People v. Domingo
People v. Domingo
Domingo
Citation: G.R. No. 204895
Prepared by: SANTOS, Mary Rose
Facts: Joel and Roel Domingo were charged with two counts of murder and one count of
attempted murder. Joel and Roel pleaded not guilty. In the pre-trial conference, it was agreed
that the prosecution would present its evidence in four settings but the prosecution failed to
present a single witness. The court dismissed the case upon the accused’s motion and directed
their release.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
notices to the prosecution witnesses had not been served because they constantly transferred
to other places due to threats to their lives as a result of these cases. The court granted the
motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the State was deprived of its right to due process as
it was not given a fair opportunity to present its witnesses; and that accordingly, double
jeopardy cannot bar the reconsideration.
Joel was rearrested. Roel died. The prosecution presented its evidence and Joel was found
guilty of the two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Thus, this appeal
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court was correct in setting aside the dismissal of
the cases against Joel and Roel – NO.
The Regional Trial Court’s initial order of dismissal of the cases was justified because the
prosecution failed to present any witness despite the facts that (1) the public prosecutor had a
month to contact and prepare them and (2) the witnesses received copies of the notices and
subpoenas.
The witnesses’ excuse about the fear for their life is unsubstantiated as it was incumbent upon
them to inform the court and the public prosecutor of their new addresses. They, in fact, went
to the public prosecutor voluntarily after the dismissal of the case. The totality of the
circumstances show that the state was given more than a fair opportunity to present its case.
In instances where the State has been given every opportunity to present its evidence yet it
failed to do so, it cannot claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its
evidence. Such failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of the
accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case.
A dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon its own motion or
express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. The moment the dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the right of
the accused to speedy trial, even if it is upon his own motion or express consent, such
dismissal is equivalent to acquittal. Any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same offense
will violate the constitutional prohibition that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.” (1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 21)
The dismissal of the cases in the initial order predicated on the violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy trial, amounted to an acquittal which bars another prosecution of the
accused for the same offense. Thus, when the RTC reconsidered such order, the RTC placed
the accused twice in jeopardy for the same offense and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
When the prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged, causing him prejudice, the court
is constrained to arrive at a finding that the accused’s right to a speedy trial was violated.