Rancle.

-ea
Allhusse __
Ranciere's critique of Althusser and Benton's
comments [RP7 RP9 respectively] raise fundamental
problems about the nature of theoretical debate in
addition to fundamental problems at the level of
theory itself. I take Benton to be presenting a
defence of a more or less orthodox Althusserian
position and the following points attempt to do
three things: firstly defend some of Ranciere's
positions against Benton's criticisms; secondly to
bring out one aspect of Ranciere's implicit theor-
etical position - that concerned with the relation-
ship between concepts in the theory; thirdly to
show that despite his criticisms of Althusser,
Ranciere reproduces in a different form a funda-
mental consequence of the Althusserian position -
an inability to understand what theoretical
debate involves.
1 Ideology in general and social cohesion
Ranciere criticises Althusser for introducing into
Marxism a notion of social cohesion and the social
totality in general, reproducing the problematic
of bourgeois sociology. Benton defends the
Althusserian position as follows:
You don't need a 'theory of the social totality
in general-'--.- .. in order to argue that there is
an ideological level in all modes of production
and that this level has certain universal
characteristics . .. [RP9 27]
Yet for Benton and Althusser ideology is defined
as supplying a system of representations which
enable the agents of the social totality to acc-
omplish the tasks determined by the structure of
the totality (or rather the structure of the mode
of production). In other words we cannot have
any concept of ideology without some reference to
the social totality in which that ideology is
placed. Thus to argue that there is an ideologi-
cal level in all modes of production is to argue
that all social totalities need an ideology i.e.
that there are functions belonging to all social
totalities in general, i.e. that there is impli-
citly such a thing as a 'social totality in
general} .
By contrast, a of 'production in gen-
eral' suggested by Benton as a parallel to that
of 'ideology in general' makes no assumptions
about the role of production in the social total-
ity as a whole but rather offers a few truisms
about production - that, for example, it involves
instruments, labour and raw materials. To talk
about social cohesion as such is not necessarily
to enter the realms of bourgeois sociology. But
to posit, through a conception of ideology in
general, a necessity for social cohesion prior.to
any conception of contradiction or conflict is.
Of course there must be some form of unity in all
societies, but if there is unity there can also be
disunity - the notions imply each other and there
are no grounds for placing one prior to the other.
The term 'contradictory unity' reveals this mutual
implication very clearly, for if there were no
unity then there could be no contradiction - only
difference and separation.
2 Social and Technical Division of Labour
Ranciere does not by and large articulate his own
theoretical position, but one important element of
it is the relationships between his concepts -
which are closer to the dialectical relations of
;18
Hegelian Marxism than to the relations that exist
in Althusser's thought. He attacks the latter as
'philosophy's police mentality' but no more.
The difference is that between a clear and rigor-
ous analytic distinction between the concepts that
combine into a theory - a distinction that Al thus.-
ser tries to maintain - and a relationship of
'fluidity' between concepts, an interpenetration
and mutual implication - such as that between
unity and contradiction. We can find this inter-
penetration again in Ranciere's discussion of the
technical and social division of labour which are,
he says, aspects of the same division of labour,
we cannot, therefore, divide institutions and fun-
functions clearly into one or the other.
It is interesting that Ted Benton accepts
Ranciere's point that they are aspects of the same
division of labour, but only accepts it, without
following it through to its conclusions; and,
when he discusses the state and ideology, he tries
to draw precisely the clear distinction that
Ranciere disputes, but the only way he can do this
is by placing his argument on a level of almost
meaningless generality. The state, for example,
fulfils the functions of co-ordination/super-
vision/administration (technical division of
labour) and, in a class society, at the same time
the function of class domination (social division
of labour); in a socialist society it would still
perform the former functions but - eventually at
any rate - not the latter [RP9 p27]. But to say
that any society will involve a co-ordinating and
administrating state is not very informative, and
when we look at the precise organs of co-ordina-
tion, administration and supervision, we can see
the way in wpich the technical and social divisions
of labour interpenetrate: the institutions and
positions involved in, say, co-ordinating produc-
tion, 'economic planning' under capitalism, can
bear little or no resemblance to those involved
in a socialist state - the relationships of the
institutions and positions to each other and to
those co-ordinated, supervised and administered
will have changed radically, as will the power of
the institution and the way in which positions
are filled. To imply, with Althus$er, that some
institutions belong clearly to the technical di'l1'i-
sion of labour is to open the way for misrepresent-
ation and technological determinism; to say, with
Benton, that some functions are a product solely
of the technical division of labour is to miss the
point, since it is the way in which these functions
are fulfilled which is important. There is no way
in which the technical and social divisions of
labour can be safely or usefully distinguished
(although this is not necessarily to say that both
are of equal importance).
Ranciere's failure to theorise his position in the
way suggested above is the major lack in his cri-
tique, which turns eventually into an attack on
theory itself - as Ted Benton recognises.
3 Scientific Knowledge
The same interpenetration of concepts is implied
in Ranciere's discussion of the science/ideology
couple. Althusser, of course, recognises no
.erpenetrations: as Ranciere points out, ideology
is other than science, the separate opposite. Ted
Benton adopts this duality, and the result is his
characterisation of position as a 'con-
cession to relativism and a-rationalism', but it
is in fact quite possible to claim the cognitive
superiority of Marxism over bourgeois forms of
knowledge without relying on some absolute criter-
ia of scientificity (unless one is also going to
claim that Althusser is the only Marxist since
Marx, which is another argument) and without be-
coming relativist and a-rationalist.
Benton's comments on seem to put forward
a rather different view of science than Althusser
does, so we are in fact dealing with three posi-
tions, and we can the implications of
argument by working through them.
Ted Benton provides a useful example in his arg-
ument that it is possible to separate the con-
tents of scientific knowledge from the form of
their appropriation: .
That such a separation can be achieved is a pre-
supposition of any adequate history of the
sciences - consider, for instance, the different
ideological currents and social relationships
with which Darwin's theory of evolution has been
articulated: the classical rlaissez-faire' liber-
alism of late Victorian England, the petit-
bourgeois radicalism of sections of German int-
elligentsia (Haeckel), the reformist socialism
of Wallace in England and the Leninism of Lenin
himself: [Benton p28]
This formulation sets up the idea of some 'true'
Darwin's theory of evolution which can be
ted from its interpretation in a similar way in
which positivism sets up a 'real' world which can
be separated from interpretations of the world
(theory) and against which those interpretations
can be tested. Yet where is this 'true' theory
of It cannot be in Darwin's work it-
self in a clear and manifest way, otherwise it
could not be taken up into
currents and social relationships, since these
must inevitably change the meaning of the theory
of evolution, and that change would be apparent.
Darwin's theory cannot exist apart from the sys-
tems (ideological or scientific) in which it is
articulated.
This leads us on to Althusser's position; which
seems to be not that there is some 'true' theory
of evolution separate from its interpretations,
but rather that one interpretation - one reading
amongst others is scientific; the scientific as
opposed to the ideological reading either meets
the criteria of scientificity or reveals the
existence of those criteria in Darwin's work, and
we know what those criteria are, we can write
the history of science. To discover the contents
of scientific knowledge we have to read the text
in which that is contained in the right
way - i.e. articulate-it into another system.
In relation to Althusser's position,
argues - it seems to me - that 'reading' must be
extended to take account of the social and insti-
tutional relationships within which readinq takes
place - not only can we not separate Darwin's
theory of evolution from its interpretation on
the theoretical level, we cannot separate it from
the social and institutional framework in which it
is presented since this framework too is an inter-
pretation.
The 'surface' effect of position is
'neutralise' scientific knowledge; thus, for
example, Marxism may be taught as scientific know-
ledge of society without threatening, perhaps even
reinforcing the bourgeois education system. But
there is a deeper effect: if our argument above
was correct - that scientific knowledge does not
exist apart from its reading, and if social rela-
tionships into that reading - then the cri-
teria for scientificity that Althusser presents,
or discovers in the proofs of the scientific dis-
course itself, are inadequate; in fact the dis-
tinction between ideology and science collapses
since scientific knowledge can be ideological and
ideology can be scientific. The fact that
continues to talk as if there were a
clear distinction between science and ideology is
an indication of his own theoretical confusion.
What we are left with is a number of different
types of knowledge, each defined by its mode of
appropriation of its object, internal
featUres, its relationship to other forms or bod-
ies of knowledge, and the social framework in
which it is articulated; in other words we move
to a way of viewing knowledge that is closer to
Lukacs than to
4 Theoretical struggle
however, does not theorise his position
in this way: rather he uses it as a base to att-
ack theory and theoretical struggle in favour of
'practice'. Ted Benton is, I think, quite right
to defend theory against such an attack, but if
position is a degradation of theoret-
ical struggle then the orthodox Althusserian posi-
tion is a denegation. The confrontation of bour-
geois ideology with criteria of scientificity is
a confrontation only, in which there is no debate,
no struggle, no argument; there is only the
presentation of an alternative and a judgement.
Both positions remove the power of theory as
weapon, as revolutionary practice in its own
right, in the latter case whilst still recognising
theory as a guide to revolutionary practice out-
side of theory. The power of theory is its abi-
lity to transform consciousness, to change people
not necessarily by intellectual conviction but by
enabling them to grasp their own world and their
own experience in a radically new way and to be-
come aware of ways of changing the world. If
Marxist theory is to do this, then it must be
able to live inside everyday representations of
the world, to take them as the starting point of
its argument, and it must be able to transform
those representations into an adequate understand-
ing of the world. 'Criteria of scientificity' do
not only not enable theory to fulfil this role but
they actively it from doing so; the epi-
stemological break between ideology and science is
also a chasm between the Marxist and those to whom
he talks.
IanCraib
. Oldanew lefl
'Tens of thousands of socialist intellectuals
radical philosophers, uneasily unattached' -
should we say, uneasily attached - this broad de-
scription is probably true, and would include me.
I was certainly as disturbed as Jonathan Ree to
read Edward Thompson's Open Letter to Kolakowski,
and I was glad to read his opening discussion
upon it(RP9) .. The Letter was very pessimistic, and
so is Jonathan Ree's commentary. In those far
off days of the fifties, he says, the socialist
intellectuals gave their allegiance to the Brit-
ish Labour movement, though they might criticize
it, but he suggests that this is now no longer
possible and our scope is more limited_
To my mind the central fact that alleviates
pessimism is that these discussions are opened
up, and hence I make my own contribution. The
things at issue are not those between Thompson
and Kolakowski: the argument there is not worth
breath, ,and I am surprized at Thompson engaging
himself in it. As an elderly socialist I see
Kolakowski taking the course that always is wide
open to such people once they establish some
prestige as socialists - the establishment wel-
come for the apostate, the pat on the back, and
the spoils that go with it. I have observed it
all my life.
The real issue is between Thompson and the New
Left Review, and here I am profoundly reluctant
to take sides, in the light of the contribution
that both are making to socialist thought and