The Sabah Issue and its Impact on Philippine-Malaysian Relations

By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Map of Sabah, Malaysia. Photo: Yodod/flickr.

Despite playing second string to the South China Sea disputes in recent years, the state of Sabah (also known as North
Borneo) has long been a major irritant in bilateral relations between the Philippines and Malaysia. However, a lasting
resolution of this longstanding issue would help cement bilateral ties between the two countries, enhance maritime
security and help regulate seaborne trade. Finally, a resolution may help determine the fate of thousands of Filipino
refugees, migrants and their descendants in Sabah, many of whom remain stateless to this day.

Roots of Contention

The Sultanate of Sulu obtained Sabah from Brunei after helping it to quell a local rebellion. In 1761, the Sulu
Sultan entered into an agreement with the British East India Company to set up a trading post on Balenkong Island. This
was followed in 1878 by the signing of an agreement to lease the sultan’s dominions in North Borneo in return for rent
from the British North Borneo Company. After 1946, the payment of the annual lease passed from the British to the
Malaysian government and continues to this day. When Sabah was transferred from the British North Borneo Company to
the Crown under the 1946 North Borneo Cession Order, former US Governor-General and then foreign affairs adviser to
the newly established Philippine Republic Francis Burton Harrison labelled the transfer as illegal on the basis that other
concerned parties were not consulted. In 1963, then-Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal refused to recognize the
Federation of Malaysia because of the inclusion of Sabah.

As the ‘rightful heirs’ to the sultanate, the Philippines continues to stake its claims over Sabah, albeit with less enthusiasm
than in the past. For instance, in 2001, Manila declared itself an interested party in negotiations between Indonesia and
Malaysia over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. As these are located off Sabah, the Philippines argued that the decision of
the International Court of Justice over the status of the islands may have a bearing on its territorial claims.

Tension Returns

The ghosts of the Sabah issue resurfaced again recently after a violent standoff between loyal followers of the Sultan of
Sulu and Malaysian troops in Tanduao village, Lahad Batu. There was also a similar encounter in Simunul village in
Semporna, raising fears that the conflict may spread over to other areas of northern Borneo. The timing of the standoff
prompted speculation that parties opposed to the Malaysian-brokered peace deal between the Philippine government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were behind the staging of the drama. Some Philippine senatorial candidates,
possibly in order to enhance their nationalist credentials, have also used the incident to lobby Manila into reviving its
claims on Sabah. However, Malaysia’s contribution to the peace deal with the MILF suggests that the Aquino
government may not take their demands too seriously.

Caught in Limbo

The recent unrest in Sabah has also reignited interest in the fate of the state’s Filipino community. Whether they are
refugees, economic migrants or illegal immigrants, Filipinos tend to be lumped into one group and subjected to many
negative stereotypes and prejudices. Many Malaysians claim, for example, that ethnic Filipinos put a strain on social
services, take jobs away from locals and generally pose a security threat. Many refugees also remain stateless and their
local status remains precarious. As a result, many have also been subjected to abuse or discrimination, despite the fact
that some are born and raised in Sabah. In addition, many undocumented Filipinos have also been trafficked to Sabah
through the porous Philippines’ southern backdoor to work in palm oil plantations. Some have even been forced into
prostitution. The plight of these Filipinos has enraged many of their relatives and kinsmen on the other side of the Sea of
Sulu. However, the Philippines’ continued reluctance to set up a consulate in Sabah, on account of its outstanding
claim, means that the fate of many of these Filipinos remains in limbo.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is an MA Asian Studies student at the University of the Philippines. His areas of interest include
territorial and maritime disputes, Philippines-China and China-ASEAN relations, and energy security. He can be reached
at [email protected]

Resolving the Sabah Island Conflict Between Malaysia and the Philippines
By Ruel F. Pepa

NEWS JUNKIE POST

A claim over the island of Sabah has developed into a serious issue between Malaysia and the Philippines. The problem is
so complex that a definite and viable solution seems unforeseeable in the near future. Notwithstanding legal claims based
on documents of ownership by the so-called ¨Sultanate of Sulu,¨ basic issues need to be resolved, and resolved concretely.
On the political front, the president of the Philippines has presented himself as a rubbery-legged weakling who cannot
firmly and decisively resolve the crisis.

In February 2013, the alleged Rajah Muda (Crown Prince) of the ¨Sultanate of Sulu¨ and his heavily armed men sailed to
the island of Sabah and occupied part of it as an initial invasive act to a forcible takeover. In defense of the territory, the
Malaysian government ordered its armed forces to quench the invasion immediately but overstepped the bounds of a
legitimate military operation by committing atrocities against, and even causing the deaths of, Filipino of the Tausug tribe:
long-time civilian residents who had been peacefully and productively living on the island. Because of this move, “boats
have been rocked,” so to speak: the Philippine boat and the Malaysian boat.

The already problematic situation might worsen if the following complicating factors and basic issues are not clearly seen
and properly understood:

1. The Philippine claim over Sabah, though highly legitimate, is not properly grounded in a concrete political foundation,
because this claim is principally that of the ¨Sultanate of Sulu”: anominal entity whose existence cannot be guaranteed by
the existence of a territory called the island of Sulu. While such an island exists, it is a province, and as such, it is headed
by a governor, not a Sultan. Consequently, within Philippine territory, Sulu’s legitimacy is as a province rather than a
Sultanate. If existing legal documents establish that the island Sabah is part of the ¨Sultanate of Sulu,¨ then the question
becomes: where is this Sultanate? History says that in the distant past there was a Sultanate of Sulu, but where is it now?
In the present era, this Sultanate may be inferred to be a figment of the imagination.
2. So many pretenders to the throne have claimed to be the “Sultan of Sulu” that the ¨Sultanate of Sulu¨ has become a big
joke in the 21st century. Each pretender has brought his own proofs and evidence to convince the Filipino people and the
Philippine government that he is the one and only rightful, and therefore legitimate Sultan, who is in the process of
declaring the others as being “haram,” thereby disqualifying them. This is unsurprising, given the chaotic state of the order
of royal lineage due to past arbitrary, and therefore illegitimate, decisions and actions by the royal family. Royal
circumstances have become confused and messy, not from any external factor, but from the disorder and instability
created by none other than the royal family itself. If no one can concretely ascertain who is currently the genuine and
legitimate Sultan of Sulu, how could one clearly establish that a Sultanate of Sulu exists?

3. Despite current difficulties to prove the tangible existence of the Sultanate of Sulu, the Philippines has every
historically-derived legal ground to claim this peacefully and diplomatically, as matters of this nature are effected in a
civilized world. But even if such a diplomatic negotiation is undertaken, can we be sure that, in the end, we will have
Sabah? Considering the current economic condition of the island, where so many Filipinos reside comfortably and
productively within the more progressive and stable Malaysian economy and government, can we honestly and reasonably
think that they would prefer to be under the political jurisdiction of the Philippines rather than Malaysia? Probably not. In
other words, a referendum in Sabah would likely result in a vote for Malaysia instead of the Philippines. This would be the
most reasonable decision from people who want a better life in terms of economic prosperity and political stability.

4. The occupation of Sabah by the alleged Rajah Muda of the ¨Sultanate of Sulu¨ and his armed troops lacks a national
objective and is based instead on a personal — family — agenda. Such an act does not sit well with the more legitimate
claim if done via the government of the Philippines. Again, we raise the issue that there is no concretely existing Sultanate
of Sulu; for the Rajah Muda to invade Sabah and claim it for the ¨Sultanate of Sulu¨ is an illegitimate act.

Unless the current state of affairs in Sabah, and the brewing conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia, are seen in the
light of this presentation, nothing will be resolved appropriately within the most convenient time. As an urgent measure to
avoid stoking up the situation between the Philippines and Malaysia, the Philippines should demand, through a
diplomatic mission, an unconditional cessation of the Malaysian government’s hostilities towards the Filipino civilian
residents of Sabah. The diplomatic meeting should be mediated by a third-party country, like Singapore or Thailand, that
is a stable and credible member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In anticipation of possible illegal
and illegitimate future activities of the ¨armed forces¨ of the ¨Sultanate of Sulu,¨ let the Malaysian military forces contain
them and also protect the island of Sabah’s Filipino civilian residents.

With these points in mind, it is confidently hoped that the Sabah problem will be resolved in the most peaceful way within
the shortest possible time.

Editor’s Note: Ruel F. Pepa is a retired university academic in the fields of philosophy and cultural
studies. He is currently based in Madrid, Spain. All photographs by Cumi & Ciki.