MICROECONOMICS

[GADE AR]

Unit 4: Price fixing with market power

2022 - 2023 Microeconomics Unit 4 Pricing with Market Power 1

I. Price Discrimination:
capturing consumer
surplus

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 2

Definition of Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is selling the same good at different prices to different
customers, even though the costs for producing for the two customers are
the same.

Arbitrage will limit a monopolist's ability to price discriminate.

What’s arbitrage?
◦ Arbitrage is the process of buying a good in one market at a low price and then selling it
in another market at a higher price. To benefit from price differences across markets.
If arbitrage is feasible, price will tend to converge towards a common and single price (in
theory).

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 3

The intuition behind Price Discrimination (1/3)
In order to price discriminate, the firm must have some market power (not
necessarily monopolists only).

Perfect Price Discrimination occurs when a monopoly benefits from the

differences in customers’ willingness to pay by charging different prices.

What is and what isn’t price discrimination?

Two important effects of price discrimination:

◦ It can reduce deadweight loss, i.e. it can eliminate inefficiencies with redistribution of rents. (Efficiency,
social welfare effect)
◦ It can increase the monopolist’s profits by extracting consumer surplus and/or serving more customers.
(Redistribution effect)

Academic year 2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 4
The intuition behind Price Discrimination (2/3)
Price

Consumer
surplus Monopolists would be
happy to capture part
Monopoly Deadweight
of the deadweight loss
price loss
as well as the remaining
Profit
Marginal cost of the consumer surplus
if they could.
Marginal Demand
revenue

0 Quantity sold Quantity

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 5

The intuition behind Price Discrimination (3/3)
Price
Examples

① Cinema tickets

In the limit, the monopolist ② Airline prices

could capture all the consumer ③ Discount coupons
surplus if she could charge Profit
different prices for each unit Marginal cost ④ Quantity
of output sold discounts

Demand

0 Quantity sold Quantity

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II. Price Discrimination:
Degrees

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Price Discrimination: Three degrees

Degree 1 Price Discrimination : Perfect PD

 Full extraction of consumer surplus: each consumer pays her reserve price (the maximum amount she is
willing to pay). Therefore, each consumer pays a different price.

Degree 2 Price Discrimination : Indirect Group PD

 The price is different for different groups of consumers (for instance, consumers of different age) but all
consumers included in one group pays the same price. The firm cannot identify customers’ in each group.

Degree 3 Price Discrimination : Market segmenting PD

 The firm charges a different price to different consumer groups and the firm can identify customers’ in
each group (e.g. consumers in different countries).

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 8

Capturing Consumer Surplus: first
degree price discrimination (1 of 7)
First degree Price Discrimination
100 €
First-Degree Price Discrimination is the practice of 90 €
charging each customer her reservation price.

PRICE $
80 € Monopoly profits
before price
70 €
Because the monopolist charges each consumer her discrimination
MR
reservation price, it is profitable to expand output to Q**. 60 €
P* = 55
50 €
When only a single price, P*, is charged, the firm’s variable 40 €
profit is the area in yellow. D=AR
30 €
MC
With perfect price discrimination, this profit expands to 20 €

the area between the demand curve and the marginal cost 10 €

curve. 0€
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

In practice, it is not simple to apply first degree PD. Why? Q* =35 Q** =70
UNITS sold

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Capturing Consumer Surplus: second degree
price discrimination (2 of 7)
Second-Degree Price Discrimination, consumers are
charged different prices depending on the amount or
volume of good they want to buy.

Also called “indirect price discrimination”: a firm gives its

customers various pricing choices and allows the customers to
choose among them.

Block Pricing vs. Single Price

In panel (a), the firm charges a price of $70 on any quantity
between 1 and 20— 1st block—and $50 for the 2nd block.
In panel (b), the firm can set only a single price of $30. When
block pricing consumer surplus is lower, total surplus is higher,
deadweight loss is lower, but consumers lose.
The more block prices a firm can set, the closer the firm gets to
perfect price discrimination.

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Further Capturing Consumer Surplus

Two markets with different characteristics:

How much should be sold to each group?
(MC=0)
The monopolist can increase profits by
reducing the size of the first triangle sold to
buyer 2 (and 1) and increasing her revenues by
expanding the size of the second triangle.
When the revenue lost from doing this equals
the gain, the monopolist would reach the
maximum profits.
In practice, price discrimination can also be
applied by changing the quality.

MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 11

Capturing Consumer Surplus: third degree price
discrimination (4 of 7) a
In third degree price discrimination, the monopolist sells to different groups of buyers of different
observable characteristics at different prices, but
o every unit of the good sold to a given group is sold at the same price to all group members
o different buyers acquiring “blocks” of different sizes or characteristics pay a different price per
unit of good.

Consumers’ actions help to include them in different categories (traceability, e.g. fidelity cards)
depending on:
 Consumption habits (ecommerce shopping, frequency of sales purchasing, …)
 Location
 Age or other consumer characteristics

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Capturing Consumer Surplus: third degree price
discrimination (5 of 7)

Consumers are divided into two groups, with

separated demand curves for each group. The optimal
prices and quantities are such that the marginal
revenue from each group is the same and equal to
marginal cost.

Here group 1, with demand curve D1, is charged P1,

and group 2, with the more elastic demand curve D2,
is charged the lower price P2.

Marginal cost depends on the total quantity produced

QT. Note that Q1 and Q2 are chosen
so that MR1 = MR2 = MC.
Capturing Consumer Surplus: third degree price
discrimination (4 of 7) b

Assuming that the market is divided in two groups, optimum outputs by group are
determined as follows. Let P1 be the price charged to the first group of consumers,
P2 the price charged to the second group, and C(QT) the total cost of producing
output QTotal = Q1 + Q2. Total profit is then
ΔΠ Δ(P 1Q1)  ΔC 0 ΔΠ Δ( P 2 Q 2) ΔC
Π P 1Q1  P 2Q 2  C(QT ) = − =0
ΔQ1 ΔQ1 ΔQ1 ΔQ 2 ΔQ 2 ΔQ 2

MR1 MC MR2 MC or MR1 MR2 C

RELATIVE PRICES must be such

that P 1 (11 E 2)
MR P (11 E ) and
d
P 2 (11 E 1)

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Case study: Harry Potter DVDs – two separated
markets USA/EU

Harry Potter DVDs sold in the United States and 38

MONOPOLIST - NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Europe 36
34
• Demand: 32
30
– United States: PUS = 36 – 4 Qus 28

– Europe: PEU = 24 – 4D2 26 D1

24 D2
• Marginal cost constant & equal in both markets 22

MC = $4 20
18 (6,5, 17)
16
14
The aggregated demand faced by the monopolist 12
is 10
MR2
D1+D2
8
6
D1+D2 = Qus + Q = 9 – P/4
EU if $36 < P < $24 4
MR1
2
Q
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
At these prices, only the US market is active -2
-4 MR1+MR2
-6 q
D1+D2 = Qus + Q = 15 – P/2 if
EU P < $24
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CASE: With price discrimination

38 40
36 MONOPOLIST - US MARKET 38 MONOPOLIST - EU MARKET
34 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 36
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Qus = 4 Pus = 20
32 34
30 32
30
28
26 28 Q EU = 2,5 Peu = 14
D1 26
24
22 24
D2
20
18
22
20 Total profits =
16 18
16
(20 – 4)x4 + (14 – 4)x2.5 = $89
14
12
14
12
million
10
10
8
8
6 MC MR2
6
4 4
2 MR1
Q 2 Q
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
-2 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
-4 -4
-6 q -6 q

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Capturing Consumer Surplus: third degree price
discrimination (6 of 7)

Even if third-degree price discrimination is feasible, it

may not pay to sell to both groups of consumers if
marginal cost is rising.

Here the first group of consumers, with demand D1,

are not willing to pay much for the product.

It is unprofitable to sell to them because the price

would have to be too low to compensate for the
resulting increase in marginal cost.
Capturing Consumer Surplus: third degree price discrimination
(7/7)
EXAMPLE: THE ECONOMICS OF COUPONS AND REBATES
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR USERS VERSUS NONUSERS OF COUPONS
Blank Cell PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY
PRODUCT NONUSERS USERS
Toilet tissue – 0.60 –0.66
Stuffing/dressing –0.71 –0.96
Shampoo –0.84 –1.04
Cooking/salad oil –1.22 –1.32
Dry mix dinners –0.88 –1.09
Cake mix –0.21 –0.43
Cat food –0.49 –1.13
Frozen entrees –0.60 –0.95
Gelatin –0.97 –1.25
Spaghetti sauce –1.65 –1.81
Crème rinse/conditioner –0.82 –1.12
Soups –1.05 –1.22
Hot dogs –0.59 –0.77
III. Price Discrimination over time:
Intertemporal price discrimination:
Peak-load pricing capturing consumer surplus

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Intertemporal Price
Discrimination and Peak-
Load Pricing (1 of 3)

intertemporal price discrimination Practice of separating consumers with

different demand functions into different groups by charging different prices at
different points in time.

peak-load pricing Practice of charging higher prices during peak periods when
capacity constraints cause marginal costs to be high.

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Peak-Load
Pricing (2 of 3)

Intertemporal Price Discrimination is often applied in

regulated utilities and other services to apply more
efficient pricing in case of significant differences in
demand elasticities at different moments in time

Consumers are divided into groups by changing the

price over time.

Initially, the price is high. The firm captures surplus

from consumers who have a high demand for the good
and who are unwilling to wait to buy it.

Later the price is reduced to appeal to the mass

market.

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Peak-Load
Pricing (3 of 3)
PEAK-LOAD PRICING (“Ramsey pricing”)

Demands for some goods and services increase

sharply during particular times of the day or
year.

Charging a higher price P1 during the peak

periods is more profitable for the firm than
charging a single price at all times.

It is also more efficient because marginal cost is

higher during peak periods.

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EXAMPLE 11.3
HOW TO PRICE A BEST-SELLING NOVEL

Publishing both hardbound and paperback editions of a book allows publishers

to price discriminate.
Some consumers want to buy a new bestseller as soon as it is released, even if
the price is $25. Other consumers, however, will wait a year until the book is
available in paperback for $10.
The key is to divide consumers into two groups, so that those who are willing to
pay a high price do so and only those unwilling to pay a high price wait and buy
the paperback.
It is clear, however, that those consumers willing to wait for the paperback
edition have demands that are far more elastic than those of bibliophiles. It is
not surprising, then, that paperback editions sell for so much less than
hardbacks.

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IV. Price Discrimination: Non-linear pricing:

- Two-Part Tariffs
- Bundling

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The Two-Part Tariff (1 of 3) – SINGLE CONSUMER

Two-part tariffs is a form of pricing in which

consumers are charged both an entry and a usage
fee. (e. g. amusement parks – “The Mickey Mouse
monopolist”)

TWO-PART TARIFF WITH A SINGLE CONSUMER

The consumer has demand curve D.

The firm maximizes profit by setting usage fee P

equal to marginal cost and entry fee T* equal to
the entire surplus of the consumer.

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The Two-Part Tariff (2 of 3) - TWO CONSUMERS

TWO-PART TARIFF WITH TWO CONSUMERS

The profit-maximizing usage fee P* will exceed marginal

cost.

The entry fee T* is equal to the surplus of the consumer

with the smaller demand.

The resulting profit is 2T* + (P* − MC)(Q1 + Q2).

Note that this profit is larger than twice the area of
triangle ABC.
The Two-Part Tariff (3 of 3) - MANY
CONSUMERS

TWO-PART TARIFF WITH MANY DIFFERENT CONSUMERS

Total profit π is the sum of the profit from the entry fee π a and the profit
from sales πs. Both πa and πs depend on T, the entry fee. Therefore

π = πa + πs = n(T)T + (P − MC)Q(n)

where n is the number of entrants, which depends on the entry fee T, and
Q is the rate of sales, which is greater the larger is n.

Here T* is the profit-maximizing entry fee, given P. To calculate optimum

values for P and T, we can start with a number for P, find the optimum T,
and then estimate the resulting profit.

P is then changed and the corresponding T recalculated, along with the

new profit level.
EXAMPLE (1 of 4) - PRICING CELLULAR PHONE
SERVICE

Cellular phone service has traditionally been priced using a two-part

tariff: a monthly access fee, which includes some amount of free
“anytime” minutes, plus a per-minute charge for additional minutes.

Offering different plans allowed companies to combine third-degree

price discrimination with the two-part tariff.

Today, most consumers use their phone not just to make or receive
calls but also to surf the Web, read email, and so on. They separate
themselves into groups based on their expected data usage, with
each group choosing a different plan.

Cellular providers have learned that the most profitable way to price
their service is to combine price discrimination with a two-part tariff.

MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER

2022 - 2023 28
EXAMPLE (2 of 4) - PRICING CELLULAR PHONE
SERVICE
TABLE 11.3: CELLULAR DATA PLANS (2016)
MONTHLY ACCESS
DATA USAGE MONTHLY PRICE CHARGE OVERAGE FEE
A. VERIZON A. VERIZON A. VERIZON A. VERIZON
1GB $30 $20 $15/GB
3GB $45 $20 $15/GB
6GB $60 $20 $15/GB
12GB $80 $20 $15/GB
18GB $100 $20 $15/GB
B. SPRINT B. SPRINT B. SPRINT B. SPRINT
1GB $20 $45 None1
3GB $30 $45 None
6GB $45 $45 None
12GB $60 $45 None
24GB $80 $45 None

1
All plans include 2GB unlimited data
EXAMPLE (3 of 4) - PRICING CELLULAR PHONE
SERVICE
TABLE 11.3: CELLULAR DATA PLANS (2016)
MONTHLY ACCESS
DATA USAGE MONTHLY PRICE CHARGE OVERAGE FEE
C. AT&T C. AT&T C. AT&T C. AT&T
2GB $30 $25 $15/GB
5GB $50 $25 $15/GB
15GB $100 $15 $15/GB
20GB $140 $15 $15/GB
25GB $175 $15 $15/GB
30GB $225 $15 $15/GB
D. VODAPHONE D. VODAPHONE
D. VODAPHONE (U.K)2 D. VODAPHONE (U.K)2
(U.K)2 (U.K)2
3GB £37 None £6.50/250MB
6GB £42 None £6.50/250MB
12GB £47 None £6.50/250MB
24GB £52 None £6.50/250MB
30GB £58 None £6.50/250MB
2
£1 = $1.29 (as of July 2016
EXAMPLE (4 of 4) - PRICING CELLULAR PHONE
SERVICE
TABLE 11.3: CELLULAR DATA PLANS (2016)
MONTHLY ACCESS
DATA USAGE MONTHLY PRICE CHARGE OVERAGE FEE
E. VODAPHONE E. VODAPHONE E. VODAPHONE E. VODAPHONE
(AUSTRALIA) (AUSTRALIA) (AUSTRALIA) (AUSTRALIA)

4GB $60 None $10/GB

7GB $70 None $10/GB

8GB $80 None $10/GB

11GB $100 None $10/GB

16GB $130 None $10/GB

F. CHINA
F. CHINA UNICOM F. CHINA UNICOM F. CHINA UNICOM
UNICOM

1GB $25 None $.03/MB

2GB $35 None $.03/MB

3GB $45 None $.03/MB

6GB $80 None $.03/MB

Bundling (2 of 12)
Relative Valuations
Why is bundling more profitable than selling the films separately? Because the relative
valuations of the two films are reversed.

The demands are negatively correlated—the customer willing to pay the most for Wind is willing
to pay the least for Gertie.

Suppose demands were positively correlated—that is, Theater A would pay more for both films:
Blank Cell GONE WITH THE WIND GETTING GERTIE’S GARTER
Theater A $12,000 $4000
Theater B $10,000 $3000

If we bundled the films, the maximum price that could be charged for the package is $13,000,
yielding a total revenue of $26,000, the same as by renting the films separately.

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 32

Bundling (1 of 12)
Bundling consists in selling two or more products as a package.

To see how a film company can use customer heterogeneity to its advantage, suppose that
there are two movie theaters and that their reservation prices for our two films are as follows:
Blank Cell GONE WITH THE WIND GETTING GERTIE’S GARTER
Theater A $12,000 $3000
Theater B $10,000 $4000

If the films are rented separately, the maximum price that could be charged for Wind is $10,000
because charging more would exclude Theater B. Similarly, the maximum price that could be
charged for Gertie is $3000.

But suppose the films are bundled. Theater A values the pair of films at $15,000 ($12,000 +
$3000), and Theater B values the pair at $14,000 ($10,000 + $4000). Therefore, we can charge
each theater $14,000 for the pair of films and earn a total revenue of $28,000.

2022 - 2023 MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 33

Bundling (3 of 12)

RESERVATION PRICES

Reservation prices r1 and r2 for two goods

are shown for three consumers, labeled A,
B, and C.

Consumer A is willing to pay up to $3.25

for good 1 and up to $6 for good 2.
Bundling (4 of 12)

CONSUMPTION DECISIONS WHEN PRODUCTS

ARE SOLD SEPARATELY

The reservation prices of consumers in region I

exceed the prices P1 and P2 for the two
goods, so these consumers buy both goods.

Consumers in regions II and IV buy only one of

the goods, and consumers in region III buy
neither good.
Bundling (5 of 12)

CONSUMPTION DECISIONS WHEN PRODUCTS ARE

BUNDLED

Consumers compare the sum of their reservation

prices r1 + r2, with the price of the bundle PB.

They buy the bundle only if r1 + r2 is at least as

large as PB.
Bundling (6 of 12)

RESERVATION PRICES

In (a), because demands are perfectly positively

correlated, the firm does not gain by bundling:
It would earn the same profit by selling the
goods separately.

In (b), demands are perfectly negatively

correlated. Bundling is the ideal strategy—all
the consumer surplus can be extracted.
Bundling (7 of 12)

MOVIE EXAMPLE

Consumers A and B are two movie theaters. The

diagram shows their reservation prices for the
films Gone with the Wind and Getting Gertie’s
Garter.

Because the demands are negatively correlated,

bundling pays.
2022 - 2023 39

Bundling (12 of 12)

Tying
Tying Practice of requiring a customer to purchase one good in order to
purchase another.

Why might firms use this kind of pricing practice?

One of the main benefits of tying is that it often allows a firm to meter demand
and thereby practice price discrimination more effectively.

Tying can also be used to extend a firm’s market power.

Tying can have other uses. An important one is to protect customer goodwill
connected with a brand name.

This is why franchises are often required to purchase inputs from the franchiser.
MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER
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RESERVE SLIDES

MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER

Bundling (8 of 12)
Mixed Bundling

mixed bundling Selling two or more goods both as a package and individually.
pure bundling Selling products only as a package.

MIXED VERSUS PURE BUNDLING

With positive marginal costs, mixed bundling may be more profitable than pure
bundling.

Consumer A has a reservation price for good 1 that is below marginal cost c1,

and consumer D has a reservation price for good 2 that is below marginal cost
c2.

With mixed bundling, consumer A is induced to buy only good 2, and consumer
D is induced to buy only good 1, thus reducing the firm’s cost.

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Bundling (9 of 12)

Let’s compare three strategies:

1. Selling the goods separately at prices P1 = $50 and P2 = $90.
2. Selling the goods only as a bundle at a price of $100.
3. Mixed bundling, whereby the goods are offered separately at prices P1 = P2 = $89.95, or as a bundle at a
price of $100.
BUNDLING EXAMPLE
Blank cell P1 P2 P3 PROFIT
Sold separately $50 $90 — $150
Pure bundling — — $100 $200
Mixed bundling $89.95 $89.95 $100 $229.90

As we should expect, pure bundling is better than selling the goods separately because consumers’ demands
are negatively correlated. But what about mixed bundling?

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Bundling (10 of 12)
MIXED BUNDLING WITH ZERO MARGINAL COSTS

If marginal costs are zero, and if consumers’ demands are not perfectly
negatively correlated, mixed bundling is still more profitable than pure bundling.

In this example, consumers B and C are willing to pay $20 more for the bundle
than are consumers A and D.

With pure bundling, the price of the bundle is $100. With mixed bundling, the
price of the bundle can be increased to $120 and consumers A and D can still be
charged $90 for a single good.

MIXED BUNDLING WITH ZERO MARGINAL COSTS

Blank Cell P1 P2 P3 PROFIT
Sold
$80 $80 — $320
separately
Pure
— — $100 $400
bundling
Mixed
$90 $90 $120 $420
bundling

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Bundling (11 of 12)
Bundling in Practice
MIXED BUNDLING IN PRACTICE

The dots in this figure are estimates of reservation prices for a

representative sample of consumers.

A company could first choose a price for the bundle, PB, such that
a diagonal line connecting these prices passes roughly midway
through the dots.

The company could then try individual prices P1 and P2.

Given P1, P2, and PB, profits can be calculated for this sample of
consumers. Managers can then raise or lower P1, P2 , and PB and
see whether the new pricing leads to higher profits. This
procedure is repeated until total profit is roughly maximized.
EXAMPLE
THE COMPLETE DINNER VERSUS À LA CARTE: A RESTAURANT PRICING PROBLEM

For a restaurant, mixed bundling means offering both complete dinners (the
appetizer, main course, and dessert come as a package) and an à la carte
menu (the customer buys the appetizer, main course, and dessert separately).

This strategy allows the à la carte menu to be priced to capture consumer

surplus from customers who value some dishes much more highly than
others.

At the same time, the complete dinner retains those customers who have
lower variations in their reservation prices for different dishes (e.g., customers
who attach moderate values to both appetizers and desserts).

Successful restaurateurs know their customers’ demand characteristics and

use that knowledge to design a pricing strategy that extracts as much
consumer surplus as possible.
2022 - 2023
MICROECONOMICS UNIT 4 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER 45
EXAMPLE (1 of 2)
THE COMPLETE DINNER VERSUS À LA CARTE: A RESTAURANT PRICING PROBLEM
MIXED BUNDLING AT MCDONALD’S—U.S. AND CHINA (2016)

UNITED STATES
MEAL (INCLUDES UNBUNDLED PRICE OF
INDIVIDUAL ITEM (MASSACHUSETTS)
PRICE SODA AND FRIES) PRICE BUNDLE SAVINGS

Premium McWrap Premium McWrap

$5.36 $9.49 $7.80 $1.69
Chicken & Bacon Chicken & Bacon

Filet-O-Fish $4.62 Filet-O-Fish $8.75 $7.06 $1.69

Big Mac $4.87 Big Mac $9.00 $7.31 $1.69
Quarter Pounder $4.62 Quarter Pounder $8.75 $7.06 $1.69
Double Quarter Double Quarter
$5.84 $9.97 $8.16 $1.81
Pounder Pounder
10-piece Chicken 10-piece Chicken
$5.48 $9.61 $7.92 $1.69
McNuggets McNuggets
Large French Fries $2.31 Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell
Large Soda $1.82 Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell
EXAMPLE (2 of 2)
THE COMPLETE DINNER VERSUS À LA CARTE: A RESTAURANT PRICING PROBLEM
MIXED BUNDLING AT MCDONALD’S—U.S. AND CHINA (2016)

CHINA
MEAL
(BEIJING) PRICE
(INCLUDES OF
INDIVIDUAL SODA AND UNBUNDLE BUNDL SAVING
ITEM PRICE* FRIES) D PRICE E S
Big Mac 17 RMB Big Mac 33 RMB 20 RMB 13 RMB
German Sausage German
Double Beef 20 RMB Sausage Double 36 RMB 32 RMB 4 RMB
Burger Beef Burger
Duck Burger 23 RMB Duck Burger 39 RMB 31 RMB 8 RMB
Blank
French Fries 7 RMB Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell
Cell
Blank
Drink 9 RMB Blank Cell Blank Cell Blank Cell
Cell
*1 RMB =
$0.15