Impact Evaluation

KALAHI-CIDSS
Final Survey
The World Bank Group
in the Philippines
Making Growth
Work for the Poor

May 2011
© 2011 The World Bank Group
July 2011
Printed in the United States.
All rights reserved.

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Standard Disclaimer:

This evaluation was carried out by the Asia-Pacific Policy Center of the Philippines with the technical support
of the World Bank and the financial support of the Millennium Challenge Corporation of the United States of
America. This work would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Government of the Philip-
pines’ Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the excellent field support of Ateneo de
Naga Social Science Research Center, Central Philippine University Social Science Research Institute, and the
Research Institute for Mindanao Culture of Xavier University. The authors of the study are also grateful for the
technical guidance and support of Julien Labonne, the assistance of Alex Glova and the monitoring and evalu-
ation team of DSWD, and the helpful comments from peer reviewers Anne Pizer, Cliff Burkley, Radu Ban and
Robert Chase. Errors and omissions, however, are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Cover photos taken from: http://kalahi.dswd.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_phocagallery

Cover and layout design: Duina Reyes-Bakovic

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Final Survey for the
KALAHI-CIDSS Impact
Evaluation
REVISED FINAL REPORT

Rosemarie Edillon
Sharon Faye Piza
Carlos Abad Santos

with

Regina Baroma
Francis Alan Piza
Donna Mae Odra
Charisse Agorilla
Aiza Villamor
Sharon Fangonon
Jose Rowell Corpuz
Faith Hyacinth Balisacan

May 6, 2011
Table of Contents
Acronyms...................................................................................................5
Executive Summary...................................................................................7
1. Introduction............................................................................................9
2. The KALAHI-CIDSSStrategy...............................................................10
3. Impact Evaluation................................................................................13
3.1 Objectives of the Impact Evaluation.............................................................. 13
3.2 Analytical framework..................................................................................... 13
3.2.1. Household Welfare............................................................................... 13
3.2.2. Some Determinants of Household Welfare.......................................... 13
3.2.3. Channels through which KALAHI-CIDSS can Affect Welfare............... 15
3.3 Research Design............................................................................................ 15
3.4 Survey Instruments........................................................................................ 17
3.5 Limitations of the Study................................................................................. 17
4. Analysis of Project Impacts................................................................19
4.1 KALAHI-CIDSS Accomplishment in Survey Areas........................................ 19
4.1.1. Perceptions on KALAHI-CIDSS............................................................ 20
4.2 Key Evaluation Results.................................................................................. 21
4.2.1. Key Welfare Impacts............................................................................. 21
4.2.2. Access to Basic Services..................................................................... 24
4.2.3. Governance and Social Capital............................................................ 27
4.3 Results from Regression Analysis................................................................. 30
4.3.1. Key Welfare Impacts............................................................................. 31
4.3.2. Access to Basic Services..................................................................... 32
4.3.3. Governance and Social Capital............................................................ 33
5. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................................37
References...............................................................................................39
Annexes....................................................................................................41
Annex 1. Project Coverage Map . ......................................................................... 43
Annex 2. Analytical Methodology.......................................................................... 44
Annex 3. Survey Operations.................................................................................. 48
Annex 4. Additional Results . ................................................................................ 53
Annex 5. List of Analysis Indicators....................................................................... 56

Final Survey  3
List of Figures
Figure 1. KALAHI-CIDSS Project Flow................................................................... 11
Figure 2. Analytical Framework.............................................................................. 14
Annex Figure 1. Project Coverage......................................................................... 44
Annex Figure 2. Member respondent attrition by province.................................... 51

List of Tables
Table 1. KALAHI-CIDSS Coverage by Phase......................................................... 10

Table 2. Types of Subprojects Implemented......................................................... 20

Table 3. Key Welfare Outcome Indicators.............................................................. 22

Table 4. Profile of Employment............................................................................... 23

Table 5. Household Production Practices.............................................................. 23

Table 6. Barangay Access Conditions.................................................................... 24

Table 7. Household Access Conditions (% of households)................................... 25

Table 8. Health Care Satisfaction Rating (% of households)................................. 26

Table 9. School Participation Rates (% of school-age children)............................ 27

Table 10. Number of Visit by Authorities................................................................ 28

Table 11. Trust and Solidarity (% of households)................................................... 29

Table 12. Participation in Barangay Activities (% of households).......................... 29

Table 13. Per Capita Expenditure........................................................................... 32

Table 14. Other Welfare Measures......................................................................... 33

Table 15. Access to Amenities............................................................................... 34

Table 16. Social Capital: Trust................................................................................ 35

Table 17. Participation in Governance................................................................... 36

Annex Table 2. Survey Areas.................................................................................. 48

Annex Table 3 Attrition Rates by Province............................................................. 50

Annex Table 4. Reasons for Attrition...................................................................... 50

Annex Table 5. Welfare Outcome Indicators.......................................................... 53

Annex Table 6. Additional Results - Profile of Employment................................... 54

Annex Table 7. Additional Results - Barangay Access Conditions........................ 54

Annex Table 8. Additional Results - Participation in Barangay Activities . ............ 55

4  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Acronyms
ARMM The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

CDD Community-Driven Development

CEAC Community Empowerment Activity Cycle

DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development

IPC Institute of Philippine Culture

KALAHI-CIDSS Kapit-Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive

and Integrated Delivery of Social Services

LGC Local Government Code

LGUs Local Government Units

MIBF Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

NSCB National Statistical Coordination Board

Final Survey  5
6  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS
Executive Summary

T
he KALAHI-CIDSS project was set up suggesting that households and locally elected
in 2002 to alleviate rural poverty. The officials in targeted municipalities see value
project seeks to achieve this by providing in the KALAHI-CIDSS approach. About 80
resources to poor rural municipalities for invest- percent of households in treated municipalities
ment in public goods and by reviving local insti- indicated being aware of the project. Three in
tutions for people’s participation in governance. every five expressed their satisfaction with the
KALAHI-CIDSS is targeted at the poorest 25 project. Elected local officials also view the
percent of municipalities in 42 of the poorest project in a positive light; 75 percent of LGU
provinces in the Philippines. As of December officials indicated they were satisfied with the
2010, the project had covered 4,583 barangays1 project. Respondents identify infrastructure
in 200 municipalities and supported 5,645 sub- improvement, better access to services, and
projects, worth PHP 5.7 billion; and benefiting community empowerment as project benefits.
about 1.26 million households. Participating Feedback from barangays that were not priori-
communities follow very detailed participatory tized (i.e., did not receive subproject financing)
processes, repeated three times in each partici- during the Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum
pating municipality, to secure resources for in- (MIBF) was more negative.
vestments in public goods.
The project had a positive impact on house-
A rigorous impact evaluation was designed in hold consumption. Specifically, per capita
2003 to evaluate project impacts on poverty consumption increased by about 5 percent as a
reduction, social capital, empowerment, and result of the project. Those impacts are stronger
governance. Quantitative data were collected for households that were classified as poor in
on about 2,000 households in 135 barangays 2003 and for households living in barangays
in 2003, 2006, and 2010. Data were gathered that received one or more subprojects. This is
on a broad range of indicators from a sample consistent with the view that long-term impacts
of KALAHI-CIDSS municipalities and from will require sustained efforts and both social
comparable municipalities that did not receive and physical investment.
project support. Similarly, qualitative data were
collected in a subsample of 20 barangays in Additional survey findings on household em-
2005 and 2010. This report presents results from ployment and marketing suggest how these
the quantitative component of the evaluation. positive impacts came about. First, the project
led to a 4-percentage point increase in labor
Available data indicate that participation force participation compared to what would have
rates in project activities are relatively high, happened otherwise. Second, the survey found
that households in KALAHI-CIDSS communi-
1 A barangay is the lowest administrative unit in the ties diversified their sources of income: they are
Philippines; corresponding to a village. now slightly more likely to be working in more

Final Survey  7
than one sector. Third, the positive impacts might an increase in secondary school and college en-
come from improved production practices. In rollment, but, surprisingly, to a small decline in
addition, while farmers are less likely to engage elementary school enrollment. However, given
in multi-cropping as a result of the project, they the relatively small amount of investments in
appear more likely to sell their produce. school buildings in the barangays sampled for
the impact evaluation, this correlation might not
The project led to improvements in basic be a result of the project.
service delivery. First, the proportion of
households visiting a health facility when sick The project also had positive impacts on a
increased. This change seems to be driven number of social capital and barangay gover-
by an increase in the use of public barangay nance outcomes, which have been shown to be
health stations compared to private hospitals important determinants of household welfare.
and clinics. Second, the project had a positive
Consistent with the project development objec-
impact on accessibility. Specifically, a 6-per-
tive, KALAHI-CIDSS led to an increase in par-
centage point increase in the proportion of
ticipation in barangay assemblies, associated
households whose house is accessible year-
with greater knowledge about the barangay’s
round can be attributed to the project. Third, the
project had a small positive impact on access income and expenses. In addition, the project
to level 2 and level 3 water systems.2 However, led to increased organizational membership,
given the relatively large nature of water invest- as well as improved trust levels. Surprisingly,
ment in the sample municipalities, this impact however, the project had a negative impact on
appears limited. The impacts on access to safe the proxy used for collective action. It is unclear
water are slightly larger but still limited. Fourth, whether this last result is driven by a decrease
project implementation appears to have led to in households’ willingness to contribute to such
activities, or by a decrease in the need for col-
lective action. Those impacts are less dependent
2 In the Philippines, a level 2 water system consists
on the barangay being prioritized, suggesting a
of a piped water system with a communal water point
(e.g. stand-pipe). A level 3 water system introduces greater role for social preparation in determin-
private water points (e.g. house connection). ing impacts on local dynamics.

8  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

1. Introduction

T
he Kapit-Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan- A rigorous impact evaluation was designed in
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery 2003 to evaluate project impacts on poverty
of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) reduction, social capital, empowerment, and
project was set up in 2002 as the flagship an- governance. Quantitative data were collected
tipoverty project of the government of the on about 2,000 households in 135 barangays in
Philippines. The project aims to achieve its 2003, 2006, and 2010. Data were gathered on
poverty-reduction goals by providing resources a broad range of indicators from a sample of
to poor rural municipalities for investment in KALAHI-CIDSS municipalities and of compa-
public goods. The project also aims to revive rable municipalities that did not receive project
local institutions for people’s participation in support. Similarly, qualitative data were col-
governance. The project adopts a Community- lected in a subsample of 20 barangays in 2005
Driven Development (CDD) strategy and is now and 2010. This report presents results from the
one of the three pillars of the convergent social quantitative component. Results from the quali-
protection programs under the Social Welfare and tative component of the impact evaluation are
Development Reform Agenda of the Department available separately (IPC 2010).
of Social Welfare and Development.
The report is organized as follows. Section
As of December 2010, the project had covered 2 provides background information on the
4,583 barangays in 200 municipalities and sup- project strategy and implementation proce-
ported 5,645 subprojects, of which 93 percent dures. Section 3 discusses the impact evaluation
had been completed. These subprojects are design. Section 4 presents the results, and
worth PHP 5.72 billion and benefit about 1.2 Section 5 concludes. More detailed information
million households. Participating communities on the evaluation and the analytical methodol-
follow very detailed participatory processes, ogy, as well as additional results, are available
repeated three times in each participating mu in Annexes 1–5.
nicipality, to secure resources for public good
investments.

Final Survey  9
2. The KALAHI-CIDSS
Strategy
T
he goal of KALAHI-CIDSS is to reduce a poverty ranking methodology developed by
poverty through community empower- Balisacan, Edillon, and Ducanes (2002). A map
ment and improved local governance, as of project coverage is available in Annex 1.
well as through investments in basic social and
economic infrastructure and services. The KALAHI-CIDSS project is implemented in
phases. Table 1 shows the coverage and duration
The beneficiaries of KALAHI-CIDSS are among of each phase. Each phase benefits from lessons
the poorest of the poor. The project works in learned in previous phases, particularly with
42 of the poorest provinces in the country and, respect to implementation strategies.
within these provinces, the poorest 25 percent
of municipalities.3 The choice of provinces is As of December 2010, a total of 5,645 sub-
based on poverty incidence as computed by the projects had been financed in 4,583 barangays
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), for a total KALAHI grant value of PHP 5.72
while the choice of municipalities is based on billion. The project operates in 200 out of 1,512

Table 1. KALAHI-CIDSS Coverage by Phase

Phase/Duration Municipalities Barangays

I (January 2003–June 2006) 11 201

II (June 2003–December 2006) 56 1,291

III-A (October 2004–December 2007) 34 883

III-B (January
3 Concerns about 2006–December 2008)
the capacity of regional DSWD 29 727
offices to cover a large number of municipalities pre-
IV (August
vented 2006–July
the program 2009)the poorest mu-
from targeting 54 1,127
nicipalities regardless of their province of origin. In
KC 1a Extension
addition, decision was(February
made not 2010–May
to implement2011)
the 16 354
project in ARMM. A similar project, the ARMM Social
Fund,Total
was implemented instead. 200 4,583
Source: KALAHI-CIDSS Progress Report (Fourth quarter 2010).

3 Concerns about the capacity of regional DSWD addition, a decision was made not to implement the
offices to cover a large number of municipalities pre- project in ARMM. A similar project, the ARMM Social
vented the program from targeting the poorest mu- Fund, was implemented instead.
nicipalities regardless of their province of origin. In

10  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

municipalities in the Philippines. Financed sub- 3) Subproject prioritization
projects can be classified into five main groups:
(1) basic access infrastructure, including roads, 4) Subproject implementation.
footpaths, bridges, culverts, and access trails; An additional stage, transition, occurs between
(2) basic social services, including community implementation and social preparation for the
water systems, barangay health stations, school next cycle. Part of the transition is the imple-
buildings, daycare centers, electrification, and mentation of a community-based evaluation.
housing/shelter; (3) environmental protec- Here the residents assess their participation in
tion and conservation, including flood control,
the project and the changes that resulted from
drainage, sea walls, artificial coral reef sanc-
this participation. Another critical activity in this
tuaries, and sanitation facilities; (4) common
stage is accountability review and reporting. In
service facilities, including final-harvest facili-
this activity, community volunteers and baran-
ties and other community enterprises; and (5)
gay and municipal LGU officials review and
capacity building and skills training. The project
report on their adherence to the project imple-
provides resources to the beneficiary munici-
mentation principles.
palities for three subproject investment cycles.
A cycle follows a four-stage process, known as
KALAHI-CIDSS Community Empowerment Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) also is a key
Activity Cycle (CEAC). The main stages of the feature of the project. In addition to the activities
process are as follows: carried out during the transition stage, there is an
internal M&E system, a number of localized—
but externally conducted—process evaluations,
1) Social preparation
and a more comprehensive and externally con-
2) Subproject identification and ducted impact evaluation. The M&E component
conceptualization aims to determine how well KALAHI-CIDSS

Figure 1. KALAHI-CIDSS Project Flow

Community-Based Accountability Review

Evaluation and Reporting

Transition Municipal
Implementing of Orientation
O&M Plan
Barangay
Implementing Orientation (BA)
Implementing SP and O&M Social
of SP and M&E
Plan and M&E Preparation
PSA
Stage
Pre-Implementing
Workshop Community
Consultation (BA)

MIBF-MDC
Engagements Criteria Setting
Workshop (MBF)

MIBF-EC Review of Project

Pending Proposals Identification, Project Development
Selection, and Workshop
Project Approval Planning
Community Stage Stage Preparation of
Consultations (BA)
Detailed Proposals

Prioritization and
Approval of Community Consultation
Proposals(MIBF) (BA)

MIAC Technical
Community Review of Proposals
Consultations

Source: Field Guide for KALAHI-CIDSS Area Coordinating Teams (2007).

Final Survey  11
has achieved its objectives and to generate in- Each stage of the CEAC process has a set of rel-
sights and lessons learned to inform the design evant activities, as shown in Figure 1. In gen-
of poverty reduction projects in the future. eral, the first cycle can be completed in 12 to 14
months4 for communities new to the KALAHI-
Participating municipalities receive a per-cycle CIDSS process. Subsequent cycles tend to take
grant equivalent to PHP 300,000 for each baran- less time.5
gay. The barangay allocations are determined
through a competitive process, the Municipal
Inter-Barangay Forum (MIBF), step 3 above. As
a result, while some barangays do not receive 4 According to DSWD, before implementation in
any subproject in the three cycles, some of them the Phase 3 area, a project cycle takes 14 months
might be prioritized more than once. Criteria to be completed. Subsequent cycles often take less
against which to rank subproject proposals are time—from 8 to 10 months.
developed by the communities themselves and 5 From interview with Ms. Consuelo Acosta, SOW
tend to emphasize poverty concerns. III of the DSWD.

12  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

3. Impact Evaluation

3.1 Objectives of the Impact means, outcomes, and even perception of one’s
state of well-being. There is a strong relation-
Evaluation ship between and among these three dimen-
sions. Deprivation in means (income or source
A set of general objectives were established at of livelihood) will result in poor outcomes (in-
the start of the impact evaluation. These are the cluding poor health and nutrition, poor housing
following: conditions, low educational attainment of family
members) unless the family is able to procure
1) To evaluate the extent to which poverty publicly provided goods and services. Poor out-
is reduced in the target municipalities comes will result in a perception of being poor.
2) To evaluate the extent to which com-
munities have been empowered and 3.2.2. Some Determinants of Household
governance has been improved Welfare

3) To examine the process by which pov- The most direct determinants of household
erty has been reduced. welfare are household decisions regarding pro-
duction and consumption. Decisions on produc-
These objectives were maintained in each of the tion involve the use of potential labor supply
survey rounds of the evaluation, while specific
and other household assets, (e.g., land, financial
objectives were also set.
assets, future earnings and credit, if available).
Decisions on consumption govern the allocation
3.2 Analytical framework of the family budget for food and nonfood items,
medical care, higher education, and improve-
The design of the survey is based on the analyti- ments in housing, for example. In rural areas,
cal framework, first discussed in Balisacan et al. where subsistence farming is prevalent, produc-
(2000) and subsequently modified to consider tion and consumption factors and decisions are
KALAHI-CIDSS interventions. Figure 2 illus- often intertwined.
trates this framework.
A host of factors influence household decisions
3.2.1. Household Welfare on production and consumption. First, the avail-
ability of adequate market infrastructure and
The evaluation adopted a comprehensive defi- quality public services such as roads, irrigation
nition of household welfare and poverty. It en- facilities, public schools, and health centers
compasses several dimensions: deprivation in should lead to improved household welfare.

Final Survey  13
Figure 2. Analytical Framework

Build-up of Social Capital

P ublicly-
provided
sevices

Good Gover n an ce
E m power m en t

Ho useho ld H H ear ned

pro ductio n income

Expenditure C onsumption

N et Transfers
Reso urce o f
the Ho useho ld: Outcomes:
(Q/ Q), Physical, P erception
of H ealth,
F inancial, Education,
Human capital well- being
Quality of Life

S HOCK S

Market infraestructure/P ublic

Rules/ Institutio ns /P olicies services
Tr ade, pr ice, cred it policies Transport and communications
Pro per ty r ig hts, ag r arian relations peace and order
Investments and labor policies Other facilities and infrastructure
Investments

Second, available evidence indicates that social in Tanzania, found that “groups with a greater
capital is an important determinant of household number of activities and maturity are more likely
welfare.6 The build-up of social capital benefits to have improved marketing performance.”
the individual directly. It has been shown that
farmers with higher social capital are more likely Finally, governance practices at the local level
to adopt modern (new) technology (Narayan are also important determinants of household
and Prichett 1997; Edillon 2010). Some types welfare. Indeed, with the enactment of the Local
of social capital also facilitate technology diffu- Government Code (LGC) in 1991, the respon-
sion, and hence learning. Bridging social capital sibility of providing many public goods and
has been credited as an effective strategy to “get services has been devolved to Local Government
ahead” (Putnam 2000). Barham and Chitemi Units (LGUs), along with the fiscal resources
(2009), looking at smallholder farmer groups and the ability to raise local taxes.7 However,
gains from decentralization might not materi-
alize in areas where accountability is weak, as
6 The social capital of the individual is defined as
the resources that can be mobilized from interper- local officials might not respond to their con-
sonal relationships based on trust or the desire to stituents’ needs. Given that both informal and
maintain a trust relationship (Edillon 2010). On the
other hand, the social capital of a society is defined
as “the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes
and values that govern interactions among people 7 However, there have been reports coming from
and contribute to economic and social development” the LGUs themselves that the devolved resources are
(World Bank 1998). not commensurate to the devolved responsibilities.

14  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

formal institutions matter for local governance 3.3 Research Design
and the difficulty in distinguishing between the
two empirically, results on social capital and
The impact evaluation followed a time series
governance will be reported jointly.
control group design, with baseline, midterm,
and final endline surveys conducted in treatment
3.2.3. Channels through which KALAHI-
and comparison municipalities. The treatment
CIDSS can affect Welfare
group consisted of beneficiary municipalities,
while the comparison group was chosen from
There are at least three channels through which municipalities within the same sample prov-
the KALAHI-CIDSS project can influence
inces with similar characteristics to the treat-
household welfare. First, the project provides
ment municipalities, but not receiving project
resources for investment in public goods. This
support.8 Given that the evaluation was not part
should lead to improved infrastructure at the
of the original project design, alternative evalu-
local level, which should translate into improved
ation designs (such as random assignment) were
household welfare. The demand-driven nature of
ruled out. The treatment municipalities were
subproject selection should ensure that selected
drawn from among the poorest quartile munici-
subprojects respond to local needs.
palities in the beneficiary provinces supported
under Phase III-A of the project. In this way,
Second, KALAHI-CIDSS uses innovative strat-
it is expected that these areas would have ben-
egies of participatory planning, implementation
efited from lessons learned from early phases of
and management of local development activities.
project implementation.
These improve the capabilities of beneficiaries
to identify subprojects that are catalytic to local
Project implementation in Phase III-A munici-
development. More importantly, these strategies
are expected to build up social capital at both the palities started in October 2004. The sample
individual and community levels. provinces were chosen to represent the distribu-
tion of beneficiaries by island group: Albay in
Luzon, Capiz in Visayas, and Zamboanga del Sur
Third, KALAHI-CIDSS promotes good gov-
and Agusan del Sur in Mindanao. In addition,
ernance. First, the quality of governance is
in two of the provinces (Albay and Agusan del
improved by the introduction of systems and pro-
Sur) qualitative data were collected in 2005
cedures (on subproject proposal and approval,
bidding and procurement, and financial manage- and 2010.
ment) that encourage transparency, people’s par-
ticipation, accountability, and the like. Second, Available information indicates that the control
governance is also improved by having an em- group provides credible estimates of what would
powered constituency that knows what they have happened in the treatment municipalities
need and knows how to demand it. This way, in the absence of the project. Given the strict
governance structures would be encouraged to poverty targeting procedures used by the project,
become more responsive to the needs of their control municipalities are slightly richer than the
constituencies. The project procedures are con- treatment municipalities but appear similar along
sistent with the LGC, which includes several other dimensions (Chase and Holmemo 2006).
provisions that are intended to promote commu-
nity participation in local governance through The key identifying assumption in the impact
the appointment of civil society representatives evaluation is that, without the project, the two
to local development councils. This provides the
venue through which the needs of marginalized 8 Refer to Chase and Holmemo (2005) for a de-
and underserved constituencies can be consid- tailed discussion of the methodology used to select
ered by the political leadership. the control municipalities.

Final Survey  15
groups of municipalities (treatment and com- The final, endline, project evaluation started
parison) would have evolved similarly. While three years after the completion of the midterm
it is impossible to test this hypothesis directly, assessment. Data collection began on the last
it is possible to test if prior to the project the week of February 2010 in Albay, Capiz, and
two groups evolved similarly; this is the so- Zamboanga del Sur. Operations in Agusan del
called “parallel trend” hypothesis. Rejection of Sur followed a month later due to peace and
the parallel trend hypothesis would cast doubts security conditions. The survey was completed
on the validity of our estimation strategy. As within a month in the first three provinces, and
indicated in Annex 2, we attempted to test the in Agusan del Sur by the third week of April.
parallel trend hypothesis. The results provide The differing time periods during the year when
convincing evidence that control and treatment the baseline, midterm and endline surveys were
municipalities would have evolved similarly conducted created some problems with time-
over the period covered by our data had the varying indicators and questions.12
project not been implemented.
By the time the final survey was conducted, all
The baseline survey was conducted in the fall the subprojects had been implemented and most
of 2003.9 The baseline covered a total of 2,400 of them had been completed for more than a
households in 132 barangays in the four prov- year and a half.13 As such, the endline evaluation
inces. There were two treatment and two control captured longer-term impacts than most evalu-
municipalities in each province. The same house- ations which tend to have smaller time frames.
holds were interviewed during the midterm and As a result, measured impacts are more likely to
endline surveys, except for those lost to attri- be sustained. About two-thirds of the treatment
tion. The midterm survey was conducted from barangays received funding for their proposed
October to December 2006.10 11 subprojects.

The evaluation was designed to estimate the

impacts of the KALAHI-CIDSS intervention as
9 In 2005, however, the Spanish Agency for In-
ternational Cooperation (AEIC) funded one cycle of a whole. However, it is also possible to compare
KALAHI-CIDSS implementation in Malinao, which is changes in barangays that were and were not
originally the control municipality corresponding to prioritized (i.e., received subproject investments
Pio Duran. To address the disruption in the evalua- funding), but those results are more tentative.
tion study, the municipality of Oas was selected as a
replacement and a baseline survey was conducted in
Some of the pre-project differences between
this new control municipality in 2005 . The replace- the two sets of barangays could also affect the
ment of Malinao as one of the control municipalities outcomes of interest.
in Albay increased the number of barangays covered
to 135. The methodology for selecting Oas is fully
discussed in the final report of the supplementary
Previous impact evaluations suggested that CDD
data collection (APPC 2006). projects might affect poor and non-poor house-
10 Except in Agusan del Sur, where it was extended
holds differently (Voss 2008). In light of those
to January 2007 because of peace and order condi- findings and the lack of evidence on the gender
tions.
11 As of the completion of the midterm survey, the
treatment municipalities had already completed the
12 Adjustments were made to the questionnaire to
first cycle and the second cycle was ongoing. In all
maintain the same reference period for time-varying
provinces except Zamboanga del Sur, only one in
indicators. This entailed asking for the information
three sample barangays proceeded to subproject
implementation toward the end of 2005. The other pertaining to the current quarter, and then for the
same information pertaining to the previous quarter.
barangays were not prioritized, meaning that their
proposed subprojects were not funded in the first 13 Three-fourths of the projects were completed
cycle. In Zamboanga del Sur, two out of three sample by 2008, while the rest were completed by June
barangays were among the prioritized barangays. 2009.

16  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

impacts of development projects in the Philip- hold, barangay, and municipality).14 The ques-
pines, the team decided to carry out subgroup tionnaires are available in Chase and Holmemo
analyses. To reduce concerns about data mining, (2005).
the choice of subgroup analyses to be carried
out was made prior to the endline data being 3.5 Limitations of the Study
available. Further, all disaggregated results (pre-
project poverty levels and gender) are reported The analysis presented in this report is bound
either in the main text or in Annex 4. by a number of limitations. These are due to
factors beyond the control of the evaluators and
3.4 Survey Instruments could have not been remedied ex ante within the
existing budget. Following are the factors that
The survey instruments used were extensively may affect the analysis.
field-tested before the baseline survey, and nec-
Only about two-thirds of the sixty-six treatment
essary adjustments were made before each addi-
barangays in the survey areas received funding
tional survey. The instruments were designed to
for subproject implementation. This proportion
capture information on the following indicators
is lower than the figure for the entire group of
(cf. Annex 4):
Phase III-A provinces, where about 80 percent
■■ poverty indicators, including means, of barangays in KALAHI-CIDSS municipali-
ties received at least one subproject. Most of the
outcomes, and the perception of well-
treatment barangays surveyed that had received
being
subproject funding had undertaken a single cycle
of subproject implementation. Eight of these ba-
■■ social capital indicators, including in- rangays received funding for two subprojects.
dicators on groups and networks, collec-
tive action, social inclusion, and infor- Common to all CDD operations, KALAHI-
mation and communication CIDSS finances a number of different subproj-
ects that are likely to affect different dimen-
■■ governance and empowerment indica- sions of household welfare. Indeed, one would
tors, iincluding indicators measuring not expect similar impacts for a farm-to-mar-
transparency, participation, accountabil- ket road and for a school building. As a result,
ity, responsiveness and flexibility, conti- project impacts are diluted over a broad range
nuity and sustainability, and compliance, of outcome indicators. Further, due to limited
consistency and rule of law. sample size, no attempts were made to distin-
guish impacts by types of subprojects.
In addition to these indicators, questions that
capture the extent of participation in KALAHI- The attrition of the panel household may also in-
CIDSS activities were added to the midterm
survey. For the final survey, some additional 14 The same questionnaires were used for treat-
questions were included, especially those of op- ment and control municipalities. The only differences
erational relevance to the Department of Social were that a small module on KALAHI-CIDSS imple-
Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the mentation was included in treatment areas. The re-
lated questions were placed at the end of the ques-
World Bank for implementing similar programs tionnaire to avoid bias associated with beneficiaries
in the future. knowing that the data were being used to estimate
KALAHI-CIDSS impacts. The questionnaires were
finalized after extensive consultations with the De-
Three sets of questionnaires were utilized, each partment of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
one for a different type of respondent (house- and the World Bank.

Final Survey  17
fluence results. Households dropping out of the cannot be remedied globally by simply adjust-
sample—mainly due to migration or death—at ing the weights. Instead, the correction should
any point in the duration of the study cannot be be outcome-specific. Addressing this concern,
avoided.15 If this attrition is not random across the however, is beyond the scope of this report,
treatment and control groups, failure to account although the limitation is recognized. Initial
for it could yield biased estimates. As pointed results suggest that such attrition is unlikely to
out by Baulch and Quisumbing (2010), attrition significantly bias the results, as the levels and
determinants of attrition do not appear to differ
15 See Annex 3 for a full discussion on attrition between the control and treatment groups.

18  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

4. Analysis of
Project Impacts

T
his section assesses changes in key in- subprojects. Available evidence indicates that
dicators in our survey areas over time. poorer barangays and barangays with a higher
Only households interviewed in all three participation in barangay assemblies prior to
survey rounds (baseline, midterm, and final) subproject implementation were more likely to
residing in the same barangays are included. be prioritized (Labonne and Chase 2009).

The discussion begins with a description of the The choice of subprojects implemented in recip-
project accomplishments in the survey areas ient barangays corresponds to the most pressing
(Section 4.1). Also included are perceptions
needs, as identified by the community members
of households and local government officials
in the respective localities. The profile of
regarding KALAHI-CIDSS. Then the project
subprojects is summarized in Table 2. About
outcomes are presented according to the frame-
work for analyzing household welfare outcomes 33 percent of the subprojects funded are roads
discussed in the previous section. The differ- and 24 percent are community water systems.
ences in project outcomes between treatment Other preferred subprojects are pre- and final-
and control areas over time are tested, first using production facilities, health stations, daycare
tests of comparisons of means (Section 4.2), and centers, and school buildings. This corresponds
then through regression analysis for a selected favorably to the problems identified by respon-
set of indicators (Section 4.3). dents during the baseline survey (Labonne and
Chase 2009).
4.1 KALAHI-CIDSS
Accomplishment in Individual subproject costs varied from Php
400,000 to Php 3.8 million (about $8,400 to
Survey Areas $80,00016). The most costly are road subproj-
ects, which average Php 2 million per subproj-
The implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS in the
ect.17 In the survey areas, most of these road
evaluation areas started in October 2004, about a
subprojects were for the rehabilitation of farm-
year after the baseline survey was conducted. In
the initial cycle, eighteen barangays in the treat- to-market roads. The water system subprojects
ment areas were given funding to implement were all level 2 systems, with an average cost
their respective subprojects. Fourteen barangays
were prioritized in the second cycle and another 16 All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless other-
eighteen in the third cycle. Overall, about two- wise indicated.
thirds of the sixty-six treatment barangays in the 17 Implementing LGUs share a 30 percent counter-
survey areas were recipients of KALAHI-CIDSS part of the total cost

Final Survey  19
Table 2. Types of Subprojects Implemented

Subproject Types #of barangays that implemented

Road (average 1.695km) 18

Water System 13

Pre- and Post-Production Facility 7

Health Station 5

Daycare Center 4

School 2
Economic/Livelihood Support (Trading
2
Center, Market, Mini Port/Wharf)
Foot/Small Bridges 1
Drainage Structures (Culverts, Overflow,
1
Spillway)
Electrification 1

Source: : KALAHI-CIDSS monitoring data.

of Php 1.6 million.18 Most of these subprojects stages, while 31 percent participated in the
were constructed after the midterm survey was subproject implementation stage. The majority
conducted (about 62 percent). By June 2009, of those participating in the early stages were
all of the subprojects covered in cycle 3 were women (about 62 percent), while the men partic-
completed. ipated or were involved in the later stages. These
volunteers devoted 2.5 hours of their time during
4.1.1. Perceptions on KALAHI-CIDSS the preparatory stage and about 9 hours (among
men) during the construction of the subprojects.
Among the households in the sample treat-
ment barangays, 80 percent were aware of the Three in every five households interviewed ex-
project, and some of them participated directly pressed their satisfaction with KALAHI-CIDSS.
in subproject implementation (for example, as The ratio is higher among barangay LGU offi-
volunteers).19 About 65 percent indicated they cials, where three in every four officials were
participated in the preparatory and planning satisfied. When asked about the benefits of
KALAHI-CIDSS, the most recurrent respons-
es were infrastructure improvement and better
access to services. Among barangay officials,
18 In the Philippines, a level 2 water system is de-
fined as one that pipes water from the source to a
community empowerment was also frequently
communal distribution point such as a stand-pipe. noted. While there was also negative feed-
19 Households were also asked about their aware-
back about the project, this was mostly among
ness of the KALAHI-CIDSS grievance redress sys- barangays that were not prioritized for subproj-
tem; only 18 percent knew of the system. ect funding.

20  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

4.2 Key Evaluation Results by 5 percent.21 Conversely, among the non-poor
households, the increase was lower in the treat-
ment group by 2 percent.
Double-difference estimates of project impacts
are computed by comparing the value of the
In addition, we looked at the non-food share of
difference between the treatment and control expenditures, which is arguably a good measure
group in the variables of interest at final with of welfare. The idea is that the poorer the house-
the baseline value of the difference. These esti- hold, the smaller their share of non-food con-
mates capture longer-term impacts, rather than sumption. Consistent with the above findings on
the short-term impacts that tend to be the fo- consumption, the project had a positive impact
cus of evaluations. Key results are presented in on the share of non-food expenditures. A 1.4
the main text below, with additional results in percentage-point increase can be attributed to
Annex 4. the project, or 4.5 percent of the baseline value.

The double differences were subjected to tests of Consistent with nationwide trends, poverty inci-
statistical significance. The results are reported dence22 has decreased from baseline to end line
in the tables as a string of either “+” or “-“. A in both treatment and control groups. Double-
positive sign indicates a positive project impact. difference estimates indicate that the project
The number of plus signs indicates the level of contributed an additional 0.4 percentage points
significance at which the hypothesis is rejected to the decrease. The small decline in poverty in-
cidence—despite the size of the impacts on per
(“+” rejected at 10 percent, “++” rejected at 5
capita consumption—seems to suggest that the
percent, and “+++” rejected at 1 percent) On
impacts were greater for households at the bottom
the other hand, a minus sign indicates a negative
of the wealth distribution. Despite evidence of
project impact. improvements in welfare outcomes, the inci-
dence of self-rated poverty has decreased only
4.2.1. Key Welfare Impacts slightly in both treatment and control groups.
Moreover, the decrease was more pronounced in
In this section, we look at the impacts of the control group, by 1.8 percentage points.
KALAHI-CIDSS on key welfare outcomes.
Specifically, we start by looking at the impacts We now look at project impacts on labor force
on per capita consumption and then move on to participation and production practices. The ra-
impacts on labor force participation and produc- tionale is that positive impacts on labor force
tion practices. participation and production practices could
explain the positive impacts on per capita con-
As indicated in Table 3, the project led to a 5 sumption.
percent increase in per capita consumption.20
This is in addition to the increase that occurred in Labor participation rates have decreased from
the control group between 2003 and 2010. If we their previous levels in both control and treat-
distinguish households by their initial poverty ment areas (Table 4). This is likely to be due
to the negative impacts of the global financial
status, we observe that among poor households,
crisis. Importantly, however, the decline is less
the increase was higher in the treatment group
marked in KALAHI-CIDSS areas. Specifically,

20 We use the natural logarithm. Extreme values

21 A household is classified as poor in 2003 if their
unnecessarily pull averages and may mask the actual
per capita expenditures at baseline were lower than
changes of pooled estimates. By using the natural
the official regional poverty line.
logarithm, the double-difference can be interpreted
as percent difference between the two groups. 22 Computed using published poverty lines.

Final Survey  21
Table 3. Key Welfare Outcome Indicators

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 2003 vs 2010

Annual per capita expenditure ( in 2010 prices)

Full Sample 9.51 9.76 9.82 9.67 9.90 9.93 0.05 +++

Among households classified as poor in

9.15 9.56 9.45 9.25 9.65 9.50 0.05 +++
2003
Among households classified as non-poor
10.04 10.05 10.06 10.12 10.16 10.16 -0.02 - - -
in 2003

Nonfood share to total expenditure 33.0 43.0 41.6 37.2 45.1 44.4 1.4 +++

Annual water expenditure (in 2010 prices) 6.04 6.58 7.25 6.30 6.65 6.75 0.75 +++

Annual transportation expenditure (in 2010

7.53 7.93 7.82 7.91 8.08 8.00 0.20 +++
prices)
Non-poor (expenditure-based incidence), %
40.5 57.6 60.2 48.1 67.1 67.4 0.4 +++
of households

Self-rated non-poor, % of households 29.0 31.0 31.5 32.2 38.1 36.6 -1.8 - - -

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively;
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively;
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Household questionnaire.

available data indicate that the project increased livestock production, and fishing). However, we
labor force participation by 4 percentage points observed a steady decline over the past seven
compared with what would have happened in years, more so among treatment households.
the absence of the project. The impact is even At baseline, 78 percent of households in treat-
stronger for women, with a 5.8 percentage ment areas were engaged in crop farming. This
point increase in labor force participation when has decreased by about 15 percentage points in
compared with the counterfactual. the final survey. The drop is also significant in
the number of households raising livestock and
In addition, the employment profile had become poultry (about 13 percentage points). This ob-
more diverse in the treatment group at final sur- servation is consistent with the increasing diver-
vey. We observed an increase in the proportion sity of employment pointed out earlier.
of households, with workers employed in more
than one sector in our treatment group (2 percent- The survey found a significant increase in the
age point difference from baseline). This implies number of agricultural households in treatment
that beneficiary households now have access to areas that were marketing their produce. That
more employment opportunities. In the control is, there is a movement away from subsistence
group, the proportion has decreased between the farming and toward integration in local markets.
baseline and final surveys. Among those engaged in crop farming, the in-
crease of those selling their produce is 14 per-
As seen in Table 5, a majority of households were centage points higher in treatment versus control
engaged in agricultural activities (crop farming, areas. For those households engaged in fishing,

22  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Table 4. Profile of Employment

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Labor Force Participation Rate

All 70.5 72.4 67.2 73.6 75.0 66.1 4.3 +++

Male 93.5 90.6 88.5 92.7 90.9 84.4 3.2 +++

Female 44.5 51.4 43.6 53.1 57.8 46.4 5.8 +++

Employment rate (% of those in labor force)

All 98.8 97.8 99.0 98.4 96.8 98.6 0.1 +++

Male 99.3 98.2 99.1 98.6 97.7 98.7 -0.3 - - -

Female 97.5 97.0 98.6 98.2 95.2 98.3 0.9 +++

Heterogeneity: HH members employed in >

24.3 28.3 26.3 31.9 31.9 30.2 3.6 +++
1 sector

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Household questionnaire.

Table 5. Household Production Practices

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Crop farming and gardening

Engaged in crop farming 78.4 73.2 63.8 64.5 61.4 56.8 -6.9 --

Practices multi-cropping 34.7 25.4 26.6 31.2 28.3 28.5 -5.5 --

of which, % sold their produce 64.1 72.9 79.9 80.2 83.9 82.1 14.0 ++

Livestock and poultry

Engaged in livestock and poultry 82.8 80.2 69.2 74.5 71.2 62.7 -1.8 --

of which, % sold their produce 45.1 43.3 46.5 57.4 43.2 47.6 11.2 ++

Fishing

Engaged in fishing 24.3 28.3 26.3 31.9 31.9 30.2 -2.1 --

of which, % sold their produce 30.7 34.4 56.9 52.1 44.1 55.6 22.7 ++

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Household questionnaire.

Final Survey  23
the increase in marketing is 22.7 percentage the quality and quantity of facilities in the treat-
points greater in the treatment areas versus the ment municipalities, which could then be used
control areas. For those engaged in livestock by households.
and poultry production, there was an increase in
treatment areas and a decrease in control areas, As shown in Table 6, the study observed an in-
for a net difference of 11.2 percentage points. crease in access by barangay residents to basic
facilities and services. We observed generally
4.2.2. Access to Basic Services more barangays with health services, postharvest
facilities, and improved water systems in 2010
This section focuses on access to basic services. compared to 2003. The increases were signifi-
We started by testing for improvements in baran- cantly higher in treatment barangays compared
gay access conditions and then checked whether to control barangays. These results are expected,
they translated into improvements in household as these were the types of subprojects commonly
access. Subprojects were expected to improve financed under the project.

Table 6. Barangay Access Conditions

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

% of barangays with

Market 16.7 18.2 15.2 13.0 13.0 5.8 5.7 +++

Stores 95.5 87.9 92.4 84.1 92.8 94.2 -13.2 - - -

Financing institution 18.2 42.4 33.3 24.6 37.7 30.4 9.4 +++

Postharvest facilities 63.6 72.7 66.7 65.2 59.4 60.9 7.4 +++

Waterworks system 39.4 68.2 71.2 47.8 59.4 71.0 8.6 +++

Elementary school 86.4 87.9 90.9 81.2 84.1 82.6 3.1 +++

Secondary school 22.7 21.2 22.7 18.8 17.4 20.3 -1.4 - - -

College 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0

Barangay health service 75.8 78.8 83.3 87.0 79.7 75.4 19.2 +++

Hospital 1.5 4.5 1.5 1.4 2.9 2.9 -1.4 - - -

Type of Roads in barangay (%)

Dirt 38.6 31.4 31.0 48.9 30.2 29.1 12.1 +++

Gravel 44.2 47.9 55.3 31.0 36.5 44.9 -2.8 - - -

Asphalt 2.8 3.2 0.3 0.9 2.9 0.2 -1.8 - - -

Cement 14.3 17.6 13.4 18.3 26.3 23.7 -6.3 - - -

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

24  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Increases in the proportion of both treatment the other hand, the proportion of dirt roads de-
and control barangays with financial institu- creased for both treatment and control baran-
tions were likewise reported, with treatment ar- gays. As expected, the decrease is much larger in
eas having higher increments. While the project the control areas (where road improvement has
did not directly provide micro-credit and liveli- been greater) compared to the treatment areas.
hood subprojects, this could be an indication of These findings on the state of roads are at odds
increased business and agricultural activities in with the results of the analysis of household ac-
the KALAHI-CIDSS areas. It may also be due cess conditions discussed below.
to micro-finance institutions similarly target-
ing poor municipalities, and/or targeting those We now look at other welfare impacts of
areas and populations that are benefiting from KALAHI-CIDSS and test whether improve-
KALAHI-CIDSS social mobilization support. ments in barangay access conditions trans-
lated into improvements in household access.
We observed a small increase in the proportion Table 7 summarizes the access conditions of
of KALAHI-CIDSS barangays with elementary
households.
schools. However, there was little or no change
in the proportion of barangays with secondary
Consistent with the large number of roads fi-
schools and colleges in both KALAHI-CIDSS
nanced under the project in the sample munici-
and non-KALAHI-CIDSS areas. This is to be
expected, as secondary schools and colleges are palities, more houses are accessible year-round
typically not barangay-level investments that the as a result of the project. Specifically, the in-
project tends to finance. crease is 6.7 percentage points higher in treat-
ment than in control areas. The discrepancy with
The survey data indicate that there was a dete- the previous set of results might be due to the
rioration in road infrastructure, particularly in way in which the data on roads were collected;
the treatment barangays. From 2003 to 2010, the survey questions asked only about the composi-
proportion of asphalt and cement roads decreased tion of roads and not about the extent of the road
in the treatment barangays, while it increased in network.
the control barangays. The difference, as shown
in Table 6, is 1.8 percentage points for asphalt In both treatment and control groups, the pro-
and 6.3 percentage points for cement roads. On portion of households with access to level 2 and

Table 7. Household Access Conditions (% of households)

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 2003 vs 2010

Water (level 2 and 3) 47.7 46.8 44.3 52.9 51.1 49.0 0.6 +++

Safe water 86.2 84.5 88.9 83.5 73.9 82.3 3.9 +++

Water-sealed toilet 54.5 62.7 68.5 61.6 70.7 72.7 2.8 +++

House accessible all-year long 43.6 58.9 56.3 61.9 72.3 67.9 6.7 +++

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

Final Survey  25
level 3 water systems went down.23 On the positive is 2.8 percentage points higher in treatment areas
side, however, more households now have access compared to those in control areas.
to safe water, compared to 2003. The increase
in access to safe water is 3.9 percentage points Use of health facilities has significantly increased
higher in treatment areas than in control areas. in the treatment group (Table 8). As a result of
Given the number of water systems supported the project, the proportion of respondents who
by the project in our sample areas, the size of reported going to a health facility when sick in-
the impact appears limited. The same is true for creased by 6.3 percentage points in the treatment
households with water-sealed toilets. There were areas, compared with changes that took place in
increases in both groups; however, the increase the control group.24 Services provided by health
facilities, particularly Barangay Health Stations,
seem to have improved. This is indicated by the
23 In the Philippines, a level 2 water system con-
sists of a piped water system with a communal water
point (e.g. borewell). A level 3 water system introduc- 24 The reference period is for the six months prior
es private water points (e.g. house connection). to the survey.

Table 8. Health Care Satisfaction Rating (% of households)

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Got sick and visited a health facility 43.5 42.8 47.0 49.8 49.7 47.0 6.3 +++

Type of facility visited

Government hospital 13.9 14.4 17.3 14.7 11.2 13.4 4.7 +++

Private hospital 8.3 6.8 13.0 6.9 9.9 18.6 -7.0 - - -

Private clinic 22.1 21.9 14.7 19.2 20.6 16.7 -4.9 - - -

Rural Health Units 11.3 8.8 11.6 15.0 7.9 17.3 -2.1 - - -

Barangay Health Stations 42.6 32.4 42.0 43.6 39.8 28.7 14.2 +++

Do you get the needed services?

Government hospital 43.5 66.3 68.4 57.4 65.6 71.9 10.5 ++

Private hospital 46.3 85.4 90.5 46.4 86.6 84.4 6.3

Private clinic 62.6 90.6 91.2 75.8 90.2 91.6 12.7 +++

Rural Health Units 66.9 61.9 58.7 56.4 63.7 63.8 -15.6 - - -

Barangay Health Stations 32.0 53.8 61.3 39.8 53.0 58.2 10.8 +++

Time to health facility < 15 min. 43.8 42.3 44.8 47.6 51.8 47.2 1.4 +++

Time to health facility 15 - 30 min. 31.3 27.7 27.3 24.3 22.1 29.2 -8.8 - - -

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

26  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

increase in the number of respondents report- 4.2.3. Governance and Social Capital
ing they were provided with the service they
required. The increase is 10 percentage points This section focuses on the governance and social
higher in treatment than in control barangays. capital impacts of the project. We start by using
the responses of barangay officials to the baran-
The results regarding school participation gay questionnaire and then move on to measures
rates are mixed. For both control and treat- of social capital and participation in governance
ment groups, the enrollment rates in elementary activities from the household survey.
school decreased from 2003 to 2010 (Table 9).
The decrease is more pronounced in the treat- Table 10 compares the number of times (over
ment group, specifically 1.6 percentage points the previous six months) that authorities in treat-
more compared to the control group. For sec- ment and control municipalities visited sample
ondary school, there were increases in both barangays. In 2010, the municipal/city mayor
groups, with the increase in the treatment group visited both treatment and control barangays 3.9
being 1.3 percentage points higher than the con- times, compared to 3.2 for treatment and 2.5 for
trol. For college level enrollment, there was an control in 2003, reflecting a significantly larger
increase in the treatment group, while a decrease increase in visits to control barangays. For other
in the control group, with a net positive change government officers and staff, the differences
in the treatment group of 5.4 percentage points. between the treatment and control barangays

Table 9. School Participation Rates (% of school-age children)

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 2003 vs 2010

All

Elementary 93.0 84.3 90.5 88.6 88.1 87.7 -1.6 - - -

Secondary 79.0 73.5 84.2 85.0 78.1 88.9 1.3 +++

College 8.2 7.9 10.6 15.4 11.7 12.4 5.4 +++

Male

Elementary 92.4 83.9 91.1 90.2 90.5 86.7 2.2 +++

Secondary 74.7 68.0 79.1 69.9 72.9 81.7 -7.3 - - -

College 5.7 5.6 5.9 13.6 9.3 10.0 3.8 +++

Female

Elementary 93.7 84.6 90.0 87.0 85.5 88.9 -5.6 - - -

Secondary 83.4 79.3 89.8 100.9 83.8 96.7 10.6 +++

College 11.0 10.7 16.4 17.6 14.8 15.4 7.6 +++

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Household questionnaire.

Final Survey  27
varied. In all cases, the number of visits by gov- dent households were also less trusting of other
ernment officers and key staff increased between people with regard to money matters; however,
2003 and 2010. The increase is higher in the in this case the decrease was larger among the
treatment barangays for the municipal planning treatment group.
officer and the agricultural extension officer. A
greater increase was noted in the control group With regard to helping other people, the house-
for the agrarian reform officer, doctor/health of- hold survey revealed that more households in
ficer, and midwife. both treatment and control areas indicated that
other people would lend them money if needed.
An underlying assumption of community-driven The increase was higher in control areas by
development (CDD) is that the approach helps 1.1 percentage points. On the other hand, more
to build or strengthen social capital that will im- households in treatment areas perceived that
prove immediate subproject implementation and people in their respective barangays were willing
contribute to longer-term governance outcomes. to help other people if needed. The net differ-
As such, indications of increased social capital ence was 7.6 percentage points, as compared to
are commonly sought in evaluating the impact the baseline and control areas.
of CDD operations.
The survey found a decline in the proportion of
The results of the household survey on questions households reporting their barangay was peace-
pertaining to issues of trust and solidarity— ful. However, the decline was more pronounced
proxies for social capital—are quite interesting in control barangays, indicating that the project
(Table 11). The 12.3 percentage point increase had a positive impact on peace and order.
in the proportion of respondents indicating that
most people in their barangay can be trusted can KALAHI-CIDSS aims to directly increase the
be attributed to the project. Impacts on trust in involvement of targeted communities with local
local officials, in national officials, and in strang- government through increased participation in
ers were also positive but smaller. The respon- barangay assemblies. The final survey indicates

Table 10. Number of Visit by Authorities*

Treatment Control
Ddiff**
Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Mayor 3.2 4.1 3.9 2.5 2.5 3.9 -0.6 - - -

Planning officer 1.3 1.8 3.2 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.1 +++

Agrarian reform officer 2.8 1.8 2.9 2.6 1.7 3.0 -0.4 - - -

Social worker 4.7 5.1 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.6 -1.3 - - -

Agriculture extension worker 1.8 3.2 4.7 3.3 7.8 5.7 0.5 ++

Doctor/health officer 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.5 0.3 -

Midwife 33.5 32.5 20.5 16.0 29.2 12.8 -9.8 - - -

* During the six months prior to the survey; **Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

28  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Table 11. Trust and Solidarity (% of households)

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10
Perceived there is peace and order in the
83.2 76.6 74.7 86.3 80.1 75.4 2.3 +++
barangay
Perceived crime and violence decreased in
30.7 25.1 31.8 35.6 27.2 29.9 6.9 +++
the barangay
Most people in the barangay can be trusted 54.5 54.8 59.0 62.4 62.1 54.5 12.3 +++

Local officials can be trusted 53.0 36.0 38.2 49.5 37.3 33.6 1.1 +++

National officials can be trusted 39.5 27.2 28.6 39.1 26.0 23.8 4.4 +++

Strangers can be trusted 5.7 3.1 2.9 8.8 4.2 2.4 3.6 +++

People can be trusted w/ regard to money 22.5 17.6 19.1 18.4 17.7 18.1 -3.0 - - -

Less likely to be taken advantage of 17.1 21.1 28.7 22.3 23.7 28.6 5.3 +++

Other people will lend money 59.7 62.9 60.8 61.1 65.4 63.2 -1.1 - - -

Willingness to help if needed 76.4 80.1 78.6 77.0 82.6 71.5 7.6 +++

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

Table 12. Participation in Barangay Activities (% of households)

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Participated in collective action 60.7 59.8 55.3 54.4 57.6 51.7 -2.7 - - -

Willingness to contribute to barangay activities:

time 75.7 78.5 74.6 74.4 77.1 72.5 0.9 +++

money 38.4 51.2 51.3 43.9 50.2 46.5 10.3 +++

Member of organization 31.7 38.0 48.4 31.3 42.1 42.7 5.3 +++

Attended barangay assemblies 62.9 73.9 72.2 62.1 57.2 66.3 5.0 +++

Knows budget of the barangay 11.8 13.0 16.2 13.0 12.1 14.4 3.1 +++

Joined in barangay dev’t. planning 30.3 36.3 28.1 26.0 20.9 28.4 -4.5 - - -

Confidence to participate 39.7 35.4 41.6 36.5 30.4 40.3 -1.9 - - -

Notes: +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
*Ddiff = double difference (see Annex 2).
Source: Barangay questionnaire.

Final Survey  29
that the proportion of households in the treat- 4.3 Results from regression
ment group who attend barangay assemblies is
5 percentage points higher than it would have analysis
been in the absence of the project (Table 12).
The proportion of households who were aware We now test whether results discussed in section
of the income and expenditure details of their 4.2 are robust to alternative methodologies. Re-
barangay LGU has also increased. Specifically, gression analysis is used to clarify the attribution
a 3 percentage point increase in awareness can of the changes observed as being due to project
be attributed to the project. interventions or to other control variables.

We also observed significant increases in orga- The basic regression models estimated are the
nizational membership—a typical measure of following:
social capital—with a 5.3 percentage point dif-
ference between treatment and control areas. (1) Yipt= a+b1 * midtermipx+ b2 * postipt + c * KCipt
+ d1 * midtermipt * KCipt + d2 * postipt * KCipt + Ii
However, some unexpected trends were ob- *Albayipt +I2 * Capizipt + I3 * Zambo_suript
served regarding the participation of households
in barangay planning activities. The proportion (2) Yipt= a+b1 * midtermipx+ b2 * postipt + c * SPIipt
decreased from 30 percent in the baseline to 28 + d1 * midtermipt * SPIipt + d2 * postipt * SPIipt + Ii
percent in the final survey. On the other hand, *Albayipt + I2 * Capizipt + I3 * Zambo_suript
for the control group, we observed an increase
from 26 percent in the baseline to 28.4 percent where
in the final survey.
Yipt is the observation on variable Y on
In addition, we noted a lower proportion of treat- the individual i residing p in baran-
ment and control group households participating gay p at time t,
in collective action activities. The decrease is
2.7 percentage points greater in the treatment midtermipx takes on the value 1 if the obser-
group compared to the control group, and more vation is taken during the midterm
marked in barangays that implemented subproj- survey, 0 otherwise
ects. This seems to be counter-intuitive and con-
trary to what CDD hopes to achieve. However, a postipt takes on the value 1 if the observa-
potential explanation is that the project increased tion is taken during the final sur-
returns to economic activity, which is consistent vey, 0 otherwise
with results on labor force participation and pro-
duction practices discussed above, and thus the KCipt takes on the value 1 if p is in a
opportunity cost of contributing time to com- KALAHI-CIDSS beneficiary mu-
munity subprojects has increased. This is also nicipality, 0 otherwise
consistent with the study’s finding of a sizable
increase in the proportion of households that SPIipt is 1 plus the cumulative number
were willing to contribute money for a commu- of subprojects implemented in ba-
nity subproject (about 10 percentage points, or rangay p as of time t. Barangays
26 percent of baseline levels). Households might in KALAHI-CIDSS municipali-
be moving away from time contributions for ties that have not implemented
collective action activities, and toward monetary subprojects at time t will have SPIipt
contributions for the same purpose. equal to 1; those in non-KALAHI-
CIDSS municipalities will have
SPIipt equal to 0

30  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Albayipt takes on the value 1 if p is in result, their inclusion might lead to biased esti-
Albay, 0 otherwise mates of project impacts.

Capizipt takes on the value 1 if p is in Capiz, The following discussion applies these regres-
0 otherwise sion models to key outcome indicators. In each
table, “Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS” captures
Zambo_suript takes on the value 1 if p is in Zam-
the project impact measured during the midterm
boanga del Sur, 0 otherwise. survey and “Final*KALAHI-CIDSS” captures
the long-term project impacts (i.e., measured in
2010). Given the timing of subproject invest-
The variable SPI is introduced to further differ- ment in the treatment barangays, the analysis
entiate among KALAHI-CIDSS beneficiary ba- focuses on the long-term impacts. For ease of
rangays. The innovative strategy of KALAHI- presentation, the parameters of interest are high-
CIDSS has resulted in marked differences in lighted in bold in the tables.
project intervention among the beneficiary ba-
rangays. A barangay with more subprojects im-
4.3.1. Key Welfare Impacts
plemented has more project inputs, both in terms
of the hard infrastructure and soft capability-
building components. Outcomes could vary ac- KALAHI-CIDSS aims to empower the house-
cording to the amount of project inputs, not just hold by building the social capital of the commu-
by whether or not the barangay is a KALAHI- nity and in the process, improving governance.
CIDSS beneficiary. As discussed earlier, results As indicated above, impacts might be different
on poor and non-poor households. Hence, proj-
on the impacts of receiving a subproject are more
ect impact on socioeconomic status (as mea-
tentative than results on the impacts of residing
sured by real per capita expenditure) is analyzed
in a KALAHI-CIDSS municipality. As a result,
separately for the poor and the non-poor.
estimates from model 1 are more credible than
estimates from model 2.
Table 13 shows that project impact on the so-
cioeconomic status of the poor is positive and
The dummy variables Albay, Capiz, and Zambo_ significant. Other things remaining the same,
sur are included to capture fixed effects that are the increase in per capita expenditure is about 6
due to province location. Examples of these are percent higher in treatment than in control mu-
geoclimatic variables, provincial LGUs, or even nicipalities. Those in barangays with more sub-
regional economic performance. projects enjoy even higher increases. Compared
with a poor household in the control group,
The parameter of interest is in d2.It represents a poor household increases its per capita ex-
the improvement in Y at final over the baseline penditure by 7.5 percent with each subproject
that could be attributed to project effects, holding implemented.
constant the effect of the other factors including
province effects. Put differently, the parameter The above results regarding the project impact
captures long-term project impacts. The coef- on socioeconomic status is supported by the ob-
ficient c captures the differences between the served effect on the share of nonfood items in
treatment and the control group at baseline and the budget (Table 14). This variable serves as a
the coefficient d1 captures short-term project proxy for household welfare. If a higher propor-
impacts. tion of the budget goes to non-food items, this
suggests that the household is enjoying higher
We do not include additional controls for time- living standards.
varying household characteristics, as they might
be affected by project implementation. As a Once we account for the number of subprojects

Final Survey  31
Table 13. Per Capita Expenditure

Model 1 Model 1
Indicator
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error

Poor households

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.0969 0.0246 ***

# of subprojects implemented -0.0973 0.0246 ***

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0077 0.0345

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0568 0.0415 *

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0407 0.0231 **

Final*# of subprojects 0.0746 0.0301 ***

Intercept 9.1745 0.0259 *** 9.1743 0.0260 ***

Non-Poor households

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.0783 0.0366 **

# of subprojects implemented -0.0782 0.0366 **

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0232 0.0465

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0269 0.0505

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0155 0.0354

Final*# of subprojects 0.0360 0.0338

Intercept 10.0697 0.0549 *** 10.0710 0.0551 ***

***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Time and location effects were included in the model, though results are not shown.
Source: Household questionnaire.

that were implemented in a barangay, we find well-being. Perhaps what is needed is for the
a positive project effect. The estimates indicate increase in income to be sustained for a longer
that each additional subproject increased the period of time.
non-food share of household consumption by
2.6 percentage points. 4.3.2. Access to Basic Services

The table also shows that the project did not, Household accessibility has improved signifi-
however, significantly affect changes in the cantly in the beneficiary barangays. The results
proportion of the self-rated poor in the treatment are summarized in Table 15. As a result of the
municipalities as compared with control areas. project, on average, households are 6 percentage
This is consistent with the framework illustrated points more likely to be accessible year round.
in Figure 2 which shows the longer transmission Similarly, there is a 4 percentage point increase
from project intervention to perception of in the proportion of households with access to

32  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Table 14. Other Welfare Measures
Model 1 Model 1
Indicator
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error

Share of nonfood

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -4.0509 1.0255 ***

# of subprojects implemented -4.0569 1.0254 ***

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 2.0739 1.1270 **

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 1.3847 1.1076

Midterm*# of subprojects 2.8414 1.0114 ***

Final*# of subprojects 2.6244 1.0062 ***

Intercept 36.5316 1.3072 *** 36.5513 1.3112 ***

Self-rated poor

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.0361 0.0246

# of subprojects implemented -0.0361 0.0246 *

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0384 0.0292 *

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0183 0.0299

Midterm*# of subprojects -0.0054 0.0254

Final*# of subprojects 0.0129 0.0250

Intercept 0.3566 0.0264 *** 0.3574 0.0264 ***

***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Time and location effects were included in the model, though results are not shown.
Source: Household questionnaire.

safe drinking water in the treatment areas, com- 4.3.3. Governance and Social Capital
pared with households in control barangays.
Both estimated impacts are statistically signifi- The improvement in trust among community
cant. In contrast, access to level 2 and level 3 members is positive and significant in the treated
water supplies has not changed significantly in barangays (Table 16). When the barangays are
the treatment barangays compared to the control further differentiated by the number of subproj-
barangays. ects implemented, improvement in intra-baran-
gay trust remains significant (as compared with
As expected, improvements in year-long acces- control barangays).
sibility in treatment barangays seem to be driven
by subproject investments (Table 15). Year-long The project did not result in any significant
access increased by 11 percentage points for change in the trust individuals have in local
each subproject implemented in the barangay. government officials. In contrast, we observe a

Final Survey  33
Table 15. Access to Amenities
Model 1 Model 1
Indicator
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
House accessible all year long
KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.1426 0.0336 ***

# of subprojects implemented -0.1425 0.0336 ***

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0448 0.0361

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0595 0.0360 *

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0960 0.0321 ***

Final*# of subprojects 0.1091 0.0307 ***

Intercept 0.6479 0.0287 *** 0.6495 0.0289 ***

Water system (levels 2 and 3)

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.0320 0.0399

# of subprojects implemented -0.0316 0.0399

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0103 0.0422

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0040 0.0403

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0278 0.0381

Final*# of subprojects 0.0366 0.0357

Intercept 0.5127 0.0351 *** 0.5141 0.0353 ***

Safe water
KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) 0.0214 0.0232

# of subprojects implemented 0.0215 0.0231

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0801 0.0292 ***

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0392 0.0230 **

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0289 0.0302

Final*# of subprojects 0.0139 0.0214

Intercept 0.9030 0.0170 *** 0.9022 0.0171 ***

***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Time and location effects were included in the model, though results are not shown.
Source: Household questionnaire.

marked improvement in trust toward national of- known as a project of the national government.
ficials. This improvement is significantly higher
in treatment barangays than in control baran- The project succeeded in increasing attendance
gays. This may be because KALAHI-CIDSS is in barangay assemblies at the midterm. The in-

34  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Table 16. Social Capital: Trust
Model 1 Model 1
Indicator
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
People in the barangay can be trusted

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) -0.2858 0.1023 ***

# of subprojects implemented -0.2849 0.1024 ***

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.0770 0.1293

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.3881 0.1383 ***

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.2014 0.1127 **

Final*# of subprojects 0.3536 0.1114 ***

Trust local government officials

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) 0.1146 0.1005

# of subprojects implemented 0.1149 0.1004

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS
Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.1118 0.1448

Midterm*# of subprojects -0.0750 0.1154

Final*# of subprojects -0.0181 0.1105

Trust national government officials

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) 0.0760 0.1118

# of subprojects implemented 0.0761 0.1116

Interaction w/ time
Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0654 0.1298

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS 0.2808 0.1540**

Midterm*# of subprojects -0.0412 0.1185

Final*# of subprojects 0.0809 0.1282

***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Time and location effects were included in the model, though results are not shown.
Source: Household questionnaire.

crease is significantly different between those Participation in collective action activities has
in treatment and control barangays. However, decreased significantly in barangays that imple-
attendance was shown to have decreased by mented one or more subprojects. This was ob-
the final survey. When compared against base- served during the midterm and final surveys. As
line levels, the change observed in treatment indicated previously, a potential explanation for
barangays is no longer significantly different this unexpected result is that, as a result of the
than the change observed in the control baran- project, the opportunity cost of contributing time
gays (Table 17). to collective action activities has gone up.

Final Survey  35
Table 17. Participation in Governance

Model 1 Model 1
Indicator
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error

Participation in collective action activities

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) 0.0780 0.0276 ***

# of subprojects implemented 0.0782 0.0276 ***

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0402 0.0377

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS -0.0273 0.0302

Midterm*# of subprojects -0.0478 0.0296 *

Final*# of subprojects -0.0544 0.0263 **

Attendance in barangay assemblies

KALAHI-CIDSS recipient (dummy) 0.0164 0.0315

# of subprojects implemented 0.0167 0.0316

Interaction w/ time

Midterm*KALAHI-CIDSS recipient 0.1589 0.0353 ***

Final*KALAHI-CIDSS recipient 0.0504 0.0413

Midterm*# of subprojects 0.0838 0.0309 ***

Final*# of subprojects 0.0187 0.0328

***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Time and location effects were included in the model, though results are not shown.
Source: Household questionnaire.

36  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

5. Conclusions and
Recommendations

T
he results of the KALAHI-CIDSS’ impact significantly. As a result of the project, on
evaluation indicate that the project led to average, there are more households in the treat-
improvements in household welfare, ac- ment barangays with year-long accessibility
cessibility, and social capital. It has, however, and access to safe water than in the control ba-
shown mixed results with regard to participation rangays. As can be expected, year-long acces-
in governance. sibility has improved even more in beneficiary
barangays that received subproject financing.
The project led to a 5 percent increase in per
capita expenditures. Those in barangays with The survey yields mixed results in the level of
more subprojects enjoy even higher increases. institutional trust and participation in gover-
The same is true for the share of non-food items nance. Organizational membership has increased
in the household budget. This has increased significantly among households in treatment
in both groups between the baseline and final barangays compared to those in control ba-
surveys, with the increase among beneficiary rangays. Participation in barangay assemblies
households being significantly higher than the was also strongly positive in treatment versus
increase among non-beneficiary households. control barangays during the midterm review,
Households in beneficiary barangays with more but was shown to have declined by the time of
subprojects are observed to have experienced the current, end-of-project, evaluation. Trust
even higher increases in the nonfood share of in national government officials has improved
household budgets. However, while expendi- significantly. However, little change or differ-
tures have increased, the increase alone attribut- ence in the levels of trust was recorded for local
ed to KALAHI-CIDSS is not sufficient to reduce government officials. This may be explained by
poverty significantly. the fact that KALAHI-CIDSS is known to be a
national government project.
In addition, the project led to an increase in the
proportion of those engaged in agriculture activi- The project had a negative impact on the extent
ties (farming, livestock, and fishing) that market of participation in collective action activities.
their produce, implying that production levels However, it also had a positive impact on the
have increased beyond subsistence. Moreover, willingness of households to contribute money
households have probably become less vulner- for activities that would benefit the community.
able due to an observed increase in the diver- This suggests that households might be choosing
sification of income sources among beneficiary to substitute contributions of time with those of
barangay households. money.

Household accessibility has also improved The study yielded a number of useful insights,

Final Survey  37
as DSWD is currently expanding coverage with than those observed after the midterm survey.
the ultimate goal of a nationwide program. Further, impacts tended to increase with
the number of subprojects received by the
First, consistent with the diverse nature of in- communities.
vestments supported by the project, impacts tend
to be very diffuse. Impacts are recorded along The above observations, combined with the rela-
a broad range of indicators, but they tend to be tively small size of per capita allocation (about
relatively small. This is to be expected as, for PHP 300/cycle), suggest that long-term impacts
example, a farm-to-market road will not yield on poverty reduction will require sustained
similar impacts as a school building, but it needs efforts and both social and physical investment.
to be carefully accounted for when designing DSWD could explore increasing either the
such evaluations. number of subproject cycles and/or the munici-
pal allocations. Alternatively, DSWD could in-
Second, impacts on per capita expenditures troduce different poverty criteria for barangays
recorded during the final survey were higher to be eligible to participate in the MIBF.

38  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

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to Evaluation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2153. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=620612

Voss, J. (2008). “Impact Evaluation of the Second Phase of the Kecamatan Development Program in
Indonesia.” The World Bank, Jakarta Research Paper

Woolcock, M. (2001) The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes.
ISUMA Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2 (1) 11-17.

World Bank. (1998) The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital: Overview
and Program Description. Working Paper, no.1. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

40  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Annexes
42  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS
Annex 1.
Project Coverage Map
Annex Figure 1. Project Coverage

Final Survey  43
Annex 2.
Analytical Methodology
Project impacts are analyzed using two related methods.

T-Test

The first simply computes for the double difference. If Yivtis the variable of interest observed in village
v at time t. The village is either in the control (C) or beneficiary (B) group and time is either in year
2003 (t=0) or in year 2010 (t=1). We then the following data:

YiB0 is the observation from the beneficiary communities in 2003,

YiC0 is the observation from the control communities in 2003,

YiB1 is the observation from the beneficiary communities in 2010,

YiC1 is the observation from the control communities in 2010,

The double difference in Y is given by:

(YB1− YB0)−(YC1− YC0)

The t-test can be applied to the double-differences to determine if the differences observed are sig-
nificant.

Regression Analysis

It is also possible to carry out a difference-in-differences evaluation through regressions analysis.

Consider the following equation25 for observation i:

(1) Yipt= a+b * Beneip+ c * timeit + d * Beneip + timeit + e * Xipt

Where

Beneip is 1 if the observation is taken from a beneficiary municipality and 0 otherwise,

25 Omitting the error term

44  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

timeit is 1 if the observation is taken at time 1and 2 otherwise.

Equation (1) implies that the variable Y is affected by the project intervention ( ), passage of time, and
by another variable X.

If the observation is taken from a beneficiary municipality at time 0, then we have

(2) YiB0= a+b+e * XiBo ,

and if the observation is taken from a beneficiary municipality at time 1, then we have

(3) YiB1= a+b+c+d+e * XiB1 ,

Concerning an observation from a nonbeneficiary municipality at time 0 we have

(4) YiC0= a+e * XiC0 ,

and an observation from a nonbeneficiary municipality at time 1 is given by

(5) YiC1= a+c+e * XiC1 ,

The double difference is given by:

(YiB1— YiB0) — (YiC1— YiC0) = d+e[(XB1— XiB0) — (XiC1— XiC0)]

The project impact is given by d but the double difference we observe involves the impact of the
changes in X. Of course, if either e is zero or there are no changes in X, then the observed double
difference could be attributed to the project. The more general case is that one or both do not hold.
Regression analysis enables us to distinguish the project impact (d) from the impact of the other
variables X(e).

This method is applied to a selected set of variables. The list was finalized after consultation with
DSWD and the World Bank.

The analyses were carried out using the survey package of R 26 to take account of the complex survey
design of the impact evaluation27.

26 The R system for statistical computing software is supported by an international collaboration of computer
scientists and statisticians. R provides a wide variety of statistical (linear and nonlinear modeling, classical sta-
tistical tests, time-series analysis, classification, clustering) and graphical techniques, and is highly extensible.
The S language is often the vehicle of choice for research in statistical methodology, and R provides an “open
source” route to participation in that activity. The survey analysis package of R is written by Thomas Lumley of
the University of Washington.
27 See APPC (2003) for a full discussion of the sampling design of the impact evaluation.

Final Survey  45
Testing the Parallel Trend Hypothesis

The key identifying assumption in the impact evaluation is that, without the program, the two groups
of municipalities (treatment and comparison) would have evolved similarly. While it is impossible
to test this hypothesis directly, it is possible to test if prior to the project the two groups evolved simi-
larly, the so-called parallel trend hypothesis. Rejection of the parallel trend hypothesis would cast
doubts on the validity of our estimation strategy.

We use data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES). The FIES is a large-scale na-
tionally representative survey carried out every three years by the National Statistics Office (NSO).
We have access to the 2000 and 2003 data. Out of the 16 municipalities included in the KALAHI-
CIDSS impact evaluation sample, 13 were included in both the 2000 and in the 2003 FIES samples.
This leaves a repeated cross-section of households in 13 of our sample municipalities. As a result, we
are able to test whether the changes between 2000 and 2003 in the treatment and control group were
similar.

For each outcome indicator (per capita food consumption, per capita nonfood consumption, log per
capita food consumption, and log per capita nonfood consumption), we run four different regressions:
with and without municipal dummies, and with and without household controls. We can’t reject the
parallel trend hypothesis (Annex Table 1). This provides convincing evidence that control and treat-
ment municipalities would have evolved similarly over the period covered by our data had the project
not been implemented.

46  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Annex Table 1. Parallel Trend Hypothesis: Consumption
Panel A: Per capita food consumption

Placebo -1.268 -0.634 -0.643 -0.177

(1.052) (1.079) (0.835) (1.079)

Observations 724 724 724

HH controls No No Yes Yes

Mun. Dummies No Yes No Yes

R-squared 0.15 0.38 0.47

Panel B: Log per capita food consumption

Placebo -0.127 -0.043 -0.060 0.004

(0.130) (0.133) (0.107) (0.126)

Observations 724 724 724 724

Mun. Dummies No Yes No Yes

HH controls No No Yes Yes

R-squared 0.01 0.15 0.48 0.56

Panel C: Per capita non-food consumption

Placebo 2.464 4.202 5.969 5.744

(5.633) (5.478) (7.232) (6.971)

Observations 724 724 724 724

HH controls No No Yes Yes

Mun. Dummies No Yes No Yes

R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.09

Panel D: Log per capita non-food consumption

Placebo -0.188 0.116 -0.052 0.121

(0.199) (0.303) (0.156) (0.287)

Observations 724 724 724 724

HH controls No No Yes Yes

Mun. Dummies No Yes No Yes

R-squared 0.02 0.12 0.46 0.50

Notes: Results from OLS regressions using 2000 and 2003 FIES data. The dependent variable is the per
capita food consumption (PHP 1,000) in Panel A, the log per capita food consumption in Panel B, the
per capita non-food consumption (PHP 1,000) in Panel C and, the log per capita non-food consumption
in Panel D. The standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber-corrected and account for intra-municipality
correlation. All regressions include time-specific dummies. * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the
5% and, *** at the 1% level.

Final Survey  47
Annex 3.
Survey Operations
The table below lists the survey municipalities, whether each is treatment (T) or control (C) and the
number of sample barangays in the sampled municipality.

Annex Table 2. Survey Areas

Island group Province Municipality # of barangays

Luzon Albay Pio Duran T 9

Oas C 12

Libon T 12

Polangui C 12

Visayas Capiz Ma-ayon T 6

Pontavedra C 6

Dumarao T 9

President Roxas C 9

Mindanao Zamboanga del Sur Dinas T 6

Tambulig C 6

Dumingag T 6

Dimataling C 6

Agusan del Sur Esperanza T 12

Bayugan C 12

San Luis T 6

Veruela C 6

Note: T – treatment, C – control

Tracking Household Respondents

A tracking protocol was developed during the Midterm Survey and was also implemented during
the Final Survey. Corresponding tracking forms were developed for this. The interviewers were in-
structed to track down original respondents to the best of their abilities using the following procedure
which was again used in the final survey.

48  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Case 1: Original sample household and original household member respondent are tracked.

• Interview the original household member respondent and collect data on her/his household.
The interviewer asks the respondent first about the members of the original household s/he is
still living with and then about the new members of her/his household, if any.

Case 2: Original sample household tracked but original household member respondent no longer
lives in the household (either moved out or died).

• Fill up the individual tracking form for the original household member respondent.

• Interview another member of the original sample household who knows about the house-
hold’s economic activities.

• In addition, if the original household member respondent moved to a barangay that is in-
cluded in our sample, s/he should be tracked down and interviewed again. He/she will be
asked the perception questions.

Case 3: Original sample household member respondent tracked but with a different household com-
position.

• Interview the original household member respondent and collect data on her/his “new” house-
hold. The interviewer asks the respondent first about the members of the original household
s/he is still living with and then about the new members of her/his household, if any.

Case 4: Original sample household and original household member respondent moved within the
municipality and in one of our sample barangays.

• Fill up the household tracking form. Ask the neighbors where the household moved.

• Locate the original sample household for interview.

Case 5: Original sample household and original household member respondent moved to another
place.

• Fill up the household tracking form. Ask the neighbors where the household moved.

A field edit protocol was also included in the Operations Manual. Monitoring visits were conducted
by APPC to ensure the quality of the survey.

Attrition

It was emphasized to the interviewers that the respondent households are those interviewed during
the midterm. But even though maximum effort was exerted, attrition in a panel survey is inevitable.
The following table shows the attrition rate in each province.

Final Survey  49
Annex Table 3 Attrition Rates by Province
Total Sample Attrition Rate (%)
Province
Baseline Midterm Final Midterm to Final Overall

Albay 600 560 511 8.8 14.8

Capiz 600 549 496 9.5 17.2

Zamboanga del Sur 600 498 438 12.0 27.0

Agusan del Sur 601 510 439 13.9 27.0

Total 2,401 2,117 1,884 10.9 21.5

Total attrition from the number of respondents at this final round of survey is 10.9%, counting from
the midterm total sample of 2,117 households. Agusan del Sur finaled the highest with 13.1%. Al-
bay and Capiz finaled single digit attritions with the former holding the lowest at 8.8%. The overall
attrition from the original sample of 2,401 reached 21.4%. This is not far from the projected attrition
of 20%28.

28 Note that the total sample at baseline is inclusive of 20% oversample to account for attrition.

Annex Table 4. Reasons for Attrition

Reasons for Albay Capiz Zamboanga del Sur Agusan del Sur
failure to track
midterm household
Count % Count % Count % Count %
respondent

Migration to

other non-sample
4 8.2 12 23.1 4 6.7 15 21.1
barangay
other non-sample
9 18.4 9 17.3 20 33.3 22 31.0
municipality
other province 21 42.9 21 40.4 30 50.0 20 28.2

other country - - 1 1.9 - - - -

Deceased 3 6.1 1 1.9 2 3.3 2 2.8

With serious illness 2 4.1 2 3.9 - - - -

Refusal to be inter-
5 10.2 3 5.8 - - 2 2.8
viewed
Not enough info to
5 10.2 3 5.8 4 6.7 8 11.3
track
Indefinite Return - - - - - - 2 2.8

Total Cases 49 100 52 100 60 100 71 100

% of Total Midterm
8.8 9.5 12.0 13.1
Respondents

50  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Migration is the leading reason for attrition across all areas. In Albay, Capiz and Zamboanga del Sur,
migration to another province accounts for at least 40% attrition. Overall migration, either to another
non-sample barangay, or non-sample municipality, or other province, and even another country ac-
count for as high as 87% attrition in Zamboanga to at least 70% in Albay. This can be attributed to the
deterioration of peace and order along with poor access to sources of livelihood and basic services.
Other reasons include illness, death, outright refusals and untracked households.

Equally important as locating the original respondent household is getting the same member respon-
dent for the last round. Many of the social capital questions are perception based and thus it is ideal
that the same member respondent during the previous rounds should be the same respondent in this
final survey. However, of the 1,887 households tracked, 200 are replacement member respondents
The following pie chart shows the distribution across provinces.

Annex Figure 2. Member respondent attrition by province

Agusan del Sur

47 Albay
57

Zambonga del Sur

32

Capiz
64

Capiz had the most replacements with 13% of the total respondents. On the other end of the spectrum
is Zamboanga with only 7% replacement member respondents. Primary reason for attrition is absence
during the conduct of the survey. Other top reasons include death, temporary migration due to job
search and illness.

Weight Adjustments

The weights have been recomputed with consideration for attrition. As before, there are two
kinds of weights, the first concerns household variables and the second concerns member-specific
variables. The weights are synthetic estimates of the sampling fraction corresponding to the sampling
domain. Household weights are computed using the following formula:

wpmsh= Npms / npms

Final Survey  51
where wpmsh is the weight given to each sample household h in province p, municipality m, and ba-
rangay stratum S; Npmsh is the total number of households; and npms is the number in the sample of
households in province p, municipality m and barangay stratum s. Barangay stratum is determined
after all barangays in municipality m are sorted in order of proximity to the poblacion (municipal
center) and grouped into three equal groups.

Member weights are computed using the following formula:

wpmsai= Npmsa / npmsa

where wpmsai is the weight given to each sample member i belonging to age-group in province p,
municipality m and barangay stratum s; Npmsa is the total number of individuals of age group a, and
npmsa is the number in the sample of individuals of age group a in province p, municipality m, and
barangay stratum s.The age groups are the following:0 to 6 years, 7 to 12 years, 13 to 16 years, 17 to
22 years, 23 years and above.

The N is computed using the 2000 population and forecasted to 2003 using the growth rate observed
in the barangay stratum s in municipality m between 1995 and 2000.Meanwhile, the N corresponding
to age group a is computed by simply assuming natural “growth” of the age cohort; that is, children
below 1 will become 3 years old three years hence, and so on.This is adjusted for the “attrition rate”
by age group observed between 1995 and 2000.

52  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Annex 4.
Additional Results

Annex Table 5. Welfare Outcome Indicators

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 2003 vs 2010

Households with (%)

Strong roof 38.3 41.8 45.7 46.5 52.9 54.8 -0.8 ---

Strong/predominantly strong roof 47.1 54.0 57.4 55.6 64.0 65.0 0.8 +++

Strong walls 16.3 18.7 16.7 23.1 27.8 20.4 3.1 +++

Strong/predominantly strong walls 36.6 44.6 38.8 44.3 50.3 44.0 2.6 +++

Tenure status of house and lot 95.1 98.8 99.0 95.3 98.0 98.1 1.2 +++

Floor area of house > 10 sq. m. 79.3 81.6 85.6 65.6 82.1 87.4 -15.5 ---

More than one room in the house > 1 86.4 89.9 86.6 75.1 90.3 87.1 -11.8 ---

Access to electricity 41.6 54.1 65.8 51.1 66.1 73.6 1.6 +++

Quality of human capital

58.0 57.8 57.2 65.3 63.4 62.4 2.1 +++
(members of school age)*

* years of schooling over potential years of schooling; +++, ++, + sign is positive and significant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; - - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively
Source: Household questionnaire

Final Survey  53
Annex Table 6. Additional Results - Profile of Employment

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

Potential labor force

All 51.7 52.4 51.2 51.8 52.4 52.6 -1.3 ---

Male 53.1 53.3 52.1 52.2 52.6 52.9 -1.7 ---

Female 50.3 51.4 50.2 51.5 52.3 52.3 -0.9 ---

+++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Source: Household questionnaire

Annex Table 7. Additional Results - Barangay Access Conditions

Treatment Control Ddiff*

Indicator 2003 vs 2010
‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10

% of barangays that are less than 15 minutes away from nearest facility

Market 90.9 81.8 81.8 73.9 75.4 79.7 -14.9 ---

postharvest facility 84.8 93.9 87.9 91.3 95.7 95.7 -1.3

elementary school 98.5 98.5 100.0 98.6 95.7 98.6 1.5 +++

secondary school 95.5 83.3 90.9 87.0 88.4 92.8 -10.3 ---

Barangay Health Service 97.0 95.5 97.0 91.3 91.3 94.2 -2.9 ---

Hospital 63.6 63.6 51.5 62.3 52.2 62.3 -12.1 ---

+++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Source: Barangay questionnaire

54  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Annex Table 8. Additional Results - Participation in Barangay Activities

Treatment Control
Ddiff*
Indicator ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 ‘03 ‘06 ‘10 2003 vs 2010

Time - collective action (hours - male) 9.4 5.3 4.1 3.3 4.9 3.8 -5.8 ---

Time - collective action (hours - female) 2.8 1.7 2.2 1.0 2.0 1.9 -1.4 ---

Time - collective action (hours) 12.1 7.0 6.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 -7.2 ---

Participation of ethnic minorities in:

Organization 6.1 7.5 10.0 3.7 5.7 6.0 1.6 +++

Barangay assemblies 10.3 11.8 12.7 6.1 6.6 8.2 0.3 +++

Barangay dev’t. planning 74.5 69.5 76.7 75.9 81.1 75.0 3.2 +++

Collective action activities 10.3 12.4 11.3 6.8 7.3 7.7 0.1 +

+++, ++, + sign is positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
- - -, - -, - sign is negative and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Source: Household questionnaire

Final Survey  55
Annex 5.
List of Analysis Indicators
ID Variables Year
Province
Municipality
Barangay
Member specific variables
DEMOGRAPHICS Relationship to the household head
Sex
Age
Marital status
HEALTH Type of facility visited
Highest educational attainment
SCHOOLING Current level attending
Type of school attending
Means of transportation to school
Reason for not attending school
Occupation
EMPLOYMENT Kind of business/industry engaged in
Class of worker
ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP Type of organization
Meeting attendance
Household specific variables
ACCESS TO FACILITIES
Health Health facility frequently visited
Distance to health facility (proxied by time)

56  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Satisfaction rating
Water Type of main water source
Distance to water source (in not in the
house)
Is water safe
Distance to source of drinking water
Sanitation Type of toilet
Road Accessibility of house all year long
Frequency of travel to the poblacion
Fare cost from house to the poblacion
Communication Distance to working final office
Distance to working telephone
Type of telephone accessed
Electricity Access to electricity
Housing characteristics Type of housing unit
Roof material
Walls material
Ownership of durables/non-dura- Appliances
bles
Furniture
Vehicles
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION Crops planted
PRACTICES
Crop farming and gardening Crops sold
Livestock/poultry raised
Livestock and poultry raising Livestock/poultry sold
Type of fishing
Fishing Fish sold
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 3-day diet recall
AND EXPENDITURES
Food Fuel
Utilities Light
Water
Transportation
Clothing

Final Survey  57
Occasional expenses Education
Recreation
Medical care
Non-durable furnishing
Durable furnishing
Taxes
Other disbursements House maintenance and repair
Special family occasions
Gifts and contributions
Purchase/amortization of real property
Payments of cash loan
Installments
Loans granted
SELF-RATED POVERTY/HUNGER (SWS type questions)
PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL
CAPITAL
Bayanihan/collective action
Type of bayanihan activities
Usual representative (sex)
Willingness to contribute time/money for
barangay projects
Likelihood of people in the barangay to help
each other in times of need
Social cohesion and inclusion Indication of exclusion (discrimination)
Trust and solidarity Peace and order in the community (rating)
Groups and networks Level of crime and violence (rating)
Governance Membership to organizations
Knowledge of the barangay development
council
Attendance in barangay assemblies
Participation in civic gatherings (itemized)
Information sources
Knowledge of barangay finances
KALAHI-CIDSS EVALUATION Knowledge of problems affecting the
barangay

58  Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS

Knowledge of barangay governance
Awareness of the project
Involvement in KALAHI-CIDSS (preparatory
and sub-project implementation phases)
Usual representative
Amount of time devoted
Reasons for not participating
Rating of KALAHI-CIDSS implementation
Barangay specific variables
PRECENCE OF FACILITIES Roads (by type)
(presence and maintenance)
Establishments

• Public (town hall, barangay hall,

church)
• Economic (market, banks, stores)
• Utilities (electricity, water systems,
telephone)
• Social infrastructure (schools, pub-
lic library. Barangay health centers,
hospitals)

PRESENCE AND REPRESENTA- Number of organizations

TION OF ORGANIZED SECTORS
IMLEMENTATION AND BARANGAY Means of informing barangay residents of
DECISION-MAKING finances of the barangay
Members of the BDC, designation and year
of election (approval)
BDC activities
Number of barangay assemblies convened
SERVICES Attendance in barangay meetings
Frequency of council meetings
GOVERNANCE Attendance of barangay LGUs in meetings
Details on Barangay Development Plan
ALAHI-CIDSS EVALUATION Satisfaction rating oon KALAHI-CIDSS
Listing of benefits and negative impact (s)

Final Survey  59
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