or 7
million they never constituted more than 10 percent. Therefore,
despite considerable intermarriage, Berber descent heavily outweighs
Arab in the Moroccan population. Moreover, Arabic cultural
penetration was not complete . Although Islam was firmly and
enthusiastically adopted in all parts of the country, a Berber cultural
residue remains among the Arabized groups (see ch . 6, Social
Structure). For example, marriage rites are pre-Islamic among both
74
Arabs and Berbers. Many farming terms used in colloquial Arabic, as
well as proper names, come from Berber roots .
The varied Arabic dialects in Morocco reflect their several origins.
Throughout the world Arabic exists in two styles : classical, including
the language of the Quran as well as the form used in the modern
press, and the local colloquials. In Morocco classical Arabic is used
primarily by the traditional religious leaders and by modern
bureaucrats in those organizations that have been Arabized. In
addition, large numbers of men, including many Berbers, have
learned Quranic quotations by rote but cannot be said to speak
classical Arabic . Increasing interest in the language has developed
among the educated young, particularly the nationalists. In the mid
1950s relatively few were able to read it; by the mid- 1960s, however,
their number had increased to an estimated 1 million. The low
average age of these new readers indicates that classical Arabic will
probably increase in importance.
Classical Arabic is written in an alphabet derived through Aramaic
from Phoenician . As is usual in Semitic scripts, only the consonants
are written and are arranged from right to left. Vowel signs and other
diacritical marks are employed occasionally in printed texts only as
aids to pronunciation. The modern form of written classical Arabic,
often called literary Arabic or modern Arabic, is grammatically
simplified and includes many words unknown in the Quran. It is used
in the newspapers, on the radio, and for much public speaking; the
classical form is still taught in schools and used for advanced Arabic
scholarship.
The spoken Arabic dialects of Morocco belong to the Maghribi
group, used throughout Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco; the
language of Malta is also a dialect of this group, as was the Arabic
formerly spoken in Spain . These dialects are mutually intelligible, but
they have diverged so far from eastern dialects that North Africans
have some difficulty in conversing with a Syrian or an Iraqi .
Dialectal Arabic , the local speech learned at home, is usually
referred to as Moroccan Arabic . It is usually neither written nor used
for literary purposes . The spoken language deviates so markedly from
the classical that one observer reports that some Moroccan audiences
can follow motion pictures made in Egypt with dialogue in classical
Arabic only through the French subtitles . It has also been reported
that 60 percent of a sample of radio listeners polled in 1957 did not
understand the classical Arabic spoken but did understand Moroccan
dialectal Arabic .
In most Arabic countries the dialect of the cities differs noticeably
from that of the countryside, but in Morocco this divergence is
exceptionally great because the dialects were introduced by different
groups. Urban, spoken Arabic derives from the dialect of the first
conquerors, as modified by that of the Spanish refugees. Rural speech

75
is patterned on that introduced by the beduin immigrants. City
dwellers ordinarily consider their speech pattern the more refined .

Berbers

Estimates of the number of Berber speakers vary but center on 40

percent. The Berber language, one of the Afro -Asiatic linguistic
family, is related to other indigenous North African tongues, such as
ancient Egyptian , the Cushite languages of the Horn of Africa, and
the Chad language group . Berber speakers occupy the highlands that
have been left relatively untouched by the advancing Arabic wave,
primarily the mountainous regions of the Rif, the Middle Atlas, the
High Atlas, and the Anti-Atlas . In some areas classification is
difficult . Identification as a Berber is frequently relative rather than
absolute and depends upon membership in a specific tribe. Although
the foothills are becoming progressively Arabized, life in the mountain
villages for the most part continues in the traditional manner. The
territory in which Berber is spoken is contracting, but the number of
Berber speakers continues to expand.
It is estimated that at least half of the Berber speakers also know
another language, usually Arabic, as well as some French . Bilingual
persons are ordinarily adult men or schoolchildren . One authority
reports that in the early 1960s fewer than 1 percent of the women in
the Rif knew Arabic or a European language . Arabic is often learned
in school, and the numerous men who travel to the cities to work,
often leaving their families behind, master the majority language,
although they usually continue to speak Berber in their homes.
No generalized feeling of peoplehood embraces all Berbers; rather,
each Berber is a member of a specific local group (see ch. 6, Social
Structure). The language, which is found in various forms throughout
North Africa, lacks the unifying vehicle of a written form and exists
as a series of regional dialects that are mutually intelligible only with
difficulty. The French attempted to emphasize the differences
between Arabs and Berbers and to foster a Berber national spirit; but
the fragmented nature of the Berber groups and the fact that they and
the Arabs are distinguished largely by ecological, rather than by
profound ethnic or cultural , differences prevented this ( see ch. 3,
Historical Setting) .
Language, dress, and ecological adaptation vary from region to
region. Methods of classification are also various. The numerous
Berber dialects have been divided into three main groups: the Rifi of
the Rif; the Tamazight of the Middle Atlas, the central High Atlas,
and the Sahara; and the Tashilhit of the High Atlas and the Anti
Atlas. The numerous tribes have been grouped into two sedentary
groups, the Rifians and the Shluh of the High Atlas and the Anti
Atlas; a third group comprises the seasonal migrant Beraber ( whose
76
name should not be confused with Berber) of the Middle Atlas and
Sahara. The fourteenth -century historian Ibn Khaldun distinguished
three main groups: the Sanhaja, the Masmuda, and the Zanata. Each
of these groups is said to have given rise to one of the three great
historic dynasties. Khaldun's divisions do not correlate with modern
reality, although a number of theories exist tying them to various
modern groups.
The largest psychologically significant unit is the local tribal section
or confederation , although this may consist of nothing more than a
number of related families farming adjacent land and sharing a
historical tie to a now defunct tribal council . Each such group is
known by a patronymic, preceded by the Arab or Berber prefix Beni
or Ait, meaning “ sons of” or “ people.” Reportedly, there are some 600
such groups.
The majority of those currently known as Berbers are sedentary
farmers and part-time herders. The proportion of time spent in
herding or farming and the techniques used vary with the ecological
setting. The varied and rugged terrain has permitted and even
compelled the development of differing local adaptations (see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry). In addition, it hindered rapid diffusion and
unity of culture.
A significant, but undetermined, number of countrypeople have
settled in cities and retain a communal identity there. So many Shluh
of the Sous region have established themselves in Casablanca as small
retail grocers that in the slang of that city " going to the Soussi’s ” is
synonymous with " going to the grocery store .” They have also
branched out into other businesses, including wholesaling; a majority
of the small entrepreneurs in Casablanca are Berbers. In many cases
families, rather than individuals, run a business, the male members
rotating between the city and the family landholdings, usually leaving
their wives and children in the country. A growing number of men ,
however, have brought their immediate families to town, weakening,
and in some cases eventually breaking, their ties to family and
village.

Jews

When the ancestors of many of modern Morocco's Jews arrived

from Spain after its fall to Christendom in the late fifteenth century ,
they found a small and scattered community of their coreligionists
who had already been settled in the country for centuries and who
claimed ancient Palestinian origin . The original Jews, some of whom
were Berber speakers apparently converted to Judaism, lived in
various parts of the country - many in rural villages totally or
predominantly Jewish in composition and others as single families or
small groups in non-Jewish villages. In some areas small Jewish
77

|
communities lived in a special quarter, or mallah (see Glossary). The
Spanish, or Sephardic, Jews settled exclusively in cities, generally
entering commerce and artisan trades.
Although significant in the economic life of the country, the Jewish
community was never large. With the founding of the state of Israel in
1948 and with Moroccan independence in 1956, the number of Jews
began to drop significantly through emigration to Israel, France, the
United States, and elsewhere (see fig. 7) . In addition to change in
absolute numbers, this emigration caused an appreciable shift in the
age structure of the Jewish community. In 1958 those over sixty years
of age constituted only 8 percent of the community, but by late 1967
they accounted for 40 percent. Conversely, 58 percent of the
community was between fifteen and sixty years of age in 1948, but in
1967 this productive age group accounted for only 25 percent.
Furthermore, a significant internal migration emptied the rural
Jewish communities into the cities until, by 1966, virtually no Jews
remained in the countryside. In 1968 two -thirds lived in Casablanca,
although in 1947 the city's share was only slightly over one-third.
1948 1951 1954 1956 1961 1963 1967 1969 1970

Before
250,000 June September
227,000

Moroccan
199,000 Independence
200,000 191,000

170,000 Conference of
Casablanca
150,000
130,000

100,000
100,000
Arab - Israeli War

60,000
53,000
50,000 45,000
40,000

Source : Adapted from “ Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord,” Maghreb [ Paris] ,

May 1968-June 1968, p. 32 ; and African Research Bulletin [London ]
( unpublished mimeo. ) , December 1970-January 1971 , p. 1902 .
Figure 7. Jewish Population of Morocco, Selected Years, 1948-70.

The departure of the Jewish community has been a particularly

sharp loss because they constituted an important pool of scarce skilled
technical, professional, and administrative manpower. Since the early
days of French rule, the proportion of Jewish children receiving
modern education has been much higher than that of any other
indigenous group, and their departure aggravated the acute shortage
of educated personnel, especially in managerial ranks. For example, of
141 lawyers admitted to Supreme Court practice in the Muslim year
1387 ( 1967/68 ), 34 were Jews. In addition, those leaving came
78
disproportionately from the ranks of professionals and managerial
Jews; their percentage of the Jewish community declined by two
thirds between 1947 and 1968, while that of businessmen and artisans
increased by one-quarter. Those Jews who remain are also
proportionately less active in economic life; in 1968 only 40 percent
participated, as opposed to 46 percent in 1947 .
The flight of the Jewish community arose from no policy of the
government nor from any severe discrimination . Both before and after
independence they have been recognized as a legitimate and valuable
segment of society. Although they suffer some social discrimination,
their local communities have official standing, including recognized
leaders and schools, and Jews have held significant government
positions. In 1968 three served on the city council of Casablanca, one
on Rabat’s, and two on Marrakech’s. Nevertheless, Jews have always
been excluded from certain social circles and did not get certain types
of jobs. In 1968, for example, there was not a single Jewish career
military man . On the other hand, warm personal relationships, often
based on business friendships, have bound Jew and non-Jew for
generations. During the June 1967 Arab -Israeli War, for instance,
numerous Berber and Arab notables personally guaranteed the safety
of Jewish associates at a time when an outbreak of anti -Jewish acts
was feared .
The government has regarded the departure of the Jewish
community as a serious loss to the country and at various times has
taken steps to stem it. Between 1957 and 1961 agencies arranging
Jewish emigration in Casablanca and Tangiers were closed by the
police, and some arrests were made. A special section of the police
was organized, and at certain times the borders were closed to Jewish
emigrants. Jews obtained passports only with difficulty. Despite these
provisions, however, 40,000 left during the period.
The June 1967 Arab -Israeli War created an atmosphere of high
tension in the Jewish community. The government, throughout the
period, acted forcefully to prevent any reprisals toward Moroccan
Jews, and many Muslim private citizens acted with exemplary and
unflagging friendship. The position of Jews in society did not alter.
Nevertheless, some anti-Jewish sentiment was generated in radical
nationalist quarters. Two Jewish youths celebrating the Israeli victory
were murdered, and some politicians began an anti-Zionist boycott
against Jewish business and professional men . The government
quickly and firmly disavowed any anti-Jewish sentiment, although it
declared itself opposed to Zionism . Nevertheless, the Jewish
community panicked, and 7,000 quit the country between June and
November of that year. Once again economic leaders bemoaned the
loss of many of their most crucial employees, including a large
number of accountants .

79
The departure of the Moroccan Jewish community came about
largely because of the insecurity many felt in the face of the
government's stated policy of Arabization and also because of the
stagnant, and possibly worsening, economic conditions since
independence (see ch. 11, Character and Structure of the Economy) .
More than any other segment of indigenous society, the Jews had
adopted French culture; they also had gained full legal equality for
the first time under the French. Before the protectorate, they had
been a tolerated subject people (see ch. 5, Religious Life ). They
therefore regarded with nervous suspicion their prospects in an
independent Morocco, fearing that nationalism might eventually
exclude them .

Europeans

A substantial, but rapidly dwindling, European community

remained, primarily in the cities . Accurate statistics were not
available in mid- 1971, but in 1970 there were an estimated 135,000, as
compared to about 200,000 in 1965. The reported emigration rate of
1,000 per month probably increased in the aftermath of the Mehdi
Ben Barka affair (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
By 1971 the French numbered 90,000. Many of them worked under
government contract ; in 1971 nearly 9,000 teachers supplied by
France taught in the schools . Together with their families they
accounted for over 20,000 persons. In addition , several thousand
technicians worked for the government and in public and private
industry (see ch . 12, Agriculture and Industry ).
Before the twentieth century no more than a few thousand
Europeans resided in the country. During the colonial period this
number increased to about 550,000 in 1955 , with the Spanish
dominating the northern zone and the French the southern, where
they were responsible for the urban and industrial development of the
region (see ch. 3, Historical Setting ).
At independence 80 percent of the European population was urban ,
concentrated in the coastal cities. Europeans controlled over 80
percent of the industrial and commercial enterprises and virtually
monopolized managerial positions, as well as controlling valuable
farmland. The French, who constituted about 4 percent of the
population in 1955, dominated the modern economic sector and
administration. Of 130,000 economically active Frenchmen in the
country, 25,000 were government functionaries; 50,000 were employed
in industry as managers or workers; 10,000 were doctors or lawyers or
were in other professions; 16,000 were merchants; and the remainder
worked on the land. Europeans produced one-third of the tax revenue
of the country and had a standard of living about seven times higher
than that of the average Muslim Moroccan. These Europeans, about
80
65 percent of whom were not born in the country , usually maintained
strong ties with their country of origin.
During colonial times the French presence was considerably more
disruptive to the social equilibrium than the Spanish . Spaniards
settled nearly exclusively in cities and did not come in large numbers.
In 1955 they totaled under 100,000 persons. Many Frenchmen, on the
other hand, came as farmers and displaced considerable numbers of
local people. In 1955 Frenchmen owned 7 percent of the land in
production and produced 40 percent of the country's agricultural
income.
Between independence in 1956 and 1965 more than half the
European population left the country. Between the census of 1952 and
that of 1960, their number decreased by about one-quarter and
thereafter by an average of 10 percent a year. Uneasiness about living
as a minority in an independent Muslim state, as well as economic
uncertainty, motivated their departure.
On the personal level, relations between Europeans and Moroccans
are friendly, although their social circles do not often intersect. The
Europeans, even those born in Morocco, identify firmly with the
mother country and make no attempt to become Moroccan .
Consequently, nationalistic, political, and economic policies threaten
them directly. Whether the government's admission of the
impossibility of rapid Arabization had improved the morale of the
European community could not be determined in 1971. Nevertheless,
the Europeans feared land reform , proposed in one form or another by
all political parties, as well as the possibility of competition for jobs
with the growing number of trained Moroccans, who by 1960 held 72
percent of all government administrative positions and over a half of
the technical ones .
European farmers, who fear or have already experienced the loss of
their lands; lawyers, faced with the gradual Arabization of the judicial
system ; and owners of small businesses are most likely to depart.
Among those remaining are older technicians and professionals who
do not wish to reestablish their careers elsewhere, teachers and public
officials dedicated to the country and better remunerated than they
would be in France, some skilled workers who do not fear replacement
by Moroccans in the near future, and some retired and poor persons
who cannot afford the expenses of a change .

LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY

Language is one of the central issues of Moroccan society. French

colonial policy bequeathed a dual language system whose effects
continue to reverberate through the social structure. Animated by
their self-imposed civilizing mission of bringing the presumed
81
blessings of French culture to the colonial peoples, French authorities
attempted to assimilate the society, and particularly the elite
stratum , into the French cultural community.
Throughout the colonial period and into the present, French has
been the language of the modern sector of society. The French had
little interest in teaching Arabic either to themselves or to the
Moroccans except as a dead language of historical or antiquarian
interest . Therefore, although Arabic remained the language of
everyday discourse among the vast majority of the people, it failed to
develop the flexibility and vocabulary needed for modern
bureaucratic, industrial, financial, and intellectual affairs. In order to
penetrate the modern sector with its desirable jobs, higher living
standards, and generally alluring modernity, one had to learn French .
As early as 1930 the urban commercial classes spoke French in both
their business and personal lives. The transformation of the modern
urban working class followed shortly.
Classical Arabic, meanwhile, remained the language of the
traditional religious authorities, such as the ulama (see Glossary ), who,
separated from the dynamism of the developing modern sector by the
ossifying traditional language, as well as by other factors, gradually
lost influence. Because Arabic, the medium of the religious tradition
and the historical glories of Moroccan society, became increasingly
identified with an old -fashioned, out-of-date, and apparently inferior
cultural milieu, problems of identity and self-image multiplied for the
French -educated individual, or evolué. French, on the other hand,
offered access to influence, professional security, and high social
status but was nevertheless radically foreign and required an
emotional and intellectual uprooting.
Because French was the language of modern education throughout
the colonial period, it became the medium of literature and
intellectual activity in the modern sector. Ironically, a good deal of
nationalist writing, as well as the upbringing of the children of many
nationalist leaders, took place in French. The radical estrangement of
the modern sector, both from the mass of the people and from the
traditional culture, is symbolized by the fact that, in 1964, only about
30 percent spoke French, however badly, and only about 6 percent
could read it. Of literate persons, constituting perhaps 10 percent of
the population, two -thirds knew French .
With independence, the mass of the people, formerly excluded by
the formidable barrier of language, demanded action on their long
held desire for access to the modern sector. This meant both the
replacement of French personnel by Moroccans and a widening of the
primary route of access—the educational system. The policymakers
therefore found themselves caught between the conflicting demands
and requisites of Moroccanization and Arabization .

82
Most of those cut off from the modern sector were excluded by
ignorance of the language of that sector. Access could be opened
either by teaching French to the masses or by switching the modern
sector to Arabic . Both alternatives proved unfeasible, and the
education ministers, who have rapidly succeeded one another, have
careened uneasily between these alternatives since independence (see
ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics) . Arabizing
the educational system and the bureaucracy proved impossible to
achieve quickly because of insufficient Arabic -speaking staff. At the
time of independence, for example, there was only one modern
university-trained Arabic specialist in the country. Teachers trained
in the traditional Islamic Arabiclanguage private schools, who had
long been precluded from employment in the public schools, were
hurriedly recruited but, because of their unfamiliarity with modern
pedagogy, standards fell. The business and intellectual elite began
withdrawing their children in favor of the cultural mission schools run
by the French government, reinforcing once again the class
distinctions that language differences had long symbolized.
The simultaneous and increasing demand for Moroccanization of
government and business caused, if anything, a greater entrenchment
of French because virtually all qualified Moroccans had been educated
in that language. According to some authorities the masses, more
interested in social mobility than in Arabic, would have accepted
education in French rather than complete Arabization. This
possibility has been foreclosed, however, by an absolute lack of
personnel (despite large infusions of teachers from France) and by a
skyrocketing birth rate which , in 1971, deprived half the children of
any schooling at all (see ch. 7, Education, Communication, and the
Arts and Sciences) . In that same year illiteracy in the coming
generation seemed to be increasing both absolutely and relatively ; no
progress could therefore be made on the language issue .
At the same time, interest in classical Arabic has been increasing
among the intellectuals and elsewhere . Nationalist sentiment
demands complete Arabization, despite the fact that in 1966 the
minister of education and in 1970 the prime minister stated that it
was impossible. A more devious goal has been attributed to well-to -do
nationalists by French observers; they feel that, since French will
probably continue as the language of influence and prestige for some
time to come, encouraging the common people to accept education in
Arabic while training the children of the elite in French will assure
the preservation of existing privileges.
The nervously balanced and paradoxical situation finds expression
in the behavior of the government. The king, for example, gives press
conferences and consults with his advisers in French ; he addresses the
people on radio and in official pronouncements in classical Arabic .
The government maintains the Bureau of Arabization in Rabat, which
83
has produced wordlists on various subjects, such as 1,000 sports terms
and 700 tourism terms ; at the same time, much administration is
conducted in French, and the Post Office has refused to accept cables
in Arabic .
The problem is aggravated by the fact that French and Arabic (or
Berber) represent differences far greater than those merely of
language. In effect, they represent different world views and social
contexts. An observer has noted, for example, that the French
language permits social relationships between male and female
acquaintances that are virtually impossible in Arabic (see ch. 6, Social
Structure). Consequently, the confusion of identity suffered by the
bilingual individual can be very great and is particularly painful to
adolescents passing through an educational system that vacillates
between two languages.
Authorities agree that, although French seems, for the time being,
entrenched in the modern sector of society, the pressure for access for
Arabic speakers is likely to increase. Data indicate that a stagnating
economy cannot produce sufficient jobs for the unemployed graduates,
particularly those of Arabic -language schools, whose number grows
year by year ( see ch. 11 , Character and Structure of the Economy) .
Consequently, observers conclude that many of the social problems of
Morocco are likely in the future, as they have in the past, to
crystallize in the issue of language.

84
CHAPTER 5

RELIGIOUS LIFE

Islam, the faith of all Moroccans except a dwindling Jewish

community and a small European colony, animates the nation's
spiritual life and anchors the traditional social system . Both the rural
and urban populations maintain a high level of loyalty to the faith ,
although practice in many regions is unorthodox and the exigencies of
industrial and bureaucratic organization have made traditional
devotion difficult for many employed in the modern sector.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion but not of
proselytism to non-Muslim faiths; nevertheless, it describes the
nation as Muslim and the king as the amir al muaminin , or
commander of the faithful. The Ministry of Religious Foundations
(Habus) and Islamic Affairs acts for the government to strengthen and
support Islam. As recently as 1961 the ulama, the orthodox religious
authorities and scholars, ratified the succession to the throne of King
Hassan II in a manner long traditional in Morocco.
The sanction of religious authority and the king's position as the
leading figure of the shurfa, the descendants of the Prophet
Muhammad, have been significant in maintaining loyalty to the
central government, which, as the embodiment of Islam, is probably
the single institution commanding the loyalty of virtually all elements
of society (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch . 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics). Islam is a strong unifying force;
veneration of the Quran , respect for the reputed descendants of the
Prophet, and proud personal identification with the Muslim
community cut across nearly all social, ecological, and linguistic
distinctions and were significant in forging a dynamic sense of
Moroccan nationhood in the late colonial period (see ch. 3, Historical
Setting; ch . 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Although many
practices and beliefs of the Berbers, as well as other rural and urban
dwellers, deviate from , and are sometimes even antithetical to, the
orthodox Islam of the Quran , personal devotion to the religion has
rarely wavered .
Before central authority was firmly established throughout the
country by the French Protectorate, religious personages and
organizations, particularly marabouts, or local holy men, along with
fraternal orders of their disciples, stood at the interstices of the
highland social system , acting to maintain order among the various
85
tribal groups (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 6, Social Structure).
The establishment of central government authority in these areas has
undermined this function, however, and during the last several
decades membership in the religious brotherhoods has atrophied along
with their usefulness as arbitrators. Nevertheless, the popular cults
surrounding the graves and descendants of deceased local saints have
remained vigorous in both country and town, as they have been for
centuries. The unorthodoxy of these observances does not detract
from their adherents' firm and personal identification with Islam.

ISLAM

Historical Background

In A.D. 610 Muhammad, a merchant of the Arabian town of Mecca

and later known as the Prophet, began to preach the first of a series of
revelations granted him by God through the Angel Gabriel .
Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow
Meccans, his vigorous and continuing censure eventually earning him
their bitter enmity . In 622 he and a group of his followers fled to
Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city) because it was
the center of his activities. The flight, or hijrah, known in the West as
the Hegira, marked the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a
force in history ; the Muslim calendar begins in 622. In Medina he
continued to preach, eventually defeated his detractors in battle, and
consolidated both the temporal and spiritual leadership of all Arabia
in his person before his death in 632 .
After Muhammad's death his followers compiled those of his words
regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the holy
scripture of Islam ; others of his sayings and teachings, as well as the
precedents of his personal behavior, recalled by those who had known
him during life, became the Hadith . Together they form a
comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the
Muslim.

Islam was rapidly transformed from a small religious community

into a dynamic political and military force; during the seventh
century Muslim conquerors reached as far as Morocco, and by the
beginning of the eighth century the Berbers were substantially
Islamized ( see ch . 3, Historical Setting) . The orthodox Sunni
denomination, which is the larger of the two branches of Islam, was
firmly established in Morocco by the Almohad dynasty during the
twelfth century. The smaller branch, or Shia, which has little
representation in Morocco, broke away during Islam's first century as
a result of a bitter dispute over the succession to Muhammad's role of
religious and secular leader.

86
Tenets of Islam

The shahadah (testimony) succinctly states the central belief of

Islam : “ There is no god but God ( Allah ), and Muhammad is His
Prophet.” This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual
occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates
one a Muslim. The God preached about by Muhammad was not one
previously unknown to his countrymen , for Allah is the Arabic for
“God” rather than a particular name. Instead of introducing a new
deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods and
spirits worshiped before his ministry and declared the omnipotence of
the unique creator, God. Islam means “ submission to God,” and he
who submits is a Muslim. Muhammad is the “ seal of the Prophets ” ;
his revelation is said to complete for all time the series of biblical
revelations received by the Jews and the Christians. God himself is
believed to have remained one and the same throughout time, but
men had strayed from his true teachings until they were corrected by
Muhammad. Prophets and sages of the biblical tradition, such as
Abraham , Moses, and Jesus ( Isa ), are recognized as inspired vehicles
of God's will. Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message,
rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the
concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, general
resurrection, heaven and hell, and the eternal life of the soul .
The duties of the Muslim form the “five pillars” of the faith . These
are shahada, recitation of the creed; salat, daily prayer; zakat,
almsgiving; sawm, fasting; and hajj, pilgrimage. The believer prays in
a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions at
dawn, midday, midafternoon , sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed
genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, which the
worshiper recites while facing toward Mecca. Whenever possible men
pray in congregation at the mosque under an imam, or prayer leader
(see Glossary), and on Fridays are obliged to do so . Women may also
attend public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from
the men, although most frequently they pray in seclusion at home. A
special functionary , the muaddhin , intones a call to prayer to the
entire community at the appropriate hours ; those out of earshot
determine the proper time from the sun .
In the early days of Islam the authorities imposed a tax on personal
property proportionate to one's wealth ; this was distributed to the
mosques and to the needy. In addition, freewill gifts were made.
Almsgiving, although still a duty of the believer, has become a more
private matter.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan , a period of
obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of the
Quran. During this month all but the sick, the weak, pregnant women,
soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young children
87
are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse
during the daylight hours. The well-to - do usually do little or no work
during this period, and many businesses close for all or part of the
day. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar
year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in different years. A fast in
summertime imposes considerable hardship on those who must do
physical work. Each day's fast ends with a signal that light is
insufficient to distinguish a black thread from a white one. Id al Fitr
(also called Id al Saghir ), a three-day feast and holiday, ends the
month of Ramadan .
All Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possible, make
the hajj ( pilgrimage) to the holy city of Mecca to participate in special
rites held at several spots there during the twelfth month of the lunar
calendar. The pilgrim, dressed in the white seamless ihram , abstains
from sexual relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. Highlights
of the hajj include kissing of the sacred black stone ;
circumambulation of the Kaaba, the sacred structure housing it;
running seven times between the sacred mountains Safa and Marwa;
and standing in prayer on Mount Arafat. The returning pilgrim is
entitled to the honorific al Haj before his name .
The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on
earth, the jihad, represents an additional general duty of all Muslims.
Although this has in the past been used to justify holy wars, modern
Muslims see it in a broader context of civic and personal action.
Abdul Karim, in his Rif rebellion of the 1920s, and later nationalist
leaders invoked the concept of the preservation of Islam from the
encroachment of Christian authority (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).
In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical
conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect and
forbidding adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion,
blood, pork, and alcohol. A Muslim stands in a personal relationship
to God ; there is neither intermediary nor clergy in Islam. Those who
lead prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of
their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than any special
powers or prerogatives endowed by ordination .
During his lifetime Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal
leader of the Muslim community; he established the concept of Islam
as a total and all - encompassing way of life for man and society.
Muslims believe that Allah revealed to Muhammad the rules
governing decent and proper behavior, and it is therefore incumbent
on the individual to live in the manner prescribed by revealed law and
on the community to perfect human society on earth according to the
holy injunctions. Islam traditionally recognizes no distinction between
church and state . Religious and secular life merge, as do religious and
secular law.

88
In keeping with this conception of society, all Muslims have been
traditionally subject to the sharia, or religious law, which covers most
aspects of life, as interpreted by religious courts; in Morocco the
Malikite school of Sunni law is followed . Consequently, when, by the
Berber dahir ( decree) of 1930, the French authorities symbolically and
actually removed the Berber tribes from the jurisdiction of the sharia
courts and from the unified Muslim community, Moroccan Muslims
felt a sharp affront to the unity of Islam. What the French had
intended as a divisive political tactic instead aroused the worst fears
for the dignity and survival of Islam and, with them, a vigorous
feeling of Islamic solidarity among all elements of the population (see
ch . 3, Historical Setting) .
During his lifetime the Prophet enjoined his followers to convert the
infidel to the true faith. He specifically exempted, however, the
“ Peoples of the Book,” Jews and Christians, whose religions he
recognized as the historical basis of Islam. These peoples were to be
permitted to continue their own communal and religious life as long
as they recognized the temporal domain of Muslim authorities, paid
their taxes, and did not proselytize or otherwise interfere with the
practice of Islam . Consequently, the Jewish community of Morocco
was, until the protectorate, a dhimmi, or protected subject people; in
matters that did not concern Muslims their own religious law was
valid . The Jews first gained legal equality under the French
Protectorate and have since been recognized as fully equal Moroccan
citizens .
The Christian community, however, arriving in substantial numbers
only after French hegemony was established, was never a dhimmi
group and, in fact, assumed control of the society. Although the Quran
specifically discusses the position and treatment of subject Jews and
Christians in Muslim society, it makes no mention of the reverse. A
Muslim society permanently subject to non-Muslims has been called
by one authority a situation inconceivable within the framework of
Islam as God's final and authoritative revelation . Such a state of
affairs is, by its nature an affront to Islam and a reproach to the
Muslims who permit it to persist; it must be ended as quickly as
possible, and the true supremacy of Islam restored . For this reason,
among others, Moroccan nationalism was, at base, largely a religious
movement (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics).
Moroccan sensibilities notwithstanding, the French established
their legal code as supreme except for marriage, divorce, and other
aspects of personal life. The postindependence Moroccan legal code
combines elements of secular law with the traditional law of the
religious communities, which is still valid in matters of personal
status (see ch . 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics).
89

1
FOLK BELIEFS AND FOLK RELIGION

Throughout the centuries since its introduction into North Africa,

Islam has interacted with the indigenous, predominantly Berber
culture to produce a style of religious belief and practice uniquely
Moroccan . Both Arabs and Berbers are profoundly Islamized; religious
terms, for example, are not translated into the Berber language.
Paradoxically, however, the highly fragmented traditional social
organization of the dissident tribesmen is antithetical to the unity
envisioned by orthodox Islam. The religion in a sense therefore
inheres in the individual rather than the group.
At various times in Moroccan history the Berbers' separatist
aspirations and their reaction against Arab authority at the center
have expressed themselves through the heretical and schismatic
doctrines of particularly vivid Berber holy men. In addition, a residue
of pre-Islamic belief and practice remains, coloring the worship of the
uneducated. Popular Islam is thus an overlay of Quranic ritual and
ethical principles on a background of belief in djinns (spirits), the evil
eye, rites to assure good fortune, and the veneration of local saints.
The educated of the cities and towns-merchants, artisans,
professionals, and scholars—have been the primary bearers and
guardians of the austere orthodox Islam .
Although orthodox Islam preaches the unique and inimitable
majesty and sanctity of Allah and the equality of all believers before
him, an important element of Moroccan Islam has for centuries been
the belief in the coalescence of special spiritual powers in particular
contemporaneous human beings. Baraka is a transferable quality of
personal blessedness, holiness, and spiritual force that is said to
congeal in certain individuals. Those whose claims to possession of
baraka can be substantiated, either through performance of apparent
miracles, exemplary spiritual insights, or genealogical connection with
a recognized possessor, are viewed as saints . These persons are known
in the West as marabouts, a French corruption of the Arabic
murabitin , persons who have undergone ribat, a religious retreat.
Baraka is said to be granted by God to certain persons and may be
transferred by them to other persons and to inanimate objects.
Beneficial effects accrue to those ordinary persons who come in
contact with a possessor.
The human being to whom God granted the most baraka is said to
be the Prophet Muhammad. Because it can be inherited in the male
line, his baraka passed to his agnatic descendants among the shurfa
(sing., sharif). Baraka, however, is not evenly distributed even among
the shurfa ; their descent gives them a hereditary tendency toward
sainthood but does not guarantee it to any particular individual.
Furthermore, baraka can be dormant for generations. At times,
90
however, so great a quantity of it fuses in one person that he is
undeniably accepted as a saint.
Saints

After death, a saint's baraka is thought to increase and to inhere in

the persons and, particularly, the places associated with him, most
especially his tomb, or kubba. After his death a saint often becomes
the patron and protector of the locality or social group in which he
lived. Persons seeking blessing, especially barren women and the sick,
visit his tomb, usually a square whitewashed building with a
horseshoe-shaped door and an octagonal roof, to perform rituals and
absorb some of his blessedness through the osmosis of physical
proximity.
The saint in his tomb is known in Moroccan dialect as the mul
bilad, the owner of the land, and his connection with a given locality,
quarter in a town, or craft group is strongly physical; the holiness
inheres not only in his spirit but also very definitely in his body and
the burial place. Thousands of saints' tombs, both large and small, dot
the landscape, and nearly every settlement has a patron. One observer
has noted that sidi and mulay, the honorifics given to saints, are as
common on the map of Morocco as the term saint is on that of
Europe and for a similar reason—the devotion of the common people
of both regions to their local patron .
Migration to cities has, for this reason , strained the cults of saints
among the newly urbanized. Countrypeople often continue in the city
to venerate the saints of their home communities, but the cults,
because of distance and the inaccessibility of the shrines, often
gradually lose their viability. Sometimes such persons attempt to
transfer their loyalty to the saints of their new home, although the
change is frequently unsuccessful, either because the new devotee
misses the strong force of tradition that tied him to his former patron
or, as is often the case in Casablanca, the slum or quarter is so new
that it lacks established traditions.
Sometimes an attempt is made to establish a new cult or embellish
a weak one ; in Casablanca, for example , the mushrooming
shantytowns (bidonvilles) and suburbs have overtaken and absorbed
old rural communities and, with them , their saints. The veneration of
saints is widespread among the uneducated, particularly the rural and
urban poor, and also among many urban middle-class women (see ch.
6, Social Structure). A long-term declining trend has been noted in
the cities, however, probably caused by education, Western influence,
the general secularization of life, and the greater tendency toward
orthodoxy among reform -minded city dwellers. Among the leading
saints are Mulay Idris, the patron of Fes, and Sidi Muhammad ben
Isa, the patron of Meknès.

91
Moroccans generally also believe in the existence of a special group
of spiritual beings called djinns, whose supernatural powers can be
used either benevolently or malevolently . Many people fear them and
protect themselves by magical incantations ; petitions ; offerings;
animal sacrifices; and the use of baraka -impregnated objects, such as
salt, iron, steel, and gunpowder.
Belief in the evil eye is widespread ; the glance or look of certain
individuals causes an evil or deadly spell, and danger is particularly
great when accompanied by an “ evil mouth ,” that is, by loose talk,
praise, joking, or cursing. Protection is most commonly sought in
incantations ; incense ; the use of magical colors, such as black, yellow,
blue, and red ; and symbolic forms of the number five or of the hand.
Abstract forms of the number five or of the hand are frequently
tattooed on the faces of women , particularly among the Berber tribes,
and are a dominant motif in crafts and architectural decoration .
Unorthodox religious beliefs and practices of this type are probably
more common among women than among men. Because they are
excluded by the social segregation of the sexes from much of the
formal religious life of the community, women attempt to meet their
spiritual needs through informal and unorthodox religious beliefs and
practices passed on from mother to daughter.
The government neither encourages nor discourages the cults of
saints but is said to view them as a symptom of a vigorous folk
culture. King Hassan II has ordered the construction of a traditional
tomb for his widely revered father, the late King Mohammed V. The
Alawite dynasty, as the leading sharifian family in the country,
derives loyalty and a degree of legitimacy from their position as
religious leaders, both ex officio and by descent. The special spiritual
features of all sharifian families are held to occur most strongly in the
royal line.
The descendants of an important saint, the awlad siyyid (saint's
children) , often form a saintly lineage, accepting the reverence of the
laymen because of their illustrious ancestor. They frequently act as
custodians of the tomb and shrine, living from the contributions
received from pilgrims and devotees. The Muslim duty of pilgrimage
has been widely reinterpreted in the popular mind to include
pilgrimage to shrines of the saints. Some persons of the Rif are said to
believe, for example, that seven pilgrimages to the shrines of Mulay
Idris and Mulay Abd al Salam equal a pilgrimage to Mecca. The
belief in pilgrimage also existed among many Jews, and persons of
both faiths frequently visited the same shrines.
In addition to guarding the shrines, the saintly lineages, particularly
in the highland areas, had served as mediators between tribal groups,
adjudicating disputes, assigning rights, and granting asylum . Berber
tribesmen in the past frequently came forward with claims of
sainthood and sharifian descent. Although Berber culture was firmly
92
established in Morocco long before the arrival of Islam and Arabic
culture, many believe that those Berbers claiming to be shurfa are
descended from originally Muslim families that later became
Berberized . Consequently, a large proportion of the population claims,
with varying degrees of success, sharifian descent, despite the logical
contradiction implicit in history (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 4,
Ethnic Groups and Languages).
Religious Brotherhoods

Groups of disciples have frequently clustered around particular

saints, especially those who preached an original tariqa, a mystical or
devotional “ way.” Brotherhoods of the followers of such mystical
teachers appeared in North Africa at least as early as the eleventh
century and during the instability of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries became mass movements (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) . The
founder, an obvious possessor of great baraka, ruled an order of adepts
who were ordinarily organized hierarchically. The authority of the
leader, or shaykh, was often absolute ; it was said that “ He who has no
shaykh has the devil for a shaykh .” The brotherhood usually centered
spatially on a combined lodge and shrine, called a zawiya. Although
the tariqa was held to supplement and enrich the members’ Islam, in
practice it usually supplanted orthodox worship.
The cult of saints and the belief in sanctity and brotherhoods
apparently antedate the arrival of Islam in Morocco, and the
adaptation of these indigenous forms eased its acceptance by the
Berber tribes. In fact, the brotherhoods were the most potent vehicles
for the early spread of Islam in the highlands. The zawiyiin also
served as hostels for travelers and sanctuaries from enemies , much as
churches did in Europe during the Middle Ages. Because of their
evident success and social utility, the orders were widely tolerated by
the orthodox ulama, many of whom were said to be members in
preprotectorate times . The orders came to exercise significant
political influence.
The strengthened central government that developed under the
protectorate has absorbed many of the traditional social functions of
the brotherhoods, however, and an ideological shift within Islam has
largely robbed them of their legitimacy. Although it was reported that
in 1939 nearly 20 percent of Moroccan males belonged to one of the
twenty -three largest brotherhoods, by the late 1960s the orders'
vitality had waned . Observers stated that those zawiyiin still
functioning consisted of older men and were not successfully
recruiting among the younger generation . Evidence exists, however,
that the zawiya as a social form is still vigorous, even among urban
populations. A survey among Istiqlal ( Independence) Party leaders in
Fes, for example, indicated that a majority viewed their local party
93
group as a zawiya, albeit one combining secular and religious
overtones (see ch . 8 , The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics) .

Religious Reform
The zawiyiin and marabouts for the most part coexisted easily with
the French authorities. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries there began to grow in the central Middle East a new drive
for an Islam purified of unorthodox accretions (see ch. 3, Historical
Setting) . Founded by Jamal al Din al Afghani and Muhammad
Abduh , this movement was known as Salafiya, from the Arabic al
salaf al salih (the pious ancestors) . A small group of men who had
lived in the Middle East, including Abdullah Ben Driss Senoussi and
Bouchaib al Doukkala, brought these ideas to Morocco after World
War I. By the early 1920s study and discussion groups had been
organized in Fes and Rabat. A student of Doukkala, Mulay al Arabi al
Alawi, in turn instructed the future nationalist leader Allal al Fassi
and his circle (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics).
The members of the Salafiya taught that the salvation of society
and of Islam, at that time both suffering disorganization and indignity
at the hands of the French, lay in a return to the simple orthodoxy of
the Quran . They rejected the profusion of popular beliefs and
practices that had grown up around Islam and denounced the
marabouts as frauds and as sycophants to the French authorities.
Early nationalism in Morocco arose from this movement and
therefore from the beginning carried heavy religious overtones (see ch.
3, Historical Setting; ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics) . The Islamic reformers were revolted by the deep inroads
made by French culture, by the ignorance of the youth of their Arabic
and Islamic heritage, and by the debasement of the Arabic language
caused by the growing use of French by the educated. They began to
organize private Arabic -language Quranic schools and nourished the
interest in classical Arabic that has been growing in recent decades
(see ch . 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).
Because of the growing influence of Islamic reformism , the
marabouts and brotherhoods quickly lost prestige. Throughout the
struggle for independence, performance of certain public duties of
Islam carried strong nationalistic overtones. Although the
requirements of industrial and office work in many cases precluded
daily prayer, the strict observance of Ramadan became a badge of
solidarity with Islam and the Moroccan people.
In more recent years the public aspects of Ramadan have retained
their symbolic importance, although the observance of other religious
duties appears less widespread than the fast. During the month of
94
fast, national wine consumption drops 30 percent. Violations of the
rules of Ramadan occur mainly among the educated and Westernized
and usually in secret. Observance is generally heartfelt; workers, even
those doing hard labor, abstain from food and drink; smokers break
their habit ; many omit swimming for fear of swallowing water ; and
women give up garlic, which is said to have aphrodisiac properties.
Each year hundreds of restaurant customers are arrested and fined
under a provision of the penal code that forbids the public
consumption of food or drink by Muslims during the fast period.
Because other religious duties are more private, observance is more
difficult to measure. The number of pilgrims to Mecca continues to
rise annually and includes a substantial number of women ; in some
years women constituted over 30 percent of the pilgrims originating in
Casablanca. Particularly for city dwellers employed in industries or
offices, halting work for the periods of daily prayer presents
difficulties, and observers note that many, particularly the young and
educated, omit this practice. Nevertheless, popular feeling toward
Islam is said to remain very deep.
The government explicitly supports orthodox Islam through the
Ministry of Religious Foundations (Habus) and Islamic Affairs, which
administers the foundations established by charitable individuals for
the advancement of the faith and of charity and also undertakes other
projects. For example, during 1968 forty - one new mosques were
constructed and thirty-seven , in the following year . Operation
Quranic Schools, launched by the king, seeks to increase religious
education among young children ( see ch . 7 , Education ,
Communication , and the Arts and Sciences) . Lectures and sermons
are broadcast on radio and television, and religious and cultural
journals are published by the ministry.
The royal family participates conspicuously in religious activities,
the king being frequently seen at prayer, usually dressed in traditional
costume . In March 1971 the seven -year-old crown prince was
circumcised at the palace, according to religious tradition, in the
presence of the king and members of the ulama. To commemorate
this event, the king absorbed the expenses of the circumcisions of
40,000 other boys of the same age in various parts of the country.

MINORITY RELIGIONS

Although the Constitution ensures the freedom to practice non

Muslim religions, proselytism among Muslims is not permitted.
Consequently, conversions to Judaism and Christianity rarely, if ever,
occur. A small number of non-Muslims accept Islam every year,
primarily women marrying Muslims. Between 1959 and 1963, for
example, some 144 such conversions were recorded in Casablanca.
95
Judaism

The Moroccan Jewish community, which in 1970 numbered

approximately 40,000, relates to the larger Muslim society through
official leaders in each locality and through officials representing the
community as a whole (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The
religious courts and schools, which formerly functioned under the
community committee, were in 1971 under the ministries of justice
and education, respectively (see ch. 7, Education , Communication ,
and the Arts and Sciences; ch. 8, The Governmental System and
Political Dynamics) . The Institute of Jewish Studies, which accepts
women students, in 1961 replaced an ancient seminary.
Judaism shares with Islam an uncompromising monotheism, as well
as proscription on the consumption of pork. It emphasizes, however,
the Sabbath as a day of rest and prayer and the unique mission of the
Jewish people as bearers of God's law as embodied in the Torah , the
scripture consisting of the Pentateuch. Other dietary restrictions,
particularly on the mixing of milk and meat, are also observed. The
level of religious observance is relatively high among Moroccan Jews;
in 1968 an observer noted, for example, that 65 to 70 percent kept the
Sabbath, which required closing businesses and absenting oneself
from work.
The majority of the country's Jews are urban , descended from
Sephardic Jews of Spain and Portugal or from Jewish migrants from
the countryside (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The
Judaism of the Sephardim had certain distinctive features and
profoundly influenced the groups already in Morocco when the
Sephardim arrived from the Iberian Peninsula . Among these features
was the use of cabala, an esoteric system of scriptural interpretation,
which assigned an occult meaning to every word and letter of the
scriptures, and the Zohar, a mystical commentary on the Torah that
was sometimes invoked as a protection against the evil eye to exorcise
the demons of sterility. These practices, as well as certain family
regulations and rites of passage, continued among many Jews in 1971.
Pilgrimages to local shrines have been customary among Moroccan
Jews, and national officials have at times participated.
Among Jews who remain in Morocco certain aspects of the
traditionalist religion are being discarded; the omission of family
prayers and ceremonies is becoming a commonplace occurrence.
Modernization of family life and the role of women affects them as
much as Muslims (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Christianity
Nearly all of the approximately 135,000 Christians in the country in
1970 were foreigners of European origin and members of the Roman
96
Catholic Church. A few Protestant foreigners resided in the country,
and there was a limited number of Protestant missionary institutions.
The Roman Catholic Church was established in the country in the
nineteenth century but has not been permitted to proselytize since
the Algeciras Conference in 1906. It is, however, authorized, and even
encouraged , to run private schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and other
institutions. Until 1961 Sunday religious services were broadcast on
the national radio network . Relations between the church and the
government are cordial, although there is some anti - Christian
sentiment among certain conservative Muslims .
The two Catholic archdioceses are centered at Tangier and Rabat.
In Tangier the Catholic population is mostly Spanish with some
French, Italians, and Portuguese. Religious orders of this archdiocese
operate several schools, teaching mostly in Spanish with a few hours
in Arabic each week, and run a few hospitals, three of which are under
direct control of Spanish Catholic orders . In the Rabat archdiocese
there are over 100 religious houses for contemplative and teaching
orders, about 75 Catholic schools, about 90 hospitals and welfare
institutions, and the internationally known Benedictine monastery at
Tiouliline, where Muslims and Christians are brought together for
study seminars. Whereas the foreign Christian population had been
greatly reduced through emigration, the number of clergy had
diminished only about 15 percent by 1965. At that time about 1,000
priests, monks, and nuns were still in the country. Organized
congregations are found in Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca, and Fes, and
other Christians are scattered in small groups throughout the
country.

97
CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In the early 1970s Moroccan social organization reflects the various

periods of the nation's modern history, primarily in a profound social
and cultural dislocation caused by the intervention of the French .
Two substantially unintegrated sectors stand side by side, one
dominating the life of the small but influential urban circles, the other
receiving the loyalty of the vast majority of the rural people and the
nonwealthy urbanites. A significant residue of the preprotectorate
tribal-based traditional society remains, as modified by the direct and
indirect results of French colonial policy, the most pregnant of which
was the creation of a French-educated elite. Developments since
independence have introduced additional elements and pressures,
continuing the pattern of relatively rapid social change characteristic
of Morocco during most of the twentieth century.
Although the nation's central symbol and religious authority, the
monarchy, has existed for centuries, the nation lacks a single system
of stratification and values binding all or even most traditional groups
into a unified whole . The countervailing ancient tradition of siba, or
tribal independence and dissidence, endures in many of the social
practices and attitudes of the outlying tribes, despite the political
centralization achieved by the French. Colonial policies, as well as
subsequent developments, have nevertheless begun to dissolve the
solidarity of the individual tribes and to modify their institutions (see
ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
The rapid, largely uncoordinated growth of commerce, industry,,
and the metropolitan centers began under the French ; the effects of
this uninterrupted development have restructured life both in cities
and in the countryside. New urban elites, partially, but not entirely,
based on the traditional ones, have assumed leadership. The sprawling
slums and workers' suburbs that have mushroomed nearly out of
control around most cities, particularly those on the coast, have
transformed tens of thousands of largely illiterate former tribesmen
into uneasy new urbanites, uncertain of their present environment
and its values and alienated from the spiritual and social heritage of
their tribes .
In addition, the mass media, increased ease of travel, contact with
urbanized tribesmen, and other factors have brought city thinking and
wants into the countryside, offering an outlet for the ambitious, an
99
escape for the disaffected, and a galaxy of unsettling new possibilities
and ideas for everyone . Although some tribes have retained a
considerable solidarity in the face of urban influences, government
policy has tended to speed the erosion of tribal organizations. During
the early 1960s the government undertook the reorganization of rural
groups into a number of communes, new local units founded on more
rational and modern criteria than the traditional tribes (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) . In some cases the
boundaries of the new communes coincide with those of preexisting
tribes, but more frequently they embody a new organization and at
least a partial realignment of relationships.
Both in the city and the countryside the family remains the core of
the social structure and the pivot of the value system. Arranged
marriage and parental authority retain much of their traditional
importance, although changing attitudes and conditions of life seem
to have insinuated desires for greater freedom and individualism,
especially among the modern educated and the urban young.

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

Traditional society consisted of relatively small groups, many of

which recognized no sovereignty larger than their own . The traditional
central government held sway over, raised armies in, and extracted
taxes from only a central core of tribes loyal to the sultanate, which
later became the monarchy (see ch . 3, Historical Setting; ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics). Beyond the boundary
of government territory, called the bilad al makhzan, stretched the
much larger, though more sparsely settled, bilad al siba, or land of
dissidence, the domain of the tribes effectively refusing fealty to the
central authorities. The boundary between the two territories
vacillated throughout history, and the tribes lived in a continuing
relation to the makhzan ( central government), even if it were only
opposition .
As a result, the country does not yet constitute a single society. No
integrating symbols exist for the country at large except for Islam
and, to some extent, the monarchy. The government attempts to
exploit in the interest of national unity what is probably the most
potent symbol recognized by both rural and urban elements, the king
as commander of the faithful, the representative and embodiment of
Islam. Both through his sharifian descent and his position as the head
of state, he personifies the leadership of the Muslim community and,
as such, can appeal to the vast majority of his subjects in the name of
the whole Moroccan people (see ch. 5, Religious Life; ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics).

100
Another important, though less potent, symbol is Arabic language
and culture. Up to 40 percent of the population, however, identify
themselves primarily as Berbers rather than Arabs (see ch. 4, Ethnic
Groups and Languages) . The Berbers , in turn, identify with a
multitude of tribal groups, rather than as one people. They are
organized into numerous different structures and respond to different
symbols .
A further significant split divides the townsman from the
countryman ; the former, including the recent urban migrant, is
relatively individualistic, whereas the latter belongs to a tribe and
thus is enmeshed in close and reciprocal relationships with a number
of relatives. In Morocco, as in other Muslim countries, the division
between town and country is relatively ancient, and the roles of
townsman and tribesman have long been clearly distinguished. A
cultural gap has for generations separated the two types of society,
and differences of dress, custom, livelihood, and loyalty, as well as
social barriers against close relationship and intermarriage, have
symbolized and enhanced these distinctions.
Before the advent of the Europeans, both city and country were
distinctive, but nevertheless complementary, parts of a single cultural
tradition. During the colonial period, however, members of influential
urban circles adopted elements of the radically foreign European
culture, alienating themselves both from the tribesmen and their less
affluent fellow townsmen . Urban social structure consequently shifted
away from traditional forms, triggering further change elsewhere in
society. Some authorities maintain , however, that the urban -rural gap,
although still quite marked, has been slightly diminished by the
tribesman’s growing knowledge of, and familiarity with, city life.
Tribal Society

As a general rule, rural society, both Berber and Arab, is tribal

society. A web of kinship relations binds the rural individual to his
native place, to his immediate kinsmen, and to ramifying groups of
his more distant kin. Authorities have noted, however, that these ties
are often highly elastic, allowing personal desires and affections to
outweigh the more formal requirements of structure in the formation
of relationships. Many people perceive and explain their society in
terms of the cultural ideal of segmentary organization, although that
ideal does not always guide behavior. Because Moroccan tribes are
independent and fractious, especially in the hills and among the
Berbers, details of organization, terminology, and specific custom vary
from region to region. In most places, however, the principles of
organization are the same.
The traditional tribe was usually based on the principle of the
segmentary lineage. That is to say, a group of kinsmen who trace

101
descent through the male line to a common ancestor mass themselves
into complementary but opposing groups of varying sizes to match the
circumstances and the relevant degree of relationship. The founding
ancestor, the presumed father of the entire tribe, also fathered a
specific number of historical sons, who in their turn produced a
known number of similarly prolific offspring, who continued the
process until it resulted after several generations in the present
members of the tribe, grouped in their small residential units or
hamlets. Each of the various members can trace his ancestry through
the preceding generations to the common founder, each more distant
ancestor gathering under the umbrella of his “people ” or “ sons ” an
increasingly larger number of descendants until all are encompassed
among the sons of the founder. Consequently, tribesmen visualize
themselves as the son of D, the grandson of B, the great-grandson of
A, joining at each level a progressively larger number of kinsmen
recognizing the same descent at that level and above (see fig. 8) .
The kinsmen who mass together as descendants of a common
ancestor at each level view themselves as a unit in opposition to all
other groups formed in that tribe at that same level. That is to say,
the grandsons of brothers form two groups in opposition to each other,
but they form one group in opposition to the descendants of the
brother of their common great -grandfather.
Fellow tribesmen conceptualize their relationships to one another,
often explicitly, by climbing up the generations to the nearest
common ancestor. All other relationships, as well as all ramifying
groups to which each belongs, are thus determined, and the exact
degree of formal relationship is fixed . Especially among sedentary
groups the segmentary scheme often closely parallels the spatial
distribution of neighboring residential groups, building from the
household, through the neighborhood, the hamlet, the village, and
finally to an entire valley or region .
Disputes between fellow tribesmen are ordinarily settled at the
appropriate level of complementary opposition . Because the
constituent opposing groups are implicit in the relationships of all
kinsmen but one's immediate household, disputes between kinsmen
rapidly escalate to the highest relevant level of opposition, involving
the members of the affected groups who may , depending on the
circumstances, either attempt a reconciliation or resort to various
means of conflict.
The structure of the tribe and relationships within it are
consequently fluid and contingent. An opponent for some purposes is
an ally for others. Individuals exploit the relatively wide leeway,
emphasizing the most beneficial social ties and maneuvering among
relationships. In addition, the complementary massing and opposition
of the segments at various levels constitute an important form of
social control within many tribes . Observers have referred to
102
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103
organizations of this type as “ tribes without government ” because
they lack a single uniform and organized system of authority and
control but nevertheless function without undue turmoil or conflict.
Between the ultimate levels of neighboring tribes there were
ordinarily no mediating genealogical connections . Consequently,
marabouts, or local holy men, often functioned as mediators, deriving
their authority from their reputations for exemplary holiness (see ch.
5, Religious Life ). This function was of course modified after the
establishment of central authority throughout the country .
The various self - conscious segments of a tribe call themselves by
names reflecting their relationships. The distinctive title is ordinarily
preceded by the Berber ait (people of) or the Arabic beni or awlad
( sons or children of). Sedentary segments are usually distinguished by
a geographic name ; and seasonal migrant and nomad groups, most
often by the name of the relevant ancestor. Each tribe consists,
therefore, of a series of named segments nesting one inside the other,
and each individual may recognize his group by any of a number of
different names, depending on the context.
This relativity of membership vividly expresses itself in the system
of personal names . Before the French no concept of a fixed
multicontextual personal name nor any permanent transmittable
surname existed. A small number of sophisticated persons required
such a name for travel documents, but the average tribesman had no
such need . ( For that matter, neither do numerous tribesmen at the
present day.) Within his group of personal acquaintances a man was
known by his own given name and by that of his father, for example,
Muhammad ben Hassan. If further clarification were needed the given
name of the grandfather might be added, to make, for example,
Muhammad ben Hassan ben Ali . Leaving his village or segment for a
neighboring one, a man takes on the name of his home, for example,
Muhammad ben Hassan al Hassuni (Muhammad of the people of
Hassun) . If he travels more widely he may take on the name of an
intermediate segment of his tribe, or if he ventures out of the
territories of his tribe or to the city, he is likely to assume the name of
the tribe as a whole and become, for example, Muhammad al
Srarhna .
Despite the fact that tribesmen believe that the genealogy by which
they explain their tribal organization accurately represents their
physical ancestry, authorities point out that such genealogies are not
in most cases historically correct. Sometimes, new persons or groups
are grafted to them . In many cases, modification and telescoping of
generations occur over the years ; only those ancestors defining socially
significant contemporary segments remain in memory, the others
falling away except in the case of lineages with pretenses to holiness.
In that case each generation of saintly ancestors strengthens the
group's claims to holiness (see ch. 5, Religious Life). Over a period of
104
years the genealogy of nonholy lineages tends to remain
approximately five generations deep.
The French, not fully understanding the fluid complexity of
Moroccan tribal organization but nevertheless trying to preserve
traditional forms while simultaneously establishing their authority
among the tribes, instigated significant social change in the rural
areas . Many of the tribes loyal to the makhzan, including the so
called jaysh (army) tribes who supplied levies of troops in lieu of
taxes, had had a more stable and centralized organization than the
tribes of the hinterland; in such cases protectorate officials integrated
the tribal leaders into their colonial bureaucracy. They hoped to
institutionalize some similar form of authority among the
uncentralized groups in order to render them more manageable. They
attempted to integrate any existing segment headmen, as well as the
marabouts, whom they took for local leaders rather than mediators,
into a formal structure of authority loyal to the protectorate. Many of
the holy men cooperated, seeing their prestige and that of their
religious followers enhanced. Nevertheless, their association with the
unpopular French authorities ultimately undercut their popular
appeal . As the independence movement developed, based heavily on
orthodox religious doctrine, the marabouts came to be widely seen as
procolonial collaborators and religious frauds ( see ch . 3, Historical
Setting; ch . 5, Religious Life ).
A number of tribes traditionally had councils or assemblies of
family heads or settlement representatives, often rather rudimentary
in form and usually representing little more authority than consensus.
Other tribes, however, had more developed systems of officials.
Nevertheless, the French attempt to incorporate existing institutions
into a colonial bureaucracy upset the equilibrium of tribal relations
and, in many cases, gave certain favored individuals and groups an
unaccustomed prestige and power . Despite these internal changes, the
outlines of most tribal organizations and the sentiments of most
tribesmen remained largely unchanged.
In some parts of the country, particularly the Sous region of the
south, fairly rapid consolidation of authority was underway even
before the French period . By the early twentieth century the
makhzan's control had been slowly spreading into that region for
some years. Powerful local authorities began to emerge, usually
exploiting the wealth, power, and influence they enjoyed as favorites
of the sultan. They became potent local leaders, sometimes posing as
agents of the sultan, sometimes as defenders of the tribes. Several of
these men, along with their families, quickly evolved into what the
French called grands seigneurs, or a quasi-feudal nobility. Probably
the most important of these new nobles was the house of Glaoui,
whose leader ruled Marrakech and the tribes of its hinterland. The
grands seigneurs, desiring stability, generally cooperated with the
105
French, whose support further entrenched them. This connection,
however, proved damaging during the independence movement, when
most of these families were discredited as collaborators and deprived
of their power. The importance of the grand seigneur system and the
tribal accommodations to it varied from region to region.
The most recent wave of change in tribal life resulted from the
reorganization of rural groups in the early 1960s. The government,
attempting to put rural life on a more efficient and manageable
footing than the old tribal system, organized the countryside into
units called communes, each composed of a number of hamlets and
small settlements and grouped around a natural center of
communication and social contact, such as a highway or souk
( market) (see ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ). Some of these new
entities coincide with the boundaries of former tribes, but many
combine elements of various traditional groups. As a consequence,
relationships and power in many rural areas have been realigned,
although some observers note that in many cases the longstanding
habits of tribal life have so far remained largely undisturbed. With
time, however, it is likely that the erosion of the affected tribal units
will intensify.
Urban influence has been steadily increasing in the countryside. For
decades a growing stream of migration to the cities has drained off
much of the rural population's natural increase (see ch. 2, Geography
and Population) . Many city migrants, particularly Berbers, retain ties
to their tribes, often keeping places in the tribal structure and rights
to land. Many men leave their families in the country, and many of
those who have moved definitively to the city visit their former homes
regularly. As a result, communication flows continually between the
city and the countryside.
The ability to earn money outside the tribal context has released
many young men from the authority of their senior relatives ,
weakening family and tribal structures. In addition, city customs and 1

practices are visible in some tribal groups. For example, the veiling of
women, traditional among urban groups but not among Berber
tribesmen, has become prevalent in some tribes of the Sous whose
men work in Casablanca as grocers . In a neighboring tribe whose men
work as miners, on the other hand, and thus do not come into contact
with urbanites, veiling is not practiced.

Urban Society

The cities of Morocco have grown explosively during the twentieth

century. At the beginning of that period there were only twenty-seven
places of more than 1,500 inhabitants ; by 1920 the number was forty;
by 1936, fifty -six; and by 1962 it had reached 107. Although figures
were not available in mid - 1971 , authorities assume that the number

106
was greater still . During the 1930s only three cities had populations
above 100,000 ; by 1968 they numbered eleven . Slightly over 30
percent of the population was urban in 1967, as opposed to a scant 8
to 9 percent in 1900. In only a few generations Casablanca had grown
from a small coastal town to a giant, bustling metropolitan
agglomeration, furiously building and industrializing and choked with
more rural migrants than it could adequately house or employ. This
growth is even more striking because it occurred during the exodus of
the Jewish and European communities, both much more heavily
urbanized than the Muslims ( see ch . 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).
From a social standpoint the frenetic pace of urban growth has
produced metropolises populated largely by countrypeople or, at best,
by persons very recently acclimated to city life. In 1952 only 6 percent
of Casablanca's household heads were natives of that city, and only 8
percent were natives of any urban place . One observer has called
Casablanca, the fastest growing center, an “ urbanizing machine,”
because it annually absorbs thousands of former tribesmen and rural
dwellers and transforms them and their children into city people,
teaching them the unfamiliar values and habits of urban life. Because
the migrants come from many tribes, regions, and social situations,
they have little shared culture or consciousness. A perceptive scholar
has called Casablanca “ a city without a past,” because of its lack of
common tradition .
Although these trends stand out most markedly in Casablanca, they
can be noticed in many other cities as well. The coastal cities have
experienced the heaviest migration, but the sprawling squatter
settlements, bidonvilles ( tin -can towns), housing new arrivals now
encircle most urban centers .
Because rapid urbanization coincided with the introduction and
widespread adoption of many aspects of European culture, the growth
of the cities represents more than new accretions of population.
Rather, the various sections of many cities were built at different
times, for different purposes, and for groups with widely differing
values and ways of life. One observer has described the juxtaposition
of the many modern European and traditional Muslim elements of
architecture and city planning as “jarring agglomerations.”
The traditional Moroccan city was, before the European arrival,
organized around the derb, or quarter. Several of these composed a
city, each consisting of a number of families that had lived in the
same place for several generations and that were bound by a feeling of
solidarity and common identification . Families of every economic
standing lived in the same quarter, the wealthy and notable assuming
leadership. Each quarter contained the services and institutions
needed for daily life — a small souk, a fountain, a communal oven, a
public bath, a mosque, and a Quranic elementary school ; life went on
107
in the context of the derb . Relationships were personal and intimate;
reputation and family honor, the major means of social control. The
Jewish population, if sizable, inhabited the mallah ; or separate
quarter. Each quarter had one or several leaders who represented it
before the city at large. To a very great extent, the derbs formed small
subsocieties functioning at an intimate level.
The economic backbone of city life was the large number of
artisans, craftsmen , and small merchants, each plying a trade
traditional in his family, often in association with sons, brothers,
cousins, or other kinsmen . The derbs, with their narrow winding
streets and closely placed houses, were often enclosed by walls or
separated by gates and were well adapted to the needs both of small
shopkeepers and traders running family businesses and of their
pedestrian customers.
The arrival of the Europeans disturbed the equilibrium of urban
life. Unaccustomed to the ways of life appropriate to traditional
Moroccan housing, they built “ new cities” along European lines, with
wide streets, private lawns, and separate houses of European plan . As
growing numbers of Moroccans began to emulate Europeans in dress,
habits, and way of life, they increasingly used European mass
produced products, much to the detriment of local artisans, many of
whom were driven out of business or into greatly reduced
circumstances. The automobile, quickly adopted by many well -to-do
Moroccans, proved singularly ill adapted to the streets of the old
quarters. This, along with the general allure of fashionable modernity,
attracted many of the affluent out of their homes in the derbs and
into European -style housing in the new sections. As a result, the
quarters lost much of their traditional leadership, and residential
segregation by class and income became important for the first time.
The European -style houses were better adapted to the European
style of life increasingly popular among prominent families. The
madina, or old city, gradually became a neighborhood for the poor. In
addition, the mallahs began to break up because the Jews, more than
any other group of Moroccans, availed themselves of French education
and succeeded in modern professional and economic pursuits.
A continuing housing shortage destroyed most of what remained of
derb solidarity in the larger cities, especially Casablanca . With the
exodus of Europeans at independence, large quantities of formerly
European housing were opened to Moroccans, scattering persons from
the various quarters throughout the city. Their places in the quarters
were rapidly taken by the flood of rural migrants, usually relatively
new to the city and unknown in their new quarters. In place of the old
residential divisions, based primarily on ethnic background, the most
thoroughgoing distinctions between residential neighborhoods were
those of class in 1971 .

108
The new governmental and economic systems, introduced whole, or
in the words of one observer, “ parachuted ” by the French into
Moroccan society, opened expansive new opportunities for the
minority equipped with French education (see ch . 4, Ethnic Groups
and Languages) . Although Europeans staffed most modern
institutions before independence, the demand for trained Moroccans
became insatiable for a few years after 1956. Those able to assume
important posts in the modern economic, governmental, and cultural
structure immediately constituted a powerful new bourgeois elite.
Recruited both from prominent families and from ambitious youths of
modest social origin, the new middle class legitimates its recently
attained social position by conspicuous consumption of expensive
European -style consumer goods, such as swimming pools, lavish
modern villas, fashionable clothing, and contemporary furniture.
The introduction of modern institutions drastically increased
opportunities for social mobility through education and technical
expertise; the relatively static traditional system had provided few
possibilities for social movement. Nevertheless, by the 1970s the job
market had become glutted with a far greater surplus of graduates,
particularly in the liberal arts, than it could absorb into acceptable
white -collar work. Although pure science also enjoyed great prestige,
technical and engineering fields, especially those with manual
overtones, attracted relatively few candidates because of the
traditional disdain for working with one's hands. Consequently,
although French and other European technicians held important
technical posts for which trained Moroccans could not be found, the
schools continued to produce applicants for white -collar positions that
did not exist (see ch. 7, Education, Communication, and the Arts and
Sciences) . In mid- 1971 many young people feared that the status for
which their education was to prepare them would prove illusory, along
with the opportunities for social mobility to which they believed
independence entitled them . Much of this frustration found
expression in agitation and criticism against the educational system
and the language policy (see ch. 7, Education, Communication, and
the Arts and Sciences; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).
Because of these changes many of the older traditional elite find
themselves stripped of the influence and, often, of the income they
formerly enjoyed. A class of religious dignitaries and families claiming
descent from the Prophet formerly occupied the social pinnacle, along
with wealthy landowning and merchant families (see ch . 5, Religious
Life) . Although devotion to Islam remains strong, some traditional
religious teachings and institutions have lost prestige with the
advance of European culture and the spread of French education (see
ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).
Traditional Islamic intellectuals adapted only reluctantly and
uneasily to the challenge of European science, which has great
109

1
prestige, particularly among the educated young (see ch. 7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences) . Muslim learning had
long assumed that the Quran, as God's complete and final revelation,
contained all knowledge. Intellectual activity consisted primarily of
the examination of the Quran by deductive means, in addition to
theological and ethical studies. The inductive experimental method of
Western science, assuming as it does the possibility of unknown and
unforeseen results, was profoundly foreign to the traditional outlook.
Assured that the profane knowledge of infidels had little value
compared to God's revelation, Islamic scholars nevertheless
grudgingly had to recognize its undeniably impressive results. As a
consequence, while science gained ground among the modern
educated, the traditional Islamic authority, initially slow to react, lost
ground. At first, however, the scientific method was little understood;
when European education was introduced Moroccan students found
classical literary authors and thinkers, such as Cicero and Jean
Baptiste Racine, far more congenial than empiricists, such as René
Descartes and Sir Isaac Newton . Among the sciences, mathematics,
the least experimental, first gained wide acceptance. Nevertheless, the
scientific method's widespread acceptance and prestige is symbolized
by the king's statement in 1971 that Morocco aspired to participate in
space exploration along with other nations . Many modernist
intellectuals are attempting to integrate the teachings of Islam with
modern science .
Although industrial technology provided enviable opportunities for
some, it did not offer them to all. As mass production replaced
handicrafts, many skilled artisans, who formerly occupied respectable
positions in the community, were reduced to factory hands. Others
managed to stay in business by changing their style or producing for
the growing tourist trade. The government attempts to nourish the
artisan tradition and find it markets abroad , but much of the work
has become decorative rather than central to economic life (see ch . 11,
Character and Structure of the Economy) . Related changes occurred
in the rural areas cultivated by the colons (French settlers in
Morocco ) where tribesmen became laborers for commercial farms.
Although some rural migrants have lost all roots in the traditional
culture, others exploit their tribal connections to help in adjusting to
city life. The serious shortage of jobs for both educated and
uneducated persons prevents most new arrivals from finding work on
their own (see ch. 2, Geography and Population) . In most cases those
who succeed in getting an industrial position do so through a network
of fellow tribesmen or relatives already employed in industry. Often
whole sections or departments of factories are staffed by men of the
same tribe, village, or region , all of whom were either hired by a
kinsman or friend working as a foreman or recommended by an
established employee .

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In some cases members of certain tribes specialize in certain types
of city work. For example, Shluh groups of the Sous region own small
grocery businesses in Casablanca on a family basis; various male
members of the family spend time in the city working in the business
and then return to the tribal home for a period. Members of the
Zenaga tribes work in cleaning services in Casablanca and as waiters
in Meknès. Tribesmen of the Tiznit plain become electricians and
mechanics, and those of the region of Mogador constitute a high
percentage of phosphate miners.
Many new arrivals who are unable to find any settled work swell
the ranks of the underemployed , performing tasks of little or no
economic value. Large numbers of makeshift peddlers crowd the
sidewalks of every city selling snacks, trinkets, and other objects for
very little profit. These individuals, although scarcely supporting
themselves, nevertheless avoid the demeaning admission that they
have no trade.
The disintegration of traditional social forms afflicts many new
urbanites. Observers have noted that men who leave their wives and
children in a tribal home, which they visit periodically, appear to
enjoy better personal adjustment than those who move their families
to town, although the former are less often transformed into
permanent urbanites. Some succeed in maintaining a position in their
tribe, marrying within it, and keeping up old relationships. Often
members of the same family or tribe live together in the city slums,
and family bonds endure for some years. Usually, however, these ties
ultimately break down, as migrants, particularly those who came with
their immediate families, integrate themselves into city life.
Nevertheless , the transition from the the personal,
personal , intimate
relationships of the countryside to the impersonal and bureaucratic
ones of the city is traumatic and difficult for many. They miss the
guidance and control of the small community and feel adrift in an
individualistic value system they do not fully understand .
Unaccustomed to being surrounded by strangers , many try to
establish personal relationships by various means . The practice of
bakshish, usually interpreted by Westerners as a bribe, often
represents an attempt, through a gift, to place a formerly impersonal
relationship on a personal footing. An interesting survival of the old
personalism in the city is the many little shops with small, personally
known clientele and prices determined through bargaining, which
most people seem to prefer to the large, impersonal, fixed -price stores
of European type.
The intense communal life of the old society expressed and
nourished itself in community-wide festivals and holy days . Because
they are socially diffuse and fragmented, Morocco's cities largely lack
celebrations of this kind, along with the identity and solidarity they
vividly affirm . Some individuals attempt, usually without success, to
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continue the traditional observances (see ch. 5, Religious Life ). In
place of the old participation rituals, large crowds gather for spectator
sports, especially soccer, which, according to observers, substitute
inadequately for the traditional fetes and represent the meager social
and spiritual solidarity found in the cities.

THE INDIVIDUAL , THE FAMILY , AND THE SEXES

Social life in Morocco centers on the family. The household is

composed of kinsmen, and among the tribes family ties ramify into
tribal structure. The individual's loyalty to his family overrides most
other obligations . Ascribed status often outweighs personal
achievements in regulating social relationships. One’s honor and
dignity are tied to the good repute of his kin group and especially to
that of its women .
Sexual segregation is basic to Moroccan social life, and sex is one of
the most important determinants of social status. Men dominate
women in most aspects of life. Although the systematic seclusion of
women is rarely practiced, men and women constitute largely
separate subsocieties, each with its own values, attitudes, and
perceptions of the other. The character of separation varies ; it is
strictest among the traditional urban middle class and most flexible
among tribesmen. Nevertheless, all groups observe it to some extent,
and the lives of men and women often intersect only in the home.

Family and Household

Moroccans reckon kinship patrilineally, and the household is based
on blood ties between men. Ideally, it consists of a man, his wife or
wives, his single and married sons with their wives and children, his
unmarried daughters, and possibly such other relatives as a widowed
or divorced mother or sister. At the death of the father each son
ideally establishes his own household to begin the cycle again.
Because of the centrality of family life, it is assumed that all persons
will marry when they reach the appropriate age; in addition, most
divorced and many widowed persons remarry. In most areas adult
status is bestowed only on married men and, often, only on fathers.
Traditionally, the individual was expected to subordinate his
personal interests to those of his family and considered himself a
member of a group whose importance outweighed his own . In mid
1971 it was still not common for persons to live apart from a family
group. Grown children ordinarily lived with parents or relatives until
marriage; for a girl of respectable family to do otherwise would be
unthinkable. Despite the closeness of family ties, however, there still
existed a reasonable leeway for individuals to maneuver within their
status positions, exploiting relationships to their best advantage.
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Marriage is a family, rather than a personal, affair. Because the
sexes ordinarily do not mix socially, young men and women have few
or no acquaintances among the opposite sex. Parents arrange
marriages for their children, finding a mate through either their own
social contacts or a professional matchmaker. In some regions — for
example, the central High Atlas - unions between parallel cousins, or
the children of brothers, are preferred . In such cases the young men of
a girl's lineage have first claim on her hand and may effectively
prevent her marriage to an outsider if one of them wishes her instead.
In other areas, such as the Rif Massif, no particular preference or
pattern exists, except that incest is prohibited and matches tend to
occur between families of similar economic standing.
In Islam, marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament.
Consequently, representatives of the bride negotiate a marriage
agreement with those of the groom . Although the future husband and
wife must, according to law, give their consent, they usually take no
part in the arrangements. At times a young man might suggest to his
parents the girl he would like to marry ; girls usually have no such
privileges. The contract establishes the terms of the union and, if they
are broken, outlines appropriate recourse. Special provisions inserted
into the standard contract become binding on both parties to the
union .
Islam gives to the husband far greater discretion and leeway than to
the wife. For example, he may take up to four wives at one time,
provided he can treat them equally; a woman can have only one
husband at a time. A man can divorce his wife by simply repeating “ I
divorce thee” three times before witnesses; a woman can initiate
divorce only with difficulty. Any children of the union belong to the
husband's family and stay with him in case of divorce. The husband,
of course, exercises authority in the home. Men expect virginity of
their brides, but no such expectation exists for bridegrooms. The
Moroccan dialect distinguishes between virgins and women, the latter
carrying a distinct connotation of sexual experience; it is assumed
that a “ woman ” is married.
Nevertheless, despite the seeming stringency of Islamic marriage
law, wives manage to exercise influence and protect themselves from
mistreatment through a number of informal means. The code of
personal status, for example, provides that a man may not take an
additional wife if injustice to his existing spouse would result; it does
not specify, however, who is to judge the likelihood of injustice.
Moreover, the husband may not divorce his wife completely at once.
The three repetitions of “ I divorce thee” must come at different
times, during which reconciliation is possible, and he must make a
conciliatory gift of money to her at the time of divorce. Furthermore,
during her marriage a wife has the right to housing apart from that of
the husband's parents and in a neighborhood respectable enough to
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provide the witnesses to any mistreatment she might need in a
divorce suit of her own .
In addition , stipulations and conditions of the marriage contract
can work to strengthen the wife's position. At the time of marriage
the bridegroom and his family make to the bride's family a
considerable payment of money, usually collected from a wide circle
of relatives and friends to whom obligations are thereby incurred . In
many cases the bride's family insists that a portion of the bride-price
be deferred, to be payable on demand or at divorce. In that case,
divorce or displeasing the wife, for example, through marriage to an
additional wife, entails for the husband the payment of a substantial
cash sum in order to placate or rid himself of his present wife, as well
as a similar substantial payment to remarry. During the 1960s bride
prices rose appreciably, from the equivalent of a few hundred United
States dollars at the beginning of the decade to US$ 1,000 or more by
its end.
The bride comes to the marriage with a dowry from her father. This
money is spent on the bride's trousseau and the furniture and
equipment for the new household. Such household goods belong to the
wife and leave the marriage with her. In most cases the bride's family
does not permit the exact items composing the dowry to be
enumerated, so that anything acquired after marriage may also be
construed as belonging to her. Therefore, on divorce, the husband may
stand to lose all his household goods except for his personal clothing
and tools. Despite the weapons at her disposal, however, the wife
ordinarily remains by far the weaker partner to the union and by far
the more dependent.

Men and Women

The social milieu in which the family lives significantly affects the
circumstances of the wife. In the countryside and among the urban
poor, women fulfill important economic functions without which the
family could not exist. Many women of poor urban families work in
factories or elsewhere, and countrywomen help in all types of
farmwork. As a result women occupy a position of relative importance
and enjoy relative freedom , especially among the Berber tribes.
Although casual social contact between the sexes of the type common
in the West is not known, segregation of the sexes is much less
pronounced than in the cities. Among the urban middle class,
however, women fulfill fewer and less important economic functions.
Artisan and merchant families earn their living from the skills of the
men , and women make little contribution. Their responsibilities are
most often limited to the household .
In such circumstances it is more likely that women are confined to
the home and their social contacts and interests limited to an

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exclusively feminine sphere. The houses of financially comfortable
urban families traditionally contained distinct men's and women's
areas : the reception room where the men of the family entertained
male guests, and the women's quarters, from which adult males other
than relatives and servants were excluded . Unlike their rural
counterparts, who moved freely in the fields and villages, urban
women walked in the street discreetly in veiled pairs, avoiding cafés,
souks, and other public gathering places, as well as any social contact
with men . Some observers have noted that women of well - to -do
bourgeois families, who have few material responsibilities and have
little part in, or contact with, the outside world, tend to become
“ overfeminized,” frivolous, and inattentive and to lack concentration
and purpose. Among the rural and urban poor, however, girls assume
responsibilities for housework and younger siblings at an early age.
Moroccans assume, often explicitly, that men and women are
different types of creatures . Women are thought to be weaker than
men in mind, body, and spirit; more sensual; less disciplined; and in
need of protection , both from their own impulses and from the
excesses of strange men . The honor of the men of a family, which is
easily damaged and nearly irreparable, depends on the conduct of
their women, particularly of sisters and daughters; consequently,
women are expected to be circumspect, modest, and decorous and
their virtue above reproach . The slightest implication of unavenged
impropriety, especially if publicly acknowledged, could irreparably
destroy the family's honor. Female virginity before marriage and
sexual fidelity afterward are essential to its maintenance. In case they
discover a transgression , the men are traditionally bound to punish
the offending woman .
Arab societies generally value men more highly than women , and
both sexes concur in this estimation . Their upbringing quickly
impresses on girls that they are inferior to men and must cater to
them and upon boys that they are entitled to demand the care and
solicitude of women . The birth of a boy occasions great celebration,
whereas that of a girl does not. Failure to produce sons can be grounds
for divorcing a wife or taking a second. Barren women , therefore, are
often desperately eager to bear sons and visit the shrines of saints and
marabouts to seek fertility (see ch. 5, Religious Life).
Most women , except those of the more sophisticated urban families,
marry in their middle teens men who, on the average, are ten years
older than themselves. The young bride then goes to the household,
village, or neighborhood of the bridegroom's family, where she may be
a stranger and where she lives under the constant critical surveillance
of her mother - in -law . A great deal of familial friction centers on the
difficult relationship between mother-in-law and daughter- in - law .
A woman begins to gain status, security, and satisfaction in her
husband's family only when she produces males. Therefore, mothers

115
love and favor their sons, ordinarily nursing them longer than
daughters. In later life the relationship between mother and son often
remains very warm and intimate, whereas the father is a more distant
figure. Observers suggest that women compensate for the emotional
lack in their often rather impersonal marriages and submerged adult
lives through their relationships with their sons, who often remain as
adults in or near the parental household. The wife who enters such a
home finds herself in a distinctly secondary position. Furthermore,
her own parents are eager to have a girl married as soon as she reaches
puberty to forestall any mishap to her virginity; she therefore is not
encouraged to remain in her own family home.

Changing Values
Relations within the family and between the sexes, along with all
other aspects of Moroccan society , have begun to show notable and
accelerating change. The European settlers, admired and envied
figures during much of their colonial tenure, embodied a set of
familial and sexual values, attitudes, and customs much different
from those traditional in the country . As education , the mass media,
and European organizations began to percolate these ideas through
the society, new perceptions and, to some extent, new practices began
to appear, particularly among those Moroccans with the most
European contact.
The traditional ideal of the polygynous extended family had never
been widely practiced ; reliable estimates place the number of
polygynous workers and countrypeople at under 5 percent and among
lower middle-class townsmen at approximately 10 percent .
Nevertheless, the values permitting and encouraging this form of
family were widespread. Contact with European notions of “ modern ”
life have, however, begun to strip them of their appeal, substituting a
desire for a more Western style of family life.
Increased opportunities for mobility, both social and physical, have
undermined the old familial ties and the values that subordinated the
individual to his kin group. Especially among the educated young, a
growing individualism has appeared. Many young people prefer to set
up their own households at marriage rather than live with parents,
and the modern - educated view polygyny with scorn . At the same time,
social security has lessened the dependence of the aged on their
children and other relatives .
Among the most marked changes are those concerning women . The
position and rights of women have become problematic under the
influence of European models. Young women , especially in the cities,
have begun to exercise greater freedom and equality than in the past,
although the guidelines of traditional practice still broadly govern
their lives. Western feminine fashion has appeared on city streets

116
although not in its more extreme manifestations. Women have in
recent decades begun to participate more in activities and interests
outside the home .
During the political crises of the early 1950s that preceded
independence, women for the first time took part in political action .
Some authorities attribute this to the influence of radio , which
brought political questions into the home and to women's attention.
European movies have also been influential, especially among the
young; the greater freedom they depict and their emphasis on
romantic love as a basis for marriage have raised basic questions.
Despite masculine opposition, a number of women of respectable
families have taken jobs in the modern sector. Many of these are poor
women who work out of economic necessity, but a growing number
come from financially secure families. Small numbers of women hold
responsible posts in government, the courts, research, and other fields.
Nevertheless, most end their careers at marriage ; masculine resistance
remains strong even in the new middle class.
Women enjoy increased opportunities for education , although
facilities are limited in many country districts (see ch . 7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences) . Observers have noted
that educated women tend to convey fewer superstitious folk beliefs
to their children and therefore can aid modernization even if they do
not enter the work force. They point out, however, that because few
countrywomen attend school, a substantial reservoir of these beliefs
remain, especially among the poor, which are reinstilled in each
generation .
City girls who attend school are not so closely chaperoned as
formerly, although they rarely go out with friends in the evening.
They also tend to marry later, often after working for several years .
Some authorities also have noted a tendency to want fewer children
than was common in the past, paralleling the desire for greater
freedom for women .
Nevertheless, despite the liberalizing trends apparent in many
areas, much of the tradition remains. The king symbolizes the
national ambivalence on the woman issue. On the one hand, he
encourages his sisters to lead the emancipation movement. Princess
Lala Fatima heads the National Union of Moroccan Women, founded
in 1969 to encourage social, cultural, and legal advancement of
women. On the other hand, the king's wife lives in seclusion, taking
no part in public life and receiving no mention in the press. Social,
political, and intellectual trends point toward a further easing of
restrictions on women but within the framework of the deeply
ingrained Muslim tradition.

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CHAPTER 7
EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, AND THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES

Since independence, Morocco has been striving to become a

modern nation but at the same time assert its Arabic -Islamic cultural
identity. Official statements have stressed the government's intention
to extend the benefits of scientific and technological achievements to
broad masses of the population. Simultaneously, policies related to
creative activities and to the transmission of knowledge stressed the
values of the Islamic-Arabic tradition . In 1957 the University of
Rabat, the country's first modern institution of higher learning, was
founded ; legal provisions for universal, free education on the primary
level were promulgated in 1962; and, during the 1970s, facilities for
graduate technical and professional training were being expanded.
King Hassan II had voiced the hope that his country might one day
join other nations in the exploration of outer space.
While establishing institutions and adopting policies to implement
modernization, the government was actively stimulating interest in
the Arab - Islamic heritage through the rejuvenation of the traditional
Quranic schools and through emphasis on cultural subjects in the
school curricula . Numerous programs on religious and literary topics
were conveyed to the population through the public radio and
television network. The government newspaper reminded its readers
daily of the value of the Arab linguistic tradition. Meanwhile,
government agencies responsible for the implementation of cultural
policies focused their attention on archaeology, ethnic crafts and
folklore, and the restoration of historic sites. In the first two grades of
public primary schools, Arabic was substituted for French as the
language of instruction.
The government's efforts to establish a general, free public school
system with uniform curricula and accessible to all have progressed
since independence, although the expansion of facilities has been
outpaced by the rapid population growth . Throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s, education was the subject of intensive public interest and
sometimes of acrimonious political debate. Students and parents alike
voiced insistent demands for increased opportunities for education
leading to future employment and economic security. Because of
limited resources and its overwhelmingly academic and theoretical
orientation , the school system could not fully respond to these
119
demands nor to the pressing national needs for technically and
professionally trained personnel. In most cases secondary schools and
universities turned out graduates in classical, humanistic studies
seeking jobs in already overcrowded fields of employment. At the
same time there was a severe shortage of the technicians and
scientists required to implement economic development plans . Other
problems in secondary education stemmed from the introduction, in
1958, of Arabic as the teaching language in the early primary grades ;
without an early basis in French, many students subsequently found
themselves unable to cope with more advanced courses given in
French at the secondary level.
The government and leaders of public opinion have also been
concerned with diminishing the residual French influence in
education and intellectual expression dating from the colonial period.
In 1970, however, French was still prominently used in the modern
economic sector, making proficiency in that language a prerequisite
for employment . French teachers conducted classes in many
Moroccan -run secondary schools because of the shortage of trained
Moroccan teachers, and the French University and Cultural Mission
continued to operate a number of private schools attended by children
of the urban elite . In the institutions of higher learning, foreign ,
primarily French, professors often outnumbered their Moroccan
colleagues. Works of fiction, literary criticism, and articles on science
and technology were mainly written in French . The government has,
therefore, proceeded at a conservative pace in substituting Arabic for
French as the language of instruction in public schools despite
persistent pressure from both the left-wing opposition and traditional
groups to hasten the change.
The government owned and operated both the radio and television
facilities. Radio, the most influential of the communications media,
was widely used to reach the masses of the population, including the
often illiterate Berber-speaking tribesmen in the mountain areas who
constituted about 40 percent of the population. Many of the programs
dealt with various aspects of the country's artistic and intellectual
heritage, including the Islamic tradition . They also constantly
reminded the audience of the role of the king as an integrating symbol
of cultural unity and religious authority .
Television facilities have been placed at government expense in
many public areas, but in 1970 the network covered only limited parts
of the country. Film production, also under government auspices, was
limited mostly to documentaries on cultural topics. Films imported
from Western countries have played a central role in presenting
customs and values of technologically advanced societies to a growing
segment of the population .
The privately owned press, comprising newspapers and periodicals
in both French and Arabic, addressed itself to the politically aware,
120
educated urban elite. Apart from a small group of French and Spanish
owned and managed newspapers, they were primarily journals of
opinion, concentrating on economic and political issues and often
vehemently critical of government policies and officials. Government
policy toward these newspapers during the late 1960s and early 1970s
was increasingly restrictive . Bans and seizures were common,
although there has been no prepublication censorship.
Three dailies were owned and published by French and Spanish
enterprises. The two French dailies, providing effective news coverage
and avoiding political commentary, offered keen competition to the
Moroccan -owned newspapers but were permitted to publish despite
vigorous protests by Moroccan newspapermen and by the political
opposition against the continued existence of the foreign - owned
press .
Fes, site of the ancient Karaouine University ( founded in A.D. 859) ,
is the center of traditional studies in Islamic theology and law
pursued by a small group of scholars . Modern thought dealing with
contemporary social and economic problems and with the role of
Islam in a modernizing society is reflected in political essays in
Arabic written by prominent journalists and other intellectuals.

EDUCATION

Background
Before the establishment of the protectorate in 1912, education was
organized within the framework of traditional Islamic institutions.
Young children attended Quranic schools at the local mosques where
they were taught recitations of the Quran and in some cases the
rudiments of reading and writing. Religious colleges (madaaris; sing.,
madrasa) in the cities taught Islamic theology, rhetoric, and Arabic
grammar. Scholars from far and near flocked to the ancient Karaouine
University at Fes to study Islamic law and letters.
The French established a modern school system primarily to serve
the resident French population. Curricula, examinations, academic
standards, and teacher certification closely resembled those in France.
Admission of Moroccan children to these schools was not encouraged,
although during the 1920s the French provided some schools for young
Moroccans to help educate an elite for the protectorate
administration. Moroccan nationalists in 1938 began a movement to
establish private schools for Moroccan children, with instruction in
Arabic. Yielding to the growing demand for public education, the
French during the mid- 1940s opened some Franco -Moroccan primary
schools and began to admit Moroccans to some French secondary
schools. The number of Moroccan children in these schools, however,

121
was negligible. At independence only about 10 percent of all school
age children were enrolled in school .
After independence in 1956 the government determined to
consolidate the diverse types of schools into a single national public
system and to make education accessible to a broad segment of the
population . Official goals also called for the inclusion of social science
subjects adapted to the Moroccan environment, the use of Arabic as
the language of instruction , and the eventual replacement of French
speaking foreign teachers by Moroccans. The first step of the official
program was to offer free primary education to as many children as
practicable and to make Arabic the language of instruction in the first
two grades. Secondary schooling was to provide personnel for the
professions and for the civil service.
The extension of education to a rapidly growing number of children
each year required an extensive school-building program and the
temporary use of makeshift classroom facilities. Many severely
underqualified, but Arabic -speaking, teachers were hired, and
extensive use was made of so -called monitor teachers who had had
only a primary education. Facilities were badly overcrowded, and the
teachers were unable to provide the academic and linguistic
grounding necessary for secondary schooling.
By the late 1950s academic standards had deteriorated markedly,
evoking protest from middle and lower class parents who felt that
poor schooling, especially in respect to French -language training,
impaired the chances of their children for finding white-collar
employment. Government officials and experts, many of whom had
attended French schools, felt that the abandonment of the high
academic standards of the French system was not in the national
2
interest .
During the early 1960s two high -level commissions—the Royal
Commission for Educational Reform and its successor, the Higher
Board of Education-were established to deal with educational
problems and requirements of the expanding population. Both
indicated the need for unification of the school system and for
continued expansion of educational opportunities but recommended a
slowdown in the rate at which the language of instruction in the
schools was being switched from French to Arabic .
Economic development plans during the 1960s called for an
intensive construction program of primary school facilities, but the
demand exceeded the rate of construction . Compulsory primary
education, promulgated by law in 1962, has been only partially
implemented-mostly in the urban areas-although enrollment
figures have increased rapidly.
The low quality of academic achievement in the 1960s, however,
caused the government to establish uniform standards for promotion,
to institute entrance examinations for secondary schools, and to
122
determine prerequisites for the award of diplomas and certificates.
Curricula were revised to strengthen and expand Moroccan cultural
subjects. At the same time there was a return to the use of French in
teaching mathematics and science in the primary grades, and the
number of hours of instruction in French was increased. Technical
and science courses were developed for secondary school programs
but, because of the lack of qualified teachers, few institutions could
offer them .

Official measures to upgrade academic quality evoked widespread

dissatisfaction among students, who feared their inability to meet the
standards and therefore subsequently to obtain a civil service job. In
March 1965 students staged massive protest demonstrations in
Casablanca, which turned into widespread rioting against
unemployment and high prices (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
Throughout the 1960s the question of the use of Arabic in the school
system was of crucial importance and the subject of strong and
persistent public controversy. Students continued to have difficulty in
making the transition from a primary education given partially in
Arabic to French -language secondary schooling. Secondary school
classrooms were crowded with repeaters, and an increasing number of
secondary school students leaving before graduation were unable to
find employment. At the same time, dissatisfaction among students
was growing because of the inadequate number of scholarships,
changes of prerequisites for technical secondary school certificates,
and reorganization of teacher training.
Widespread student unrest in the early spring of 1970 disrupted
teaching in many secondary schools and institutions of higher
learning. In May of that year an assembly of students, parents,
teachers, and government officials was called by King Hassan at the
mountain resort of Ifrane to attempt a resolution of the major causes
of public dissatisfaction . No specific measures were agreed upon, but
the conference provided a forum for the restatement of official
policies, including those governing the use of Arabic in the schools.

The School System

In 1970 some 53 percent of children seven to eleven years of age

attended primary schools. Of the age group comprising twelve- to

eighteen -year -old youths, about 17 percent were enrolled in the lower
cycle; and some 4.7 percent, in the upper cycle of secondary schools.
The school system included modern secular public institutions,
traditional religious schools, and private schools. Traditional religious
schools were part of the public school system ; they served no more
than 40,000 students on the primary and secondary levels in 1970, or
about 2.8 percent of the total enrollment.
123
Although their enrollments were declining, private schools
continued to attract some students, especially in the cities . In 1970
some 2.5 percent of primary school students and about 10 percent of
secondary students attended private schools. Because of difficulties in
providing sufficient public facilities and teachers, the government has
permitted private schools to operate despite its commitment to a
single public school system . Some such schools, notably those in
Casablanca, have received financial aid from the municipal
government in the form of grants and teacher salary supplements.
Some private schools were closely controlled by the government.
French private schools, however, had a considerable degree of
autonomy in accordance with provisions of cultural agreements
between Morocco and France .

Administration

In early 1971 public education was under the jurisdiction of the

Ministry of Primary Education and the Ministry of Higher,
Secondary , and Technical Education . Each was responsible for school
inspection, curricula, administration of examinations, teacher
placement, and the issuance of official tests in the respective school
levels under their jurisdiction.
The ministries shared a planning division in charge of research and
statistical operations related to educational planning. The twelve field
offices of the Planning Division studied local educational needs,
furnished statistical data on the school age population of their
respective regions, and estimated local needs for physical facilities.
The Higher Board of Education, a top-level consultative and
planning body, was responsible for drafting policies on educational
reform , including modernization of vocational and professional
training. The board's permanent members included high -ranking
government officials in education, economic planning, and public
service; representatives from the ministries ; deans of institutions of
higher learning; and members of the Education Commission of the
House of Representatives. Appointed members included teachers from
primary and secondary private schools, university professors, and
students.
Local authorities in each of the nineteen provinces and in the two
urban prefectures had limited responsibility in the administration of
education. There was, for example, some local participation in school
construction, notably in Casablanca. Local initiative in matters
affecting educational policies is rare although , during the 1960s,
members of delegations representing local citizens have at times
expressed themselves vigorously in matters of scholarships, curricula,
and the assignment of children to various schools.
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Finance

In 1970 the budget of the ministries of education totaled DH670

million (5.06 dirham equal US$1—see Glossary ). Another DH38
million was earmarked for education and training programs in the
budgets of the Ministry of Agriculture and National Development and
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
Current expenditures of the ministries of education during the
1960s accounted for more than 20 percent of the government's
recurrent budget. Taking into account educational expenditures of
other ministries and official agencies, the proportion exceeded 23
percent in 1971. The Five Year Plan ( 1968–72) earmarked 39 percent
of capital expenditures for education to primary schooling, 53 percent
to secondary schooling, and 8 percent to institutions of higher
learning
A major portion-about 80 percent-of education funds was
devoted to salaries; the rest, to scholarships, boarding expenditures,
and teaching materials. Expenditures in 1971 reflected a 20-percent
increase in teachers' salaries. High personnel costs on the secondary
and upper school levels were related to the presence of many foreign
teachers who received substantially higher pay than their Moroccan
counterparts.
External sources complementing official budgets included funds
from France, which contributed the equivalent of US$6 million in
1970. Between 1960 and 1970 the United Nations Development
Program made available more than US$8 million for the
establishment of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning.
In 1971 a loan equivalent to US$8.5 million was extended by the
International Development Association (IDA) for upgrading scientific
and technical training in secondary education and the expansion of
postsecondary -training institutions, teacher training, and educational
research.

Preprimary and Primary Education

In October 1968 King Hassan launched a program to rejuvenate the
system of Quranic schools, where young children are given religious
and moral instruction, apparently in part to relieve some of the
pressure on the standard primary system. Attendance was to be made
compulsory for children between five and seven years of age ;
completion of the two - year program officially was recognized as the
equivalent of the first primary grade. The king emphasized the
importance of Quranic schools in instilling at an early age Islamic
spiritual and moral values and fostering awareness in Arabic linguistic
and cultural traditions. Urging all parents to enroll their children, the
king stated that one of the important functions of the modern

125
Quranic school was to offer day care to the children of working
parents.
The curriculum of the six -hour schoolday had been drafted by the
Ministry of Primary Education, which also supplied the texts for
instruction . The subjects included history and teachings of Islam,
Islamic reading and writing, and civics, to which much importance
was attached. The traditional custom of reciting the Quran by rote
was continued. The schools were located in buildings and rooms used
formerly by the traditional institutions operated in conjunction with
the mosque and were equipped by the respective communities, which
also appointed the teacher and paid him a nominal fee. Data on the
number of Quranic schools and on their enrollment in 1971 were
lacking.
Primary school enrollment during the late 1960s had been relatively
stagnant and, between 1968 and 1969, there had been a slight decrease
in the number of pupils attending primary schools. In 1969 seven out
of a total of sixteen provinces reporting showed a decrease in the
number of primary pupils; increases were noted in the remaining
nine .
Enrollment in primary schools in 1970 totaled 1,142,810; girls
accounted for about 33 percent of the total. Attrition rates were high,
especially in the first grade; repeater rates tended to rise in the upper
grades. In 1968, 121 out of every 1,000 students left school after the
first grade, and 505 out of every 1,000 had to repeat the fifth grade.
Primary schooling was open to children seven years of age and was
offered in a five -year course, although only 6 percent of the rural
schools offered the full five -year program . The Certificate of Primary
Studies, a prerequisite for entrance into secondary school, was earned
at the end of the fifth grade.
In 1971 , after extensive public controversy regarding the pace at
which Arabic was being substituted for French as the language of
instruction in primary grades, all subjects were being taught in Arabic
in the first two grades. In the upper grades instruction was bilingual.
Fifteen hours a week were taught in Arabic; and fifteen hours (in
mathematics and science), in French. Among subjects taught were:
religion and the history of Islam and the early caliphates, ethics,
civics, Moroccan history and geography, mathematics, basic science,
and Arabic and French. In the rural schools the program included
elementary agricultural education.

Secondary Education
In mid- 1971 the seven-year period of secondary education was
divided into a first and second cycle of four and three years,
respectively. Except for a few subjects offered in Arabic, the language
of instruction was French. The first four-year cycle, taken by all
126
secondary school students, led to the Certificate of Secondary
Education . The first year of this cycle, called the observation class,
was designed to facilitate the transition from primary to secondary
studies. The four -year curriculum had general studies, including
Arabic, French, another modern language (usually English) , history,
geography, civics, mathematics, handicraft, physical education, and
music. In some institutions practical skill courses were added during
the late 1960s.
Students who completed the first cycle could proceed to the second
cycle where they followed a university - preparatory course leading to
specialization in either commerce, industry, or agriculture. Students
following the general academic course could major in literature,
Arabic studies, economics, mathematics, or experimental science.
Each of the major programs terminated in the baccalaureat ( final
examination) , the successful passing of which represented academic
achievement and qualified for university admission.
The three-year courses offering specialization in commercial and
industrial subjects led to the Technician's Diploma. The commercial
course offered specialization in commerce and bookkeeping, business
administration, and secretarial work. The industrial course had majors
in technical subjects or mathematics. The diploma earned upon
completion of the industrial and commercial courses , however, was
not recognized for university entrance qualifications and was not
highly regarded in the respective occupational fields. The
unsatisfactory status of these diplomas was the subject of much
student concern during the late 1960s.
In 1970 official plans were in progress to upgrade industrial and
commercial courses in order to enable the holders of the Technician's
Diploma to enter institutions of higher learning. In the industrial
program the diploma is to be replaced by a baccalaureate degree in
mathematics or technology ; prerequisite courses will offer a wider
range of training in engineering techniques as well as a higher level of
theoretical studies to qualify the holder of the industrial baccalaureate
degree for university -level training in engineering and technology. In
1970 the new type of training was available only at the Mohammedia
Engineering School and at the School of Mines, but government plans
called for the introduction of these courses in ten other secondary
schools by 1972. In the commercial courses persons majoring in
commerce, bookkeeping, or business administration will earn a
baccalaureate degree in economics, which qualifies for university
admission. Students majoring in secretarial studies, however, continue
to receive the Technician's Diploma.
Training in agriculture is also available. Under the auspices of the
Ministry of Agriculture and National Development, four -year courses
are offered in eight specialized secondary schools to train field
assistants ; the course for field agents is of two years ' duration .

127
Training in hotel management and in the applied arts was added to
the upper secondary cycle during the late 1960s, but data on this type
of training were lacking in 1971 .
Vocational training under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs is available in training centers offering short -term
courses in various technical and commercial occupations. Entrance
requirements vary depending on the trade or craft in which training is
offered. The courses, usually of one year's duration , offer about 80
percent practical and 20 percent theoretical instruction. Longer
courses are available for selected advanced students, and special
programs are offered for persons wishing to upgrade their skills. The
centers train about 1,000 persons a year, mostly in basic level courses
in mechanics, electricity, and automotive mechanics. The ministry
plans to increase the annual number of graduates to 2,500 by 1972 and
to open additional centers in Casablanca — for training in the building
trade — and in Kenitra - for engineering trades.
Secondary schools were relatively less crowded than primary
schools, but plans for the improvement and expansion of the facilities
and curricula were made during the late 1960s in anticipation of the
greater number of students who would be continuing after primary
school. Enrollment has been increasing at a rate of 3.6 percent
annually. In 1970 the total enrollment was 291,205, with 247,755
students in the first cycle and 43,450 in the second cycle. Officials of
the Five Year Plan estimated that by the end of the plan period the
number of secondary school students will exceed 390,000.
Only 26 percent of the 291,205 students in the two secondary cycles
were girls; the comparative proportion in 1961 was 20 percent. A
further analysis of the proportion of girls in secondary schools shows,
however, that in the private schools they accounted for 40 percent of
the student body, whereas in the public schools, the corresponding
proportion decreased to 25 percent.
The general academic program, which included majors in literature
or in experimental science, was the choice of the majority of students
in the second cycle. The science program , however, suffered from the
lack of qualified teachers and laboratory equipment and placed
excessive emphasis on theoretical instruction. Only some 14.5 percent
of the total of 43,450 students in the second cycle took technical and
commercial courses . An analysis in 1970 of the enrollment in technical
and commercial public secondary schools shows that of the 6,284
students enrolled, 3,429 majored in commerce, and 2,241, in technical
fields; the rest took courses in hotel training, agriculture, or the
applied arts.
Continuation of education after primary school has been encouraged
by a program of government scholarships for secondary and higher
education. Although the demand has been growing, many students
were insufficiently prepared for academic work at the secondary level .
128
The French -language training available in primary schools was not
sufficient to help the students master secondary level subjects offered
in that language. Inadequately trained teachers, outmoded methods of
instruction , and the lack of teaching equipment discouraged many
from continuing their studies. The majority of students enrolled in the
first year
of secondary education fail to complete the two cycles ; not
more than about 8,000 students each year pass the baccalaureat
examination .
During the late 1960s about 45 percent of first -cycle students
proceeded to the three -year program of the secondary cycle. In the
first cycle the attrition rate was 35 percent, increasing to about 40
percent in the second cycle. The incidence of failure was also high;
completion of the first cycle took an average of 6.1 years ; and
completion of the second cycle, 4.4 years. Failures were especially
common in the general academic course of the second cycle where the
rates of failure doubled between 1965 and 1970.
Tuition and board in public secondary schools were free, but fees
were charged to students for equipment, library services, and other
items. A survey in 1969 of secondary schools in Casablanca showed
that the average annual cost for a nonboarding secondary student was
DH100 for boys and DH120 for girls. In general, the costs tended to
rise in the upper grades.
In 1971 several plans were awaiting implementation to expand
secondary school facilities and to resolve qualitative problems in
secondary education . Construction of eighteen new secondary schools
financed by a loan from the IDA was nearly finished in 1971. A
substantial portion of another IDA loan has been earmarked for the
construction and equipment of science laboratories in six existing
secondary schools, for workshop and laboratory equipment in ten
technical secondary schools, for modernization of thirteen commercial
secondary schools, and for secondary teacher training.
Teachers

Primary school teachers were trained in seventeen regional colleges

with an approximate enrollment of 1,600 in 1970. Completion of the
first cycle of secondary education was an entrance requirement for the
program , which consisted of one year of theoretical training followed
by one year of practice teaching. Officials planned to raise entrance
requirements and to add another year of theoretical training.
Candidates for admission would be expected to complete four years of
secondary schooling rather than three.
For teachers of the lower secondary cycle the training was of two
years' duration, followed by one year of practice teaching. Fully
qualified secondary school teachers must complete four years of higher
education after earning the baccalaureat at the end of secondary
129
schooling. The Higher Teacher Training School ( Ecole Normal
Supérieur) in Rabat offered a four- year program leading to a licence
( certificate) in letters or science and a teaching certificate. The
University of Rabat (sometimes called Mohammed V University) also
offered training for teachers of the second cycle, with emphasis on
subject specialization. Most secondary school teacher candidates
during the late 1960s majored in the humanities. Of a total of 928
students enrolled in teacher training for the lower secondary cycle,
only 152 majored in mathematics and sciences; the corresponding
figure among trainees for the upper secondary cycle was 156 out of a
total of 2,773.
Plans awaiting implementation in 1971 provided for teachers of the
first secondary cycle to be trained in six regional teachers colleges in
three -year courses . Completion of secondary education and possession
of the baccalaureat would remain a usual entrance requirement, but
some students would be admitted on the basis of entrance
examinations. Teachers for the second cycle of secondary schools
would be trained in the Higher Teacher Training School in a one- year
course after they earned a university degree.
The training capacity of institutions for teacher education in 1970
was inadequate to meet national demands. During the late 1960s there
was an annual need for 1,200 lower cycle secondary teachers, but
existing facilities trained only some 500 a year. About 150 upper cycle
secondary teachers were trained in various courses and institutions,
although the need was for 300 annually .
Low remuneration of teachers was a primary reason for the lack of
interest in teaching careers. In 1969 primary school teachers earned
between DH380 and DH800 a month ; and secondary teachers,
between DH650 and DH1,500 a month , depending on the level of
training. The much higher salaries of French teachers, ranging
between DH1,700 and DH5,000 a month, were partly financed by
French government funds.
The government paid tuition and board and an allowance to teacher
trainees, who were required to pledge to serve in the public education
system for eight years ; otherwise, fees paid by the government became
refundable. To stimulate interest in science teaching, supplementary
allowances were announced for science teacher candidates in 1970.
By 1971 nearly all foreign teachers in primary school had been
replaced, and the upgrading of the training of Moroccan teachers was
progressing. In 1968, 30,248 of a total of 30,299 primary school
teachers were Moroccans. Most of the teachers had at least partially
completed normal school. The pupil -teacher ratio was approximately
thirty -five to one. There were also 2,430 teachers in private primary
schools ; of these , 1,154 were Moroccans , and the rest were French,
Spanish, or of other origin.
Moroccan statistics published in 1968 showed that more than half of
a total of 12,365 secondary teachers were foreigners. The proportion of
foreign teachers was most significant in the public secondary schools
130
where they numbered 6,475 of a total of 11,206 . A later survey
prepared in 1970 revealed that almost 60 percent of the teachers of
academic subjects in the first cycle of secondary schools were
foreigners; in the second cycle the corresponding proportion was about
71 percent. In the private secondary schools the proportion of
Moroccan teachers was highest in institutions offering the traditional
religious curriculum, in schools of the Jewish Ittihad (Union), and in
those operated by Muslim Moroccans .
A 1970 survey showed that only some 25 percent of teachers of
academic subjects in the first secondary cycle were fully qualified . Of
those not fully qualified, the majority had completed secondary
schools ; the rest had only partial secondary education. The proportion
of fully qualified teachers in the second cycle was more favorable: 86.1
percent had completed higher education. Eight percent had partial
higher education ; the rest, complete or partial secondary education .
Private Education

Academically outstanding private schools were operated by the

French University and Cultural Mission ( Mission Universitaire
Culturel Française—MUCF) , established by a cultural convention
signed between France and Morocco in 1957. Intended mainly for
children of the foreign, especially of the French, community, the
schools also admitted Moroccan children on a competitive basis and
were favored by the Moroccan elite. Many leaders in public life had
been trained in such prestigious schools as the Lycée Lyautey in
Casablanca .
The MUCF had contributed part-time teachers, teaching supplies,
and facilities to the public school system and, since the decline of the
foreign community in the 1960s, had turned over many of its
buildings and classrooms to it. In 1970 more than 11,000 children were
enrolled in the MUCF schools, but the number of Moroccan children
in this total was not known .
In addition to the MUCF schools, there were private secular
Muslim schools, mainly in Rabat and Casablanca. They offered a
modern academic program in Arabic and French based on the official
curriculum . In 1970 these schools enrolled about 26,000 students on
the primary and about 11,200 on the secondary level.
Other schools were operated by private individuals, mostly French,
and by French and Spanish Catholic teaching orders . In 1970
enrollment in these schools on the primary and secondary levels
totaled about 28,000 and 5,000, respectively.
Private education for Jewish children was available in the Ittihad
schools of the Jewish community. Since the number of Moroccan Jews
was rapidly decreasing, these schools operated on a diminished scale,
enrolling about 2,000 students in secondary classes in 1970.
131
Higher Education
Higher education was offered at two universities, the renowned
Karaouine University at Fes—an ancient center of Islamic studies
with a famous library - and the University of Rabat. The former, the
oldest university in North Africa, was founded in A.D. 859 as an
appendage to the Karaouine mosque. Theology , Islamic law, and
interpretation of the Quran constituted the mainstay of the
curriculum . In 1963 Karaouine was reorganized and placed under the
authority of the Ministry of Education . Some changes in the
curriculum and teaching methods were made. Under the new
organization a faculty of law continued to operate at Fes, and two
other faculties, one for Arabic studies and one for theology, were
opened at Marrakech and Tetouan, respectively. Three years of study
at one of the faculties lead to a degree in the chosen field . In 1969 the
university enrolled 898 students. Traditional Islamic fields were also
taught at the Ben Youssef University in Marrakech with an
enrollment of 1,100 in 1970.
The University of Rabat was opened in 1957. It had its roots in
several earlier institutions founded by the French for advanced
studies in law, science, and administration . In 1970 the university had
four faculties and several specialized schools. Some of the latter had
semiautonomous status and were located in Casablanca and Fes . A
new campus for the main facility at Rabat was in the planning stage
in 1971. The campus was earmarked to be the site of several planned
institutions for professional and technical training.
The Faculty of Arts and Letters was based in Rabat and had a
branch located in Fes. Courses in philosophy, literature, history, and
geography were offered in French and Arabic; the faculty was also
noted for its courses in Moroccan history and archaeology. The
Faculty of Science had courses in mathematics and in the physical
and natural sciences. In both faculties a year of preparatory study was
followed by three years of specialized studies leading to the degree of
licence. The Diploma of Higher Studies was awarded after two years
of study to holders of the licence. The Faculty of Law, Economics,
and Social Sciences, a major source of personnel for the civil service,
had branches in Fes and Casablanca; it offered a five-year program for
the Diploma of Higher Studies and a shorter course leading to a law
diploma. The Faculty of Medicine had a six -year course preceded by a
premedical year in the Faculty of Science. The attrition rate in the
Faculty of Medicine was particularly high between the premedical
course and the first year of study.
The Mohammedia Engineering School, in the port city of the same
name near Casablanca, was affiliated with the University of Rabat. It
offered a five -year course and had an enrollment of 260 students in
1970. University level training in agriculture was available at the
132
Hassan II Institute of Agronomy in Rabat. The course was open to
candidates who had completed two years of preparatory studies at the
Faculty of Science. In 1970 only two years of the planned four -year
course were offered, with about thirty students enrolled. Plans in 1970
called for the expansion of the institute by the addition of a
department of veterinary science ; training in this department would
be of four years' duration preceded by a preparatory year in the
Faculty of Science .
Other institutions of higher learning affiliated with the University
of Rabat included the Moroccan School of Administration, with a
curriculum of bilingual courses in law, administration, and business
management taught in French and Arabic . Associated with the
Faculty of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences were the Center for
Studies on Economic and Social Development and the Center for
Preparation in Business Administration. The former offered a two
year program in economics and sociology in Rabat and Casablanca,
mainly for high government officials; a baccalaureat, or special
examination, was required for admission . The latter was for
postgraduate students who had a university degree or could pass a
special entrance examination .
According to data prepared by the Moroccan Statistical Office in
1969, there were 10,908 students of higher education, including 767
from foreign countries . Of the total, 9,400 attended universities, and
the rest were in other institutions of higher learning. Some 14 percent
of the 9,400 university students were women . The humanities and law
were the major fields for 80 percent of university students; those in
medicine and science accounted for the remaining 20 percent. In other
institutions of higher learning, 70 percent of the students were
enrolled in courses leading to administrative or teaching careers, and
the rest were in technical courses. On the other hand, 90 percent of
2,700 Moroccan students enrolled abroad that year studied for science
degrees.
Enrollment in higher education in 1970 was estimated at about
12,700 ; an additional 3,000 students were enrolled in institutions of
higher learning abroad . The large majority of students in domestic
institutions of higher learning followed courses leading to degrees in
literature and in other liberal arts; only about 27 percent of the first
year students were enrolled in science and technical courses.
During the mid - 1960s about 20 percent of university students
received government scholarships . Those intended for students abroad
were awarded mainly to candidates for degrees in scientific and
technical fields. Scholarships for students in these fields were also
awarded through the French technical assistance program. The
proportion of scholarship recipients in 1971 .was not known, but
students voiced complaints that the lack of finances prevented many
from attending institutions of higher learning.
133
According to education experts more than half of the students
enrolled in domestic universities fail their examination, change their
major field , or leave before completion of their course . The physical
facilities for higher education were generally adequate and in many
cases included modern laboratory facilities, but the latter were often
underused because of insufficient enrollment. Throughout higher
education , moreover, there was a severe shortage of teachers. In 1969
there was a total of 512 teachers in universities and institutions of
higher learning; more than half of these were from foreign countries.

Literacy

Literacy in 1970 was estimated to be between 15 and 20 percent.

The most recent analysis of literacy data available in 1971 derived
from the 1960 census, which reported that 51 percent of those who
could read and write could do so in Arabic ; 41 percent, in French and
Arabic; and the remainder, in French alone or a combination of
French and Arabic or Spanish .
Immediately after independence in 1956, the Moroccan League for
Fundamental Education and Literacy was organized under
government sponsorship to introduce programs in reading, writing,
simple arithmetic, domestic science, child care, and handicrafts at the
local and national levels. The league also produced and distributed
basic texts and newspapers for the newly literate . Many of the
programs were offered in adult education and youth centers set up
throughout the country. The number of persons reached, however, was
limited, and enrollment tended to decrease after the first year of
operation. Since the mid - 1960s literacy training has been offered
mostly in conjunction with on -the - job vocational instruction . The
phosphate mining works, the Moroccan railroads, and the sugar
enterprises were among the major public companies offering literacy
training in 1968.

THE ARTS AND SCIENCES

Traditions

After the Arab invasions of the seventh century, decorative

elements and architectural forms spread westward through North
Africa to Morocco, where they were used mainly in the cities. In the
countryside the local Berber forms of stone and mud architecture and
geometric decorations continued, however, with relatively little
change. Intellectual pursuits were almost exclusively the province of
Arabic scholars and wealthy merchants or political leaders. Studies in
Islamic theology, law, philosophy, and geography were concentrated at
the Karaouine University.
134
Most of the renowned figures in intellectual life flourished during
the medieval Berber dynasties ( eleventh to fourteenth centuries) . The
Almoravids (1062–1147), who brought all of Morocco and much of
Spain under their rule, introduced a mixture of Berber, Arab, and
Spanish culture and inaugurated a period of four centuries of vigorous
artistic and intellectual activity. Because both the Almoravids and
their successors , the Almohads ( 1147-1212) , gained power on waves of
religious reform , their concern was directed largely to theology,
philosophy, and Islamic law. Under the Marinid dynasty ( 1269–1465 ),
less concerned with religious purism , Moroccan verbal and artistic
expression became more intricate, and decorative motifs took on the
luxuriance of detail that came to characterize later Moroccan work.
Ibn Bajja (also known as Avempace, d.1138) wrote treatises on
music, mathematics, and astronomy, as well as the commentaries on
Aristotle for which he is famous. Ibn Tufayl ( d. 1185) and Ibn Rushd
(also known as Averroes, 1126-98) , both of whom served as court
physicians to the Almohad monarchs, represented the high point of
philosophic thought in Morocco. The Aristotelian commentaries of
Averroes had a marked influence on the development of European
scholasticism . In other branches of knowledge the medieval period
was equally rich. Scholars from Spain and all of North Africa came to
the Karaouine University to study medicine, astronomy, astrology,
technology, law , grammar, and rhetoric.
The works of Idrissi and Ibn Battuta took their place among the
greatest geographical descriptions of medieval times. Ibn Battuta
( 1304-78) of Tangier reached Russia, India, Java , China, and
Timbuktu and wrote a description of his travels for a Marinid prince.
Several types of writing were common in medieval Morocco : the
fahrasa, a work describing the author's education and the professors
he learned from ; the diwan, or collection of poems; and biographies
written in prose and verse. A biography of the Prophet, written in
rhymed verse by the Cadi Jyaddh, has been a classic in the country
since the twelfth century .
After the fall of the Marinid dynasty in 1465, political strife, foreign
wars, and the growth of maraboutism wrought changes in intellectual
life. Religious brotherhoods ( zawiyiin ; sing. zawiya — see Glossary)
rather than the court became the centers of literary expression . Much
of the writing from the sixteenth century on is tinged with mysticism.
Biographies of saints and collections of the sayings and writings of
leaders of religious brotherhoods became popular literary forms. Basic
styles in the arts remained the same, and craftsmen limited
themselves in large part to the imitation of the past. Intellectual and
literary production and patronage were maintained, however, by a
number of urban families, particularly those who had fled from Spain
to settle in Fes and whose members wrote poetry, history, and legal
treatises. In the sixteenth century Hassan Ibn Mohammed al Wazzi
135
known in the West as Leo Africanus, who was converted to
Christianity and became the protégé of Pope Leo X-wrote his
famous Description of Africa .
Subsequent periods noted for architectural monuments and royal
patronage of scholars and writers occurred under the Saads ( 1549–
1660) and during the seventeenth- and eighteenth -century reigns of
the two famous Alawite rulers, Mulay Ismail and Sultan Mohammed
(see ch. 3, Historical Setting) . Intellectual life was limited to a
relatively small group of urban families who, by virtue of their alleged
descent in the line of Muhammad, their status as government
officials, or their wealth, were able to travel and study abroad. The
completion of one's studies in Cordova, Baghdad , or Cairo was
considered the final seal to education. As in all Muslim countries,
religious education shaped intellectual life, and the most highly
respected men in the country were religious scholars known as ulama
(see Glossary ), who had completed many years of religious studies and
combined qualities of scholarship with religious insight. Some of them
were advisers to the sultan, renowned members of the faculty of the
Karaouine University, and judges in such matters as the succession to
the sultanate (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) .
Literature continued to follow old forms and showed little
originality, but at all times there seems to have been a few persons
whose works were considered outstanding. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, there was some renewed interest in the work of
Moroccan scholars of the past, and some of their works were
lithographed in Fes and distributed. Much of Moroccan literature of
the traditional period, however, has been lost over the centuries, and
many manuscripts have remained in private libraries where they have
received little attention .
The goal of education was the development of the cultivated man
intelligent, mannered, acquainted with the various divisions of
knowledge considered important, fluent and clever in speech and in
the writing of prose and verse, and appreciative of fine things. Less
importance was attached to discovery or to originality, except
expression, than to competence in discussing philosophy and theology,
rhetoric , poetry, and law.
Artistic creativity in the cities was traditionally the province of a
separate group , the master artisans, who after years of training gained
recognition as experts and who designed and executed the intricate
decorations of architecture and handicrafts. Similarly, professional
musicians and dancers were trained in performance since childhood.
These craftsmen and musicians lived by the sale of their skills or by
obtaining the permanent patronage of a man of wealth or of the sultan
himself.

136
Among the rural population music, dance, craftwork and design ,
and folklore have always been well established popular arts, both as
vocations and avocations. Storytellers, musicians, and dancers still
provide entertainment, as they have for hundreds of years, for market
day crowds or tribal gatherings . Rural crafts are marked by
considerable regional variation, and in some areas the Berber crafts
seem to have been influenced little, if at all, by the more highly
developed arts of the city .
French influence introduced under the protectorate was reflected in
changing attitudes toward the traditional artistic and intellectual
forms. The French schools in Morocco and visiting European musical
or dramatic performers were patronized by increasing numbers of
Moroccans providing contact with modern European secular and
scientific thought and art forms.
Although the cultivated man, in the older sense, was still highly
respected, persons of more utilitarian knowledge came to be
recognized as better equipped to become leaders. The traditional view
of higher education, however, remained strong, and most recipients of
higher education continued to aim toward government jobs or the
legal profession rather than medicine, engineering, or science .

Literature

The ability to express oneself in poetry is still considered a mark of

the cultivated man , and, as elsewhere in Islam, poetry itself is valued
as the highest use of language. Rhymed prose, second only to poetry
in the admiration that it commands, has been used extensively in
biography and even in scholarly treatises.
Modern Arabic literature, mainly in the form of political articles
and essays, developed under the nationalist movement of the 1920s.
The period also had its practitioners of traditional Arabic literary
forms. Most prominent among these was Allal al Fassi, noted for his
nationalistic poems rendered in classical Arabic verse form . After
World War II the literature of political essays and editorials continued
to flourish, providing important vehicles for social and political
thought. Some essays, notably those by the journalist Muhammad
Tazi, reached a high literary quality, providing a transitional form to
fictional prose. Much of this literature written by leaders of political
factions, journalists, and other intellectuals was published in political
magazines. Thawat al Haq, of the Istiqlal ( Independence) Party,
represented conservative Arabic -Islamic values and conservative
literary trends. Aqlam , an organ of the National Union of Popular
Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires—UNFP) , published
ideological essays, research articles, and free -form poetry .
French cultural influences had a strong impact on literary
expression in modern Morocco. Difficulties in adapting both the
137
classical and the dialectal Arabic to modern literary forms contributed
to the lasting influence of French, especially in fiction writing,
although a few novels have been published in Arabic since the 1950s.
Whether writing in Arabic or French, however, Moroccan authors have
a deep sense of mission to interpret the social and political changes of
the postindependence period. Novels and short stories reflect concern
with the role of Islam in the modern state, the status of women and,
above all, the questions of cultural identity or alienation in relation to
the Arabo-Islamic and French traditions of the country . The themes
of cultural alienation and depersonalization in a developing country
are often treated in subjective psychological contexts.
Driss Charibi is perhaps the best known contemporary author of
fiction in French . Born in Casablanca , he studied chemistry in Paris
where he has lived since the 1940s. His early works, among them The
Past Perfect, written during the 1950s, express passionate protest
against the cultural and social dicta of traditional Islam and of the
West. His Open Succession, published in 1962, is autobiographical
and deals with the problems of adjustment of an Arab expatriate in
France. Charibi is also noted for his essays on the literature of the
Maghrib, published in the French journal Confluent.
The other major author writing in French, Ahmed Sefrioui, won
acclaim with his ethnographic novels, notably with the Box of
Miracles portraying the life of humble craftsmen in the traditional
sector of Fes, the author's native city. Sefrioui's short stories and
tales, published in a volume entitled Beads of Amber are rendered in
picturesque language, sometimes in the form of parables. Appointed
to the post of director of fine arts in the Ministry of Culture during
the late 1960s, Sefrioui has also written articles on tourism and
traditional handicrafts.
Muhammad Khair Eddine is a representative of avant -garde
literary forms, which he uses in both prose and verse. Living in Paris
and a recipient of a French literary prize, he has explored the theme
of identification of the present generation with its forebears.
Literary analyses and criticism by modern Moroccan and other
Maghribian authors were written in French . These are published in
Soufflés, a French - language literary review founded in Morocco in
1966 .
Writing in Arabic, Abdulhamid Benjelloun has won acclaim with
his novel Memories of Childhood, a volume of short stories entitled
The Valley of Tears, and works of poetry. Benjelloun is a well-known
public figure , having held the posts of ambassador to Pakistan, chief
of mission to Africa and Asia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
minister of education .
Another writer in Arabic, Muhammad al Sabbagh , is also a veteran
of high government posts, including one in the Ministry of Islamic
138
Affairs. He is noted mainly for his poetic essays, including The Tree
of Fire, published in 1955.
Bel Hachemy Abdelkader, a professor of Arabic, is a bilingual writer
and playwright. He published tales in Arabic in a literary magazine
and a work entitled Thourya, or The Unfinished Novel, published in
Arabic and French in 1959 .

Folklore

Storytelling remains one of the commonest forms of amusement

among the people at home, in the café, or in the marketplace, and
oral literature is far more widespread than written work . During the
early 1970s professional storytellers were still found in the largest
markets. Others travel from town to town for the weekly markets. The
storyteller announces his presence by beating a drum , an instrument
often used for punctuation and emphasis in the telling of the story.
He collects from his listeners before he begins and often requires them
to pay again to hear the ending. Tales are rendered dramatically and
repeated again and again .
Much of the folklore concerns the characteristics of animals — why
the bat has no feathers, why the owl is wise, the stork is sacred, or the
donkey is ill behaved. Two of the recurrent human heroes of folk
literature widely known in the Middle East and North Africa are Sidi
Suleiman ( King Solomon) , revered for his wisdom, and Jeha, a
picaresque hero and cunning clown of whom his neighbors try to take
advantage but who outwits them in the end . Both good and evil
spirits figure prominently in folk tales, as do the evil eye and methods
of averting it .

The Visual Arts

Architecture and Decoration

Moroccan architectural style, designated Hispano-Moorish by

Western art historians, originated in the eighth century in Umayyad
Spain , evolved further in both Spain and North Africa, and reached
its height in Morocco between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.
As in other Muslim countries, architectural style found its highest
expression in the mosques and Islamic school buildings adjacent to
mosques and to a lesser extent in palaces, city walls, and gates. Most
distinctive in Moroccan architecture is the repeated appearance of the
horseshoe arch (both round and pointed) framing gateways, doorways,
and windows or supported by slender columns in the colonnades that
open into the courtyards of almost any sizable building. Decoration is
so much a part of architecture that a building is as much the creation
of the specialized craftsmen who adorned it with plaster, wood,
mosaic, and tile as of the masons who outlined the basic structure.
139
Under the French Protectorate new European residential and
business sections were constructed a mile or so from the existing old
cities, leaving the madina (traditional Muslim quarters) untouched. In
addition, some of the ancient mosques, Quranic colleges, and other
buildings in the old cities were restored. Because of urban crowding,
however, modern cities and the madina have grown together in many
of the major urban centers.
A noted monument of the postindependence period is the
Mohammed V memorial in Rabat, built by King Hassan in memory
of his father and officially regarded as a national shrine. Consisting of
the late king's tomb, a museum, and a mosque, it is executed in the
traditional Hispano-Moorish style and is decorated with carved stucco
and marble, chiseled bronze, and elaborate tile mosaics .
Handicrafts

In addition to the crafts used in architectural decoration, household

articles made by the family for its own use or by highly specialized
craftsmen are nearly all decorated in some way and are valued for
attractiveness as well as utility. Leather, textiles, rugs, pottery, and
articles of wood, copper, brass, and iron are the products of Morocco's
most skilled artisans. Their tooled leather, brass trays, and wrought
iron grillwork have long been known outside the country.
The government operates cooperative centers for traditional
artisans to encourage the production and marketing of handcrafted
items. The centers also train the craftsmen in the operation of modern
machinery for use in the production of traditional items. In 1967 a
total of 8,000 craftsmen were trained in centers for weavers and
leather, wood, and pottery workers. A “ Month of Handicrafts” is
celebrated each year under official auspices to stimulate interest in
the traditional handcrafted works. National museums at Rabat and
Tangier and regional museums at Fes, Marrakech, and Meknès
preserve examples of the best Moroccan products.
In all Moroccan crafts regional variation is apparent both in the
type of article made and in the designs and colors used. Designs in
many crafts often incorporate motifs considered to bring luck or to be
effective in warding off evil . Urban crafts, in the Arab and Andalusian
traditions, are the more highly developed and specialized and are
characterized by the use of floral motifs and arabesque designs.
Painting

Painting as a separate art rather than as a decorative element in

architecture is a relatively new form . Exhibitions held in Casablanca
and in other major cities during the 1960s and early 1970s attracted a
small educated group of Moroccans and members of resident foreign
communities .

140
A school of young painters, some of whom have been trained in
France, gained national and international recognition, notably at the
exposition of “ 2,000 Years of Moroccan Art ” held in Paris in 1963 .
Farid Belkahia, director of the Casablanca School of Fine Arts, is the
representative painter of this group, which also includes Ahmad al
Yacoubi, Hassan Al Glaoui, Miloud ben Mokhtar, Radia Cherkaoui
(Mokhtar's mother), Ahmed Laouidire, and Mohammed ben Allal.
Subjects are drawn generally from nature ; some show street scenes
and human figures, a departure from the Islamic proscription against
representative painting. Others in the group, notably al Yacoubi and
ben Allal, paint abstractions of the modern Western variety. The use
of brilliant colors and pleasant harmonies are typical .
Music , Dance, and Drama

Moroccan music is of many types ; it includes Arab, Berber,

classical, and popular elements. Musicians perform in concerts, in
cafés, at private homes, at circumcision ceremonies , marriages,
funerals, and religious processions and in accompaniment to dancing
and storytelling
Classical music in the Moroccan sense is the Andalusian music of
the tenth to fifteenth centuries. It is extremely complicated in
musical structure, and its lyrics are characterized by the strict use of
the Andalusian dialect or classical Arabic and by the construction of
verse in the style of classical poetry. It is played by an orchestra
composed of the tar, a form of tambourine; sometimes the darbuqa, a
funnel- shaped drum made of clay ; and three types of stringed
instruments — the rebab, played by the leader and considered the most
important; the kemanjah, now supplanted in most instances by the
European violin ; and the oudh, a lute. Students spend many years
learning the theory and techniques of classical music at conservatories
in Rabat and Marrakech .
Andalusian music is given regular performances by several
orchestras, among them the National Broadcasting Orchestra and the
concert orchestras of Fes, Marrakech , and Casablanca. Since
independence the Association of Andalusian Music in Casablanca has
attempted to preserve examples of this music, collecting and writing
down the melodies and words, which have been transmitted largely by
ear .

Moroccan Arab popular music, griha, is musically similar to , but

simpler than, the classical music and uses the popular, rather than the
classical, language. New songs are composed in this genre; they
usually concern love, war, and adventure and often include topical
satire, frequently directed toward another writer of verse . This type of
music has also been adapted by some of the brotherhoods for religious
chants .

141
Berber music, even more closely linked to poetry than Arab music,
is usually associated with the dance and varies considerably according
to region . Percussion instruments, drums, and tambourines provide
the rhythm , while the melody is played on a flute or a single-stringed
rebab .
Western classical music is little known outside the cities, although
European orchestras visit Morocco on tour . Jazz and popular
Egyptian music, however, have become popular and are heard
regularly on the radio.
Dances are common, particularly in the countryside, at times of
ceremonies, such as harvest festivals, marriage festivities, and
religious celebrations. Traditional dances, Berber in origin, have
survived in various local and regional forms in the various Arab- and
Berber-speaking areas. Most public performances are accompanied by
music and attended by most of the community or neighborhood .
Drama, not a traditional form of artistic expression in Islamic
countries, was introduced in Morocco during the protectorate. The
performances of French theatrical companies on tour in Morocco were
patronized by members of the European community and European
educated Moroccans. During the 1950s amateur groups in the major
cities, notably in Casablanca, performed plays in Arabic and some
plays translated from French. The playwrights and actors included
students, teachers, and low -level government functionaries whose
efforts were limited by lack of experience and resources. Many of the
plays dealt with the conflict between traditionalist parents and
modern youth ; others were replete with melodramatic plight. The
audience included a wide range of social groups, from middle class to
illiterate rural migrants, but because of problems of unintelligibility
owing to language and overcomplicated plots, coupled with poor
staging techniques, the presentations had limited success.
After independence in 1956 the Moroccan National Theater was
established, and in 1959 a dramatic art school and the Moroccan
Dramatic Research Center were opened in Rabat under government
auspices . Young people interested in the theater are trained as actors,
directors, and technicians at this school, as well as in Paris. They
produce plays in French and Arabic — the former are usually examples
of classical European drama, the latter are concerned with social
mores and political themes of the day . Hammamet, a theatrical
troupe under the direction of Ali Ben Ayed, has produced the plays of
Shakespeare, Molière, and others in Arabic translation . Ahmed El Haj
-a former carpenter turned playwright, actor, and singer - has gained
popularity with urban audiences. Workers' theaters under the
sponsorship of the Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocain du
Travail — UMT) have staged Western plays translated into Arabic,
with a Moroccanized milieu and hero .

142
In general, however, theater performances attracted limited,
French -educated audiences and have not gained wide popularity.
Young directors and actors expressed concern over the continued
reliance on the repertoire of Western plays and have urged the
inclusion of more indigenous Arabic material.
Despite their lack of interest in the formal theater, Moroccans have
a keen sense of the ridiculous, and the gift of mimicry is considered a
social asset. Berber songs mocking the local caid (tribal chief — see
Glossary) are widely enjoyed, and the mimicking of professors is a
popular pastime among students. In the traditional quarters of the
cities and on rural market days, wandering comedians attract crowds
of people. Relying more on gestures and mime than on words, the
comedians act out the escapades and tribulations of everyday man .
These simple dramatic forms may well be the source of a new,
indigenous type of comedy.

Scholarship and Research

Scholarly activities before independence were concerned mostly
with Moroccan history, ethnology, and traditional crafts. Much of the
knowledge in these fields rests on the investigations conducted by
French scholars since the 1920s. Anthropologists and ethnologists have
investigated Berber customs and have described ceremonies, folklore,
and religious attitudes . Archaeological finds and ethnographic
material are displayed in museums in Rabat and other cities .
French scholars also published works and bibliographies on early
and modern Moroccan history, although most data on these works
were based on European sources and translations of Arab historical
studies. Morocco's libraries, archives, and institutions of traditional
learning contain valuable historical sources in Arabic . Little of this
material has been explored, although French scholars have described
some of it in articles published in learned Moroccan journals .
Moroccan scholars writing on the country's history and literary
history include Muhammad ben Shenab, noted for his work on North
African language and literature, and the historians Muhammed Hadj
Sadok and Muhammad Umar al Hijwi.
Archaeologists have directed the excavation of Roman sites in the
cities of Volubilis, northwest of Meknès, and Lixus, on the Atlantic
coast south of Tangier. The foundations of buildings and forums from
the Roman era have been discovered at these sites, and new
explorations under government sponsorship were in progress during
the late 1960s. Historical monuments were also being restored at the
same time, including the necropolis of the Marinids in Rabat, the
tombs of the Saad dynasty in Marrakech, and the gate and twelve
palaces in Meknès built by the seventeenth -century Alawi ruler
Mulay Ismail.

143
Institutions developed during the protectorate formed the nucleus
of several facilities for scholarship. The Sharifian Scientific Institute
for Research , founded in 1920, conducts investigations in geology,
geography, and physics and other natural sciences. The institute has
branches for seismological observations at Ifrane and Berrechid. The
Pasteur Institute is concerned with epidemiological and
bacteriological research . The National Institute for Research in
Agronomy is engaged in soil and climatological studies.
Since independence the government has tended to favor the
development of research branches within the various government
agencies, many of which have their own libraries and archives . Chief
among these agencies is the Secretariat of State for Planning, which
carries out most of the statistical and conceptual research for the
country's economic development plans. The National Center of
Documentation, established in 1968 with the assistance of United
Nations funds, operated under the Secretariat of State for Planning.
The center is engaged in the preparation of an extensive, computer
based bibliography and microfilm collection on materials pertaining
to Moroccan agriculture. The National Geological Survey, with an
extensive library, was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Commerce in 1970 .
The Center of Experimentation Research and Training in
Casablanca, a study group under the Directorate of City Planning and
Housing of the Ministry of Interior, was engaged in urban housing
research in collaboration with the National Institute of Statistics and
Applied Economics. The Hassan II Institute of Agronomy in Rabat
coordinated data related to the Sebou River development project (see
ch. 2, Geography and Population) .
Social science research was also conducted by two institutes
attached to the University of Rabat, but the scope of these activities
was limited. The University Center for Scientific Research was noted
chiefly for its scholarly publications, including Hesperis - Tamuda, the
Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc, and the Revue de
Geographie du Maroc. The Institute of Sociology, also attached to the
university, was being closed down according to information published
in 1970 .

The requirements of the government for personnel trained in

science and technology have been so great that there has been a severe
shortage of persons qualified to conduct theoretical and applied
research . Most of the teaching and research personnel in the various
institutions and in the science departments of universities have been
supplied by foreign countries, mainly France .
The country's major libraries were repositories of research material.
There are a total of eighteen public libraries in Casablanca and other
major cities.

144
The Moroccan General Library and Archives (Bibliotheque
Generale et Archives du Maroc) was the country's national library.
Located on the campus of Mohammed V University in Rabat, it had
holdings of more than 200,000 volumes in Arabic and in European
languages and an extensive collection of Moroccan journals and
newspapers . The archives were noted for their medieval books and
manuscripts of interest to Muslim scholars and for their microfilm
collection of historical documents. The Tetouan branch of the general
library had extensive historical material, including manuscripts,
administrative documents, and photographs. Its European section had
some 45,000 volumes ; the Arabic section, 15,000 volumes. The library
of the Karaouine University in Fes was a repository of valuable
ancient Islamic manuscripts. Materials of interest to traditional
scholars could also be found at the Ben Youssef University in
Marrakech .

COMMUNICATION

The Press
Historical

The press largely developed during the French and Spanish

protectorates ( 1912–56 ), although a few periodicals were in existence
before then . During the protectorate the dissemination of public
information was controlled either by the French and the Spanish
colonial governments or by publishers who represented their points of
view (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
Until 1936 the publication of Arabic -language journals by
Moroccans was not permitted. During the early 1930s, however, a
group of young Moroccans opposed to colonial policies published a
French -language weekly, L'Action du Peuple, under a chief editor who
was French . Some Arabic journals were printed in the regions of the
Spanish Protectorate where the government appeared to be more
conciliatory toward cultural self- expression .
In 1936 permission was granted by the French resident general for
the publication of private Arabic-language journals in the region of the
French Protectorate, provided that their tone was moderate ;
thereafter, several weeklies were published in Casablanca. The
development of Moroccan newspapers or journalism , however, was not
encouraged, and publications were strictly controlled by protectorate
authorities . Despite these restrictions, a number of nationalist
journals were published after the independence movement gained
foothold during the late 1930s .
Although committed to the development of Arabic as a national
language, each political group endeavored to publish a French
language organ as well, in order to reach a broader readership .
145
Because of their nationalist tone, however, these journals were
tolerated for only brief periods of time by the protectorate authorities.
Conflicts among nationalist groups and economic difficulties were
added reasons for their brief lifespans.
Censorship restrictions introduced during World War II and applied
rigorously against nationalist publications remained in force until
independence in 1956. The Istiqlal Party was permitted to publish Al
Alam ; and the Democratic Independence Party (Parti Démocratique
de l'Indépendance-PDI) , Al Ray al-Amm . Both were heavily
censored, however, and intermittently suspended. All nationalist
journals were suppressed after the Casablanca riots of 1952 (see ch. 3,
Historical Setting ).
Throughout the protectorate period, a controlling position was held
among newspaper publishers in the French zone by Pierre Mas and
his son, Yves . In consistent editorial opposition to the Moroccan
independence movement, they created an empire that, in 1956,
included several of the largest and most influential newspapers in the
country . The most important of these were the Casablanca dailies Le
Petit Marocain and La Vigie Marocaine, the Fes daily Le Courrier du
Maroc, and Echo du Maroc, published in Rabat. In addition, Mas and
his son published several periodicals and controlled an important
segment of the printing and advertising industries. The press in the
Spanish zone, privately owned but reflecting official views, was less
well developed. The Tangier daily España, however, was influential
not only in northern Morocco but in southern Spain as well.
Development Since Independence

The removal of French controls after 1956 revitalized the domestic

press. Politically sponsored newspapers proliferated after the Istiqlal
Party split into factions in 1959. Like their predecessors before 1956,
these newspapers aimed to convince rather than to inform . Their
main goal of independence achieved, their polemic fervor turned on
one another's political philosophies, as well as against government
policies and high officials and on the social and economic
shortcomings of the newly established order (see ch . 8 , The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
Several dailies and weeklies were published by the Istiqlal Party,
the main opposition party, and by political groups that split from it
and regrouped themselves as the National Union of Popular Forces
(Union Nationale des Forces Populaires — UNFP ). The conservative,
loyalist Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire-MP) and the
Party of Independent Liberals ( Parti des Liberaux Independants
PLI) were each represented by three journals. The Ministry of
Information , in cooperation with the royalist Front for the Defense of
Constitutional Institutions ( Front pour la Défense des Institutions
Constitutionnelles-FDIC), published two dailies and two weeklies.
146
The Moroccan Communist Party ( Parti Communiste Marocain
PCM) published three newspapers until its proscription in 1959 (see
ch . 8, The Governmental System and Political Dynamics).
Freedom of expression was proclaimed in King Mohammed V's
Charter of Public Liberties of November 1958, which incorporated a
basic press code. The latter contained provisions empowering the
government to apply stringent measures to limit press freedom .
Strengthened in 1960 and again in 1963, the code stipulated that the
minister of interior might seize copies of any newspaper or periodical
that appeared to threaten public order. Furthermore, he could
suspend, or the prime minister could ban, any newspaper or
periodical that in their judgment had attacked the political or
religious foundations of the country. Official measures directed
against the press for other offenses, however, had to be initiated
through the courts.
Under pressure from the Istiqlal Party, provisions were also
included in the press code that within six months of November 1958
all newspapers must be owned or controlled by Moroccan nationals.
The government took no action, however, apparently because it
believed the foreign press fulfilled a service the Moroccan press was
not yet ready to assume. This attitude was strongly resented by
opposition party leaders and Moroccan newspaper publishers.
In early 1964 the Istiqlal-dominated Moroccan Press Association
brought suit against the French - owned Mas Publishing Company on
the grounds that it had no legal right to publish according to
provisions of the 1958 press code. The Rabat Appeals Court upheld
the charge but, although it levied a small fine against the publishing
company, it did not prohibit the firm from continuing to publish. The
case put all foreign -owned newspapers on notice that their
publications could be suspended at any time without cause, and since
then they all have followed cautious editorial policies to avoid giving
offense to the government. Shortly before the proclamation of the
state of emergency in 1965, amendments to the code were passed
under Istiqlal pressure to enforce the 1958 prohibition on newspapers
owned by non-Moroccans, but Parliament was suspended before the
amendment could be promulgated (see ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) .
On October 6, 1971, the government announced that the prime
minister had informed the owners of La Vigie Marocaine, Le Petit
Marocain, and España that their temporary license to publish would
be terminated as of November 1971. The prime minister stated that
the decision had been made on instructions by the king.
The contest between the government and the opposition press
gained momentum during the political crises of the mid- 1960s. The
suspension of the Istiqlal Party's popular daily, La Nation Africaine,
in February 1965 for publishing an antimonarchical citation by a
147
nineteenth -century Egyptian philosopher created a political crisis in
Parliament. After the newspaper's director was sentenced in criminal
court to ten months in prison and to the equivalent of about a
US $ 1,000 fine, the Istiqlal hardened its opposition to the press code.
When the code was put before the lower house of the then bicameral
Parliament for revision in early June 1965, Istiqlal spokesmen led by
the head of the party, Allal al Fassi, forced through amendments to
the code that would eliminate the government's power to suspend or
ban a newspaper. This signal defeat of the government was widely
credited with having sparked King Hassan's decision to take personal
control of the government in June 1965 (see ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) .
Although the state of emergency was lifted in July 1970, the
government acted with increasing stringency against opposition press
criticism ( see ch . 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics) . The Istiqlal's Arabic newspaper, Al Alam, and French
newspaper, L'Opinion, were the main targets of government
restrictive measures in 1970 and 1971. In September 1970 Mohammad
Berrada, editor of L'Opinion and member of the Party's Central
Committee, was arrested for publishing an article on alleged
maladministration in the armed services. Berrada was convicted on
October 25 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine of
DH1,000. The trial and the interpretation of the evidence by the
prosecution aroused much public anger ; Berrada was released in June
1971 by royal amnesty although , after an earlier appeal, his prison
sentence had been increased to one year.
An attack by unknown persons on the printing press of L'Opinion
and Al Alam in mid -February 1971 forced the newspapers to suspend
publication for several weeks. They began republications in March
but, because of subsequent seizures and bans by the government, the
appearance of these dailies throughout the spring and early summer of
that year was highly irregular. In April L'Opinion was seized on six
separate occasions , and the May 1 issues of both Al Alam and
L'Opinion were confiscated ; official reasons for these measures were
not given , however.
Le Monde, a French newspaper published in Paris, commented that
official measures against the Moroccan opposition press evoked
“ anxiety in international opinion .” Referring to L'Opinion in
particular , Le Monde deplored official efforts to prevent the
dissemination of opposition views in a newspaper that is often quoted
in the international press.
Dailies and Periodicals

In 1970 the national press included six dailies differing in aims,

political orientation, and language. The national newspapers, although
diverse and politically vigorous , were weakened by frequent
148
government seizures and powerful competition by the foreign -owned
press . The leading Moroccan dailies have circulations of between
35,000 and 40,000, representing mostly street sales at the price of
DHO.30.
Al Anba, the Arabic -language government daily, was published by
the Ministry of Information . Its tone of serene optimism contrasted
vividly with the passionate polemics of the opposition press. A
mouthpiece for official views, Al Anba sought to interpret,
disseminate, and seek public support for government policies. The
activities of the royal court, royal speeches, and parliamentary
debates were extensively covered. The government's identification
with Islamic cultural and political traditions was expressed editorially
and by elaborate photographic coverage of religious and court rituals.
The Istiqlal Party's Arabic -language daily, Al Alam , with a
circulation of about 40,000 in 1970, was the most influential privately
owned Moroccan newspaper. Its prestige and authority were derived
from the prominent role in the independence struggle of its
sponsoring party and of its founder, nationalist leader Allal al Fassi .
Since its establishment in 1946, Al Alam had been the major
opposition newspaper, regularly read by Mohammed V. Many of its
essays and editorials were written by prominent intellectuals . A
political and cultural newspaper of authority, Al Alam reported on the
complexities and vicissitudes of national life in the light of Istiqlal's
philosophy, endeavoring to popularize it among the general
population . The newspaper abstained from sensational reporting and
from publishing items of commercial appeal , such as cartoons ,
housewives ' columns, and courtroom chronicles .
Istiqlal's French newspaper, L'Opinion , has the largest circulation
among dailies - about 50,000. Founded in 1965 to replace the banned
La Nation Africaine, it has many foreign readers and is frequently
quoted in the international press. Shortly after it was first published,
L'Opinion stated editorially that it intended to counter the influence
of the foreign press by offering vigorous journalistic competition . It
has supported the monarchy and institutions related to it but
criticized in vigorous tones government policies, including
information policies, and attacked groups and persons whom it held
responsible for shortcomings in the implementation of social and
economic programs.
Added to the domestic press in 1970 were three daily newspapers ,
all published under independent auspices . Jaridatuk was first
published in Rabat in August 1970. Information is lacking on the
other daily, Al Kawalis, but a satirical political weekly by the same
name, sympathetic to the UNFP, was published during the early
1960s. La Depêche is published in French by Mehdi Bennouna, who is
also director of the Maghreb Arab Press, the national news agency.

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Most of the approximately forty periodicals appearing in 1970 were
weekly publications of political parties or their affiliates. They
covered a wide range of party journals, labor union and student
magazines, and periodicals catering to special interests . The majority
were published in Arabic, in tabloid format. Almost all had small
circulations and were heavily dependent on subsidies and struggling
to stay in business. Catering to a small, partisan readership, the
opposition press expressed its antigovernment views with great verbal
vehemence, and therefore its journals were frequent targets of
government seizure and suspension.
Akbar al Dunya was an independent satirical weekly journal. Often
seized because of its humorous allusions to the bureaucracy and public
issues generally considered inviolable, Akbar al Dunya has been
popular with educated readers and had a circulation of about 15,000
during the mid - 1960s. Maroc Informations, a monthly, specialized in
economic, commercial, and maritime news and was read mostly by
French -speaking educated groups. During the mid- 1960s the journal
appeared under the titles Maghrib Informations and Maghrib
Maritime.
Al Siyasa, a weekly, was founded in 1967 ; it succeeded Al Dustur
formerly the newspaper of the Constitutional Democratic Party ( Parti
Démocratique Constitutionnel-PDC) . Al Saab is a conservative
weekly journal of commentaries reflecting the views of its founder and
editor, Muhammad al Mekki al Naciri, a representative of early
Moroccan nationalism advocating national rejuvenation through
return to the simple orthodoxy of Islam. Al Nidal is an independent,
liberal, literary - political weekly appealing to young readers.
The National News Agency

Since its creation in November 1959 Maghrib Arab Press (MAP ),

the national news agency, has been by far the country's most
important news service. In 1971 it provided the domestic press with
foreign news in Arabic and with domestic news in Arabic and French
and transmitted and translated material from the foreign news
services operating in Morocco. In addition, it supplied news to the
radio and television services, to the royal court, ministries, foreign
embassies, and some private enterprises.
Founded by Mehdi Bennouna as a private, independent joint stock
company, MAP's news coverage and presentation reflected its
agreement with government policies. The agency had permanent
offices in Rabat, Casablanca, and Tangier; branches in Tunis, Algiers,
and Paris; and correspondents in all major Moroccan cities.
MAP obtained world news from eighteen national news bureaus.
With five of these-Agence France Press (AFP) , United Press
International (UPI) , the British news bureau (Reuters), Algerie Presse
150
Service ( APS) , and Tunisie Afrique Press (TAP) —the agency
maintained constant contact .
In early 1971 MAP had one radio teletype transmission daily, each
in Arabic and French, and each of one and one-half hour's duration.
The transmissions included political, economic, social, and
international news ; economic and sports reports; and items of interest
to the diplomatic communities .
Radio

Radio broadcasting has been solely in the hands of the government

since 1959, when, in accordance with a government decree
promulgated early that year, all privately owned commercial radio
stations were put off the air. The government purchased the facilities
of the important Radio Tangier International and Radio Africa
Maghrib , both based in Tangier, and Radio Dersa, based in Tetouan ,
and has since used these stations as part of its national network.
Broadcasting in 1971 was handled by the Moroccan Radio and
Television ( Radiodiffusion Television Marocain - RTM ), also known
as Radio Maroc, an agency of the Ministry of Information, which
controls its programming and editorial content. News was supplied
for broadcast by MAP.
Rabat was the broadcasting center of the country . Most broadcasts
of the national network originated in one of the main studios in
Rabat, although studio facilities also existed in Casablanca, Tangier,
Fes, Oujda, and other smaller cities.
Network A of the domestic service broadcast fifteen hours daily in
Arabic. Most of the cultural programs were in classical Arabic, but
news was broadcast in the colloquial dialect. Network B, known as the
international network, had programs in French, Spanish, and English
twelve hours daily on weekdays, fourteen hours on Saturdays, and
seventeen hours on Sundays. The bulk of the broadcasting time was in
French . Network C broadcast in three Berber dialects - Tashilhit,
Tamazight, and Tarift - for nine hours a day. During the mid- 1960s
three hours were devoted to each of the dialects .
The former Radio Tangier operated as a separate network known as
the Voice of Morocco, broadcasting a total of thirteen hours a day, of
which eleven were in Arabic ; the rest, in French and Spanish .
Religious and educational programs were prominently featured in
addition to music and variety, which constituted the bulk of the
program . Readings and commentaries of Quranic texts were broadcast
at least twice a day. The texts were related to social and political
issues of the day, and the commentaries represented the official
interpretations of these issues. Lectures by prominent Islamic scholars
on timely social problems, notably on marriage and divorce, and on
scientific and economic questions were broadcast weekly. Educational

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programs on the primary level were inaugurated during the mid
1960s, reaching more than 2,000 classrooms equipped with
loudspeakers and radio sets. Moreover, there were broadcasts of
interest to housewives, manual workers, and the youth ; a program of
medical information ; on -the-spot interviews; quizzes ; and sports
broadcasts.
Radio Maroc broadcast special foreign service programs to
Mauritania and other West African countries, the Middle East, Latin
America, and Equatorial Africa, in Arabic, French, English, and
Spanish. The Arabic program was broadcast for fifteen hours ; the
French, for 9-1/2 hours ; the Spanish, for 2-1/2 hours; and the English,
for one hour daily . Home service broadcasts were beamed abroad as
well, by shortwave transmitters. The broadcasts to Africa included
programs in classical and colloquial Arabic, Spanish, Poular, and
Wolof (languages of Senegal) , and English . The Arabic -language
programs were aimed at explaining Moroccan policies and reflecting
the country's ties with the Arab world .
Morocco had cooperated with other African countries in developing
and coordinating cultural and educational programs for the
audiovisual media . It was a member of the Union of African National
Radio and Television Services, which met in Rabat in December 1970
to discuss program exchanges and to draft programs designed to
develop African traditional music .
The government had worked steadily to improve the technical
quality of its broadcasts, a difficult task since the mountainous terrain
interfered with reception even of powerful local stations. In 1969 there
were thirty -five transmitters, of which twenty -two were longwave and
mediumwave ; seven, shortwave; and six, ultra-shortwave. Domestic
broadcasts were transmitted mainly on mediumwave; the shortwave
transmitters were used to broadcast the home service programs to
remote southern areas of the country, to other parts of Africa, and to
the Near East. The most powerful facility was a 400-kilowatt
longwave transmitter in Azilal used for external broadcasting.
There was a shortage of trained scriptwriters, producers, and
communications technicians . Agreements have been signed between
Radio Maroc and foreign countries, mainly France, for the training of
such personnel.
In 1968 there were about 826,000 licensed radio receivers . According
to unofficial sources the total number of receivers in 1970 was 934,689
( about 60 per 1,000 population) , but it is not known whether this
figure included unlicensed receivers. The domestic production of radio
sets started during the mid - 1960s. By 1968 some 150,000 sets were
produced annually, according to Moroccan official sources ; another
approximately 60,000 were imported. Experts reported that all sets in
operation could receive mediumwave broadcasts, and about half or
more were equipped to receive shortwave broadcasts as well .

152
Broadcasting facilities in the country included shortwave
transmitters of the Voice of America, located in Tangier, operating
under a special agreement between Morocco and the United States.
Under the terms of agreement, the Voice of America had granted
permission to Radio Maroc to use the transmitters for a specified
number of hours each week for broadcasts to West Africa and
Mauritania .

Moroccans reportedly took great pride in owning a radio set and in

displaying it. Almost every household was reported to own a radio of
some sort. Sets were also set up in most cafés, village markets, and
other gathering places, where they blare forth the entire day . The
most popular hours for radio listening are between 7:30 and 8:30
A.M. , between 1:00 and 1:30 P.M. , and between 8:00 and 9:00 P.M.
In addition to Radio Maroc, a number of foreign radio stations
could be heard throughout much of Morocco and apparently had large
audiences. According to press reports during the mid - 1960s, Radio
Algiers was heard in the villages ; Radio Paris, in the madina ; the
Voice of Arabs ( Radio Cairo) , in the cafés; BBC ( British Broadcasting
Corporation) , in educated circles ; and Nouakchott Radio
(Mauritanian government radio) , among the politicians. Radio Algiers
and the Voice of the Arabs were particularly popular because they
played Egyptian music.

Television

Television was introduced in 1954 by a private French company . Its

facilities were taken over by the independent Moroccan government,
and in 1962 the television service was incorporated with Radio Maroc.
Since then telecasting has been an autonomous service within Radio
Maroc and has shared with radio broadcasting the government
administration and control mechanisms of the Ministry of
Information .
In 1970 the area reached by television was limited, notably to the
large cities and their environs in the northern portions of the country
between Oujda and Fes and in the western coastal region . Plans were
underway, however, to expand the network notably through a new
station planned in Agadir. In 1970 there were television stations in
eight locations telecasting through six channels for four hours daily.
The system had been linked to Eurovision, the European television
service, since 1965. The Arabic program was beamed for two hours
and forty - five minutes ; the rest of the time was devoted to French
telecasts. Much of the programming was devoted to educational and
cultural features. Programming material was supplied largely by
foreign producers, notably in France and in the United States. Since
early 1971 the country had also subscribed to Eurovision's daily

153
television news service. Commercial telecasts first authorized in 1970
were beamed for six minutes each day.
The domestic production of television sets began during the early
1960s, but prices remained high . About 8,200 sets were produced in
1968, and another 2,000 were imported. Production was to be raised to
some 11,000 sets annually under the Five Year Plan. The private
ownership of sets was limited to the wealthy urban groups ; other sets
were owned by community organizations or by cafés where they were
used for public viewing. The government had furnished television sets
free of charge to various public places, such as youth hostels.

Films

Films were a favorite form of entertainment for urban Moroccans

and for the small segment of the rural population to whom film
showings were accessible. Films from Western countries had played
an important role in exposing Moroccans to life and customs in
technologically advanced Western societies and in many cases had
altered traditional social attitudes, notably toward women . American
westerns, French comedies, and mystery films provided good forms of
temporary escape and were valued especially by urban low income
groups. Egyptian films, because of linguistic and cultural identity,
were especially popular. Many of the Egyptian films, however,
presenting a Westernized social setting and values, complemented
and even exceeded the influence of foreign films in modifying the
views and ways of life of a growing segment of the population .
In 1969 there were 226 film theaters. Fifty of these were in
Casablanca, accounting for about 40 percent of the box office receipts
of all theaters. According to other data available in 1971, the country
had 173 film theaters in 1969, equipped for showing thirty -five
millimeter feature films and twenty-three theaters for showing
sixteen -millimeter documentaries. The total seating capacity of the
two types of theaters was 107,700, and the annual attendance was
about 18.2 million. There were also eight mobile film units operated
by the Ministry of Information, offering some 1,200 performances
during the year.
Most of the feature films and short subjects were imported. Before
being cleared for distribution by private enterprises, all imported
films were officially censored for moral and political content. Films
were also produced domestically by the government -directed
Moroccan Cinematographic Center ( Centre Cinematographique
Marocain - CCM ), established in 1961. The CCM had studios in
Souisse and Ain -Chok ( near Casablanca ), both equipped for producing
thirty -five -millimeter and sixteen -millimeter films, including
television features. Full -length feature films had been officially
encouraged but, because of budgetary limitations, CCM produced
154
mainly newsreels and documentaries for various ministries. In 1969
CCM documentaries included Folkloric Dances and Troubadour of
Marrakech ( for the Ministry of Tourism) and Andalousian Nights ( for
the Ministry of Culture) .
Despite limited scope of production CCM produced several full
length films in 1968. Two of the films, Vaincre pour Mourir ( Win to
Die) and Le Soleil du Printemps (The Sunshine of Spring) , were
presented at the government-sponsored Mediterranean Film Festival
in Rabat in the fall of 1968. Several Moroccan film directors,
including Muhammad Tazi Abdelaziz Ramdani and Larbi Bennani,
have been acclaimed by Moroccan and foreign filmgoers.

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SECTION II. POLITICAL
CHAPTER 8

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL

DYNAMICS

On July 10, 1971, a military coup d'etat threatening to overturn the

governmental system was directed against the king and a large
assemblage of government and diplomatic notables gathered at the
Skhirat Palace southwest of Rabat. By the evening of the same day
the ill -conceived attempt had collapsed, leaving in its wake some 250
dead. King Hassan II, who survived unharmed, firmly resumed royal
control, principally assisted by General Mohammed Oufkir. The
armed forces remained loyal, and no substantial public uprising in
support of the sudden eruption occurred.
The attempt, employing duped cadets of a noncommissioned
officers training school, was organized by a small group of apolitical or
conservative senior army officers apparently intent upon
“ purification ” of the government and seizure of power, but under
what form was not clear. The opposition parties—the Istiqlal
(Independence) Party and the National Union of Popular Forces
( Union Nationale des Forces Populaires—UNFP)—were not involved.
No previously known political party or faction, domestic or foreign ,
was involved, and no specific political ideology was adduced . During
the action, the antimonarchical Arab socialist government of Libya,
apparently assuming that the revolt would succeed, broadcast support
for the attempt in strong language which, in the succeeding days,
resulted in the mutual withdrawal of the diplomatic missions of the
two countries but not a formal break in diplomatic relations (see ch. 9,
Foreign Relations) .
The rapid and dramatic failure of the conspiracy attested to the
basic stability of the governmental system and society as well as to
the ineptitude of the plotters ; it also illuminated a national
characteristic of a political society in which balanced tensions
required the role of the king as central arbiter. Of at least equal
importance, the convulsion of July 10 was symbolic of interrelated
dissatisfactions and stresses in the stagnated governmental-political
and economic systems that had evolved in the wake of the French
colonial period terminated by independence in 1956.
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Sources and legitimation of national power are found both in the
distinctive Moroccan -Islamic background and in a modern overlay
embodied in the Constitution of 1970, a document endorsed by
popular referendum in July of that year. In the country at large
Moroccan society remained essentially traditionalist, Islamic, and
authoritarian -deferential, as reflected in the constitutional
identification of the king as commander of the faithful. Although the
basic system of constitutional monarchy appeared virtually
indispensable to the country, internal change and reform within that
system appeared to be required . To this end Hassan II designated a
new prime minister and government on August 6, 1971. In the
aftermath of the bizarre and bloody but symptomatic outburst of July
10, the king charged this new government with prompt
implementation of a four- point cleanup and reform program .
Political analysts observed in 1962 and 1963 that progress and
stability depended upon cooperation between the throne on the one
hand and the political parties and their associated interest groups on
the other and questioned whether the country could afford both a
multiparty system and the institution of a monarch who not only
reigned but also ruled . Subsequent experience up to late 1971 showed
that the country could live with this condition. Stability seemed to
have prevailed but in a polity of balanced factional tension that
tended to immobility rather than progress. Analysts described the
dilemma as a balance of factors and conditions pointing strongly
towards change but counterpoised by other factors, both traditional
and modern, making change unlikely . In this equation the personality
and leadership of the king, rather than the institution of his office,
were described as most likely to provide the impulse for change or
regression or, inertly, for continuation of the uneasy balance.
Underlying all sources of power and patronage, both in earlier and
in modern times, is control of the armed forces; and this power also is
in the hands of the king, confirmed in legal form in the Constitution.
The loyalty of these forces is, in consequence, always a matter of the
first interest. Among the rank and file, as shown by the failure of the
coup attempt on July 10, 1971, military loyalty to the throne was not
seriously in question. A subversive group , as shown by the same
events, had formed among the senior leadership but was destroyed in
the attempt and its aftermath .

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
Development of Constitutionalism

In December 1962, almost seven years after independence, Morocco

received a written , Western -style constitution . There was
precedent in the country's history for a written charter limiting the
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power of the monarch. As early as 1908, however, a constitutional
document was drafted but not implemented ; and in the 1930s
nationalists, in looking toward an independent Morocco, often
referred to the form of their vision as a constitutional monarchy.
Following a gradualist policy of balancing tradition with change, King
Mohammed V acted to keep essential political controls in his own
hands during the transition period after 1956. One of his first acts
after independence was to create a cabinet, or Council of
Government. The cabinet first headed by Embarek Bekkai, which
functioned as an advisory and administrative body, was appointed by
and responsible only to the sultan. Under the presidency of Mehdi
Ben Barka, Morocco's first national consultative assembly was, like
the cabinet, appointed by the sultan and had only consultative
powers. From the opening debates in November 1956 until May 1959,
when Mohammed V let its charter lapse, the assembly served as little
more than a sounding board for the political parties and an initiation
to the procedures of parliamentary government.
The next important move from the palace came on May 8, 1958, in
the form of the Royal Charter, in which the king restated his
contention that the best form of government for an independent state
is democratic and that a true democracy, in which the people would
participate increasingly in the affairs of government, could be evolved
within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. In November 1958
the guarantees made in general terms in May were specified in the
King's Charter of Public Liberties, and the basis of civil rights thus
passed into law.
In May 1960 the palace announced that before the end of 1962 a
constitution would be drawn up that would permit all Moroccans to
participate in the government through the intermediary of elected
representatives. In the same month the long-awaited elections for
communal councils finally took place . Concerning the still
unanswered question of who would draft the constitution, the king
chose a middle course between UNFP demands for a nationally
elected constituent assembly and his own preference for a constitution
drafted by a select group of experts. On November 3, 1960, he
appointed the Constitutional Council, composed predominantly of
Istiqlal leaders, to write a constitution, which would be approved by
him and submitted to the people in a referendum . The absence of
numerically small, but politically important , other elements
ultimately undermined the council's authority, and it became defunct
after King Mohammed's death on February 26, 1961 .
On succeeding to the throne on March 3, 1961 , Hassan II continued
his father's work in the direction of the projected constitutional
monarchy. His Fundamental Law, promulgated on June 2, 1961,
reaffirmed the country's basic principles of adherence to the Islamic
religion and the Arabic language and the preservation of monarchical

159
government evolving toward " authentic democracy.” In addition, he
restated the basic rights and obligations of citizens that would later be
found in the constitution, but the question of how and by whom the
proposed constitution would be written remained unanswered. By late
1961 it was apparent that the king was planning to elaborate the
constitution without a constituent assembly. The document that was
finally presented to the people for ratification in December 1962 was
the work of Hassan II and a small group of advisers, especially the
minister of interior, Reda Guédira.

The Constitution of 1962

Despite many innovations, the new constitution embodied the
essentials of Moroccan tradition and formalized the practices of
government since independence. Importantly, it was open to legal
revision, allowing for the evolution of the political system . For many
politically sensitive Moroccans, however, the constitution fell short of
expectations, both in content and especially in the manner in which it
was drafted . The latter question continued thereafter to be a major
issue for the political opposition in the country. Essentially, it
reflected the larger contest between those favoring a single -party
system and the royal determination that this should not occur.
On November 4, 1962, two weeks before the text of the constitution
was made public , the procedures of the referendum were announced
from the palace. All Moroccans over twenty-one could go to the polls
on December 7 to vote yes or no to the question “ Do you approve the
draft constitution which has been proposed ? ” All authorized political
parties, which excluded the Communists, were permitted to
participate in the campaign. The Istiqlal supported the government
for the last time, as it turned out, in a major action . Leading the
opposition to ratification was the UNFP, joined by the Moroccan
Labor Union ( Union Marocain du Travail - UMT), which maintained
that only a nationally elected assembly could draft the constitution .
The outcome of the campaign and referendum was an overwhelming
royal victory : 84 percent of the electorate voted, 95 percent in favor of
ratification .
With the new constitution, effective on December 14, 1962, the
kingdom of Morocco became a “ constitutional monarchy,” at least to
the extent that it was endowed with a written statement of the legal
bases of its authority. The constitution defined the kingdom of
Morocco as a sovereign Muslim state, in form a social and democratic
constitutional monarchy, with Arabic as the official language. The
state was declared to be an African state and part of the “ Greater
Maghrib .” Sovereignty was said to “ belong to the nation,” which
exercised it directly through the referendum and indirectly through
the intermediary of its representative institutions-a two -house
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national parliament and provincial and communal councils . The
constitution supported political parties as a means to allow citizens to
organize in their own interests ; it specifically prohibited any single
party from exercising a monopoly of political activity. All Moroccans
were held equal before the law, as the highest expression of the will of
the nation . Fundamental to the new constitution was the provision for
representative government on the local level through the elected
communal and provincial councils. Civil rights, based on the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man, were spelled out, as were basic
obligations of citizenship. Revision was provided for, to be initiated
either by the prime minister or by a member of the Parliament .
Elections for the lower house of the national Parliament were held
in May 1963 and for the upper house in the following October; by the
end of the year all of Morocco's new institutions of representative
government were in operation . King Hassan opened the first session
of Parliament on November 18, 1963. Despite the separation of powers
and cross - checking devices of the constitution, however, the decisive
balance of power remained constitutionally and in fact with the
throne .

The Constitution of 1970

On June 7, 1965, King Hassan II, in view of public disturbances

earlier that year and the immobility of the Parliament, which had
presented to him only two pieces of legislation since its opening,
utilized the powers granted to him by Article 35 of the Constitution of
1962 to declare a national emergency, or “ state of exception,” under
which he ruled directly, with his council of ministers, for the next five
years. During this time he himself acted as prime minister until July
7, 1967. Parliament was suspended rather than dissolved, since its
dissolution would have required new elections . Rather than
conducting new elections, as advocated by the political opposition,
the king and his government held that constitutional revision was first
necessary to enable representative institutions to break out of their
deadlock and provide legislation for national problems . King Hassan
and a small staff of consultants prepared a new draft constitution,
again without calling a constituent assembly for the purpose and
again, as in 1962, incurring the opposition of the UNFP and now of
the Istiqlal as well .
On July 24, 1970, the new Constitution was presented to the
electorate through a referendum , was overwhelmingly endorsed by a
98.8-percent vote and became effective on July 31 , 1970. Many
provisions of the 1962 document were restated or modified only
slightly. There were, however, significant changes—particularly in the
manner of revision and in the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The position of the throne was strengthened, both in the
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sections directly describing the monarchical functions and indirectly
through interlocking provisions relating to other institutions.
The Constitution of 1970 consists of a preface stating the national
identity and broad policies and twelve chapters totaling 101 articles.
Chapter 1 sets forth basic principles and individual political,
economic, and social rights; chapter 2 deals with the institution of the
monarchy; chapter 3 describes the organization and powers of the
House of Representatives; chapter 4 defines the executive agency of
the government, comprising a prime minister and ministers; and
chapter 5 covers relations between the various authorities. Chapters 6,
7, and 10 deal with the judiciary and courts ; chapter 8, local
government ; chapter 9, the Higher Council for National Promotion
and Planning; chapter 11, revision of the constitution ; and chapter 12,
transitional provisions empowering the king to conduct all affairs of
state until the investiture of the new House of Representatives . (The
House was elected in August 1970 and opened on October 9.)
The preface to the Constitution of 1970 declares that “ Morocco is a
sovereign Islamic state, with Arabic as its official language, and forms
part of the Greater Maghrib .” As an African nation, Morocco seeks
the objective of African unity and, as a member of various
international organizations, pledges support to their charters. Finally,
the preface states a determination to continue working for world
peace and security. Elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East,
constitutions propounded by Arab nationalist-socialist regimes
frequently contain references to “ Arab unity ” and the “Arab nation .”
This particular language does not occur in either the 1970 or the 1962
constitution of Morocco; the country, however, belongs to the League
of Arab States and has consistently aligned itself with the principal
Arab causes (see ch. 9, Foreign Relations).
In the enumeration of basic principles and individual rights set
forth in chapter one of the Constitution of 1970, Morocco is stated to
be “ a constitutional monarchy, democratic and social.” Sovereignty
resides in the nation and is exercised directly by referendum and
indirectly through the constitutional institutions. Political parties,
unions, communal councils, and professional chambers all participate
in the organization and representation of the citizens. The last three
of these elements were not cited in the parallel statement of the 1962
Constitution. Significantly, the 1962 constitutional prohibition of the
single -party system is restated in the 1970 document . The rule of law
and equality of all before the law are reaffirmed. Islam is again
specifically given as the religion of the state, which guarantees to all
the free exercise of religious worship. In the concluding sections of
chapter one, the political, economic, and social rights and obligations
of citizens are restated exactly as in 1962.
The Constitution of 1970, like its predecessor, contains provision for
its own amendment, or revision, again specifying as exceptions that
162
the monarchical form of the state and the provisions relating to Islam
cannot be the object of such change. The manner of revision in 1970 is
decisively altered from that of 1962 by placing the initiative for
revision and the power of calling the required confirmatory
referendum squarely in the hands of the king.

THE MONARCHY

Powers of the King

The Constitution of 1970, like that of 1962, confirmed the

traditional role of the king as both secular and religious head of state
and delineated the wide scope of his powers. The document of 1970,
in fact, extended those powers. The king is commander of the faithful,
supreme representative of the nation, symbol of its unity, and
guarantor of its existence and continuity. He is the guardian of
respect for Islam and the Constitution and protector of the rights and
liberties of citizens, groups in the society, and organizations. He is the
guarantor of the nation's independence and of the territorial integrity
of the kingdom in its “ authentic frontiers .” His person is “ sacred and
inviolable .”
The prime minister and ministers are appointed by the king, who
presides over the cabinet, officially called the Council of Ministers .
The king signs and promulgates laws and can put them to a
referendum or send them back to the House of Representatives for a
second reading. He can dissolve the House by decree ( dahir) after
consulting the president of the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court and addressing the nation. In the event of dissolution ,
elections for a new House must be conducted not more than three
months later; in the interim the king exercises both executive and
legislative powers. The new House then formed cannot be dissolved
less than a year after its election .
The king also has the right to address both the nation and the
House by messages not subject to debate . He exercises the
administrative power , and by decree, under Article 29, he may
delegate defined administrative authority to the prime minister. In
general, royal decrees are countersigned by the prime minister except
in cases involving ministerial appointment or release, dissolution of
the House, use of the referendum and revision of the constitution, and
the declaration of national emergency .
The king is commander in chief of the armed forces and makes all
civil and military appointments or delegates appointment power. He
accredits Moroccan ambassadors, and foreign ambassadors are
accredited to him . He signs and ratifies treaties, except that treaties
involving financial expenditures must have the prior approval of the
House, and any treaties having provisions contrary to the
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Constitution cannot be ratified without prior constitutional revision.
A declaration of war requires prior notification to the House.
Additionally, the king constitutionally presides over the
Educational Higher Council , the Higher Council for National
Promotion and Planning, and the Higher Council of the Magistracy.
He appoints the judiciary upon recommendation from the Higher
Council of the Magistracy and has the right of pardon by amnesty or
commutation .
The capstone of royal authority, however, is the extraordinary
power awarded by Article 35. When the national territory is in danger
or the functioning of constitutional institutions is jeopardized, the
king, after consulting with the president of the House and addressing
a message to the nation, is empowered to declare by decree a national
emergency and assume the full powers necessary to restore normalcy.
The emergency period is terminated in the same way it is begun . It
was under this power, stated also in the Constitution of 1962, that
Hassan II ruled between June 1965 and August 1970.
Succession to the Throne

Under Articles 20 and 21 of the 1970 Constitution , as in that of

1962, succession to the throne is hereditary by male primogeniture in
the line of King Hassan II, except when the king during his lifetime
designates a successor other than his eldest son . If the king has no
son, the succession passes to his nearest collateral male relative under
the same conditions . Regularization of the succession was initiated on
July 9, 1957, by Mohammed V when he officially named Mulay
Hassan crown prince.
The king is not of age until the completion of his eighteenth year.
During his minority the Regency Council exercises all powers of the
crown except those pertaining to constitutional revision. (This means,
in effect, that during a period of royal minority constitutional change
is not legally possible.) The Regency Council is to be presided over by
the nearest collateral male relative of the king who is himself more
than twenty-one years old; the other members are the first president
of the Supreme Court, the president of the House of Representatives,
and seven others appointed by the old king during his lifetime. After
the new king completes his eighteenth year, the Regency Council
continues as a consultative body until the king completes his twenty
first year. The constitution specifies that the rules and procedures of
council operations be fixed by an organic law; this requirement was
fulfilled by the Regency Council Law of October 16, 1970.
Hassan II and the Royal Family
King Hassan II was born on July 9, 1929 , in Rabat, the eldest son of
Sultan Mohammed V, who had succeeded to the sultanate only in
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1927. Mohammed had been elected by the ulama (see Glossary) in the
traditional manner but only after approval by the ruling French
colonial regime. His early life, despite his sharifian princely lineage ,
had been austere. His education was primarily in terms of Arabic
classicism and the Quran rather than in the context of modern times .
Later, by rigorous self-education, he repaired these omissions. Also, he
ensured that his children should be educated in both modern and
classical terms and that they should enjoy the comforts of life, which
his station, even under the French, could provide.
Hassan II, from his earliest days, was prepared carefully by his
father for his eventual ascent to the throne. He developed a wide
range of interests, for which he became distinguished , ranging from
athletics, automobiles, and aircraft to scientific technology, classical
and modern literature, and a mastery of both the Arabic and the
French languages. After graduating with honors from the Imperial
College, he entered law studies at the Rabat Institute of Higher
Studies, a department of the University of Bordeaux. He received the
law degree from this university in 1951 and in 1952 the Diploma of
Higher Studies corresponding to the Master of Arts degree. After
independence he gradually became the king's principal representative
and adviser. When Hassan II, at the age of thirty-two, succeeded as
king on March 3, 1961, he had been well prepared. His legal, political,
and military training, the combination of modern and classicial
education he had received, and the experiences shared with his father
and the nation enabled him to assume Mohammed V's role with a
firm hand .
In 1960 Hassan II married Lala Latifa, a member of a leading
Moroccan family. They have five children : Crown Prince Mulay Sidi
Mohammed , born on August 21 , 1963, three daughters, and a second
son, Prince Mulay Rachid, born on June 20, 1970. The king's brother,
Prince Mulay Abdullah, has actively assisted in various governmental
affairs, including cabinet posts, and his sisters, Princess Lala Aisha
and Princess Lala Fatima, have been active in public representation .
In 1971 the latter was president of the National Union of Moroccan
Women ( Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines — UNFM ).

GOVERNMENT AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers

The prime minister and the individual ministers together form the
Council of Ministers , or cabinet . Collectively , they are

constitutionally designated and referred to, in the European manner,

as “ the government.” They are appointed and may be dismissed by
the king and are responsible both to him and to the House of
Representatives. The Constitution does not prescribe the number of
165
ministries or any specific identifications except for the prime
minister, and the composition of the cabinet is thus a royal
prerogative. The king, at the time of appointment of a new
government, habitually makes a policy address providing his
guidance. The prime minister is then required to go before the House
of Representatives and present the program he intends to carry out.
The government is responsible for enforcement of the law and
controls the administration .
The prime minister, as head of the government, coordinates the
activities of the various ministries. He has the right, after discussion
in the cabinet, to introduce draft bills into the House of
Representatives. He countersigns laws, except those having to do with
the basic royal powers, and may initiate and issue administrative
directives under powers delegated him by Article 29 of the
Constitution . In this case, the concurrence of the minister who will be
charged with their execution is required. The prime minister may ask
the House of Representatives for a vote of confidence. If the vote is
negative he and all the ministers of his government are required to
submit their resignations to the king. A House vote of censure has the
same result. Ministers may simultaneously be members of the House
and of the cabinet.
King Hassan has frequently changed one or more ministers without
changing the prime minister and the government as a whole. The
length of cabinet tenure has been generally less than two years.
Changes have usually been made, especially since 1963, within a
relatively small group of executives known for their loyalty and their
experience in administration. The king has frequently consulted with
ministers on an individual basis, using the council as a body of
advisers somewhat like the council of wazara (executive officials of the
sultan-plural of wazir) of the old makhzan (see Glossary ). On August
17, 1971 , however, Hassan II, under Article 29 of the Constitution,
delegated extensive administrative power and responsibility to the
government, a development likely to change the mode of cabinet
functioning.

The Civil Service

The bureaucracy played a major role, exceeded only by the throne,

in assuring national stability in the transition period of
decolonization. Through the succession of cabinet crises, rural
rebellions, border conflicts, political tensions, and strikes that
disturbed the order of Moroccan society, the civil service continued to
carry out the routine business of government, remaining loyal and
relatively apolitical . Patterned after the French model established
during the protectorate, the civil service replaced foreign personnel
166
with Moroccans more rapidly than in other sectors of national life,
except for the Ministry of Justice.
The bureaucracy established by the French to run the country
under their colonial protectorate was a revolutionary innovation in
Moroccan governmental experience, and by 1934 it had spread itself
into every corner of the land. This bureaucracy provided a lucrative
career field for the French , who occupied most positions of
importance while in general relegating Moroccan employees to the
lower grades and menial tasks. By the end of 1955 some 35,000 French
were imbedded in the governmental system . In the four and a half
decades of protectorate administration close links developed at all
levels between the civil service and the private sector. Pork -barrel
politics and the arrogance of office set a style for the bureaucracy
that, in addition to modernized organizational forms, inevitably
influenced administration after independence.
The public administration became the first major wage-earning
group to benefit from independence ; with the transformation of the
administrative elite, position in the bureaucracy became a mark of
prestige. Although exact and agreed figures were not available,
informed estimates indicated that by 1970 the 35,000 French of 1955
had been reduced to less than 8,000; in the same period Moroccan
civilians employed in the government service increased from about
12,000 to about 96,000.
By 1960 the Istiqlal Party, never able to displace Mohammed V as
the symbol of national independence, had been split by the defection
of the UNFP, and the king completed his consolidation and
centralization of the power of appointment and patronage. In 1961 the
UNFP and its ally the UMT attempted to generate a civil service
strike, but the effort, securing partial support from employees of only
two ministries, failed badly . When the three Istiqlal members
resigned from the government in January 1963, the last party
challenge to royal control of the government apparatus came to an
end .
Since that time the emphasis has been on individual loyalty and
apolitical routine management, producing a high degree of self
protection, security, routine competence, and continuity in the offices
of chiefs of service ( chefs de service) and below, with a recurring
higher level rotation, or flux, of ministers and directors among a
limited loyal elite. Basically, according to observers, this was simply
the traditional system of the old preprotectorate sultanate,
modernized in the style of the French example. Being essentially
dependent, it was stable but also low in administrative vigor and
vulnerable to collusion and corruption at all levels. The Istiqlal press
complained in 1970 that, although the Constitution forbade the device
of single-party rule, the administrative bureaucracy was actually the
single party of the regime.
167
Civil service pay in all steps of the career grades has been frozen
since 1960 and has never been high ; this factor was at the base of
much of the petty corruption in the service. That King Hassan was
well aware of the problem as part of the national problem of wages
and prices, as well as of government efficiency, was shown by his
indication in early 1971 of an impending salary increase . The king's
motive, accelerated by the events of July and August 1971, has been
reform and rejuvenation within the system .
During the decade of 1960–70 five state - operated institutes were
opened for government service training: the Mohammedia
Engineering School, the Institute of Statistics and Applied
Economics, the Kenitra School for Managers ( “ cadres” ), the Hassan
II Institute of Agronomy, and the Moroccan School of Administration .
The programs at these institutions were designed to produce skillful,
nonpolitical technicians for the career civil service. Their ultimate
effect had not yet had time to be seen by late 1971 .

The Higher Council for National Promotion and Planning

The urgent requirement for national development in a newly
independent nation led to the formation in 1957 of a separate body,
called the Higher Council for National Promotion and Planning,
having quasi-executive and legislative attributes and free from many
of the limitations of ordinary cabinet administration . This
organization was constitutionally established in 1962 and again by
Articles 89-92 of the Constitution of 1970. It is presided over by the
king, and its composition is fixed by law to include certain ministers,
technical advisers, and appointed union representatives. The draft
plan drawn up by the staff is considered by the plan council and by
the Council of Ministers.After approval by the Council of Ministers,
it is presented to the House of Representatives for approval, where
budgetary allocations are made (see ch. 11, Character and Structure of
the Economy) .

LEGAL SYSTEM , JUDICIARY, AND COURTS

At independence, the confusion resulting from the existence of

several legal systems, each of which had its own court system,
necessitated the creation of a unified legal structure and court system.
The major portion of this reorganization had been carried out by 1958
without political complications.
Traditional Islamic law, Berber customary law, rabbinical law, and
1
the French and Spanish legal codes of the protectorate were brought
together into a hybrid system that maintains the distinction between
modern law and court systems and the traditional secular and
religious systems that are still a part of Moroccan culture . In the

168
traditional sector of the society the sharia ( Islamic law ) continued to
function , although gradually being integrated into the modern law
system. In the modern sector statute law is used, combining elements
of the French legal code system of the protectorate with some
practices of Islamic law as established under the makhzan.
The implementation of this legal reorganization was begun by
divesting the caid ( local administrator - see Glossary) of all judicial
functions. The Berber decree of 1930 that had institutionalized the
Berber customary law courts was revoked in 1956, and Berber courts
were replaced by cadi (Islamic law courts) (see ch. 3, Historical
Setting) . Hebrew law continued to apply to personal status questions
in the Jewish community. The monumental task of rewriting a
comprehensive legal code, which involved modernizing many
traditional practices, was accomplished with relative speed. A new
code of personal status, concerning the family, marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, was compiled and promulgated in 1958. Despite pressure
from progressive elements for a more rapid Westernization of law,
many elements of the sharia were retained in the code, revealing the
continuing influence of traditionalist thinking. A reformed penal code
was published in February 1959, unifying criminal law and procedure
and increasing the protection of the citizen against police errors and
abuse. Under the code, the individual is presumed innocent until
proved guilty, may not be held in police custody for more than forty
eight hours without indictment, and is guaranteed the right to legal
counsel. Four classes of crimes are defined, with maximum penalties
prescribed for each, and the jurisdiction of the various levels of courts
is fixed .
Moroccanization, the replacement of foreign civil servants by
Moroccan personnel, occurred somewhat more rapidly in the judiciary
than in other sectors. This was due in part to the high number,
compared with other professions, of Moroccan lawyers; law has been
the favored subject for study by students from the Moroccan upper
classes as preparation for entry into politics and public service. After
independence it appeared that more than a third of university
students were in this field .
In June 1964 Parliament voted to terminate all courts established
under the protectorate . In the reorganized court system , Muslims
appear before cadi, Jews before rabbinical courts, and foreigners
before courts of first instance for matters of personal status . For
penal, civil , and commercial questions, two parallel lines of
jurisdiction exist : the traditional, functioning in the rural areas and
old cities, incorporates the sadad (conciliation) courts, and the
modern , operating in the Europeanized cities, such as Rabat and
Casablanca, comprises courts of peace ( triunaux de paix) and courts
of first instance. Functioning in the modern line are labor courts,
established in 1957 to arbitrate disputes arising in commerce,

169
industry, agriculture, and the professions. Traditional, modern, and
labor courts are under four courts of appeal, located in Rabat,
Tangier, Fes, and Marrakech .
At the top of Morocco's court system, the Supreme Court — the
highest court of appeals—is divided into five chambers: criminal,
correctional (civil) appeals, abrogation and revision, administrative,
and constitutional , numbered in that order. The administrative
chamber deals with abuses of authority by administrative agencies.
The constitutional chamber, provided for in the Constitution of 1962,
determines the constitutionality of organic laws before their
promulgation, decides disputes over location of powers, approves the
internal rules of the House as to constitutionality, and oversees the
regularity of elections and referenda. It consists of four members
including its presiding officer, the first (senior) president of the
Supreme Court.
Two other organs of Morocco's judicial structure are the Higher
Council of the Magistracy and the High Court. The former regulates
and disciplines the judiciary and ensures its guarantees. It is presided
over by the king, with ten other members, four royally appointed and
six elected within the judiciary. The High Court, sometimes called the
High Court of Justice but not so named in the Constitution, decides
on abuses of power and corruption in the government. Charges against
a minister may be made by a secret ballot and a two-thirds majority
in the House. The president of this court is royally appointed. The
number of other members and their procedures are set by law; they
are elected by the House of Representatives.
The basic judicial structure is stated in Articles 75-85 and 93-95 of
the Constitution of 1970, specifying the independence of the judiciary,
the rendering of judgments in the name of the king, the royal
appointment of judges based on the recommendations of the Higher
Council of the Magistracy, and the establishment of that council, the
High Court, and the constitutional chamber. Detailed procedures for
all bodies are promulgated by implementing decree; administration of
the system is under the minister of justice, who is also vice president
of the Higher Council of the Magistracy and head of the National
Institute of Judiciary Studies, established by royal decree on January
29, 1970. The public prosecution is conducted under the king's
attorney general in the Supreme Court and lower echelons.

LEGISLATIVE ARM AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The unicameral legislature is called the House of Representatives,

also often given in English as the Chamber of Representatives. Within
the structure of the House, multiple forms of representation were
utilized: directly, by geographical electoral district; indirectly, from

170
the councils of provincial and local government; and functionally,
through professional chambers and unions.

Constitutional Organization and Powers of the House

The Constitution of 1970 provides for national election of the House
of Representatives, specifying that the right to vote is personal and
cannot be delegated. Freedom of expression and legal immunities of
representatives during session and recess are delineated ; critical
challenge of the royalist system or Islam and disrespect for the king,
however, are not permitted and, in general, legal immunity does not
extend to any member caught in the act of a crime or misdemeanor.
The House of Representatives is required to hold two sessions
annually : the first, commencing on the second Friday of October, is
opened by the king ; the second commences on the second Friday in
April . Sessions lasting more than two months may be terminated by
royal decree without dissolving the House. An extraordinary session
for a special agenda may be called by decree or by an absolute
majority of the members.
All government ministers may attend meetings of the House and of
the committees by which its work is prepared. Meetings of the House
are open to the public, and the record of discussion, like laws, is
published in full in the Official Bulletin. Closed sessions may be held
at the request of the prime minister or one -third of the
representatives. The House makes its own rules of procedure by vote,
subject to constitutional review by the Supreme Court.
Representatives are chosen for a term of six years, part by direct
universal suffrage and part indirectly by electoral colleges of the
communal councils and separate electoral colleges of the professional
associations and wage earners. The Constitution does not specify the
total number of representatives, the numbers in the representational
categories, or the conditions of eligibility and method of election.
These matters are required to be set forth in an organic law. The
president and officers of the House are elected annually by the House,
in proportion to participating groups, at the beginning of the October
session. In September 1971 the president of the House chosen in the
elections of August 21 and 28 continued to be the former foreign
minister, Abdul Hadi Boutaleb . On October 11 Mahdi Ben Bouchta
was elected president, replacing Boutaleb , who had announced his
intended resignation at the beginning of the session .
The House of Representatives legislates by voting and, in some
circumstances, can delegate authority to the prime minister and the
government to issue decree laws. It has competence to legislate on
individual and collective rights, principles of legal codes, the creation
of courts, and basic matters pertaining to civil and military personnel
of the government. It approves the budget and the development plan
171
but cannot later change them. If the general budget is not approved
by December 31, the government proceeds as if it were.
The king, the prime minister, and members of the House of
Representatives all may introduce draft bills. The government is
answerable to the House, and one meeting per week may be scheduled
by the secretariat for the questioning of ministers. The failure of a
vote of confidence motion to gain an absolute majority in the House
or the passage of a no -confidence motion or vote of censure by an
absolute majority causes the collective resignation of the prime
minister and ministers. Only one censure vote may be passed in one
year.

The Organic Law and Electoral System

The organic law pertaining to the membership and election of the

House of Representatives, and implementing the Constitution, was
promulgated as royal decree No. 1-70–206 of July 31, 1970, published
in the Official Bulletin on August 1, 1970. This law, in addition to its
own provisions, contains citations to numerous related decrees dealing
with elections and constituent bodies. It provides that the House of
Representatives shall consist of 240 members, of whom ninety shall be
elected by direct universal suffrage, ninety shall be elected within the
framework of the prefectures and provinces by assemblies or colleges
of communal councilmen, and sixty shall be elected by colleges in the
chambers of commerce and industry and in agriculture, crafts, and
wage earners ' unions. The professional and wage earners' unions seats
were allocated as follows: agriculture, twenty - four; commerce and
industry, sixteen ; crafts, ten ; wage earner representatives, ten. The
ninety communal council seats were separately divided by proportion
among the nineteen provinces and two prefectures.
Those eligible to vote in the direct election include Moroccans of
both sexes over twenty-one years of age who are registered on the
communal election lists ; for the representatives in the other
categories, additional factors of eligibility are determined by the
bodies concerned . Candidates for the House must be citizens of at
least twenty - five years of age at the date of election, registered voters,
and members of the particular constituency from which they are
seeking election. Certain categories of persons are not eligible to vote
or run for office. Disqualification procedures are prescribed, as are
definitions of the limits of incompatibility between status as a
representative and other activities, and punishments for falsification
or commercial exploitation of office are set forth. Detailed procedures
required for the declaration of candidacy are also spelled out.
Articles 28 through 52 of the decree establish in extensive detail
procedures regulating campaigning for and conduct and discipline of
elections, maintaining electoral lists, opening and closing polls,
172
counting votes at local and national levels, handling records,
publishing results, and processing complaints and appeals. Single
member electoral districts for the direct vote segment are designated
by separate decree. The machinery for election management and
observation is highly organized and is administered under the
minister of interior, provincial governors, and the representational
chambers. The principle of voting is the secret written ballot, with
color codes for the illiterate .
Reports from all polling stations and intermediate reviews must
end up with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in
Rabat, where the national and final certification is made by a
commission composed of the president of the constitutional chamber,
a judge of the administrative chamber, and the minister of interior.
Each party list may be represented by one delegate to the
commission. Elections may be partially or fully nullified if one or
more of the following conditions prevailed : if the election was not
conducted in the manner prescribed by law, if voting was not free, if
there was fraud, or if an elected person was found to be legally
incapacitated .

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Constitutional Provisions for Local Government

The Constitution of 1970 deals with local government under three

short articles, with only minor changes in wording from the
corresponding articles in the document of 1962. As in other categories
of government description, delineation of details is left to be “ created
by law ,” meaning, in effect, by royal decree. Articles 86 and 87 state
that the kingdom's local communities are the prefectures, provinces ,
and communes and additional communities as created by law. The
communities elect councils, or assemblies, to manage their affairs
democratically in accordance with conditions determined by law.
Article 88 directs that in the prefectures and provinces the governors
shall execute the decisions of the prefecture and provincial
assemblies. Governors also coordinate administrative activity and
watch over the application of the laws.

Evolution and Structure of Local Government

The principal characteristic of regional administration during the
protectorate period was a highly centralized authority leading from
the resident general down to the district officers in the military and
civil zones. A double structure of European administrators and
Moroccan officials appointed by the Europeans descended in parallel
lines, but in every case ultimate power resided with the Europeans. At
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the lowest echelon the district officer reached the rural population
through the Moroccan caid. After independence the double structure
disappeared. Names of towns, titles of officials, and boundary lines
changed, but the essential administrative system used under the
protectorate remained as a hybrid system of European procedures
adapted to Moroccan institutions, serving to bring the entire country
under a single, central administration, after some initial rural
turbulence from 1956 to 1959 ( see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 14,
National Defense and Internal Security) .
In the early years of independence the loose structure of rural
administration imposed during the protectorate was modified to suit
the requirements of a new nation. A major objective was the
integration of Berber tribesmen into a national administrative system,
attempted by rearranging rural administration on a basis of
communal centers rather than tribes. In many rural areas this
entailed bringing previously autonomous tribal leaders under the
control of new administrators, who were often Istiqlal Party members
from urban areas.
Under the administrative decrees of 1959 and 1960, implemented
by the Ministry of Interior, the basic regional units are the
constituency ( circonscription ), the circle, and the province. The
constituency is based on the traditional unit of administration, the
caidat. Constituencies are of two types, the rural and the urban, each
of which exhibits hybrid characteristics of both traditional and French
influence plus later accretions.
Administration in the rural constituency is headed by an official
called the caid, whose functions are executive . ( He does not have the
judicial power of the old sultanic caid.) Subareas, or communes, under
the rural caid are each administered by a shaykh (see Glossary);
within each of these, the headman of a small village is called a
muqaddam . There is no set geographical size for any of these
divisions, their scope being determined by Ministry of Interior
authority guided by custom and local conditions. Schematically,
however, the structure is pyramidal and authoritarian. In the urban
constituencies the senior official, parallel to the caid, is the pasha
(governor, or mayor, of a city) . Under him, administration of each
municipal ward ( arrondissement) is headed by a khalif.
The administrative level above the constituency is the circle,
headed by a senior caid . It functions as an intermediate unit between
the constituency and the province and has grouped under it two or
more constituencies. Circles, in turn, are grouped under the nineteen
provinces.
Although minor variations exist at the lowest level, the executive
heads of the administrative chain from muqaddam to provincial
governor are civil servants appointed usually by officials two levels
higher upon recommendation from officials one level higher, but
174
ultimately by royal authority. Each position, therefore, constitutes a
key point of contact between the throne and all parts of the kingdom.
The minister of interior, at the national level , is responsible for
directing and administering the whole structure.
Partly because of the closeness of his contacts with the central
government and partly because of his power, the governor of a
province is one of the most highly regarded officials in government.
He has a triple responsibility: to the king, whose direct representative
he is ; to the minister of interior, for the administration of the entire
province; and to the representative provincial assembly, the decisions
of which on social and economic questions he must consider for
approval. The governor's functions include overseeing and executing
the decisions of the provincial assemblies and coordinating provincial
projects among various ministries. He receives local budgets from the
caids and pashas and presents them, as well as the provincial budget,
to the minister of interior for approval. He is usually consulted by the
minister of interior before bills relevant to his province are taken up
by the cabinet. Periodically, governors meet in conference with the
king, thus assuring royal control and coordination .
Morocco's two largest cities, Rabat and Casablanca, are classed
separately as prefectures, on the same administrative level as the
provinces. Their pashas, at once governors and mayors, are appointed
by, and therefore directly responsible to, the king. They are charged
with overseeing and coordinating all administrative services as well as
supervising the activities and executing the decisions of the
prefectural assembly. A political and social service oversees the affairs
of the wards into which the prefectures are organized for
administrative purposes. A general secretariat for administrative and
technical affairs coordinates urban planning and prepares the budget
for the pasha, who submits it to the Ministry of Interior . The urban
communes in municipalities elsewhere in the country are organized
and function essentially like Rabat and Casablanca.
A far-reaching reform in Moroccan local government was achieved
by the long- prepared and frequently postponed elections of May 29,
1960, which established urban and rural communal councils in the
communes of the constituencies . Local elections again were held in
1963 and 1969. In practice, the power of the councils is restricted to
the deliberation of social and economic affairs of the commune .
Political questions are expressly excluded by law. Councillors prepare
and vote on the communal budget, but all decisions are subject to
approval by the caid, who may change or insert items on the budget,
as he may on the agenda. The relationship between the local councils
and the officers of the administration was not yet well clarified in
1971, but the essential powers lay with the latter group.
Councillors are elected for six-year terms by direct universal
suffrage. According to the size of the commune , the council may have
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as many as fifty members. Its president, the highest elected official of
the commune, is chosen from among them by secret ballot; he
presents the budget , applies the decisions of the council , and
represents the commune in court. Public sessions are held four times
a year for two weeks each. As the representative of the central
government, the caid or pasha attends all council sessions, and all
decisions made by councillors are subject to his approval, as are all
items on the agenda and in the budget.
Institutions of representative government on the provincial level,
initiated by the assembly elections of October 1963, have little
political weight, like the communal councils, but do exercise slightly
wider legislative powers. Like the communal councils, the provincial
assemblies vary in size according to the population of the province. In
each province, assemblymen are chosen by communal councillors
from among their own members . In addition to the elected
assemblymen, one representative is chosen from each provincial
chamber of agriculture, commerce, industry, and handicrafts.
Assembly sessions are held publicly, in the spring for two weeks and
for three weeks in the fall, when the provincial budget is debated. The
minister of interior, upon consultation with the governor, may
dissolve the assembly. The agenda is established by the president, in
cooperation with the assembly and the governor, although the
minister of interior may include any items he sees fit. The budget is
prepared by the governor and then submitted to the appropriate
commission within the assembly where it is voted on ; only after the
approval of the minister of interior can it be enacted.
Municipal and communal elections were held nationwide on
October 3, 1969, for the first time since 1963. Neutral or independent
nonopposition candidates won 9,199 seats out of 11,166 contested. The
opposition parties together won only seventy seats as compared to 850
in the 1963 elections and were thus swept aside at the local level .

Regions, Provinces, and Prefectures in 1971

A new development and further expansion of the consultative

council device appeared in the designation in mid- 1971 of seven
administrative regions, each encompassing two to four provinces or
prefectures. All the current nineteen provinces and both prefectures
were included (see table 1) . Announcement of the regions was made
by decree No. 1-71-71 of June 16, 1971, published in the Official
Bulletin on June 23. Under this decree, a regional consultative council
is to be formed in each region to advise the government on all
programs of social and economic development. The council is to be
kept informed on the progress of development programs in its region
and can request from pertinent authorities all necessary information
176
on progress and problems. It can then make suggestions concerning
implementation.
Table 1. Administrative Regions, Provinces, and Prefectures of Morocco, 1971
Region Region Components
Number

1. Southern Agadir
Tarfaya
Ouarzazate
2. Tansilt . Marrakech
Safi
3 Central Al Jadida
Settat
Khouribga
Beni Mellal
Casablanca
4. Northwestern ... Tangier
Tetouan
Kenitra
Rabat-Salé
5. North-Central ... Fes
Taza
Al Hoceima
6 .. Eastern ... Nador
-

Oujda
7 .. South-Central . Meknès
Ksar al Souk

* Rabat-Salé and Casablanca are prefectures; all others are provinces.

Source : Adapted from Laws, Statutes, etc. , of Morocco , U.S. Department of Com
merce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publications Research Service
JPRS (Washington ) , Translations on North Africa, “ Decree No. 1–71-77,
16 June 1971 , 'Creation of Administrative Regions’,” Bulletin Official,
Rabat, February 4 , 1970 , (JPRS :50,196, Series No. 882 , March 31 , 1970) .
What executive arrangement would prevail in these regions was not
clear. It was expected that one of the governors in each region would
initially be designated as senior governor for regional purposes.
Because of the coup attempt of July 10, 1971, the change of
government on August 6, the military and security reorganizations
underway, and the high priority of the reform program directed by
King Hassan , it seemed unlikely to observers that rapid
implementation of the new regional level of government would take
place .

PARTIES , INTEREST GROUPS , AND ELECTIONS

Postindependence Party Development
On the eve of independence Mohammed V received delegations
from all political elements in the country except the Communists. Of
177
the four political parties that had cooperated in the struggle for
independence three remained after independence: the Istiqlal, the
Democratic Independence Party ( Parti Démocratique de
l'Indépendance-PDI) , and the Party of Moroccan Unity (Parti de
l'Unité Marocaine-PUM) . The PDI reorganized in 1959, forming a
new group, the Constitutional Democratic Party (Parti Démocratique
Constitutionnel—PDC) , and the PUM played no further significant
role in politics after independence. The fourth group, the Islah
( National Reform Party) of Abdel Torres in the Spanish zone, merged
with the Istiqlal when Moroccan independence was achieved ( see ch .
3, Historical Setting).
The Istiqlal's objective of forming a single-party government was
obstructed not only by Mohammed V but also by the other parties
and by newer forces, such as the labor movements, forming in the
society. Consequently, the Istiqlal had to share portfolios in the first
cabinet with the PDI and the Liberal Independents. The latter group,
not formally a party, had coalesced in the late 1930s around Rashid
Mouline and the “ grey eminence,” Guédira, a staunch supporter of
both Mohammed V and, later, Hassan II, and a member of many
cabinets .
The Istiqlal and, in general, the national political movement that
had achieved independence were mainly Arab and urban. Many of the
leaders came from the traditionalist inland cities, such as Fes, and
from families of moderate wealth . It was to this group that most of
the early fruits of independence went rather than to the large majority
of rural Moroccans .
It was not surprising, therefore, that the first new political group to
appear after independence in competition with the Istiqlal would seek
to represent the interests of the countryside. The integration of the
rural sector into the nation was begun at its own demand. There was
apparently no direct connection between the new political party and
the rural uprisings of 1957 and 1958, but its very existence gave a
voice to the numerically important agricultural sector for the first
time. Operating clandestinely in the mountains after 1957, the rural
party survived both guilt by association with the rebellious Berber
tribesmen and attacks by the Istiqlal in 1958 to register officially in
February 1959 as a political party known as the Popular Movement
(Mouvement Populaire-MP) .
Friction within the Istiqlal, some aspects of which were publicly
evident in 1958 , became open in January 1959, when its younger,
radical left wing became a party calling itself at first the
“ confederated ” or “ true ” Istiqlal . This split was of central importance
to the evolution of Moroccan politics for it marked the end of the
widespread allegiance the Istiqlal had enjoyed since 1956 and of its
hopes of becoming the single party in Morocco.
178
In September 1959 the confederated or “ democratic ” Istiqlal
formally constituted itself the National Union of Popular Forces
(Union Nationale des Forces Populaires — UNFP ), which defined itself
as neither a party in the traditional sense nor a front but a new
organization whose structure and élan would no longer be based on
personalities but on ideology-an essentially socialist ideology
propounded by its leader, Ben Barka.
The dynamism and the radical program of the new UNFP attracted
those who had been frustrated in the lower ranks of the Istiqlal, labor
leaders, and many from other parties. They represented a faction of
the Istiqlal that saw little in the program of social reform through
traditionalist Islam, irredentist nationalism, and royalism that was
relevant to the problems of national development in 1959. The UNFP
leaders' talk of socialism at home and radical neutralism abroad
appealed to those who, unlike many of the first generation of
nationalists, felt that independence was not the ultimate goal but only
the beginning of a new social order.
The popular approval of the Constitution of 1962 by referendum
was a turning point in the political evolution of Morocco. The UNFP,
however, complained that the king neglected party positions in
drafting the document, that the new system formalized an excessive
concentration of power in the hands of the executive , and that the
referendum campaign was calculated to exclude from power those who
differed with the king. The UNFP's ineffective attempt to boycott the
referendum during the campaign was brushed aside by overwhelming
popular support for the king. In addition to this disastrous defeat, the
UNFP severely alienated its strongest allies, the labor unions, which
refused to participate in the boycott .
The Istiqlal, which had backed the king during the referendum
campaign , withdrew its support one month later in protest against the
handling of the referendum . The three Istiqlal ministers in the
government resigned, and the Istiqlal went into the opposition. This
move prompted the formation of an electoral alliance among
progovernment parties — the mass -based MP and Guédira’s following
among the Liberal Independents and the PDC—to secure a majority
in the parliamentary elections of 1963. These groups joined in March
1963 to form a loose electoral alliance , the Front for the Defense of
Constitutional Institutions ( Front pour la Défense des Institutions
Constitutionnelles - FDIC ) . Desirous of consolidating the
government's advantage won in the referendum three months earlier
and wary of an opposition now fortified by the Istiqlal and the
prestige of its scholar-leader, Allal al Fassi, members of the FDIC
readied themselves for the five elections, scheduled to take place
between May and October 1963, that would create the institutions of
representative government authorized by the Constitution .

179
In the first and most important election, conducted on May 17,
1963, for the House of Representatives, the FDIC obtained only a
plurality, winning sixty-nine of the 144 seats ; the UNFP won twenty
eight; and the Istiqlal, forty -one. Six seats were taken by unaffiliated
members. The elections were immediately protested by both parties
of the opposition—the UNFP and, since January, the Istiqlal - chiefly
because the leader of the FDIC, Guédira, as minister of interior,
controlled all electoral procedures . The UNFP was further alienated
by the government's arrest of 130 of its leaders in July 1963 on
charges of conspiring to assassinate the king and overthrow the
regime. Newly elected UNFP members of Parliament were arrested
and held in violation of immunity privileges, and the penal code was
retroactively applied. These and other irregularities led the UNFP to
withdraw its candidates and boycott the four remaining electoral
contests. The absence of the major opposition party helped the FDIC
in the subsequent elections , as did the proregime sentiment
galvanized by the war on the Algerian frontier during the last
elections, in October 1963. In March 1964 the government won its
case in the UNFP trial . The party, publicly discredited, almost
disappeared ( see ch . 3, Historical Setting) .
By October 1963 all the constitutionally authorized institutions
were created and, just before the opening of Morocco's first elected
Parliament in November, the king resigned from the position of prime
minister, which he himself had occupied since 1961. He appointed
Ahmad Bahnini, minister of justice in the preceding government,
prime minister over a cabinet drawn exclusively from members of the
FDIC and unaffiliated politicians. The two opposition parties, because
of the need for national unity during the border war then current with
Algeria, muffled their accusations of electoral illegalities and took
their seats in Parliament .
After the elections of October 1963, which gave the FDIC 107 out of
the 120 seats in the upper house of Parliament, or Chamber of
Councillors, the FDIC began to break up. Guédira, who had formed
the FDIC only a year before in order to defeat the opposition parties,
now formed the Democratic Socialist Party ( Parti Socialist
Democrate- PSD) in April 1964. The party's name, however, was a
misnomer for it was not , in fact, socialist .
By early 1965 the political parties experienced a decline in public
confidence, and the failure of the government to alleviate the
country's critical economic problems contributed to the spread of a
general disillusionment with the regime as well . Morocco was in the
throes of an economic and political crisis that had been in the making
for more than a year. Economically, the crisis was characterized by
increasing unemployment, rising living costs, declining production in
the agricultural sector, and the continuing inability of the government
to remedy any of these problems.
180
Related to and complicating the economic situation was a political
stagnation that had persisted for eighteen months since the opening of
the country's first Parliament. Finally, the situation erupted in the
Casablanca riots of March 1965 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). King
Hassan, after a palliative general amnesty of political prisoners,
endeavored to form a new national front government of all parties.
This effort failing, he then invoked his emergency powers under
Article 35 of the Constitution of 1962, and the 1965–70 period of direct
rule began .
In Morocco's vigorous multiparty system, party leaders have
participated actively in the affairs of the nation, and party
newspapers, although subject to periodic suspension and seizure, enjoy
some degree of freedom and diversity of opinion. Parties tend to be
relatively nonideological, excluding the Communists and, perhaps, the
UNFP, which inclines toward Marxian explanations and socialistic
pronouncements. Political alignments are made on a pragmatic basis,
and personalities are as important as issues. Hence, parties tend to
revolve around a handful of leaders, whose followings cut across all
sectors of the social spectrum . The political elite numbers no more
than a thousand individuals, forming a close, if not closed, group of
friends and enemies whose intimacy at once facilitates
communication among allies and exacerbates rivalries. Parties in
Morocco cannot be defined with precision in terms of left and right
because of the diversity of their membership and the changing
character of their policies. At the time of King Hassan's assumption
of emergency powers in 1965, and so continuing in 1971 , the political
parties could best be classified into those opposing and those
supporting the king.
In 1965 the opposition consisted of three main elements. The
Istiqlal, founded in 1944 and headed by the esteemed Allal al Fassi,
was the oldest and largest. Long featured by a high degree of cell and
party organization , its leadership was essentially urban middle class.
The UNFP, founded in 1959 and by 1970 headed by Abdullah Ibrahim
and Abdul Rahim Bouabid, was Marxian socialist in character. The
Moroccan Communist Party ( Parti Communiste Marocain - PCM ),
headed by Ali Yata since its founding from French origins in 1944,
was prohibited in independent Morocco, as it had been under the
French, but enjoyed periods of comparative toleration . Definitely an
opposition party, the PCM was occasionally able to make temporary
expedient alliances with parts of the UNFP or Istiqlal or their
affiliates in the labor and student movements. In mid- 1965 it was
small and almost extinguished . By 1970 its membership was
estimated at only 400, with 2,000 to 3,000 other adherents.
Supporting the king was the loose FDIC alliance of four parties: the
rural-based MP, founded in 1959 and headed by Mahjoub Ahardane
and Haddan Abarkash; the PDC, formed in 1959 from the older PDI,
181
headed by Mohammed Wazzani and Mohammed Sharkawi; the PSD,
formed in 1964 and headed by Guédira, who was also ostensible leader
of the FDIC ; and the remnants of the old Liberal Independents of
Mouline. Of these, the MP was by far numerically the strongest.
During the royal rule of the 1965–70 period political party activity
continued at low key and under close government observation .
Certain party changes and modifications occurred. The FDIC alliance
broke up into its component parts. The influence of Guédira and, with
him, the PSD declined. In July 1968 the PCM formed a front
organization called the Party of Liberation and Socialism ( Parti de
Liberation et Socialisme-PLS) and registered it as a legal party. In
September 1969, however, the government, recognizing the PLS
simply as the PCM in disguise, banned it and its publications also
and sent Yata to jail for several months . On the whole, when King
Hassan announced in July 1970 that a new constitutional referendum
and elections would be held, the basic alignments of opposition and
royalists that had solidified in 1965 were still in effect, and these
continued in 1971 .

Labor and Youth Movements

Labor is the most powerful pressure group in Morocco. Organized in

1955 by Mahjub Ben Sadiq, the Moroccan Labor Union (Union
Marocain du Travail—UMT) accounted for one -third the membership
of the Istiqlal in 1956 and within the year increased its enrollment to
an estimated 400,000. Like the parties, the labor federation soon
developed its own affiliates such as the Moroccan Worker -Youth
( Jeunesse Ouvriere Marocain - JOM ) and the Progressive Union of
Moroccan Women ( Union Progressiste des Femmes Marocaines
UPFM ) . In 1961 it formed the Federation of Farmers ' Unions (Union
des Syndicats Agricoles-USA) , unionizing for the first time
thousands of farmworkers.
The UMT has at no time been a mere appendage of a political
party but has always moved on the perimeters of politics and has been
a frequent critic of both the government and the parties. Although it
insists upon its independence from each, it has played an important
role in both. The UMT has frequently been consulted by the king and
has been represented in key government agencies. The power of labor
is not confined to formal participation on the fringes of government.
Its strike capacity can at any time paralyze Moroccan industry, but in
1971 the extent of urban unemployment appeared to have weakened
this weapon ..
The growth of Morocco's major labor movement followed that of the
major political party, splitting into progressive and conservative
wings in 1959 and 1960. The UMT found itself closer to the UNFP
and withdrew its support of the Istiqlal. Hoping to recover its losses,
182
the Istiqlal founded its own labor affiliate in 1960, the Union of
Moroccan Workers (Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains
UGTM) under its secretary general, Hachem Amine ; this group has
been moderately successful in certain regions and in various
industries, but the UMT still commands the allegiance of the majority
of workers. To counter losses to the UMT youth wing, the UGTM
founded its own young workers' organization in 1962. As labor became
increasingly political, disputes between the UGTM and the UMT
sometimes broke into violence. After 1963, when the Istiqlal shared
the opposition with the UNFP and the UMT declared its
independence from that party, antagonism between the two labor
wings diminished.
While the UGTM has remained loyal to the Istiqlal, the UMT has
been more jealous of its autonomy, pulling away from the UNFP in
late 1962 and formally declaring its dissociation from the party at its
third national congress in January 1963. Although the move was based
on the desire to keep free of any affiliation with a political party in
order to maintain its own independence, Ben Sadiq insisted that the
UMT had no intention of becoming uninterested in politics .
Nevertheless, the UMT has continued to follow a policy that
corresponds to that of the UNFP more than to that of any other
political group .
Morocco's youth has been organized, with varying degrees of
effectiveness, by the government, the parties, and labor groups. Each
labor federation has its own youth wing, as do the two major
opposition parties. By far the most active and politically significant
element among Moroccan youth has been the university students, and
student organizations, whether independent or affiliated with a party,
constitute an active force in the political life of the nation . Enjoying
more license than the opposition parties, they have sometimes been
able to attack the government when parties or labor organizations
could not.

The first significant student organization, the National Union of

Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains
UNEM) , was founded in 1956 by Ben Barka, then in the Istiqlal.
Paralleling its activity in the government, the Istiqlal secured near
total control over the UNEM until its schism in 1959, when the
student group remained uncommitted to either faction . Gradually,
however, the progressive program of the new UNFP won over the
UNEM , which remained closely associated with this party in 1965.
Despite attempts by the government to restrict UNFP influence
among youth, students from the secondary schools and in the
universities both at home and abroad have remained generally
sympathetic to its position . Alarmed by the students ' drift toward the
UNFP, the Istiqlal organized its own youth wing in 1962, the General
183
Union of Moroccan Students (Union Generale des Etudiants
Marocains - UGEM ).

Referendum and Elections of 1970

In the national referendum conducted on July 24, 1970, 4,536,407

voters participated, or 93.2 percent of the 4,869,168 voters registered,
according to official figures. After discarding invalid ballots, the
affirmative vote was found to be 4,443,561, or 98.8 percent approval,
against only 55,101 negative votes. This overwhelming endorsement of
the king's position made the elections to the House of
Representatives, scheduled for the following month, virtually a
foregone conclusion. Commenting upon the similar royal victory in
the referendum of 1962, the North African analyst W.A. Beling wrote
in 1964: “ The referendum results revealed what subsequent elections
confirmed , that Hassan II and the monarchy constitute the principal
factors of Moroccan unity and stability.” This conclusion was again
decisively confirmed by the referendum of 1970.
Immediately after the referendum , what was probably the most
significant political party development since 1965 took place. The
Istiqlal and UNFP, both of whom had ineffectually campaigned for
“ no” votes on the referendum , announced on July 27, 1970, that they
had formed the National Front (Al Kutla al Wataniya) to oppose the
government. A central committee was to be the controlling device,
and support from trade unions and students was claimed. Also, Yata
of the banned PCM and PLS announced his endorsement of the
opposition front and appeared to be endeavoring to align himself with
it. By late 1971 the Istiqlal, still headed by Allal al Fassi, appeared to
be leading the National Front, but it was by no means certain in
Moroccan politics that this would continue. The Central Committee
of the National Front was announced in this order as comprising Allal
al Fassi ; Ibrahim , president of UNFP ; Boubakr Kadiri, Istiqlal ;
Mohammed Boucettar, Istiqlal ; Bouabid, UNFP; Ben Sadiq, UMT
UNFP ; Mohammed Labbabi, UNFP ; and Mohammed Douiri,
Istiqlal .
The parties of the National Front officially boycotted the
communal- professional chamber electoral college elections on August
21, 1970, for 150 seats in the new House of Representatives and the
direct general elections on August 28 for the balance of ninety seats.
Nevertheless, some opposition party members, standing as
individuals, were elected .
King Hassan and his supporters secured in these elections 221 of
the 240 seats in the House as follows: neutral, or independent
royalists, 159; the MP, sixty ; and the PDC, two. The opposition
parties secured nineteen seats, with eight to the Istiqlal, one to the
UNFP , and ten to the Social Progress Party ( Progres Social—PS) , a
184
new party from the trade unions. After these elections, the opposition
parties called them illegal, alleging irregularities that the government
denied. The new House of Representatives was convened on October
9, 1970.

POLITICAL STRESS AND CRISIS

Pressures for Change

By early 1970, before the referendum for the new Constitution and
the elections of August, internal pressures for change were mounting,
mostly through predictable channels, which had manifested
themselves in the past among the opposition parties, labor, and
students and which were becoming increasingly restless under the
prolonged state of emergency. On Labor Day, May 1, 1970, the
Istiqlal's Arabic newspaper Al Alam editorialized on the subjects
requiring the attention of labor : increasing unemployment,
burgeoning population growth , low wages and standard of living,
inadequate educational facilities at all levels, slow development of
agriculture and industry, oppression and inefficiency of the
government bureaucracy, and political relegation of the working class
and its organizations “ on the sidelines as spectators .” On the same
day Allal al Fassi, speaking at UGTM headquarters, called for
“ termination of the state of emergency and building up of a true
democracy.” Also on May 1, 1970, the official UGTM statement of
the day characterized Moroccan workers as living in a “ gloomy and
stormy atmosphere because of the lack of democratic institutions,"
called for an end to the emergency period, rejected the “ theory of the
elite,” and, in different language, reiterated Allal al Fassi's stands
calling for educational reform , adherence to Islam, Arabism , and the
Arab language, and opposition to the “ Zionist foe.”
The Istiqlal editor of L'Opinion, Mohammed Berrada, was arrested
on September 28, 1970, because of a news story pointing to
maladministration in the army service forces. Despite a defense by
fifty -three lawyers, he was convicted on October 25 and sentenced to
six months in jail and a fine. He appealed the verdict and the
sentence, which was then increased to twelve months . Before
completing his sentence, he was released by royal amnesty . On
November 16 Mohammed Yazghi, a leader of the UNFP, disappeared.
Claims of other disappearances were advanced by the Istiqlal, amidst
recollections of the Ben Barka affair (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). On
November 28 six farmers were killed and others wounded near
Kenitra in a melee with police and officials involving land sales. At
the end of the year labor and student unrest again showed itself in the
cities, although sustained strikes — the main political weapon of the
185
opposition-were not feasible because of widespread urban
unemployment .
Of further political significance in the security conscious, politically
restive state in early 1971, and reminiscent of the plot and trials of
the 1963–64 period, was the government's announcement on January
15 that 193 persons had been charged with plotting against the
security of the state. Of the accused, 161 were under detention ; thirty
two were to be tried in absentia. Among the latter were the UNFP
leaders Mohammed Basri, reported by some sources to be in Iraq, and
Yazghi, whose whereabouts were unknown. The plot, first detected in
December 1969, allegedly involved contact with external radical Arab
socialist movements such as the Baath (Resurrection) Party of the
central Middle East. The trial, first scheduled to be held in a military
court, opened on June 14, 1971, before the regional civil tribunal of
Marrakech and ended on September 17. Although the prosecution had
asked for forty -nine death sentences, only five were awarded . Of
these, four were in absentia. Fifty -two of the accused were acquitted.
The balance received sentences of imprisonment varying from six
months to life.

Of all the sources of dissent and pressure for change, possibly the
greatest, however, was the general complaint, not simply of
stagnation, but of widespread corruption and malfeasance in
government and government- related affairs. On November 19, 1970,
in addressing the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Ahmed
Laraki stated that bribery had become a “ serious social disease ” in
Morocco and pledged a government attack on this condition. Earlier,
on August 20, King Hassan observed with regret in a public address
that integrity was becoming a “ rare virtue” and that corruption
existed on all sides—including " some in high places .”
By mid-1971 measures directed at the principal economic, social,
and administrative problems of the country had been undertaken , and
all the legal and political forms of power, supported by tradition, were
held by King Hassan and his supporters. The political opposition,
however, remained alienated, insisting that progress was either too
slow or nonexistent and maintaining their familiar demand for
“democratic elections” and constitutional change as vociferously as
the law and the watchful Ministry of Interior under General Oufkir
would allow. To the public view, some minor changes of official
position had again occurred among familiar figures in the recurring
cycles of Moroccan elite politics. In what some analysts have called
the Moroccan system of “ balanced tensions,” contending rival
personalities seldom lost or won completely or permanently, and the
throne was always the balance of power. The pressures for change had
mounted , but so had the neutralizing pressures and power for
stability. Some problems, such as education and Arabization , seemed
186
virtually insoluble. Radical change had not occurred, and it was not
clear how it could occur by constitutional and peaceful means.
The Attempted Coup d'Etat of July 10, 1971
Approximately 400 guests were assembled on July 10, 1971, at the
royal seaside palace at Skhirat, fifteen miles southwest of Rabat, to
celebrate King Hassan's birthday. The guests included Prime
Minister Laraki and cabinet ministers, members of the diplomatic
corps, and prominent Moroccans of official and private life. Among
them were members of all political parties except the UNFP,
including Allal al Fassi of Istiqlal and Abdulhadi Messouak, who had
been associated with the PCM .
At about 2:00 P.M. the garden party came under sudden attack by
troops employing small arms and grenades. King Hassan and General
Oufkir withdrew to the private apartments of the palace. Outside,
firing continued . The troops involved were all young and could be
identified as noncommissioned officer trainees (widely reported as
cadets) from the training center at Ahermoumou , about 135 miles east
of Rabat.
Other rebel forces, meanwhile, under Colonel Mohammed Ababou,
commandant of the Ahermoumou training center, seized the army
headquarters in Rabat as well as the radio and television station.
Rebel -controlled radio stations in both Rabat and Casablanca
announced that a revolution was underway. The Rabat radio stated
that King Hassan was dead and announced that “ all responsibilities
are deferred to the local military authorities,” ending with the words
“ Long live the Republic.” The Casablanca broadcast stated, “The
army has just conducted a revolution for the people. The royal regime
is abolished .” None of these broadcasts, beyond proclaiming an army
sponsored republic for “the people,” contained enough substantive
content to show what sort of new regime was to be established.
About 2 1/2 hours after the attack commenced , however, King
Hassan reemerged from the royal apartments accompanied by a
sergeant and several young soldiers. The troops present shouted
“ Long live Hassan the Second!” and the revolt began its precipitous
collapse. As stated later by the king, he was informed by the sergeant
that the troops had attacked the palace because they had been told
the king was in danger. When they saw Hassan II, they put down their
arms. Others, in confusion , mounted trucks and drove off to Rabat as
ambulances began to arrive. King Hassan on the spot invested
General Oufkir with full civil and military powers and commanded
him to restore order. The diplomatic corps were freed to return to
their embassies.
Moving immediately, General Oufkir found that communications
were still responsive to him and that all regular troops and police,
187
with the exception of the trainee attack unit from Ahermoumou and
small elements in Casablanca, had remained loyal. The rebel group
had called upon regular units, including the air force, to join the
revolt but without avail . The counterattack was swift and became
decisive by midnight. By noon on July 11 rebel elements had been
mopped up. Soon afterwards General Oufkir announced that all those
implicated were dead or in custody. Colonel Ababou of Ahermoumou
was killed in the fighting.
Rabat quickly returned to usual surface patterns of life, but military
forces remained on alert and took over the Casablanca port as part of
the security operation. The reaction of the general public was passive
on the whole because of the swiftness of events . Some public
demonstrations had begun in various locations after the rebel
broadcasts but quickly aborted because of the rapidity of the
counteraction .
King Hassan addressed the nation by radio at 1:10 A.M. on July 11,
thanking God and advising the population of his safety and the
circumstances of the revolt . He identified General Mohammed
Madbuh , killed on the afternoon of the attempted coup at the palace,
as the coup leader of a group of officer conspirators not exceeding ten.
He spoke of the dead and wounded, rich and poor, Moroccan and
foreign , and then briefly described his deliverance upon being
recognized by the deceived soldiers. This convinced him, he said, that
the army was still sound. Citing the Libyan radio, which had
broadcast support for the revolutionaries, he called upon the people to
beware of troublemakers. The people, he said, would have been made
orphans, but God had overcome the troublemakers.
Reaction to the Crisis

Messages of encouragement and congratulations on his survival

quickly came in to Hassan II from the heads of state of most Arab and
African nations, including Egypt but not Libya. On July 12 King
Hassan , accompanied by King Husayn of Jordan , participated in the
funeral of loyal officers and soldiers killed in the uprising. At 11:15
A.M. on July 13, after extensive interrogation , four generals, five
colonels, and a major constituting the conspiracy leadership were
executed by firing squad after decision by a ministerial war council
headed by the king.
According to official figures, ninety -nine guests and staff personnel
were killed and 133 wounded at Skhirat Palace; in Rabat and
elsewhere 158 mutineers were killed, and about 900 were taken
prisoner-all from the Ahermoumou training unit. Although the
interrogations of the executed officers were not made public,
government sources stated that the outburst was the work of
“ paranoid schizophrenics ” who had grossly misled the

188
noncommissioned officer trainees. The 900 prisoners were confined
under continuing investigation but not treated in the same category
as the executed officers.
General Oufkir, after returning from the executions on July 13,
stated to the press that the plot had been in preparation for more
than a year and that the principal leader was, in fact, Colonel Ababou
rather than General Madbuh. He announced also that his special task
was now finished , that his extraordinary powers were laid down, and
that he was returning to his usual functions at the Ministry of
Interior. The monarchy, he said, was the safeguard of unity, and only
the king could head the country.
The executed generals, all of brigadier rank, were Khiati Bougrine,
commanding the Fes-Taza Military Zone ; Abdul Rahman Habibi,
Marrakech Military Zone; Amazun Hammu, Rabat-Kenitra Military
Zone ; and Amirak Mustapha, commandant of the Royal Military
Academy. Like General Madbuh, who had been the trusted chief of
the Royal Military Household, all were regarded as right -wing
conservative, austere, and honest disciplinarians. A common trait
among them , according to international press commentators, was
exasperation with the personality intrigues and influence traffic in all
phases of public life generally included under the term corruption .
Some were said to be impatient with any indications of liberalism or
concession by the government to the political opposition, such as the
king's effort to establish dialogue with students and the opposition in
the conference at Ifrane in March 1970 (see ch.7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences) .
In the relatively small Moroccan military establishment, all senior
officers had known each other long and well through many years of
change and crisis since they were first in uniform . To what extent the
coup attempt may have reflected intra-army power struggles and old
personality conflicts was unknown. All the conspirators were of Berber
origin, but so also were General Oukfir and a majority of the forces of
all ranks. Particularly since independence, the ancient problem of
Berber versus Arab, or bilad al siba (see Glossary) versus bilad al
makhzan (see Glossary ), has been better identifiable simply as rural
versus urban politics, and, in any event, did not appear to be a major
factor in the conspiracy .
The ultimate intentions of the conspirators, had they succeeded , as
to the form of government or its foreign relations or the person of
Hassan II were not definitely known . It was clear that the attempt
was not a revolution of any radical ideology and that it developed
from an internal source in the form of an essentially conservative, or
puritanical, impulse to purify the government and national life. No
evidence of actual foreign participation appeared, although the
premature Libyan broadcasts of support after the attack was initiated
resulted in the withdrawal of diplomatic missions by the two
189
countries. More important, none of the well-identified opposition
elements was involved-neither Istiqlal, nor the UNFP, nor the
accused in the trial underway at Marrakech , nor labor, nor the
student organizations. Among the neutralizing “ balanced tensions” of
Moroccan political, social, and economic life, the explosion of July 10,
1971 , came from an unexpected direction and, as such, was
symptomatic rather than determinant of the pressures for change.
King Hassan in public statements maintained that the intensity of
opposition criticism had harmed national morale, and he cautioned
opposition leaders that, if the coup attempt had succeeded, their
situation, instead of being improved, would have been far worse. The
noninvolvement of the organized political opposition, however,
appeared to make possible a new effort for rapprochement. In an
extensive interview with world press representatives on July 16, 1971,
the king remarked : “ I have come to realize that more seriousness,
even strictness, by the state concerning the sphere of management
and some fields of application of government policy will be necessary
in the future. ... I again affirm that a change is going to take place.
This will be in the means to be used, not in the democratic, social,
and economic principles which Morocco, since its declaration of
independence, has adopted .”
Subsequently, Bouabid , a leader of the UNFP and chief defense
counsel at the Marrakech trial, stated that a resumption of the
dialogue between the monarchy and the opposition might now be
possible, adding that the methods used by the government had thus
far “ resulted in stalemate.” Allal al Fassi, who had been present at
Skhirat on July 10 but was unhurt, observed that the abortive coup
resembled old-time revolts against the sultans and emphasized that
the rebel group had not made contact with either the Istiqlal or the
UNFP . He said the attempted coup reflected the general malaise in
the country and hoped that the lessons from it would lead to
government reorientation in the direction of greater democracy .

NATIONAL GOALS

Hassan II's Assessment and Reform Program

On August 4, 1971, King Hassan, in a major address by radio,
informed the nation that he had accepted the resignation of Prime
Minister Laraki and his cabinet. Change was required, Hassan said,
not in the fundamental principles of the nation but rather in means
and emphasis. Article 29 of the Constitution specifically allows a wide
delegation of royal powers to the prime minister and ministers.
Although the heaviest and final responsibility still rested upon
himself, the king announced that he would implement Article 29,
abolish the post of director general of the royal, or personal, cabinet
190
occupied by General Driss Slaoui, and hold ministers responsible for
their performance. This statement was significant as indicating a
limited withdrawal from the practice of direct royal rule. The new
government, the king said, would have approximately eighteen
months to draw up and implement a reform program centered in four
related areas : education, distribution of the national wealth,
administration, and justice. Speaking briefly on each of these, King
Hassan decried the widened gap between rich and poor as intolerable,
cited the need for improvement in land distribution and industrial
organization, and was particularly emphatic on the “ offense of
corruption .” The Quran, he said, is the true constitution, teaching
equality and justice. He called also for reorganization of the judiciary
so that “ formal justice marked by great equity will be administered . ”
In the last section of his address the king recalled that in his speech
on Youth Day, July 8, he had asked God for blessing and witness to
the royal sincerity and love for the country's people. Then , he said :
“ Scarcely one day later, God supplied concrete proof of the sincerity
of our speech. Thus did He spare us.” Hassan called for harmonious
national cooperation, with room for all “ well-intentioned people ...
without distinction between one faction or another .”
In this important address, in addition to the announcements
concerning the cabinet, several lines of analysis and a sense of
urgency were apparent . Concentration of effort was to be on internal
problems. Foreign policy, generally successful in the preceding five
years, would not be changed, and no attempt was made to conceal
internal difficulties by directing attention outward. King Hassan
subjected himself to self-criticism and spoke in a strongly Islamic
context virtually certain to be appealing to the mass of the Moroccan
people. Because he was saved from the coup attempt, in remarkable
circumstances and conceivably by the will of God, his link with the
people as imam (spiritual leader) and commander of the faithful was
reasserted and strengthened .

The Cabinet of August 6, 1971

The new government formed after the king's address of August 4
took the oath of allegiance on August 6, 1971, with Mohammed Karim
Lamrani, the minister of finance in the previous government, as
prime minister and minister of finance. The ministries and designees
were: defense, and chief of staff of the armed forces, General Oufkir ;
justice, and secretary general of the cabinet, Bahnini; interior, Ahmad
ben Boushta; foreign affairs, Abdul Latif Filali ; higher, secondary, and
technical education , Ahmad Laski; primary education, Haddou al
Shigair; posts, telegraph, and telephone, General Driss Ben Omar
Alami ; agriculture and national development, Mati Jorio ; religious
endowments and Islamic affairs, Ahmad Bargash ; public works and
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communications, Mohammed Burnousi; public health, Abdul Majid
Ben Mahi ; administrative affairs, Ahmad Majid Ben Jelloun ;
information , Abdul Qadir Sahrawi; and youth , sport, labor, and social
affairs, Arsalan Jadidi. In addition , the posts of king's representative
to the cabinet and director of the royal household, both of ministerial
rank and occupied respectively by Ahmed Balafrej and Ahmad
Osman, were retained . The office of director general of the royal
cabinet was abolished, as were the four associated ministerial posts. In
the government no nominations were made to the former ministries of
maritime affairs, commerce, culture, and tourism ; also, no ministers
of state without portfolio were named.
As had been forecast by the king, the new cabinet was distinctly
smaller than its predecessor, with seventeen ministers rather than
twenty - eight. Reduced size indicated concentration for priority
attention to the four - point program , as opposed to past diffusion . The
personnel and functions of the disestablished ministries were
presumably to be absorbed by the functionally related remaining
ministries, but exactly how this would occur was not clear in early
September 1971. Six members of the new cabinet held the same posts
as in the previous one ; five members of the preceding cabinet moved
to different ministries in the new one . All members were familiar
figures, well experienced in Moroccan politics, and royalist
supporters.
Choice of the economist Lamrani as prime minister showed the
emphasis to be placed in this area . The shift of General Oufkir from
the Ministry of Interior, which he had headed since 1964, to the
Ministry of Defense was of at least equal significance. Because the top
military leadership had been decimated by the coup attempt and
subsequent executions and in view of the critical importance of the
armed forces' loyalty and effectiveness as the underlying source of
power, General Oufkir's task was to scrutinize, reorganize, and retrain
these forces. In speaking to the press, he postulated a new primary
role for the armed forces as a socializing agency engaging in
community action work.
The king had been ready to designate at least one minister from the
Istiqlal and UNFP, and Bouabid of the UNFP remarked that there
were in the king's address of August 4 “ ideas which cannot be
rejected .” The Central Committee of the opposition National Front,
however, declined to participate in the government and reiterated its
familiar basic position calling for new elections and a “ democratic
constitution .”
The delegation of powers promised by the king under Article 29 of
the Constitution was formalized by decree on August 17, 1971 , and
announced at a meeting of the new Council of Ministers. King Hassan
informed the new prime minister that eighteen months were allowed
to implement the reform program . He described the delegation of

192
powers as involving increased responsibility for ministers, individually
and collectively, and stressed that “ the administrative task has been
entirely entrusted to the government.” The cabinet showed early signs
of response, among which was the announcement on August 29, 1971 ,
by the minister of administrative affairs that a civil service reform
law, replacing the old basic statute of 1950, had been approved by the
cabinet and would be submitted to the House of Representatives in
October.
Royal responsibilities and constitutional powers were not basically
altered in the program of change. The king retained his constitutional
rights to withdraw his delegation of powers, to appoint and dismiss
the prime minister and ministers, to proclaim a state of emergency, to
initiate popular consultation by referendum , to dissolve the House of
Representatives, and to appoint the judiciary .

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CHAPTER 9

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In late 1971 Morocco's foreign policy objectives continued to be

concerned with the survival of the kingdom and its monarch,
countering of foreign influence that might undermine the Alawite
dynasty, procurement of significant amounts of economic and
military aid and technical assistance for internal development and
national security, adherence to the cause of the Arab states in the
Arab -Israeli dispute, and technical nonalignment in cold war issues.
Moroccan diplomats have sought to achieve these goals by active
participation in the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies,
the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU ),
and the Islamic Solidarity Bloc and by hosting numerous Arab,
African , and Islamic conferences.
During the early years of independence, that is, from 1956 through
the mid-1960s, key aspects of Morocco's foreign policy were based on
its irredentist claims to parts of Algeria, Mauritania, the Spanish
Sahara, and Mali. By 1971 these claims had been abandoned, except
those concerning Spain's North African possessions, and a border
dispute with Algeria apparently had been resolved ( see ch . 2,
Geography and Population ). In addition, earlier disputes with France,
which had been of a particularly bitter nature, had not so much been
resolved as allowed to wither away, and French economic, technical,
commercial, and military aid and assistance have been and remain of
crucial importance to the country's development efforts (see ch. 3,
Historical Setting; ch. 11, Character and Structure of the Economy;
ch . 13, Trade and Transportation ).
Moroccans on occasion have described the role of their country in
foreign affairs as both a bridge for the transmission of European and
American technological and philosophical ideas to North Africa and
the Middle East and a mediator who offers his good offices to his
feuding friends to resolve their differences. Thus, on the global level
Morocco, by maintaining cordial relations with both the United
States and the Soviet Union, has remained an important beneficiary
of both super powers ; on the regional level it has endeavored to
remain neutral in the intra -Arab and intra -African rivalries and
conflicts, yet it has played host to the numerous pan -Arab and pan
African conferences held to alleviate differences between the
members; on the subregional level it acted as mediator between

195
Algeria and Tunisia in their brief border conflict. Its activities at all
levels have redounded to the benefit of Morocco .
During the first year of independence, Morocco's interests abroad
were represented by France and Spain , but the development of its
own diplomatic corps soon made their assistance unnecessary. By
1971 Morocco had exchanged diplomatic representatives with over
sixty countries. In 1971 King Hassan II continued to be the chief
architect of foreign policy guidelines and on most important issues
acted as the nation's chief spokesman and negotiator.

RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF THE MAGHRIB

The Maghrib, the western Islamic world of North Africa, is held

together by common threads of culture and historical experiences. As
a geographical expression, the Maghrib is frequently used to
encompass the modern states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya ; in political terms, however, many authors exclude Libya.
Particularly since the coup in 1969, the government of Libya has
manifested more interest in purely Arab, as opposed to Maghribian ,
affairs and in 1971 joined Syria and the United Arab Republic (UAR )
in the formation of the Federation of Arab Republics. At the same
time, Morocco has encouraged Mauritania to orient itself toward the
Maghrib and has sought to include Mauritania in Maghribian affairs.
Morocco and its North African neighbors have long sought unity of
purpose and goals in the formulation and implementation of domestic
and foreign policies. The road to such a unity has, however, been
arduous. Close collaboration between the states is, to some extent,
inhibited by the differing natures of the regimes, yet psychological
and economic imperatives have caused them to arbitrate their
territorial differences and enter into a series of economic, cultural,
technical, and political agreements (mainly bilateral) that might
eventually pave the way toward a greater unity.
Although cultural and economic contacts between the peoples of
North Africa had never ceased , even during the colonial period, a new
kind of relationship — that of politically conscious students studying
abroad - came into existence in the 1920s. Realizing the military and
economic weaknesses of the individual states vis - a -vis the colonial
powers, these students, most of whom were in France, talked about
forming a federation as a potential force that would eliminate
European hegemony from North Africa . These contacts were not very
productive, however, because the colonial powers made it extremely
difficult for the students to maintain ties with one another after their
return from abroad . Thus, nationalist leaders had to await
independence before concrete steps could be taken toward Maghribian
unity.

196
Initial efforts to build North African unity were made in the fields
of labor and education . Labor leaders and educators from Morocco,
Tunisia, and Algeria met annually to consider the means by which the
Algerian revolutionaries could be aided and discussed plans for a
North African confederation . In March 1957 Morocco and Tunisia
signed an agreement that provided that the two signatories would
hold frequent consultations on a common foreign policy, have joint
diplomatic representation in some states, take steps to abolish visas,
and maintain a permanent commission to coordinate their economies
and standardize their economic systems .
A year later, in April 1958, representatives of the Istiqlal
(Independence) Party (Morocco ), Neo-Destour (Tunisia) , and the
National Liberation Front (Algeria) met in Tangier and passed a
number of resolutions on foreign and domestic issues that, among
other things, expressed their common support for Algerian and
Mauritanian independence. They also proposed a Maghribian
consultative assembly, with powers to examine questions of mutual
interest and to make recommendations to national executive organs.
The conferees urged the governments to coordinate their defense and
foreign policies and created a permanent secretariat of six members.
Only a few of their recommendations were adopted by the
governments.
Another significant step towards Maghrib unity was taken at the
initiative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
which in 1964 established the Maghrib Permanent Consultative
Committee (MPCC) with headquarters in Tunis. Under the aegis of
the UN, a committee of industrial studies was also set up for the
Maghrib. The MPCC established a number of subcommittees on
tourism, post and telecommunications, and transportation . In
addition, the four Maghribian states have entered scores of
agreements. These agreements cover numerous fields of cooperation,
from a partial customs union to a judiciary arrangement that allows
any lawyer in one country to take a case in another.

Algeria
Relations with independent Algeria have in the past been strained
and often antagonistic, primarily because of their border dispute in
the Colomb -Bechar and Tindouf-Djebilet areas . After eight years of
discussions and abortive efforts at arbitration by a seven-member
commission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU ), interspersed
with a series of border skirmishes and a bloody armed conflict in 1963,
the disputants reached an amicable solution to the border dispute.
Meeting in Tlemcen on May 20, 1970, King Hassan and President
Houari Boumedienne signed an agreement that recognized the
Algerian -Moroccan frontier established by France and gave Algeria
197
undisputed sovereignty over the iron ore-rich region of Gara -Djebilet
but awarded Morocco a share in a joint company to exploit the mines.
The 1970 accord followed the procedure established in a March 1968
agreement between the two countries that had given Morocco the
right to share in the exploitation of the zinc mines of Al Abid. In
addition to settling the border dispute, the two leaders expressed the
determination of the two governments to coordinate their efforts in
respect to Spanish territories in North and Northwest Africa.
The Tlemcen meeting was preceded by President Boumedienne's
first official visit to Morocco in January 1969, at which time Morocco
and Algeria had signed a twenty -year treaty of solidarity and
cooperation and set up mixed commissions of specialists to
implement the provisions of the treaty. In an official communique
published on January 17, the two parties expressed the wish to see the
armament race ended , to abstain from the use of force for the solution
of differences, and to mobilize the Muslim world for the support of
the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. The two heads of state expressed
their mutual desire to cooperate, especially in the economic field . The
communique emphasized the need for pursuing a policy of
nonalignment and of building a greater Maghrib.
Notwithstanding the Tlemcen agreement and the Treaty of
Solidarity and Cooperation, the two neighbors remain suspicious of
each other because of the dissimilarity of their political systems. After
only a year of the Tlemcen agreement, for example, a regional
Moroccan tribunal, which was trying 193 alleged conspirators charged
with plotting to overthrow King Hassan, accused Algeria of providing
military training to 17 of the accused (see ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) .
Before Algeria's independence, Morocco maintained excellent
relations with the leaders of the National Liberation Front ( Front de
Liberation Nationale-FLN) . During the Algerian war Morocco
provided the FLN with military, financial, and political aid and
allowed Moroccan territory to be used as a sanctuary and training
base . In 1958 Morocco was one of the first countries to extend
diplomatic recognition to the provisional government of Algeria.
Moroccan -Algerian collaboration not only caused serious friction
between Morocco and France but also prompted the Moroccan
government to develop cordial relations with the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of China ( PRC) , whose military help was
believed to be essential for the FLN . Morocco was a conduit for arms
shipments to the FLN from the Soviet and Chinese sources.
Before Algeria attained independence, Morocco signed with the
Algerian Provisional Government a set of accords, including a secret
agreement signed in 1960 that provided for a negotiated settlement of
the Morocco -Algerian border dispute. The second agreement, signed
in January 1962, dealt with a future Maghrib federation , but nothing
198
came of this agreement because of the border conflict between the two
soon after Algeria's independence.
Neither the secret agreement nor Morocco's material and moral
support for the FLN, however, prevented the simmering territorial
and ideological conflicts from resulting in armed border clashes within
a week of Algeria's independence in July 1962. After a series of border
skirmishes, the conflict was controlled for a little over a year, but it
once again flared up into an armed conflict in October 1963. In the
meantime, the ideological differences between the two countries
manifested themselves in the form of charges by Morocco that Algeria
was harboring and encouraging a group of antimonarchical elements,
especially such individuals as Mehdi Ben Barka and Abdel Krim (see
ch. 3, Historical Setting) . Algeria countered by charging that Morocco
had been supporting the antistate activities of former Algerian
nationalist leader Belkacem Krim. Although Abdel Krim's death in
1962 alleviated King Hassan's apprehensions about Algeria's political
designs in Morocco, Ben Barka's association with the Algerian head,
Ahmad Ben Bella, remained a source of friction between the two
countries, and this was further aggravated during the 1963 border
conflict when Ben Barka publicly denounced the Moroccan
government for its irredentist claims on Algeria.
When armed conflict began during the fall of 1963, Algeria quickly
sought to internationalize the situation by eliciting support from its
allies . It appealed to the League of Arab States, commonly known as
the Arab League, which Morocco wanted to bypass because Syria and
the UAR had' sided with Algeria. Neither of the disputants could,
however, take much satisfaction from the pronouncements of the
league, which merely passed a resolution asking the belligerents to
cease firing. After bilateral talks and mediation attempts by nearly a
dozen heads of state, the Arab League, and the OAU had failed ,
President Modibo Keita of Mali and Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethopia finally brought together the Algerian and Moroccan heads of
state at Bamako, Mali, on October 30, 1963. There the two
belligerents and mediators signed an agreement to cease hostilities
and formed a commission to establish a demilitarized neutral zone,
the security and neutrality of which became the responsibility of
Ethiopia and Mali.
Ten days later the foreign ministers of OAU member states met in
Addis Ababa to name a commission to ascertain the facts of the
Algerian -Moroccan quarrel and recommend a solution. Algeria and
Morocco agreed to refrain from propaganda attacks on each other and
from interference in each other's affairs and to settle all subsequent
disputes by means of negotiations. After the cease -fire went into
effect, there were no serious shooting incidents on the border, and the
leaders of the two countries cautiously moved forward toward a

199
rapprochement expressed in the form of a treaty of solidarity and a
border agreement.
Although the conflict was eventually resolved amicably, it had
created a disagreeable climate of opinion for Morocco's relations with
a number of Afro - Arab states and put heavy strains on the country's
economy because of the new military demands for arms. The border
conflict adversely affected relations with the UAR , Syria, and Cuba,
all of whom were reported to have given materiel and personnel aid to
Algeria during the actual fighting. Morocco recalled its envoys from
Cairo and Damascus and severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Allegations that the United States and Spain had extended military
assistance to Moroccan forces during this period further weakened
Morocco's position among the countries of the Afro -Asian nonaligned
bloc by casting doubts on its neutralist credentials.
Recognizing its economic and political limitations in an arms race
with Algeria, in 1967 Morocco approached the OAU and the UN with
a view to reaching an international arms inspection and control
agreement for North Africa . In its proposal to the OAU, Morocco
suggested strict control of armaments in North Africa and offered to
hand over surplus arms to the UAR or any other country threatened
by Israel. Both of these proposals were rejected by Algeria, which was
reluctant to place restrictions on the expansion of its forces.
Tunisia

Morocco's relations with Tunisia have passed through stages of

warmth and coolness. Compared with the intensity and duration of its
difficulties with Algeria, however, Morocco's disputes with Tunisia
have been minor. Soon after their independence Morocco and Tunisia
entered into a series of agreements and treaties designed to move the
two states toward Maghribian unity. A number of political irritants,
however, prevented them from moving toward this goal . Friction was
caused by a series of incidents and events, including the personal and
political clash between Moroccan political leaders and Tunisian
President Habib Bourguiba; the deposition of the bey of Tunis, an
event that brought sharp criticism from Morocco ; and Morocco's
initial endeavors to establish close relations with the UAR and the
Arab League, with both of whom Tunisia had strained relations.
These points of friction did not cause a break in Moroccan - Tunisian
relations until 1960 when, despite Morocco's bitter opposition,
Tunisia extended diplomatic recognition to Mauritania and sponsored
its membership to the UN. Diplomatic relations between the two
countries were suspended and were not restored until April 1964.
This, however, did not prevent President Bourguiba from attending
the funeral services of King Mohammed V in 1961. While in Rabat
the Tunisian president conferred with King Hassan and expressed the
200

1
hope that the two countries would soon normalize their diplomatic
relations. By January 1963 Moroccan - Tunisian ties were sufficiently
cordial for Tunisia to request King Hassan to use his good offices in
bringing about a reconciliation between Algeria and Tunisia .
By this time a number of internal and external factors had
prompted King Hassan to abandon the irredentist claims advanced
by his late father and the Istiqlal Party and to make efforts to
normalize Morocco's relations with its neighbors. During the January
1964 Arab Summit Conference in Cairo, meetings between Hassan
and Bourguiba opened the way for an exchange of ambassadors,
followed by visits by ranking officials of the two countries . In
December 1964 Hassan paid his first official visit to Tunisia and, after
discussing with Bourguiba a wide range of topics, notably projects for
economic unity of the Maghrib, he witnessed the signing of several
accords between the two states. Since then the two heads of state
have exchanged several personal visits. The Hassan -Bourguiba talks
have included such topics as the discussion of a Maghrib summit
meeting, the progress of the OAU, and the possibility of creating a
Maghribian common market. To increase social contacts and benefits,
the two countries agreed to exchange information in scientific
research , family planning, and the medical profession. In order to
maintain high -level contacts, the two heads of state agreed to
exchange visits every two years .

Mauritania

After refusing for ten years to recognize the separate existence of

Mauritania, Morocco dropped its irredentist claims on its neighbor
and, in 1970, full diplomatic relations between the countries were
established. Initial steps for a reconciliation had been taken by
Morocco during the preparatory work for the 1969 Islamic Summit
Conference at Rabat, when Morocco invited Mauritania to the
conference. It was a propitious time to extend the invitation because
the Istiqlal Party, the major exponent of Moroccan irredentism, could
scarcely criticize the government for inviting Mauritania to a
conference that was being convened to express Muslim indignation
against the burning of the al Aqsa mosque in the Israeli-occupied
sector of Jerusalem .
Availing himself of the favorable circumstances created by the
conference, King Hassan invited Mauritanian President Ould Daddah
to a dinner -conference, during which the king reportedly assured the
president that Morocco would forthwith drop its irredentist demands
in the hope of creating better relations between the two countries.
Soon after the Hassan -Daddah meeting, Hassan quietly eliminated
the Ministry of Mauritanian Affairs from the Moroccan cabinet. This
action and a series of exchanges of goodwill missions opened the way
201
for the two countries to sign, in June 1970, a treaty of solidarity and
good neighborliness. Under this treaty, the two signatories agreed to
respect the other's territorial integrity ; to refrain from any
interference in the other's internal affairs; to strengthen their
political, economic, social, and cultural relations ; and to establish an
interministerial joint commission to develop bilateral relations.
Morocco had claimed Mauritania on the ground that the territory
had been under its suzerainty ever since Sultan Mulay Ismail ( 1672–
1727) brought large portions of the area under Moroccan rule (see ch.
3, Historical Setting) . Morocco asserted that Mauritania had been
detached by France during its colonial ascendancy in North Africa.
Morocco's claim to Mauritania was first verbalized in the 1950s by the
Istiqlal Party's leading figure, Allal al Fassi, who, after obtaining King
Mohammed's support, turned the irredentist demand into a top
priority national goal. Open support for the concept of a greater
Morocco was expressed for the first time by King Mohammed on
February 25 and by his cabinet on March 17, 1958. Two weeks later
the monarch laid claim to Mauritania in more explicit terms by
receiving four prominent Mauritanian public figures, who pledged
him their allegiance.
On the international level the question of Mauritania was first
discussed, at Morocco's request, by the foreign ministers of the Arab
League in 1960. At that time, being in good standing with the Arab
League, Morocco procured the ministers' support for its claim . In the
hope of securing further international support for its irredentism ,
Morocco in the fall of 1960 took the case to the UN, where it failed in
its efforts to muster sufficient favorable votes in the political
committee of the General Assembly .
Morocco then turned to the Casablanca Bloc, in the formation of
which the king had played a significant role, for legitimizing its claim
to Mauritania. Meeting in Casablanca in January 1961, the heads of
state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR and representatives of
Libya and the Provisional Government of Algeria— the members of
the short -lived Casablanca Bloc - passed a resolution stating that
France had severed the southern portion of Morocco (Mauritania) in
order to establish its hold in the Sahara on firmer grounds, to exploit
wealth, and to assure itself of outlets on the Atlantic Ocean. The
conference approved Morocco's efforts to recover Mauritania.
Although the political committee had failed to adopt any resolution
on Mauritania, Morocco, with the help of the Soviet veto, was able to
deny Mauritania's membership in the UN for two years. Thereafter,
the Soviet Union withdrew its objection in an agreement with
Western powers to admit Mauritania and Outer Mongolia to the UN
simultaneously.

202
Libya

Before the 1969 Libyan coup, Morocco maintained warm and

friendly relations with Libya, which was then also a monarchy. These,
however, began to change, largely because of the new Libyan
government's provocative attitude toward, and pronouncements
against, the Moroccan monarchy. This attitude was openly expressed
in the aftermath of the July 1971 coup attempt against King Hassan,
who publicly accused Libya of encouraging the Moroccan dissidents.
As a reaction to the Libyan broadcasts, which sought to incite the
Moroccans against their government, Morocco expelled the Libyan
ambassador and his staff in July 1971 and suspended, but did not
formally break, diplomatic relations.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES

Morocco's relations with African states have been generally

satisfactory. Even before Morocco attained independence, its political
leaders had established contacts with African intellectuals living in
Paris and Cairo, and many of these contacts were renewed at the
Bandung Conference in 1955. Morocco's active participation in
African affairs, however, began in 1958, when the king sent
delegations to pan - African conferences held in Cairo and Accra .
Although little was achieved during these conferences, they provided
the Moroccan leaders opportunities to exchange ideas with other
African leaders.
The Congo crisis of 1960 provided the Moroccans another
opportunity to take a keener and more constructive interest in the
affairs of their continent . In answer to a UN call, Morocco contributed
a 3,100-man military contingent to the UN Force in the Congo.
Morocco was not satisfied with the UN operations in the Congo,
however, and withdrew its forces in December 1960. Soon after the
withdrawal, King Mohammed V took the lead, in January 1961 , in
forming the Casablanca Bloc, a political group of radical and
neutralist African states that, like Morocco, had become disillusioned
with the UN policies in the Congo. From this alliance the Moroccan
government drew at least two significant benefits: it effectively
immunized the king against the leftist attack on his conservative
domestic policies and received the bloc's support for Morocco's
irredentist claim on Mauritania.
Although the Casablanca Bloc soon disintegrated, Morocco
continued to provide political and moral support to a number of
revolutionary African groups fighting for the independence of Angola
and Mozambique from Portugal. In August 1963 Morocco recognized
the Angolan revolutionary government- in - exile led by Holden Roberto
and soon thereafter broke off relations with Portugal.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES

In 1971 Morocco's relations with most Arab states were friendly. It

shared with them a mutual desire for a closer political, economic,
cultural, and technical cooperation among the members of the Arab
League. Taking into consideration its physical distance from the
eastern Arab states, the meagerness of its resources, and its
preoccupation with its own domestic and international problems,
Morocco seems to have taken a keen interest in the affairs and well
being of its friends in the Arabian heartland . Within its capabilities,
Morocco has sought to provide political, moral, and financial help to
Arab states in the Arab -Israeli conflict, and Morocco has consistently
supported the Palestinian Arabs .
Politically, Morocco has persisted in its efforts to elicit support of
the major powers for the Arab cause and, financially, has given
generously, relative to its capability, to both the Palestinian refugees
and to the Palestinian Liberation Movement. Militarily, Morocco has
twice offered military contingents to the eastern Arab states: in
January 1964, to the Arab League if it called for a military action
against the Israeli plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River; and
in May and June 1967, when the king placed units of the Royal
Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales — FAR ) at the disposal of the
UAR. The 1964 offer was never put to test because the Arab League
failed to adopt a military contingency plan for the Jordan River
Project, and the 1967 expression of solidarity with the UAR and its
allies did not make any material changes in the outcome of the war.
Moroccan troops, which were en route to the Suez front, were in Libya
when the call for a cease -fire was accepted by the UAR.
In the early independence period Morocco's relations with the UAR
were warm and friendly ; for some time Rabat considered Cairo its
principal friend among the Arab states. This friendship was especially
evident during their activities in the Casablanca Bloc. The activities
of the Casablanca Bloc rapidly declined, however; as both Morocco
and the UAR became preoccupied with their respective, though
dissimilar, problems with Algeria and Yemen, the intimacy of former
days changed into open hostility. The growing friendship between
Algeria and the UAR and Radio Cairo's sharp criticism, in late 1962,
of the monarchy in Rabat for its hesitation in recognizing the
Egyptian -backed regime of Yemen caused serious damage to
Moroccan -Egyptian relations, which continued to decline to the point
of diplomatic rupture in the fall of 1963, when a group of Egyptian
soldiers was captured at the Algerian -Moroccan front.
Formal diplomatic relations were normalized in February 1964, but
Moroccan -Egyptian cooperation in the field of education and in
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technical and cultural activities was halted when Morocco declared
persona non grata the Egyptian teachers, technicians, and cultural
experts working in the country. By the end of 1964, however,
Moroccan -Egyptian relations had improved and the vice
president of the UAR attended Moroccan independence day
celebrations . This trend toward a rapprochement was further
strengthened, in March and September 1965, when King Hassan and
President Gamal Abdul Nasser exchanged official visits . These
exchanges were considered highly successful by the two rulers, who, in
the joint communiques issued after each conference, expressed their
complete agreement and support for African unity and the liberation
of Palestine, Oman, and Aden . The countries also affirmed their
solidarity with the peoples of Africa in their fight against colonialism .
Notwithstanding its diplomatic, moral, and military support to the
UAR, Morocco has firmly opposed all efforts by the UAR for
hegemony in the Arab world . At the 1969 Islamic Summit Conference
of the Arab states in Rabat, Morocco opposed the UAR proposal for
the establishment of a higher Arab command, to which each country
would make firm financial, troop, and equipment commitments.
Morocco, along with Tunisia, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, made a
counterproposal to increase contributions to the Palestinian
Liberation Movement but not to the UAR military budget.
The Algerian -Moroccan border conflict in 1963 precipitated a
Moroccan -Syrian crisis that culminated in a diplomatic rupture
between the two countries. Accusing Syria of hostile action in the
border dispute, Morocco withdrew its ambassador from Damascus.
During the next two years relations improved somewhat, but
diplomatic ties had hardly been restored when once again, in
November 1965, Morocco felt obliged to suspend relations because of
the alleged hostile attitude of the Syrian press in commenting on
Moroccan domestic affairs. Relations between the two countries
remained cool until a new Syrian government initiated negotiations
for a restoration of relations, which were resumed in February 1970.
Morocco's relations with the rest of the Arab states have been
cordial. It continued in late 1971 to maintain friendly ties with Iraq,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian
Gulf.

RELATIONS WITH WEST EUROPEAN STATES

In late 1971 Morocco was on friendly terms with all the countries of
Western Europe with the exception of Portugal. After five years of
arduous and highly complex negotiations with the European
Economic Community ( EEC) , Morocco signed an association
agreement with it on March 31 , 1969 (see ch. 13, Trade and

205
Transportation ). The five -year accord provided for mutual trade
preferences and included a stipulation that by the end of the third
year talks would be resumed on advancing the association . As far as
trade and aid relations were concerned, Morocco continued to rely
most heavily on France but showed increasing interest in the
opportunities for economic cooperation with its closest European
neighbor, Spain . At the same time, it has obtained important
industrial investment from Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany ( West Germany) . Morocco has continued to maintain
excellent relations with West Germany, despite the pressure from the
Algerian-UAR-Syrian front to break diplomatic ties with Bonn over
its decision to recognize Israel in 1965. At that time, however, King
Hassan expressed his displeasure at the German action by postponing
his scheduled trip to Bonn.

France

Until December 1969 a number of political and economic issues

complicated Morocco's relations with France, notably the Algerian
war of independence, France's support for Mauritania, the French
nuclear tests in the Sahara, the Moroccanization of French enterprises
in the country, Morocco's membership in the now defunct Casablanca
Bloc, and, particularly, the so -called Ben Barka affair. During the first
ten years of Morocco's independence relations with France were
suspended on three occasions : in 1956, in 1960, and in 1965. The
breaks in diplomatic ties were accompanied by announcements of
suspension of French economic and technical aid, which was usually
restored, however, within a brief period.
The earlier episodes that had caused diplomatic breaks between
France and Morocco—the French hijacking, in October 1956, of a
Moroccan plane carrying FLN leader Ahmad Ben Bella and four of his
close associates, and in early 1960 the French nuclear testing in a part
of the Sahara that Morocco claimed as its own - had also touched off a
spate of anti-French incidents in Morocco, but the issues were fairly
easily resolved . The 1965 Ben Barka affair generated such
unparalleled mutual resentment and an inflated sense of indignation
and national self-righteousness that the scars made by this event did
not fully heal until President Charles de Gaulle, who had made the
incident a matter of personal and national honor, resigned and was
replaced by Georges Pompidou, who did not share his predecessor's
views on this issue ( see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
As a result of the Ben Barka affair, France suspended its financial
assistance to Morocco. After a break of approximately two years,
French aid was gradually resumed until it reached a total of 323
million francs in 1970. As a prelude to a resumption of large-scale
French aid, Morocco and France entered into high -level negotiations
206
and an exchange of visits by senior officials. In May 1968 Moroccan
Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki made a hurried visit to Iran , where he
was reported to have met with visiting French Prime Minister
Pompidou. This meeting was followed by an exchange of visits
between officials of French and Moroccan ministries of finance in July
and August 1968. These officials discussed the Moroccan Five Year
Plan ( 1968–72 ) and agreed to aid in the amount of 80 million francs
for the development plan .
In February 1970 King Hassan, accompanied by his prime minister
and minister of foreign affairs, paid a one-week private visit to
France, where he and his party held a series of talks with ranking
French officials, including President Pompidou . French -Moroccan
relations were further improved when the French foreign minister,
Maurice Schumann, paid an official visit to Morocco in December
1970. During his visit—the first by a French foreign minister since
Morocco achieved independence—the two governments agreed to
establish a permanent joint French-Moroccan commission to meet at
least once a year to settle points at issue between the two contracting
parties and to formulate bases for continued cooperation between
them. The objectives of the new intergovernmental commission were
expected to include discussions on increasing trade and other bilateral
commercial exchanges, arms and military training, and the delicate
question of compensation for the 90,000 French residents in Morocco
whose commercial interests or property had been or were being
Moroccanized.
In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Schumann
visit on December 19, 1970 , the two parties agreed that the
Mediterranean should be a zone of peace and stability and stressed
the similarity of their views on a settlement of the Middle East
question. In the educational and technical fields, the two countries
agreed to maintain the current level of French assistance, which
provided nearly 9,000 teachers for Moroccan state schools (see ch. 7,
Education, Communication , and the Arts and Sciences) . The French
foreign minister promised to extend the necessary credit to Morocco
to buy modern military equipment .

Spain

Spanish- Moroccan relations have been close and cordial, despite

the fact that the two countries have had territorial problems centering
on the status of several parcels of land, some of which were still under
Spanish rule in late 1971. Since independence Morocco has amicably
resolved with Spain most of their territorial disputes, including the
northern and southern zones of the Spanish Protectorate and the
Atlantic coast enclave of Ifni (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .

207
The only territorial dispute still unresolved in 1971 centered on the
North African coastal cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the island
fortresses of Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas, and the Shafarin
Islands. With a view to resolving this dispute, the two countries have
had intermittent negotiations, but Morocco has not gone beyond
verbal demands for the return of the enclaves . In a speech in 1968
celebrating the seventh anniversary of his accession to the throne,
King Hassan urged Spain to settle the territorial disputes over Ifni
and the Spanish Sahara, but he made no mention of Ceuta and
Melilla .
On the eve of the formal transfer of Ifni to Morocco on June 30,
1969, King Hassan, accompanied by his ministers of interior and
foreign affairs, paid a five- day private visit to Spain, where he held
meetings with Generalissimo Francisco Franco and other senior
Spanish officials. Since that time a number of high-level visits have
been exchanged between the two countries, in their continued effort
toward evolving more meaningful ties. In addition to these visits, the
ties have been further strengthened by showing special favors to each
other's government. Such a favor was shown by Spain to Morocco in
February 1970, when the Spanish government arrested two Moroccan
opposition leaders and handed them over to the embassy of Morocco
in Madrid . The two Moroccans had been tried in absentia and
sentenced to death for their alleged role in a 1963 plot against the
king. Although there was no extradition treaty between the two
countries, the Spanish action was considered to be a manifestation of
its desire to strengthen the Moroccan monarchy against revolutionary
efforts to displace it.
In March 1971 Spain and Morocco took yet another step to improve
their ties when they signed an agreement that established a joint
commission for cultural , economic, scientific, and technical
cooperation . The commission, which will be headed by the respective
ambassadors of the two countries in Rabat and Madrid, was given the
task of resolving the problems that exist or may arise between
Morocco and Spain. These problems were not only concerned with
various territorial claims, but also included matters relating to fishing
rights and the United Nations' Law of the Sea in reference to the
Strait of Gibraltar.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Moroccan ties with the United States go back to the earliest history
of the American republic, when the reigning monarch, Muhammed
ben Abdullah, recognized the newly founded United States and, in
1787, signed a treaty of friendship with the union. Maintained in its
essential provisions to the present day, it is the longest unbroken
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treaty relationship in American history. After establishing a consulate
in Tangier in 1791 , the United States during the nineteenth century
obtained commercial and extraterritorial rights and privileges. These
rights were also covered by the most -favored -nation and
extraterritorial clauses of the Moroccan-United States treaties signed
in 1836, 1880, and 1906, and these rights and privileges were
confirmed by the Algeciras Conference of 1906 (see ch. 3, Historical
Setting) . After the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912,
the European powers renounced their extraterritorial rights in
Morocco, but the United States continued to maintain its treaty
rights until October 7, 1956, when, under intense pressure from
Moroccan nationalists, it too renounced its extraterritorial rights .
Beginning in the early 1940s, American interest in Morocco began
to change from primarily commercial to political -strategic affairs. In
1942 the United States took control of and expanded and modernized
a naval base at Port Lyautey (later changed to Kenitra) .
In January 1943, during his visit to Casablanca for a meeting of the
Allied leaders, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Sultan Sidi
Mohammed ben Youssef (later known as King Mohammed V and
was reported to have assured him of American support for Moroccan
independence. This promise, if made, could not be kept, however,
because the Moroccan struggle for independence was waged at a time
when the United States did not consider it prudent to alienate
France. Thus, during the UN debates and votes on Morocco in the
early 1950s, the United States generally favored France. American
Moroccan relations were further complicated when, in December
1950, the United States and France entered into secret agreements
that allowed the American government to build air and naval bases in
Morocco . Although at the time of the negotiations for the bases the
United States had requested France to inform Sultan Mohammed of
the plans, the agreements were executed without his approval or
knowledge.
Because the bases had been built during the period of French
hegemony, and without reference to the sultan, Morocco, soon after
independence, demanded the withdrawal of American forces from the
country. The exigencies of Morocco's radical foreign policy in the late
1950s and the internal political pressures exerted by the leftist
elements obliged the government to press for an early evacuation of
the American bases. A visit by King Mohammed V to Washington in
1957 and a return visit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Rabat
in 1959 finally produced an agreement that called for the evacuation
of all bases by the end of 1963. The bases were returned to full
Moroccan sovereignty in 1963, but Morocco has continued to permit
the United States to use communications facilities at some of the
bases .

1
209
Economic and technical assistance from the United States dates
from 1956, when Morocco was looking for increased aid that would
also counterbalance the preponderant influence of France. With the
exception of a brief break in 1964, the American government has
maintained constant aid commitments to Morocco. In February 1964
the United States suspended aid to Morocco because the 1964 Foreign
Aid Act required that military and economic aid be withheld from
countries that supplied strategic materials to the PRC whose flagships
took part in trade with Cuba. In order for it to remain qualified for
American aid, Morocco was told that it must stop deliveries of cobalt
to the PRC and prevent its ships from calling on Cuban ports.
The Moroccan foreign minister criticized the action and said that
those demands would put into jeopardy the policy of nonalignment
that the country had pursued since independence. Furthermore, he
maintained that it was essential for Morocco to sell cobalt to the PRC
in order to obtain Chinese tea. Realizing that Morocco would face
economic hardships if pressed to stop the cobalt deliveries and,
perhaps, also appreciating the need to maintain telecommunication
centers in the country, the United States government on April 15,
1964, granted a waiver in the case of Moroccan shipments of cobalt.
At the same time Morocco was reported to have assured the United
States that it had taken appropriate steps to discontinue carrying
goods in Moroccan ships to Cuba.

RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST STATES

In keeping with its avowed policy of friendship with all nations

irrespective of their internal political systems, Morocco has
maintained diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and military relations
with most communist states. The monarchy does not perceive an
imminent external communist threat to the country's integrity,
though it bars communist activities within the state. Morocco has
been generally nonideological in the formulation and implementation
of foreign policy and expects the same from foreign powers . In this
respect, the communist representatives in Morocco have, by and
large, avoided taking sides in the country's political activities; they
showed no hostile reaction, for example, to the ban imposed on the
Communist Party (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics ).
Communist support to Morocco during the struggle for
independence was limited to casting favorable votes in the UN and
rhetorical denunciations of French policy in the country . Three
months after Morocco's independence, the Soviet Union extended
diplomatic recognition. This action was soon followed by the PRC and
a number of other communist states, and diplomatic envoys were

210
exchanged with Moscow and Peking in September 1958 and April
1959, respectively.
Before the exchange of envoys, however, Morocco had already
entered into a series of commercial and cultural agreements with the
Soviet Union and the PRC. Subsequently, similar ties were
established with Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Czechoslovakia . Under these arrangements a number of cultural
groups as well as trade, labor, and student delegations were exchanged
between Morocco and the communist states. A number of Moroccan
national leaders also visited the Soviet Union and returned with high
praise for Soviet achievements . In February 1961 Leonid I. Brezhnev,
chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, paid a two-day
unofficial visit to Rabat, where he was cordially received by King
Mohammed V. The Brezhnev visit coincided with the arrival of the
first Soviet military consignment, which included a dozen MIG- 17s
and two Ilyshin bombers for the Royal Air Force. The military
hardware was accompanied by a complement of two dozen Soviet
technicians.
Morocco has received several additional consignments of military
equipment from the Soviet Union and a number of other communist
states . In 1967 alone the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia sold to
Morocco the equivalent of about US$20 million worth of arms. In an
effort to acquire more Soviet military equipment, a Moroccan
delegation led by the chief of staff, General Driss ben Omar al Alami ,
visited the Soviet Union in June 1969 and had talks with senior
Soviet military and political figures. Results of the talks were not
announced .
Although Morocco had played host to Brezhnev in 1961 and to
Deputy Prime Minister Anastas I. Mikoyan in 1962, it was not until
July 1966 that a Moroccan minister paid an official visit to the Soviet
Union. The visit of the Moroccan foreign minister to Moscow was the
beginning of a renewed effort to establish closer commercial and
technical links with the Soviet Union. In August, as a sequel to the
ministerial visit, a Soviet economic delegation arrived in Morocco to
continue discussions concerning Moroccan -Soviet relations that the
foreign minister had initiated in Moscow.
These visits laid the ground for King Hassan's five - day state visit to
the Soviet Union in October 1966, which was the occasion for the
signing of a Soviet-Moroccan economic and technical accord that
provided for the extension of a number of projects already under
study. In addition , the two countries agreed to increase substantially
the volume of their trade . The trend toward closer ties was further
strengthened when, in April 1969, Nikolai Podgorny, chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, paid a six - day official visit to
Morocco. In 1970 the two countries established a joint Soviet
Moroccan permanent committee for economic, technical, and

211
scientific cooperation, which held its second meeting in Morocco in
July 1971. As a result of this meeting, the two countries concluded a
number of bilateral agreements to promote Soviet -Moroccan relations
in the commercial, economic, and social fields.
Morocco's relations with the PRC have remained cordial, but there
were no indications in 1971 that either country planned to expand ties
beyond the scope of usual commercial, cultural, and economic
agreements. Since Prime Minister Chou En -Lai's weeklong visit to
Morocco in December 1963 and the participation of the king's brother
in the fifteenth anniversary celebrations of the PRC in October 1964
no high -level visits have been exchanged between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the volume of trade continues to grow , and a new trade
protocol was signed on April 26, 1971 .

THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS

Morocco became a member of the UN on November 12, 1956. In

general, the Moroccan delegation to the UN has voted with the Afro
Asian bloc ; it consistently supports, for example, resolutions calling
for an end to colonialism and color discrimination . Morocco is a
member of all UN international agencies . In 1963 it was elected a
member of the Security Council for two years .
Morocco became a member of the Arab League on October 1, 1958,
and has attended all conferences and summits called by the league.
Morocco is also an active member of the recently formed twenty -five
nation Islamic Solidarity Bloc, which seeks to foster closer relations
among member states . Morocco continues to take a keen interest in
the activities of the OAU, with which it has been associated since
shortly after its inception in 1963.

MECHANICS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The making of Morocco's foreign policy is largely the responsibility

of the king. According to the 1970 Constitution, the king receives
foreign ambassadors and special representatives and appoints
ambassadors to foreign countries and international organizations.
All major policy decisions are made by the king. His reliance on
personal diplomacy, although not as extensive as that of some other
heads of state, often takes him abroad several times a year to attend
Arab , African , and Muslim leaders' conferences. Members of the royal
family have also served as the country's representatives abroad. The
minister of foreign affairs usually represents Morocco at other
meetings .

212
CHAPTER 10

POLITICAL VALUES
1

The dominant system of political beliefs, opinions, and attitudes

centers on the dual roles of the monarch as the spiritual leader and
the secular ruler. In 1971 an overwhelming majority of the citizenry.
subscribed to the notion of the king as the commander of the faithful
(amir al muaminin) and seemingly accepted the king's advocacy of his
divine right to rule.
King Hassan II combines in his person the symbol of the legitimacy
of the Alawite dynasty that has ruled, except for the brief interlude of
French and Spanish occupation, since the seventeenth century. He
was the appointed and unchallenged successor to the venerated King
Mohammed V, who was the focal point of the struggle for
independence (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) . The king, and therefore
his son and appointed successor, is recognized as a direct descendant
of the Prophet Muhammad and, as such, is endowed with special
grace and favor in religious and mundane matters (see ch. 5, Religious
Life).
The widespread allegiance to the king and the infrequent and thus
far ineffective resistance to his role as the arbitrator and manipulator
of events have as their source a combination of historical - traditional
and modern circumstances. Continuity with present times may be
said to begin with the introduction of Islam in the seventh century
A.D., which was followed by the establishment of the central authority
of the sultanate, massive Arab immigrations, and, more gradually, the
absorption of Arabic -Islamic cultural patterns from the eastern
Mediterranean area . Previous conquerors and socioreligious systems
had asserted themselves and declined, but Morocco attained its
recognizable, independent identity with the coming of Islam and the
sultanate (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) .
Thereafter, regardless of the succession of dynasties, all were
Islamic, and the people at large remained Muslims. In addition,
regardless of how little or how much of the country particular
dynasties or sultans firmly controlled, an indigenous central authority
did exist. In the late medieval period, Morocco alone in the region of
the Middle East and North Africa did not fall under the sovereignty
of the Ottoman Turkish sultans but remained independent until
succumbing to French colonial power in 1912. During the French
period, native exercise of power was severely circumscribed, but the

213
traditional Moroccan values, modes of thought, and social customs
persisted.
The Islamic legal code called the sharia was the public law in
Morocco, as in other Islamic states, until well into modern times, and
its influence and, in some cases, direct application continued in 1971 .
This code, deriving from the scriptures of the Quran and associated
traditions, is grounded in the concept that the purpose of government
is to ensure obedience and worship of God by the community of
faithful believers . Islam means “ submission,” and a Muslim is “ one
who has submitted .”
As the relation between God and his creatures is one of absolute
authority, so is the relation between the earthly ruler and the
community essentially authoritarian. The Constitution of 1970, as had
that of 1962, confirmed traditional practice by identifying the king as
commander of the faithful. The mutually reinforcing influences of
Islamic theocratic legalism and authoritarian social custom in 1971
continued to be the most basic and significant roots for the role and
power of the historic monarchy.
Early nationalism, which began in the mid- 1920s, was closely
associated with Islamic reformism . The religious character of the
nationalist movement was never entirely lost and accounts in part for
the relative absence of secular European socialist or Marxist ideology
in its subsequent development. Nationalist opposition to the
protectorate spread to a broad segment of the population as the
French hardened in their insistence that the sultan submit to
protectorate government suzerainty. The exile of Sultan Mohammed
V in 1953 for refusing to yield to French demands made him a symbol
of national unity and Islamic solidarity against the infidel Europeans.
Thus, popular devotion to the sultan in his sacred role was converted
to a loyalty to the sultan as a secular leader and as the focus of
national political unity. By 1955 the French realized that they could
no longer maintain their status in Morocco peacefully and agreed to
grant independence. Sultan Mohammed V was brought back from
exile and enthusiastically accepted as the ruler of the new state.
The power of the throne was thus established, identifiable in its
historic Moroccan outlines, and above party. Although not
invulnerable to pressure from parties, unions, the press, or other
interest factions, the king became the essential weight in any question
of policy, preferment, or patronage.
Mohammed V, although inclined to act by gradual steps and only
after careful study , nevertheless looked to the necessities of
modernization and the future. He announced and moved toward the
goal of a constitutional monarchy, actions that his son and successor,
Hassan II, continued. Democratic institution building, however, often
clashed with the forms and manners of the older monarchic way.
Democratic innovations have been hampered by the two constants of
214
the traditional political environment: the continuity of Islam as the
state religion and the essential inviolability of the figure of the king as
the commander of the faithful. Each reinforces the other, and both
have been placed beyond constitutional change.
Although King Hassan has made occasional efforts to establish and
work through democratic institutions, the attempts have been of short
duration . In 1965 he terminated his brief experiment with a
parliament and did not renew the attempt until 1970 ; according to
most observers, the absence of a parliament was felt acutely by few
other than the former legislators.
Hassan's rule, a mixture of traditional and modern forms, has been
characterized as one of stalemate and tension management. With the
exception of a few dissidents, such as the late Mehdi Ben Barka, the
political scene has been, and in 1971 remained, devoid of ideology or
ideologues. Hassan copes, with and rules through a group of about
1,000 men in the military, political, civil service, business, landowning
elite, men who, as one observer put it, have “ known one another only
too long and too well.” The king manages and manipulates them, and
they are dependent on him not just for advancement but also for
continuance.
The bulk of the population, especially the large rural majority,
continues to support this nonideological kingship. Tradition oriented,
strongly religious, and preoccupied with local issues, they view the
monarchy as the personification of Morocco. A relatively small middle
class provides additional popular support for the monarchy. Deeply
involved in economic affairs and generally conservative Muslims,
members of the middle class may, privately, distinguish between the
secular and sacred roles of the king, and they may, again privately, be
critical of specific policies and arts, but they have remained a bulwark
of royal support .
During the middle and late 1960s, however, there were increasingly
vociferous and potentially powerful groups who viewed the concept of
a virtually absolute monarchy as a political anachronism. By late 1971
King Hassan was one of only half a dozen monarchs who ruled rather
than reigned, and to an unknown but apparently large number of
urban proletarians, students, and professional-intellectuals, Hassan's
role as secular ruler required revision and restriction.
The attitudes of Morocco's youth are difficult to ascertain . The
most vocal groups among young people, and certainly the most
politically aware, are the university student unions. The student
unions do not necessarily represent the majority of Moroccan youth,
and the radicalism of those for whom they speak may be exaggerated.
Nevertheless, their opinions are often the only attitudes expressed by
youth, and they have an important influence on political parties.
In general, students are likely to think about Morocco in terms of
the development of an independent society ; they are, for example,
215
less likely than their elders to confuse irredentism and Islamic
fundamentalism with nationalism. Idealistic, they are apt to seek
solutions to Morocco's problems through some variety of socialism.
The attitude of youth toward the king reveals an increasingly sharp
awareness of the difference between his religious and his political
functions and, on occasion, students have been hostile to the king.
In March 1965 peaceful antigovernment demonstrations by students
in Casablanca provided the fuse to the serious riots, which were
quelled only by harsh police and army measures (see ch. 7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences ; ch. 8, The Governmental
System and Political Dynamics) . The riots were quickly joined by
thousands of dissatisfied, unemployed, and poverty -stricken urban
slum dwellers, who were unorganized but capable of producing the
most serious threat to public order since independence . As a
spontaneous, undirected outburst of population frustration, the 1965
riots—which spread from Casablanca to Fes and other cities-were
significant as an expression of discontent not otherwise capable of
being articulated in the political system. The shock of the labor
unions and political parties and their inability to either deal with or
take advantage of this discontent revealed their lack of
communication with the urban proletariat.
A major complaint of the students is that there are not enough
positions for them upon graduation, and this charge is echoed by a
reportedly large group of unemployed intellectuals. In 1971 there was
no information to indicate that this group had evolved a common
ideology or general set of beliefs, but they were known to be
increasingly disenchanted with arbitrary rule by the king. Journalists,
subject to frequent seizures of their publications, are also critics,
albeit discreet ones, of the monarchy.
None of the groups had, by late 1971, articulated publicly any direct
attack on the sacred side of the king's role, no doubt reflecting their
appreciation of the depth of commitment by most Moroccans to that
kingly function . But, as many observers of Morocco have noted,
Moroccans do not engage in long-range planning by choice, preferring
instead to adjust to new situations as they develop. Politically, it is
enough to cope with the problems of today and to seek protective
alignments for the morrow.

216
SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 11

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE

ECONOMY

In late 1971 Morocco continued to have a centralized , capitalist,

dualistic, underdeveloped economy, a terrain somewhat modestly
endowed with natural resources, and a number of difficult economic
problems that had been inherited along with independence in 1956.
Its economic performance since independence had been
commendable, considering the disadvantages it had had to cope with.
The country is a monarchy in which the economic decisionmaking
power and other broad powers have been centralized in the person of
the king. This had made for an unusual capacity for decisionmaking
and for continuity and consistency in the evolution of the country's
economic policy. From an economic viewpoint this centralization has
probably been a source of progress since independence and, other
things being equal, it may be expected to continue to be so, although
it has posed some related political problems (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
The economy is fundamentally based on private ownership of
property, private enterprise, and a capitalist form of monetary
apparatus. There is, however, a large measure of government
participation in the economy. Ownership of the subsoil mineral rights
is vested entirely in the government, which also enjoys large
proprietary rights to the forest and nonagricultural surface areas of
the country. The government has undertaken considerable
participation in productive services, such as transport and
communications, and to a less, and perhaps diminishing, extent in the
economy's production process. The government, moreover, is
dedicated to an as rapid as possible increase in the average per capita
income and reduction in the spread between large and small incomes.
On balance, however, the economy at the start of the 1970s was
essentially private enterprise oriented.
Since the institution of the French and Spanish protectorates in
1912 the economy has leaned heavily on exports, especially to the
large sheltered market created by the country's protectorate status.
Largely as a function of this special market treatment, a modern
217
economic sector grew up alongside the traditional sector. The modern
sector was operated mainly by foreigners and for foreigners, both in
Morocco and abroad. It tended to enjoy the use of the best of the
country's resources-notably its agricultural resources—and to use up
to-date techniques and inputs imported from abroad. The traditional
sector persisted in the old ways, which were not only inefficient but
also actively wasteful of resources. Although the modern sector was
appreciably more efficient than the traditional, its reliance on
protected markets had tended to reduce its effectiveness below that of
its potential competitors in other countries. This situation paved the
way for difficulties after independence.
Since the early 1960s successive economic and social development
programs have been undertaken by the government, with increasing
measures of success, in a continuing effort to augment and
redistribute the national income . At the beginning of the 1970s some
70 percent of the population was rural and dependent upon
agriculture ( including animal husbandry and forestry ). The economy
was therefore, by customary definition, still an underdeveloped one.

RESOURCES AND PROBLEMS

In the early 1970s the country's visible physical resources were

largely limited to exceptional tourist attractions, reasonably abundant
supplies of cropland and water, and large resources of phosphate rock.
The ratio of cropland to population in 1968 was estimated at around
three acres per capita. This ratio was about the same as in Algeria and
somewhat lower than in Tunisia and Syria . Some 6 to 7 percent of the
cropland was estimated to be irrigated, and this was considered to be
about one-half of the area that was potentially irrigable (see ch. 12,
Agriculture and Industry) .
Apart from phosphate rock, most of the known mineral deposits
had ceased, by the early 1970s, to be of positive economic significance.
Either they had for practical purposes been exhausted or were of
unimportant dimensions or they were being exploited at such high
unit costs that export of their output was impracticable without
subsidies or quotas. Their domestic utilization was based more on the
desire to maintain employment or to limit imports than on
considerations of comparative costs .
Energy sources included petroleum products, hydroelectricity, coal,
wood, and dung. Petroleum products, practically all imported,
represented some two-thirds of energy consumed . Hydroelectricity
accounted for the bulk of domestic energy sources. The other domestic
sources, including petroleum, were either not available in commercial
quantities or were of inferior quality, making for high production
costs .

218
As the economy entered the 1970s it faced a number of problems
that promised to offer obstacles to its future progress. Foremost
among them was the rate at which the population was increasing.
Although this matter would continue to be somewhat obscured until
the results of the 1971-72 census were available, it was generally
accepted in 1971 that the population was growing at around 3.3
percent per year (see ch. 2, Geography and Population ). For practical
purposes, a rate of growth such as this meant that, unless the national
output of goods and services could grow at a rate of around 3.5
percent per year (compounded), the per capita income would stand
still .

A second major problem lay in the year-to-year instability of the

rainfall pattern. This had its direct and its indirect effects. The direct
effect resulted from the impact of inadequate rainfall on agricultural
production, which caused foodstuff shortages, the need to consume
stocks (even of seed grains), the need to turn to wheat imports to
supplement domestic production, and the generalized economic
debilitation induced by a decline of income in the agriculture sector.
The indirect effect lay in the difficulties that the foregoing situation
created for an assured source of supply of the annually increasing
amounts of petroleum products that are required under modern
conditions by a developing economy. On the one hand, no adequate
supply of petroleum had yet been discovered in Morocco. On the
other hand, there had not as yet been developed an export category
( including tourism ) that could with certainty be depended on from
one year to the next to provide the foreign currencies needed to
purchase petroleum products abroad. The periodic droughts reduced
the total value of export receipts, and the need for wheat imports,
having first priority, resulted in further reducing the part of the
already diminished export proceeds that would be available for the
purchase of nonfood imports, including petroleum (see ch. 13, Trade
and Transportation) .
Over the long run , this problem should be alleviated by greater
amounts of irrigation and flood control, new high -yield strains of
wheat, the rapidly growing tourist trade, and greater efficiency both in
industry and traditional agriculture. Offsetting these benefits, on
present estimates, would be the continued rapid increase in
population . For the time being, the problem depended for its solution
upon foreign assistance.
Unemployment was also a major problem, although it was perhaps
more a political than an economic one. In any case, it had economic
repercussions in that it induced the introduction or continuation of
certain costly production methods characterized by a high ratio of
labor to capital investment that might not have been maintained or
undertaken had it not been for the employment situation. Another
219
problem was caused by the shortage of trained and experienced
Moroccan management and administrative personnel.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

In 1965, which could be called an ordinary year in terms of rainfall

(and therefore in terms of agricultural yields), the gross domestic
product ( GDP) totaled an estimated DH10.79 billion (5.06 dirham
equal US$ 1—see Glossary ), measured in constant prices of 1960 (see
table 2) . In 1966, which was a poor year in terms of rainfall, the gross
domestic product declined to DH10.61 billion (at constant prices) . In
1968, the best agricultural year on record, the gross domestic product
rose to DH12.74 billion (at constant prices) , 21 percent above 1966.
Provisional estimates for 1969 indicated an increase over 1968 of
around 1 percent. In mid- 1971 the latest available information
suggested a further increase in 1970 of 4 to 5 percent to around
DH13.35 billion to DH13.45 billion at 1960 prices, or about DH16.5
billion to DH16.6 billion at current prices. Assuming a population of
around 15.7 million at mid- 1970, this would have meant a per capita
income in that year of around DH835, equivalent to about US $ 200 .
The data available in 1971 suggested that over the 1956–65 period,
at the time the economy was adapting itself to the country's new
political status, the average annual rate of growth of the gross
domestic product was around 2 percent (at constant prices), implying
a probable decline over the period in per capita real income. On the
other hand, a comparison of the gross domestic product for the year
1960 with that of the years 1967 through 1970 would give average rates
of growth per year during those years varying from 3.3 percent over
the 1960–67 period to 4.4 percent over the 1960–68 period and 4
percent for the 1960–69 period (compounded and adjusted for price
changes) . In mid- 1971 it was not clear whether the improved gross
domestic product growth rates in recent years reflected a movement
of the economy to a higher plateau of productivity and output. In any
case, they did represent achievement of the target average growth rate
of 4.5 percent per year called for by the Five Year Plan ( 1968–72).
The breakdown of the gross domestic product by sectors indicated
that agriculture has consistently been the most important sector of
the economy, representing about 30 percent of the total, and that
during the 1960s the breakdown remained stable. Although there
appeared to have been a slight decline in the relative importance of
agriculture, for the most part the year-to-year variations in the
relative importance of the sectors were caused by the changes in the
size of the agricultural output as a result of annual variations in
rainfall. The sectors that appear to have improved their relative
position over the period as the position of agriculture declined were
220
Table
2.
Gross
Domestic
Product
Morocco
1960
Market
SPrices y
Industrial
Origin
,bofelected
Years
1,1at 960-69
billions
(in
dirham
)2of

Economic
Sector Percentages
1960 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 3 9
196
1960 1966 1968 31969

ivestock
flAgriculture
, orestry
a nd
fishing 2.65 3.06 3.15 2.78 3.07 3.98 3.63 29 26 31 28
Mining
and
quarryi ng 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.60 6 5 5 5
Manufa
and
industr
.craft ies
cturing 1.10 1.29 1.32 1.37 1.42 1.49 1.58 12 13 12 12
Constru
. ction 0.32 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.57 0.62 3 5 4 5
Energy 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.34 2 3 2 3
Commerce 1.91 2.18 2.13 2.14 2.28 2.44 2.56 21 20 19 20
asTransp
, torage
nd ort
other
non
services
government 1.50 1.66 1.78 1.82 1.89 1.99 2.09 17 17 16 16

-
Government
services 0.89 1.02 1.10 1.14 1.23 1.43
1.38 10 11 11 11
Gross
domestic
product 9.09 10.43 10.79 10.61 11.33 12.74 12.85 100 100 100 100
Index

-
1( 960 )
100 100 115 118 117 125 140 142

the The
domestic
differs
from
grossnational
product
by
including
not
factor
mpayments
profits
wabroad ainly
dinterest
ividends
nd
rom
(f),anet
positive
or
hether
.)negative
After
October
1959
the 2
value
par
of
dirham
equaled
DH5.06
US
$1.per
P.3 reliminary
Includes
nsurance
cbanking
estateommunication
ownership
,arieal
nd
dwellings
.of
Source
A
Agency
S. ,N
;.,p
Interna
for dapted
Yearbook
from
National
of
Accounts
Statistics
UYork nited
: 970
41Nations86–487
pew
.969
tional
GDevelopment
National
Product
Rates
Trend
WData
;a.pand
1Statistical
,Yearbook rowth
971
:, 7ross
2ashington
pnd
970
New
51UYorknited
, 971
77
.pNations

221
construction, energy, and government wages and salaries. The relative
contribution of nongovernmental services appears to have declined
somewhat, but the item was so much of a catchall that it was
impracticable to determine in what components of it the decline took
place .

CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT

A breakdown of expenditure on the gross domestic product at the

end of the 1960s indicated that about 75 percent of total expenditure
was for private consumption ; about 14 percent, for government
consumption ( wages and salaries) ; and the balance, for fixed
investment and inventories. The total expenditures on consumption,
in percentage terms, remained relatively stable except in 1968, when
private consumption was reduced ( in percentage but not in physical
terms) to replenish the stocks that had been drawn down in 1966 and
1967 as a consequence of the drought in 1966. Public consumption
may have increased somewhat over the period at the expense of
private consumption, reflecting mainly increased employment by
government.
Fixed capital formation apparently increased from around 10
percent of the gross domestic product at the start of the decade to
close to 14 percent at the end of it, reflecting government investment
for irrigation, transport, and communication facilities and both
private and government investment for tourist facilities. The scanty
data available in this connection suggested that at the end of the
decade the government investment ( including public sector
enterprises) represented better than two -thirds of the total, despite
persistent efforts by the government, through privileged tax treatment
and other incentives, to stimulate an increase in private and
especially foreign private investment.
The data on overall savings were also scanty. They suggested that
the level of savings, both public and private, varied between 10 and 12
percent over the course of the decade-apparently representing
around 12 percent at the end of it. An excess of imports over exports
became characteristic of the economy in the years after 1965, as a
consequence of the drought- induced grain imports in 1966 and 1967 ;
the increasingly effective implementation of the government's Five
Year Plan ; and the private sector's increased participation in tourism,
construction, and industry .

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Under the constitutions of 1962 and 1970 the right of private

ownership of property was guaranteed, although provision was made
222
that this right might be limited by law if the requirements of the
economic and social development of the country should make that
necessary . Expropriation was prohibited, except as expressly provided
for and prescribed by law. Taxation applied to all citizens, according
to their ability to pay. Laws might not be retroactive.
The role of the government in the economy at the start of the 1970s
was widespread. The keystone of the governmental structure was the
king, whose powers included those of initiating policy, promulgating
legislation, appointing the ministers and, if need be, dissolving the
legislature or abrogating the constitution. This concentration of
control had made for continuity and freedom of action in evaluating
and coping with the problems confronting the economy, including the
enlistment of technical assistance from abroad when necessary.
Since early in the twentieth century the government had enjoyed a
monopoly of all subsoil natural resources. By 1971 it had come to
exert an increasing degree of direction over surface natural resources
as well ; this it had done through its investment in irrigation and by
retaining control over a growing quantity of land that had been owned
by Europeans under the protectorate and that since independence had
been repossessed by the government but not redistributed to former
owners or others. The government owned railroad, highway, power,
and communication networks ; the large-scale multipurpose irrigation
installations; the phosphate, sugar, and tobacco-processing industries ;
and most of the airline and navigation services. It also held greater or
lesser participating interests in most other major enterprises
associated with mining and with the modern portion of the industrial
sector. In the aggregate, these interests were estimated at around
DH0.5 billion. In mid- 1971 the government was proceeding with a
policy of requiring that enterprises operating in the banking,
insurance, and import-export sectors be incorporated and controlled
in Morocco, though not necessarily nationalized.
In addition to its role as a direct participant in the productive
activity of the economy, the government also exerted an appreciable
indirect influence upon it. This it did through extension of low-cost
credit to private sector agriculture, industry ( including mining), and
tourism ; through tariff and other protection to agriculture and
industry ; through a statutory commission to screen projected new
investments ( domestic and foreign ); through exchange and price
controls ; and through the use of customs duties and other taxes as
inducements to investment in those parts of the private sector that
the government desired to see expanded. Foreign trade was guided
not only by exchange controls and physical quotas but also by the
existence of government export -import agencies that monopolized
most of the major exports and a number of important imports (see ch.
13, Trade and Transportation ) .

223
What was likely to be the net effect on the development of the
economy of the attempted coup of July 1971 was not at once clear.
The immediate reaction was a commitment by the king to eradicate
corruption. Other actions suggested increased emphasis on agrarian
reform and small-scale agriculture and on the social, at the expense of
the strictly economic, aspects of the 1968-72 and 1973–77 five - year
plans. This harbored possibilities of increased costs and decreased
efficiency in agriculture and perhaps also in industry. Unless these
were accompanied by increased assistance from abroad and
compensating internal changes, the timetable of economic self
sufficiency might be delayed. The promised curtailment of corrupt
practices, however, was itself important in securing economic
assistance from abroad .

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Government programming for economic and social development

began before independence . After independence interest in
development planning was stressed and abetted by the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, for example, the Food and
Agriculture Organization ( FAO) , the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD), commonly known as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ( IMF) , and the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). Since independence there
have been four investment or development programs during the
periods 1957–59, 1960–64, 1965–67, and 1968–72; in 1971 another was
being readied for the five - year period 1973-77. The first three were
overly ambitious and suffered from coincidence with bad crop years.
The 1968–72 plan, although it was somewhat belated in getting
started, benefited from the impetus of the better than average crops
in 1968, 1969, and 1970 and the tourist-hotel and irrigation
construction boom in 1969 and 1970. At the end of 1969 the plan was
sufficiently on, or ahead of, schedule in its several sectors that the
total projected outlay for the last three years of the plan ( 1970–72) was
raised by nearly a quarter, most of the additional outlay going into
agriculture, irrigation, and transport.
The constitutions of 1962 and 1970 assigned to the king the
responsibility for presiding over the country's Higher Council for
National Promotion and Planning, which includes all institutions
dealing with the social and economic life of the country and makes
the final recommendations to the king on matters having to do with
social and economic development. Final decisions on development
policy rest with the king. The Five Year Plan was given extra force by
being issued in the form of a law.

224
The planning apparatus in 1971 was located in the office of the
prime minister under the direction of a director general of planning
and development. The office organization centered on the planning
division, which was served by a statistical staff and which reported to
the Inter-Ministerial Planning and Budget Coordination Committee.
Its activities included planning, collection , and processing of
statistical information ; the coordination of technical assistance ; and
the supervision of a UNDP-sponsored statistical training office
The purpose of the 1968–72 plan, in aggregate terms, was to raise
the level of gross investment over the plan period from about 14
percent of the gross domestic product to around 18 percent per year.
This level of investment was expected to lift the average annual rate
of growth of the gross domestic product ( in constant prices) from 4.3
to 4.8 percent, depending on the performance of agriculture. Such a
rate of growth would imply raising the average rate of increase of per
capita income to the range of 1 to 1.5 percent per year.
The emphasis in the plan was upon the upgrading of agriculture,
with special attention to the construction of multipurpose irrigation
projects; upon the fostering of tourism ; and upon the training of
upper level government administrators and technicians . The indirect
intention of this approach was to reduce the import of goods and
services ( including foreign technical services) , to expand the export of
goods and services ( including tourist services) , and to alleviate the
pressure on the country's small availabilities of foreign exchange
reserves. The necessary investments would be accompanied by those
government reforms in the fields of public and private finance and
exchange and tariff policy that were considered necessary to call forth
the requisite savings and domestic and foreign investment .
Relatively little stress was placed on the social sectors. The latest
information, however, indicated that substantially greater emphasis
would be given to those sectors in the new plan ( 1973-77) .
The 1968-72 plan consisted of a central government investment
program and estimates of the investments by central government
enterprises, local governments, and the private sector that would be
needed to bring about the levels of growth decided upon by the plan
(see table 3) . Total outlays called for by the plan amounted to
DH11.45 billion, of which DH7.68 billion represented outlays by the
public sector and DH3.77 billion were expected to be forthcoming
from the private sector.
Although the year-to-year framework of the plan was to be kept
flexible and subject to change where desirable, the projected timing of
the plan foresaw total annual outlays rising from DH2 billion in 1968
to DH2.75 billion in 1972. The central government's participation was
projected at approximately DH1 billion annually.
225
Table 3. Morocco's Five Year Development Plan, 1968-72 , at Constant (1967) Prices,
by Sectors and Investing Agencies

(in millions of dirham)

Public Sector
Central Local
Govern Govern Private Public
ment ment Public Sector and
Capital Capital2 Enter Total Total Private
Budget Budget prises Total

Agriculture ... 1,550 55 0 1,605 160 1,765

Dams.. 746 0 0 746 0 746
National Development . 120 30 0 150 0 150
Tourism 171 10 230 411 349 760
Power 214 0 296 510 0 510
Mines 300 0 829 1,129 133 1,262
Industry 290 0 465 755 666 1,421
Crafts 22 0 0 22 0 22
Trade and public services .. 0 0 0 0 90 90
Education-training - 276 0 0 276 0 276
Youth and sports 20 5 0 25 0 25
Public health 101 0 0 101 0 101
Transport .-- 554 10 57 621 72 693
Telecommunications . 170 0 21 191 0 191

Housing-water supply - - 181 83 15 279 1,000 1,279

Administrative facilities ... 196 2 0 198 0 198

Total new investment . 4,911 195 1,913 7,019 2,470 9,489

Renewal4 . 0 205 317 522 1,300 1,822
Payments 139 0 0 139 0 139

GRAND TOTAL .. 5,050 400 2,230 7,680 3,770 11,450

1
After October 1959 the par value of the dirham equaled DH5.06 per US$ 1 .
2 Included nineteen provinces, two prefectures, seventy -four municipalities and autonomous centers,
and some 730 rural communities.
3 Excluding state contributions included in the central government budget. Public enterprises in
cluded (1969) : phosphate monopoly ; railways; tea and sugar monopoly; tobacco monopoly ;sugar factories;
export authority ; electricity authority ; National Agricultural Credit Bank; Industrial Office ; Social
Security Fund ; and others.
4 Renewal of equipment: materials, buildings, or public works.
5
Settlement of treasury commitments for work carried out before 1968.
Source : Adapted from Morocco, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Planning and the
Training of Senior Grades, Five Year Plan, 1968–72 , I , Section II , Rabat,
1968, ch. 2 , p.4 .

The projected financing of the central government's outlays of

DH5.05 billion foresaw the equivalent of DH1.94 billion (39 percent)
from external sources and DH1.52 billion ( 30 percent) from new fiscal
revenues and internal borrowings . This left DH1.59 billion ( 31
percent) still to be financed, either internally or externally, depending
largely on future opportunities of obtaining favorable interest and
repayment terms abroad. The authors of the plan expressed
226
determination not to have recourse to inflationary financing. In point
of fact, however, it did prove necessary to have recourse to the central
bank for residual financing in each of the first three years of the plan.
The manner in which the private sector investments were to be
financed could not be defined in advance, inasmuch as it could not be
known to what extent the private sector would react to official
investment incentives and to what extent such reaction might involve
direct foreign investment.

PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES

The financial operations of the public sector occur at three levels

the central government, the various local government units, and the
wholly or partly owned enterprises of the central government. Because
the official data on the public sector's financial activities available in
1971 tended to be incomplete or inadequately identified, assessment
of the full impact of the fiscal operations of the public sector on the
economy was difficult.
The central government presents its annual estimates of budgetary
receipts and outlays in a finance law that is divided into three parts:
the general budget of the state , a group of separate agency budgets
annexed to the general budget, and a series of special treasury
accounts . In 1971 the estimated outlays under the general budget
totaled some DH4.4 billion ; the estimated outlays of the annexed
budgets, about DH266 million ; and the outlays under the special
treasury accounts, DH823 million - for a total for the year of about
DH5.5 billion. The overall budgetary resources of the government
were estimated to exceed expenditures by some DH90 million.
The general budget of the state is presented in a threefold
breakdown that comprises an operating budget resembling fairly
closely the generally accepted prototype of a current budget ; an
investment budget consisting mainly of expenditures connected with
the Five Year Plan ; and expenditures on account of the public debt.
The latter consist of interest and repayment of principle in respect to
the amortizable debt and interest alone in regard to the so-called
floating debt.
For practical purposes the expenditures for the public debt should
be added to the current ( operating) budget. In 1971 budgeted
expenditures through the current budget ( including DH354 million for
the public debt) amounted to about DH3.1 billion, and budgeted
outlays under the investment budget amounted to about DH1.3
billion,
The so-called annexed budgets relate to a number of government
agencies—the Government Printing Office; the Casablanca Port
Authority ; the Other Ports Authority ; the Ministry of Posts ,
227
Telegraph, and Telephone; and the Moroccan Radio and Television
Office. They are presented separately from the general budget of the
state both for historical reasons and because they resemble
commercial institutions in having some independent sources of
operating revenue. They are linked to the general budget through the
transfer of their current surpluses to the general budget resources and
through the funding of their current deficits and investment outlays
from the general budget expenditures .
The annexes may, therefore, be visualized as an extension of the
general budget and may be added to it in considering the relationship
of the government to the economy. Of the total anticipated
expenditures of some DH266 million through the annexed budgets in
1971, about DH210 million was on account of current operating costs,
and DH55 million was allocated to investment .
The treasury special accounts are accounts set up over the years in
connection with special-purpose outlays and receipts. Their individual
size, composition, and exact objectives are not readily available, but
they apparently include accounts in connection with membership in
international agencies ; the counterpart funds created in connection
with United States Food for Peace (PL 480) assistance ; residual items
connected with discontinued operating budget items; foreign grant
and loan funds; and probably the accounts set up in connection with
bilateral trading arrangements with communist countries. They are
apparently financed in part with foreign loans and grants, specially
earmarked current revenues, monies from the general budget, and
treasury ( medium- and short-term) bonds. Although determining their
precise relationship to the general budget was not practicable, they
also appeared on balance to represent an extension of the general
budget.
Expenditures of the local government units (regional administrative
offices, provinces, municipalities, and major urban centers) at the
start of the 1970s were estimated to approximate 10 percent as much
as the central government's expenditures under the general budget.
An estimated 20 to 25 percent appeared to be financed with the units’
own revenue collections ; more than 60 percent, with central
government transfers; and the balance , with other transfers and loans.
About 60 percent of outlays seemed to be for current operating
expenses, and 40 percent, for investment .
The major state enterprises included the transportation, power,
phosphate, fertilizer, tobacco, and sugar monopolies, in addition to
the posts, telegraph, telecommunication, and port authorities . To the
extent that they were self-financing, they were not a burden on the
government, but they did expand its operations . To the extent that
they were not self-financing ( this tended to result in plant
obsolescence and inefficiency), they figured in the government's
expenditures-especially in the form of investment outlays for
228
rehabilitation and renewal of plant and equipment. Because this was
being carried out in the framework of the Five Year Plan , it probably
would not represent an addition to the plan outlays already
incorporated in the central government's investment budget. Even
where such renovations were not included in the investment budget, it
was possible that they might be funded under one of the special
treasury accounts and again , therefore, would not be added to outlays
already accounted for.
Because of the definitional confusion surrounding the ideas of state
enterprise and local governmental units, it was not practicable to
aggregate the various components of public sector expenditure and
reach an assured estimate of it and, therefore, of the ratio of public
sector expenditures to the gross domestic product. Other factors
contributing to this confusion were double - counting within the central
government budget, the local unit budgets, and the annexed budgets
and the large element of imprecision in regard to the content of the
special treasury accounts. It seemed probable, however, that during
the late 1960s perhaps close to one-third of the gross domestic product
was directly or indirectly originating in the public sector.

The Budgetary Process

The public finance enabling legislation, under which the central
government's annual finance law is drafted , voted, and implemented,
was provided for in the constitutions of 1962 and 1970 and enacted in
the Organic Finance Law of November 9, 1963. The finance law for
each year consists of two parts, and it may be amended in the course
of the year. The first part authorizes the collection of public revenues
and the issuance of public loans. It also fixes global ceilings for
expenditures and presents the measures necessary to implement the
above provisions. The second part of the law sets forth, by ministry
and in detail, the expenditures to be undertaken under the general
budget. It authorizes the operations called for in the annexed budgets
in some detail. It authorizes the special accounts of the treasury in
global figures only.
A draft of the finance law is prepared annually by the Ministry of
Finance in cooperation with the planning division of the Five Year
Plan organization. The draft is presented not later than November 1
to the Council of Ministers for their consideration and approval and is
then sent to the legislature to be discussed and voted into law. The
provisions of the draft finance law may not be modified in Parliament
if such modification would result either in reducing the projected
receipts or in increasing the projected expenditures (see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .

229
Expenditures
The central government's current expenditures, as set out in the
general budget, have included the government's ordinary operating
budget and the costs of carrying the public debt (see table 4) . Over
the 1966–70 period the projected ordinary operating budget increased
about 35 percent, compared with an estimated increase in the gross
domestic product (at current prices) over the same period of around
25 percent .
The current operating budget is presented by ministries, which are
grouped in three categories : administrative, economic, and social
service . In addition, relatively minor amounts are allocated for the
expenditures of the crown and for a catchall miscellaneous item. The
largest single allocation in 1971 was for national defense and police
(34 percent) , followed by allocations for education ( 25 percent) , public
health (8 percent) , agriculture ( 7 percent) , and finance (also 7 percent).
Between 1966 and 1971 the administrative group increased its
operating budget 70 percent ; the social service group, 30 percent ; and
the economic group, 25 percent .
The central government's investment budget in 1971 contained
projected allocations totaling DH1.3 billion, reflecting an increase of
about 62 percent in the investment budget since 1966 (see table 5) .
The big jump from DH864 million in 1967 to DH1,130 million in 1968
resulted from the introduction of a “ corrective budget" during the
course of the year. The initial investment budget for 1968 apparently
called for outlays of only some DH650 million, which was appreciably
less than those for the year before, and also less than the DH1,010
million average annual share of the Five Year Plan .
The investment budget is presented in the same functional format
as the operating budget, with the several ministries grouped as
administrative, economic , and social service. By far the most
important group in the investment budget in recent years has been
the economic group, which in 1971 accounted for almost 80 percent of
the budget, compared with 10 percent for the administrative group
and 8 percent for the social service group.

Receipts

The means of financing the central government's budgetary

expenditures are for practical purposes divided into current revenues
and exceptional receipts (see table 6) . The first consist of tax and
other current receipts ; they are intended to finance the government's
current expenses, including the public debt charges. The exceptional
receipts are for the most part made up of variable mixes of foreign
and domestic borrowing. As presented, they are equal to the
investment budget and are solely intended for that purpose. Before
230
Table 4. Budget Estimates of Current Expenditures of the Central
Government of Morocco, 1966-71
(in millions of dirham ) 1
Per
1966 1967 1968 2 1969 1970 1971 cent
age of
1971

Expenditures of the Crown . 31 34 34 41 44 52 2

Administrative Ministries 41
Prime minister .. 16 17 22 22 24 24
Youth and sports 19 20 21 22
Information . 4 14 5 5 5 5
Justice 67 67 75 76 82 81
Foreign affairs.... 44 44 48 51 52 55
Defense and police.-- 542 575 841 851 872 943 34
Chamber of
representatives 15

Total.. 673 717 1,010 1,025 1,056 1,145

20
Economic Ministries
Tourism . 7 7 11 17 14 17
Finance - 153 136 246 162 183 193 7
Commerce, industry ,
mining, and mer
chant marine ... 18 18 18 18 18 18
Public works and com
munications . 105 107 120 120 121 115 4
Agriculture and land
reform ... 149 153 174 177 186 190 7
National Development
and crafts ..
Posts, telegraphs, and
telephones--- 5

Total .-- 432 421 569 494 522 538

33
Social Service Ministries
Education 507 497 553 594 625 690 25
Labor . 11 11 13 14 15 15
Health .. 190 200 204 213 216 217 8
Housing 3 3

Total.-- 708 708 770 821 859 925

Reconstruction of Agadir..
4
.

Miscellaneous.. 75 72 88 117 123 111

TOTAL ORDIN
ARY EXPENDI
TURES ... 1,919 1,952 2,471 2,498 2,604 2,770 100
Debt Service ( interest and
commissions) 215 242 264 274 324 354

TOTAL CURRENT
EXPENDI
TURES .----- 2,134 2,194 2,735 2,772 2,928 3,124
1 At current prices. After October 1959 the par value of the dirham equaled DH5.06 per US$1 .
2 Revised estimates .
.. Less than 1 .

231
Table 5. Budget Estimates of the Investment Outlays of the Central Government of
Morocco, 1966-71
(in millions of dirham) 1
Per
1966 1967 1968 2 1969 1970 1971 cent of
1971

20

25
Expenditures of the Crown . 9 22 27 22 2

NOT
Administrative Ministries 10
Prime minister... n.a. 1 15 7

UT
A
Youth and sports 4 4 7
Information . 6 2 3 10 7
Justice ... 1 1 2 3 2
Foreign affairs. 2 2 2
Defense and police . 20 24 57 n.a. 60 112

Total.. 33 29 69 80 92 134

Economic Ministries 80
Tourism .. 5 2
Finance 188 204 222 184 126 195
Commerce, industry,
mining, and mer
chant marine .. 3 3 9 6 6 7
Public works and com
munications ... 219 249 361 430 447 445
Agriculture and land
reform .. 290 296 344 347 332 295
National development
and crafts 8 n.a. 5 n.a.
Posts, telegraphs, and
telephones . 13 1 22 3

Total... 708 765 936 973 943 1,040

Social Service Ministries 8

Education .. 35 21 78 67 45 86
Labor . 2 1 1 2 2 3
Health ... 13 8 13 14 21 14
Housing - 4 n.a.

Total . 50 30 92 87 68 104

Reconstruction of Agadir .. 8 n.a. 6 2 2

Miscellaneous 1 2

TOTAL .- 808 864 1,130 1,164 1,132 1,300 100

n.a.-Not available.
- less than 1.
1 At current prices. After October 1959 the par value of the dirham equaled DH5.06 per US$1.
2 Revised estimates.

232
1969 the current budget was sometimes presented with an uncovered
deficit; since then it has shown a nominal surplus.
Failure of the sources of financing for either the current or the
investment budget to come up to expectations would probably mean
that the central bank would be called upon to meet the shortfall,
unless expenditures also had fallen sufficiently short of projections to
offset the revenue deficiency. By the same token, an excess of receipts
over outlays in the current budget would, other things being equal,
have the effect of reducing the government's need to borrow from the
central bank or from other internal sources. To the extent that foreign
borrowing was being depended upon to finance the import of foreign
goods and services for given investment projects, those projects would
not be included in the budget in the absence of the corresponding
financing from abroad unless the government's foreign exchange
reserves had been sufficiently augmented in the meantime to sustain
the extra load.
The current revenues for the most part comprise indirect taxes and
customs receipts, direct taxes, stamp and registry taxes, and
contributions of local units and public entities. Until 1968 the current
revenues included a sizable item composed of receipts from
government monopolies and enterprises ; since 1969 these receipts
have been treated as indirect taxes and included in that item. In the
1971 estimates of current revenues, indirect taxes, which included
customs receipts, accounted for 65 percent of total current receipts ;
direct taxes, for 22 percent ; and stamp taxes, for 6 percent. Between
1966 and 1971 projected total current receipts increased about 52
percent, compared with increases of about 35 percent in current
expenditures and 25 percent in the gross domestic product over the
same period. The growth in the current revenues resulted from
increases in the tax base, increases in the tax rates, improvement in
collection methods, incorporation into the budget of the profits of the
phosphate monopoly, and retention of portions of the turnover tax
that previously had been shared with the local unit governments .
The indirect taxes were of three types. The first consisted of excise
taxes on commodities easily and profitably taxable at the source, such
as petroleum products, tobacco products, sugar, alcoholic beverages,
and certain luxury articles. The second was a turnover tax on most
goods and services, at rates of around 12 to 15 percent and 6 percent,
respectively. During the 1960s this tax was the most rapidly growing
of the major revenue sources, and in 1970 it was expected to be the
most productive.
The third kind of indirect taxes were the customs duties and
surcharges ; they formerly constituted the government's most
important source of current revenues. Import duties affect most
imported goods—at rates ranging from 3 to 150 percent-except low
income essentials and some capital goods and raw materials imported
233
Table 6. Budget Estimates for Financing of Current and Investment Outlays
of Morocco, 1966-71
(in millions of dirham )
Per
Revenues 1966 1967 1968 2 1969 1970 1971 cent
age of
1971

Current Receipts
Direct taxes 447 531 654 680 701 679 22

Agriculture ... 44 44 44 80 80 n.a.

Salaries 84 90 100 125 132 n.a.
Business profits . 263 340 377 405 410 n.a.
Customs receipts ------ 442 438 472 490 517 566 18

Import duties and

taxes .. 340 383 410 420 455 n.a.
Indirect taxes .. 531 559 843 1,194 1,268 1,474 47
Turnover (tax on
products and
services) -- 195 215 440 590 n.a. n.a.
Excise 336 344 403 604 n.a. n.a.

Stamp and registration

taxes - 115 115 135 178 188 200 6

Receipts from govern

79 54 53 53 57
ment properties .--

Receipts from govern

ment monopolies and
government enter
prises 309 260 367 1 7

Contributions of local
units, government
agencies, and public
entities. 49 54 40 54 56 59 2

Other current fiscal

income... 101 95 134 124 146 140 5

TOTAL CUR
RENT REVE
NUES .. 2,073 2,106 2,698 2,774 2,933 3,125 100

Exceptional receipts, do
mestic and foreign bor
rowing, and use of
counterpart funds. 808 864 1,167 1,164 1,133 1,308

TOTAL BUDGET
ARY FINANCING . 2,881 2,970 3,865 3,938 4,066 4,433
- not applicable.
n.a.-not available.
1 At current prices. After October 1959 the par value of the dirham equaled DH5.06 per US$1.
2 Revised estimates.

234
to be used in production by domestic enterprises . A flat -rate
surcharge of 2 to 3 percent ad valorem is imposed on all imports. In
1970 export charges on minerals and other commodities amounted to
about 12 percent of total customs receipts. In 1971 they were
discontinued .
The direct taxes mainly included a tax on business profits, a tax on
salaries, and an agricultural tax. The tax on business profits was
assessed against both business enterprises and individuals, at fairly
high rates (around 20 to 48 percent above DH24,000 for individuals
and 40 to 48 percent above DH500,000 for enterprises in 1969) ;
businesses were also subject to a business tax . The salaries ( income)
tax was assessed against upper level salaries and collected at the
source at progressive rates ; a compulsory government loan introduced
in 1968 was tantamount to an increase in the salaries tax . The
agricultural tax, representing less than 3 percent of current revenues
in 1970, appeared meager in comparison with the importance of the
agricultural sector in the economy. The stamp and registry taxes
consisted largely of a property transfer tax and a unitary stamp tax.
The domestic debt portion of the exceptional receipts allocated to
finance the investment budget apparently was composed of long-term
( more than five years) government bonds plus the compulsory bonds
introduced in 1968 to help finance the large in-year increase in the
investment budget. Should such bonds prove insufficient for the local
currency requirements of the investment budget, the deficit would
presumably be absorbed by the treasury, if it had extra funds
available, or by the central bank. The central bank statutorily, and
within clearly defined limits, makes short-term (less than one year)
advances to the government to smooth out the lags between its
receipts and expenditures. It may also, by special written agreement,
make additional advances to the government, which apparently have
tended to accumulate rather than be repaid.

BANKING AND CURRENCY

Currency is widely used even in remote local markets, and the

modern , urban sector of the economy has been served for many years
by a highly developed banking system of public credit institutions
and subsidiaries of foreign private banks. In 1971, however, the great
majority of Moroccans made no use of banking institutions. Savings
were invested in jewelry, livestock, and land . Borrowing—which was
mostly for subsistence rather than investment purposes-was from a
landlord, a merchant, or a moneylender.
When Morocco regained its independence in 1956, the country had
three separate monetary systems. Since then the government's efforts
in the monetary field have been directed mainly at integrating those
235
systems into one and at creating new national monetary institutions,
including a new central bank, named the Bank of Morocco, and a new
currency—the Moroccan dirham . Although the government has
indicated it would prefer not to nationalize the banking system, it has
emphasized its purpose of reducing the extraterritorial ownership of
the foreign units in the system .

Monetary Policy
Monetary policy in the years after independence was liberal, both
with regard to credit to the private sector, the financing of rising
budget deficits by the central bank, and the relative freedom from
restraints on imports of goods and services and with regard to the
repatriation of foreign ( mainly French) investments. The result was
excessive expansion of the money supply and deterioration of the
foreign reserve position. This led to some stiffening of monetary and
fiscal policy in 1961, which failed , however, to be adequate to the
needs . In 1965, after a continued decline of the exchange reserves, the
preliminary report of an indepth study of the economy by a World
Bank survey mission, and the assumption of emergency powers by the
king, the government instituted a restructuring of its monetary, fiscal,
and foreign trade policies and machinery. Strict measures were taken
to govern exchange movements ( see ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ).
In 1967 basic legislation on money and credit was laid down to
provide greater control over the money supply, and revised budgetary
definitions and guidelines, based on the organic finance law of 1963,
were introduced .
This strengthening of the government's fiscal and monetary posture
was given additional impetus by the attempted coup in July 1971,
though just how this would work itself out was still unclear in late
1971. Accumulated upward pressure on prices had, to date, been
largely contained by rigorous governmental price and wage controls,
but this was a continuing problem that would have to be dealt with if
Moroccan exports were to be competitive in overseas markets .

The Money Market

The organized money market at the start of the 1970s consisted

mainly of the central bank ; some seventeen Moroccan commercial
banks (including the Popular Credit Bank system ); a dozen or so
foreign commercial banks ; deposit funds located in the post office and
the treasury; a score or more important insurance and reinsurance
companies ; a stock exchange at Casablanca ; and a number of
government -owned or government -controlled special purpose banks
and funds. The special purpose banks and funds included the Deposit
and Investment Fund (Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion-CDG), the
236
National Economic Development Bank, the National Agricultural
Credit Bank, and the Construction and Hotel Credit Organization.
The government was engaged also in an effort to develop a network
of credit cooperatives, but to 1971 that effort had not achieved a large
measure of success . The appreciable amount of unorganized credit
extended in the rural areas by landlords, local merchants, and
moneylenders was not easy to quantify, but it probably represented a
large part of the supply of credit available to small-scale agriculture,
presumably at high rates of interest.
The total credit mobilized at the end of 1970 by the organized
money market as defined and adjusted for double-counting was
estimated to approach some DH7 billion, of which perhaps somewhat
more than 50 percent represented claims on the government .
Inclusion of the credit outstanding in the unorganized rural credit
market would very likely have shifted the balance of indebtedness
from the public to the private sector.
Of the organized credit to the private sector, apparently around 40
percent had been extended to industry ( including fuel and power) ;
perhaps 20 to 25 percent each to agriculture and commerce ; 5 to 8
percent, to tourism ; and lesser amounts, to transport, real estate, and
other purposes . Between 75 and 80 percent of it was short -term
credit .

The Banking Organization

The central bank ( the Bank of Morocco) was created in 1959 as a
public institution with all its capital subscribed by the state. The
bank was designed to act as the sole issuer of currency, to hold and
administer foreign exchange reserves, to act as financial adviser and
agent for the government, to control the banking system and national
credit policies (under guidance of the Ministry of Finance and the
Committee of Money and Credit—Comité du Credit et du Marché
Financier) , and to have, in addition to the issue department, a
commercial banking department. The bank had branches in the
principal cities throughout the country. The law governing the Bank
of Morocco requires that it maintain reserves in gold or convertible
exchange equal to at least one -ninth the value of notes in circulation .
As a means of controlling the economy, the bank may be required by
the government to raise its reserves to one-third of the notes in
circulation .
At the end of 1970 the commercial , or deposit money, banks
(including the Popular Credit Bank system) operated under the
provisions of the banking and credit law enacted in 1967. The central
bank and the special purpose banks were controlled by the several
statutes creating them .

237
The 1967 law established the minister of finance as the chief
executive officer of the commercial banking system and money
market, thereby affording more effective coordination of monetary
and fiscal policy. It also provided for the advisory Committee of
Money and Credit, of which the minister would be president and
which would comprise, in addition to him, the governor and the vice
governor of the Bank of Morocco, a number of government officials,
and representatives of the special banks and of the banking
profession . The Bank of Morocco was charged with carrying out the
decisions of the committee relating to money and credit. In this the
bank would be assisted by a banking association, also set up under the
1967 law and in which membership by the commercial banks was
statutorily required. The association was instructed, in addition, to
represent the banks in the study of matters of common interest to
them and to the government.
After getting the opinion of the advisory committee, the minister of
finance was authorized by law to establish or modify the relationship
between any two or more components of the assets and liabilities of
any commercial bank ; to set the ratio of government securities to
demand deposits ; and to fix the ratio of reserves in the central bank
to demand liabilities. The minister might also fix the maturity, as
well as the amount and the interest rates, of the banks ' various
categories of credit. These additional discretionary powers were
helpful in maintaining control over the money supply, inasmuch as
the usefulness for that purpose of the discount rate had been largely
nullified by the government's longtime desire to maintain it at the
low level of 3.5 percent with the intent of stimulating the economy. At
the end of 1970 the outstanding credit of the commercial banks to the
private sector totaled about DH2.2 billion, most of it at short term .
Around 45 percent was for industry; about 20 percent, for agriculture;
a similar amount, for commerce ; and appreciably smaller amounts for
hotels, transport, and real estate.
The most important of the government's special purpose financing
institutions seem to have been the National Agricultural Credit Bank
system , the National Economic Development Bank, and the CDG.
In December 1961 all agricultural credit institutions were absorbed
into the National Agricultural Credit Bank ( Caisse Nationale de
Crédit Agricole - CNCA ). The CNCA makes loans only to credit
organizations, public institutions, and cooperatives . Loans to
individuals are made by regional or local agricultural credit banks or,
if the borrower is in the low income group, by the agricultural credit
and provident societies, which had a clientele of over 750,000 farmers.
The whole pyramid of institutions is funded by CNCA, and their
lending activities are directed by it. The societies perform a training
and educational function as well as a financial one.

238
The National Economic Development Bank ( Banque Nationale
pour le Developpement Economique-BNDE) was also established in
1959, with the purpose of promoting the economic development of the
country. Half of its DH20 million original capital was subscribed by
the state ; one - fourth , by private Moroccan interests ; and one - fourth ,
by foreign banks in a number of countries. Three - fourths of a
subsequent DH10 million stock issue was subscribed by the
International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank.
Additional lending resources of the bank come from rediscounting
loans at the central bank, from credits advanced by the government
and borrowing on the open market, and from US$61 million in loans
(up to mid- 1971) from the World Bank.
The BNDE has been particularly active in financing two sectors,
manufacturing and tourism, and is the main source of long -term
finance for manufacturing. Although it may participate in ownership,
it acts mainly through loans, which are limited to investment, not to
working capital . Between 1962 and 1971 it had extended aggregate
financing totaling more than DH500 million.
The CDG was established in 1959 as an autonomous public entity
to receive and invest public sector deposits. Certain savings and
retirement funds, including the national social security fund, are
legally required to hold their deposits with the CDG, and other
cooperative and mutual institutions may voluntarily do so. The CDG
is responsible for the investment not only of the funds deposited with
it but also of the national insurance and pension fund and the
communal equipment fund, which is designed to extend loans or
advances to local communal groups. The CDG may invest in
government securities or private sector securities quoted on the stock
exchange ; it may lend to the BNDE and may purchase or construct
real estate assets . In 1968 it invested about DH500 million in
governmental obligations.
Interest rates charged by the various lending institutions at the
start of the 1970s were low. They ranged from the central bank's
discount rate of 3.5 percent, through heavily subsidized rates for
agricultural credit and hotel construction mortgage loans, to rates on
industrial loans of 6 to 7 percent. Rates on commercial bank credit
varied from about 6 to 12 percent, depending on the purpose and term
of the loan .

Currency, Money Supply, and Prices

The Moroccan dirham is a nonconvertible paper currency unit,
consisting of 100 francs, issued by the Bank of Morocco . By
agreement with the International Monetary Fund ( IMF) on October
16, 1959, it was defined as equivalent to 175.61 milligrams of fine gold
239
with a par value of DH5.06049 per US$ 1 . The paper currency is issued
in notes with denominations of five, ten, fifty, and 100 dirham ; and
the subsidiary currency, in coins denominated one, two, five, ten,
twenty, and fifty francs and one and five dirham .
The money supply, as defined by the IMF in its monthly
International Financial Statistics, is the sum of currency in the hands
of the public and bank deposits subject to withdrawal on demand.
Year-to -year changes in the money supply are attributable to the sum
of changes in the country's net foreign exchange reserves, changes in
credit extended by the banking system to the government (net of
government deposits), and changes in credit extended by the banking
system to the private sector, less changes in other balance sheet items
( net) . The Moroccan statistics, in defining the money supply, include
certain other deposits in addition to the demand deposits. Because
the International Financial Statistics definition is more satisfactory
for purposes of intercountry comparison and its data are more current
and convenient to update, its formula has been used here.
Between 1964 and the end of 1970 the money supply increased from
DH3,593 million to DH5,543 million, or approximately 54 percent,
which compares with an estimated increase in the gross domestic
product of around 25 percent and suggests the possibility of some
inflationary buildup ( see table 7) . During this period the proportion of
currency in the money supply increased more rapidly than that of
bank deposits, from 35 percent in 1964 to 41 percent in 1970,
reflecting not only the improved crop conditions but also probably
some increase in monetization in the rural parts of the country and
possibly some increase in hoarding in the rural sector.
Analysis of the factors causing the increase in the money supply
indicates that, taking the period as a whole, the major source of
increase was bank credit, especially central bank credit, to the
government. This credit accounted for more than 60 percent of the
upward push on the money supply, compared with less than 30
percent attributable to bank credit to the private sector and about 10
percent attributable to improvement in the foreign exchange
position .
After the drought in 1966 the foreign exchange position deteriorated
rapidly. In 1969, however, the trend was reversed. It continued to
improve in 1970 and buoyantly in the first four months of 1971 .
Bank credit , including deposit money bank credit, to the
government sector was restrained through 1966 but rose sharply in
1967, in step with increased food imports and the increase in
development expenditures. It continued to rise until the end of 1970,
though at a slower rate after 1969, reflecting the improvement in
budget revenues and other sources, domestic and foreign, of budget
financing. Bank credit, especially commercial bank credit, to the
240
1Morocco
Money
,Supply
in
Sources
of
Changes
and
7.965-701
Table
dirham
)2millions
(in
of
Item 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Total
1965–70
1970 1971
April
Supply
Money
Currency
-- 2,262
2,122
1,859
1,386
1,614
1,429 2,203

1
-
-

-
-
-

-
-
Deman s
depositd 3,281
3,076
2,370
2,829
2,527
2,425 3,418
>
1
1

-
Total
... 3,811
3,799 4,141 5,19
5,54
4,68838 5,621
cha
year
to
mon
in rey
nge
supply
Yea +218 -12 +342 3+547
+1,950
+510
+345 3+78
Money
in
Change
of
Sources
Supply
et
exchan
foreign
and
).(nGold ge -62
+231 -144
+105
-94
+182 +218 +277
to et
govern
the
credit
(nBank
)sector ment
Central
bank
)(n. et +27
+16
+30
+20
+2104
1
3 +989 -187
ban
Depo ey
sit
.monks 5
+0 +12 +11 +37
+212
+67 +389 +47
dem
offi
pos
and ce
andry
Tretasu
deposits -79 1
- +33 +10
4 8 -17 +40 +37

Total +32
+184
+1
+1,418
+523
+345
+333 -103

1
sector
private
the
to
credit
Bank
.bank
Central +27 +32 -6
2 +48 +62 -40 +103 +10

-
ne
bank
mo
Dep syt
osi +22 +33 -119
+46
+421
+133 +536 +52

-
.
Tota l +49 +65 +107 +469 -57 +6 +639 +62
Less
Time s
and
savings
deposit +42 -20
+42 +106 +71
-23 +218 +43
Oth
bala
shee
item tsnce
)(net er +68
+19 2
-6 +5 -10 +50 +106 +111
. al
Tot +61 +48 +61
+111
+16
+27 +324 +154
sources
total
Net
change
of
money
in
supply +220 +5 42
47
13 10
-
+3 +345 3 951
+1, 3
+82
E
of
peri
1. ndod
?Aper
Oct
valu
par
1959
dir
the
of
equa
$1.DH5
US eledr
.06
ham
obe
fter
3 rounding
.
of
because
presumably
differ
Totals
.21971
pFinancial 40–243
pugust
o.
,8ANStatistics
XIV
Fund
IInternational
XMonetary
: nternational
Source
from
dapted

241
private sector increased steadily from 1964 to 1968. In 1969 and 1970
it was restrained by the authorities in order to reduce the growing
inflationary pressures on prices .
The available price indexes included a wholesale price index in
Casablanca and a cost of living or consumer index. Both were limited
in their coverage and heavily weighted with foodstuffs. The wholesale
index had a 1939 base, and the consumer index, a 1959 base.
Inasmuch as the prices of basic consumer foods, beverages, fuels,
power, and transport were fixed by the government, the cost of living
index had a built -in tendency toward stability. As a consequence, it is
probable that changes in the index have tended to understate the
actual decline in purchasing power of the currency unit. According to
the consumer index, as presented by the IFS, prices increased about
1.6 percent from 1964 to 1967 ; from 1967 to 1970 the increase was
about 4.8 percent, for an apparent, but probably underestimated,
average of less than 1 percent per year between 1964 and 1970. From
December 1970 to April 1971 there was an increase of about 2.3
percent, indicating a rapid rise in the tempo of inflationary pressures.
This led in mid- 1971 to a 16-percent wage increase for government
workers, offset, in part at least, by reductions in some foodstuffs and
increases in some taxes.

The Public Debt

Available estimates of the public debt differ appreciably, mainly as

a result of differences in definition , coverage, and timing; when
adjusted, they appear to agree fairly well on the general order of
magnitude of the debt. A reasonably approximate estimate of the
indebtedness of the central government ( including the treasury) at the
end of 1968 would seem to be in the range of DH6 billion to DH6.5
billion ; a range is used to allow for the possibility of double-counting
among the commercial banks, the insurance companies, and the CDG.
This estimate includes the long- and medium -term direct and
guaranteed debt of the government and the treasury ( DH4.4 billion),
as presented in the Finance Law of 1969 (adjusted for a number of
statistical errors), of which some DH3 billion represented foreign
debts; plus short-term treasury bonds held by the commercial banks,
estimated at about DH0.6 billion ; central bank advances to the
central government of DH1.2 billion ; and government and treasury
bonds held by the CDG, estimated at up to DHO.2 billion. The
estimate does not include supplier credits to state enterprises or the
outstanding balance of payments agreements with communist and
other countries, the total of which is not known ; nor does it include
the debt of the local government units, which in 1968 totaled around
DH100 million, according to the Finance Law of 1969. The estimated
242
indebtedness of the central government may be compared with the
estimated gross domestic product in 1968 of DH15.25 billion at
current prices. Service on the public debt in 1968 was estimated at
DH264 million .

243
CHAPTER 12

AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

Agriculture in 1971 continued to be the mainstay of the economy.

About 70 percent of the active population was directly engaged in
farming, livestock raising, fishing, and forestry, and some 75 to 80
percent of the total population was dependent on agriculture.
contributed over half of exports and roughly 30 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP-see Glossary ), depending largely on the
effect of weather on the harvests. Despite some sizable mineral
deposits, increasing industrial output, and a rapidly growing tourist
trade, the development of agricultural resources remained the key
factor in the country's plans for economic expansion (see ch. 11 ,
Character and Structure of the Economy) .
The principal crops were cereals - barley, wheat, and corn. A large
variety of vegetables, fruits and nuts was also grown, primarily for
export. Although wide annual variations in rainfall threatened the
agricultural economy with shortages, in years of normal harvest the
country was largely self -sufficient in most foods except sugar and
edible oils ; in poor crop years, cereals had to be imported.
The industrial sector is defined to include energy, mining, and
manufacturing ( including handicrafts). At the end of the 1960s it
accounted for about 20 percent of the gross domestic product ; mining
represented around 4 or 5 percent, power accounted for 3 or 4 percent,
and manufacturing represented about 12 percent. By this definition,
industry apparently employed at that time around 500,000 workers :
20,000 in the energy sector, some 40,000 in mining, 150,000 to 175,000
in large -scale modern manufacturing ( more than 10 workers per
workshop ), and the balance ( 265,000 to 290,000) in handicraft and
small-scale workshops . The sector, as defined , accounted for about 30
percent of exports.
In 1971 Morocco was one of the major producers of phosphate and
the world's largest exporter. The phosphate rock reserves were
estimated at some 40 billion metric tons, much of it of high quality.
Other mineral deposits, however, such as coal, iron ore, and
petroleum, either were of relatively low quality or were being, or had
been, depleted . In 1971 extensive prospecting for liquid fuel deposits
was continuing
The country's work force continued in the early 1970s to grow more
rapidly than the economy, thus exacerbating an already grave
245
economic and political problem . Perhaps 50 percent of the
agricultural workers were underemployed, and in 1968 an estimated
12.4 percent of a work force of approximately 5,575,000 were
unemployed. The percentage of unemployed was projected to reach
14.2 by 1973, but in 1971 various observers estimated that urban
unemployment was as high as 25 percent.
There continued to be a shortage of skilled laborers, technicians,
and managerial and professional personnel. The official policy of
replacing foreigners with Moroccans was being implemented
cautiously at best, despite pressure from political opposition and labor
union groups .
In 1971 less than 15 percent of the work force was unionized. The
two leading union federations, the Moroccan Labor Union (Union
Marocain du Travail-UMT) and the Union of Moroccan Workers
(Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains-UGTM) , have a long
history of political activities. The UMT in particular was an
important element in opposition politics ( see ch . 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .

AGRICULTURE

Of the country's approximately 174,000 square miles ( about 111

million acres), only some 18 percent was estimated to be arable in the
mid - 1960s; 17 percent was permanent pasture, 20 percent was forest
land, and 45 percent was nonarable mountain, desert, or urban areas
( see table 8) . The agricultural area, comprising arable land and
pasturelands, thus constituted approximately 35 percent of the total
area. The plains and uplands of western Morocco between the Atlas
ranges and the Atlantic Ocean, together with the intermontane
valleys of the Middle Atlas range, constitute the main agricultural
region. In crop year 1967/68 an estimated 13.5 million acres, or two
thirds of total croplands, were under cultivation, the remainder lying
fallow . On the basis of farming methods, the agricultural area was
divided into a traditional sector, accounting for about 85 to 90 percent
of the total, and a modern sector, accounting for the remainder.
Roughly 1.25 million acres were under irrigation at the end of the
1960s. Nearly two -thirds were in the traditional sector and were
irrigated by the use of springs and artesian and other wells, by the
diversion of streams and, in the more arid areas, by horizontal tunnels
connecting the irrigated land with water sources in the hills, in some
cases many miles distant. Irrigation by these methods had been
practiced for centuries, and the government, both before and after
independence, continued to initiate small- and medium-sized flood
control and irrigation water-control projects. It also embarked upon
eight large multipurpose installations, called perimeters, designed to
246
Table 8. Estimated Land Utilization in Morocco, Mid - 1960s 1

Use Area ? Percent of Total

Agricultural land
Arable land 19.51 18
Permanent pasture . 18.90 17

Total agricultural land.-- 38.41 35

Forest land 22.23 20
Marshland .. 0.07 0
Nonarable land . 50.29 45

TOTAL . 111.003 100

1 There are a number of estimates of land utilization, in general resembling one another, but varying
somewhat in date, definition, and coverage. Pending completion of a cadastral survey that was being
designed in 1971 and the national census, including a farm census that was expected to be taken in 1972,
the choice among them is probably not too significant.
2 In millions of acres .
3 Takes account of 1970–71 boundary settlements with Algeria.
Source : Adapted from U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority, Morocco: Role of Fer
tilizer in Agricultural Development, Muscle Shoals, 1967, table 1 .

irrigate 1.6 million or more acres. At the end of 1970 these projects
were in various stages of completion and probably were not providing
more than half of their potential usefulness. In some instances the
water had been brought to the edge of the fields to be irrigated, but
the fields had not yet been leveled, and the internal ditching had not
been finished .
Agriculture in Morocco is confronted with a number of difficulties.
Predominant among these are the increasingly generalized lack of
water as one moves from northwest to southeast and the year-to -year
unpredictability of rainfall (see ch. 2, Geography and Population) .
This basic situation is compounded by historical factors in the
traditional sector.
Primitive methods of cultivation, a lack of understanding of the use
of fertilizers and insecticides, and the absence of means to acquire
them contribute to low yields on the vast majority of farms.
Continuous planting of one crop on the same land, despite a two-year
plant-fallow cycle, has devitalized the soil and, as a result, annual
yields are low and may be expected to become lower until something
is done to remedy the situation . Fragmentation of land among heirs,
resulting from the provisions of traditional Muslim inheritance laws,
has created large numbers of minute, irregularly shaped, and often
widely scattered plots that are inefficient to cultivate.
The physical situation makes difficult the use of modern equipment
in the traditional sector and, together with extreme poverty, continues
to tie the Moroccan peasant to the hoes, wooden plows, and pointed
247
sticks used by his ancestors. Harvesting on these small holdings is
done by hand, and threshing is done by animals. Expensive fertilizers
are not used unless they are subsidized. Livestock fare poorly on the
overgrazed pasture. Frequent droughts and insect plagues help to
make the life of the subsistence farmer even more precarious.
Attempts, both before and after independence, to consolidate these
small holdings have met with little success. Under present conditions,
an increase in the amount of land under cultivation could be achieved
only by a reduction of the already insufficient grazing lands. Such
lands, moreover, would be marginal and would not significantly
increase yields.
In 1971 two categories of agricultural production were being carried
on more or less side by side—the traditional subsistence agriculture of
the bulk of the indigenous population and the modern agricultural
production. The modern system had been introduced by Europeans,
primarily colons ( French settlers), in the first half of the twentieth
century on land taken over by the protectorate government to be
colonized or purchased from Moroccans by private owners. The
modern sector included an estimated 2.5 million acres of agricultural
land, most of which was under field or tree crops; this figure was
down from the mid- 1960s estimate of 3.7 million acres ( see table 9) . In
1971 perhaps 25 percent of this land was still owned by Europeans.
The year 1971 was being referred to officially, however, as the " year of
Moroccanization ,” and it was possible that most of the remaining
foreign -owned agricultural land would soon be “ recuperated .” Lands
that already had been “ recuperated ” by the government were
apparently being retained within the modern sector in order to
maintain their current yields rather than necessarily being returned to
their former owners.
Although the modern sector comprised only about 10 or 15 percent
of total agricultural land, it included some of the most fertile land in
the country, and it contributed over 85 percent of commercialized
agricultural production, including almost all of the citrus fruit, fresh
vegetables, wine, soft wheat, and other export crops. Much of the
agricultural land in the traditional sector was devoted to grazing, and
the average yields per acre of cropped land were less than half of those
in the modern sector. The traditional sector supported over 1 million
families which , even in good years, consumed nearly all that they
produced. Estimates at the end of the 1960s suggested that in the
traditional sector farms had to be larger than ten acres in order to
have the repayment capacity to support the use of fertilizers and that,
where farms were larger than twenty -five acres in the rain -fed areas,
they held promise of substantial development if adequately fertilized .

248
Table 9. Estimated Distribution of Agricultural Land in Morocco, by Owner
ship, Mid -1960s

Ownership Area 1 Percent of Total

Makhzan, jaysh, and habus land 2.. 0.74 1.9

Traditional sector
Collective land
Permanent pasture . 13.09 34.0
Arable land . 2.47 6.4

Total collective land.. 15.56 40.4

Privately owned land (milk)
Greater than 25 -acre parcels --- 7.41 19.2
Less than 25 -acre parcels .. 11.11 28.8

Total privately owned land . 18.52 48.13

Total traditional sector .. 34.08 88.5

Modern sector
Owned by foreigners ... 1.11 2.9
Reacquired from foreigners 4 0.62 1.6
Owned by Moroccans .. 1.98 5.1

Total modern sector 5. 3.71 9.6

GRAND TOTAL 38.53 100.0

1 In millions of acres.
2 Partly in the modern sector, partly in the traditional sector, without indication of the breakdown.
3 Subtotals may not add to total because of rounding.
Held by the government for distribution or rental.
6 Includes an estimated 257,000 acres of irrigated land, without indication of their ownership .
Source : Adapted from U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority, Morocco: Role of Ferti
lizer in Agricultural Development, Muscle Shoals, 1967, table 1 .
Ownership and Tenure
Traditional System

In the traditional sector the land tenure system was rooted in

concepts and usages common to the Arab world. The system provided
for five broad types of landholdings : makhzan, jaysh, habus, milk, and
collective land .
Makhzan land was owned by the sultan or the central government
( makhzan) . In addition to a considerable amount of arable land, it
included most forest land and all unused land and wasteland . The
makhzan also owned the jaysh land , but the jaysh tribes had
permanent usufruct of the land in exchange for the supply to the
government of permanent military contingents ( see ch. 3, Historical
Setting) . By 1971 all makhzan land was referred to as state land .
249
Habus land ( land donated under Islamic law to a religious
foundation) was in principle inalienable, but the protectorate
government permitted holders to exchange or sell it in order to
purchase other property.
Milk land was privately owned. In the mid - 1960s milk land
apparently totaled around 18.5 million acres of agricultural land,
approximately 54 percent of the holdings in the traditional sector.
Milk cropland consisted predominantly of parcels of less than 10
acres; more than 80 percent of it was rain -fed land, without irrigation.
Under Muslim Arab usage, milk land had to be worked ; if it were not
worked, by definition it could not be treated as milk land — that is,
privately owned.
Much of the milk land was worked under several forms of
sharecropping. Under the most common system the sharecropper
received about one- fifth of the crop in return for his labor, and the
landowner, who supplied land, seed, tools, and sometimes clothing
and food, received the remainder. In 1960, at the time of the last
census, there were an estimated 120,000 sharecroppers.
Because of the importance of water, rights to it were traditionally
dealt with separately from the land in customary law. An elaborate
system of rules governed the transfer and exercise of water rights, and
specialized customary officials saw to their proper application. Water
rights could be acquired by inheritance, purchase, traditional right, or
helping in the construction of the irrigation works. A well or other
water source was rarely the property of a single individual, and the
division of the available water among joint owners was either by
alternating time periods of use or by a divider with various sized
openings through which the water flowed from the source into the
irrigation canals.
Modern System

Individual ownership with a clear, registered title was an outgrowth

of colonization. Although some registration of titles existed under the
traditional land tenure system, the procedure was not adequate for
the needs of the European settlers. Therefore, in 1914 the French
introduced a system under which registration became compulsory in
cases where changes in ownership involved non-Moroccans.
Although large-scale colonization was discouraged in the early years
of the protectorate, colons later began to arrive in large numbers, both
with and without assistance from the French government. By
independence in 1956 nearly 6,000 Europeans were in possession of
more than 2.5 million acres of land, most of it in the fertile coastal
areas and around Fes, Meknès, and Marrakech . Slightly more than a
fourth of these lands was acquired under official colonization schemes
and was provided by the government primarily from makhzan lands
and jaysh lands and, when these proved insufficient, from supposedly
250
unused communal and milk lands. The remainder of settler land was
acquired by private purchase.
During the period of French rule some Moroccan landowners
operating large -scale farms in the modern sector also had their land
titles registered. Since independence the extent of Moroccan -owned
land with clear, registered titles has been augmented both through the
purchase by Moroccans of European -owned land and through the
expropriation and redistribution to Moroccans of a part of the lands of
official colonization. In this way the amount of land held outright by
Europeans had apparently been reduced to less than 1 million acres
by the end of the 1960s.
Under the protectorate, all water was declared to be public domain ,
but landowners were allowed the use of water on their land, and
private water rights acquired earlier were recognized . Official
authorization was required for any new diversion of waterways. The
legislation was probably strictly applied only in the areas where
governmental water-control projects were undertaken .

Agricultural Production
Crops

About 60 percent of agricultural income at the end of the 1960s was

from crops. In the past the crops planted in the traditional sector
were designed to minimize the risks of weather variability, even at the
expense of forgoing large crops when the weather was exceptionally
favorable. The principal crops were cereals, which were planted on
over 80 percent of the arable land, including land held fallow . After
cereals, the important crops were pulses, citrus fruits, grapes,
vegetables, sugar beets, cotton, oil-producing plants, and nuts (see
table 10) . For the most part cereals were grown in the traditional dry
farming sector. The more than 1 million acres of irrigated land, as
well as much of the best high -rainfall land in the northwest part of the
country, were used to produce the modern sector's vegetables, citrus
and other fruits, sugar beets, cotton, and rice.
The main cereal crops, which provide the staple diet of the country,
are barley, hard wheat, and corn. These — with pulses—are the main
crops grown by the subsistence farmers; they are also grown as cash
crops, primarily by European settlers. Small quantities of sorghum,
millet, and oats are also raised, and in recent years sufficient rice has
been grown in irrigated areas to meet the small local demand. Cereals
are affected more than other crops by the variable climate. In general,
though by no means exclusively, wheat has been planted north of the
Atlas ranges in the Fes, Meknès, and Chaouia regions and the Rharb
and Tadla plains, where rainfall was greater than ten inches annually.
The cultivation of barley predominated south of the Atlas from
251
Table 10. Output of Principal Agricultural Commodities in Morocco,
Average 1961-65, Annual 1966-70
( in thousands of metric tons )

Commodity Average 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 *

1961-65

Wheat -- 1,117 814 1,090 2,411 1,612 1,870

Barley 1,110 506 1,100 2,223 1,309 1,477
Sugar Beets ... 86 391 367 785 918 1,000
Oranges and tangerines .. 528 676 775 720 819 753
Milk .. 421 501 520 525 535 525
Grapes.-- 396 448 450 470 400 420
Tomatoes . 232 302 277 245 270 280
Corn .. 279 154 255 240 333 276
Meats .. 154 168 174 175 180 175
Potatoes .. 193 275 205 160 100 140
Dates . 71 95 75 100 100 105
Chickpeas.. 42 33 67 70 57 94
Broad beans.. 77 50 52 113 75 93
Millet and sorghum . 67 32 54 66 77 88
Figs (fresh )--- 76 59 65 65 60 60
Peas (dry ) 34 30 32 47 41 60
Rice (paddy ) --- 16 19 27 45 46 30
Olive oil.. 25 18 18 50 16 30
Canary seed . 26 21 27 41 20 24
Oats .-- 19 12 11 25 16 22
Lentils . 15 9 15 18 20 20
Almonds (in shell). 18 20 24 20 20 20

Wool (greasy base ) 15 14 14 12 14 14

Cottonseed ... 13 16 11 13 12 13
Sunflower seed . 6 5 9 4 8 8
Cotton .. 6 8 5 6 6 7

Grapefruit . 13 17 15 13 8 5
Flaxseed .. 6 3 3 5 4 4

Beans (dry ) . 4 3 5 7 4 3
Lemons.. 7 9 5 5 3 3
Tobacco . 2 2 2 1 2 2

* Preliminary .

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Indices of Agricultural

Production in Africa and the Near East, Washington , 1971 , table 21 .
Eastern Morocco to the Al Jadida, Marrakech, Safi, Essaouira, and
Agadir regions.
The country in average years produced enough cereals to take care
of internal consumption and allow for some export of hard wheat,
barley, and oats. In low-yield years, such as 1957, 1961, and 1966, the
country became a net importer of cereals. After 1966 it continued to
be a net importer, even though the cereal crops from 1968 through
1970 were larger than in the past. Although the 1968 harvest was the
largest on record, the accumulated shortages of 1966 and 1967 had

252
apparently not been made up by 1971. Until 1968 there had been no
significant change in the area or yields of land under cereals in three
decades. Whether the continued large crops beginning in 1968 were
fortuitous or represented a new trend of yields and production was
still not clear in mid - 1971 .
Citrus fruits - primarily oranges and tangerines—have been locally
cultivated for centuries, but after the 1920s they were grown
commercially by Europeans, particularly in the area north of Rabat.
Production has been developed rapidly, and it was hoped that exports
would reach a level of 700,000 metric tons by 1970. Vineyards were
cultivated primarily by colons, largely for producing wine for export
to France. The economic importance of the wine industry has
declined seriously in recent years, particularly since independent
Morocco lost its preferential treatment in the French market, and it
has been increasingly difficult to dispose of its surplus. The European
Economic Community (EEC) and the Soviet bloc countries may be of
help in disposing of its wine surplus, but there has been a tendency to
shift out of raising wine grapes.
Other cultivated fruits and nuts included dates, figs, pomegranates,
cherries, apricots, peaches, plums, apples, pears, almonds, walnuts,
and pecans. Almonds in 1971 were the most important nut crop.
Olives were grown widely and were the principal source of vegetable
oil. Oil was also produced from flaxseed , sunflower seed, cotton seed,
and castor beans. The olive crop was subject to wide cyclical
fluctuations.
Truck gardening near the large cities, particularly in the
Casablanca area, was carried on by both Europeans and Moroccans.
Potatoes, tomatoes, onions, green beans, eggplant, squash, sweet and
red peppers, carrots, cabbage, and lettuce were the main truck crops.
Some vegetables, especially tomatoes and potatoes, were raised as
“early vegetables” for export to Europe, where they have a two- or
three -week edge on the production of southern Spain, France, and
Italy. France was a major, and protected, outlet for such vegetables
during the protectorate period. The government has hoped that
Morocco's association with the EEC and with the East European
communist countries would expand this market. A major problem in
this connection has involved the various aspects of marketing
timing, packaging, and delivery (see ch . 13, Trade and
Transportation ).
The cultivation of sugar beets has been actively encouraged by the
government in order to reduce the import of sugar, one of the most
costly import items in terms of hard currencies. From zero output in
1961 sugar beet production rose to around 1 million metric tons in
1970, enough to meet nearly one-half of the country's annual sugar
needs.

253
Livestock

The livestock population exceeded the country's grazing and

feeding capacity. Livestock raising, which has been estimated to
contribute from 30 to 40 percent of agricultural income, was carried
out on some 25 million to 35 million acres of pasture land and forest
land, mainly by an estimated 100,000 seminomadic and nomadic
families that customarily invested their savings in animals (see ch. 6,
Social Structure). Because little feed was raised and stored, many
animals starved during the dry season, and in years of very low
rainfall the livestock population was subject to abrupt diminution .
The large numbers of sheep and goats represented a threat to the
natural pasture and state forests and to the delicately balanced
equilibrium between crops and livestock. During the late 1960s some
redress was attempted by reforestation and flood control, by the
settlement of the nomad tribes, and by the gradual disappearance of
the camel.
Sheep and goats were the principal animals raised and were the
main source of meat and milk. In 1970 the livestock population
included an estimated 15 million sheep, 6 million goats, and 3 million
cattle. The cattle were raised more for their dairy produce than for
their meat, but they were estimated to produce only about half as
much milk as the sheep and goats. Estimated meat production totaled
150,000 to 175,000 metric tons, and milk production was estimated at
525,000 metric tons.
Wool production averaged approximately 15,000 metric tons a year
and was used chiefly by local craftsmen in making rugs and other
textiles. Hides and skins (dried) totaled around 22,000 metric tons, of
which cattle hides represented about one-half.
Camels, mules, and donkeys were used as work animals, donkeys
being the most common pack animals. In 1968 it was estimated that
the country had 930,000 donkeys, 390,000 mules, 350,000 horses, and
216,000 camels. Pigs, estimated at 11,000, were raised primarily by
and for Europeans .
Fish

The Atlantic coastal waters abound in sardine, tuna, mackerel, and

anchovies. The fishing industry, one of the most important in Africa,
has grown appreciably since 1922. In 1922 the catch (mostly sardines)
amounted to 5,000 metric tons ; in 1956 it had increased to 110,000
metric tons, and in 1963 the fish catch reached a peak of about
300,000 metric tons. In 1968 it declined to about 220,000 metric tons,
but it was not certain in 1971 whether the decline was a result of
obsolete equipment or a depletion of the fishing grounds.
Small amounts of fish are consumed locally. In the form of canned
fish and fish products, fish has become an important export; some
40,000 to 45,000 metric tons of canned fish are exported annually. Fish
254
canneries, largely French owned, are concentrated in Casablanca. A
plant for the production of fish flour was constructed in the late 1960s
in Agadir with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture
Organization ( FAO) of the United Nations. By the early 1970s both
the fishing and processing aspects of this industry were suffering from
obsolescence and high unit costs, making competition with other
countries, especially Portugal, increasingly difficult. The Five Year
Plan ( 1968–72) allocated public outlays of DH1.25 million (5.06
dirham equal US$ 1—see Glossary) to the modernization of the
industry; this was expected to be supplemented by several times as
much from private sources .
Forestry

Forests covered around 20 million acres in the mid - 1960s,

appreciably less than the 25 to 30 percent of the country's total area
that is widely considered to be ecologically desirable in
underdeveloped countries. The most valuable trees are cork and green
oak, cedar, argan, eucalyptus, acacia, and pine. In addition, around 7
million acres are covered with esparto grass and scrub palm, the
sources of esparto and vegetable horsehair. During the 1960s the
forests provided work for about 40,000 families engaged in charcoal
burning, cork gathering, and woodcutting.
The cork forests, all of which are state owned , cover about 775,000
acres and produce an annual 40,000 metric tons of cork, both for local
industry and for export. The cedar forests, which cover around 375,000
acres and include trees several hundred years old, are among the
finest in the world . Eucalyptus trees, introduced into the country to
combat erosion and to supply cellulose for the textile industry, cover
from 110,000 to 120,000 acres.
The argan , a tropical tree that grows in the southwest and is
unknown outside that area, covers about 1.7 million acres of rather
scattered forest in the Sous region . It is a spiny, evergreen tree of the
ironwood family and produces a fruit about the size of a plum , which
cattle and goats eat. An oil extracted from the fruit is used in place of
olive oil by the southern Moroccans. The tree also supplies wood for
domestic needs .
Esparto grass , or alfa, which covers large areas of Eastern Morocco
and the Moulouya Valley, is baled and exported for the paper pulp
industry. Vegetable horsehair, a fiber obtained from the leaves of the
dwarf Mediterranean palm, has a wide foreign market as stuffing for
mattresses and upholstery. Morocco is the world's leading producer of
vegetable horsehair, which since World War II has become southern
Morocco's most valuable forest product.
Depletion of the forests for purposes of land clearing, construction,
fuel, and furniture making has been underway since the Arab
invasions of the eleventh century. It was recognized as a national
255
problem of serious proportions by the French colonial administration.
The government could not effectively cope with the problem until the
gradual expansion of the transportation network had opened up the
country to efficient penetration by both law enforcement and
technical agencies. It is estimated that more than 1 million acres of
forest land were replanted during the period of French rule. Although
much of this progress was lost during World War II, the introduction
at that time of the eucalyptus tree provided a potent vehicle for
renewed progress when conditions should permit. Since independence
the government , with advice and assistance from international
agencies, has continued to take steps to resolve the problem and, as a
part of its successive development plans, has made appreciable
headway. The Five Year Plan proposed to reforest around 175,000
acres at a cost of some DH70 million.
Role of the Government
Since independence the primary economic preoccupation of the
government has been to increase the output of the agricultural sector,
particularly cereals and sugar beets. This preoccupation has taken the
form of attempts to increase the area and productivity of the
traditional sector without sacrificing at the same time the greater
efficiency and the specialized production and outlets that had been a
byproduct of the colonial administration. To the extent that these
objectives proved incompatible as they were pursued , the government
support perhaps tended to favor the modern sector. If so, it was in
large part because of the necessity to keep up production that could
be converted into foreign exchange and thereby create an effective
hedge against the food shortages resulting from the rising rate of
population growth and the recurrence of droughts.
At the outset, the new government's approach to the problem took
the form of a number of restricted programs, which met with only
limited success. The first program was a series of land distribution by
the king beginning a few months after independence in response to
popular demands for the confiscation and redistribution to landless
peasants of the lands belonging to Europeans and the Moroccan
“ traitors ” who were considered to have collaborated with the French
or to have profiteered under the protectorate . Because of a desire to
maintain friendly relations with France and the resistance and
political power of large Moroccan landowners only about 20,000 acres
of the nearly 50,000 acres distributed were colon or “ traitor” lands ;
the remainder were lands that had previously belonged to the state.
About 2,000 peasant families benefited from these distributions, but
only the first group of 270 received full title to the land. The others
only received the right of usufruct, which enabled the government to
impose controls on the kind of crops raised and the agricultural
methods used.

256
The problem of the land held by the European settlers continued to
be a critical one; the government was caught between mounting
public demands for recovery of the land and its own reluctance to
jeopardize French aid and the level of production on the foreign
owned farms, which were the most modern in the country and the
source of most of the export crops. In September 1963, however, a
dahir (government decree) was issued providing for the gradual
takeover of all European-owned lands that had been received as
grants under official colonization schemes during the protectorate.
Since then, most of the colonization lands have been taken over by
the government; a large part continue to be held by the government
and operated under its aegis.
French financial aid, which had been blocked after the first
takeovers, was resumed after an agreement was reached providing for
indemnification to the Europeans for their livestock, machinery, and
other property apart from the land. The land that had been purchased
privately by Europeans was not affected by the government actions,
but considerable amounts had been sold to Moroccans before such
sales were subjected to regulation in 1959 and even afterwards despite
the law.

A general land reform law was promulgated in 1966 that, it was

foreseen, would affect not only erstwhile colon lands but also some
state-owned lands , collectively held tribal lands , holdings of
individual Moroccans in excess of specified limits, and a portion of
the increment resulting from state -financed irrigation projects. Land
was to be distributed in 10- to 25 -acre parcels, on a twenty-year
repayment basis, preferably to landless workers, who were to be
provided with necessary credit for basic equipment and initial
operating expenses. Of the approximately 600,000 acres originally
included in the concession lands to be recovered, apparently less than
one-half had been redistributed to landless farmers up to the end of
1970; simultaneously, some existing large landowners were able to
increase their holdings.
In regard to its irrigation provisions, the 1966 law and supporting
legislation provided for a virtual contract between the government
and the farmer that presumably applied not only to colon lands and
Moroccan privately owned lands served by already existing irrigation
projects but also to all lands that should be benefited by future
government -sponsored irrigation projects. Under this arrangement,
the government would carry out the engineering works ( external
preparation) necessary to bring irrigation water to the farmer. The
farmer for his part would carry out on his land the necessary internal
preparations to enable the use of water. He would also acquiesce in
governmental supervision and recommendations concerning the crops
to be planted.

257
Contrary to expectations, events indicated that many farmers in
the traditional sector, even some with large farms, were for a variety
of reasons unwilling or unable to fulfill their part of the virtual
contract. The government, moreover, observing the disparity in
efficiency between large farms in the modern sector and the small
farms of the traditional sector, appeared loath to forgo the advantages
of large -scale production by extension of land redistribution to
efficiently operating farms in the modern sector.
The relationship between the government and the agricultural
sector was redefined in the Agricultural Investment Code of 1969.
Under the code, the government would carry out both the external
and the internal preparations needed for effective irrigation on the
lands to be benefited . The farmer would make a monetary
contribution to both, in lieu of the effort he would previously have
contributed to the actual preparation process. He was furthermore
constrained to regroup his land with other land, if necessary, in order
to create viable -sized farms and not to subdivide his land for reasons
of inheritance below the limits of viable size. He was expected also to
accept the government's guidance in land use and crop rotation.
In case of persistent incapacity or resistance, farmers who had
benefited from land redistribution could, in accordance with
provisions of the code, be removed from their privileged status of
usufructors, with the proviso that indemnification would be accorded
them for capital improvements they had made to the properties.
Although these arrangements were more easily and advantageously
applicable to the large irrigation schemes, they were also available for
application to the small-scale irrigation and rain -fed areas as the
administrative and financial logistical resources of the government
permitted.
The government's land policy was supported by a number of
incentive programs. For the short run , perhaps the most important
were fixed prices for bread, sugar, and edible oils ; a fertilizer program
that foresaw the expansion of effective fertilizer use from around
741,000 acres in 1968 to about 1.8 million acres by 1972 ; a
mechanization program that included construction of local assembly
lines for tractors that would produce a farm tractor count of more
than 10,000 units by 1972 ; and a seed program involving more general
distribution of selected domestic seed strains and experiments with
imported high -yield strains.
For the medium term (five to ten years ), the supporting program
was the continuance of the policy of irrigation - flood control, which
was expected to raise the effective irrigated area from around 1
million acres in 1968 to 1.2 million acres in 1972 and to around 2.5
million acres by the 1985-90 period. Another medium -term program
was improved organization and effective supervision of markets for
the small farmer's surplus production .
258
Long-run programs, in addition to the large -scale multipurpose
irrigation projects, included the development of agricultural
extension, agricultural credit, agricultural research, and rural
education facilities. These facilities had largely depended on the
colonial public administration and consequently had been decimated
after independence and not yet replaced by 1971. A byproduct of
these would be a network of cooperatives, which the government was
actively fostering but which required greater amounts of management
and training than were available in the early 1970s. In the meantime,
as much advantage as possible was being taken of the assistance
offered by various international and foreign national agencies.
Two special programs were the National Development Program
(Promotion Nationale), acting under the direct responsibility of the
king, and the Development of the Western Rif Program
( Developpement Economique et Rural du Rif Occidental — DERRO ).
The first program was set up in 1961 to provide employment to the
rural unemployed, reduce the drift of the poor to the cities, and carry
out local flood and erosion control, minor irrigation, reforestation, and
road construction projects that could be done by manual labor. During
the late 1960s the project employed about 100,000 men ( for 200 days a
year) and was partly financed by the United States Food for Peace
(PL 480) food grants. DERRO, set up in 1968 as a twenty -five -year
project to carry out the same sort of activities as the National
Development Program, was limited to an integrated rehabilitation
program for the former Spanish Rif, one of the poorest and most
undeveloped sections of the country.
Beginning in the early 1960s the government's agrarian policy and
supporting programs were more and more implemented within the
framework of the successive development plans (see ch. 11, Character
and Structure of the Economy ) . Increasingly these tasks were
performed by state agencies, as the French expertise in organizing and
dealing with foreign markets was withdrawn, and as the inherited
French markets themselves broke up and were replaced by the Soviet
bloc countries and the EEC . The programs were progressively fortified
by incentives afforded by subsidies, taxes, guaranteed prices, and
exchange and trade controls (see ch. 11 , Character and Structure of
the Economy ; ch. 13, Trade and Transportation ).

INDUSTRY

Moroccan official statistics treat the industrial sector as comprising

energy, mining, and manufacturing (see table 11 ) . On that basis the
sector represented about 19.4 percent of the estimated gross domestic
product in 1969 (energy, 2.5 percent; mining, 4.8 percent ; and
manufacturing, 12.1 percent) . From 1963 to 1969 energy output
259
increased an estimated 40 percent, and mining rose 18 percent;
manufacturing over the same period increased about 24 percent.
The Five Year Plan allocated some DH3.2 billion to the
rehabilitation and development of the industrial sector: DH510
million to energy; DH1,260 million to mining; and DH1,440 million to
manufacturing ( including the handicraft industries) . The actual
allocation to energy is of course greater than indicated by these
figures because a portion of the new power is to be hydroelectric and,
as such, will be designed and developed as an integral part of the
large irrigation projects (see ch. 2, Geography and Population) .
Table 11. Index of Industrial Production in Morocco, by Sector, Selected
Years, 1963-69
(base year 1958 = 100) 1

1963 1965 1967 1968 1969 22

Energy 139 153 165 181 194

Mining 111 126 124 124 131
Manufacturing - 128 128 142 150 158
Metal transformation ---- 102 103 114 124 136
Ceramic and building materials . 137 139 145 168 186
Chernicals ... 111 134 154 170 174
Fats and oils 145 125 136 140 121
Food products .. 121 127 144 145 141
Textiles. 183 181 196 222 267
Leather.. 121 100 96 112 121

Paper and cardboard .. 134 133 147 157 178

Other... 138 117 133 128 137
General Index 123 130 138 144 152

1 Of weights totaling 1,000 in 1958, sector weights of 110, 375, and 515 were assigned to energy ,
mining, and manufacturing, respectively .
2 Provisional.
Source : Adapted from Morocco, Ministère d'Etat Chargé du Plan et de la
Formation des Cadres, Division du Plan et des Statistiques, La
Situation Economique du Maroc en 1968, May 1969, ch . 4, pp. 2, 10 ;
Bulletin Mensuel [Rabat) , January 1971 , p. 7 ; and Banque Maro
caine du Commerce Exterieur, Facts and Figures on Morocco (4th
and 5th eds. ) , Casablanca , 1969, 1970.
In general, the industrial sector since independence has been
subject to overcapacity except the electricity subsector. Even in this
subsector overcapacity has spasmodically occurred when the
completion of large, multipurpose irrigation dams suddenly created
more capacity than the demand or the distribution systems were
temporarily capable of absorbing. In regard to mining and
manufacturing, overcapacity was in part a function, directly or
indirectly, of production having been geared initially to the French
markets created by the country's special protectorate status and by
the postindependence breakdown of those markets. In addition, unit

260
costs became too high, through obsolescence or indifferent
management, to permit efficient competition in other markets.
Morocco's association with the EEC in 1969, as well as recent sizable
increases in its virtually barter trade arrangements with communist
countries, has improved but not basically cured the situation (see ch.
13, Trade and Transportation) .

Energy
At the end of the 1960s Morocco consumed more energy than it
produced. The domestic production of energy in 1968 from coal,
lignite, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, as measured
in coal energy units, totaled an estimated equivalent of 720,000 metric
tons of coal, whereas the apparent consumption of energy totaled the
equivalent of an estimated 2.64 million metric tons of coal, suggesting
that almost three - quarters of the energy consumed in 1968 had to be
imported.
Of the energy consumed in 1968, about 45 percent was estimated to
be in the form of electricity ; about 45 percent, in the form of direct
use of petroleum products ; and 10 percent, in the form of coal. ( Small
amounts of natural gas were available on the Atlantic coast.) The
figures were adjusted for most of the double counting inherent in the
use of coal and petroleum products in the generation of electricity.
Approximately 50 percent of the consumption of electricity was in the
cities, and almost 20 percent was in the rural areas . The remaining 25
to 30 percent was taken up by phosphate and other mines, the
railroad system, municipal pumping systems, and other industries,
most of which were in the public sector.
Since 1963 most of Morocco's electricity producing capacity has
been concentrated in the National Electricity Authority. At the end of
the 1960s the authority controlled from 90 to 95 percent of the total
capacity of around 500,000 kilowatts. An additional 200,000 kilowatts
of capacity was under construction , and a further capacity for 225,000
kilowatts was in varying stages of design. Production in 1970 was
close to 2 billion kilowatt -hours.
Roughly 350,000 kilowatts (70 to 75 percent of the total) was
produced largely as a byproduct of irrigation projects, and served
large municipalities or industry in the modern sector areas. Another
145,000 kilowatts or so were produced either by large municipal
thermal units, also in the modern sector, or to a less degree by smaller
units used to provide peaking power in the large cities. In addition,
there were around a dozen small units with a capacity of from 216 to
1,230 kilowatts, located in the small municipalities in the eastern and
southern parts of the country.
The largest hydroelectric plant was the joint Bin al Ouidane
Afourer complex on the Al Abid River northeast of Marrakech, with a
261
combined capacity of more than 200,000 kilowatts. The largest
thermal unit was the three - stage plant at Jerada that was being
constructed with financial and technical help from the Soviet Union.
This plant was designed with the dual purpose of using Jerada coal,
thereby keeping those mines open, and meeting the growing power
demands of Oujda, Casablanca, and if necessary the northeast coast.
When completed in 1972, its three stages are expected to have a total
capacity of about 160,000 kilowatts. The high-tension power grid
initiated by the French in the northwest has continued since
independence to be extended, integrated, and upgraded. By 1971 it
effectively included most of the industrially active sections of the
country.
Although industrial demand for energy was growing, the spread
between peak and regular loads was still high. This problem, together
with the high cost of local fuels, the high cost of some of the large
hydroelectric projects, and the necessity of maintaining extra thermal
standby plants because of the unpredictability of the rainfall, has in
the past made for higher energy costs than were desirable to make the
domestic manufacturing industry internationally competitive. The
unpredictability of the rainfall presents a specialized logistical
problem : a certain ratio between hydroelectric and thermal
production must, at least for the time being, be maintained as
insurance against the danger of inadequate rainfall. The Five Year
Plan provided for a reduction of power costs by reducing distribution
costs, as well as production costs, especially for thermal power, and by
revising the price schedule to benefit large industrial users of power,
thereby increasing the use of publicly produced power in comparison
with other power sources.

Mining

At the end of 1970 Morocco appeared to be only meagerly endowed

with industrial mineral resources, with the exception of phosphate
rock, which was abundant. After phosphates, the most important
minerals were iron ore, anthracite coal, and pyrrhotite (see table 12) .
On balance, mineral production was either stagnant or declining,
apparently as a consequence of obsolescence leading to
noncompetitive unit costs or because of depletion of known deposits
of liquid fuels. The estimated value of mineral output in 1968 was
around DH850 million ; most of it was exported in the form of ores or
concentrates. Under the Five Year Plan it was proposed that around
DH260 million should be invested in the mining industry during the
plan period, approximately half of it for prospecting, especially for
petroleum .
Mining legislation issued in 1914 provided that mineral deposits
should revert to the state, unless they clearly belonged to the tribes or

262
Table 12. Mineral Production in Morocco, Selected Years, 1964-70
(in thousands of metric tons)

Production 1964 1966 1968 1969 1970 1

Phosphate rock .. 10,098 9,439 10 , 512 11,295 11,4242

Iron ore- 889 1,017 809 742 8723
Anthracite coal. 400 451 451 397 4334
Pyrrhotite --- 0 282 418 390 392
Lead concentrates . 104 119 121 117 130
Manganese. 341 362 160 131 112
Crude petroleum . 120 103 89 59 46
Zinc concentrates 81 94 68 71 32

Copper ore . 7 9 10 9 n.a.

Cobalt 5 1,850 2,198 1,840 1,700 1,600

n.a. — not available .

1 Provisional.
? Of which 11,163,000 metric tons were exported .
3
Of which 813,900 metric tons were exported.
4 Consumption for the year totaled 550,700 metric tons, reflecting production of 450,000 tons ( in
cluding 17,000 tons of agglomerates ), exports of coal of 60,000 tons, imports of 68,000 tons, and (pre
sumably) a draw down of stocks of 93,000 tons.
5 In short tons of recoverable cobalt.

unless they could be mined by open-pit methods. Phosphate deposits

were nationalized in 1920. In 1928 the Bureau of Mining Research and
Participation ( Bureau de Recherches et de Participations Minières
BRPM) was established by the government to prospect for coal and
petroleum and to initiate production in partnership with private
firms; other minerals (except phosphates) were added to coal and
petroleum in 1938. In 1951 the earlier exemption from state ownership
of open -pit mines was rescinded. By 1956 BRPM had acquired
participatory interests in the production of all coal, petroleum, lead,
and manganese.
Phosphates

Reserves of phosphate rock were estimated at some 40 billion

metric tons at the end of the 1960s, and Morocco was, with the United
States, the Soviet Union, and the Spanish Sahara , one of the world's
major producers of phosphates and the largest exporter. Phosphate
rock represented some 70 percent of the value of mining output. The
major deposits at Khouribga are of high quality and command
premium prices abroad. Other deposits, in the Youssoufia area and at
Ben Guerir, are inferior in quality . In 1970 the Sharifian Office of
Phosphates (Office Chérifien des Phosphates) produced about 11.4
million metric tons of phosphate rock, of which about 11.2 million
metric tons were exported . Production was projected to increase over
the period of the Five Year Plan to from 16 million to 18 million

263
metric tons a year, under the stimulus of a DH720-million
modernization program and projected stability of world prices.
The phosphate mines are the largest customer of the nation's
railroad network and the second largest user of coal. Phosphates are
exported through the modern ports of Safi and Casablanca. At Safi
there is a modern chemical complex, which in 1968 converted about
350,000 metric tons of phosphate rock into triple superphosphate ; this
output could be expanded to 1 million metric tons a year should the
local and ( or) export demand for fertilizers increase.
Coal

As far as was known in 1970, the country had no coking coal. At

Jerada there were deposits containing an estimated 100 million metric
tons of anthracite coal that would continue to be difficult and costly
to exploit unless the scale of production should be appreciably
increased. Meanwhile, production was being heavily subsidized to
maintain employment at the mines.
In 1968 the government engaged Soviet interests to construct a
thermal powerplant at Jerada to use the local coal. Coal output would
be about doubled, to some 800,000 metric tons per year; of the output,
the new power plant would absorb about half, and other thermal
plants and cement plants would use much of the remainder. Some
part of the expanded output would be exported. It was hoped that
expanded production would eliminate the need for subsidies.
Petroleum

Despite continuous exploration since 1950 ( 150 exploratory wells to

the end of 1968) , no sizable petroleum deposits had been found as of
mid- 1971. The largest output, in 1963, was about 150,000 metric tons;
this compared with import requirements of 1.7 million metric tons in
1969, by which time domestic production had declined to about 60,000
metric tons. At the end of 1970 much of the Atlantic coastal area,
which has been considered geologically the most potentially
productive area, was held in short-term concession by foreign
companies, in some cases under partnership arrangements with
BRPM. These arrangements generally provided that the contracting
company would meet the greater part of the costs and that, in the
event oil was discovered in commercial quantities, a fifty - fifty or
similar arrangement would be arrived at for exploiting the deposits.
In 1970 the country had two refineries: one, government-owned, at
Sidi Kassem, with a capacity of 400,000 metric tons per year; and the
other, privately owned, at Mohammedia, with a capacity of 1.3
million metric tons. The first was operated by the state oil production
branch, the Sharifian Society of Petroleum ( Societé Chérifienne des
Petroles) , and processed all domestic crude production, as well as part
of the imports from Algeria and the Soviet Union. Both refineries
264
were expected to double their output during the course of the Five
Year Plan , and that at Mohammedia was expected to expand its
range of output (thus making Morocco self -sufficient in all but highly
specialized petroleum products) , for a sizable saving in foreign
exchange.
Iron Ore

Iron ore production in the 1960s was mainly concentrated near

Nador in the northeast. The deposits had been mined by open pit
methods, but it was expected that these would run out during 1971.
An additional 25 million metric tons or so of not very high grade ore
were available by going underground, but this would involve sizable
capital outlays and an increase in wages. A pelletizing plant was set
up in 1971 ; after the governmental decision to mine the underground
deposits, it was further decided in 1971 to go forward with a small
( 240,000 metric tons per year) steel industry at Nador, based on local
iron ores and coal from the coal mines at Jerada. Although this would
be a high unit -cost operation, it was expected to have the desirable
effect of reducing foreign exchange costs for iron and steel, and it
would meet a significant proportion of the country's requirements in
this basic part of the industrial sector.
Other Minerals

At the end of the 1960s the country was an internationally

significant exporter of cobalt and manganese. It also produced, mainly
for export, sizable quantities of lead, zinc, and pyrrhotite, and small
quantities of copper, silver, barite, and gypsum .

Manufacturing

Manufacturing at the end of the 1960s contributed roughly 12.1

percent of the gross domestic product. In common with agriculture
and, increasingly with mining, it was divided into modern and
traditional sectors, comprising a few large-scale production units and
many small-scale ones. In manufacturing the distinction between the
two was perhaps less sharp than in agriculture, inasmuch as the major
branches of manufacturing were probably even more a mixture of
modern and traditional. To arrive at an estimate of the overall
breakdown of the value of production in manufacturing between the
modern and traditional sectors was impracticable with the statistical
information available in mid - 1971 .
For the most part, the manufacturing sector produced light
consumer goods, with emphasis on foodstuffs, textiles, matches,
metal, and leather products. Heavy industry was largely limited to
petroleum refining, chemical fertilizer production, automotive vehicle
and tractor assembling, some foundry work, and cement
manufacturing. The manufacturing sector also included production of
265
electric motors, batteries, cables, and other light equipment; some
light industrial metal and wire ; and pulp, paper, and paperboard.
Processing and assembly activities depended, in the main, on
imported raw and intermediate materials.
A profile of the growth of the manufacturing sector emerges, albeit
somewhat hazily, from a review of selected production data from 1965
to 1969 (see table 13) . The value of the commodities produced was not
available. The presentation of the data in volume terms has the
advantage of showing the fluctuations in output, without adjustments
necessary for price changes; however, the volume data do not provide
any exact clue as to the relative ( value) contribution of the individual
industries or manufacturing groups. Although the available
information on this matter was more than usually precarious, it
seemed likely that at the end of the 1960s the foodstuffs, beverages,
and tobacco group represented roughly 25 to 30 percent of the
contribution of manufacturing to the gross domestic product. Textiles
contributed perhaps somewhat less than that, followed more or less
closely by metal transformation, and much more remotely by
chemicals and fertilizers, leather goods, and building materials.
Although the ownership of manufacturing was mostly held in the
private sector, the government participation in manufacturing was
sizable and strategic. It included ownership of the phosphate-chemical
fertilizer industry, and the bulk of the petroleum industry and a major
participation, through partnership or financing, in much of the sugar
milling capacity, the car and truck assembly facilities, and the
manufacture of tires. Thus the government was a participant in most
of the country's modern manufacturing sector, as well as the owner of
the port, railroad, and power facilities (see ch. 13, Trade and
Transportation ).

LABOR

Although reliable data on the size and composition of the work

force, the nature and extent of underemployment and unemployment,
and related labor matters were not available in mid- 1971, official
Moroccan reports made clear that during the 1960s the rate of
unemployment had increased rapidly and would continue to do so in
the 1970s . In 1968 the work force totaled about 5,575,000 out of a
population estimated at 14.5 million ; the unemployment estimates
ranged upwards from a minimum of about 690,000 (see table 14). This
was about a 33-percent increase in unemployment since 1964 ( from
about 9.4 percent of the labor force in 1964 to approximately 12.4
percent in 1968 ). In 1971 it was conservatively estimated that
unemployment would exceed 14 percent by 1973.
266
Table 13. Manufacturing Production in Morocco, Selected Commodities, 1965-69
(in thousands of metric tons)

Commodity 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

Food and Beverages

Flour milling (modern )----- 636 696 830 649 625
Sugar refining 334 358 340 384 409
Nonalcoholic drinks . 259 284 291 352 407
Canned fish 1 3 3 4 4 2

Textiles 2
Cotton textiles (modern )------- 7,156 7,237 9 , 302 9,711 13,037
Synthetic textiles (modern ) ---- 1,338 1,822 1,887 2,214 2,954
Woolen textiles (modern ) 688 767 572 793 1,005

Chemical Products
Superphosphates . 160 249 247 253 282
Chemical fertilizers . 77 65 120 111 78
Sulfuric acid .. 40 40 29 30 28
Paints .. 6 7 7 8 10

Metal Transformation
Insulated wire cable .-- 15 15 14 18 19

Foundry products. 7 6 6 7 8

Construction Materials
Cement.. 788 856 875 1,011 1,165
Red bricks . 96 93 102 120 126

Miscellaneous
Cars, assembled 3 5,220 5,378 9,460 12,500 19,150
Paper and paperboard 38 44 43 44 55
Leather, tanned 4 17 22 20 23 27
-

1 Million cases .
2 In metric tons.
3 Units.
4 Million square feet.
Source : Adapted from Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur, Facts and
Figures on Morocco (4th and 5th eds.), Casablanca, 1969 , 1970 ; Quarterly
Economic Review , Morocco, Annual Supplement, 1971 (London ), 1971 , p .
9 ; and Middle East Economic Digest, 1970 Annual Review , XIV, No. 52,
London , 1970, p . 1516.

In 1971 over two-thirds of the work force was engaged in

agricultural pursuits, and the number of people in the rural area was
steadily increasing. As a percentage of those employed, however,
agricultural workers were decreasing, and it was estimated that
perhaps half of the rural workers, many of whom were women, were
underemployed.
Seasonal changes and migration affect practically all categories of
the labor force. In agriculture the activity of both unpaid family

267
Table 14. Distribution of Work Force in Morocco, 1964, 1968, and 1973
Number Percent of Employed
Occupational Categories (in thousands)
1964 1968 1973 1 1964 1968 1973 1

Agriculture 2 3,250 3,400 3,675 72.4 69.6 67.5

Industry and handicrafts... 420 436 458 9.3 8.9 8.4
Commerce 3 250 287 332 5.6 5.9 6.1
Services 4 148 225 282 3.3 4.6 5.2
Public sector 5 200 215 258 4.5 4.4 4.6

Transportation and com

munication . 87 110 146 1.9 2.2 2.7
Other 6 . 134 212 290 3.0 4.3 5.3

Subtotal . 4,489 4,885 5,441 100.0 99.97 99.87

Estimated Unemployment .. 467 690 900 9.4 8 12.4 8 14.28

TOTAL . 4,956 5,575 6,341

1 Projected .
2 An estimated 50 percent of the agricultural workers are described as underemployed ; nearly half
are female . Not included are children from six to fifteen years of age employed as herders or as helpers.
3 Includes bazaar shopkeepers, street vendors, rural peddlers, and related occupations.
4 Includes domestic workers, both in hotels and homes, and casual urban occupations, such as porters
and shoeshine boys.
6 Persons working for the central government, local governments , the social security service, and
government-owned enterprises, which included the Moroccan railroads, the sugar and tobacco industries,
and electric powerplants.
6 Includes mining, construction and public works, energy and water, and special projects to alleviate
unemployment by the National Development Program . Number under the program has increased from
19,000 in 1964 to 80,000 in 1968 and was projected to reach 150,000 by 1973.
7 Does not total 100 because of rounding.
8 Percentage of total work force.
workers and the small wage-earning sector decreases sharply after
planting and harvesting. Between crops, many farmers take unskilled
construction jobs, temporarily boosting the number of workers in that
sector. There is a regular small-scale seasonal movement of farmers to
handicraft shops in villages and towns. Some seasonal workers
migrate from the cities to the plantations that offer high wages at
harvesttime. Food processing, a major industry, extensively uses
seasonal labor, since the scope of its operations depends on the
quantity of harvest and of the fish catch.
The cityward migration of workers continues at a rate of
approximately 100,000 a year, aggravating the problems of
unemployment and spawning city slums (see ch. 2, Geography and
Population) . Despite the difficulties imposed by substandard housing
and long periods of unemployment, most migrants eventually become
permanently urbanized. The majority of seasonal and temporary
workers are males, but permanent relocations to the cities usually
involve entire families.

268
The Five Year Plan provides for the creation of about 710,000 new
jobs during the plan period. Planning officials hope to place some
275,000 workers in the agricultural sector, 138,000 in transport,
commerce, and services, and 43,000 in public administration ; mining,
utilities, industry, and public works, however, were expected to
provide only some 29,000 new jobs during the period. Government
sponsored public works projects under the National Development
Program were to employ another 70,000 persons. The optimum
implementation of the plan would still leave unemployed more than
20 percent of jobseekers in 1972 ; reports published in 1970, however,
indicated that the official goals of the plan may be exceeded because
of increased activity in some economic sectors, notably in
construction , commerce, and services (see ch. 11 , Character and
Structure of the Economy ; ch. 13, Trade and Transportation) .
The National Development Program offers temporary employment
to jobless persons on various public works including roadbuilding,
reforestation , and land restoration . The workers are paid DH2 per
day, in addition to an equivalent amount in food rations, mainly
wheat flour procured from the United States under the surplus
agricultural commodities plan. The program benefits mainly the rural
unemployed, although a growing number of urban jobseekers were
employed during the late 1960s on slum clearance and construction
projects. Employment under the program increased from an average
of 13 million man -days per year before 1965 to between 15 million and
18 million man-days a year between 1965 and 1968. The Five Year
Plan called for an increase to 25 million man-days per year by 1972.
A relatively small number of jobseekers find employment through
one of the twenty -three government employment exchange offices
under the Ministry of Youth, Sport, Labor, and Social Affairs (until
August 6, 1971, called the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs). Of
329,273 persons registered with these offices in 1969, employment
was found for 26,340. A survey of these jobseekers showed that more
than half of them were unskilled workers ; unemployed were the next
most numerous, followed by metalworkers and workers in the services
sector.

Worker emigration to France, other West European countries, and

Libya steadily increased during the 1960s. In mid- 1971 agreements for
the large-scale employment of Moroccans were in effect with France,
the United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Spain, Algeria, and Libya. It was not clear what effect
the rupture of diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco in
July would have on the status of Moroccans working in Libya.
Morocco has appointed attachés to its embassies in six of these
countries to aid immigrant workers and to facilitate their placement
in jobs. With France and Belgium, moreover, social security
269
agreements have been signed to provide for the transfer of family
allowances to Morocco.
The volume of worker emigration under the auspices of the
Ministry of Youth, Sport, Labor, and Social Affairs increased from an
average of about 10,000 a year during the mid - 1960s to more than
23,500 in 1969. In 1969 Moroccan workers abroad totaled an estimated
200,000 ; of these, there were about 130,000 in France, 14,000 in the
Netherlands, and about 8,000 in Belgium and in Germany. In
addition, an unknown number of workers emigrated through private
rather than official channels.
The great majority of the work force is unskilled. In 1963 only about
one -third of the industrial workers were classified as skilled or
semiskilled ; the situation was probably much the same in 1971.
To meet the need for skilled industrial labor and for trained
industrial staff in general, training centers have been organized under
the Ministry of Youth, Sport, Labor, and Social Affairs. Two centers,
located in Fes and Casablanca, train skilled workers and technicians
in milling, lathe -turning, mechanical and electrical engineering,
welding, and automotive mechanics ; other centers, also located in
major cities, offer short- term courses in industrial skills and in such
services as tailoring and office work. The centers are staffed by
graduates of the National Institute for Technical Training in
Casablanca. Vocational training programs were also offered by private
technical schools , and
and various educational programs were
administered by other government agencies (see ch. 7, Education,
Communication, and the Arts and Sciences) .
The Five Year Plan provides for the training of some 28,000 skilled
workers and technicians, including 8,000 workers for the hotel
industry, 3,500 skilled industrial workers, 2,000 public health workers,
and 2,000 workers for projects of the Ministry of Interior. Although
little detailed information was available in 1971, the military was
believed to be actively engaged in training relatively large numbers of
men in skills related to the expanding tourist trade (see ch. 14,
National Defense and Internal Security).
Since independence the government has passed various decrees
intended to reduce the number of non- Moroccans in the skilled and
professional labor force. A decree of July 1959 provided that all
salaried employees must be hired through public placement bureaus,
and employers were instructed to give priority in hiring to
Moroccans.
The replacement of skilled foreign personnel in the labor force by
Moroccans continued at a modest pace during the late 1960s.
According to French press reports in 1971, there were, in addition to
the 7,000 to 9,000 foreign schoolteachers, about 12,000 foreign wage
and salary earners in Morocco, mostly in high and intermediary
positions. A Moroccan official during the same year stated that there
270
were about 10,000 foreign technicians in the country, mostly from
France and other West European countries.

Working Conditions
Extensive legislation, some of it dating back to the early
protectorate period, regulates various aspects of working conditions.
Both the old laws and those passed since independence are in many
respects similar to the labor laws of France. Government practice has
been to issue separate decrees as the need arises. In general, the laws
cover workers in most occupations, except those employed in small
agricultural enterprises and in handicraft shops . According to a
statement made by the minister of labor and social affairs, a new
labor code was in preparation in 1971 ; the minister said, moreover,
that plans were underway to expand social security benefits and
medical services for workers in industry and agriculture.
In late 1971 the enforcement of labor laws continued to be uneven,
partly because of the lack of trained labor inspectors and partly
because of the unfamiliarity of many workers with the rights and
privileges provided by the laws. Compliance with labor legislation was
most complete in the modern industrial enterprises of major cities. It
tended to be slack in commercial establishments and small craft
shops because these rarely employed more than ten persons and were
therefore not subject to official inspections. In general, stricter
compliance is required in foreign -owned enterprises than in
Moroccan -owned enterprises .
The Ministry of Youth, Sport, Labor, and Social Affairs was
charged with the administration and enforcement of labor laws. In
1970 its subdivisions included the offices of manpower, social security
regulations, labor accidents, statistics and documents, social affairs,
vocational training, and inspection of social laws in agriculture. The
Manpower Council, a high -level consultative body under the ministry,
was created by a royal decree promulgated in August 1967 to advise
the government on all questions relating to employment.
Labor inspectors were responsible for the enforcement of labor laws
through regular visits to industrial, craft, commercial, and
professional establishments. They were entitled to make
representations against employers who failed to comply with the laws.
Special inspectors as well as regular labor inspectors ensured
compliance with the regulations of the National Social Security
Fund.
According to law, all workers must be hired through government
labor exchanges, but this provision has not been enforced. Small-scale
employers have generally preferred to hire relatives or friends rather
than applicants referred to them by the official labor exchange. Even
in large enterprises, the major portion of unskilled and casual workers
271
were recruited through word of mouth and sometimes through
advertising
Reduction in force, incompetence, and several violations of
discipline were legally recognized causes for dismissal, but workers
must be given notice for periods that vary according to seniority, and
they were entitled to compensatory pay proportionate to length of
service . A royal decree regulated worker dismissal in enterprises that
plan partial or complete closedown; dismissals in such instances must
be authorized by local labor officials, and unauthorized dismissals
were punishable by fines. The rates of compensation for legally
dismissed workers were stipulated in two other royal decrees also
promulgated in 1967 .
A minimum wage was guaranteed by law for most occupations. For
establishing minimum wage levels, the country was divided into four
zones with four different levels, according to the cost and standard of
living in the respective regions. The highest minimum -wage zone was
Casablanca. The rural areas comprised the lowest zone, with
minimum wages about 14 percent below those in Casablanca.
Minimum wages also varied according to sex and age. Young persons
usually received 50 to 80 percent of the wages of adults, and women
received about 80 to 85 percent of those of men. The level of pay was
lower in the agricultural sector.
Since 1960 the legal minimum wage has been linked to the cost-of
living index. According to legal minimum wage provisions, wages and
salaries were to be adjusted upward if the cost- of-living index rises by
more than 5 percent. The index rose by 31 percent between 1959 and
1969, but as of mid- 1971 no official wage increase had been granted
since January 1962.
Wage levels varied considerably among industries. The metal and
machinery industry, for example, paid the highest wages, largely
because they employed many skilled workers and practically no
women. The construction industry, however, employed large numbers
of unskilled workers and paid low wages. Wages were still lower in the
textile and clothing industries , which employed a high percentage of
women as well as many unskilled and semiskilled workers.
In 1970 unskilled workers earned from DH1.10 to DH1.50 per hour ;
semiskilled workers, from DH1.25 to DH2.00 ; skilled workers, from
DH2.00 to DH2.75 ; and highly qualified workers, from DH3.50 to
DH4.00. The monthly wages of foremen varied from DH1,100 to
DH1,500. According to information available in 1971, the minimum
daily wage in agriculture in 1967 was DH3.89 for men and DH2.92 for
women .
Various compulsory supplemental payments cost employers an
additional amount equal to from 15 to 30 percent of the basic wage.
Other supplemental payments varied according to industry. Miners,
for example, were given housing and medical bonuses. Bonuses were
272
given in the construction industry to foremen, nightworkers, and all
workers involved in - hazardous work. Employees and workers in the
semipublic sector received various bonuses, including housing
allowances and an end -of-year bonus not exceeding 10 percent of their
gross annual pay. The latter type of bonus was quite common
throughout the modern industrial sector.
Social security, effective since 1961, covered about 15 percent of the
labor force; most of those covered work in modern industrial and
commercial establishments (see ch. 2, Geography and Population) .
Compensation for accidents and occupational diseases was provided
to the workers by law. Victims of industrial accidents or occupational
diseases received one-half of their wages for the first twenty-eight
days of disability and two-thirds of their wages beginning the twenty
ninth day of disability. A pension was payable to the workers in case
of permanent disability.
Health, sanitation, and safety standards for a small category of
workers were also prescribed by law. Establishments employing fifty
persons or more were required to provide annual medical
examinations and X -rays for all workers . Employers were also
required to arrange for adequate drinking water and for food and
shelter if the worksite is more than seven miles away from localities
that provide these facilities . In addition , legislation provided
standards for industrial safety and worker protection and for fire
prevention. Sanitary and safety conditions were good in the modern
sector, where many establishments also offered dispensaries,
transportation facilities, lunchrooms, and vacation camps. Throughout
most of the industrial sector, however, hygienic and safety facilities
were marginal

Organized Labor and Labor Relations

The right of workers to organize into unions and the right to strike
were included in the Constitution of 1970. These general rights have
been both limited and supported by governmental decrees and were
the topics of pending legislation in mid- 1971 .
The largest union organization, the Moroccan Labor Union ( Union
Marocain du Travail-UMT) , in 1970 claimed a total membership of
about 700,000. The strongest unions within the UMT were the
railroad, public works, mining, and transportation workers. The next
largest labor grouping, the Union of Moroccan Workers (Union
Générale des Travailleurs Marocains - UGTM ) , with a claimed
membership in excess of 100,000, had as its main strength the
teacher's and port worker's unions.
Union efforts aimed at the social and economic betterment of
workers, such as demands made in 1970 for a 50-percent general wage
and salary increase and a minimum income of DH300 a month for all
273
workers. Union leaders also demanded an increase in social security
family allowances, a minimum housing allowance of DH100 a month
for workers in industry and commerce, improvement of vocational
training programs, and a reduction of the price of medicine and
sugar.
The unions have used strikes in attempts to achieve their goals.
There were twenty -four strikes, mostly in low-wage food and textile
factories, during the first six months of 1969. A major facet of union
activity has been in the sphere of political opposition. The unions
generally have been affiliated with, and sometimes are an important
component of, a political party. The UMT, which has been affiliated
with the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des
Forces Populaires—UNFP), a leftist opposition party, and with the
Moroccan Worker - Youth ( Jeunesse Ouvrière Marocain-JOM) , has
long been viewed as a powerful political interest group ( see ch. 8, The
Governmental System and Political Dynamics) .
Employer attitudes toward worker demands varied considerably,
depending on the industrial sector and type of enterprise. Large,
modern establishments generally maintained an attitude of
progressive paternalism toward workers and readily negotiated with
unions. Both union and nonunion members were hired and, although
labor federations had not objected to this practice, they had been
watchful to prevent discriminatory treatment on the basis of union
membership.
A 1957 decree defined the form , coverage, and duration of collective
bargaining contracts . These contracts may be negotiated for a period
not to exceed three years . After they are written, they must be
deposited with local authorities and with the Ministry of Youth,
Sport, Labor, and Social Affairs and posted in the enterprises
covered . If employers bound by the contract employ at least one-half
of the workers in the occupation, industry, or geographic area named
in the article defining the field of application, the ministry is
empowered to extend coverage to all workers in those categories but
only in the presence of “ compelling economic reasons.
Collective bargaining is relatively new in the country and has been
strongly favored by the UMT. Contracts usually have been negotiated
on a plant-by-plant basis, although the UMT has favored more
comprehensive agreements . Disparities in the level of economic
development of the various regions have tended to limit the number
of more comprehensive agreements . Most enterprises in the
Casablanca -Rabat area practice collective bargaining, but the practice
has spread slowly in the less developed areas .
Most collective disputes have been caused by dismissals and by
worker complaints of inadequate wage and salary levels. In the
absence of a government agency for arbitration or mediation in
collective disputes, labor inspectors of the ministry have been
274
assigned to act as go-betweens. Although their role has been
technically minor, they have become increasingly important in
settlement procedures. Because of the rather general nature of
government legislation regarding disputes, collective contracts,
negotiated on behalf of workers represented by powerful unions, spell
out individual and collective dispute settlement procedures in some
detail.
In 1962 a decree provided for the establishment of committees for
the settlement of collective and individual disputes in enterprises
employing more than 10 persons. In 1966, 310 enterprises representing
some 4,530 workers resolved collective disputes through their
committees on the enterprise level.
The legislation in effect in 1971 provided that grievances, if not
settled on the enterprise level, could be taken to a labor court. Such
courts functioned in Casablanca, Rabat, Meknès, Fes, Marrakech,
Tangier, Tetouan, Nador, Oujda, Agadir, Beni Mellal, and Ksar al
Souk. After a review of the facts involved, the conciliation committee
attempted to resolve the case. If it failed to do so, the case was
referred to the judicial committee, whose decision could be appealed
if the court's competence was questioned. Both committees were
headed by a senior legal or administrative official of the province in
which the court was located.

275
CHAPTER 13

TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION

The share of trade, transportation, and other services in the

country's gross domestic product ( GDP-see Glossary) remained
rather constant during the 1960s ; it constituted some 36.4 percent in
1969 against 35.8 percent in 1963. At the launching of the Five Year
Plan ( 1968–72) these sectors employed 387,000 persons out of an
estimated number of 5,575,000 economically active Moroccans. The
figures are expected to increase by the end of the plan period to
478,000 and 6,340,000, respectively.
In late 1971 domestic trade continued to be characterized by the
existence of a modern sector juxtaposed to, but segregated from , the
traditional system . The first existed primarily but not exclusively in
the major urban centers ( see ch . 6, Social Structure ). It handled the
distribution of imports and the selling of local products abroad.
The traditional sector, on the other hand, was prevalent in smaller
towns, rural areas, and the older sections of the cities . Its basic
features were the small retail shops, which carried wide varieties of
merchandise, and the weekly souks ( markets) where large numbers of
farm producers, craftsmen , and other sellers gathered to sell their
produce or merchandise .
Tourism and foreign trade were greatly helped by a well-developed
transportation system that included the second best road network in
Africa. Railroad and sea transport systems were well integrated with
those of Europe and neighboring Algeria and Tunisia. European
tourists reached Morocco either by air or by train or car via a
regularly operated ferry service between Casablanca, Tangier, and
Spain .
In the 1960s imports rose by an average rate of 3.4 percent and
exports by only 2.7 percent annually, causing an increasing deficit in
the balance of trade averaging DH150 million ( 5.06 dirham equal
US$ 1—see Glossary) during the 1960-69 period. A decline in world
phosphate prices and the liberalization of import regulations since
1967 contributed to the rising gap between imports and exports.
Major exports included phosphates, citrus fruits, vegetables, and
canned fish; and leading imports were sugar, wheat, industrial goods,
and petroleum . Because of the country's traditional French ties, a
sizable portion of its foreign trade was conducted with France. Since
independence, however, France's share in Morocco's imports and
277
exports has been diminishing, while those of the United States, other
Western European countries, and Eastern European countries have
been growing.
The deficit in the balance of trade has been partially offset in the
balance of payments by revenues from the expanding tourist industry,
remittances from Moroccans working abroad, and multilateral and
bilateral aid and loans. Tourism alone brought over DH700 million in
revenue in 1970 .
Because of the importance of tourism to the country's economic
development, the government has provided a number of fiscal and
credit benefits to private investors in tourist -related industries.
Expansion in hotel capacity, however, has been concentrated in the
first -class category despite an announced intention to increase the
number of moderately priced hotels. Nevertheless, about 852,000
tourists visited Morocco in 1970, indicating that the target of over 1
million tourists by 1972 would be achieved .

DOMESTIC TRADE

In late 1971 commerce and business were composed of modern and

traditional sectors . The modern sector emerged during the
protectorate with the entry of European settlers and a subsequent
expansion in domestic and foreign trade and finances. Because it had
little to do with the traditional system and relied basically on the
industrial and agricultural production of the Europeans and on foreign
trade, the modern sector did not affect the economic life of the
majority of the population. With more Moroccans becoming involved
in this sector, however, by 1971 a greater degree of integration
between the two sectors was gradually evolving.

Traditional Sector

The traditional market structure is characterized both by the small

shops, opened regularly throughout the week, and the souks, where
small local and farm producers and craftsmen gather once a week to
sell their produce to town or city dwellers. In both the small rural and
town shops and in the souks, a wide variety of domestic products is
offered for sale. Price determination, except for the merchandise
whose prices are fixed by the government, depends on supply and
demand and the buyer's relative skill in bargaining.
Souks are held at three different levels : local, regional, and city.
Local souks usually draw a small number of buyers and sellers from a
radius of ten to twelve miles. Regional and city souks usually draw a
larger number of buyers and sellers than local souks and hence result
in a greater volume of sales. The exact locations where the regional
and city souks are held are determined by both convenience and
278
habit. Usually, regional souks are held at the convergence of
transportation lines ; and city souks, in the madina (ancient Muslim
quarters in the urban areas ).
Souks usually last for the whole day and are given the name of the
day on which they are held. Thus, souk al Arba ( Wednesday market)
is held every Wednesday from early in the morning until sunset. If a
seller does not sell his goods before the end of the day, he usually
either carries them to another souk the following day or, if possible ,
returns to the same one the following week.
Because of economic development and gradual changes in taste the
traditional system is slowly changing. Handicrafts have been
particularly affected by the penetration of some modern manufactures
sold at competitive prices in the small rural shops and the souks .
Modern Sector

The modern sector is found almost exclusively in the urban and

industrial centers. It deals basically with the sale of manufactures, as
well as with foreign trade and services. It is heavily concentrated in
the Casablanca-Mohammedia area, which has replaced the principal
older commercial cities of Fes, Meknès, and Marrakech, and is likely
to remain as the country's main commercial and financial center for
the foreseeable future.
Until independence practically all large business establishments
were wholly owned by foreigners — mainly French. Since then many
Europeans have left, and more Moroccans have become owners and
managers. In some cases Moroccans have been accepted as minority
partners in European -controlled establishments both as a gesture of
goodwill and for security and public relations purposes.
Trade associations , such as the Moroccan General Economic
Confederation and the Moroccan Union of Industrialists, Merchants,
and Artisans, play an important role in establishing marketing
channels and providing trade promotion. There are more than 100
associations covering most sectors of the economy, including industry
and handicrafts.

Forms of Business Organization

In 1971 business activities were still governed by the Commercial

Code of 1913 as amended . The code organized business estab
lishments into five main types : sole proprietorship, general partner
ship, limited partnership, joint stock-limited liability company, and
corporation .
The general partnership has a legal personality as an artificial being
that can sue and be sued. The limited partnership has some partners
with limited liability and some with unlimited liability ; the former is
279
neither responsible for management nor liable beyond their shares in
the capital. Insurance companies, banks, and other financial
institutions are prohibited from this type of organization .
In the limited liability company, shareholders are not liable beyond
the value of the shares they hold. Such an organization could be
formed by a minimum of two persons other than a husband and a
wife, but its shares may not be issued to the public and may not be
sold except with the consent of all concerned. Furthermore, it may
not be changed into any other form of business except a corporation .
The capital of a corporation is divided into shares that may, after
receiving an authorization, be sold to the public. This form of
organization may be formed by a minimum of seven persons. It has to
have a board of directors, whose members are selected by a general
assembly vote for a maximum duration of six years . Board members
are jointly responsible for the management of the corporation, and
their shares are considered nontransferable, registered securities
during the period of their service on the board .

Government Role in Distribution and Pricing

Government involvement in domestic trade aimed at maintaining
relative stability in prices, raising revenues to finance certain projects,
and raising productivity and volume of sale in some agricultural
commodities. Government agencies in charge of these activities were :
the Interprofessional Office for Cereals (Office Chérifien
Interprofessionnel des Cereals—OCIC) ; the Office of Trade and
Export (Office de Commercialisation et d'Exportation-OCE) ; the
National Office of Tea and Sugar ( Office National de Thé et du Sucre
-ONTS) ; and the Moroccan Cooperative for Edible Oils
(Cooperative Marocaine des Huileries Alimentaires — COMHA ).
The main items subject to government price controls in 1971 were
foodstuffs (bread, sugar, meat, milk, eggs, oils, wine, and some fruits),
tobacco, fuels, water, charcoal, electricity, gas, and transport. The
government also fixed wholesale prices or profit margins on flour, rice,
salt, fresh and canned fish , butter, cheese, some fruits and vegetables,
cotton textiles, soap, tea, coffee, school supplies, and farm machinery
and supplies .
Government price and profit controls on these commodities along
with a virtual freeze on salaries succeeded in stabilizing prices during
the 1960s. The cost-of-living price index, used by the government,
reached only 129 by mid- 1970 ( 1958 = 100) . This index, however, did
not include imported consumer goods, the cost of which rose steadily
during the late 1960s.
In announcing a 15-percent increase in grain prices in mid- 1971, the
government noted that such an increase was the first since 1965 and
announced that its aim was to motivate farmers to grow more wheat
280
and hence reduce the country's growing dependence on imports. The
government was also encouraging farmers to use cooperatives in the
marketing of grains.

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATION

Road Transport

Morocco has a well developed road network. Until 1910 the country
had only few roads, mainly in the sections leading toward the major
cities. The present roads are relatively new and have been well
planned.
Of the total of about 31,000 miles of principal and secondary roads
in 1971, some 14,820 miles were well paved, and 12,600 miles were
earth roads of good quality . The distinction between principal and
secondary roads was based on their economic and tourist value. The
latter were, however, mainly constructed to connect principal or trunk
roads .
Major principal and secondary roads include those connecting
Tangier and Oujda, the coastal or subcoastal towns and cities from
Tangier to Goulimine, Marrakech to the Algerian border, Fes to
Marrakech, Fes and Meknès to Ksar al Souk and Rissani, Marrakech
to Ouarzazate, and Agadir to Figuig (see fig. 9) . Each of these
highways passes through a number of cities and towns, and the
number of lanes varies in accordance with the expected volume of
traffic at the time of construction .
A number of secondary roads were being constructed under the Five
Year Plan to link various population centers to irrigation and
development projects, either recently completed or still under
construction , as well as to sites of tourist interest. In 1971 work was in
progress on a road between Ifni and Tarfaya and another between
Tangier and Fridek. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank, was also
providing some assistance to a number of road maintenance and
construction projects and feasibility studies.
All land transport of goods and passengers was under the
jurisdiction of an autonomous public agency, the National Transport
Office (Office National de Transport-ONT) . In practice, this agency
has restricted its activities largely to the field of intercity, common
carrier road freight. It set freight rates, maintained an extensive
system of freight depots, and allocated freight among all trucks with a
carrying capacity over two metric tons that were for public hire.
Motor vehicle registrations reached 278,000 in 1969 ; of these,
191,000 were passenger cars and the remainder were trucks, buses,
and other transport vehicles. This was more than double the total
number of cars registered in 1957. In terms of geographic distribution,
281
10 6
SPAIN

36 MEDITERRANEAN SEA 361

Tangier
Tetouan

Al Hoceima
Ros Kebdana
& Laroche Nodor
AlJebha
Al Alun Oujda
Sidi Slimand
# Kenitra Sidi Kassem Taza +
Guercit Jerada
Rabat- Sale Fes
Meknes
Berguent.
ATLANTIC Mohammedio
Casablanco + Casa Anto
Ifrane
# Al Jadido Cosa Nouasseur
OCEAN Settat Ait Ammar
Khouribga Oued Zem
Bou Arta
_Figuig . )
32

Safi Beni Mellal

32 Ben Guerir 32
SAI Keloa des Straghna Ksar al Souk
Marrakech
Essaouira
Rissani
ated
marc
Ouarzazate
(Unde )
Taroudant
Agadir

ALGERIA
Ifni International Airports
Domestic Airports
Goulimine Major Ports
+ Secondary Ports
Tan Tan
+++ Railroads
28 28
Tarfaya 0 25 50 100

MILES
SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA

10 6 2

Source : Adapted from Investment in Morocco ( 2d ed. ) , Rabat, July 1969 .

Figure 9. Railroads, Principal Highways, Ports, and Airports of Morocco, 1970.
about 50 percent of the cars on the roads in 1969 were registered in
Casablanca ; 20 percent, in Rabat; 6 percent, in Meknès; and 6
percent, in Marrakech .
Many of the cars used in Morocco were assembled locally. The
largest plant, Somaca, produced 21,000 vehicles in 1970, compared
with 19,000 the previous year. Some of the needed parts and
components, such as radiators, safety glass, tires, and mufflers, were
also being produced locally.
Rail Transport

In 1971 the railroad system was owned and operated by the

Moroccan National Office for Railroads (Office National des Chemins
de Fer Maroc - ONCF ). Previously it had been under the control of
three separate private firms, whose concessions were terminated in
1963 .
The rail network covered a distance of 1,062 miles, of which 440
miles were electrified and the remainder diesel operated. Principal
lines extend from Casablanca eastward to Oujda and the Algerian
frontier and southward to Marrakech.

282
The Casablanca-Sidi Kassem-Tangier section of the Moroccan
railroads links Tangier with the European system via ferry service
across the Strait of Gibraltar. A train ride from Paris to Casablanca
takes fifty -two hours ; and from Geneva to Casablanca, about three
days, with a change in Madrid.
To encourage more Moroccans, tourists, and industries to use the
railroads, ONCF started a program to improve freight and passenger
services and establish new lines over the decade of the 1970s. The
program provides for the acquisition of thirty -three high -powered
electric and sixteen diesel electric locomotives and 1,000 new thirty
metric-ton freight cars and for the modification of existing railroad
cars. In addition, some of the tracks that were not strong enough to
carry heavy mineral and freight traffic at high speeds were to be
relaid ; these included the tracks between Youssoufia and Safi,
Youssoufia and Marrakech, Casablanca and Rabat, and south of
Casablanca to Sidi al Aidi . ONCF also had a number of long-term
plans of expansion in the present network.
During the late 1960s the annual passenger traffic in the rail system
averaged about 270 million passenger- miles ; and freight traffic, about
17.6 million tons and 1,482 million ton-miles. This compares with 6.2
million metric tons of freight carried by road transport in 1969. About
85 percent of the railroads' revenues come from freight, and minerals,
particularly phosphates, accounted for the major part of it. All the
railroad operations were operating at a loss except for phosphates .
To arrive at a greater coordination in the Maghrib transport
system, Morocco along with Algeria and Tunisia established the
Maghrib Rail Transport Committee, composed of representatives
from the three states. In a meeting held in Tunis in May 1971, the
committee agreed on a number of measures, including the Arabization
of rail documents, exchange of personnel, and the operation of the
permanent secretariat of the Rail Transport Committee .

Sea Transport

The country has four major ports (Casablanca, Tangier, Safi, and
Mohammedia) , three regional ports ( Kenitra, Agadir, and Al
Hoceima), and ten minor ports. Casablanca is by far the largest,
accounting in 1969 for over 75 percent of the 16.8 million metric tons
of goods loaded and unloaded in Moroccan ports. Some of the export
items shipped through this port are phosphate, citrus fruits, cereals,
and vegetables. Casablanca also handles part of the country's
passenger traffic and oil imports.
Tangier is the major passenger and tourist port and the only one in
the country with a free trade area. It is also the point of entry for a
number of important import items, such as cereals and sugar. Safi is
primarily a sardine export port; however, it also handles a portion of
283
phosphate exports. Along with Casablanca, Kenitra and Agadir are
important for shipping citrus fruits.
Most of the oil imports come through Mohammedia. In 1970
improvements in port facilities and work on pipeline installations
were completed, allowing 100,000 -ton tankers to supply the refinery at
Mohammedia. The refinery itself was linked to the port with a two
mile pipeline.
Warehouses at Casablanca are under the control of the Casablanca
Port Authority (Regie d'Aconage du Port de Casablanca - RAPC ).
Most imported consumer goods may be stored free of charge for ten
days at the port’s facilities. Inflammable and other dangerous goods,
however, are limited to four days of free storage. Goods declared for
transshipment or in transit are allowed twenty days free of charge in
the port's warehouse. At the end of these various periods continued
storage becomes subject to charges calculated on the basis of gross
weight. These charges increase at an accelerated rate.
The largest shipping company is the Moroccan Shipping Company
( Compagnie Marocaine de Navigation-COMANAV) . It is 96 percent
government owned and has a fleet composed of eight vessels with a
combined capacity of over 39,000 metric tons, about 60 percent of the
merchant fleet. Its regular lines include services to the major ports in
the other Maghrib countries, France, Poland, the Soviet Union, and
the Scandinavian countries.
Recently the company opened a travel agency and began operating
an auto - ferry service connecting Casablanca with Rouen,
Southampton, and Lisbon. The purpose is to make it possible for
European tourists to reach Morocco in their own cars, thus providing
an added incentive to potential visitors.

Air Transport

Morocco has some fifty civil airports administered by the

Directorate of Aviation, an agency of the Ministry of Public Works
and Communications. In terms of their capacity, installations, and
traffic, these airports were classified roughly into three main
categories : principal, secondary, and tourist.
The principal airports- Casablanca-Nouasseur, Rabat - Salé,
Casablanca - Anfa, Tangier-Boukhalf, Agadir, Marrakech, Oujda, Al
Hoceima, and Fes—have a volume of traffic and the type of terminal
installations and equipment of international airports . Until 1969 the
Casablanca - Anfa airport was the most important in the country, but
in 1969 the Casablanca -Nouasseur airport was opened for civil aircraft
and replaced the operational structure of Casablanca -Anfa. Originally
built as a military base for the United States Air Force, Nouasseur
was turned over to the Moroccan authorities in 1963. Work on its
reconversion and adaptation to make it suitable to receive large -size
284
aircraft and meet the requirements of international civil aviation was
started in 1967 with an initial loan granted by the United States
Agency for International Development ( AID ).
The Tangier- Boukhalf airport is the oldest in Morocco and one of
the oldest in Africa. In 1971 it was being enlarged to accommodate
more and larger aircraft. When work on this airport is completed, it is
expected to be the best equipped in the country . The Rabat - Salé
airport was also being enlarged and modernized in accordance with
the Five Year Plan .
The airport at Fes-Sais, opened for international traffic only in
1969, would be able to receive such aircraft as the Boeing 727 by 1972.
In terms of volume of traffic, it is expected to become the fifth most
important airport in the country .
Most important cities have an airport in the tourist category,
serving the needs of light planes and sport aviation. The most heavily
used of these airports is Til Mellil, which is thirteen miles from
Casablanca. Most of the aircraft using this airport and the other
tourist airports are private, belonging to either tourists or businesses.
Morocco has subscribed to the Chicago Convention of Air
Transport, the International Civil Aviation Organization , and the
World Meteorological Organization. It has also signed bilateral air
agreements with twenty - four countries . Some of these bilateral
agreements provide for absolute equality between the national airline
of one party and an airline designated by the other and for the
elimination of identical routes. Examples of these are the agreements
signed with France and Spain. Some of the other agreements are less
rigid, providing for equality of opportunity and allowing a certain
degree of permeability. Examples of the latter are the agreements
signed with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and
the United Kingdom .
Morocco has two national airlines : Royal Air Maroc (RAM) and
Royal Air Inter (RAI). RAM, founded in 1957, operates regular flights
to Europe, Africa, and the United States. It is 63.6 percent state
owned , and the remainder of its capital is distributed between Air
France ( about 17 percent) and various other air transport companies
and individuals . RAI was created in 1970 ; it is 80 percent owned by
RAM . It operates domestic flights between major Moroccan cities.
In addition to RAM and RAI, sixteen foreign airlines serve the
principal airports in Morocco-ten European, five African , and one
American. To attract more foreign airlines to extend their services to
Morocco, the Ministry of Public Works and Communications and the
Directorate of Aviation allow the establishment of regular services
with Morocco even in the absence of an air agreement between
Morocco and the country where the airline company is registered.
Most of the foreign airlines serving Moroccan airports have
representatives in Casablanca, Rabat, or Tangier and are subject to
285
the Moroccan Commercial Code, as is any other business enterprise.
Because only the national airlines have the right to intervene directly
with the Directorate of Aviation, foreign airlines do not have direct
access to responsible government agencies ; instead they assign a
spokesman to deal with RAM. Representatives of these airlines have
also formed a professional organization, the Board of Airline
Representatives (BAR) , to formulate common policy and deal with
their problems in a collective fashion.
In 1971 the three Maghrib countries-Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia-announced their intention to merge their national airlines
by 1972. Should this plan materialize, the air transport system in the
three countries would undergo some change, and previously
established agreements and regulations would be revised.

Postal Service and Telecommunication

Postal service and telecommunication are operated by the Ministry

of Posts, Telegraph , and Telephone. The private concessions for
telecommunication in the former Spanish Protectorate in the north
and in Tangier were ended in 1964 and 1967, respectively.
Direct cable connections with France, Algeria, West Africa, and
Italy and a newly established satellite communications ground station
provide an adequate link between Morocco and the rest of the world .
All major cities are connected by telegraph and an automatic
telephone network. In 1969 there were over 160,000 telephone
subscribers, mostly concentrated in Casablanca and other major
cities. Increases in demand for telephone subscriptions have been at
the rate of about 4 percent per annum .
Postal service was adequately provided, although it still did not
reach some of the more remote villages and towns. In 1966 there were
128 post offices and 500 agencies serving the country.

TOURISM

Tourism has become a major industry. The number of tourists

visiting the country in 1970 reached an estimated 852,220, up from
255,520 in 1962 and 482,000 in 1965. In 1970 visitors came mainly
from France ( 23.2 percent), the United States ( 15.8 percent), Great
Britain ( 11.3 percent), and Algeria (8 percent), and most of the
remainder came from Belgium , the Netherlands, Italy, and the
Scandinavian countries .
The expansion of tourism may be attributed both to natural factors
and to conscious efforts by the government and the private sector to
increase and expand the needed services and facilities. Aside from the
country's location, which makes it accessible from Europe by air, sea,
and land, Morocco is endowed with such natural assets as a favorable
286
climate, historic sites, 1,700 miles of white beaches along the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean Sea, and scenic mountains and countryside
(see ch. 2, Geography and Population) .
The diversity in weather conditions in the different parts of the
country, coupled with the moderate year -round climate in the
lowlands, makes seasonal variations in tourist traffic less pronounced
than in many other Mediterranean countries. About 40 percent of all
visitors arrive between July and September, most of the remainder
being dispersed throughout the rest of the year.

Importance to the Economy

Tourism is Morocco's fastest growing industry. It brought in an
estimated DH700 million in gross revenues in 1970, against only
DH332 million in 1965. This is an increase of 20 percent a year, which
is above the world average of about 11 percent a year during the same
period .
Aside from bringing in substantial quantities of foreign exchange,
the tourist industry interacts with other sectors of the economy to
bring about an expansion in employment and in the construction,
food, amusements, transportation , and handicrafts industries. Its
impact on the construction industry is reflected in the expansion in
hotel capacity needed to meet the growth in the number of tourists.
Investments in hotel construction and expansion during the 1965-67
period amounted to DH295 million, and the Five Year Plan allocated
DH671 million for hotel development.
The target of the Five Year Plan was to increase hotel capacity and
other tourist accommodations to provide about 50,000 beds for
tourists at any one time, compared with 20,000 when the plan was
launched. This would create new employment opportunities for about
2,400 Moroccans.
The pattern of tourist expenditures indicates the relative income
received by the various sectors of the economy from this industry. In
1968, for example, 30 percent of tourist payments were for shelter ; 25
percent, for food and drinks; 25 percent, for purchases (handicrafts); 5
percent, for amusements ; 5 percent, for domestic transport; and the
remaining 10 percent, for other purchases and services. Hotel income
from tourism in that year amounted to about DH290 million, of which
DH158 million, or 55 percent, was for food and drinks provided to
customers . Domestic transport received another DH22.5 million and
the handicrafts industry about DH113 million.

Government Role in Tourism and Planned Expansion

In 1971 the main branch in the government in charge of tourism
was the National Tourist Office; it was the executive organ of the
287
Ministry of Tourism until that ministry was eliminated in August
1971. Its functions include the formulation of the state's policy on
tourism, disseminating the information abroad, attracting potential
investors, and regulating the businesses involved in the industry.
Because of the great importance of tourist revenues to the country's
well-being, the government has encouraged investment in tourist
related projects by both the public and the private sectors. As an
incentive, investors have been exempted from a number of taxes, and
government-backed organizations were established to provide
assistance and loans for hotel expansion.
The Investment Code of 1960 exempts investors from a number of
taxes and offers foreign investors in hotel and other projects a number
of guarantees concerning repatriation of capital and profits. A royal
decree of July 17, 1965, further exempts hotel, motel, and holiday
resorts and tourist complexes from the tax on services and provides
that the state may extend a guarantee on the repayment of loans for
the construction , expansion, or improvement of hotels.
Investments necessary for tourist development have been estimated
at nearly DH1.3 billion for the 1960–72 period. Investment allocations
for tourism by the public sector alone in the Five Year Plan amount
to over DH171 million, of which DH92.5 million was directed to hotel
construction . In addition, investments by semipublic organizations
and local cooperatives have been estimated at another DH437.9
million. The private sector, both domestic and foreign, is expected to
invest an additional DH151 million during the same period. Aside
from these direct investments in tourist-related projects, expenditures
on beautification and the development of public utilities are of a
special tourist value but included under different accounts.

Promoting Investment
Three organizations participate in the development and financing
of the tourist sector through loans or financial and technical aid : the
Construction and Hotel Credit Organization (Crédit Immobilier et
Hotelier -CIH) , Morocco-Tourism ( Maroc - Tourist) , and the
Moroccan Company for the Development of Tourism ( Societé
Marocaine pour le Développement du Tourisme - SOMADET). CIH
was founded in 1928 to extend loans to investors in tourism and has
since contributed to many projects. Loans made between 1959 and
1968 amounted to about DH121.6 million.
Under a law of December 1968, CIH was permitted to grant loans
as high as 80 percent of the costs of hotel building construction or
renovation and 70 percent of the value of needed furnishings and
materials. Reimbursement of the loans may include a five -year grace
period, and interests are set at 4-1/2 percent for twenty years on new
construction and for ten years on equipment .

288
The other two organizations also contribute to the development of
tourism , but their approach is different. Morocco - Tourism operates
large tourist complexes and has investments in a number of hotel
companies, whereas SOMADET conducts studies and establishes new
joint projects with interested foreign partners to increase tourist
traffic and revenues . The latter is particularly concerned with
carrying out studies for large -scale tourist projects and joining with
foreign interests in implementing them .

Prospects for Expansion

A target of the Five Year Plan was to increase tourist traffic to over
1 million a year by 1972. With a growth record of 20 percent between
1965 and 1970, this volume seems to be realizable . The most
important impediment was the high cost of hotel accommodations
and other expenditures as compared to other Mediterranean
countries, such as Italy and Spain .
According to one estimate in 1970, the cost of one week in a four- or
a five-star hotel with complete board averaged the equivalent of
DH230 in Spain, DH320 in Tunisia, and DH520 in Morocco. Although
the Five Year Plan provided for the construction of more moderately
priced hotels to attract more tourists, in 1971 construction of first
class hotels was still the major part of new hotel construction.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The balance -of-payments position improved in the late 1960s

despite a widening deficit in the merchandise trade balance. It
reached a critical deterioration in the 1961-64 period because of a
succession of sizable deficits, resulting in large part from the outflow
of capital and an unfavorable trade balance. This situation prompted
the establishment of strict exchange and trade regulations in 1964.
The balance of payments and the volume of foreign exchange
reserves improved significantly in 1969 and 1970, showing surpluses
amounting to about DH131 million in 1969 and DH170 million in
1970. Although figures for the merchandise balance showed that
imports exceeded exports by DH288 million in 1969 and DH600
million in 1970, these deficits were more than offset by transfer
payments from abroad and foreign aid and loans. As a result, foreign
exchange reserves at the end of 1970 increased to DH600 million, an
increase of about 43 percent over 1969.

Balance of Trade

The volume of foreign trade and its importance to the economy rose
sharply during the protectorate period because of the increase in the

289
number of European settlers, whose needs for consumer and capital
goods were not available domestically and had to be imported, as well
as a sharp increase in the export of minerals and agricultural
products, mainly to France and Spain. Thus, although the volume of
foreign trade was only about DH10 million a year at the beginning of
the twentieth century, it reached about DH35.5 million in 1913 and
about DH576 million by 1930, of which about DH435 million
represented imports of consumer and other goods. The volume of
imports consistently exceeded that of exports during the protectorate
period .
The deficit in the balance of trade was offset by French economic
aid until 1956. After independence, however, French aid was
periodically interrupted because of political difficulties, while the
deficit in the balance of trade continued to grow (see ch. 9, Foreign
Relations). Exchange restrictions were imposed in 1964, with a total
ban on imports during the month of October.
Improvements in the balance of payments in 1965 led to a gradual
liberalization of trade policy, particularly after 1967, which in turn led
to a widening deficit in the balance of trade . The only noticeable
improvement in the trade balance was in 1969, when a significant
increase in olive oil exports and a drop in wheat imports reduced the
gap between imports and exports. In 1970, however, imports were up
again because of a resumption of wheat imports. Preliminary figures
indicated that imports increased by 17 percent over the 1969 level ;
but exports increased by only 3 percent, causing an estimated
balance -of- trade deficit twice that of 1969.

Tourism, Transport, and Insurance

The 1969 balance-of-payments figures indicate that gross receipts

from tourism amounted to DH614 million (see table 15) . Net receipts
reached DH346.7 million, the difference representing expenditures by
Moroccan travelers abroad. During the same year, receipts from
maritime transport and insurance amounted to DH88.3 million,
against total payments of DH239 million ; of these, foreign exchange
receipts by RAM came to DH11.5 million against payments of
DH56.4 million made to foreign airlines.

Income from Investment and Cash Receipts

The income from the investments account included the repatriation

of profits and interests by the private sector and interests payments
and receipts by the public sector. Receipts in this account increased
slightly in 1969 because of a rise in interests collected by the public
sector, but expenditures remained relatively stable. Transfers by the

290
Table 15. Balance of Payments of Morocco, 1969
(in millions of dirham )
Item Receipts Expenditures Balance

Goods and Services

Goods f.o.b. 2 2,450.1 2,634.3 - 184.2
Gold for industry ---- 0 6.6 - 6.6
Transport charges and insurance on
international shipments . 88.3 239.0 - 150.7
Other transport... 25.6 73.9 - 48.3
Travel.- 614.0 267.3 +346.7
Income from investments . 58.7 264.7 -206.0
Governmental transactions. 151.1 265.3 -114.2
Other services .. 47.2 100.6 -
- 53.4

Total goods and services. 3,435.0 3,851.7 -416.7

Cash Transfers
Private . 532.1 260.1 +272.0
Public.. 153.5 73.9 + 79.6

Total cash transfers .. 685.6 334.0 +351.6

Nonmonetary Capital
Private
Balance of commercial credits... 77.2 0 + 77.2
Loans and investments . 77.3 44.1 + 33.2
Other.. 50.6 208.8 - 158.2

Total private.. 205.1 252.9 - 47.8

Public
Commercial credits ---- 193.3 75.4 +117.9
Loans in foreign exchange . 155.4 87.7 + 67.7
Loans in dirham . 70.9 16.3 + 54.6
Other.-- 3.5 0 + 3.5

Total public.--- 423.1 179.4 +243.7

Total nonmonetary capital ... 628.2 432.3 +195.9

GRAND TOTAL .-- 4,748.8 4,618.0 +130.8

15.06 dirham equal US $ 1 — see Glossary.

2 Free on board .

Source : Adapted from Monthly Bulletin of Information (Rabat), March 1970, p . 20 .

private sector represented 44.2 percent of the total in 1969, down from
52 percent the previous year.
In 1969 cash receipts from salaries, pensions, and gifts amounted to
DH532.1 million, of which DH302.3 million represented remittances
by Moroccans working abroad. Cash expenditures, on the other hand ,
291
reached DH260.1 million, of which DH231.3 million was in salaries
repatriated by foreign citizens working in Morocco .
The surplus in government cash transfers fell to DH79.6 million in
1969, against DH96.2 million in 1968 and DH117.4 million in 1967.
This resulted from a drop both in receipts from France for payment of
the salaries of French citizens working in Morocco under the technical
assistance program and in American grants usually obtained from
private sources.

The Capital Account

The deficit in Morocco's private capital account has persisted since
the mid - 1950s. In 1968 it reached DH81.1 million, dropping to DH47.8
million in 1969. Public capital transfers, however, had a surplus of
DH243.7 million in 1969, resulting in an overall surplus in the capital
account amounting to DH195.9 million . Total public grants, gifts, and
loans registered DH423.1 million in that year, whereas repayments of
public debts reached only DH179.4 million.
Exchange Controls
Exchange control regulations are set and administered by the
Exchange Control Office ( Office des Changes), an agency of the
Ministry of Finance. Authorized banks act in some cases on behalf of
the Exchange Control Office in the execution of some exchange
control measures ( see ch . 11 , Character and Structure of the
Economy) .
According to regulations in force in 1971, foreign exchange brought
into Morocco must be declared and exchanged for dirham at
authorized banks. The par value of exchange of Moroccan dirham was
set at 0.175610 gram of fine gold, or DH5.06049 equal US$ 1, and the
rate per French franc at DH1.09755.
Importation of Moroccan banknotes is prohibited, and foreign
banknotes brought in must be declared upon entry. For resident
travelers, foreign exchange must be surrendered within fifteen days of
entry .
Morocco does not have a foreign exchange market. Sale and
purchase of foreign currency are centralized in the Bank of Morocco;
authorized banks that are permitted to handle foreign exchange
transactions on behalf of their customers are required to purchase
from or sell to the Bank of Morocco the balances of their daily foreign
exchange transactions .
The Exchange Control Office classifies countries for prescription of
currency purposes into three groups : the French franc area countries,
the payments agreement countries, and the area of convertibility
countries. Transactions with the franc area are made in francs or in
292
dirham through the French Franc Area Accounts (in which Moroccan
dirham are held by franc area residents for use in any settlement
except imports ).
Transactions with the payments agreement countries are debited or
credited in the payments agreement accounts. Countries with which
Morocco has entered into such agreements are Bulgaria, the People's
Republic of China ( PRC ) , Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic ( East Germany) , Guinea, Hungary, Mali,
Poland, Spain, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Soviet Union.
Although a distinction is made between the franc area and the area
of convertibility, exchange controls apply equally to countries in the
two areas. Unlike the franc area, however, transactions with the
convertibility area are settled in convertible currencies negotiated by
the Bank of Morocco. Some of the countries included in this category
are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and the United States.

FOREIGN TRADE

Since independence, and particularly during the late 1960s, the role
of foreign trade in the economy of Morocco has been declining
steadily despite the increase in import-export volume. Exports, which
constituted about 19.5 percent of the national income in 1964, made
up only 17.3 percent of it in 1969; and imports, which were 20.7
percent of the national income in 1964, dropped to 20 percent in
1969.

Exports
Exports in 1969 totaled DH2,455 million, compared with DH1,942
million in 1963, DH2,168 million in 1966, and DH2,278 million in
1968 ( see table 16) . Most of this increase is attributed to growth in the
export of foodstuffs, raw materials, and processed goods.
Exports of food and beverages reached DH1,185 million in 1969, or
about 48 percent of the total. Morocco is the world's second largest
exporter of citrus fruits. Some 551,000 metric tons of these fruits were
exported in 1969-mostly to France, the Soviet Union, West
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium-bringing a revenue of
DH388.5 million. Fresh tomatoes, of which 133,142 metric tons were
exported in 1969, brought an additional revenue of DH145.6 million.
Canned fish is third in importance, with a total metric tonnage of
46,908 valued at DH133 million . France and West Germany were the
two leading customers for Moroccan tomatoes and canned fish .
Agricultural raw materials constituted about 9.7 percent of total
exports in 1969, bringing DH238 million in revenue. Olive oil, cotton,
293
,Table
Morocco
of
Trade
Foreign
16.
1966–69
)*(in
dirham
of
millions

294
1966 1967 1968 1969

Imports
Food
,a
tobacco
drink
nd 659.6 722.7 618.7 452.2
and
lubrica
Fuels nts 117.1 126.9 165.7 164.6
Product
bulk
in
animal
of
and
vegetab
origin s
le 294.4 268.9 327.2 291.8
Minerals 23.5 22.4 36.1 50.6
.Semipro
goods cessed 516.3 550.1 616.0 731.1
goods
Manufactured
Manufactured
for
industry 385.1 528.9 588.4 663.3
Manufactured
consumption
for 415.8 396.8 433.3 483.6
Gold
industry
.for 6.1 3.5 4.7 7.2

TOTAL 2,417.9 2,620.2 2,790.1 2,844.4

Exports
tobacco
Food
,a
drink
nd 1,051.7 1,061.9 1,168.5 1,184.9
Fuels
and
lubrica
. nts 6.5 10.7 16.3 7.8
Produc
bulk
in
animal
of
vegetab
and
origin ts
le 137.7 140.9 134.2 238.2
Minerals 777.5 753.7 737.7 768.2
Semipro
goods
. cessed 110.1 122.3 155.0 .1445
Manufactured
goods
Manufactured
for
industry 4.8 2.1 8.3 2.9
Manufactured
for
consumption 43.7 54.6 57.1 108.9

TOTAL 2,132.0 2,146.2 2,278.1 2,455.4

dirham
equal
US .06
Glossary
5.—s$1*ee
Bfrom
:A
,Source
Exterieur
Commerce
du
Marocaine
Banque
dapted
(Culletin
d'Information
)NMensuel
M
.105
1970
asablanca
o.
ay
and cork were the major items in this group. Olive oil exports showed
a significant increase in 1969; about 32,765 metric tons valued at
DH91.4 million were exported in that year, compared with 2,430
metric tons valued at DH7.2 million in 1968. This increase, however,
does not necessarily reflect a trend because Morocco's olive oil
production is subject to a triennial cycle.
Minerals contributed about DH776 million, or 31 percent of total
exports, in 1969. Morocco is the world's leading exporter of phosphate,
the country's leading export item . Revenues from phosphate exports
in 1969 amounted to DH551 million, or 22 percent of total export
value. Major customers, in order of importance, were France, the
United Kingdom , the Belgium -Luxembourg Economic Union, Spain,
Poland, the Netherlands, PRC, Japan, and Italy. Other minerals
exported are lead, iron, manganese, zinc, cobalt, and coal .

Imports
Total imports reached DH2,844 million in 1969, compared with
DH2,790 million in 1968, DH2,418 million in 1966 , and DH2,310
million in 1963. Food, beverages, and tobacco constituted 15.9 percent
of total imports in 1969 ; fuel and raw materials ( including food oil),
17.8 percent ; and consumer goods, about 17 percent.
Morocco imports large quantities of sugar, but the amount
imported has been declining in recent years because of the
government's encouragement of sugar beet production and an
expansion of sugar- refining capacity (see ch. 12, Agriculture and
Industry ). Thus, although sugar imports were valued at DH327 million
in 1964, they dropped to DH262 million in 1965, DH191 million in
1966, DH149 million in 1967, DH119 million in 1968, and DH109
million in 1969. Long -range plans aim at self-sufficiency in sugar
production by 1985.
The two other leading food imports were tea and wheat. Tea was
second to sugar in value in 1969, reaching DH103 million. This was
more than double the 1963 value of only DH51 million and a sharp
rise over 1968, which registered DH82 million.
Morocco became a net importer of cereals early in the 1960s.
Between 1966 and 1970 yearly imports averaged 63,420 metric tons.
According to an estimate by the Ministry of Agriculture and National
Development, improved methods of cultivation could increase the
country's wheat production to almost 3 million metric tons a year by
1977. If this level were achieved, import needs from this commodity
would drop by 80 percent of the 1970 level. The alternative would be a
rise in imports to a level of 1.3 million metric tons by 1977 .
Fuels and raw materials imported include crude oil, lumber,
lubricants, gasoline and diesel fuel, peanut oil, and other food oils.
Imports of these items rose from DH377 million in 1963 to DH435
295
million in 1966 and DH507 million in 1969. Morocco depends on
imported petroleum for most of its oil needs ; crude oil imports rose
from DH65 million in 1963 to DH79 million in 1966 and DH102
million in 1969. The Soviet Union and Algeria were the major
suppliers.
Semifinished products imported consist of metal products, cotton
and synthetic textile yarn, intermediate paper products, fertilizers,
and other chemicals and industrial goods. In 1969 the value of these
imports amounted to DH731 million, constituting some 25.7 percent
of total imports against 20 percent in 1963 and 21.4 percent in 1966.
Imports of agricultural and industrial equipment were valued at
DH663 million in 1969, a sharp increase over 1963 and 1966 figures of
DH370 million and DH385 million, respectively. Most of this increase
was in the industrial equipment and machinery category (as opposed
to agricultural equipment), which accounted for DH415 million in
1969 against only DH154 million in 1963.
Consumer goods imported in 1969 amounted to DH484 million.
Automobiles and auto parts, hardware and appliances, and
pharmaceuticals were the major items in this category. Because of the
expansion in domestic textile production , the value of textile imports
dropped significantly in the 1960s — from DH165 million in 1963 to
DH97 million in 1966, DH71 million in 1967, and DH25 million in
1969 .

Trade Pattern

France, West Germany, and Italy are Morocco's leading partners

( see table 17) . These three states and the other three members of the
European Economic Community ( EEC) received 58.8 percent of
Morocco's exports in 1969 and supplied it with 52.3 percent of its
imports.
Table 17. Principal Suppliers and Customers of Morocco, 1969
Suppliers Value * Percent Customers Value * Percent

France . 866,206 30.5 France . 862,838 35.1

West Germany -- 279,313 9.8 West Germany. 209,493 8.5
United States . 213,869 7.5 Italy . 200,328 8.2
Soviet Union ... 159,439 5.6 Great Britain ... 143,492 5.8
Italy --- 152,193 5.3 Netherlands . 102,924 4.2
Great Britain . 147,821 5.2 Spain . 99,982 4.1
Other--- 1,025,580 36.1 Other 836,397 34.1

TOTAL .. 2,844,421 100.0 TOTAL ... 2,455,454 100.0

• In thousands of dirham ; 5.06 dirham equal US $ 1 — see Glossary.

Source : Adapted from Monthly Bulletin of Information (Rabat), June 1970 .

296
Although France's relative share in Morocco's trade declined during
the 1950s and 1960s, in 1971 it remained the principal supplier of
Morocco's imports and the major market for its exports. In 1969
France supplied 30.5 percent of Morocco's total imports and received
35.1 percent of its exports. Morocco was also one of France's leading
suppliers and customers, ranking twelfth among both its sources and
its customers.
After a long period of negotiation, an association agreement
between Morocco and the EEC came into effect in 1969. In
accordance with this agreement, about 75 percent of Morocco's
exports to the EEC get preferential treatment on tariffs and quotas
for industrial products and tariffs for farm products. Moroccan citrus
exports get an 80-percent reduction in the common external tariff,
and canned fruits and vegetables get a 50-percent tariff cut. Special
consideration is also given to fish products and olive oil.
In return for these concessions Morocco agreed to reduce tariffs on
imports from the EEC by an average of 12.5 percent and establish
some quotas guaranteeing the maintenance of the same level of
imports on certain items traditionally obtained from member
countries. The establishment of these quotas, however, did not imply
any new purchasing obligations, since they were based upon the share
of the EEC members in Morocco's imports before the association
agreement was signed .
This agreement did not show any immediate favorable results with
regard to an increase in volume or a change in direction of trade.
Provisional figures for 1970 even indicate a small drop in the volume
of goods traded. Moroccan citrus fruit exports to the community
dropped slightly in that year because of competition from Spain and
Israel, and total Moroccan exports to the six member countries
dropped from DH1,443 million in 1969 to DH1,087 million in 1970,
while its imports from the community fell from DH1,448 million to
DH1,296 million.
The United States is Morocco's major trading partner in the
Western Hemisphere . The United States had for many years
maintained second place among Morocco's suppliers. A good wheat
crop in 1969, however, resulted in a reduction of Morocco's imports of
this commodity, which in turn reduced that year's volume of
American exports to Morocco and caused it to rank third among
Morocco's sources of supply. In addition to wheat, Morocco imports
vegetable oils, cotton, tobacco, and tallow from the United States.
Although total American exports to Morocco in 1969 amounted to
DH213 million, or about 7.5 percent of the total, its imports from
Morocco registered only DH47 million, or about 1.9 percent of the
total. The reason for the low level of American imports from Morocco
is that the United States is a major producer of most of Morocco's
traditional exports. It is, for example, the world's major producer of
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phosphate, which is Morocco's main export item. The United States,
however, still imports a number of items from Morocco, including
chemical manganese ore ; zinc ore ; dried vegetables and spices ;
canned vegetables, fish , and olives ; agar; barium ; and hides and
skins.
The Soviet Union has been Morocco's major trading partner among
the communist states. In the early 1970s it was Morocco's second
major crude oil supplier and the second largest buyer of its oranges.
The total volume of Soviet-Moroccan trade, however, was still small,
as was the total value of trade with all the communist states, whose
total share amounted to only 12 percent of Morocco's foreign trade in
1969 .
A permanent Soviet-Moroccan commission for economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation was established in 1970 to enhance trade
and other relations between the two states. They also signed a new
three -year trade agreement covering the 1970–73 period, according to
which the Soviet Union would sell Morocco hydroelectric power and
refrigeration equipment, tractors, and agricultural machinery worth
about DH222 million. Payments for these imports would be made in
citrus fruits, cotton, cork, and canned sardines.
Morocco's trade with Africa has risen steadily since the mid - 1960s.
In 1969 alone it rose by 30 percent, total imports amounting to
DH130.8 million and exports to about DH137.1 million. Over 65
percent of this trade is composed of commodity exchanges with the
other three North African countries: Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.
Most of Morocco's trade with Asia is conducted with Japan and the
PRC. Imports from Japan amounted to DH55.5 million in 1969, up
83.7 percent from the previous year; exports were DH37.6 million, up
by 41 percent .
Imports from the PRC were greater in volume in 1969 than those
from Japan, reaching DH66.6 million, of which DH55.2 million
represented payments for green tea. Morocco's exports to China in the
same year were composed of phosphate and cobalt ore and amounted
in value to DH34.5 million . In mid - 1971 negotiations were underway
for the sale of Moroccan -assembled buses to China.

Government Role

Until 1963 the government's direct involvement in export trade was

restricted to the phosphate industry. The production and export of
this mineral have always been handled as a government monopoly.
The Sharifian Office of Phosphates (Office Chérifien des Phosphates
-OCP) was founded in 1920 and has since been responsible for the
production and exportation of phosphates.
In 1965, because of disappointment over the slow growth of the
country's export earnings and suspicion that some exporters were
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resorting to underinvoicing to repatriate capital, the government
established the Office of Trade and Export ( Office de
Commercialisation et d’Exportation-OCE) , giving it a monoply over
the export of citrus fruits, fresh and canned vegetables and fruits,
fresh and canned fish , and fruit juices. In 1966 wine and cotton were
added to the list of controlled items.
Direct government involvement in the import trade is limited to
tobacco, sugar, and tea. Tobacco and tobacco products have for many
years been handled exclusively by the Tobacco Authority ( Regie de
Tabacs) , but control over sugar and tea imports was started only in
1963. The National Office of Tea and Sugar has since been given a
monopoly over the importation and wholesaling of these
commodities .

Foreign Trade Regulations

During the protectorate, Morocco's foreign trade was theoretically
regulated by the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which provided, among
other things, for equal treatment of all states in Morocco's foreign
economic policies and trade regulations and established a maximum
tariff rate of 12.5 percent on all goods imported. France and Spain,
however, established quotas and currency restrictions as a result of
which each secured a major share of trade in the zone under its
control. Thus, French products were imported freely into the French
Protectorate, but goods imported from other areas were subject to
import quotas.
Accordingly, by the 1930s Morocco was importing 34 percent of its
needs from France and the French franc zone, and by 1950 this share
had reached about 68 percent. In the meantime, most importers,
exporters, and retailers, as well as a significant portion of the
potential consumers, were French .
After independence, Morocco's foreign trade policy was governed by
its balance -of-payments situation. The strict measures taken in 1964
were prompted by the deterioration of the balance -of-payments
position and the drop in foreign exchange reserves. As soon as
circumstances allowed, however, import regulations and controls were
gradually eased .
In 1967 new simplified import regulations divided imports into
three categories or lists ( A , B , and C) . Goods in category A do not
require import licenses, goods in category B are subject to import
licenses, and those in category C are forbidden entry to the country
because they are either injurious or unnecessary .
It is indicative of the increasing liberalization of trade that items in
category A, originally described as essential goods and materials
needed for domestic industry, increased steadily. In the 1971 General
299
Import Program , about three -fourths of all imports were included in
this category, and very few items were left in the C category .
Import licenses for items in the B category, described as either
already produced locally or restricted because of the state of the
country's foreign finances, are secured from the Exchange Control
Office. A deposit of 25 percent of the f.o.b. ( free on board) value of the
shipment is to be made by the importer, upon applying for a license,
at a bank designated by him to handle the transaction .
In common with most trading nations, Morocco has adopted the
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature and has a two-column tariff system , in
which one column indicates how high the rate could go without a prior
announcement and the other the current rate. Duties are assessed on
an ad valorem basis, and value is decided in terms of wholesale price
at the country of origin and costs of transportation .
In an effort to increase exports, minimum export controls have been
used in Morocco, and export taxes were completely abolished in mid
1971. Items that are neither under a government export monopoly nor
of a critical nature, such as gold, jewelry, petroleum, and cereals, are
exported freely. Items that are considered of a critical nature or of
special importance are subject to export declarations, which remain
good for a period of six months, as do import licenses.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Sizable amounts of French capital were invested in Moroccan

industry, agriculture, housing, and trade during the protectorate . A
1952 study made by the Bank of Morocco indicated that about 68.7
percent of the private capital invested in Morocco in that year,
estimated at the equivalent of about US$1.9 billion, came from
France and that most of the remainder belonged to French colons
( settlers in Morocco) . This put the French in strong control of most of
the modern industrial and business sectors in Morocco, accounting in
1955 for about 80 percent of investments in commerce, industry, and
mines and 40 percent of investments in the construction industry.
As the prospects of Morocco's independence became clear, many
French merchants and property owners decided to return to France,
carrying with them the proceeds from the sale of their businesses and
properties. It was estimated that capital flight amounted to the
equivalent of US$60 million in 1955, increasing to US$285 million in
1956, the year of independence . Big property owners, industrialists,
and financiers remained, however .
Unlike many newly independent countries Morocco did not resort
to large -scale nationalization of foreign -owned businesses. As a result,
there were still about 3,000 French firms in Morocco in the mid - 1960s,

300
of which 450 accounted for more than half of the country's industrial
production.
The closest that the government came to nationalization was the
1963 takeover of some 556,000 acres of land from French owners.
These properties, however, had originally been taken over by the
protectorate government and distributed among French colons.
French - owned milk (see Glossary) land, which at the time amounted
to 800,000 acres, was not affected by these measures, although many
of the milk landowners later preferred to sell their lots to Moroccans
(see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry).
Other instances sometimes cited as government takeovers were the
ending of the concessions of the private electric power and railroad
companies before their expiration dates and participation by the
government in a French metal-box manufacturing company. In the
latter case the public sector put up DH10 million in fresh capital, thus
doubling the company's capital and establishing a fifty -fifty
participation in the management of the firm . One reason given for
this partial nationalization was that the higher prices paid by
Moroccan processing and canning industries for cans produced by this
firm caused Moroccan canned fish, vegetables, and fruits to be less
competitive internationally.
Although foreign investment in Morocco continued in 1971 to be
primarily French, other European and American investments have
increased significantly since independence and particularly since the
mid - 1960s. In 1969 alone, out of a total inflow of foreign investment of
DH68.8 million, some 40.3 percent was from the United States ; 34.1
percent, from France (compared to 64 percent in 1968) ; 13.2 percent,
from Switzerland ; and 5.5 percent, from West Germany.
The number of American ventures and branch offices in Morocco
rose from forty -six in 1967 to sixty -four in 1969. They were basically
involved in tourism, banking, agricultural projects, petroleum
distribution and exploration, and tire manufacturing. Recent
estimates of the total value of these ventures were the equivalent of
about US$40 million.

Policy and Incentives

In 1971 foreign firms could operate in Morocco either through a

branch office or a subsidiary company. The first was treated under
law as a sole proprietorship, without regard to its legal status in its
mother country, and was treated for tax purposes on that basis . On
the other hand, subsidiaries of foreign firms were registered as
Moroccan firms and were subject in their formal structure to
Moroccan legal requirements.
In 1958 the government promulgated an investment code to assure
private and foreign investors of the safety of their properties and
301
provide some incentives to attract new foreign capital. In the same
year an investment commission was established to administer the
application of the incentives offered in the code.
In 1960 a new investment code became operative that applied to
productive enterprises, both foreign and domestic, which had received
approval from the investment commission. Basic incentives provided
under this code include : increasing the rate of depreciation to a limit
up to twice its permitted level ; allowing the maintenance of a tax - free
reserve for the acquisition of new equipment up to a level of 40
percent of the total value of approved investment and 50 percent of
net annual profits; providing a guarantee for the total or partial
repatriation of capital in the currency originally brought into Morocco
to start or expand the venture ; allowing an equipment premium or a
direct government subsidy of up to 20 percent of investments made in
Tangier and 15 percent in the other parts of the country (except the
Casablanca-Mohammedia area) ; providing total or partial exemption
from customs duties on imported tools, machinery, equipment, and
other capital goods (provided that they are new and are not produced
locally at competitive prices and are needed to increase productivity);
reducing company registration and license taxes on new construction
and equipment ; and granting a ten-year stabilization guarantee on
profit, license, urban , and local taxes.
Repatriation of profits and transfer of salaries and wages earned by
foreign employees and workers were provided for under the foreign
exchange regulations that were set and administered by the Exchange
Control Office. These regulations provided that profits after taxes,
dividends on shares in Moroccan firms held by nonresidents, and
undistributed profits were transferable to the investor's country of
residence after receiving the proper authorization from the Exchange
Control Office. Salaries and wages earned by foreign employees and
workers qualify for transfer up to the limit of 50 percent of the
employee's or the worker's family does not reside in Morocco and 30
percent if he is single or his family lives in Morocco.
In 1967 an investment promotion center was established by a royal
decree to provide information on available opportunities and
incentives, assist with feasibility studies, act as a basic point of
contact between local and potential foreign investors, and serve as a
reception and documentation center for investors . This center,
therefore, supplements the work of the investment commission.
As an additional incentive to foreign investors, Morocco has signed
investment guarantee agreements with the United States, West
Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The agreement with the United
States covers expropriation ; convertibility ; risk of war, revolution,
and insurrection ; and extended risks. Furthermore, it has ratified the
convention drawn by the World Bank for the settlement of
investment disputes .

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Moroccan Control over Trade and Services

Increasing the share of Moroccan nationals in business activities

and employment without resort to stiff nationalization measures has
been an area of concern in Morocco. In 1970 the government finally
announced its intention to Moroccanize the trade and services sector
( tertiary sector) . Firms in this sector are to have a minimum of 51
percent Moroccan capital, and two-thirds of the members of their
boards of directors are to be Moroccans. In cases in which private
Moroccan capital cannot be obtained, the government-controlled
National Investment Company ( Societé Nationale d'Investissements)
would make available the necessary capital.
Government spokesmen, however, were quick to explain that unlike
nationalization, which is usually undertaken through specific
legislation, what is referred to by Moroccans as Moroccanization of
the tertiary sector is a form of joint venture or partnership between
national and foreign private capital and is to be arrived at through
negotiations and mutual agreement. Furthermore, no specific deadline
was announced, although some Moroccan officials referred to 1971 as
the year of Moroccanization.
Specifically, the companies expected to Moroccanize were : import
companies representing specific brands ( exclusive agencies) ;
enterprises subject to authorization, such as freight forwarders,
transportation companies, pharmacies, and the press; and wholesale
and retail businesses. With regard to banks and insurance companies,
joint committees, composed of government officials and
representatives of foreign chambers of commerce and other concerned
trade associations in Morocco, have been formulated to study the
possible approaches to the Moroccanization of these financial
establishments .

FOREIGN AID

France has traditionally been the major supplier of aid to Morocco.

After independence it was joined by the United States and, since the
mid - 1960s, by the World Bank, the Soviet Union, West Germany, and
a number of other countries. Figures released for 1970 indicate that
Morocco received a total of DH756.5 million in foreign loans and
grants in that year. Of these, about 40.4 percent came from the
United States ; 18.9 percent, from France; 11.2 percent, from West
Germany; 10 percent, from the World Bank group ; and 8.5 percent,
from the Soviet Union . It was estimated that about 40 percent of
investments included under the Five Year Plan would be financed
through foreign aid and loans.

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French Aid

Following independence, negotiations were held for a new French

aid program , but the French kidnapping of five Algerian leaders and
the subsequent anti-French riots in Morocco caused a deterioration in
French-Moroccan relations and a breakdown in the negotiations. As a
result, the flow of French aid remained below the expected level, and
in 1959 it was completely suspended for about three years. During the
1960s another break in the supply of French aid resulted from the
1965-66 Ben Barka affair (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 9, Foreign
Relations).
After 1968 French aid to Morocco became totally tied, much to the
satisfaction of French businesses and French -owned establishments in
Morocco. French firms were contracted to carry out projects financed
by French aid, and needed purchases also had to be obtained from
French businesses. Some of the projects completed under this aid
program were the Sidi Bennour Sugar Works and the expansion of the
petroleum refineries.
In mid- 1971 France and Morocco signed three protocols on new
French aid amounting to 530 million francs, of which 380 million was
directed to financing a number of projects, including laying an
underwater cable between the two countries, the construction of an
assembly plant for French cars and a cement works, the expansion of
a cellulose factory, and the installment of a thermal center in Roches
Noires. The remainder of the aid would be used for the purchase of
telecommunication equipment and conducting a number of feasibility
studies on public works and other projects.

United States Aid

United States aid to Morocco began in 1957 at the level of US$20

million. It was later increased to an average of US$40 million between
1959 and 1964.
In the early years of the United States aid program , assistance was
mainly in the form of loans to the government of Morocco, but
starting in 1962 greater emphasis was given to technical assistance
and the financing of some major projects. A substantial program was
also started during the 1960s to supply Morocco with surplus grain
and other agricultural commodities under United States Food for
Peace ( PL 480 ).
By the end of 1970 total United States aid to Morocco amounted to
some US $ 700 million, approximately 60 percent of which was in the
form of long-term loans and about 40 percent in gifts and grants.
Substantial amounts of Morocco's wheat imports were still being
obtained under PL 480 titles I and II, the Commodity Credit
304
Corporation ( CCC) credits, and a small part of them under AID
agriculture sector loans.
The Export -Import Bank has also participated in extending aid to
Morocco with its financing of two Boeing 727s received by RAM . In
1971 it was also involved in financing the iron ore pelletization plant
at Nador and an earth satellite station.

Aid from the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Program

The World Bank has extended to the government of Morocco a

number of loans for projects in agriculture, tourism , and
transportation. In 1969 it agreed to provide US$46 million to finance
irrigation works in the first phase of the Rharb- Sebou project. Part of
this loan was allocated to the construction of a dam at Arabat on the
Inoauene River.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has provided
some assistance in a number of projects, including a manpower and
technical requirements study and a project to improve methods and
quality of economic statistics . In addition , it has helped both
financially and technically in mining studies in the Anti-Atlas and in
studies aimed at improving the protein concentration of fishmeals.
Other Sources of Aid

The Soviet Union, Italy, Canada, and Kuwait have extended

varying amounts and forms of aid to Morocco. In 1966 the Soviet
Union provided the equivalent of US$42 million for project financing,
basically in agriculture, and long-term trade credits . This was
followed by another long- term loan for the construction of a
hydroelectric power station at Ait Adel near Marrakech, totaling $ 19.2
million . In 1970 new loans from the Soviet Union amounted to DH64
million .
Italian aid to Morocco was about DH50.6 million in 1971 , directed
basically to projects under the Five Year Plan. On the other hand, the
bulk of Canada's aid until mid- 1971 was devoted to financing and
supplying technicians and equipment to the Development of the
Western Rif Program (Développement Economique et Rural du Rif
Occidental - DERRO ) . Morocco has also received a number of loans
from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development ( KFAED) ,
including a US$ 16.9 million loan in 1965 and a US$28 million one in
1966 .

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SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 14

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL

SECURITY

In late 1971 the loyalty to the monarchy of the Royal Armed Forces
( Forces Armées Royales-FAR) and therefore its future role in politics
and government were for the first time since independence the
subjects of extensive speculation by observers and of apparent concern
to the king. An attempted coup d'etat on July 10, 1971, not only
resulted in the death of nine of the thirteen generals then on active
military duty but also revealed that five of the nine had been engaged
in a plot either to kill the king or to make him a prisoner and thus
force him to comply with their demands. As of late 1971 the exact
nature of the conspirators' demands had not been made clear by the
government, but a reported goal of the coup leaders, who were
depicted by various spokesmen as of a conservative, puritanical,
reactionary bent, was to eliminate corruption and the corrupters as an
initial step in a vague program that would purify and preserve the
kingdom ( see ch . 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics) .
King Hassan II had been, as crown prince, a member of the royal
commission appointed by his father in 1956 to establish a military
force, which in 1971 continued to be a part of the royal household
rather than an integral part of the apparatus of government . As the
first and only chief of the general staff and as the supreme
commander since his succession to the throne in 1961, Hassan has
given unremitting attention to the selection and promotion of military
personnel. For several years before the coup attempt, Hassan had
relied heavily upon several score mid- and senior- level military
officers to discharge administrative duties at all levels of government,
and in 1971 most of the nineteen provincial governors were army
officers.
Not surprisingly, Hassan at first belittled the coup attempt as a
clumsy effort by a few dissident officers to seize power, and he
reiterated his faith in the loyalty of the FAR. On August 6, however,
he appointed a new government in which General Mohammed Oufkir,
since 1964 the minister of interior and widely regarded as second only

307
to the king in power, was designated as the new minister of defense
and FAR chief of staff (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and
Political Dynamics) . Because of Oufkir's reputation for ruthless
efficiency and unalloyed allegiance to the king, it was generally
assumed that Oufkir had been assigned the task of ensuring that the
king could continue to rely upon the FAR as the main bulwark of his
regime (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 9, Foreign Relations ).
In 1971 the main component of the FAR was the army, with nearly
50,000 officers and men . The air force, with about 4,000 men, was
lightly armed and served largely as a support element of the army, as
did the navy, a small force with slightly over 1,000 men. The Royal
Guard, a small force of a few hundred men attached directly to the
royal family, also is technically a part of the FAR .
In addition to the FAR, the kingdom's security forces included the
Auxiliary Forces, a paramilitary command of about 20,000 men; the
Royal Gendarmerie, a rural police force of about 7,000 men ; and the
Sûreté Nationale, the national police force with about 16,000 men (see
fig. 10 ). The commanders of these units were personally appointed by
the king, and the director general of the police was responsible
directly to the monarch. The Auxiliary Forces were attached to the
Ministry of Interior, and the Royal Gendarmerie received operational
control from the Royal Moroccan Army.
The King as Supreme Commander
and
Chief of General Staff

Royal Ministry of Defense

Military Cabinet Guard and Chief of Staff

Sûreté Nationale Royal Armed Forces ( FAR ) Ministry of Interior

Royal Moroccan Army Royal Air Force Auxiliary Forces

Royal Gendarmerie Formal line of command

Royal Moroccan Navy Operational line of command
Note -- In late 1971 Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Major General Mohammed Oufkir handled direct reports by commanders
of brigades and independent battalions for operational guidance.
Figure 10. Defense and Security Forces of Morocco, 1971 .
The only foreign military threat to the nation's security came
during the brief border war with Algeria in 1963, during which the
FAR fought skillfully and, on the whole, successfully (see ch . 3,
Historical Setting; ch. 9, Foreign Relations). Serious internal threats
to security have been infrequent, but on those few occasions the

308
government has reacted vigorously. In response to four days of rioting
by students and workers in 1965, for example, the king declared a
state of emergency that was not lifted until 1970. Individuals have
frequently been sentenced to death or life imprisonment on charges of
conspiracy, and in late 1971 , five of the 193 persons on trial on
conspiracy charges were sentenced to death, and a number of others
were sentenced to life imprisonment.
Despite a serious lack of modern equipment, the national police
force has been successful in coping with normal law and order
problems. The rate of serious crime has been relatively low. Morocco,
however, has experienced some difficulty in coping with law violations
by a fairly large transient and tourist population . The government has
sought the help of, and cooperates as fully as its resources allow with,
international agencies in the control of illegal drug and narcotics
traffic.

THE ARMED FORCES

Throughout the period of the French Protectorate ( 1912–56) the

armed forces in Morocco consisted of French and Spanish forces
stationed in their respective zones to maintain order and enforce the
laws (see ch. 3, Historical Setting) . Moroccans were accepted for
service in both armies in enlisted and commissioned grades along
with French and Spanish nationals.
After independence a military commission was appointed by Sultan
Mohammed V to decide on the details of establishing the armed
forces. The commission included the sultan, Crown Prince Mulay
Hassan, ranking cabinet ministers, and French and Moroccan army
officers. On March 22, 1956, the sultan announced the creation of a
ministry of defense and a general staff. Reda Guédira, a close
associate of the sultan, was named minister of national defense, and
Hassan was appointed chief of the general staff.
In subsequent negotiations with the French and Spanish, it was
decided to establish a 20,000- man force to be known as the Royal
Moroccan Armed Forces and to permit the French and Spanish forces
to remain in the country for an indeterminate transitional period. For
the first several years the government concentrated on creating an
army. A small air force was established in late 1956, but a navy was
not created until 1960; both were subordinated to the army .
The army was formed initially by the transfer of Moroccan units,
mainly from the French occupation army. By May 1956 the army
comprised 14,000 men ; during the following year the army was
expanded by the integration into it of about 10,000 Moroccans who
had served in the Spanish occupation forces.

309
The new army lacked trained Moroccan officers and
noncommissioned officers . The French supplied nearly 1,000 officers
and a like number of noncommissioned officers on one -year contracts
in order to fill the immediate need. A longer range solution was
sought by agreements under which the French and Spanish
governments opened their national military academies at St. Cyr and
Toledo to Moroccan officer candidates for one - year accelerated
training programs. About 200 officer candidates entered each school in
the summer of 1956. The French also undertook to staff and conduct
officer training at the Royal Military Academy at Dar al Bayda, a
suburb of Meknès, where, since its founding, the Moroccan officers
corps in the French army had been trained. The course at the
academy was compressed to ten months and included academic
studies as well as military science and tactics. About 100 candidates
were accepted for the course beginning in the summer of 1956. After
the pressing need for Moroccan officers had been satisfied, the course
at the Royal Military Academy was lengthened to two years and in
1965 was extended to three years, where it has remained .
One of the problems that faced the new army was the necessity to
bring the guerrilla forces of the Army of National Liberation (Armée
de Liberation Nationale-ALN) under governmental control. The
ALN, which had been formed in October 1955 around a core of Berber
tribesmen who had been trained in the French army and had fought
in World War II and in Indochina, considered itself the only authentic
Moroccan army. It had maintained a loose relationship with the
nationalist movement headed by the Istiqlal (Independence) Party
and had fought to achieve independence not only for Morocco but also
for all of North Africa. By March 1956 the ALN had seized from the
French control over the Rif and much of the Middle Atlas ( see ch. 3,
Historical Setting) .
Between March and July 1956 Prince Hassan negotiated with the
leaders of the various ALN sectors the details of their integration into
the army. By the time final agreement was reached in July, the ALN
had grown to 10,000 men. Integration proceeded slowly ; about half the
ALN joined the army by the end of 1956, increasing the size of the
army to about 30,000 officers and men. Those that were acceptable
were sent to a six- month training course for instruction in military
and civic duties. Many had to be taught to read and write. From the
graduating class of May 1957 only twenty -nine officers were accepted
for integration into the army. Those ALN forces that declined to be
integrated continued to harass the French and Spanish troops and
civilian population and proved an embarrassment to the Moroccan
government.
With a new general staff that had never before functioned , an
untried and inadequate logistics system, a shortage of officers, and
troops that had never operated together, the army was soon called
310
upon to prove its ability to protect internal security. In October 1956,
infuriated by the French kidnapping of five leaders of the Algerian
National Liberation Front who were flying in a Moroccan plane from
Rabat to Tunisia, Moroccans in Meknès rioted and attacked French
settlers and their property. European casualties totaled about fifty
killed. Moroccan army troops did not arrive until the next day. An
army officer was given supreme military and civilian authority, with
two battalions of troops at his disposal. Within a week order was
restored in the Meknès area, over 1,500 arrests were made, and those
responsible for the disorders were tried by military courts. Although
the army's role in the Meknès affair was more an occupation than an
aggressive operation, it disclosed many weaknesses in staff operations
that called for correction .
In January 1957 the governor of Tafilalt Province refused to accept
the appointment of local administrators, police, and judges made by
the ministries of interior and justice. Sympathizers in the adjoining
province of Fes joined the revolt and established roadblocks on the
single road from the north. The premier issued an order to the
governor to give up the post office, reopen communications, remove
roadblocks, and report immediately to Rabat. Hassan ordered two
battalions south from Fes to open the roads. Opposition continued,
and Hassan replaced the rebellious governor with an army major. The
army battalions entered Midelt on January 22 without resistance, and
the governor surrendered three days later and was placed under house
arrest in Rabat. The prompt and decisive action displayed in this
affair resulted in a bloodless military operation that accomplished its
purpose.
During the fall and winter of 1958 and 1959 the Moroccan army was
called upon to suppress a widespread rebellion in the Rif. The police
arrested and jailed some of the leaders, but the tribes around Al
Hoceima and north and south of Taza in the Middle Atlas took to the
hills in armed revolt. A battalion of army troops with mountain
artillery was sent in with orders to encircle the rebels, avoid open
combat, and await a surrender. By the end of December the area was
under control, but the remainder of the rebellious tribesmen in the Rif
continued to revolt .
In January Prince Hassan took personal command of operations. He
established his headquarters in Tetouan and prepared to mount an
offensive against the rebels in the vicinity of Al Hoceima. Leaflets
were dropped, and a radio appeal was made promising pardon and a
review of their grievances for all who returned to their homes by
January 7. Order was restored in most of the country, but several
thousand rebels around Al Hoceima and Taza continued the fight.
About 20,000 army troops, formed in three columns, moved from the
east, the south , and the southwest toward the troubled areas. Al
Hoceima was relieved on January 12, 1959, but the rebels had

311
retreated to the mountains. Hassan moved his headquarters to Fes on
January 23 and proceeded with mopping-up operations around Taza.
On February 13, 1959, the army was commended for its
accomplishment .
During the first two years of independence Morocco was unable to
pay much attention to the defense of its eastern frontier. It had
neither a plan nor the strength for its adequate defense, and as a
consequence the border with Algeria was largely unguarded from the
Mediterranean almost to the Atlantic, although the ALN had more or
less assumed the responsibility for border control. The first 350 miles
of the border south from the sea to Figuig was fairly well marked, but
beyond that the demarcation line was undefined and open to dispute
It was mid- 1958 before even token forces of the army were stationed
in Oujda Province. Minor border incidents were frequent.
Immediately after Algeria gained its independence in 1962, border
difficulties multiplied. In July 1962 Moroccan troops moved into
Zegdou and Saf- Saf in the area where the border was undefined. They
were driven out of Saf -Saf by stronger Algerian forces that then laid
siege to Zegdou . Morocco claimed this area and also the area around
Tindouf where there are large iron ore deposits. Fighting occurred in
the Tindouf area in September and October 1962.
By the summer of 1963 the border disputes with Algeria had
reached an impasse . In September Moroccan troops occupied
strategic points on the route from Colomb-Bechar to Tindouf. On
October 8 Algerian troops reoccupied the area, killing ten Moroccans.
Moroccan troops in considerable strength were moved on October 14 ;
fighting continued until the end of October. A cease -fire was arranged
at a meeting between King Hassan and President Ahmad Ben Bella
presided over by Emperor Haile Selassie in Bamako, Mali. By
February 20, 1964, it had been announced that by agreement a
demilitarized zone would be established by each country pulling back
its forces 4.3 miles from positions occupied on October 1, 1963. An
exchange of prisoners followed .
Since the end of 1963 there have been occasional border clashes on
the Algerian border and around Ifni, but none has been on a scale to
precipitate a shooting war. Concern over the mounting stockpile of
Algerian weapons has made Morocco anxious to negotiate differences
as they arise or refer them to the Organization of African Unity for
settlement ( see ch . 9, Foreign Relations) .

THE PLACE OF THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE

As institutions, the elements of the FAR have the dual missions of

protecting the nation from an external military threat and of
providing assistance to the police forces for internal security. Military
312
personnel, however, have been called upon to perform a wide range of
governmental functions. Numerous generals have held cabinet and
other senior positions. In 1971 there were two generals in the Council
of Ministers, most of the nineteen provincial governors were army
officers, and many of the ministries that were particularly concerned
with social welfare and development programs were heavily staffed by
mid-level army officers. In the rural regions many, if not most, of the
local administrative officers were on detached duty from their
military units.
On assuming his new post as defense minister and chief of staff on
August 6, 1971, General Oufkir stated that in his view a major role for
the army would be to act as a “ staff school” to train large numbers of
citizens in various administrative and technical skills. Oufkir's
statement suggests a probable intensification of a program launched
in the late 1960s whereby several hundred recruits were trained in
office procedures, hotel work, mechanics, and other skills.
In addition, the army had been active in relief and rescue work in
times of natural disaster and in various aspects of public works.
Information available in 1971 indicated that roadbuilding, bridge
construction, assistance on irrigation projects, and similar activities
by the army would be increased during the 1970s.
With a population of about 16.2 million in 1971 and an armed forces
strength of about 55,000, Morocco had a relatively low ratio of
military personnel to total population. Less than 0.34 percent of its
population was in the military. With the addition of the estimated
20,000 men in the paramilitary Auxiliary Forces, the ratio is increased
to only 0.46 percent of the population. The size of the armed forces
did not constitute a drain on the labor force because there was
widespread unemployment, and any significant reduction in the size
of the armed forces would in fact increase the rate of unemployment
(see ch. 12, Agriculture and Industry) .
The funds allotted to the FAR fall under two headings, the
operating budget and the equipment budget. Personnel expenses and
the continuing day-to-day operations of the military establishment are
charged to the operating budget, and the purchase of new armament,
vehicles, and equipment is made from the equipment budget. The
operating budget has shown a large, steady increase since
independence, reflecting both increases in the size of the military
establishment and upward revisions of the pay scale. The equipment
budget, in proportion, has risen less rapidly but does not represent the
actual costs of new armament and equipment, which have been and
are furnished from time to time by foreign countries under foreign aid
programs.
In 1969 defense and police expenditures totaled DH851 million
( 5.06 dirham equal US$ 1—see Glossary ), somewhat over 34 percent of
the total budget. The defense portion was probably about two -thirds
313
of the defense and police expenditures, which were slightly above
earlier figures; there was probably little change for the 1970 and 1971
budgets.
During the protectorate period Moroccans, particularly Berbers,
were used in the French and Spanish armies. During both world wars
Moroccan units fought with the French army ; in World War II about
300,000 Moroccan troops fought in North Africa, Italy, and France.
After the end of the war Moroccans served with the French forces in
Indochina. At the time of independence over 50,000 Moroccans were
still in the French and Spanish armies.
Berbers made up the bulk of the Moroccans in the French and
Spanish armies. In 1971 they were still estimated to constitute about
80 percent of the troops in the FAR and over half of the officers
commissioned before independence. Rural Berbers have proved their
worth as combat soldiers and with proper training make excellent
troops . They have long been conditioned to hardship in a harsh
physical environment where the land is not productive and violence is
prevalent. They make fierce and tenacious fighters, capable of great
endurance, and have a strong sense of loyalty to the king and to their
officers.
Service in the armed forces is open to all Moroccan male citizens
who are able to meet the qualifications for enlistment. The army is a
professional army in which the rate of reenlistment is high; soldiers
prefer to remain in the service until forced out by age. Since
independence there have been three large inductions or increases of
army personnel - some 2,000 original five -year enlistments in June
1956; the integration between 1956 and 1960 of the ALN ; and the
recall of some 25,000 ex-servicemen in October 1963, at the time of
the Algerian border conflict.
The more sophisticated urbanites have tended to view a military
career with suspicion and disdain, partly because of the repressive role
of the army during the colonial period and partly because of the use of
the army to suppress the occasional student and worker riots. The
rural population, however, has been attracted to the military, which is
viewed as an honorable vocation and which offers economic security,
and volunteers have always exceeded the annual enlistment quotas. In
1967, however, the king issued a decree that provided for an eighteen
month compulsory service.
In 1971 it was unclear as to the percentage of physically eligible
youths conscripted annually. Various Moroccan government
publications, however, suggested that perhaps 4,000 conscripts a year
were given basic military training followed by training in skills that
would be of immediate use in the economy, particularly in the tourist
trade, and then were returned to civilian life ( see ch. 13, Trade and
Transportation) .

314
The source of officers for the FAR is usually the Royal Military
Academy at Dar al Bayda or a foreign military academy approved by
the government. There are, however, certain exceptions.
Noncommissioned officers of the grade of chief or junior- grade
warrant officer, with a minimum of twelve years' service (of which two
years have been in one of the warrant officer grades) , may become
officers. Individuals holding a university degree in certain fields, such
as engineering, may become officers, as may individuals holding a
doctor's degree in medicine, chemistry, veterinary medicine, or
dentistry. Officers commissioned from civilian life are required to
undergo six months of military training at the Royal Military
Academy as officer cadets and must agree to serve not less than five
years in the armed forces.
Within the officer corps there are several distinguishable groups,
according to experience and background. Fewer than 100 officers who
had served in the French and Spanish armies before independence
form the older, higher ranking group. Nearly all were educated at the
Dar al Bayda military school near Meknès under French tutelage. A
second group of officers was integrated from the ALN in 1956 and
1957. They were given a six months' course of training that included,
for some, reading and writing. Tension existed at first between this
group and the regular officers who had fought against them in the Rif,
but these former Maquis officers seem to have satisfactorily
integrated. Another distinguishable group is made up of those who
joined the army after independence and have attended French and
Spanish military schools or the Royal Military Academy. This group
is younger, with an urban background, and is more interested in
politics. A fourth , small, and quite different group is made up of
former noncommissioned officers who have earned commissions.
Maximum age- in -grade limits, ranging from fifty - one for
lieutenants to sixty -one for generals, have been fixed by law.
Statutory age limits for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men
range from forty - five for privates to fifty for warrant officers. Highly
qualified noncommissioned officers or enlisted men who perform
special duties may be authorized to serve beyond their statutory age
limit, however.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Since 1956 the armed forces has had to depend on foreign sources of
supply to fill its needs for weapons and military equipment. The
initial requirements of the FAR were supplied by the transfer of
weapons, transport, and equipment from the French and Spanish
armies in Morocco . The French contribution was valued at the

315
equivalent of US$40 million; the value of the Spanish contribution is
not known, but it was considerably less.
Morocco has accepted military aid and made purchases from both
East and West in keeping with its policy of nonalignment. In 1960,
when its leaders felt that French and United States military
assistance was inadequate and was coming too slowly, they turned to
the Soviet Union for help. The first large shipments of Soviet arms
and equipment reached Morocco in late 1960 and early 1961. In
March 1962 a second sizable purchase of Soviet arms was made,
including twelve MIG-17 jet fighter-interceptors and two MIG-15 jet
trainers. Soviet technicians accompanied these shipments.
As a result of this dependence on a number of different foreign
sources, the FAR is saddled with a wide range of types of arms and
equipment, making standardization next to impossible. The air force,
for example, had a mix of American, French, and Soviet jet
interceptors and trainers, although most of the Soviet aircraft had
been retired by 1970. In 1970 the army had 120 Soviet medium tanks
and an equal number of French light tanks. The armored cars and
personnel carriers were mostly of World War II vintage and were of
Soviet, French, Czech, and American origin, as was the artillery.

Ranks and Pay

The rank structure of the army and the air force corresponds to
those of the French and United States armies, except that there are
only seven enlisted grades. The rank structure of the navy section
corresponds to that of the French navy. Until March 1965 the navy
was commanded by a capitaine de frigate ( commander) on loan from
the French navy. The navy was then turned to Moroccan control.
Members of the Moroccan armed forces are paid a basic monthly
salary augmented by certain allowances. Within each rank there are
several base pay steps based upon length of time in grade or total
years of service or a combination of both . At the time of
commissioning and throughout their military careers, officers holding
a baccalaureate degree, indicating completion of secondary school,
receive two years of service seniority as regards pay. Married officers
receive slightly higher housing allowances than bachelors ; other
allowances are based on the number of children in the family.
Officers' pay schedules set in 1956 were lower than the schedules for
similar duties in other government departments. This discrepancy,
plus the fact that military pay scales were not increased for the first
seven years after independence and that promotions in the military
service were slower than in the other governmental services, created
growing dissatisfaction among the officers, particularly among the
junior grades. Some junior officers resigned their commissions and
316
sought higher paying positions in the civilian branches of the
government.
Prompted by the drop in officer morale, the king approved a new
pay scale in July 1963, retroactive to March 1, 1963. In early 1971 a
new pay scale was approved, but by late 1971 not all personnel had
received the increase that was to have placed them on a par with the
civil service.
In April 1965 official announcement was made of an air service
allowance and a maritime allowance. The air service allowance is
granted to military personnel belonging to airborne units of the armed
forces. A 50-percent increase in base pay is granted to military
personnel holding a parachute badge, a pilot certificate, an observer
certificate for artillery observation air units, or an air force flying
certificate. A 25-percent increase is granted personnel authorized for
air service training with a view to obtaining any of those badges or
certificates. The maritime allowance grants a 50-percent increase of
base pay to naval personnel during their assignment to a ship of the
Royal Moroccan Navy. A 25-percent increase of base pay is granted
maritime personnel during their assignment to an instructing unit of
the navy as an instructor or as a trainee. If the recipient has been
absent without leave or has been disciplined, the allowances are
suspended for the duration of the absence or the disciplinary sanction.
In the case of air force personnel a yearly test for proficiency is
required for a continuation of the allowance .
A pension program for all military personnel is based on longevity
and rank at retirement. In addition, disability pensions are provided
for all who have become incapacitated through injury or disease
incurred while on active duty. Rates of disability pay depend on rank
and degree of disability. Widows, orphans, and parents of military
personnel who die or are killed while on duty are entitled to
compensation.
Uniforms and Insignia

Four types of uniforms are worn by the army: field, service,

semidress and service, and full dress. Army uniforms closely resemble
those of the French army with the exception of the officers' semidress
and service uniforms, which more closely resemble those worn by
officers in the United States Army. The field uniform for all ranks is
of olive-drab cotton and consists of a jacket over which a web belt is
worn. The trousers are straight, with deep side patch pockets, and are
generally tucked into short canvas leggings. A steel helmet or a green
beret is worn by all personnel in field uniform . The service uniform
for all ranks is of olive - drab wool or gabardine and consists of an
Eisenhower-type jacket with two breast pockets, belted at the bottom.
The trousers are full length and straight. With the winter service

317
uniforms enlisted men may wear canvas leggings. The semidress and
service uniform is of olive -drab gabardine or cotton cloth . The
semidress blouse with notched lapels is similar to that of the United
States Army. A shirt of the same material may be worn with black tie
in the summer in lieu of the blouse. With this uniform officers wear a
garrison -type service cap with black headband and visor; enlisted men
wear the green beret as headpiece. When the blouse is worn with the
semidress uniform , officers wear a white shirt with a black tie.
When the air force was made a separate and autonomous service in
February 1964, it adopted a distinctive uniform made from United
States Air Force blue uniform material supplied through the United
States Military Assistance Program (MAP) . The cloth supplied was
winter-weight serge and summer-weight and overcoat material
sufficient to equip 5,000 men. Officers wear a blue service cap or
beret; enlisted men wear only the blue beret for headgear. The style
and pattern of the air force uniform is similar to that of the army.
Officers' insignia of rank is displayed on red shoulder boards, or
epaulets. Warrant officers wear a silver star insignia on the shoulder
loops of the coat or shirt. Enlisted insignia of grade is indicated by
green diamond-shaped patches overlaid with a gold crown and various
combinations of red and (or) yellow chevrons, worn on the left sleeve
of the winter uniform midway between the elbow and the shoulder.
With the summer uniform the same enlisted insignia of grade is worn
suspended from the left breast pocket of the shirt. Insignia for all
officer ranks and enlisted grades includes a gold crown . The cap
insignia consists of a gold palm wreath with the Moroccan star in the
center, a smaller size for enlisted and warrant officer grades and a
larger size for officers. The warrant officers' cap insignia is a silver
wreath, and the field grade officers' is a combination of an outer gold
wreath and an inner silver one. A dark leather pocket medallion
bearing the army crest is generally worn suspended from the right
breast pocket. Within the army, the branch of service is designated by
shoulder boards of various color and fabric .
Air force officers wear gray shoulder boards instead of red and a
distinctive pocket medallion. Grey shoulder boards denote officer
status, the rank indicated by sleeve stripes of gold braid. The air force
cap insignia consists of various sizes of gold wreaths and silver wings
and crown to denote senior officers, junior officers, senior and junior
noncommissioned officers, and basic airmen. In 1962 the air arī
adopted flight badges (wings) to denote different categories of flying
personnel, pilots, navigators, radio -navigators, and flight engineers, to
be worn by both officers and enlisted men.
Military Justice
A code of military justice applicable to all members of the armed
forces was promulgated by a decree of November 10, 1956; it has since
318
been amended by several decrees. The code provides that penal
justice for members of the armed forces is rendered in peacetime by
the Tribunal of the Royal Forces (Tribunal Des Forces Royales) or, in
time of war, by the Armed Forces Military Tribunals ( Tribunaux
Militaires aux Armées) and by the Supreme Court.
The code established a single permanent military court, which
usually sits at Rabat but can be moved to another site upon order of
the minister of national defense. It specifies that the president of the
military court shall be a civil magistrate of the regional tribunal or a
magistrate of the court of appeal from the same jurisdiction as the
accused . For the trial of misdemeanors and minor offenses the
president of the court is assisted by two military officers as assistant
judges ; and for the trial of criminal offenses, by four military assistant
judges. The military assistant judges must be of a higher seniority
than the accused on trial. When the accused is a general officer, the
court is composed of a president of a chamber of an appeals court as
president and two officers senior to the accused.
The competence of the military courts covers three categories of
offenses: military offenses, including disobedience, desertion,
surrender, abandoning post, disrespect toward the flag, rebellion,
striking a superior, abuse of authority, or offenses involving military
property, such as embezzlement, receiving stolen goods, and selling
military property; miscellaneous offenses not specified by the code of
military justice but covered by the ordinary penal code, which become
triable offenses when committed by military personnel; and offenses
against the external security of the state or aiding and abetting the
enemy. For the trial of offenses of the third category two magistrates
from an appeals court are added to the panel of the court for criminal
offenses.
According to the code, sessions of the court during trial are open to
the public. The accused is authorized counsel of his own choosing. If
the accused refuses to appear after legal summons, he may be tried in
absentia . The decision of the judges is rendered by secret written
ballot, a majority vote deciding guilt or innocence. In criminal
matters it takes four votes to one for a conviction, and in crimes
against the external security of the state a vote of five to two is
required. The death penalty may be imposed for crimes against state
security. Sentences pronounced by the military court may be
appealed before the penal chamber of the Supreme Court. The
condemned has eight days in which to avail himself of the right of
appeal.
The prompt execution of the conspirators in the coup attempt of
July 10, 1971, indicated that there are exceptions to the provisions of
the code. On July 11 the king announced that the conspirators would
be executed as soon as they had provided the details of their crime ;
the king surmised that this would be within twenty -four hours. The

319
conspirators were not executed until July 13, but there was no
suggestion that any sort of trial or hearing in a legal sense had been
held. The International Commission of Jurists, in response to the
king's July 11 statement, had sent him a message urging that the
accused be tried in a court of law, and the commission also sent a
message of protest after the execution had been announced . Neither
the king nor his government took official notice of either message.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The army is by far the most important and well developed branch
of the FAR ; a small air force became independent of army control
only in 1964, and a weak navy section remained, in 1971, under the
control of the army. The gendarmerie is operationally subordinate to
the army but administratively within the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Interior.
Territorial organization of the army has been gradually
strengthened and simplified since 1956. Originally based on
strongpoints and scattered troop camps inherited from the French,
army control of the country was placed on a regional basis in 1959.
The sixteen military zones were only approximately contiguous with
administrative provinces. No provision was made for commands
specifically responsible for frontier protection. The shortage of trained
senior officers prevented the creation of a strong general staff or of
large military units. Rather, battalions were scattered around the
country under the command of junior officers.
By 1965 the army had enough senior officers to attempt a more
centralized territorial organization. The country was divided into
three military zones and one independent sector. By 1971 this had
been changed to six military zones, each commanded by a general
with the title of military governor .
In the aftermath of the attempted coup in July 1971, the military
zone system was abolished, possibly reflecting the fact that three of
the five generals who took part in the coup attempt were governors of
military zones but also reflecting the decimation of the high command
of the FAR. As of August 6 the senior officers included an
octagenarian marshal who did not hold a responsible military post;
Oufkir as defense minister and chief of staff; a general serving as
minister of posts, telegraph, and telephone ; a general serving without
title as an adviser to the king; and three other generals.
The army in 1971 was broken down into one armored brigade, two
motorized infantry brigades, one light security brigade, one paratroop
brigade, twelve independent infantry battalions, and two camel corps
battalions. There were in addition three desert cavalry detachments
and four artillery groups, plus various support elements .
320
Traditionally the Ministry of Defense was concerned basically with
logistics, supply, payrolls, pensions, and related matters. A separate
chief of staff stood between the various commanders and governors of
military zones and the king as chief of general staff and supreme
commander. Although the information was at best fragmentary in late
1971, it appeared that the various brigade and battalion commanders
reported directly to Oufkir, as did the air force and navy
commanders.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Sûreté Nationale

The Sûreté Nationale (national police force) has primary

responsibility for internal security and political intelligence and
shares responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the
major urban areas. In 1971 the force was commanded by a director
general, who was appointed by, and responsible solely to, the king.
The director general, in common with some other senior police
officers, was an army officer.
The government, which means the king, appears to have a policy of
avoiding a clear delineation of authority and responsibility among the
various agencies of government. Because there are nineteen provinces,
two prefectures, ten police regions, seven development regions and,
until August 1971, six military regions, coordination among the
various regional chiefs is difficult, perhaps intentionally so. In
addition, the police and the Royal Gendarmerie share responsibility
and authority in some police duties, a situation that makes it
impossible to determine ultimate responsibility in some gray areas.
There are four broad police sections : the internal security service,
the Mobile Intervention Companies ( Compagnies Mobiles pour
l'Intervention - CMI), the Judiciary Police, and the Urban Corps. The
country is broken down into ten operational regions ( called sûretés,
such as the Rabat Sûreté ) , each under the command of a
commissioner. For administrative purposes, however, the police force
has five subdirectorates ( see fig. 11) .
Over two - thirds of the Sûreté Nationale are in the Urban Corps, a
uniformed detachment whose members are stationed in all cities and
major towns. Their basic assignment is the all-encompassing one of
the maintenance of public order. They perform foot, bicycle,
motorcycle, and automobile patrols ; man traffic control stations ;
respond to emergency requests for protection ; and discharge related
control and protection functions.
The Judiciary Police, on the other hand, is a specialized criminal
investigation corps of about 3,000 officers and men. The individual
policemen are assigned or attached to courts of law and conduct their
321
322
KING
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investigations at the instruction, and under the supervision, of an
officer of the court (see ch. 8, The Governmental System and Political
Dynamics) . It would appear that members of the Judiciary Police feel
a stronger sense of attachment to the court system than to the police
force, and the working relationship with the court officials reportedly
is a close and cordial one.
The responsibilities of the internal security police are roughly
analogous to a combination of the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the special branches of the departments of treasury
and justice that are charged with narcotics control, counterfeiting,
immigration control, and related topics. The section operates
clandestinely as the kingdom's counterespionage and counter
subversion arm, and little is known as to its size and organi
zation . It reports directly to the director general and, although it is
known as the Sixth Subdirectorate, it does not appear on the Sûreté
Nationale organization chart.
The CMI is an active reserve police force of about 3,000 officers and
men. In addition to its mobile support role, for which each company
of some 250 men is equipped with transportation and radio
communication, the companies are called upon to police public
functions at which important dignitaries are present. It frequently
forms the honor guard and provides personal protection for the king,
senior officials, and foreign heads of state or diplomats. The
companies of the CMI are located near or in the major metropolitan
areas, and the CMI staff forms the second level of command in the
Subdirectorate for Public Safety.
Within a region, the various parts of the Sûreté Nationale, with the
exception of the internal security section, are placed under the
administrative and operational control of a commissioner (see fig . 12) .
The relationship of the sûreté commissioner to elements of the Royal
Gendarmerie serving in the region was not clarified, however, by the
information available in late 1971 .

Royal Gendarmerie

Although it is an integral part of the FAR, the Royal Gendarmerie

is basically a police unit. The commander and many, if not most, of
the officers are army officers, but the remainder of the corps is made
up of volunteers for five -year tours of duty.
The gendarmerie, which has its headquarters in Rabat, is organized
by companies that are located throughout the country. The companies
are in turn subdivided into sections and brigades, the size of the units
varying widely in response to functions and assignments.
The basic unit of the gendarmerie is the brigade. There are four
types of brigades—motorcycle brigades, jeep brigades, criminal
investigation brigades, and village police brigades. The special Mobile
323
Rabat Regional
Cabinet Headquarters
(Commissioner)

Documentation and Mobile

Central Commissioner Administration for Judiciary Police Intervention
Regulatory Control
for Rabat Rabat and Region
Rabat and Region Companies

Judiciary Police Judiciary Police

Urban Corps Precincts
for Rabat for Rabat Region

Commissioners
Cabinet
of Small Districts

Documentation Judiciary Police

Public Safety Administration
and Regulation

Note-- The central commissioner has responsibility for Rabat city; none outside the city.
The services of Administration and Documentation exercise functional supervision in the
Urban Corps Precincts police districts.
The Judiciary Police may either be organized , as in Rabat, with separate sections responsible
for investigations in Rabat and the region outside Rabat or may have a single unit
responsible for Rabat and the region. The Judiciary Police at regional level are
responsible for all investigation in Rabat and for follow -up investigations in the small
districts and in areas of Gendarmerie jurisdiction .

Source : Adapted from Thomas M. Finn , et al . , Morocco : Police Survey Re

port, Washington , 1966 , pp. 41-42 .
Figure 12. Organization of a Police Region in Morocco.
Group is maintained for rapid response deployment to assist in riot
control or other special projects. In addition to these mainly, but not
exclusively, rural police functions, the gendarmerie serves as a
military police unit for the FAR, collects unpaid and delinquent
taxes, and checks the registration of automobile radios.

Auxiliary Forces
The Auxiliary Forces are made up of the Administrative Maghzani
and the Mobile Maghzani. In 1971 the total number of officers and
men was reportedly about 20,000, but from 50 to 75 percent of these
were in the Administrative Maghzani. The Administrative Maghzani
is a nonuniformed force whose members guard buildings, bridges,
wells, and other “ sensitive” areas ; act as messengers and minor clerks
for local officials; patrol markets ; serve as arbitrators of grazing and
water disputes ; and perform related supplemental and support duties
for the uniformed police. Many members are military or police
pensioners and are paid a small stipend in addition to their pension.
The Auxiliary Forces are commanded by an inspector general who
is responsible to the minister of interior. The inspector general and
most of the officers are serving on detached duty from the army.
To the extent that the Administrative Maghzani is armed, it is
equipped with sidearms or rifles of World War II or earlier origin. In

324
the general course of their duties, the members are controlled by the
civil servant to whose office they are assigned. On certain occasions
the guards are called upon to support either the FAR or the Sûreté
Nationale, in which instance the military or police unit to which they
are assigned is supposed to provide arms, equipment, and
transportation.
The Mobile Maghzani, however, is a relatively well equipped
paramilitary force. In 1971 it had between 4,000 and 6,000 men,
perhaps more, organized into units or companies of about 150 officers
and men. The units were motorized, and the men were specifically
trained to control riots and civil disorders.
The companies are stationed individually or as groups near the
major population centers. The Casablanca Intervention Group, for
example, in 1965 was composed of eight companies of Mobile
Maghzani ; the group was available either for use in the Casablanca
Prefecture or for rapid deployment anyplace in the country. The units
of Mobile Maghzani are also trained to provide assistance to the FAR
in the event of a border disturbance .

PRISONS

During the colonial period prisons were under the control of the
police, but at independence the Ministry of Justice assumed full
responsibility. In 1971 the ministry's Penitentiary Administrative
Division (Direction de l'Administration Penitentiare) operated some
thirty -five prisons and correctional institutions. There were three
maximum security prisons and one juvenile reform center; the
remainder were medium security prisons. The information available
in 1971 suggested that prison conditions were grim. Sanitary facilities
ranged from minimal to inadequate, and the food ration was low in
quantity and quality.
Small detention facilities are attached to all large and most small
police stations. The penal code stipulates that those arrested must be
formally charged or released within twenty -four hours of arrest.
Political prisoners and foreigners apparently are an exception to the
code, but information on this subject was not readily available in late
1971 .

325
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE NOVEMBER
1965 EDITION

Section I. Social

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through June 1965.)

332
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(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the
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1957 through December 1964 ; The Christian Science Monitor, from
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348
Section III. Economic

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355
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" The Role of Communications : Air Transport in Morocco,”
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December 1970, 1-44.

375
“ Tourism ,” Bulletin Mensuel d'Information (Casablanca ),
No. 102, February 1970, 1-21 .
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d'Information ( Casablanca ) , No. 105, May 1970, 3–24.
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December 1969, 53-98.
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First National City Bank of New York . Morocco : An Economic
Study. New York : 1967 .
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Hodder and Stroughton, 1971 .
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1964 .
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1
1
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“ Easing of Retransfer Regulations Relating to Foreign Investment
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“ Eighteen Million Olive Trees in Morocco, but Very Irregular
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February 1971 ; Middle East Economic Digest (London ), January 1967
-September 1971 ; Monthly Bulletin of Information (Rabat ), January
1966-February 1971 ; and Quarterly Economic Review (London ),
January 1967 - September 1971.)

379

1
Section IV. National Security
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382
GLOSSARY

ALN ( Armée de Liberation Nationale) — Army of National

Liberation .
amir al muaminin - Commander of the faithful. Traditional and
constitutional title of the king of Morocco in his role as religious
head of Moroccan Islamic society.
baraka — The quality of special blessedness or grace characterizing
marabouts (q.v.) or other divinely favored individuals in North
African Islam .
Berber(s) — The indigenous peoples of Northwest Africa, including
Morocco. Word is of Latin origin. In 1971 people of Berber descent
continued to be a major element in population, particularly in
mountain and rural areas.
bidonville-A shantytown adjoining a municipal area , created by
large -scale migration of rural poor to cities.
bilad al makhzan - Arabic expression meaning " land of the central
government ,” referring to those areas of preindependence Morocco
where central government control was firmly established ; may be
seen in transliteration as bled el makhzen and similar variations.
bilad al siba-Arabic expression meaning “ land of dissidence,”
referring to those areas of preindependence Morocco where central
government control was not fully or consistently in effect; also seen
in transliteration as bled el siba and similar variations.
caid-In modern Morocco, the executive head of a rural constituency
in the local government structure ; formerly, a rural area chief
having wider judicial powers than the postindependence caid. Also,
qaid.
casbah - The older, interior area of the non -Europeanized portion of
North African cities ; anciently, often referring to the central
fortification of a settled locality, the citadel.
colon-A French colonial settler in Morocco .
dahir - Royal decree ; a law promulgated by the king.
dirham (DH) —Unit of currency ; in 1971 DH5.06 equaled US$ 1 at par
value .
EEC-European Economic Community.
FAR (Forces Armées Royales) — Royal Armed Forces.
FDIC (Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles)-
Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions.

383
GNP - Gross national product. Equal to gross domestic product plus
factor income ( mainly investment income) earned by Moroccan
nationals residing abroad, less factor income earned by foreign
nationals residing in Morocco.
Greater Maghrib-Expression used in Moroccan Constitution to
identify area to which the country belongs; may have various
political interpretations. See also Maghrib.
gross domestic product - The value of the total output of domestically
produced goods and services.
habus — Islamic religious endowments ; a Moroccan usage. Occurs
elsewhere in Islamic countries as waqf. Sometimes written habous.
IBRD—International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
IDA - International Development Association.
imam-In general, an Islamic leader who is a recognized authority on
Islamic theology and law. Specifically in Morocco, refers to the king
as religious head of the society under his title of “ commander of the
faithful.” See amir al muaminin .
IMF - International Monetary Fund.
jaysh - Arabic word meaning “ army.” Occurs in reference to jaysh
tribes, that is, tribes of preindependence Morocco that performed
military service for the sultan in exchange for exemption from
taxation. French transliteration : guich .
khalif - A successor or substitute. Specifically, in modern Morocco the
executive head of one of the municipal wards under a pasha (q.v.) .
khalifa — A successor or deputy ; specifically, the governor
representative of the Moroccan sultan in the Spanish protectorate,
1912-56 .
Maghrib-Northwest Africa ; traditionally includes Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and sometimes Libya ; literally, the time or place of sunset,
the west .
makhzan – Central government .
mallah - The traditional Jewish residential quarter in towns or cities ;
French transliteration : mellah .
marabout - In North Africa, an Islamic holy man, often a Sufi mystic,
teaching at local rural levels and thought to be touched by a special
divine blessing; not usually a member of the ulama (q.v.) .
milk land-Private freehold land, often belonging jointly to several
owners .

mission civilisatrice — The French concept of duty, which requires the

spread of the knowledge and benefits of French civilization and
culture for the advancement of humanity ; hence, a form of
ideological justification for French colonization .
MP (Mouvement Populaire) -Popular Movement .
mulay — In Morocco, a prenominal title for a descendant of the
Prophet Muhammad in the male line, that is, an agnatic sharif.
Also seen as moulay, mawlay, and similar variant transliterations.
384
OAU - Organization of African Unity .
oued - French transliteration of Arabic word for stream or river.
Standard English transliteration is wadi.
pasha - In modern Morocco, the mayor of a municipal area ; formerly,
a governor under the sultan.
PCM (Parti Communiste Marocain )-Moroccan Communist Party .
PDC ( Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel ) -- Constitutional
Democratic Party .
PDI ( Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance) —Democratic
Independence Party.
PLS ( Parti de Liberation et Socialisme)-Party of Liberation and
Socialism .
PRC-People's Republic of China.
PS (Progrès Social)-Social Progress Party.
PSD ( Parti Socialist Démocrate ) —Democratic Socialist Party.
PUM (Parti de l'Unité Marocaine) -Party of Moroccan Unity.
ribat-Berber religious retreat or fortress; root word for Rabat, the
capital city.
shahadah - Islamic statement of belief: “ There is no god but God, and
Muhammad is His Prophet.”
sharia — The traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal,
based on the Islamic scriptures called the Quran.
sharif ( pl. , shurfa or ashraf) -A descendant of the Prophet
Muhammad ; a noble. Used as a title.
shaykh - In modern Morocco, the executive head of one of the rural
subareas under a caid (q.v.) . Formerly and loosely, a tribal leader.
UAR — United Arab Republic.
UGTM (Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains) -Union of
Moroccan Workers.
ulama (sing., alim)—The body of scholars learned in Muslim theology,
philosophy, canon law, and Quranic studies. French transliteration :
ulema.
UMT (Union Marocain du Travail ) —Moroccan Labor Union.
UNDP-United Nations Development Program.
UNFM (Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines) -National Union
of Moroccan Women .
UNFP (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires)-National Union of
Popular Forces.
UPFM (Union Progressiste des Femmes Marocaines ) -Progressive
Union of Moroccan Women.
USA ( Union des Syndicats Agricoles) — Federation of Farmers'
Unions .
wazir ( pl. , wazara) —A minister of the sultan's court in
preindependence Morocco; a vizier.
zawiya (pl., zawiyiin ) -Literally, in Arabic, “ a corner.” In Morocco,
refers to a religious brotherhood or lodge, possibly led by a
marabout (q.v. ) . Alternate word : taifa .
385

1
INDEX

Ababou , Mohammed, Colonel : 187, 188, Aisha, Lala, princess: 29, 165
189 Ait Ammar : 22
Abarkash, Hadden : 181 Al Abid River : 13, 16 ; hydroelectric
Abbasid dynasty : 35, 37 ity, 261
Abdelkader , Bel Hachemy : 139 Al Alam : 146, 148, 149, 185
Abduh, Muhammad : 94 Al Anba : 149
Mulay Abdulla, Prince : 165 Al Hoceima : xiv, 11, 177 ; history, 43,
Abdulla, Muhammed ben : 208 47, 311 ; transport, 282, 283, 284
administrative divisions ( see also pre- Al Jadida : xiv, 12 , 177, 252, 282
fectures ; provinces ): viii, xiv ; de- Al Kulla al Wataniya. See National
fense, 3, 320 Front
Afghani, Jamal al Din al : 94 Al Maghrib al Aqsa : 7
African relationships (see also in- Al Ray al -Amm : 146
dividual countries ; Organization of Alawite dynasty : 1-2 , 7, 40, 41-42, 58,
African Unity) : 7, 31 , 63–64, 65 , 92, 136, 143, 195, 213
160, 162, 188, 200, 203, 212 ; trade Algeciras Conference/ Act ( 1906) :
and communications, 285, 286, 298 45–46, 51, 97, 209, 299
Agadir: xiv, 11 , 12, 17, 22, 153 , 177, Algeria ( see also National Liberation
274 ; economy, 252, 255 ; history, 39, Front ) : xiv, 7, 8, 17, 63, 65, 68, 180,
46, 62 ; reconstruction, 231 , 232 ; 196, 197–200, 202, 205, 206, 269 ;
transport, 281 , 282, 283, 284 border dispute, 5, 9, 10, 32, 62, 65,
Agency for International Develop- 180, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 205,
ment ( AID, U.S. ) : 284, 305 308, 312 , 314 ; communications with ,
agriculture (see also irrigation ; re- 8, 277, 281 , 282, 283, 286 ; trade, 265,
form, agrarian) : viii, 4-5, 11, 12, 296, 298
51 , 172 , 185 , 218 , 219, 224, 226, 234, Allies . See World War II
245, 246, 249, 300, 301 , 305 ; credit , Almohads ( 1147–1212 ) : 37, 38, 86, 135
223, 238, 239 , 259 ; education , 125 , Almoravids ( 1062–1147 ) : 36–37 , 135
126, 127, 132–133 , 259 ; government ALN . See Army of National Libera
role, 256–259 ; and the GDP , 220, tion
221 , 225 , 245 ; labor , ix, 245 , 246, Amine , Hachem : 183
267, 268, 269, 271 , 272 ; mechaniza- amir al muaminin : vii, 2, 31 , 61, 85,
tion, 5 , 218, 258, 298 ; production , 213
27, 180, 248, 251-259 , 278 ; tax, 235 Anti-Atlas : 7, 8, 11, 14 , 16, 49, 72, 76,
Ahardane, Majoub : 181 305
Ahermoumou : 187, 188 Aglam : 137
aid, foreign ( see also credit opera- Arab ethnic group ( see also Arabians ;
tions; individual countries ; individ- tribes ) : 25 , 31 , 36, 39, 53 , 73 , 74–76 ,
ual international institutions ) : ix, 79, 90, 178, 189, 213
5 , 68 , 195, 206, 207, 210 , 211-212, Arab Israeli War : 68–69, 79
219, 223, 224, 225, 228, 262, 281 , 284, Arab League. See League of Arab
290, 292, 298, 303–305 ; military, 65, States
68, 195 , 200 , 207, 211 , 310 , 315-316 Arab Summit Conference ( 1964 ) : 201
air force : ix , 3, 308, 317, 320 Arabians ( see also Arab ethnic group ;
air transport : ix, 223, 277, 284-286 ; League of Arab States ) : 31, 64 , 65
lines, ix, 285,286, 290 162, 186, 188, 195, 198, 200, 204–205 ;

387
beduins, 36, 37, 38, 74 , 76 ; invasion banks and banking : 46, 223, 235–236 ,
and rule, 8, 33–36 ; Israeli war, 68– 237,239 , 240, 241 , 242, 280, 292, 301 ,
69, 79, 195 , 204 303
Arabic language: vii, 1, 34, 36, 52, 71, baraka : 90–91, 92, 93
72, 73, 74, 76 , 82 , 83, 84, 94, 97, 101, Basri, Mohammed : 186
120, 121 , 122 , 123, 126, 127, 132, Battuta, Ibn ( 1304–78 ) : 135
133, 134, 142, 143, 159, 160, 162, 185 ; Bechar : 10, 197, 312
Arabization, 72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 82, Bekkai, Embarek : 60, 61, 159
83, 186 ; classical, 75, 82, 83, 137, Beling, W.A.: 184
141 , 151 ; dialects, 75 ; literature, Belkahia, Favid : 141
138, 139 ; mass media (see also Ben Arafa, Mohammed, Mulay : 58,
newspapers ; radio ) , 119 , 145, 150 , 59, 60
151 , 152 Ben Barka, Mehdi : 63, 67–68, 80, 159,
Arabization. See Arabic language 179, 183, 185, 199, 206, 215 , 304
archaeology : 119 , 143 Bella, Ahmad, president
Ben Bella, of
architecture : 107, 134, 136, 139–140 Algeria : 199 , 206, 312
armed forces ( see also aid ; air force ; Ben Bouchte, Mahdi : 171
Auxilliary Forces ; navy; Royal Benjelloun, Abdulhamid : 138
Armed Forces ; Royal Gendar- Ben Jelloun, Ahmad Majid : 192
merie ) : 62, 66, 158, 192, 216, 307, Ben Sadiq, Mahjub: 182, 183, 184
309–321; Chief of Staff, 191, 307, Ben Youssef University : 132, 145
313 , 320 ; civil efforts, 192, 312-315 ; Benhima, Mohammed : 69
command, 3, 163, 305 ; conscription, Beni Mellal: xiv, 177, 274, 282
314 ; foreign, 62, 63, 209, 284 ; ma Bennani, Larbi : 155
teriel, 315-316 ; officers, 2 , 315 ; Bennouna, Mehdi : 150
training , 310, 315 Berber languages : vii, 72 , 73, 74, 76,
Army of National Liberation ( Armée
..
de Liberation Nationale, ALN ) : 58 , Berbers ; dialect
120, 142( see s, 72,76, 151
also Berber languages ;
62, 310, 312, 314, 315
dahir ; tribes ) : 1 , 8, 25, 71 , 73, 74,
Arslan, Shakib : 53, 54 75, 76–77, 79 , 85, 86, 89, 90 , 106,
arts. See architecture ; dance music, 168, 169, 189, 314 ; culture, 76, 90,
painting 92 , 93 , 101 , 114, 134, 135 , 137 , 141 ,
Association of Andalusian Music : 141
142, 143 ; history, 32 , 33 , 34, 35 ,
Association of North African Muslim 36–39, 40, 41, 42, 53 ; resistance
Students : 53
movements, 48 , 57, 58 , 59 , 62 , 63,
Atlantic Ocean : xiv, 7, 8, 11 , 15, 16, 310, 311
17, 19 , 22, 23 , 287 Berrada, Mohammed : 148, 185
Atlas mountains ( see also Anti-Atlas; Beth River : 15, 17, 22
High Atlas ; Middle Atlas ; Sahara ): |bidonvilles : 9, 26, 27, 30, 52, 91, 107
vii, 7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 , 25, 32, bilad al makhzan : 41 , 44, 53 , 100, 189
246, 251 bilad al siba : 41 , 44, 53 , 100, 189
automobiles : viii, 108 , 281–282, 296 ; Bin al Ouidane Dam : 16, 17
assembling : 265 , 266, 267, 282 , 304 birds: 21
Auxiliary Forces : ix , 3, 308, 324–325 birth control : 23–24, 66
Ayachi Mountains : 13 birth rate : 9 , 24, 83
Aziz, Abdul : 44, 45 Bou Arfa : 13 , 22, 282
Bou Hamara, pretender : 44, 45
Baath Party : 186 Bou Iblane : 13 , 14
Bahnini, Ahmad : 66, 67, 180, 191 Bou Nasser peak : 13 , 14
bakshish : 111 Bouabid , Abdul Rahim : 181, 184, 190,
Balafrej , Ahmed : 52, 54, 55 , 192 192
Bani Wattas : 38, 39, 40 Boulemane : 13
Bank of Morocco : 233 , 235, 236 , 237, Boumedienne, Houari, president of
238, 239, 240, 292, 300 Algeria : 10, 197–198

388
boundaries (see also Algeria) : xiv, | Ceuta : 11, 17, 208 ; history, 32, 35, 39,
9-11, 62, 312 ; war ( 1963 ) , 64-65, 43, 47
312 Chamber of Councillors : 180
Bourguiba, Habib, president of Tuni- Chaouia: 12, 20, 251
sia : 200-201 Charibi, Driss : 138
Boutaleb , Abdul Hadi : 171 Charter of Public Liberties : 147, 159
Brezhnev, Leonid I.: 211 chemicals : viii, 264, 266, 267, 296
BRPM. See Bureau of Mining Re- Cherkaoui, Ahmed : 54
search and Participation children (see also students ) : 23, 27,
budget (see also defense ) : 172 , 227, 28, 29, 87, 112, 113 ; education
228, 229-235 ; deficit. See public (see also education) , 72, 76, 82, 83,
debt ; expenditure, viii, 227 , 229 , 95, 121 , 122 , 124, 125, 131
230, 231, 291–292 ; local government, China. See People's Republic of China
175, 176 ; receipts (see also tax ), Chou En-Lai, prime minister of the
230-235 , 287 , 288, 290-292 People's Republic of China : 212
Bureau of Arabization : 83 Christians and Christianity : 87, 89,
Bureau of Mining Research and Par 95 , 96–97, 136 ; history, 33, 36, 37,
ticipation ( Bureau de Recherches et 38, 39, 77
de Participations Minieres , BRPM) : Churchill , Winston, prime minister of
263 , 264 Great Britain : 55
Byzantine Empire : 33 citrus fruit : viii, 251, 252, 253 ; export,
cabinet. See Council of Ministers 5, 277, 284, 293, 297, 298, 299
caid : 40,44, 49, 50, 53, 54, 57, 143, civil rights(see also Charter of Pub
174, 175, 176 lic Liberties; freedom of expression ;
capital punishment : 186, 208, 309, 319 religion ; suffrage) : 57, 60, 89, 160,
161 , 162, 163, 169, 171
Carthage : 32 civil service (see also Morocconiza
Casablanca : viii, xiv, 8, 9, 12, 16, 17,
tion ) : 4, 29, 66, 122, 123, 166–168,
19, 20, 22, 23 , 28, 107, 108, 169, 175,
174, 193, 269
177, 187, 188, 264, 275 ; cultural,
72, 91, 95, 97, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132,climate : 15, 16–20, 219, 220, 245, 247,
133 , 140, 141 , 144, 154, 270 ; econo 251 , 262 , 287 ; drought, 222, 240,
256
my, 236, 242, 253 , 255, 262, 272 ;
history, 46, 51, 56 ; information, 150, coal : 21, 22, 218, 245, 261, 262, 263,
264, 265, 295
151 ; population, 24, 25, 26, 71, 77,
79, 107, 111 ; riots (1952 ) , 57, 146 ; coastal plain : 8, 11-12, 20, 25
riots ( 1965 ) , 66–67, 123, 181, 216 , colons : 49, 52, 56, 110, 248, 250, 253,
309 ; transportation , 277, 282, 283, 256, 300, 301
284, 285 Comité d'Action Marocaine ( CAM ) .
Casablanca Bloc : 202, 203 , 204, 206 See Moroccan Action Committee
Casablanca Conference ( 1943 ) : 55 Comité du Maroc. See Committee of
casbah : 25, 41 Morocco
CDG . See Deposit and Investment commerce (see also trade) : viii, 26,
Fund 172, 221 ; chambers of, 172 ; code,
censorship : 57, 146, 148, 181, 216 279–280, 286 ; historic, 41 , 43, 46,
census : ( 1952 ) , 81 ; ( 1960 ) , 24, 25, 81 ; 51-52; labor, ix , 268, 269, 274
( 1971–72 ) , 219 Committee of Morocco : 46
Center of Experimentation Research communal councils : 162, 171 , 172,
and Training : 28, 144 175-176 , 184
central bank. See Bank of Morocco communes : 173, 174, 175–176
central government ( see also mak- Communists and communism (see also
hzan ) : 86, 100, 104 Moroccan Communist Party ) : 214,
cereals ( see also wheat ) : 245, 251 , 228, relations with countries ( 886
252–253, 256, 280, 295, 300 also Cuba ; People's Republic of

389
China ; Soviet Union ) , 210–212, 242 , 237, 238, 239, 240–242, 278, 288 ;
253, 261 , 278, 293 , 298 foreign ( see also aid ) , 229, 233
conference of Fedala ( 1956 ) : 61 crime : 171, 309
Congo : 203 Cuba : 200, 210, 293
Constituent Assembly : 64 cultural activities ( see also architec
constitution, development of : 158-160 ture; cultural influences ; dance ;
Constitution ( 1962 ) : 67, 158, 159, drama ; music ; painting ) : 60 , 82 ;
160-161, 162, 163, 164, 170, 179, history, 37, 38
181 , 222, 224, 229 cultural influences : 91 , 107, 108, 116,
Constitution ( 1970 ) : 158 ; amendments, 120, 135, 142, 169 ; Arab, 31, 33, 37,
162–163 ; civil rights, 85, 95 , 162 ; 53, 74, 119, 135 ; French, vii, 1 , 7,
economy, 222, 224, 229 ; foreign pol- 52, 71, 80, 82, 94, 101 , 137–138, 140,
icy, 5, 7, 162, 212 ; government, viii, 166, 168, 271 ; Roman, 33, Spanish ,
165-166 , 167, 168 , 170, 171-172, 37, 135 ; Turkish , 40
173 , 179, 190, 214 ; labor, 273 ; mon- Cultural Mission ( Mission Universi
archy, 162, 163–164 ; promulgation taire Culturel Fr- ncaise, MUCF ) :
of, 31 , 69, 161 , 182 120, 131
Constitutional Council : 159 currency : 235,237, 239-242
Constitutional Democratic Party customs duties ( see also tariff ) : 197,
( Parti Democratique Constitution- 233-235, 300, 302 ; history, 46
nel, PDC ) ; 150 , 178 , 179 , 181 , 184
construction : 95 , 122, 124, 128, 129, Daddah, Ould, president of Mauri
tania : 201
221 , 222, 224, 225, 259, 281 , 287,
289, 302, 305, 313 ; housing, 29-30 ; dahir: 163, 171, 257, 288, 302, 314,
irrigation dams, 8, 15–16, 17, 224 ; 318,319 ; Berber ( 1930 ) , 53–54, 55,
89, 169 ; historical, 44, 49, 56, 57
labor, 268, 272, 273 ; materials, viii, Damascus : 34, 35
265, 266, 267
Consultative Assembly : 63, 159 dams. See irrigation
consumer goods ( see also foodstuffs; dance : 136, 142
Dar al Islam : 33
textiles ) : 109, 265, 290, 296
Convention of Lalla Marhnia. See de Gaulle, Charles, president of
Treaty of Lalla Marhnia France : 68, 206
cooperatives : 237, 238, 259, 281 ; hand- Declaration of the Rights of Man :
161
icrafts : 140
decrees. See dahir
copper : 21 , 22, 23 defense ( see also armed forces ) : ix ,
Cordova, Kingdom of : 35, 136 3 , 60, 197 ; administrative divisions,
corruption : 170, 186, 189, 191 , 224, 3 ; budget, 313–314 ; minister ( see
307
also Ministry of Defense ), 3
cost of living : 27, 180, 242, 272, 280 Democratic Independence Party (Par
Council of Government (Protector- ti Démocratique de l'Indépendance,
ate ) : 50, 57 PDI ) : 56, 61 , 178, 181 ; publica
Council of Ministers: viii, 3, 159, 163, tion, 146
165–166 , 168, 172, 175 , 178, 187, Democratic Socialist Party (Parti
191–193, 201 , 229, 309, 313 Socialist Democrate, PSD ) : 66, 180
coup attempt ( 1971 ) : 2, 157 , 158, 177, democratic traditions : 2, 59, 159, 160,
187–188, 307, 319 ; consequences, 3, 162, 185 , 186, 192, 214, 215
71 , 188–190, 224, 236, 320 Deposit and Investment Fund (Caisse
courts ( see also labor ; Supreme de Dépôt et de Gestion, CDG) : 236,
Court ) : viii , 162, 168-170, 323 ; mil- 238 , 239 , 242
itary, 319 ; religious, 50, 89, 96, 169 derb : 107–108
crafts : 110, 119, 135, 137, 140, 172, Description of Africa : 136
221 , 226, 245 , 260, 279 desert ( see also hamaidiya ; Sahara ) :
credit operations : 223, 229, 235, 236, 14, 16 , 20

390
diplomatic relations. See foreign re- energy ( see also electricity; coal ; pe
lations troleum ) : 221, 222, 226, 228, 242,
dirham : 236, 239, 292–293 259–260, 261–262, 266
disease : vii, 27–28, 273 English language : 127, 151 , 152
divorce : 89, 112, 113–114, 151, 169 Entente Cordiale : 45
Dlimi , Ahmad : 67, 68 Essaouira : 11 , 12, 19, 23, 252, 282
Douiri, Mohammed : 54 Ethiopia : 199
Doukkala : 12, 17, 20 ethnic groups ( see also Arabian ethnic
Doukkala, Bouchaib al : 94 group ; Berbers ; Europeans; Jews ) :
Draa River : 7, 10, 11, 14 , 16, 17, 22 , 1 , 23 , 71 , 73–81
25 ; history, 39, 47, 49 Europe, relations with ( see also Euro
drama : 142 pean Economic Community ; indi
dress : 76, 101 , 108, 116–117 ; military, vidual countries ) : 42–47, 51 , 196,
317-318 205–206 ; trade, 278, 301 ; trans
Driss, Abdelaziz ben : 54 port, 278, 301
European Economic Community
Eastern Morocco : 7, 8, 11 , 14–15 , 22 ;
( EEC ) : 5-6, 205–206 , 253, 261 ,
economy, 252, 255 296, 297
economy (see also agriculture ; indus- Europeans ( see also colons ; French
try ; minerals ; trade ) : viii, 31 , 60, ethnic group ; Spanish ethnic
180, 217–218 , 219 , 245, 287 ; develop
ment ( see also Five Year Plans ; group ) : 80–81 , 85, 96, 101 , 107, 108,
109, 218, 223 , 253 , 257, 271 , 278,
National Development Program ), 279, 290
218, 224-227, 259, 278, 279 ; govern- Eurovision : 153–154
ment role, 217, 222-224, 230, 256–
exchange. See foreign exchange
259 , 280–281, 286, 287–288, 298– export ( see also customs duties ) : viii,
299 , 301
4 , 5 , 217 , 219 , 223 , 225 , 264, 277,
Eddine, Muhammad Khair : 138
290, 293–295, 296, 297, 298, 300 ;
education ( see also Arabic language;
agriculture, 245, 254, 255, 298, 299 ;
schools ; technical education ; uni earnings, viii, 4, 298
versities ) : vii ; 3, 4, 31, 52, 72, 73 ,
82, 83, 109, 117, 119–123, 136, 185, family ( see also children ; marriage) :
186, 191 , 204-205 , 226 ; adult, 134 ; 77, 96, 100, 112, 116, 169
religious. See Quran family planning : 9, 23, 24, 25, 201
Educational Higher Council : 164 FAR. See Royal Armed Forces
Egypt (see also United Arab Repub- Fassi, Allal al : 31, 53 , 54, 58, 94, 137,
lic) : 45, 75 149, 179 , 181, 184, 185, 187, 190,
Eisenhower , Dwight D., president of 202
U.S.A .: 209 Fatima, Lala, Princess : 117, 165
elections : 64, 159, 161 , 163, 170, 171 , fauna. See wildlife
172–173 ; ( 1960 ) , 63, 175 ; ( 1963 ) , Faure, Edgar, premier of France : 59
180 ; local government ( 1969 ) , 69, FDIC. See Front for the Defense of
176 ; ( 1970 ) , 31 , 69, 184–185 Constitutional Institutions
electricity : 26, 52, 260, 261-262, 280, Federal Republic of Germany : 206,
301 ; hydroelectricity, 15, 16, 218, 269, 270 , 285, 295, 296, 301, 302 ;
260, 261–262, 298, 305 aid, ix, 303
emergency, state of : 164, 193 ; ( 1965– Federation of Farmers Unions (Un
70 ) , 31 , 67–69, 147, 148, 161 , 164, ion des Syndicats Agricoles, USA ) :
182
181 , 182, 185, 191, 236, 309
emigration ( see also Jews ) : 9, 23, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain : 38
80, 97, 269–270 fertilizer : 296 ; production , 265, 266,
employment ( see also labor ; unem- 267 ; use, 247, 248, 258
ployment) : 26, 72, 119, 120, 218, Fes : xiv, 17, 19, 22, 28, 153, 177, 178,
269, 287 216, 274 ; cultural, 72, 91, 93, 94,

391
97, 132, 135, 140, 141 ; economy, 207, 257, 290, 292, 303, 304, 310,
250, 251 , 279 ; history , 35, 38, 40, 315-316 ; disputes, 195 , 198, 206,
46, 48 , 52 , 54, 311 , 312 ; population, 304 , 311 ; history, 41 , 42, 43, 45 , 46,
25 , 26, 74 ; transport, 281 , 282, 284 47, 55 ; trade, 277, 284, 293, 295,
Figuig : 10, 46, 62, 312 ; transport, 296, 297, 299
281 , 282 Franco, Francisco, Generalissimo : 60,
films: 120, 154-155 ; foreign, 75 , 117, 208
120, 154 Franco - Moroccan Protectorate Trea
finance (see also banks and banking ; ty of Fes ( 1912 ) : 46–47, 48, 49,
budget ; investment) : viii-ix, 225 57, 59, 60
fishing and fisheries : viii, 245, 254– Franco Spanish Treaty ( 1912 ) : 47
255, 280 ; export, 254–255 , 277, 283, freedom of expression (see also cen
293, 297, 298, 299 sorship ; civil rights ) : 120, 147, 171 ,
Five Year Plan ( 1968–72 ) : 15, 30 , 181
220, 222 , 224, 225 , 226, 227, 229, French ethnic group ( see also colons;
256 ; aid for, 207, 303, 305 ; for birth European ethnic group ) : 4, 23 , 49 ,
control, 9, 25 ; education, 125, 128 ; 50, 52 , 56, 59, 60, 72–73, 80 , 121 ,
employment, 269, 270, 277 ; for in- 131 , 167, 255 , 271 , 279 , 292, 309,
dustry, 154, 255, 260, 262, 263 ; 311
tourism, 287, 288, 289 ; transport, French language : vii, 1 , 52, 72–73,
281 , 285 75 , 76, 82, 83 , 84, 119 , 120, 122 , 123 ,
Five Year Plan ( 1973–77 ) : 224, 225 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 143 ;
FLN. See National Liberation Front literature, 138, 139 ; mass media
floods : 15 , 16 ; control, 16, 219 , 254, ( see also newspapers ), 145, 146,
258, 259 150, 151 , 152
flora. See vegetation French rule ( 1912–56 ) : vii, 1, 2, 12,
folk culture ( see also religion ) : 136, 26, 31 , 45–60, 63, 72, 78, 80, 81 , 82,
137, 155 89 , 94, 99, 101 , 140, 142, 157, 165,
folk lore : 119 , 137, 138, 143 167, 174, 202, 209, 213, 256, 259,
foodstuffs : viii, 242, 245, 260, 265 , 271 , 309, 314 ; central government.
266, 267, 269, 280, 293 , 294, 295 , See makhzan ; economy, 217, 223,
299 ; inadequacy, 9, 27, 219 , 256 248, 250, 251 , 257, 278, 289–290,
Ford Foundation, U.S.A.: 23 299, 300, 301 ; education, 72, 120,
foreign aid. See aid 121 , 131 , 132, 144 ; information ,
145–146 ; laws, 89, 168, 169 ; move
foreign exchange : 4, 219 , 225 , 233 , ment against, 52–60
236, 237, 240, 241 , 256, 265 , 287, 290 ,
299 ; controls, 223 , 259, 290, 292– French
10
Spanish convention ( 1912 ) :
293, 300, 302
foreign relations ( see also individual French
54
Spanish-Muslim Association :
countries ) : 5-6, 31-32, 60, 62 , 63 ,
French University : 120, 131
64, 65–66, 69, 189, 191 , 195–196 ; Front for the Defense of Consti
diplomatic missions, 157, 163 , 187, tutional Institutions ( Front pour
189, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201 , 203, la Défense des Institutions Consti
204 , 205 , 206, 209, 210–211 , 212 ,
269 ; history, 41 , 42–47 ; policy, 195– tutionelles, FDIC) : 64, 66, 67, 179,
196, 197, 209, 210, 212 180, 181 , 182 ; publication , 146
Fundamental Law ( 1961 ) : 159
forests and forestry : 11 , 20–21, 217,
221 , 245 , 246 , 247, 249 , 254 , 255, Galaoui, Thami al : 48, 50–51, 57, 58,
256 : reforestation, 256, 259 59 , 105
France ( see also French rule ) : 62, Gara-Djebilet : 10, 198
63, 67–68, 124, 131, 141, 152 , 153 , General Union of Moroccan Students
196, 206–207, 209, 210, 269, 270, ( Union Generale des Etudiants
285, 286 ; aid, ix, 5, 133, 195, 206, Marocains, UGEM ) : 184

392
Germany ( see also Federal Republic | Higher Council for National Promo
of Germany ) : 42, 45, 46 ; World tion and Planning : 162, 164, 168,
War II, 55 224
Gibraltar, Strait of : vii, 11 , 42, 47, hijrah : 86
74, 208, 282 holidays : 29, 111
government. See central government; holy wars : 39, 42, 88
local government House of Representatives: viii, 162,
grands seigneurs : 105-106 163 , 164, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171–
Great Britain : 42 , 43, 45, 46, 50 , 269 , 172, 180, 184, 185, 193
285, 286, 295, 296 housing ( see also bidonvilles; slums ) :
gross domestic product ( GDP ) : viii, 9, 25, 26, 108 , 144 , 227, 268, 272,
220–222, 225 , 229, 240, 242 , 245 , 273, 274, 300 ; government pro
259, 277 grams, 28, 29–30 ; loans, 28, 30
Grou River : 17, 22 Husayn, king of Jordan : 188
Guédira, Reda : 160, 178, 180, 182,
309 Ibn Abdullah, Idris : 35
Ibn Bajja : 135
Guercif : city, 282 ; plain , 14 Ibn Khaldun : 77
Guir River : 10, 16, 17
Ibn Nusayr, Musa : 33
habus ( see also Ministry of Religious Ibn Rushd : 135
Foundations and Islamic Affairs ) : Ibn Tashfin , Yusif : 36
50, 85 ; land, 249, 250 Ibn Tufayl : 135
Hadith : 86 Ibrahim, Abdullah : 181, 184
Hafid, Sultan : 46, 47 Id al Fitr : 88
hajj : 87, 88, 92 Idris 11 : 35
hamaidiya : 14, 16 Ifni: 10, 22, 207, 208 ; history, 43, 47,
Haouz plain : 12, 16, 17 51, 61, 62 ; transport, 281 , 282
harbors. See ports Ifrane : 144, 189
Hassan, Sultan ( 19th C ) : 44
imazighan : 32
Hassan II Institute of Agronomy: import (see also customs duties): viii,
133, 144, 168
218, 219, 222, 223, 233, 236, 245,
Hassan II, King : 1-2, 3, 10, 23, 31,
264, 277, 284, 290, 293, 294, 295–
66, 67, 68, 69, 83, 85, 92, 117, 140, 296, 297, 299-300, 303
148, 158, 159–160 , 161 , 164–165 , 166,
168, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181 , 182, 184, Inaouene River : 14, 15, 17, 305
186, 190–191, 192, 198, 213, 214, income (see also wages ) : 219, 273 ;
215 , 224, 236, 307, 308, 314, 317, agricultural, 251, 254 ; per capita ,
319, 320 ; coup attempt, 157, 187, 27, 217, 225
188, 189 ; education policies, 95, independence: first years, 61-67 ;
110, 119, 123, 125 ; foreign policy, gaining of, vii, 10, 50, 59–61, 178,
65, 68, 197, 199, 200-201, 203, 204, 209, 210, 213 , 310
205, 206, 207, 208, 211 , 212 ; Prince, industry (see also energy ; manufac
62, 64, 310, 311 , 312 turing ; mining) : viii , 11, 26, 31 ,
Mulay Hassan, Prince. See Hassan II 51 , 80, 172 , 185 , 219, 221, 222, 224,
health ( see also disease ; medical serv- 226, 259–261, 300 ; credit, 223, 238,
ice ) : vii, 9, 24 , 26, 226, 270, 273 239 ; equipment, viii, 296, 299 ;
High Atlas : 7, 8, 11 , 12–14, 21, 22, labor, ix, 80, 245, 246, 268, 269, 271,
48, 72, 113 ; population , 25, 76 274 ; production, 245, 278
High Commission on Population : 23 inflation : 27, 240
High Court : 170 Institute of Jewish Studies : 96
High Plateau : 8, 14, 20 insurance : 223 , 236, 242, 280, 290, 303
Higher Board of Education : 122, 124
International Bank for Reconstruc
Higher Council of the Magistracy : tion and Development ( IBRD ) : ix ,
164, 170 224, 236, 239, 281 , 302, 303, 305

393
international commitments ( see also | Italy : 206, 286, 295, 296, 305 ; history,
individual organizations ) : ix, 5, 45, 56
212, 228, 285, 309
International Development Associa- jaysh: 40, 43, 105 ; land, 249
Jews and Judaism : 1 , 9, 24, 26, 36,
tion ( IDA ) : 125, 129 68–69, 71 , 73, 77–80, 85, 87, 89, 92,
International Financial Statistics
( IFS ) : 240, 242 95, 96, 108, 131 ; anti , 38 , 55 , 185 ;
emigration, 78, 79, 80, 107 ; law ,
International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) :
168, 169 ; Sephardic, 38, 78, 96
239, 240
investment, capital (see also private journalists and journalism : 137, 145,
216
219,
222, ; state
sector225, 227, 230,) 232,
226,enterprises : 217, 234, journals and periodicals ( see also
newspapers ) : 120-121 , 137, 146,
239 , 288–289, 290–292 , 303 ; code,,
258, 288, 301-302 ; foreign , 288,
150 ; French , 138, political 137 ; re
300-302 search, 143 , 144, 145
iron : 295 ; ore, 10, 21, 22, 198, 245, judges : 50
262, 263 , 265, 312 judiciary ( see also courts ) : viii, 64,
162, 164, 168–170, 193 , 197 ; French
irrigation ( see also construction ) : 4 ,
rule , 50, 53, 54
12, 15–16, 17, 25, 52, 218, 219, 223,
224, 225, 227, 246-247, 251, 257, Juin, Alphonse, General : 56–57
258, 259, 260, 305 , 313 justice ( see also Islamic law ; judici
ary ; laws and legal codes ) : viii, 3,
Isla. See National Reform Party 191 ; military, 318-320
Islam ( see also Islamic law ; Quran ; Karaouine University , Fes : 52, 121,
reform ; Shia Islam ; Sunni Islam ; 132 , 134, 135, 136, 145
values and traditions) : vii, 53, 71, Karim , Abdul : 88
85, 86–89, 109–110, 113, 120, 150, Kasba Tadla : 14
185 ; brotherhoods (see also mar- Keita , Modibo, president of Mali : 64,
abouts) , 86, 93–94 ; culture (see 199
also cultural influences ), 33–36, 37, Kenitra : xiv, 12, 22, 23, 26, 128, 177,
137 ; education, ( see also Quran ) , 209 ; transport, 282, 283, 284
121 , 126, 134, 136, 145, 151; intro- Kharidjites: 34, 35
duction of, 33–36, 38, 74, 86, 90, Khouribga: xiv, 12, 22, 23, 177, 263,
213 ; popular (see also Sufi Islam, 281
86, 90–93; spiritual head, vii, 1, 31, king, duties and powers ( see also
60, 61 , 85, 163, 191 , 213, 214, 215, Hassan II ; Mohammed V ; mon
216 ; and the state, 85 , 86, 88, 89 ,
archy ) : vii , viii, ix, 3 , 31 , 69, 85,
159 , 160, 162 , 163 , 215 100, 158, 159, 161 , 162, 163-164 ,
Islamic law : viii , 50, 53, 89, 113, 132, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171 , 172, 174,
135 , 168–169, 214, 247 193, 214, 215, 216, 217, 223, 224,
Islamic Solidarity Bloc : 195, 212 308, 314, 321 , 322 ; succession, 164
Islamic Summit Conference ( 1969 ) : Kingdom of Morocco ( see also bound
10, 201 , 205
aries) : location , vii, 7 ; size, vii, 4,
Ismail, Mulay, Sultan ( 1672–1727 ) : 7
41 , 136, 143, 202 Krim, Abdel: 199
Israel : 71 , 78, 200, 201 , 204, 206 ; Ksar al Souk : xiv, 177, 275 ; trans
Arab war, 68–69, 71 , 79, 195 , 204 port, 281 , 282
Istiqlal Party : 55, 57, 58, 59, 61 , 62, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
63, 64, 66, 69, 93 , 147, 157, 159, 160, Development ( KFAED ) : 305
161 , 167 , 174, 178, 179, 181 , 184,
190, 192, 197, 310 ; irredentist poli. L'Opinion : 148, 149, 185
cies, 179, 201 , 202 ; labor / youth La Nation Africaine: 147–148, 149
movements, 182–184 ; publications, labor ( see also wages) : ix, 29, 219,
137, 146, 147–148, 167, 185 245–246 , 266-271; arbitration , 273–

394
275 ; code, 271 ; conditions, 271-273 ; nisia ) : 7, 64, 160, 162, 196–197,
courts, 169–170, 273 ; riots, 57, 66, 198, 201 ; communications, 283, 284,
185, 309, 314 ; unions. See trade 286 ; history, 36 ; trade, 298
unions Maghrib Arab Press (MAP) : 149,
Lamrani, Mohammed Karim : 191, 150–151
192 makhzan ( see also central govern
land ( see also reform, agrarian ) : ment ) : French , 47, 48, 49, 50 , 53,
ownership and tenure, 5, 218, 223, 56, 93 , 105 , 169 ; history, 37, 38, 39 ,
248, 249–251, 256-257 ; utilization, 40, 41 , 43, 44, 100, 105, 166, 189 ;
246, 247, 248 land ( see also bilad al makhzan ) ,
languages ( see also Arabic language ; 249
English language ; French lan- Mali: 195, 199, 202, 293
guage ; Spanish language ) : vii, 31 , Malikite rite. See Sunni Islam
72, 73 , 81-84 , 109 mallah : 26, 78, 108
Larache : 15, 17, 22, 282 ; history, 41 , Mamlaka al Maghribia :
46 Mamora : 21
Laraki, Ahmed : 69, 186, 187, 190, 207 mandub : 51
Latifa, Lala : 165 manganese : 21, 22, 263, 265, 295,
laws and legal codes ( see also Islamic 298
law) : viii, 89, 168–169, 271 ; com- Mansur, Sultan Mulay Ahmad al : 40
mercial, 279–280, 286 ; military, manufacturing: viii, 245, 259, 260,
318,319 ; penal, 95, 319 ; promulga- 265-266 , 294, 301
tion, 163, 171 marabouts : 37, 38, 39, 40, 48, 51 , 53,
League of Arab States : ix, 5, 57, 63 , 85 , 90, 94, 104, 105, 135 ; modifica
195, 199, 200, 202, 204, 212 tion of power, 41, 53, 86, 94, 104
Leo Africanus. See Wazzi Marin Bani : 38
levante : 20 Marinids ( 1269–1465 ) : 38–39, 41, 135,
Liberal Independents : 178, 182 143
libraries : 143 , 144-145 Marrakech : xiv, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22,
Libya : 157, 188, 189, 196, 202, 203 , 26, 28, 170, 274 ; administration,
269, 298 105 , 177 ; cultural, 72, 132, 140, 141,
literacy : vii, 83 , 120, 134 145 ; economy, 250, 252, 279 ; history ,
literature : 135, 136, 137-139 36, 37, 38, 40, 46, 48, 51 , 143 ; popu
livestock : 245, 248, 254, 257 lation, 26, 79 ; transport, 281 , 282,
living standards (see also housing ; 283 , 284
nutrition ; sanitation ) : 9, 27-28, 56, marriage: 74–75, 89, 100, 112, 113–
80, 185 114, 116, 117, 151, 169 ; intermar
local government : viii, 63, 161 , 162, riage, 74, 101
173–177 ; finances, 227, 228, 229, marshland: 11, 12, 247
233 ; history, 40, 44 ; in the pro- Mas, Pierre : 146
tectorate, 47, 50, 173 Masmuda Berbers : 35, 77
Louis XIV, king of France : 41 Massa River : 16, 17, 22
Loukkos River : 15, 17, 22 Mauritania : xiv, 6, 8, 17, 22, 64, 65,
Lyautey, Louis, Marshal : 48, 49, 51 , 152, 153, 195 , 196, 197, 200, 201,
52 202, 206 ; history , 40 ; territorial
Lyazidi, Mohammed : 54, 55, 56 claims in, 10, 201 , 202, 203
Lycée Lyautev : 131 medical services : vii, 9, 24, 28, 52,
271 , 272
Madbuh , Mohammed , General : 188, Mediterranean Sea : xiv, 7, 11, 15, 17,
189
22, 287
madina : 26, 108, 140, 279 Meknes : xiv, 15, 17, 21 , 22, 25, 26,
Madrid Conference ( 1880 ) : 43, 45 177, 274, 310, 311 , 315 ; cultural, 91 ,
Maghrib ( see also Algeria ; Libya ; 140 ; economy, 250, 251, 279 ; history,
Mauritania ; North Africa ; Tu- 40, 143 ; transport, 281

395
Mekouar, Ahmed : 54 Ministry of Religious Foundations
Melilla : 11 , 17, 22, 208 ; history , 39, and Islamic Affairs : 85, 95 , 191
43, 47 Ministry of Youth and Recreation :
Meseta : 8 28, 192, 231 , 232 ; ( 1971 ) , 269, 270,
Messouak, Abdulhadi : 187 271 , 274
Middle Atlas : 7, 8, 11, 12–14, 20, 21 , mission civilisatrice : 43, 57, 72, 81–82
22, 72, 246 ; history, 49, 310, 311 ; Mohammed V Dam : 15, 17
population, 25, 76, 77 Mohammed V, King (previously Sul
Middle East ( see also individual coun- tan ) : 2, 31 , 51 , 54, 55, 57, 60 , 63,
tries ) : 162, 186, 195, 213 64, 147, 149, 159, 164, 165, 167, 177,
migration , internal : 4, 5, 9, 25–26 , 27, 178, 200, 213, 309 ; exile, 2, 58–59,
52, 78, 91 , 106, 107, 110, 111 , 259 ; 214 ; foreign policy, 202, 203, 209 ;
historic, 7 ; seasonal, 267, 268 tomb, 92, 140
Mikoyan , Anastas I.: 211 Mohammed, Sultan ( 18th C) : 41, 136
military. See armed forces Mohammed V University. See Uni
Military Assistance Program ( MAP, versity of Rabat
U.S. ) : 318 Mohammedia : 279 ; transport, 282,
milk land : 249, 250, 251 , 301 283, 284
minerals ( see also iron ; manganese ; Mohammedia Engineering School :
phosphates; zinc ) : 8, 21-23, 51 , 127, 132, 168
217, 218, 223, 245, 262, 263, 294 ; monarchy ( see also king) : viii, 1, 2,
export, 235 , 263, 264, 294, 295 61 , 99, 100, 163, 184, 189, 195, 203 ,
mining : viii, 198, 221 , 223, 226, 259, 204, 208, 212, 214, 216, 217, 307 ;
260, 262–265 ; labor, 272, 273 constitutional, 31 , 59, 62, 158, 159–
Ministries of Education : 66, 96, 124 , 160, 162, 193 , 214
125, 132, 191 , 231 , 232 Moriscos : 38, 74
ministries and ministers ( see also Moroccan Action Committee ( Comité
Council of Ministers ; individual d'Action Marocaine, CAM ) : 54, 55
ministries ) : 162, 163, 165-166, 170, Moroccan Cinematographic Center
191 , 231 , 232 ( Centre Cinematographique Moro
Ministry of Agriculture and National cain, CCM ) : 154–155
Development: 125, 127, 191, 231 , Moroccan Communist Party ( Parti
232, 295 Communiste Marocain, PCM ) : 57,
Ministry of Commerce : 144, 231 , 232 58, 160, 177, 181, 182, 184, 187 ;
Ministry of Culture : 138, 155 publications, 147
Ministry of Defense : 191 , 192, 231 , Moroccan General Library and Ar
232, 308, 309, 320 chives (Bibliotheque Generale et
Ministry of Finance : 229, 237, 292 ; Archives du Maroc ) : 145
minister, 238 Moroccan Labor Union ( Union Maro
Ministry of Information : 146, 149, cain du Travail, UMT ) : 69, 142,,
154, 192, 231 , 232 167, 182, 183 , 246, 273, 274
Ministry of Interior : 2, 3, 28, 144, Moroccan League for Fundamental
174, 175, 186, 189, 191 , 192, 270, Education and Literacy : 134
308, 320 ; minister, 3, 147, 173, 176, Moroccan League for the Protection
324 of Children : 29
Ministry of Justice : 96, 167, 191 , 231 , Moroccan Muslims : vii, 8, 24
232 ; minister, 170 Moroccan National Front : 57
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Moroccan National Office for Rail
( see also Ministry of Youth and roads (Office National des Chemins
Recreation ) : 28, 125 , 128, 231 , 232 de Fer Maroc, ONCF ) : 282
Ministry of Public Health : 28, 192, Moroccan Press Association : 147
231 , 232 Moroccan Radio and Television (Ra
Ministry of Public Works and Com- diodiffusion Television Morocain ,
munications : 284, 285 RTM ) : 151, 152, 153, 228

396
Moroccan Shipping Company (Cam- National Liberation Front (Front de
pagnie Marocaine de Navigation, Liberation Nationale, FLN ), Al
COMANAV ) : 284 gerian : 62, 198, 199, 206, 311
Moroccan Unity Party : 55 National Mutual Aid ( Entr'Aide Na
Moroccan Worker - Youth ( Jeunesse tionale, EAN ) : 29
Ouvrière Marocain, JOM ) : 182, 274 National Party : 54
Moroccanization : 206, 246, 248, 270, National Reform Party : 55 , 178
303 ; education, 72, 82 ; government, National Social Security Bank : 29
72, 83 , 167, 169 National Tourist Office: 287–288
mosques : 25, 87, 95, 107, 140 ; schools. National Transport Agency (Office
See Quran National de Transport, ONT ) : 281
Mouline, Rashid : 178 National Union of Moroccan Students
Moulouya : history, 35 ; River, 11, 13, ( Union Nationale des Etudiants
15 , 17, 22 ; valley, 8, 13, 14, 17, 22, Marocaines, UNFEM ) : 183
25 , 255 National Union of Moroccan Women
mountains ( see also individual ( Union Nationale des Femmes
ranges) : vii, 7, 11 , 19, 20, 287 Marocaines, UNFM ) : 117, 165
MP. See Popular Movement National Union of Popular Forces
Msoun River : 13 , 15 ( Union Nationale des Forces Popu
Muhammad, Prophet : 33, 34, 86, 87, laires , UNFP ) : 63 , 64 , 66, 67, 69 ,
88 , 89, 90, 135 ; descendents ( see 157, 159 , 160, 161 , 167, 179 , 180,
also sharif), 1 , 34, 35 , 39, 40, 85, 181 , 182, 183, 184, 185 , 186, 187,
90, 109, 136, 213 190 , 192 ; labor / youth movements,
Mulay Sidi Mohammed , Crown 182–184 , 274 ; publications , 137 ,
Prince : 165 146
museums : 140 nationalists and nationalism ( see also
music : 136, 141-143 independence) : 2, 31 , 80, 83, 146,
Muslims ( see also Islam ; Moroccan 159, 196, 214 , 310 ; and culture, 137 ;
Muslims ) : vii, 2, 33, 87, 160, 213 ; and education, 121 ; and Islam , 88,
history, 38, 39 89 , 94, 216 ; movement, 50, 52–61
navy : ix, 3 , 308, 317, 320
Naciri, Muhammad al Mekki : 54, 55, news agencies: 149, 150–151
150
newspapers ( see also press ) : 119, 121 ,
Nador : xiv, 11 , 15, 17, 22, 265 , 274,
282, 305
181 ; Arabic, 146, 148 , 149 ; French ,
145, 146, 147, 148, 149
Nakhla River : 15 , 17
nonalignment: 31 , 64, 65–66 , 179, 195,
names ( see also titles ) : 75 , 77 , 104 198, 200 , 210
narcotics : 308, 323 North Africa ( see also Maghrib ) : 7,
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, president of
68, 74, 75, 162, 213 : history, 31 , 32,
United Arab Republic : 205 33 , 310 ; religion, 90, 93
National Agricultural Credit Bank nutrition : 9
( Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agri
cole, CNCA ) : 237, 238 oases : 7, 14, 16, 20, 25, 46
National Development Program ( Pro- Official Bulletin : 171 , 172, 176
motion Nationale ) : 29, 259, 269 official language ( see also Arabic
National Economic Development Bank language ) : vii, 1 , 71
( Banque Nationale pour le Develop- oil, edible : 245, 253, 255, 258, 280,
pement Economique, BNDE ) : 237, 290, 293, 294, 297
238, 239 Organization of African Unity
National Front : 184, 192 ( OAU ) : ix, 5, 195, 197, 199, 200,
National Investment Company ( So- 201 , 212, 312
cieté Nationale d'Investissements ) : Ottoman Empire : 31, 40, 41 , 42, 213
303 Ouanoukrim peak : 13

397
Ouarzazate : 14, 16, 17, 22, 23 , 25 , 177 ; 177–182 , 216 ; opposition, 1 , 23 , 157,
transport, 281 , 282 160, 176, 179 , 180 , 181 , 182 , 184 , 185,
Ouezzani, Mohammed Hassan : 53, 54, 186, 190 , 208, 246
56 polygyny : 116
Oufkir, Mohammed, General : 2–3 , Pompidou, Georges, president of
67, 68, 157, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191 , France : 206 , 207
192 , 307-308, 313, 320 Pope Leo X : 136
Oujda : xiv, 15 , 17, 22 , 26 , 62, 153 , 177, Popular Credit Bank : 236
262, 274, 312 ; history, 46 ; trans- Popular Movement ( Mouvement Popu
port, 281 , 282, 284 laire, MP ) : 54 , 63 , 64 , 178, 179,
Oum al Rbia River : 12, 16, 17, 22, 25 181 , 182 , 184 ; publication, 146
population ( see also census ) : vii , 3 ,
painting : 140-141
Palestine Liberation Movement : 204 , 7, 8–9 , 11 , 12, 23–26, 185, 219, 256
205
ports : xiv, 227 , 228 , 264 , 266, 282 ; air ,
ix , 2, 284 , 285 ; sea , ix, 11 , 12 , 283
Parliament: 64, 161 , 180, 181
Portugal : 203 , 255 ; history, 38 ; rule
Party of Independent Liberals ( Parti of Morocco, 39
des Liberaux Independants , PLI ) : prefectures (see also individual pre
146
fectures ) : viii, xiv, 173 , 175, 176–
Party of Liberation and Socialism 177
( Parti de Liberation et Socialisme ,
press ( see also newspapers ) : 27 , 75 ,
PLS ) : 182 , 184
Party of Moroccan Unity ( Parti de 83 , 119, 145–151 , 303 ; censorship ,
L'Unité Marocaine , PUM ) : 178 57 , 121 ; code, 147 , 148 ; history,
145–146 ; opposition, 148 , 149
pashas : 40, 44, 49, 50 , 53 , 54 , 174 ,
175 , 176 prices ( see also cost of living ) : 66 , 69 ,
PCM . See Moroccan Communist Party 123, 236 ; controls, 236, 258, 259,
PDC. See Constitutional Democratic 278 , 280–281
Party prime minister, duties : viii, 147 , 158 ,
PDI. See Democratic Independence 161 , 162 , 163 , 165–166, 171 , 172,
Party 190, 193 , 225 , 231 , 232
PDS. See Democratic Socialist Party prisoners : 325 ; amnesty, 66, 181 , 185 ;
penal system ( see also laws and legal exchange, 65
codes ) : 325 private sector : 30 , 217, 222-223 , 225 ,
Penon de Velez : 39, 43 , 47 227 , 263 , 266 , 286 , 288 , 290–291 ,
People's Republic of China , ( PRC ) : 300 , 303 ; credit, 223 , 236 , 237, 238 ,
65 , 198, 210, 211, 212 , 293 , 295 , 298 240–242 ; foreign, 4 , 222 , 235 , 236,
petroleum ( see also energy) : 8, 22 , 288 ; incentives, 278, 288–289 , 301
23 , 218 , 219 , 245 , 262 , 263 , 264–265 , 302 ; land . See land
266, 301 , 304 ; imports , viii , 218 , 264 , professionals : ix, 29, 78, 79 , 80, 81 ,
277, 300 122 , 215 , 246 , 270 ; associations, 171
Phoenicians : 32, 71 , 75 Progressive Union of Moroccan Women
phosphates : viii , 4 , 223 , 228 , 233 , 245 , ( Union Progressiste des Femmes
262 , 263–264 , 266 , 267 , 277 , 283 , Marocaines, UPFM ) : 182
284, 298 ; deposits, 10, 12 , 21-22, 218 Prophet. See Muhammed
privates and piracy : 38 , 39 , 41 protectorate. See French rule ; Span
Plan of Reforms: 55 ish rule
Podgorny , Nikolai : 211 provinces ( see also individual prov
police ( see also Royal Gendarmerie ; inces ) : viii , xiv , 173 , 175 , 176-177
Sûreté Nationale ) : ix, 62, 66, 169 , public debt ( see also trade ) : 227, 229,
187, 216, 308, 311 , 312 , 313 , 314, 233 , 236, 242-243 , 292 ; domestic,
321-325 ; history, 46, 47 235
political parties ( see also individual public sector ( see also budget; state
parties ) : 159 , 160, 161 , 162 , 173 , enterprises ) : 227–229, 290, 291

398
publishing ( see also press) : 145, 146, Rif Massif : 7, 8, 11 , 13, 15 , 19, 20,
147 21 ; cultural, 72, 74 ; development,
PUM. See Party of Moroccan Unity 259, 305 ; history, 32, 45 ; resistance
movements, 48, 59, 62, 63, 310, 311,
Qadr, Abdul : 42
315 ; society, 76, 113
Quran : 34, 75, 85, 86, 87, 90, 94, 110, Rifi : 72, 76
132 , 151 , 191 , 214 ; schools, 94, 95,
107, 121, 125-126 , 140 riots (see also Casablanca ; students ) :
Meknes ( 1956 ) , 311
Rabat : vii , viii, xiv, 8, 9, 11 , 12, 16, rivers ( see also individual rivers ) :
17, 22 , 28 , 175 , 177, 187 , 188, 323 ; 11 , 12, 13, 15–16, 17
cultural, 72, 94, 97 , 130 , 132, 133 , roads and highways : ix, 223, 259, 277,
140, 141 , 155 ; history, 38 , 46 , 53 , 281–282, 312
54, 58, 143 ; information , 146, 150, Roberto , Holden : 203
151 ; justice, 169, 170, 274, 319 ; Roman Empire : 32–33, 143
population , 26, 79 ; transport, 282, Roosevelt, Franklin D., president of
283, 284 , 285 the U.S.A.: 55, 209
Mulay Rachid, Prince : 165 Royal Air Inter ( RAI ) : ix , 285
radio : ix , 75 , 83, 97, 117, 119, 120 , Royal Air Maroc ( RAM ) : ix, 285,
142, 150, 151-153, 187, 190 ; educa 286, 290, 305
tional, 95, 151–152 ; international, Royal Armed Forces ( Forces Armées
151 , 152, 153 ; propaganda : 65 Royales, FAR ) : ix, 3, 62, 204 , 307,
Radio Maroc. See Moroccan Radio and 308, 312–315, 316, 320 , 323, 325
Television
Royal Charter. See Charter of Public
Radio Tangier International: 151 Liberties
Rahman, Sultan Mulay ( 19th.C) : 42 Royal Gendarmerie : ix, 3, 308, 320,
railways : ix, 223 , 264, 266, 273 , 277 , 323-324
282-283, 301 Royal Guard : 308
Raisuli : 44-45
Royal Military Academy : 189, 310,
Ramadan : 87–88, 94-95 315
Ramadani , Muhammad Tazi Abdela- Royal Military Household : 189
ziz : 155
Royal Moroccan Army : 62, 308
Rashid, Sultan Mulay ( 17th.C ) : 41 rural society : vii, viii, 4, 9, 24, 25,
Red Crescent : 29
27 , 99 , 101 , 110 , 169, 174 , 267,
referenda : 160, 162 , 163 , 170 ; ( 1962 ) , 286 ; administration, 100, 106 ; cul
160 ; ( 1970 ) , 158, 161 , 182, 184-185 tural, 75–76, 137 ; economy, 237,
reform : 47, 48, 56, 158, 168, 175 , 177, 240, 259, 261 , 272, 277, 278 ; educa
192 , 193 , 225 ; agrarian, 81 , 224 , tion , 126 , 259 ; politics, 63, 178, 181 ,
256–257, 301 ; political , 59 ; reli 215 ; population, 71 , 77, 218 ; reli
gious, 52, 53, 94–95, 135, 214 ; social , gion, 85, 91 ; structure, 101-106
31 , 47, 62 , 66 , 179
Regency Council : 59 Saad dynasty ( 1549-1660 ) : 39, 40–41,
religion ( see also Christians and 136 , 143
Christianity; Islam ; reform ): vii, Sabbagh , Muhammed al: 138–139
215 ; freedom of, 85, 95 , 162 Safi : xiv, 17, 22, 26, 177, 252 , 264 ;
repatriation of capital : 299 ; from history, 39 ; transport, 282 , 283
Morocco, 236, 278, 288, 302 ; to Sahara : 10, 14, 17, 202, 206 ; Alge
Morocco, 291 , 292 rian, 8, 9 ; Atlas, 13, 14 ; desert, 7 ;
reptiles : 21 population, 76, 77 ; pre Sahara, 8,
research : 28, 143-145, 201 ; agricul- 11 , 14 ; Spanish, xiv, 8, 10–11 , 17,
ture, 259 ; drama, 142 ; education, 51 , 195 , 208, 263
124, 125 Salafiya : 52 , 53, 94
resident general: 48, 49, 173 salaries. See wages
Rharb Plain : 8, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23, Salé : 38, 41 , 177 ; transport, 282, 284
251 ; Sebou project, 305 sand dunes : 11

399
Sanhaja Berbers : 35, 36, 77 Sous Plain : 8, 14, 20, 21 , 77, 105, 255 ;
sanitation : 26, 28, 52, 273, 325 history , 39, 49 ; River, 17, 22
Sarho Mountain : 14
South Rifian Strait : 14
School of Mines : 127 Soviet Union : 65–66 , 68, 195 , 198,
schools ( see also students ; teachers ; 202, 210, 211 , 262, 293, 303 , 305,
universities ) : vii , 52, 53 , 74 , 83 , 84, 316 ; trade, 263, 264, 284, 296, 298
122, 123–129, 183 ; public, 83, 119, Spain ( see also Spanish rule ) : xiv,
123 , 128 ; private, 83 , 97, 120, 121, 8, 62, 96, 196, 200, 206, 207–208 ,
123 , 124 , 131 , 270 269, 277, 285 ; history, 31 , 33, 34,
Schumann, Maurice : 207 35 , 37, 38, 39, 43 , 45 , 46, 47 , 54, 74,
Sebou River : 11 , 12, 13, 14–15 , 17, 22 ; 77, 135, 139 ; trade, 293, 295, 299
development, 144 Spanish ethnic group : 97, 309
security ( see also police ; riots ; Spanish language : 134 , 151
strikes ) : 3, 186, 195, 311 , 312 ; Spanish rule ( 1912–56 ) ( see also
crime against, 319 Sahara) : vii, 1 , 7, 10, 12, 26, 31 , 47,
Sefriou , Ahmed : 138 48, 51 , 81 , 145 , 146, 168, 198, 207,
Seguiet al Hamra : 10 213, 217, 286, 311 ; movement
Selassie , Haile, emperor of Ethiopia : against, 48, 54-55, 60–61, 62
65 , 199, 312 sports : 112
Senoussi , Abdullah Ben Driss : 94 state enterprises (see also public sec
services, utility : 221, 222, 226, 277, tor) : 217, 223, 227, 228, 229, 233,
291 ; labor, ix, 268, 269, 303 234 , 264, 266, 284
Settat : xiv, 17, 22, 177 steppes : 14 , 19, 25
settlement patterns : 25 strikes : 182, 185 , 274 ; right of, 273
shahadah : 87 students : 119, 120, 123, 169, 189 ;
sharia . See Islamic law music, 141 ; politics / riots, 66–67,
sharif and Sharifian dynasties : 35 , 123 , 181 , 183 , 184, 185, 189, 196,
39-42, 44 , 45 , 85, 90, 92, 93, 100, 215, 216, 309, 314
165 suffrage: 64, 160, 171 , 172 , 175
Sharifian Office of Phosphates (Office Sufi Islam : 37, 38, 39
Cherifien des Phosphates, OCP ) : sugar: viii, 245, 253, 258, 266, 267,
263 , 298 280, 304 ; beet, 253 , 256, 295 ; im
Sharkawi, Mohammed : 182 port, 277, 295, 299
Shenab, Muhammed Ben : 143 sultan, office and duties : 43–44, 47,
Shia Islam : 34, 35 , 86 48, 49, 51 , 57, 60 , 61 , 100, 249 ;
shurfa. See sharif succession, 136
sirocco : 20 Sunni Islam : vii, 34, 35, 39, 86 ; Mali
Siroua : 14 kite rite, 36, 37, 51 , 89
Skhirat Palace : 157, 187, 188, 190 Supreme Court : viii , 78, 164, 170, 171 ,
slave trade : 40, 41 319 ; Constitutional Chamber, 163,
slums ( see also bidonvilles ) : 5 , 99, 170 , 173
268 Sûreté Nationale : ix, 3, 67, 308, 309 ,
321-323 , 325
Social Progress Party ( Progres So
cial, PS ) : 184 Syria : 196, 199, 200, 205
social security : 28–29, 269–270, 271 , Tadla Plain : 12, 13, 16, 17, 25, 251
273 , 274 Tafilalt Plain : 16, 17, 25 ; history, 36,
social welfare ( see also medical serv 39, 40
ices ; social security ) : 27, 28–30 , Tamazight: 72, 76, 151
313 , 317 ; religious , 95 Tan Tan : xiv, 282
socialists and socialism : 179, 181 , Tangier: xiv, 11 , 17, 20, 22, 26, 97,
186, 216 170, 177, 274 , 286, 302 ; cultural , 72,
soils : 12, 20 140 ; history, 32, 39, 41 , 42 , 45, 47,
souk : 25, 106, 107, 115, 277, 278–279 48, 51 , 54, 56, 61 ; information, 150,

400
151 , 153 ; transport, 277, 281 , 282 , 277, 278, 281 , 282, 284, 286,289, 290,
283, 284, 285 301 , 305, 309, 314
Tarfaya : xiv, 10, 61 , 177, 281 , 282 trade ( see also commerce ; export ;
tariff ( see also customs duties ) : 300 ; import ) : 226, 277, 280-281 , 290,
preferential, 225, 297 ; protection, 293 , 300, 303 ; balance /deficit, 277,
223 278, 289–290, 299, 305 ; barter, 261 ;
Tashilhit : 72, 76, 151 domestic, 277, 278–279, 280 ; foreign ,
tax : 80 , 223 , 229, 233-235 ; excise, 206, 212, 223, 228, 277, 278, 294,
233 ; history, 43 , 44, 50, 100 ; incen- 296–298 , 299-300
tives, 222, 259, 288, 302 ; religious, trade unions : 67, 69, 150, 168, 172,
87 181 , 182–183, 184, 185, 216, 246,
Taza : xiv, 14, 177 ; city, 14 , 15 , 282 ; 273-275
cultural, 72 ; history, 33 , 38, 48, 311 , transport ( see also air transport;
312
railways ; roads and highways ) : ix ,
Taza Pass : 8, 12 , 13, 14 12 , 31 , 51 , 217 , 221 , 223 , 224 , 226 ,
Tazi , Muhammad : 137 228, 238, 242, 256, 277, 280, 290,
teachers ( see also universities ) : vii, 291 , 303 , 305 ; labor , ix, 268, 269 ,
72 , 83 , 120, 121 , 122, 123 , 125 , 126 , 273 ; sea , 283–284
128, 129–131 ; foreign, 125 , 130, 144, treaties and agreements (see also in
205, 207, 270 ; training, 123 , 125, dividual treaties ; international com
129-130 mitments ) : 41 , 45, 163–164, 197,
technical education ( see also agricul 198 , 199, 200, 201 , 205 , 208, 209,
ture ) : 66, 119, 120, 123 , 124, 125 , 212 , 285 , 293 , 297, 302 , 310
127–128 , 134, 144, 270, 274, 314 ; Treaty of Fes ( 1969 ) : 10
civil service, 168, 225 Treaty of Lalla Marhnia ( 1845 ) : 10,
telecommunications (see also news
45
papers ; radio; television ): ix, 31, Treaty of Marrakech (1787) : 41
217, 223 , 226 , 286 , 304
Treaty of Meknes ( 1836 ) : 42
television : ix , 119 , 120, 150, 153–154 ,
187 ; educational : 95, 152 tribes ( see also Arabs ; Berbers ) : 38,
Tell Region : 8 71 , 73, 76, 99, 100, 101–106, 110,
Teniet al Sassi : 10
111 , 112 , 113, 174, 178, 257, 262 ,
311 ; nomad, 254
Tensift River : 12, 16, 17, 22
Tessaout River : 16, 17 Tripolitania : 45
Tetouan : xiv, 11 , 15, 17, 22, 26, 151, Tumart, Mohammed bin : 37
177, 274, 282 ; cultural, 72, 132, Tunisia : 7, 65, 196, 197, 200–201, 205,
145 ; history, 39, 48, 51 , 54, 311 298 ; history, 32, 33, 35, 43 ; trans
Tetuán . See Tetouan port, 277, 283 , 286
textiles : viii, 225 , 260, 265 , 266, 267 , UGTM. See Union of Moroccan Work
272, 296 ers
Thawat al Haq : 137
theater : 142-143 ulama : 38, 47, 52, 58, 82, 85, 93, 95,
165
Tichka Pass : 13
timber : 51 Umayyad dynasty : 34, 35, 36, 139
UMT. See Moroccan Labor Union
Tindouf : 10, 68, 197, 312
titles : 40, 88, 91 , 104 unemployment and under employ
Tlemcen : 40, 42 ; conference and ment : ix, 3–4, 9 , 27, 29, 66, 84, 109 ,
treaty, 197 110, 123 , 180, 182, 185 , 186, 216,
topography (see also mountains; 219, 246, 259, 266, 269, 313
rivers ) : vii, 7 UNFP. See National Union of Popu
Torres, Abdel : 54, 55 , 178 lar Forces
Toubkal, peak : 13 Union of Moroccan Workers ( Union
tourists and tourism : 4, 8, 23, 110, Generale des Travailleurs Maro
218, 219, 222, 224, 225 , 226, 245, cains, UGTM ) : 183, 185, 246, 273

401
United Arab Republic : 63, 68, 196, Voice of America : 153
199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 293 Voice of Morocco : 151
United Nations : ix, 5 , 24 , 25 , 60 , 68 ,
144, 195, 200, 202, 203, 209, 210, wages: 69, 185, 274, 292, 302 ; civil
212, 224, 255 ; Development Pro- service, 168, 222 ; controls, 236 ;
gram , 125, 224, 225 , 305 ; Economic military, 316-317, 320 ; minimum,
Commission for Africa, 197 ; Law of 272, 273-274 ; tax, 235
the Sea, 208 water supply : 251 , 280 ; agricultural.
United States of America : 41 , 42, 43, See irrigation ; urban , 15 , 16 , 26
45, 46, 50, 55, 65, 153, 195, 200, wazir: 44, 50, 166
208–210, 263, 285, 286 ; aid, ix, 5, Wazzani , Mohammed : 182
68, 210, 284, 303, 304–305, 316, 318 ; Wazzi, Hassan Ibn Mohammed al :
bases, 63 , 209, 284 ; food program, 135-136
228, 259, 269, 304 ; trade, 298, 296, West Germany. See Federal Republic
297, 301 , 302 of Germany
universities (see also individual uni- wheat : 245, 248, 252, 280–281; import,
versities ) : 52, 132–134, 169 , 183 ; viii, 219, 277, 281 , 290
graduates, 4, 315 ; teachers, 124, wildlife : 21
134 Wilhelm II , Kaiser : 45
University of Rabat : 28, 119, 130, women : 23, 24, 27, 29, 74, 76, 87, 91 ,
132, 133 , 144, 145 92, 95 , 96 , 106, 112, 113 , 114, 115 ,
urban society : vii, viii , 4 , 5 , 9 , 11 , 23 , 116–117 ; associations, 117, 182 ;
26, 27, 52 , 99 , 101 , 140, 153, 154 , education, 96, 128
169, 174, 261 , 286 ; cultural, 75, 76 ; World Bank. See International Bank
for Reconstruction and Develop
economy, 277, 278, 279 ; education , ment
122, 124 ; politics, 63, 66, 178, 215 ,
216 ; population, 77, 80, 96 , 107 ; World War II : 55–56, 256, 310, 314
structure, 106–112
Yata, Ali : 181 , 182, 184
values and traditions: 160, 169 ; Arab / | Yazghi, Mohammed : 185, 186
Islamic, 137, 149, 215 ; educational, Youssoufia : 22, 263, 283
109–110 ; political, 213—216 ; social, youth (see also students ) : 215, 216,
112, 116–117 226 ; movements, 182–184
Vandals, 33 Yusif, Mulay : 47
vegetation ( see also forests and
forestry ) : 11, 12–13 Zanata Berbers : 35, 36, 38, 77
vehicles. See automobiles zinc : 198, 263 , 265, 295, 298
Villa Sanjurjo. See Al Hoceima Ziz River : 7, 16, 17, 22

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