Discrimination-to-Destruction
Discrimination-to-Destruction
DISCRIMINATION TO DESTRUCTION:
A Legal Analysis of Gender Crimes Against the Rohingya
About Global Justice Center
The Global Justice Center (GJC) is an international human rights organization dedicated
to advancing gender equality through the rule of law. We combine advocacy with legal
analysis, working to expose and root out the patriarchy inscribed in so many international
laws. Our projects forge legal precedents in venues that have the greatest potential for
global impact, such as the United Nations Security Council, and in places with the most
potential for systemic change, like conflict and post-conflict situations and transitional
democracies. We believe that enforcing treaties and international human rights laws can
be a catalyst for radical change, moving these hard-won rights from paper to practice.
GJC has worked on issues related to justice and accountability in Burma, particularly
for sexual violence against ethnic women, since 2005. GJC also has a project focused
on Gender & Genocide, which seeks to ensure that women and girls’ experiences of
genocide informs efforts to prevent, suppress and punish genocide.
For more information, please visit our website: www.globaljusticecenter.net
Acknowledgements
This brief was drafted by Grant Shubin, Elena Sarver and Kristin Smith, with drafting and
editing support by Akila Radhakrishnan. Design and layout by Liz Olson.
Cover Photo: Fatema fled with her family when the Burmese military opened fire on her village.
She has been in Kutapalong refugee camp for two months. Anna Dubuis/DFID/CC BY 2.0
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................ 1
METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................2
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................3
BACKGROUND & CONTEXT..................................................................................6
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY..............................................................................9
1. Attacks against the Rohingya are Widespread, Systematic and Directed at a
Civilian Population........................................................................................................9
2. Persecution of Rohingya Women on Girls on the Basis of their Gender .......................13
3. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Rohingya Women and Girls: Rape.............21
4. Other Sexual Violence Crimes of Comparable Gravity Against Rohingya
Women and Girls........................................................................................................ 24
5. Deportation & Forcible Transfer of Rohingya Women and Girls.................................... 26
6. Torture of Rohingya Women and Girls......................................................................... 33
7. Murder of Rohingya Women and Girls......................................................................... 36
GENOCIDE...................................................................................................... 38
1. Intent to Destroy the Rohingya Religious and Ethnic Minority as a Group, in
Whole or in Part.......................................................................................................... 38
2. Killing of Rohingya Women and Girls...........................................................................50
3. Causing Serious Bodily and Mental Harm to Rohingya Women and Girls......................51
4. Deliberately Inflicting on Rohingya Women and Girls Conditions of Life
Intended to Bring About their Physical Destruction .................................................... 55
5. Imposing Measures to Prevent Births in the Rohingya Population................................ 59
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................62
Executive Summary
Since August 2016, the Burmese military (Tatmadaw), Border Guard, and police
forces have conducted a systematic campaign of brutal violence against Rohingya
Muslims in Burma’s northern Rakhine State. These attacks come in the midst of a
decades-long campaign of persecution of the Rohingya through discriminatory
measures to police and control the group, including denying citizenship rights,
restricting movement and access to healthcare, and limiting marriage and the
number of children in families. While all members of the Rohingya population were
targeted for violence, gender was integral to how the atrocities were perpetrated.
This brief seeks to bring to light the international crimes—crimes against humanity
and genocide—committed against Rohingya women and girls since 2016 by Burmese
Security Forces and highlight the role gender played in the design and commission of
these atrocities. The military has long used rape as a weapon of war and oppression
in its conflicts with ethnic groups, and in the recent attacks, Rohingya women
and girls were targeted for particularly brutal manners of killing, rape and sexual
violence, and torture.
Rape and sexual violence were widespread, pervasive, and often conducted in
public. The acts resulted in serious bodily and mental harm to women, including in
some circumstances, death. Many women reported being gang raped, some by as
many as eight perpetrators. The rapes were accompanied by other acts of violence,
humiliation, and cruelty. Women were beaten, punched, kicked, and subjected to
invasive body searches. Their bodies were mutilated, their breasts and nipples cut
off and vaginas slashed. Women and girls were not spared by age or condition—
with girls as young as five and pregnant women among the victims.
Gendered crimes and consequences were not limited to sexual violence and rape.
Rohingya women and girls were often murdered by being burned alive or butchered
by knives used for slaughtering animals—methods of killing that mirror the
destruction of objects and property, demonstrating the Security Forces’ misogyny
and deeply gendered conceptions of power.
When these acts are compared against the elements of international crimes, they
reveal a series of criminal conduct informed and defined by the gender of the victim.
These include, as analyzed in this brief, the crimes against humanity of murder,
persecution, forcible transfer or deportation, rape and other sexual violence of
comparable gravity, and torture, as well as the genocidal crimes of killing, causing
serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group.
The international community has, at long-last, begun to recognize the imperative
to ensure justice and accountability for the crimes committed by Burmese
Security Forces and the impossibility for justice in Burma’s domestic system.
As the international community begins to develop mechanisms for justice and
accountability—whether through international investigations and evidence
collection, at the International Criminal Court, or in third-party states—it is
essential that a strong gender perspective and analysis is incorporated at all levels
of these processes, from investigation to prosecution to redress and reparations.
1. Burma was renamed Myanmar by the military junta in 1989. Because this decision was made “without consulting
any public opinion” we continue to refer to the country as Burma throughout this brief. See Gwen Robinson, “Suu Kyi
refuses to use ‘Myanmar’ name,” Financial Times, July 3, 2012.
2. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Myanmar: Tatmadaw leaders must be investigated
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes – UN Report,” Aug. 27, 2018; “Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” paras. 43-49, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, Mar. 9, 2018; “Rep. of the Ind.
Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, paras. 82, 93, Aug. 24, 2018; “Statement by Special
Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict at Security Council Open Debate on Sexual
Violence in Conflict,” Apr. 16, 2018; “Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Advisor on the Prevention
of Genocide on his visit to Bangladesh to assess the situation of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar,” Mar. 13, 2018.
3. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Myanmar: Tatmadaw leaders must be investigated
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes – UN Report,” Aug. 27, 2018.
4. “Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” para. 73, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/67, Mar.
14, 2017; “Statement by Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council,” Mar. 12, 2018.
5. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 96.
6. “Myanmar rejects UN findings in Rohingya genocide report,” Al Jazeera News, Aug. 29, 2018.
7. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, paras. 82, 93.
8. Nyiramasuhuko et al. (Butare), Case No. ICTR-98-42, Trial Judgment, para. 5747, June 24, 2011; Prosecutor v.
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Judgment, para. 1108, Mar. 7, 2014; Prosecutor v. Karemera and Ngirumpatse, Case
No. ICTR-98-44-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 1597-98, Feb. 2, 2012.
9. United Nations Press Release, “Myanmar’s Refugee Problem among the World’s Worst Humanitarian, Human Rights
Crises, Secretary-General Says in Briefing to Security Council,” Aug. 28, 2018.
10. Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the [Rome] Statute,’ Case.
No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, para. 74, Sept. 6, 2018.
11. Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the [Rome] Statute,’ Case.
No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, paras. 73, 75-78, Sept. 6, 2018.
12. While the decision from Pre-Trial Chamber I only discusses the crimes against humanity of deportation, persecution
and other inhumane acts in name, the Court appears to open a door for other crimes to be considered by the Office of
the Prosecutor, in particular where the element of a cross-border crime is met. Paragraphs 74 through 79 go beyond
the Prosecutor’s initial request to the Court, which was limited to the crime of deportation, and extend the rationale
behind the grant of jurisdiction to “other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” where “at least one element”
of those crimes occurs on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. The Court provides two “examples” of
other crimes that may satisfy this requirement in the case of the Rohingya—persecution and other inhumane acts—
but does not limit any potential investigation to just these crimes. This broader view of crimes that may fall within
the ambit of this decision is also supported by the press release from the Court that accompanied the decision,
which states that “the Chamber further found that the Court may also exercise its jurisdiction with regards to any
other crime set out in article 5 of the Statute.” Article 5 of the Rome Statute broadly sets out the categories of crimes
that fall under the Court’s jurisdiction—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. (Decision
on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the [Rome] Statute,’ Case. No. ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/18, paras. 74-79.)
13. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Concept Note: Accountability mechanism for
Myanmar,” undated, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/ConceptNoteAccountabilityFramework.pdf.
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art 1, 78 UNTS 277, Dec. 9, 1948.
15. “Rep. of the Secretary General on Conflict-related sexual violence,” at Annex p. 34, UN Doc. S/2018/250, Mar. 23, 2018.
16. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Myanmar: Tatmadaw leaders must be investigated
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes – UN Report,” Aug. 27, 2018.
17. “End of Mission Statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” at 3, Feb 1, 2018.
18. United Nations Press Release, “UN Human Rights experts call on Myanmar to end counter-insurgency operations
targeting civilians in Northern Karen State and Eastern Pegu Division,” May 16, 2006.
19. “Rep. of the Secretary General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence,” at 11, UN Doc. S/2014/181, Mar. 13, 2014; Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to the Comm’n on Human
Rights, “Addendum: Summary of Information, including individual cases, transmitted to Governments and replies
received,” paras. 157-174, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, Mar. 21, 2006; Women’s League of Burma, “Same Impunity,
Same Patterns,” at 3, Jan. 2014; Burma Campaign UK, “Burma Briefing: Rape and Sexual Violence by the Burmese
Army,” at 6, Jul. 2014.
20. See Global Justice Center, Submission to the Ind. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, Feb. 15, 2018.
21. See Global Justice Center, Submission to the Ind. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, Feb. 15, 2018.
22. 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, art. 445
23. 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, arts. 20(b), 343(b).
24. 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, art. 204(b).
25. Amnesty Int’l, “‘Caged Without a Roof,’ Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” at 20, 2017.
26. Refugees Int’l, “Field Report, Reluctant Refugee: Rohingya safe but not secure in Bangladesh,” at 4, Jul. 2017.
27. Refugees Int’l, “Reluctant Refugee,” at 4, Jul. 2017; Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 20.
28. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 20.
29. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 20; “Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation in human rights in
Myanmar,” paras. 56–58, UN Doc. A/67/383, Sept. 25, 2012; “Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in Myanmar,” paras. 47-48, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/58, Apr. 17, 2013; UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), “Flash Report: Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh – Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing
from Myanmar since 9 October 2016,” at 6, Feb. 3, 2017.
30. For a detailed description of ARSA and its activities, see Int’l Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a
Dangerous New Phase,” Asia Report no. 292, Dec. 7, 2017. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 24; Refugees
Int’l, “Reluctant Refugee,” at 4, Jul. 2017.
31. US Holocaust Museum & Fortify Rights, “Atrocity Crimes Against Rohingya Muslims,” at 6, Nov. 2017.
32. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 42, Feb. 3, 2017; UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, paras. 42-49.
33. Refugees Int’l, “Reluctant Refugee,” at 4.
Crimes Against Humanity Against Rohingya Women and Girls 10-year-old daughter
when they fled their
The gender-based atrocities committed by Burmese Security Forces likely constitute numerous
village as it was being
crimes against humanity.
burned to the ground.
Crimes against humanity occur when certain acts are “committed as part of a widespread or She says she has no
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”48 Courts hope of seeing her
have found that “the requirements of ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ should be read disjunctively.”49 alive again.
Further, the perpetrator must participate in and have knowledge of the widespread or systematic Photo
attack.50 Anna Dubuis/DFID
CC BY 2.0
International law recognizes a myriad of different crimes against humanity, and, as discussed below,
Burmese Security Forces targeted Rohingya women and girls for crimes including rape, sexual
violence, forced displacement, torture, persecution, and killing. Each of these crimes was generally
perpetrated in accordance with the requisite chapeau elements of crimes against humanity,
including that the attacks be “widespread” and “systematic.”
1. Attacks Against the Rohingya are Widespread, Systematic and Directed at a Civilian
Population
The Burmese Security Forces’ acts against the Rohingya meet each of the general requirements
for crimes against humanity: the attacks have been widespread, systematic, and directed against
civilians.
“Widespread” is defined by a number of different factors including the number of victims, the
consequences of the attack upon the targeted populations, and the scale of the attack.51
The Burmese Security Forces’ attacks have impacted a massive number of victims. Recent estimates
indicate nearly 6,700 Rohingya were killed in the first month of violence alone following the start of
the attacks on August 25, 2017.52 In November 2017, one organization documented over a thousand
incidents of sexual violence after the August 2017 attacks, and this number is likely much lower than
the actual number of incidents due to underreporting by women and girls as a result of stigma, fear
of medical fees, and distrust of the criminal system.53 Indeed, a March 2018 report indicates that
there have been 6,097 gender-based violence incidents reported between August 2017 and March
2018, which include, but are not limited to, sexual violence.54 In the village of Tula Toli alone, it is
estimated that over 100 women and girls were raped and many killed.55
In addition to high numbers of victims, the consequences of the attacks on the Rohingya have created
one of the worst humanitarian emergencies in memory. Since 2016, over 700,000 Rohingya have
fled Burma and are currently living in vast and poorly resourced refugee camps in Bangladesh.56
The “clearance operations” burned, bulldozed, and utterly destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages
and structures.57 At the individual level, victims are deeply traumatized by their own experience of
violence, as well as from being forced to witness atrocities committed against their families and
community members.58
The attacks have also been carried out on a large scale. In both the October 2016 and August 2017
attacks, human rights organizations documented the mass movement of Security Forces in which
hundreds of villages and tens of thousands of structures were destroyed. Additionally, satellite
imagery has confirmed that “thousands of homes burned in hundreds of Rohingya villages,”59 as
well as “schools, marketplaces and mosques.”60 The Myanmar FFM found that of the 392 villages
that were partially or totally destroyed, nearly 80% were burned in the first three weeks of the
51. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, paras. 94-95, June 12, 2002; Prosecutor v.
Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, Judgment, para. 260, Feb. 11, 2014; Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović,
Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgment - Vol. I of II, para. 963, May 30, 2013.
52. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 46.
53. Human Rights Watch (HRW), “‘All of My Body Was Pain: Sexual Violence against Rohingya Women and Girls in Burma,”
at 21, Nov. 2017.
54. Inter Sector Coordination Group, “Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis - Cox’s Bazar,” at 12, Mar. 25, 2018.
55. Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command: Sexual violence as a weapon against the Rohingya,” at 9-10, Feb. 2018.
56. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 33.
57. Amnesty Int’l, We Will Destroy Everything, at 112-123, 135, 167.
58. See OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 17, Feb. 3, 2017 (detailing an incident where the military
publicly set an elderly couple on fire).
59. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 45 (post-2017 attacks). Satellite imagery also confirmed massive numbers of homes
burned as a result of the attacks in 2016. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 32, Feb. 3, 2017.
“Satellite images demonstrate widespread destruction of homes and other civilian properties—in some cases,
entire villages have been destroyed. Amnesty International analysed satellite images of northern Maungdaw
Township and confirmed the destruction of over 1,262 buildings in 12 villages in October and November …. Analysis
of near red band confirmed burning by fire. These findings are consistent with those of Human Rights Watch,
which conducted a similar review of satellite imagery and found that 1,500 buildings in Rohingya villages had been
destroyed between 10 October and 23 November.” Amnesty Int’l, “‘We are at Breaking Point: Rohingya: Persecuted
in Myanmar, Neglected in Bangladesh,” at 26, 2016.
60. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 42.
Systematic
The requirement of “systematic” has been interpreted to mean the “organized nature of the acts of
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence,” as well as the indications of patterns in
the crimes.62
The Burmese Security Forces’ individual attacks on Rohingya villages and townships each follow
similar patterns, indicating an organized, systematic plan rather than random, spontaneous action
(see below, Systemic Patterns of Attack section). Human rights reports indicate a “clear pattern of
violence” whereby: the military, Border Guard or police force arrived in villages and called citizens
to come out of their homes, men and boys were separated and taken away or killed, women and girls
were subjected to sexual violence, and homes were burned.63 These patterns were repeated time and
time again after both the October 2016 and August 2017 waves of violence.64 Women from different
villages have provided consistent testimony about their experiences.65
Evidence and witness testimony suggest that these attacks could not have been carried out at
random.66 For example, reporting that hundreds of troops raped hundreds of women in over a dozen
remote locations in just a two-month span, with each rape having a similar set of characteristics and
circumstances, tends to show that high-level instruction and authorization were present.67 Similarly,
the scale and sophistication of attacks evince their systematic nature. For instance, during the Tula
Toli massacre in August 2017, “[t]he large deployment of troops as well as the use of [rocket propelled
grenades] would have required detailed planning and coordination and the strategic allocation of
significant financial resources and arms.”68
Additionally, analysis of satellite images has also revealed consistencies in how buildings were
burned in totality and other areas were left unharmed—corroborating witness statements that
“Attacks directed against any civilian population” generally refer to a course of conduct “against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack.”72
Burmese Security Forces have referred to their actions as “clearance operations,” which they
have justified as a response to the “‘terrorist threat’ posed by ARSA.”73 However, the “grossly
disproportionate”74 military response did not target only armed actors; rather, it was primarily
Rohingya civilians, including men, women, children, and the elderly, who suffered most as a result of
the mass attacks.
Acts qualifying as such attacks are not limited to the use of armed force, but instead encompass
“any mistreatment of the civilian population.”75 A single act or limited number of acts could qualify
as long as they are not isolated or random.76 The organization committing the attack—in this case
the Burmese Security Forces (all acting under the control of the Commander-in-Chief)—must have
acted in line with a policy to commit such an attack.77 In other words, attacks constituting crimes
against humanity are composed of any acts of mistreatment against the civilian population that are
“planned, directed or organized,” as opposed to “spontaneous or [consisting of] isolated acts.”78
As already detailed, the campaigns of violence carried out by the Burmese Forces against the Rohingya
population since October 2016 and August 2017 clearly constitute attacks on civilians. The multiple
crimes detailed throughout this brief indicate the mistreatment of the Rohingya population—a mild
description for the killings, rape, and other crimes of sexual violence repeatedly perpetrated against
the targeted group of civilians. Indeed, evidence indicates the violence was not isolated or random
but rather committed in planned, systematic ways.
69. Amnesty Int’l, “‘My World is Finished:’ Rohingya Targeted in Crimes Against Humanity in Myanmar,” at 27, 29, 31, 32,
35, 2017; HRW, “Burma: New Satellite Images Confirm Mass Destruction,” Oct. 17, 2017.
70. Amnesty Int’l, ‘We are at Breaking Point,’ at 27.
71. Amnesty Int’l, ‘My World is Finished,’ at 38. See also Physicians for Human Rights, “‘Please Tell the World What They
Have Done to Us:’ The Chut Pyin Massacre: Forensic Evidence of Violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar,” at 12,
July 2018.
72. Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).
73. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 33.
74. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 33.
75. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 86, June 12, 2002.
76. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 96, June 12, 2002.
77. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 211, Jan. 23, 2012.
78. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 210, Jan. 23, 2012.
As shown above, there is significant support for the claim that the Burmese Security Forces’ violence
against the Rohingya population constitutes widespread, systematic attacks directed against a
civilian population sufficient to constitute crimes against humanity.
Persecution is a crime against humanity comprised of a multitude of acts committed against “any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”79 Although
victims of persecution are targeted on the basis of their identity with a group or collectively, a single
act against a single victim can potentially constitute persecution when committed with the necessary
discriminatory intent.80
Targeting persons by reason of identity of the group or collectivity and discriminatory intent
Grounds for persecution are based on the perpetrator’s perception rather than whether a victim
factually belongs to a certain group, and bases for persecution are often conflated and intersectional,81
with group identities converging in the eyes of perpetrators. Thus, types of discrimination should
be examined in totality rather than in isolation.82 Discrimination against women, even when based
on their sex and gender, is also “inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as
race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class.”83 As described by the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “women experience varying and
intersecting forms of discrimination, which have an aggravating negative impact.”84
The discriminatory intent that underlies persecution can be inferred from expressed hostility,85 the
behavior of perpetrators, the continued or systematic targeting of specific groups,86 and from knowing
participation in a campaign/system of abuse or against a backdrop of widespread abuse.87 Moreover,
although “the existence of a discriminatory policy is not a requirement for proving persecution…
persecutory acts may form a part of a discriminatory policy or practice.”88
Persecution based on gender is expressly envisioned in the Rome Statute,89 and was acknowledged
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTR, for example, held that:
acts of rape and sexual violence…were committed solely against Tutsi women, many
of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation…These rapes resulted
in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their
communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction,
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction
and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.90
Similarly, the 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict described sexual
violence as a “vehicle of persecution, directed in particular towards women and girls of reproductive
age, as the perceived transmitters of cultural and ethnic identity and the symbolic repositories of
familial and national ‘honour.’”91 The report also noted that “patterns of violence are embedded in
the underlying structural conditions, including inequality, discrimination on the basis of gender and
the neglect of the rights of minority groups,” which are then “exacerbated by militarization.”92
Thus, gender plays a multifarious role in the crime of persecution, as both grounds for persecutory
violence and a factor adding to the persecutory suffering of women and girls (as well as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, trans and other gender non-conforming individuals).
The Burmese military has consistently used sexual violence “as an expression of ethnic hatred” in
conflicts and has “employed [it] as a tactic of war, terrorism, torture and repression.”93 International
courts have repeatedly acknowledged that rape can be used for purposes of, amongst other things,
degradation, humiliation, and discrimination.94 The pervasiveness of discrimination within a society
does not normalize it to a point where it is not persecution or is rendered irrelevant, and the gender-
based persecution manifested through sexual violence and other human rights violations during
the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations reached new levels and compounded existing gender
inequalities. As described below, gender-based persecution and persecution that disproportionately
affects women go beyond sexual violence, though sexual violence is “assaulting to women’s dignity
and the most obvious result of Burma’s patriarchal culture that subjects women to violence.”95
The threat and use of sexual violence were central to the Burmese Forces’ strategy to terrorize,
collectively punish, and destroy the Rohingya as a group. That violence was specifically directed at
women and girls who “are seen as custodians and propagators of ethnic identity” and “represent the
Laws and legal structures that deprive a protected group of fundamental rights and are discriminatory
can potentially constitute persecution. The fact that discrimination is legal under national laws does
not justify the violation of fundamental rights under international law.112 Courts have recognized
Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017 (describing the “Fake Rape” interview as “confrontational, and out of keeping with
accepted guidelines on how to conduct interviews with victims of sexual violence”); ALTSEAN Burma, “Rohingya
Targeted by Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan/ Rakhine State,” 2017. See also, Amnesty Int’l, “Myanmar: Four Years On,
Impunity is the Kachin Conflict’s Hallmark,” June 9, 2015 (father who filed a complaint about his daughter’s death
“was charged and found guilty of making ‘false allegations’ against the Myanmar Army and ordered to pay a fine”).
106. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 2, 17, 19.
107. “Statement by Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,
at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council,” Mar. 12, 2018; “Statement by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017; Kaladan
Press Network, “Rape by Command” at 34.
108. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, “We Will Destroy Everything,” at 155-166 (describing potential responsibility for sexual
violence and other crimes through command responsibility and direct perpetration).
109. CEDAW Comm., “List of issues and questions in relation to the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of
Myanmar,” Addendum, Replies of Myanmar, para. 35, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/MMR/Q/4-5/Add.1, May 3, 2016.
110. UN Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya
Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar,” para. 60, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, June 28, 2016; “Statement by Marzuki
Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, at the 37th session of the
Human Rights Council,” Mar. 12, 2018; “End of Mission Statement by Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in Myanmar, Feb. 1, 2018 (“What the Myanmar government claims to be the conduct of military or security
operations is actually an established pattern of domination, aggression and violations against ethnic groups…While
reports from Rakhine State have rightly provoked international outrage; for many in Myanmar, they have elicited a
tragic feeling of déjà vu.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Burma,” at
14; Women’s League of Burma, “Same Impunity, Same Patterns,”at 1; U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, “‘They Want
Us All to Go Away:’ Early Warning Signs of Genocide in Burma” at 4, 2015; UNDP et al., “Situational Analysis: Gender
Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar,” at 143, 2016.
111. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 17 (“This is the only case of male rape Human Rights Watch
documented, but because of deep stigma regarding such violence, it may be underreported.”). But see, UN Doc.
A/HRC/39/64, paras. 38, 62 (“There are credible reports of men and boys also being subjected to rape, genital
mutilation and sexualised torture.”); “SRSG Patten remarks for the event on ‘Addressing Sexual and Gender-based
Violence against Rohingya Refugees,’” July 3, 2018 (noting that recent arrivals in Bangladesh reported the targeted
killing and mutilation of sexual organs of male babies, allegedly related to pressure to accept national verification
cards).
112. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 614, Jan. 14, 2000.
Citizenship
The 1982 Citizenship Law precludes most Rohingya from qualifying for citizenship, and excludes
them as one of Burma’s “national races.”118 The Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights
in Myanmar, as well as others, has determined that “the Citizenship Law (1982) is not in line with
international standards…particularly regarding discriminatory provisions for granting of citizenship
on the basis of ethnicity or race.”119 The Rohingya’s lack of citizenship is one of the main obstacles
to their safe existence in, or return to, Burma.120 Without access to citizenship, the Rohingya are
vulnerable to violations of their fundamental rights, of the types described in this brief, and are
unable to access social services or economic opportunities.121
The refusal to resolve the Rohingya’s citizenship status is discriminatory, constitutes persecution,
and enables a range of additional human rights deprivations described below.
113. Mohamed Elewa Badar, “From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against
Humanity,” 5 San Diego Int’l L.J. 73, at 128, 2004; Gregory S. Gordon, “Hate Speech and Persecution: A Contextual
Approach,” 46 Vand. J. Transnt’l L. 303, at 313-20, 2013.
114. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 227, Mar. 3, 2000.
115. See, e.g., Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords,” at 91-95; see generally, Fortify Rights, “Policies of
Persecution: Ending Abusive State Policies Against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar,” 2014.
116. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 96.
117. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, “They Want Us All to Go Away,” at 4, 6. The International Military Tribunal convicted
Julius Streicher of persecution stemming from hate speech, not all of which included incitement to violence,
but which “infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to active
persecution” and “injected [poison] into the minds of thousands of Germans which caused them to follow the
National Socialist policy of Jewish persecution and extermination.” United States v. Goering et al., Judgment, Int.’l
Mil. Trib., Oct. 1, 1946.
118. Burma Citizenship Law of 1982, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982, ch. II, § 3.
119. UN Doc. A/HRC/34/67, para. 12; see also Advisory Comm’n on Rakhine State, “Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous
Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State,” at 29, Aug. 2017.
120. Advisory Comm’n on Rakhine State, “Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine,” at
26. See also, section below on “Longstanding Discrimination.”
121. UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, para. 26.
In 2015, Burma adopted four laws ostensibly created to “protect race and religion,”122 but which
instead sought to limit the Rohingya’s freedom to marry and have families of the size and timing of
their choosing, including through the Population Control Health-care Law. These laws discriminate
against minorities and women, in violation of human rights obligations.123
Other such policies also exist. For example, a decade-old local order imposes a two-child policy on
Rohingya in certain townships of northern Rakhine State, bars Rohingya from having children out of
wedlock, and requires couples to “limit the number of children, in order to control the birth rate so
that there is enough food and shelter.”124 The policy imposes criminal penalties, instructs officials
to enforce the policy through forced breast-feeding, at times has been enforced through pregnancy
tests (to obtain a marriage permit), and has reportedly caused women to seek illegal abortions.125
These laws have been enacted with discriminatory intent. The two-child policy, for example, is
only imposed on the Rohingya, and has been described as necessary “only for certain groups” and
“beneficial” by lawmakers.126 These policies have serious consequences for women and that impact
is relevant for determining persecution.127
There are several ways the Rohingya have been systematically segregated from other populations in
Burma. For example, as a result of violence in 2012 when Security Forces separated communities by
ethnicity, about 120,000 people remain confined to internal displacement camps.128 The government
has in the past attempted to cement segregation of internally displaced Rohingya by transitioning
displacement camps into villages.129 Social tensions surrounding the “erosion of livelihoods, food
insecurity, and increased anxiety related to prolonged displacement” can increase rates of domestic
violence—in particular because camp leaders and protection structures “tend to downplay incidents
of sexual violence,” adding to existing safety and accountability challenges.130
Additionally, movement restrictions requiring Rohingya to go through burdensome procedures to
secure authorization to travel, severely limit their “ability to access healthcare, markets, farming
land, areas for fishing, and employment of almost any kind.”131 These restrictions are “largely used to
122. For a brief description of the Religious Conversion Law (2015), Population Control Health-care Law (2015), Buddhist
Women’s Special Marriage Law (2015), and Monogamy Law (2015), see UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71, Annex; see also ALTSEAN
Burma, “Rohingya Targeted by Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan/ Rakhine State,” at 15.
123. UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71, para. 33; UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, para. 20.
124. Fortify Rights, “Policies of Persecution,” at 10, 24.
125. Fortify Rights, “Policies of Persecution,” at 10, 24, 28.
126. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, “They Want Us All to Go Away,” at 6; Jason Szep & Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Myanmar
Minister Backs Two-Child Policy for Rohingya Minority,” Reuters, June 11, 2013; Fortify Rights, “Policies of
Persecution,” at 26, 46-47.
127. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 1072-73, Dec. 3, 2003 (“Unlike
the crime of incitement, which is defined in terms of intent, the crime of persecution is defined also in terms of
impact. It is not a provocation to cause harm. It is itself the harm. . .”)
128. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 22.
129. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” para. 70, UN Doc. A/72/382, Sept.
8, 2017.
130. UNDP et al., “Situational Analysis: Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar,” at 198.
131. “Statement by High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein at the Special Session of the Human
Rights Council on the human rights situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the
The movement restrictions imposed on the Rohingya community are among “the main obstacle[s]
for Rohingya in accessing health care.”135 More than half the Rohingya surveyed by Physicians for
Human Rights in 2016 said movement restrictions “affected their ability to travel to a health clinic,”
including trouble obtaining necessary permits, lack of access to local hospitals, and fear of passing
through checkpoints en route to facilities.136 The government-imposed permission requirements,
lack of access to local hospitals, and curfews delay access to care, almost completely preventing it
at night, including in emergencies.137
The government also limited healthcare access through revoking humanitarian aid access in Rakhine
State, which included healthcare.138
For victims of sexual violence, both inside and outside of areas of military campaigns, access to
care and life-saving services is limited by local capacity “and restrictions upon women’s freedom of
movement due to increased militarization.”139 During the Burmese Forces’ “clearance operations,”
one organization noted that “[n]one of the rape survivors [they] interviewed received post rape
care in Burma,” and therefore missed necessary and time-limited interventions for emergency
contraception and HIV infection.140 Women arrived in Bangladesh with serious and untreated injuries
from sexual violence.141 Rohingya women also suffer from a “particularly high” unmet family planning
need and have limited access to abortion services in refugee camps in Bangladesh.142
As noted by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delays and the
referral process used in emergencies can result in preventable deaths.143 For women with pregnancy
complications and for babies, “delays in seeking or receiving emergency obstetric treatment can have
All persecutory conduct was committed in connection with a crime against humanity and genocide
The Rome Statute requires that conduct amounting to persecution be “committed in connection
with” another crime against humanity, war crime, or act of genocide.148 The ICC recently indicated
that the Court may exercise limited jurisdiction over persecution against the Rohingya, at least in
connection to the crime against humanity of deportation.149 Other crimes against humanity or acts
of genocide where an element occurred in Bangladesh may also be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction
under this theory.150
Gender-based crimes, including those that constitute persecution, were an integral part of the
atrocities committed against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Sexual violence, for example, was
“a driver and ‘push factor’ for forced displacement,”151 and was committed within the context of
an attack against the civilian population that constitutes crimes against humanity and genocide.
The discriminatory laws detailed here are part of the background of discrimination implemented
against the Rohingya, and are connected to acts described in this brief that amount to crimes against
humanity and genocide.
The sexual and gender-based violence committed by Burmese Security Forces against Rohingya
women and girls constitutes the crime against humanity of rape and other forms of sexual violence
of comparable gravity.
The crime against humanity of rape is defined as an invasion by the perpetrator of “the body of a
person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or
any other part of the body.”152 The invasion must be committed by force, threat of force or coercion,
by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against someone incapable of giving consent.153
Extensive, thorough reporting by UN offices, human rights organizations, and the media substantiate
numerous cases of rape by Burmese Security Forces against Rohingya women and girls. The accounts
of survivors and witnesses have been corroborated by doctors providing care in Bangladesh, including
reports of “wounds from … forced penetrations and vaginal lacerations.”154
While it is challenging to determine the exact number of incidents of rape that have occurred, and
there is very likely extensive underreporting,155 humanitarian organizations have indicated that they
have received hundreds of rape cases.156 In March 2018, for example, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
reported treating “113 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence since 25 August, aged from
nine to 50 years old,” with “[t]he majority [being] rape survivors.”157 Furthermore, of the 101 women
interviewed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 52% said they had
been raped or subject to sexual violence.158
One report documented rape survivors from 19 different villages in Rakhine State with many
describing similar experiences,159 indicia of the fact that rapes were carried out systematically across
multiple locations. The rapes were also perpetrated in a variety of situations – during the “clearance
operations” of villages, as women and girls fled their villages for the Bangladesh border, and while
they were detained in military camps.160 Gang rapes were common as many victims report being
Coercive Circumstances
Courts have interpreted “coercive environment,” in the context of force and consent, to include
“military presence of hostile forces among the civilian population.”168 Factors creating a coercive
environment include “the number of people involved in the commission of the crime, or whether the
rape is committed during or immediately following a combat situation, or is committed together with
other crimes.”169 Additionally, “[t]hreats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which
prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion.”170
In almost all reports, the perpetrators of nearly all rapes were described as “uniformed members of
security forces, almost all military personnel.”171 One report identified that “[a]t least 27 Myanmar
Army battalions—including 22 Light Infantry Battalions and five Infantry Battalions—comprising
up to 11,000 soldiers were involved in the attacks in northern Rakhine State beginning in August
2017, and at least three combat police battalions were also involved, comprising an estimated 900
police.”172 Eyewitnesses, Bangladeshi officials, and local and international aid workers also all noted
an increase in the Burmese Forces’ presence and military activity before August 25, 2017.173 Such
“military presence of hostile forces among the civilian population” is sufficient to establish the
presence of a coercive environment.
The Burmese Security Forces routinely committed rapes with force and threats of force. Perpetrators
often “held rifles against the victim’s face, chest or belly or a knife to their [sic] neck and threatened
161. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 48; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 2.
162. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 21, Feb. 3, 2017.
163. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 19.
164. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 7, Oct.
11, 2017.
165. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 8; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’
at 18.
166. Susannah Savage, “‘A lot of shame:’ Rohingya camps brace for wave of babies conceived in rape,” Washington Post,
May 22, 2018.
167. Susannah Savage, “‘A lot of shame:’ Rohingya camps brace for wave of babies conceived in rape,” Washington Post,
May 22, 2018.
168. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, para. 104, Mar. 21, 2016.
169. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, para. 104, Mar. 21, 2016.
170. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 688, Sept. 2, 1998.
171. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 2.
172. Fortify Rights, ‘They Gave Them Long Swords,’ at 14.
173. Fortify Rights, ‘They Gave Them Long Swords,’ at 49-50.
Consent
Regarding consent, “[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent
if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.”175 Further, “[f]orce or threat of force
provides clear evidence of non-consent, but force is not an element per se of rape,”176 and “any form
of captivity vitiates consent.”177
As discussed above, Security Forces raped women and girls as young as five years old – a clear
example of “age-related incapacity” as they are far too young to be able or expected to provide
consent. Similarly, the use of force, threats of force, and detention of Rohingya women and girls is
also clear evidence of non-consent.
Conclusion
The extensive documentation of cases of rape, the presence of a coercive environment, and lack of
consent among victims, among other factors, substantially demonstrates that the Burmese Forces’
sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls likely constitutes the crime against humanity of
rape.
4. Other Sexual Violence Crimes of Comparable Gravity Against Rohingya Women and Girls
Acts that do not meet the elements of rape may still constitute a crime against humanity if the act
perpetrated is “sexual violence of comparable gravity”178 to crimes like rape, forced pregnancy and
forced sterilization.179 Specifically, the crime of sexual violence is defined in international law as:
an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caus[ing] such person
or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or
by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity
to give genuine consent.180
This definition has generally been understood to embrace all “serious abuses of a sexual nature
inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat or force or
intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”181 Thus, the crime
against humanity of sexual violence may be committed in situations where there is “no physical
182. Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, para. 199, Feb. 26, 2009.
183. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Trial Judgment, para. 933, Dec. 18, 2008.
184. Prosecutor v. Sesay et al, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1287, Mar. 2, 2009.
185. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 16.
186. Fortify Rights, ‘They gave them long swords,’ at 152; Amnesty Int’l, ‘We will destroy everything,’ at 94; HRW, ‘All of
My Body Was Pain,’ at 16.
187. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 7.
188. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 7.
189. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb. 3, 2017.
190. Amnesty Int’l, ‘We will destroy everything,’ at 33.
191. See HRW, “Massacre by the River,” at 7; Kristen Gelineau, “Rohingya Methodically Raped by Myanmar’s Armed
Forces,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 11, 2017.
192. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb. 3, 2017.
193. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb. 3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Military
Massacres Dozens in Rohingya Village – Soldiers Shot, Stabbed Men and Boys in Maung Nu, Rakhine State,” at 5, Oct.
4, 2017; HRW, “Massacre by the River,”; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women,
Girls – New Eyewitness Accounts Show Systematic Attacks Based on Ethnicity, Religion,” at 3, Feb. 6, 2017; US
Holocaust Museum & Fortify Rights, “Atrocity Crimes Against Rohingya Muslims,” at 10, Nov. 2017.
Conclusion
Each of these acts individually, and taken together, amount to the crime against humanity of sexual
violence of comparable gravity through physical sexual abuse, threats of violence, mutilation, sexual
slavery in military captivity, forced public nudity, and humiliation.
The deportation or forcible transfer of a population are crimes against humanity under international
law.203 While sharing substantially similar elements, deportation and forcible transfer are two
separate crimes;204 deportation requires forced displacement to another State, while forcible transfer
is to another location in the same State.205 For the crime to be completed, the perpetrator must have
deported or forcibly transferred one or more persons, without grounds permitted in international
law, from a place in which they are lawfully present.206 The “force” required includes both physical
force and coercion, such as threats, “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression
The broad act of forced displacement and the destruction of homes, villages, and food sources211 was
not limited by gender. However, several of the terror-inspiring tactics212 the Burmese Security Forces
used to coerce the Rohingya to leave were committed along gendered lines and in ways that targeted
the integrity and social cohesion of the Rohingya as a group through attacks on women and girls.
Women, many of whom were subjected to sexual violence, were traumatized by having witnessed
Security Forces and Rakhine villagers kill family members in front of them, including their children.213
Subjecting women to rape and sexual violence is another manner in which Security Forces coerced
Rohingya communities to leave Rakhine State. In many attacks, rape and sexual violence were
committed in public, which can demonstrate the Forces’ intent to inflict harm on entire communities,
not just individuals.214 Security Forces raped women in groups or in front of others, raped them and
then locked them in burning houses, and in some cases took them to military barracks or gathered
215. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,” at 7; Kristen Gelineau, “AP: Rohingya Methodically Raped
by Myanmar’s Armed Forces,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 11, 2017.
216. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 21-22, Feb. 3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the
River,” at 21.
217. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 9-10, 20, Feb. 3, 2017.
218. “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence, UN Security Council Briefing on
Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body was Pain,” at 21; “Statement, SRSG Patten remarks for
the event on ‘Addressing Sexual and Gender-based Violence against Rohingya Refugees,’” July 3, 2018.
219. UN Women, “Gender Brief on Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response in Bangladesh,” at 1, Jan. 2018 (based on interviews
with survivors and community leaders).
220. Amnesty Int’l, “Briefing: Myanmar Forces Starve, Abduct and Rob Rohingya,” at 4-5.
221. “Press Release, UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten concludes visit to Cox’s
Bazar, Bangladesh, and calls for enhanced measures to protect and assist Rohingya survivors of sexual violence,”
Nov. 16, 2017; “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN
Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017 (“Women and girls recounted how, upon the arrival of soldiers
in their village, they were forced to strip naked and threatened with rape in front of their husbands and fathers while
their homes were set ablaze. They related how, in some cases, village leaders were compelled to sign documents
stating that they had set fire to their own homes, in order to save the women of their community from rape.”).
222. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 24, Feb. 3, 2017.
223. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 24, Feb. 3, 2017.
224. Donny Meertens, “Forced Displacement and Gender Justice and Colombia: Between Disproportional Effects of
Violence and Historical Injustice,” at 9, July 2012.
Deportation and forcible transfer are international crimes where they are committed “without
grounds permitted in international law.”225 This element recognizes that international law permits
certain military and humanitarian reasons for forced removal, such as evacuating civilians for their
own protection or security, for “imperative military reasons,” or to transfer prisoners of war to
detention facilities.226 In these circumstances, measures must be taken to provide for the safety,
shelter, health and other rights of the displaced population, and evacuation should be made in a
manner that ensures the population’s ability to return to their homes.227 Under no circumstances
would the Burmese Security Forces’ rape and sexual violence campaigns be considered permissible
grounds for displacing civilians.
Further, rather than making preparations to provide for the safety of the civilian Rohingya population
during “clearance operations,” the Burmese Security Forces intimidated and harassed Rohingya
civilians, including requiring them to remove fences that were essential privacy protections and left
women increasingly vulnerable to attack. These practices also accelerated the ease of attacks during
clearance operations.228 During the 2016 operations, Burmese governmental authorities helped to
evacuate and provide shelter for non-Rohingya civilians displaced by the violence, but did not extend
that assistance to displaced Rohingya civilians, and blocked humanitarian agencies from access to
the region.229 Authorities also reportedly conducted headcounts and de-listed absent and displaced
Rohingyas, which had the effect of removing their residency status and further compliciating the
ability of displaced populations to return to Burma.230
Displacement is never lawful when it is caused by a humanitarian crisis that “is itself the result of the
perpetrator’s own unlawful activity.”231 Instead, the forced displacement of the Rohingya is the result
of terror inflicted on them by Security Forces.232 It is part of the Forces’ plan to assert “control” of the
Rakhine region with “national races,” which General Min Aung Hlaing stated in September 2017 was
“their rightful place.”233
Courts have clarified that lawful presence should not be equated with requiring lawful residence as a
legal standard when examining forced displacement.234 Despite continued assertions by officials that
the Rohingya are not legal citizens of Burma, the Rohingya have lived in Rakhine State for generations,
and their lack of recognized status does not bring into doubt the lawfulness of the presence of
Rohingya communities attacked by Security Forces throughout 2016 and 2017.235 Due to the lack of
citizenship status available to many Rohingya in Burma,236 the legal status and documentation of
Rohingya in Rakhine State depend on household lists, which are updated periodically by crossing
off or adding names after births, deaths, and marriages to reflect the permanent residents of
households.237 Officials reportedly conducted the annual household list update in some areas of
Rakhine State during the 2016 operations, which threatened the status of Rohingya individuals that
had fled who would be “unable to prove that they are legal residents of Burma upon their return” if
they were “delisted” from family lists.238 During the 2017 operations, Burmese officials stated that
refugees must provide “proof of nationality” to return to Burma, and have also reportedly pressured
remaining Rohingya communities to accept identification cards.239 These actions make clear the
consequences of measures to remove Rohingyas’ status, and are a “cynical ploy to forcibly transfer
large numbers of people without possibility of return.”240
The effects of displacement are also relevant considerations in international criminal law, as
international courts have ruled that perpetrators can potentially be held liable for crimes that are
the “natural and foreseeable consequence”241 of other violations. The ICTY held a perpetrator liable
for inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity due to his involvement in creating a
humanitarian catastrophe (lack of food, shelter, necessary services) as well as for his involvement
in forcibly transferring people within this context and the “incidental murders, rapes, beatings
234. According to ICTY jurisprudence, “the terms ‘lawfully present’ should be given their common meaning and should
not be equated to the legal concept of lawful residence.” Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment
(Volume I), para. 491, Mar. 24, 2016; Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88 -T, Judgment, para. 900, June
10, 2010 (“In the view of the Trial Chamber, the requirement for lawful presence is intended to exclude only those
situations where the individuals are occupying houses or premises unlawfully or illegally and not to impose a
requirement for ‘residency’ to be demonstrated as a legal standard.”).
235. Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, para. 253, Jan.
23, 2012; Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges, para. 125, June 9, 2014. See also sections above and below on “Citizenship” and
“Longstanding Discrimination.”
236. Burma Citizenship Law of 1982, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982, ch. II.
237. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 34. The household lists are used to register for identity documents, travel,
and school enrollment because Myanmar stopped issuing Rohingya birth certificates in the 1990s. Amnesty Int’l,
“Caged Without a Roof,” at 34.
238. UN Doc. A/HRC/34/67, para. 76; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 36, Feb. 3, 2017; Simon Lewis
& Wa Lone, “With a Stroke of Red Pen, Myanmar’s Rohingya Fear Losing Right to Return,” Reuters, Mar. 15, 2017.
239. “Human Rights Council 36th Session, Opening Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights,” Sept. 11, 2017; Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 33; Amnesty Int’l, “Briefing: Myanmar
Forces Starve, Abduct and Rob Rohingya,” at 3. Rohingya also reported pressure from their own communities to
reject the citizenship “verification process” and NVC cards due to its underlying assumptions of their non-citizen
status and fears of being labeled so officially. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 33.
240. “Human Rights Council 36th Session, Opening Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights,” Sept. 11, 2017.
241. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 149, Apr. 19, 2004.
242. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, paras. 616-18, Aug. 2, 2001; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.
IT-98-3-A, Judgment, para. 149, Apr. 19, 2004 (“The Trial Chamber expressly found that, given the circumstances
at the time the plan was formed, Radislav Krstić must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would be
inevitable given the lack of shelter, the density of the crowds, the vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence
of many regular and irregular military and paramilitary units in the area and sheer lack of sufficient numbers of UN
soldiers to provide protection. The Appeals Chamber agrees with this finding.”)
243. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/01-T, Judgment, para. 327, Nov. 2, 2001.
244. Patricia Viseur Sellers, “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as Means
of Interpretation,” at 16.
245. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 8-9, Oct. 11, 2017 (estimated
time).
246. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 8-9, Oct. 11, 2017.
247. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body was Pain,” at 29 (“Two women said that words could not adequately convey the
minute-after-minute, hour-after-hour pain of walking up and down hills on severe injuries after being gang raped.
Almost every rape victim said they experienced physical agony during their flight.”).
248. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body was Pain,” at 32; Kristen Gelineau, “AP: Rohingya Methodically Raped by
Myanmar’s Armed Forces,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 11, 2017.
Conclusion
Burmese Security Forces clearly engaged in the forcible displacement of the Rohingya, from places
where they were lawfully present, through coercion, and without grounds permitted in international
law. Documentation has clearly shown that the Rohingya were forcibly displaced to Bangladesh—
with over 80% of the Rohingya population of northern Rakhine State displaced following the 2017
263. Mayesha Alam, “Women and Girls at Risk in the Rohingya Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 27, 2017; UNDP
et al., “Situational Analysis: Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar,” at 197-98; Refugees Int’l, “Reluctant
Refuge: Safe but not Secure in Bangladesh,” at 12.
264. Inter Sector Coordination Group, “Gender Profile No. 1 for Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response,” at 4; UNDP et al.,
Situational Analysis: Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar,” at 197-98; UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 57.
265. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 11, Oct. 11, 2017; Refugees
Int’l, “Reluctant Refuge: Safe but not Secure in Bangladesh,” at 12-13; UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 57.
266. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 57.
267. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 23, Feb. 3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body was
Pain,” at 33.
268. Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking Point,” at 33.
269. OCHA, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis: 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, September 2017- February 2018,” at 10, Oct.
2017.
270. “Facts and Figures: Humanitarian Action,” UN Women, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/humanitarian-
action/facts-and-figures; “2016 World Humanitarian Data and Trends,” UN OCHA, at 38-39, 2016.
271. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body was Pain,” at 34.
272. Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking Point,” at 30-31.
273. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 16.
Torture is a crime against humanity occurring when a perpetrator inflicts “severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.”275 Such pain or suffering must not “arise only from, [or be] inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions,”276 and the victim must be “in the custody or under the control” of
the perpetrator.277
Human rights bodies and international and regional tribunals have repeatedly found that rape and
sexual violence cause severe physical and mental pain and suffering and can constitute torture.278
Moreover, the threat of rape or other forms of sexual violence also meets the threshold for torture.279
Courts have further recognized that rape can be used for purposes of, among other things,
degradation, humiliation, discrimination and punishment and is a “violation of personal dignity.”280
All of these forms of torture are reflected in the patterns of rape perpetrated against Rohingya
women and girls by Burmese Security Forces.
Rapes committed by Burmese Security Forces inflicted severe physical suffering on Rohingya women
and girls. Reams of reports documenting the current crisis have found and described brutal rapes
and sexual violence as an inherent and regular feature of the attacks. Patterns have emerged in the
way the rapes were perpetrated—often, victims were held down by soldiers while others raped them
and threatened them with guns.281 Some women reported going unconscious as they were raped.282
The rapes were also combined with other forms of brutal violence, including beatings, cutting and
274. Int’l Crisis Grp., “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase,” at 8, 2017.
275. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(f).
276. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(f).
277. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(f).
278. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 150, June 12, 2002; Prosecutor v.
Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, paras. 493, 495, Nov. 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T, Judgment, para. 731, Sept. 2, 1998; Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, “Supranational Criminal Prosecution of
Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR,” at 189, 2005.
279. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, para. 561, Nov. 2, 2001.
280. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 597, Sept. 2, 1998.
281. HRW, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by
Command,” at 30-31, 36.
282. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 17.
The ICTY has found that the mental suffering inflicted on a person forced to witness a relative or
acquaintance severely mistreated constituted torture.290 Similarly, “the presence of onlookers,
particularly family members, also inflicts severe mental harm amounting to torture on the person
being raped.”291
The mental suffering caused by the Security Forces’ widespread and systematic rapes of Rohingya
women and girls is profound. Indeed, the purpose of the Forces’ systematic sexual violence was to
humiliate and terrorize the Rohingya community.292 In numerous cases women and girls were raped
in front of others,293 often family members, which, as stated earlier, has been found to cause mental
suffering amounting to torture.294 Rapes were also perpetrated in public,295 and were often combined
with threats against women and girls’ lives.296 In some cases soldiers beat and killed women’s children
and husbands in front of them during the rape.297 Victims were forced to endure the particularly cruel
sequencing of witnessing their children, including infants, thrown to the ground or into the river,
283. Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command,” at 11, 38, 39; Kaladan Press Network, “Witness to horror – Rohingya
women speak out about Myanmar Army rape and other atrocities in Maungdaw,” at 1-2, Feb. 2017; John Sifton,
“Submission to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Rohingya Crisis in Burma,” Human Rights Watch,
at 3, Oct. 24, 2017; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 16, 17; Amnesty Int’l, ‘My World Is Finished,’ at 24; HRW,
“Massacre by the River,” at 24, 26, 27, 29.
284. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 19.
285. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 23, Feb. 3, 2017; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 3, 30.
286. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 32.
287. Kristen Gelineau, “Rohingya methodically raped by Myanmar’s armed forces,” AP, at 8, Dec. 11, 2017.
288. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 17.
289. Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command,” at 11.
290. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, para. 149, Nov. 2, 2001; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case
No. IT-97-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 267, Dec. 10, 1998.
291. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, para. 149, Nov. 2, 2001.
292. “Rep. of the Secretary General on conflict-related sexual violence,” UN Doc. S/2017/249, para. 51, Apr. 15, 2017.
293. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 7, 8; UN Doc. S/2017/249, para.
51; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 17, 24, 28, Feb. 3, 2017; HRW, “Burma: Security Forces
Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 20; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape
by Command,” at 11, 30-31, 36.
294. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, para. 149, Nov. 2, 2001.
295. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 17, 19, 20; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command,” at 11.
296. HRW, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 2-3.
297. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 3, 26; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 24, Feb. 3, 2017;
HRW, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017.
The crime against humanity of torture requires that the victim be “in the custody or under the control”
of the perpetrator.
There are multiple reports of rapes while women and girls have been held in detention by Burmese
Security Forces. One organization reported that “[i]n five locations…women and girls were forcibly
detained and raped in military camps, for periods of up to two weeks.”303 Thus, the additional element
that victims be in the custody of the perpetrator is also clearly satisfied in these circumstances.
Furthermore, in most instances the perpetrators of rape—members of Burmese Security Forces—
had effective control over villages, Rohingya civilians, and their victims. Also discussed above,
there was a significant increase in the Security Forces’ presence and military activity leading up to
August 2017.304 The patterns accompanying the Forces’ attacks of Rohingya villages highlight the
effective control the Forces exercised over Rohingya women and girls: Forces would enter villages
indiscriminately shooting and killing all civilians, men and women would be separated, and women
were sexually assaulted and raped, sometimes at gunpoint.305 Given these circumstances, Rohingya
women and girls were under the effective control of the Burmese Security Forces for the purposes of
the control element of the crime against humanity of torture.
The requirement of the pain and suffering not being incident to lawful sanctions is ordinarily
contemplated to cover pain and suffering created in circumstances of imprisonment. None of
the Tatmadaw’s conduct directed toward the Rohingya can be considered “lawful sanctions”—
international crimes committed by the Forces against civilians cannot function as justification for or
as a lawful response to attacks by a limited group of armed actors (ARSA). The commission of crimes
against humanity can never be justified.
Burmese Security Forces unlawfully inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering by raping
Rohingya women and girls effectively under their custody or control, and doing so in public or in view
of relatives—clearly arising to the crime against humanity of torture.
Murder constitutes a crime against humanity when the perpetrator kills one or more persons.306
Similar to the perception of killing as a genocidal crime (described below), the crime against humanity
of murder often skews towards favoring “fast” deaths, often of men and boys.
1. Intent to Destroy the Rohingya Religious and Ethnic Minority as a Group, in Whole or in Part
For the occurrence of genocide to be established, the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such must be identified. Genocidal intent can be
inferred from a number of factors and circumstances, including the general context in which the
acts took place, the nature of particular acts committed, systematic perpetration or “repetition of
destructive and discriminatory acts,” systematic targeting of perceived group members, evidence of
311. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Rome
Statute, art. 6, intro para.
312. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, paras. 85-87.
Although the violence that commenced in August 2017 followed similar patterns to previous waves of
violence in Rakhine State, the scale of the crimes was unprecedented. Reports estimate that 9,400
Rohingya died in the first month of violence alone, 6,700 of whom were killed—numbers that do not
fully account for the scale as violence continued into 2018.319
313. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 47, July 5, 2001; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-
33-A, para. 41, Apr. 19, 2004; Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 2116, Dec.
18, 2008; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), paras. 550, 553, Mar. 24, 2016.
314. Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 2115, Dec. 18, 2008; Prosecutor v.
Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), paras. 552-55, Mar. 24, 2016; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-
95-10-A, Judgment, para. 82, July 5, 2001 (“Genocidal intent may therefore be manifest in two forms. It may consist
of desiring the extermination of a very large number of the members of the group, in which case it would constitute
an intention to destroy a group en masse. However, it may also consist of the desired destruction of a more limited
number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of the group as
such. This would then constitute an intention to destroy the group ‘selectively’.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-
98-33-A, para. 12, Apr. 19, 2004.
315. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, Judgment, para. 493, Jan. 30, 2015 (upholding determination that thousands
of murdered men were relevant to determining what could constitute a “substantial part,” as the determination
was not merely a numerical issue); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 83, Dec. 14, 1999
(“international custom admits the characterisation of genocide even when the exterminatory intent only extends
to a limited geographic zone.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, paras. 590, 594, 598, Aug. 2,
2001; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, paras. 13, 17, Apr. 19, 2004 (“area of the perpetrators’ activity and
control, as well as the possible extent of their reach” is relevant in examining intent and the substantialness of the
targeted group).
316. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 32, Apr. 19, 2004.
317. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 551, Mar. 24, 2016 (emphasis added).
318. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 550, Mar. 24, 2016.
319. Medecins Sans Frontieres, “No One Was Left,” at 23; UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 36. Over 43,000 Rohingya children
who arrived since August 25, 2017 reportedly are missing one or both parents. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human
Rights, “The Rohingya Crisis: Past, Present, and Future, Summary Report of Findings from Fact-Finding Mission to
Bangladesh 21-24 January 2018, at 3, 2018.
320. Inter Sector Coordination Grp., “Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Mar. 25, 2018.
321. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 42; UN Security Council, Meeting Minutes, “Amid ‘Humanitarian and Human Rights
Nightmare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return of Displaced Rohingya, End
to Military Operations,” SC/13012, Sept. 28, 2017 (the UN Secretary-General noted that “Myanmar authorities
themselves had indicated that at least 176 of 471 Muslim villages in northern Rakhine had been totally abandoned. .
. Elsewhere too, most of the abandoned villages were majority Muslim.”).
322. Int’l Crisis Grp., “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase,” at 8. As of June 2018, there were
919,000 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, as there was an existing Rohingya refugee population
before the influx after August 25, 2017. Because the Rohingya were not enumerated during Myanmar’s 2014 census
(self-identification as Rohingya was not allowed), the total number of Rohingya in Rakhine State is not known with
certainty, although the census included an estimate that 1,090,000 people were not enumerated (thus believed to
be Rohingya) in Rakhine State. Inter Sector Coordination Grp., “Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Aug. 16,
2018; Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 19-20.
323. U.N. Security Council, Meeting Minutes, “Amid ‘Humanitarian and Human Rights Nightmare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-
General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return of Displaced Rohingya, End to Military Operations,” SC/13012.
324. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, paras. 28-31, Apr. 19, 2004; Trial Judgment, ¶ 595. The International Court
of Justice has recognized that forced displacement and acts of “ethnic cleansing” “may be significant as indicative
of the presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis) inspiring” acts of genocide. Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2015 I.C.J. 3, para. 161-63, Feb. 3, 2015.
325. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 1.
326. For investigations that highlight military knowledge of the atrocities, see, e.g., Simon Lewis et al., “Tip of the Spear:
The Shock Troops that Expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar,” Reuters, June 26, 2018); Amnesty Int’l, “Military
Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State,” 2018.
327. See, e.g., Antoni Slodkowski et al., “How a Two-Week Army Crackdown Reignited Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,”
Reuters, Apr. 25, 2017; Tatmadaw True News Information Team, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News
Information Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungtaw region, Rakhine State,” para. 9, Nov. 13, 2017; State Counsellor
Office Information Comm., “Information Committee Refutes Rumours of Rape,” Dec. 26, 2016.
328. International criminal law allows for commanders and superiors to be held responsible for the actions of their
subordinates, for example, where they “either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known
that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes” and “failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
Longstanding Discrimination
The attacks against the Rohingya were committed in a context of longstanding persecution and
discrimination against the group.332 Significantly, the Rohingya have been subjected to several
legal restrictions that affect their recognization, rights and survival as a group. As a starting point,
the government refuses to recognize the Rohingya as one of the “national races” of Burma for the
purposes of the 1982 Citizenship Law, encourages a narrative that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh, and has made attempts to label them as foreigners on identity documents.333
As a result, the Citizenship Law and its implementation, having effectively rendered the Rohingya
authorities for investigation and prosecution.” Rome Statute, art. 28(a). Knowledge of genocidal intent and further
participation might also potentially implicate liability under the Rome Statue such as aiding or otherwise contributing
to the commission of crimes. Rome Statute, art. 25(3).
329. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 34, Apr. 19, 2004.
330. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 549, Aug. 2, 2001 (“The gravity and the scale of the crime
of genocide ordinarily presume that several protagonists were involved in its perpetration. Although the motive
of each participant may differ, the objective of the criminal enterprise remains the same. In such cases of joint
participation, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such must be discernible in the criminal act
itself, apart from the intent of particular perpetrators. It is then necessary to establish whether the accused being
prosecuted for genocide shared the intention that a genocide be carried out.”). See also, Prosecutor v. Kayishema
and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 594, May 21, 1999 (finding that perpetrators of genocidal
acts “were acting with a common plan and purpose” and that defendants “played pivotal roles in carrying out this
common plan.”); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 2126, Dec. 18, 2008
(“The Chamber has considered, as the only reasonable inference, that Bagosora in the exercise of his authority
between 6 and 9 April 1994 ordered the crimes at Kigali area roadblocks (III.2.6.2). In the context of the open and
notorious targeting and slaughter of Tutsis at them, he was aware of the genocidal intent of the perpetrators and
shared it.”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, para. 40, Mar. 22, 2006; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 523, Sept. 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment,
paras. 704-07, Sept. 1, 2004; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, paras. 1166, 1172, Dec. 12, 2012.
331. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, paras. 94, 289, May 21, 1999 (confirming
that it is “unnecessary for an individual to have knowledge of all details of the genocidal plan or policy,” and that
the “widespread nature of the attacks and the sheer number of those who perished” was “compelling evidence” of
planning and coordination by government officials.).
332. “Statement by High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein at the Special Session of the Human
Rights Council on the human rights situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the
Rakhine State of Myanmar,” Dec. 5, 2017. For an explanation and analysis of Myanmar’s “political doctrine” or policy
towards the Rohingya, including years of repressive policies, see Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords,” at
91-95 (describing the “political doctrine” of discrimination as evidence of intent to destroy the group).
333. Compare Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 31-32 (“Rohingya leaders explained to Amnesty International
that, although information on ethnicity and religion is not recorded on the card, the sections requiring this
information remain on the application form. Several expressed concerns that local authorities might fill in the empty
space with ‘Bengali’ at a later date or that they may be forced to identify as such when they undergo the citizenship
verification.”) with U.S. Dep’t of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Burma,” at 32, 47 (“The
government no longer requires all participants to identify as ‘Bengali’as a condition of participating in the process,
nor does it require applicants to list their race or religion on forms in the earliest phases of the process,” but the
ethnic designation of some Muslims included a foreign qualifier (such as “Indian Bamar”)); U.S. Dep’t of State, “2016
Religious Freedom Report: Burma,” at 11-12, 2017 (“there appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a
person’s religion was indicated on the card… Some Muslims reported that they were required to indicate a ‘foreign’
ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on applications for citizenship cards.”).
334. See, e.g., UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71/Add.1, Mar. 9, 2016 (“Freedom of movement is available for every citizen but those
who citizenship status is not clear, they need to apply for travel permission.”); Simon Lewis et al., “Tip of the Spear:
The Shock Troops that Expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar,” Reuters, June 26, 2018 (quoting a military officer
as telling Rohingya community leaders that they “behaved very badly in Kachin—and they’re citizens. You’re not
citizens, so you can only imagine how we’ll be.”).
335. Advisory Comm’n on Rakhine State, “Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine,” at
35-37.
336. Fortify Rights, “Policies of Persecution,” at 26-27, 34. Reports indicate that this policy was sporadically and inconsistently
enforced. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, “Country Reports for Human Rights Practices in 2017: Burma,” at 33.
337. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 13 (“Almost every institution of the state, at the township, district, state
and even Myanmar-wide levels, is involved in the discrimination and segregation of the Rohingya community and
Muslims generally in Rakhine State. The discriminatory and excluding regime described in this brief is created by
numerous laws, regulations, policies and practices. It is impossible for officials in Rakhine State and in Myanmar
generally to maintain and enforce such a system without being fully aware of, and therefore fully responsible for, the
atrocious consequences it has for the life of the Rohingya population.”)
338. UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71 (list of legislation provided in Annex).
339. Krithika Varagur, “The Muslim Overpopulation Myth that Just Won’t Die,” Atlantic, Nov. 14, 2017); Hannah Beech,
“Across Myanmar, Denial of Ethnic Cleansing and Loathing of Rohingya,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2017; UN Secretary-
General, “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” para. 20, UN Doc. A/71/308, Aug. 5, 2016 (noting
only a “marginal increase” in proportions of Christians and Muslims in Myanmar compared with 1983); UN Doc.
S/2018/250, para. 55. See also section above on “Marriage and Family Planning.” These beliefs are compounded by
the lack of accurate census data and consistent birth registration of Rohingya in Myanmar. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged
Without a Roof,” at 37.
340. Penny Green et al., Int’l State Crime Initiative, “Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar,” at 36, 2015.
341. Fortify Rights, “Policies of Persecution,” at 11 (describing these motivations for laws in effect in 2012); Rep. Union of
Myanmar, “Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State,” at 26, 2013.
In the weeks leading up to August 25, 2017, Burma’s Security Forces increased their troop presence
near the Bangladesh border.342 The Myanmar FFM perceived this buildup as “suggest[ing] considerable
prior military planning and organization,” noting that the additional presence allowed the Forces to
begin attacking civilian communities within hours of the August 25, 2017 ARSA attacks.343 Before both
the 2016 and 2017 attacks, villagers were ordered to remove fencing and barriers around their houses
and other facilities for “security,” which left Rohingya women particularly vulnerable to intimidation
and harassment by security personnel.344 The OHCHR described the Burma Security Forces’ strategy
prior to August 25 as follows:
→→Arrest and arbitrarily detain male Rohingyas between the ages of 15-40 years;
→→Arrest and arbitrarily detain Rohingya opinion-makers,
leaders, and cultural and religious personalities;
→→Initiate acts to deprive Rohingya villagers of access to food, livelihoods,
and other means of conducting daily activities and life;
→→Commit repeated acts of humiliation and violence prior to, during, and after August 25,
to drive out Rohingya villagers en masse through incitement to hatred, violence, and
killings, including by declaring the Rohingyas as Bengalis and illegal settlers in Burma;
→→Instill deep and widespread fear and trauma—physical, emotional, and
psychological—in the Rohingya victims via acts of brutality, namely killings,
disappearances, torture, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.345
In both 2016 and 2017, attacks were documented across Rakhine State (in over 40 and hundreds
of villages, respectively) for several months in each wave of violence. These widespread attacks
followed similar patterns, evidencing that they were conducted with coordination and direction.346
Comparing testimony from different villages, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described
the 2016 “clearance operations” as typically involving large numbers of armed men (military, police,
and sometimes Rakhine villagers) destroying houses, mosques, schools, and other buildings with
rocket-propelled grenades and petrol/matches, burning fields, livestock and food crops, separating
groups by gender, beating, killing, or detaining men and subjecting groups of women to rape, sexual
violence, public humiliation and strip searches, as well as killing fleeing civilians and vulnerable
individuals such as children and elderly.347 The “clearance operations” beginning in August 2017
included shelling or open fire in Rohingya villages, indiscriminate shooting, killing and targeting
342. U.N. Security Council, Meeting Minutes, “Amid ‘Humanitarian and Human Rights Nightmare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-
General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return of Displaced Rohingya, End to Military Operations,” SC/13012
(Statement of Masud Bin Momen, Ambassador and Permanent Rep. of Bangladesh to the United Nations).
343. “Statement by Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,
at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council,” Mar. 12, 2018. See also, Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long
Swords,” at 49-50 (describing these buildups as “enabling circumstances or preparatory action” for atrocity crimes).
344. UN Doc. A/HRC/34/67; Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords,” at 42-43; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by
Command,” at 20-21.
345. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 1, Oct. 11, 2017.
346. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 14; “Statement by High Commissioner
for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein at the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights
situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar,” Dec.
5, 2017).
347. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 39, Feb. 3, 2017.
348. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 3-4, 6-9, Oct. 11, 2017; UN
Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 46.
349. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls”; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission
to Bangladesh,” at 19, Feb. 3, 2017; U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 10;
Medecins Sans Frontieres, “No One Was Left, at 16.
350. Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking Point,” at 24; “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017.
351. Wa Lone et al., “Massacre in Myanmar: One Grave for 10 Rohingya Men,” Reuters, Feb. 8, 2018; Foster Klug, “AP Finds
Evidence for Graves, Rohingya Massacre in Myanmar,” Assoc. Press, Feb. 1, 2018; Michael Schwirtz, “For Rohingya,
Years of Torture at the Hands of a Neighbor,” N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2018.
352. Int’l Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” at 9, 2016; Amnesty Int’l, “My World is
Finished,” at 31.
353. See generally, Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,”; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Military Massacres
Dozens in Rohingya Village – Soldiers Shot, Stabbed Men and Boys in Maung Nu, Rakhine State”; Physicians for
Human Rights, “Please Tell the World What They Have Done to Us”.
354. Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,” at 38; Physicians for Human Rights, “Please Tell the World What They Have
Done to Us,” at 12 (Rohingya leaders “were told to warn Rohingya villagers that they would die if they rejected the
NVC registration.”).
355. Amnesty Int’l, “Myanmar: Scorched-earth campaign fuels ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from Rakhine State,” Sept.
14, 2017; Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,” at 38; OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission:
13-24 September 2017,” at 9, Oct. 11, 2017.
356. Amnesty Int’l, “Myanmar: Scorched-earth campaign fuels ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from Rakhine State”; Human
Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,” at 12; Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,” at 21.
357. U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 13-14; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No.
IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 48, July 5, 2001 (finding that although “the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal
ingredient of the crime…in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a plan or policy may become an
important factor” and “may facilitate proof of the crime.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment,
The particularly brutal and public nature of sexual violence, mutilation and killing committed by
Burmese Security Forces is a pattern that demonstrates their intent to instill terror in surviving
Rohingya in order to destroy them as a group. Investigations reveal that sexual violence victims were
raped and left in public spaces,359 were photographed by perpetrators,360 were raped in front of
family members,361 witnessed the murder of their children before abuses,362 were laughed at during
gang rapes,363 and were mutilated.364 Many acts of sexual violence in this context were committed
with the intent to kill victims, as perpetrators simultaneously beat or mutilated victims and in many
cases locked them in buildings before setting them on fire.365
This type of destruction: targets the social bonds between the Rohingya as a group by attacking
symbols of purity and honor existing in cultural gender stereotypes,366 uses sexual violence as
collective punishment and dehumanization,367 targets women and girls of reproductive age,368 and
threatens the ability of Rohingya women to have future procreative relationships.369 The commission
of crimes such as killing, sexual violence, mutilation, and other crimes against Rohingya in public,
evidences a clear intent to affect the community as a whole rather than simply as individuals.370 The
para. 572, Aug. 2, 2001 (Finding that evidence that “has shown that the killings were planned: the number and nature
of the forces involved, the standardised coded language used by the units in communicating information about the
killings, the scale of the executions, the invariability of the killing methods applied, indicate that a decision was
made to kill all the Bosnian Muslim military aged men.”).
358. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 91.
359. Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,” at 28; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb.
3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 17.
360. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb. 3, 2017.
361. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 28, Feb. 3, 2017; Medecins Sans Frontieres, “No One Was
Left,” at 19.
362. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 2.
363. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 16.
364. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 16; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command,” at 38-39.
365. See, e.g., “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN
Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017.
366. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 9.
367. “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security
Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017; UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 38.
368. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 13; Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,” at 26; UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 38;
Medecins Sans Frontieres, “No One Was Left,” at 18-19.
369. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 55 (“Violence was visited upon women, including pregnant women, who are seen as
custodians and propagators of ethnic identity, as well as on young children, who represent the future of the group.”);
Kristen Gelineau, “AP: Rohingya Methodically Raped by Myanmar’s Armed Forces,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 11, 2017; Linah
Alsaafin, “Bangladesh: Rohingya Rape Survivors Battle Stigma,” Al Jazeera, Aug. 8, 2018; Medecins Sans Frontieres,
“No One Was Left,” at 13, 18. See also, Elise von Joeden-Forgey, “Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and
Prevention,” 7 Gender Stud. & Prevention 89, at 94-95, 2016.
370. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 1728, Dec. 18, 2008 (emphasizing
the highly public nature of the genocidal rapes of Tutsi women and girls, many of which took place at road blocks);
Beyond Displacement
The Burmese Security Forces claim that “clearance operations” are intended to apprehend suspects
involved in terrorist attacks, but those operations consistently targeted civilians who could not have
been confused for insurgents (such as children and the elderly) in both the 2016 and 2017 attacks.371
These acts had the effect of traumatizing surviving Rohingyas.372 Survivors describe Security Forces
shooting at fleeing civilians from helicopters and using rocket-propelled grenades.373 In October
2017, the UN described the “deliberate[] plant[ing] by the [Burmese] security forces after 23 August
2017” of landmines on the border “in an attempt to prevent the Rohingya refugees from returning to
[Burma].”374
Burmese Security Forces also deliberately blocked humanitarian aid375 and took control of Rohingya
crops,376 inflicting starvation conditions on remaining populations. The Forces’ blockade of
humanitarian aid in 2016377 and 2017 (beginning several weeks before August 25)378 is well documented
by humanitarian organizations and in UN discussions, and is also consistent with the military’s “Four
Cuts” strategy (see below), which includes the targeting of civilian food sources as a way to challenge
and eliminate perceived support for opposition groups.379 The blocking of humanitarian aid and food
supplies demonstrates the Security Forces’ intention to weaken Rohingya who survived initial attacks
or remained in Burma as part of a larger destructive strategy.
Prosecutor v. Karemera & Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 1667-68, Feb. 2,
2012 (finding that widespread and systematic rape, mutiliation and sexual violence against Tutsi women “not only
cause[d] serious bodily and mental harm to the women themselves, but also, by extension, to their families and
communities.”); OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 28, Feb. 3, 2017; Elise von Joeden-Forgey,
“Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention,” 7 Gender Stud. & Prevention 89, at 93, 2016.
371. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 128, Sept. 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Karemera &
Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 1626-27, Feb. 2, 2012 (“Following the speech
[inciting to genocidal acts], Tutsis including women, children, and the elderly, who could not possibly have been
suspected of being actual or potential combatants in the war between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF, were
being killed on a large scale in Butare prefecture. The Chamber has found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse were
members of a JCE to destroy the Tutsi population in Rwanda by this point.”).
372. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 17, Feb. 3, 2017 (detailing an incident where military publicly
set an elderly couple on fire).
373. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 39, Feb. 3, 2017; Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking Point,”
at 19; Antoni Slodkowski et al., “How a Two-Week Army Crackdown Reignited Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” Reuters,
Apr. 25, 2017.
374. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 10, Oct. 11, 2017.
375. Many Rohingya communities have relied on humanitarian assistance because they are isolated in displacement
camps since the 2012 violence, and the Myanmar authorities have allegedly used humanitarian assistance to attempt
to induce compliance with citizenship “verification” processes in the past. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,”
at 30.
376. Amnesty Int’l, “Briefing: Myanmar Forces Starve, Abduct and Rob Rohingya,” at 2; Amnesty Int’l, “Remaking Rakhine
State,” at 7, 9, 2018.
377. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 78.
378. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 79; Amnesty Int’l, “Briefing: Myanmar Forces Starve, Abduct and Rob
Rohingya,” at 4.
379. See section below on “Statements that Support Inferences of Genocidal Intent,” for an explanation of the Four Cuts
strategy.
Statements by Security Force and government officials, threats and insults reported by victims during
attacks, and other instances of hate speech make clear that crimes committed against the Rohingya
were committed in connection with their ethnic and religious identity.383 Burma’s officials have used
media to further the narrative of the Rohingya as “illegal immigrants” that are a “threat” to Burma’s
national character, with some public statements furthering the classification and dehumanization of
Rohingyas as “others”384 and seeking to justify their removal from Burma.385 Although some reports
note superficial government attempts to dissuade hate speech, many politicians and government
officials have largely failed to condemn hate speech and failed to protect targeted populations.386
The Myanmar FFM determined that government and military rhetoric has condoned and mirrored
inflammatory narratives, and has “fostered a climate in which hate speech thrives, human rights
violations are legitimised, and incitement to discrimination and violence facilitated.”387
Victim testimony includes instances of ethnic and religious references during attacks, and specifically
during acts of sexual violence that make clear the connection between Security Forces’ conduct and
Rohingya ethnic and religious identity. Such statements include soldiers asserting Islam was not the
“religion of Myanmar,” calling the Rohingya “Bengalis”, saying that Rohingyas would be “eliminated
from Myanmar,” and that “all Muslims” would be “vanish[ed],” and also indicated that attacks were
collective punishment for alleged support for “insurgents.”388 Other examples include :
380. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 553, Mar. 24, 2016 (“Forcible transfer
alone would not suffice to demonstrate the intent to ‘destroy’ a group but it is a relevant consideration as part of
the Chamber’s overall factual assessment.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 568, Aug. 2,
2001; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 31, Apr. 19, 2004 (both describing the combinations of killing
and forced displacement of specific segements of the Bosnian Muslim population as purposeful and part of a plan to
eliminate the possibility of the community reconstituting itself).
381. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 6, Oct. 11, 2017; Kaladan Press
Network, “Witness to Horror,” at 33; Foster Klug, “AP Finds Evidence for Graves, Rohingya Massacre in Myanmar,”
Assoc. Press, Feb. 1, 2018. See also, Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,” at 20; Medecins Sans Frontieres, “No One
Was Left,” at 17.
382. “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security
Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 121,
Sept. 2, 1998.
383. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 10, Oct. 11, 2017.
384. United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,” 19, 2014; Gregory H. Stanton, “The Ten Stages of
Genocide,” Genocide Watch, 2016 (describing othering and dehumanization).
385. Hannah Beech, “Across Myanmar, Denial of Ethnic Cleansing and Loathing of Rohingya,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2017;
OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 5, Feb. 3, 2017; “Statement by High Commissioner for Human
Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein at the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation of the
minority Rohingya Muslim population and other minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar,” Dec. 5, 2017 (“There
has been little, if any, action taken by the authorities to counter the prevailing vision, among many in Myanmar, of
the Rohingya community as alien, barely human – undeserving of their human rights, and a threat to be destroyed.”).
386. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 81; U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill
Us All,” at 16; but see, Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2018: Burma,” at 5, 2018 (describing some government
measures “against Buddhist monks and organizations that used extremist and ultranationalist rhetoric,” though
orders have been “violated without consequence”).
387. UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, para. 73.
388. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 21, 42, Feb. 3, 2017; “Statement by the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017;
Antoni Slodkowski et al., “How a Two-Week Army Crackdown Reignited Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” Reuters, Apr.
25, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls”; U.S. Holocaust Mem’l
Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 12.
389. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 42, Feb. 3, 2017.
390. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 4, Oct. 11, 2017.
391. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 8, Oct. 11, 2017.
392. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 21, Feb. 3, 2017.
393. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 21, Feb. 3, 2017.
394. Kate Brannen, “When Claims of ‘Fake News’ Hide Ethnic Cleansing,” Just Sec., May 8, 2018.
395. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls.”
396. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls.”
397. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls.”
398. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 29-30, Feb. 3, 2017.
399. Simon Lewis et al., “Tip of the Spear: The Shock Troops that Expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar,” Reuters, June
26, 2018.
400. Simon Lewis et al., “Tip of the Spear: The Shock Troops that Expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar,” Reuters, June
26, 2018.
401. Simon Lewis et al., “Tip of the Spear: The Shock Troops that Expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar,” Reuters, June
26, 2018.
402. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 551, Mar. 24, 2016. In some attacks,
perpetrators have targeted symbols of the Muslim religion, such as mosques, the Quran, civilians’ beards, and
religious leaders. Foster Klug, “AP Finds Evidence for Graves, Rohingya Massacre in Myanmar,” Assoc. Press, Feb.
1, 2018; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 32, 36, Feb. 3, 2017. During the 2016 conflict, women
were also reportedly raped inside of mosques. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 32, Feb. 3,
2017.
403. See, e.g., Rodion Ebbighausen, “Pope Faces Tightrope Act in Myanmar Amid Rohingya Crisis,” Deutsche Welle, Nov.
27, 2017.
404. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 28, 96; Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Facebook Post, “Lack
of country-loving spirits may lead to disunity and all citizens should have country-loving spirits, patriotic spirits and
Myanmar spirits, Nay Pyi Taw,” September 10, 2017 (“The term ‘Rohingya’ was not present in the country’s history.
The term ‘Bengali’ was used since the colonial era. The country could not accept and recognize the term ‘Rohingya’
by hiding the truth. Rakhine ethnics are only our indigenous people who had long been living there since the time of
their forefathers.”); Speech by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, “As Tatmadaw members legally hold arms in serving
duties, they must abide by military discipline, civil-military laws, international laws and conventions and must be
free from personality cult and isms and must have consideration in accord with the law,” April 18, 2018 (“Every
country has its national character. Being the strongest organization, the Tatmadaw must try to safeguard Myanmar
from losing national character due to the current mainstreams.”); Hannah Beech, “Across Myanmar, Denial of Ethnic
Cleansing and Loathing of Rohingya,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2017.
405. Facebook Post, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, “Lack of country-loving spirits may lead to disunity and all citizens
should have country-loving spirits, patriotic spirits and Myanmar spirits, Nay Pyi Taw,” September 10, 2017; see also,
James Hookway, “Myanmar Says Clearing of Rohingya is Unfinished Business from WWII,” Wall Street J., Sept. 2,
2017.
406. Jurawee Kittisilpa, “Myanmar Army Chief Urges Internally Displaced to Return to Rakhine,” Reuters, Sept. 21, 2017.
407. Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,” at 43; Int’l Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New
Phase,” at 13; Speech by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, “As Tatmadaw members legally hold arms in serving duties,
they must abide by military discipline, civil-military laws, international laws and conventions and must be free from
personality cult and isms and must have consideration in accord with the law,” April 18, 2018 (“the Bengali terrorists
failed to achieve their aim… Fearing punishment for their lawless acts, they as well as their families, relatives and
accomplices fled to the other country. As they did not dare to come back for fear of punishment, they made false
accusations against the Tatmadaw to mislead the international community.”); Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking
Point,” at 9; Tatmadaw True News Information Team, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the
terrorist attacks in Maungtaw region, Rakhine State,” paras. 13-14, Nov. 13, 2017 (stating that prior to the August 25
attacks, “Villagers from the most of the Bengali villages were persuaded to become terrorists.” And that “action will
be taken against those responsible and arrests of the remaining ARSA Bengali terrorists will continue.”); OHCHR,
“Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 13, 15, Feb. 3, 2017.
408. Hannah Beech, “Myanmar Official Line: Rohingya are Returning. But Cracks in that Story Abound,” N.Y. Times, Aug.
2, 2018.
Conclusion
When examined together, the scale and knowledge, the longstanding discrimination against the
Rohingya, the systemic pattern of attack, the brutal and public sexual and gender-based violence
crimes, the consequences beyond displacement that have occurred and the government and the
Forces’ own statements, are strong indicators of genocidal intent to destroy the Rohingya.
In addition to the chapeau element of intent to destroy, genocide can be committed by the killing of
one or more persons belonging to a particular group.411 Indeed, killing is mistakenly, more often than
not, the only act examined in determining the occurrence of genocide. In general, these examinations
focus only on relatively “fast” killings of men and boys (e.g. execution by gunshot), and leave behind
gendered aspects of the act of killing.
The requirements of “killing” as a genocidal act are equivalent to those for murder as a crime against
humanity, namely, when a perpetrator intentionally causes the death of one or more persons by act
or omission.412
Burmese Security Forces targeted all Rohingya for “fast” manner killings, openly targeting men,
women, and children for intentional killings by gunfire, artillery explosions, and beating.413 After initial
waves of indiscriminate attacks, Security Forces systematically swept through Rohingya villages,
calling out families from their homes, singling out men and boys for instantaneous execution, and
women and girls for physical and sexual assault before murder.414
The non-instantaneous killings of females demonstrates how women fit in to the Burmese Security
Forces’ deeply gendered conceptions of dominance, power, and masculinity—highlighting the
misogyny of the Forces, their need to humiliate and diminish women and girls, and how this informed
their genocidal strategies.
409. See, e.g., OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 41, Feb. 3, 2017 (clearance operations in the
most affected villages seem to be “in line with the Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency ‘four cuts’ strategy – a strategy
developed in the 1960s to cut off rebel forces from their four main support sources (food, funds, intelligence,
recruits), and largely unchanged since.”).
410. Int’l Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” at 7; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission
to Bangladesh,” at 41, Feb. 3, 2017.
411. Elements of Crimes, art. 6(a).
412. Prosecutor v. Karadžič, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Judgment, para. 542, Mar. 24 2016
413. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, at para. 46; OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at
6; US Holocaust Museum & Fortify Rights, “Atrocity Crimes Against Rohingya Muslims,” at 9.
414. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, at 46.
3. Causing Serious Bodily and Mental Harm to Rohingya Women and Girls
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to an individual or members of a particular group, when
conducted with the requisite intent to destroy, constitutes genocide.421
In determining the meaning of “serious bodily or mental harm,” courts have repeatedly held that
the harm must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.422 The harm does not have to be permanent
or irremediable423 and “[t]he degree of threat to the group’s destruction may…be considered as a
measure of the seriousness of the bodily or mental harm.”424 Additionally, the harm must go “beyond
temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation” and result “in a grave and long-term
disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.”425 Bodily harm is typically
The particular conduct causing serious bodily harm may include rape and other forms of sexual
violence.432 The ICTR classified rape and sexual violence as “one of the worst ways” to inflict harm
on a victim since “he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm,”433 and found that sexual violence
plays an “integral” role in the destruction of a particular group.434
The Burmese Forces’ campaign of rape and sexual violence caused serious bodily harm to Rohingya
women and girls. The rapes inflicted serious injury to women and girls’ bodies, resulting in vaginal
lacerations, extensive vaginal bleeding, infections, and severe pain.435 Such harm was compounded
in the widespread instances of gang rape, where victims were held down and penetrated by multiple
426. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 109, May 21, 1999.
427. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, para. 46, Mar. 12, 2008 (citing Kajelijeli Trial Judgment,
para. 815, referring to Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 110; Semanza Trial Judgment, para. 321).
428. Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by Command,” at 22.
429. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 8.
430. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 45; OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 24, Feb. 3, 2017; OHCHR,
“Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 5; HRW, “Massacre by the River,” at 21.
431. HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 24.
432. Elements of Crimes, art. 6(b).
433. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 731, Sept. 2, 1998.
434. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 731, Sept. 2, 1998.
435. OHCHR, “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission: 13-24 Sept. 2017,” at 7; UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 48;
HRW, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017; HRW, ‘All of My Body Was Pain,’ at 3;
Kristen Gelineau, “Rohingya methodically raped by Myanmar’s armed forces,” AP, at 8, Dec. 11, 2017.
Rape and sexual violence are amongst “the worst ways” to inflict serious mental harm, in part
because, as the ICTR found, they cause “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life
itself.”443
The instances of rape and sexual violence by the Burmese Security Forces inevitably inflict serious
mental harm on Rohingya women and girls. Women reported that during rapes they feared that
they would be killed.444 Women and girls—some only five years old—were raped in front of others,
including family and children.445 As one young woman stated about her sister who was raped, “her
dignity is destroyed.”446 Other “severe mental consequences” include suicidal thoughts, “insomnia,
depression, fainting, persistent fear, and getting startled at any noise.”447 In some cases pregnant
women were raped and expressed fears of losing their babies as a result of the attacks.448 In one
reported instance, a perpetrator slit open the pregnant woman’s stomach and killed her unborn baby
with a knife after having raped the woman.449 In another, after a “brutal gang rape,” one pregnant
Additional acts such as beatings,451 death threats, “harm that damages health or causes disfigurement
or serious injury,” torture, and inhumane or degrading treatment may also amount to serious bodily
or mental harm.452
The Burmese Security Forces’ rapes were often perpetrated with additional violence, which caused
serious bodily harm to Rohingya women and girls. Human rights organizations have found that
“[r]ape survivors spoke of enduring numerous abuses at once.”453 Women and girls were beaten with
guns, rifles, and fists, kicked with boots, slapped, and burned.454 One woman reported that Security
Forces “used a lighter to burn her genitals.”455 Victims were also bitten, including on their breasts,
and cut with knives, with some victims’ breasts cut off and others’ vaginas cut.456 In one particular
instance, as a woman was being raped the soldiers stuck her in the side with a knife to keep her from
moving.457 This type of violence inflicts serious injuries which likely amount to serious bodily harm.
Forced Displacement
Forcible transfer or deportation and persecution have also been determined to be included in the acts
that cause serious bodily and mental harm.458 The ICTY found that, depending on the circumstances,
forced displacement may cause serious mental harm by triggering “grave and long-term disadvantage
to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life so as to contribute or tend to contribute to
the destruction of the group as a whole or a part thereof.”459
The Burmese Security Forces’ sexual violence towards Rohingya women and girls has been called
a “driver” and “push factor” for forced displacement on a massive scale, and a calculated tool of
terror aimed at the extermination and removal of the Rohingya as a group.”460 Similarly, the Forces’
policy and practice of totally destroying Rohingya villages and townships further forces them away
from their homes and communities. In the few months after the October 2016 attacks, human rights
organizations documented the Security Forces’ “mass movement … into at least 40 villages across
a relatively vast geographic area.”461 More recent reports indicate that “at least 392 villages (40%
Conclusion
As shown above, the Burmese Security Forces’ rape and sexual violence, beatings, torture, inhumane
and degrading treatment, and forced displacement of Rohingya women and girls caused serious
bodily and mental harm constituting the crime of genocide.
4. Deliberately Inflicting on Rohingya Women and Girls Conditions of Life Intended to Bring
About their Physical Destruction
The deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, when
combined with the chapeau element of intent to destroy, constitutes genocide.467 The ICTR found
that such conditions “include methods that do not immediately kill members of a group, but which,
ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”468 These may include deliberate deprivation of resources
essential to survival, such as food, water, clothing, sanitation, or medical care, or subjecting members
of a group to systemic expulsion from homes or excessive physical exertion or work.469 Further, the
Sexual Violence
Sexual violence can bring about the physical destruction of a group, even where it does not “lead
immediately to the death of members of the group,” because it is capable of destroying group
members’ potential for future relationships and marriages, and of ostracizing them from the
community (or in the extreme, subjecting them to increased risk of violence).473 Sexual violence
leaves lasting devastation on its victims and their communities, including trauma, stigma, poverty,
and health conditions.474
The calculated sexual violence perpetrated against the Rohingya fits this definition. Sexual violence
occurred in diverse geographic areas through the duration of both clearance operations and was
integral to the Burmese Security Forces’ strategy to destroy the Rohingya.475 The brutal nature of
the sexual violence perpetrated against the Rohingya, its persistence within the conflict, and the
community’s vulnerability all point to its calculated nature as a condition of life calculated to bring
about physical destruction.476 Targeting of women of childbearing age (including pregnant women)477
and the public nature of sexual violence478 also attacked the dignity, perceived religious purity, and
societal roles of Rohingya women and girls as wives and mothers.479
517, July 31, 2003; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 547, Mar. 24, 2016;
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest, paras. 32-40, July 12, 2010.
470. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para.116, May 21, 1999.
471. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2015
I.C.J. 3, para. 362-64, Feb. 3, 2015.
472. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), paras. 546-48, Mar. 24, 2016.
473. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, “The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia,” at 587, 1996; UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 13; see also section above on “Brutality and Public Nature of
Sexual Violence Crimes.”
474. UN Doc. S/2018/250, para. 14.
475. UN Doc. S/2018/250, paras. 55, 56; Kristen Gelineau, “AP: Rohingya Methodically Raped by Myanmar’s Armed
Forces,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 11, 2017.
476. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls”; Kaladan Press Network, “Rape by
Command,” at 9, 11, 26; Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by the River,” at 21.
477. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 19, Feb. 3, 2017.
478. See, e.g., OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 22, Feb. 3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “Massacre
by the River,” at 28.
479. UNDP et al., “Situational Analysis: Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar,” at 77; Women’s League of
Burma, “Same Impunity, Same Patterns,” at 14.
Systematic Expulsion
The “systematic expulsion from homes” can amount to the genocidal act of inflicting conditions to
totally destroy a group.487 While the ICTY has explained that conditions must be more than deportation
and dissolution of the group,488 the ICJ has noted that forced displacement can potentially constitute
genocide when accompanied by the required intent to destroy the group.489 In the context of the
Darfur situation, the ICC concluded that in addition to contamination of wells and water pumps,
there were reasonable grounds to believe that “the forcible transfer of hundreds of thousands of
civilians belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups coupled with the resettlement in
those villages and lands they had left by members of other tribes” were conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the groups as part of a genocidal policy.490
480. “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Security
Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017.
481. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 28, Feb. 3, 2017.
482. The deliberate infection of Rwandan women with HIV as part of the Rwandan genocide is one example. Mark A.
Drumbl, “She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman: The Genocide Conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011,” 34
Mich. J. Int’l L. 559, 2013. See also, Obijiofor Aginam, “Rape and HIV as Weapons of War,” United Nations University,
June 27, 2012; Jennifer Hentz, “The Impact of HIV on the Rape Crisis in the African Great Lakes Region,” 12 Human
Rights Brief 12-15, 2005.
483. Amnesty Int’l, “We are at a Breaking Point,” at 26.
484. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 33-34.
485. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 29, 32.
486. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Volume I), para. 548, Mar. 24, 2016.
487. Elements of Crimes, art. 6(c) Element 4, fn. 4
488. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. It-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 519, 557, July 31, 2003. Deportation was not considered
as “conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction” itself in the Brđanin Trial Judgment because it
had not been pleaded in the indictment, but was included as evidence of genocidal intent. Prosecutor v. Brđanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 693, Sept. 1, 2004.
489. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2015
I.C.J. 3, para. 376, Feb. 3, 2015.
490. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest, para. 38, July 12, 2010.
Movement restrictions and curfews implemented following an outbreak of violence in 2012 have
remained in force years later, and similar curfews have been imposed in the wake of both the 2016
and 2017 violence.499 These movement restrictions severely limit the ability to travel to hospitals,
which, together with the denial of humanitarian access, has impacted the health of the Rohingya
population.500 Even before the 2016 clearance operations began, UN entities reported that these
restrictions led to preventable deaths as Rohingya were denied travel for emergency treatment,501
or subjected to costly and additional referral processes in order to access health care.502 UN sources
491. Attacks in 2016 “resulted in the displacement of at least 94,000 Rohingya civilians from Maungdaw Township over a
three-month period.” U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 14.
492. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 44; Amnesty Int’l, “We Will Destroy Everything,” at 8.
493. OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 3, Oct. 11, 2017.
494. See, e.g., OHCHR, “Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission: 13-24 September 2017,” at 1, Oct. 11, 2017.
495. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 45; “Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual
Violence in Conflict, UN Security Council Briefing on Myanmar,” Dec. 12, 2017; Amnesty Int’l, “My World is Finished,”
at 7, 21-22.
496. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 75-76 (describing projects by the Ministry for Development of Border
Areas and National Races (“NaTaLa”) to relocate Rakhine and other non-Rohingya villagers to newly-built villages
on formerly Rohingya land in northern Rakhine State, which are “often built on land confiscated from Rohingya using
Rohingya villagers for forced labour”); Amnesty Int’l, “Remaking Rakhine State,” at 3, 7.
497. UN Doc. A/HRC/37/70, para. 60; U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum & Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All,” at 5.
498. Jurawee Kittisilpa, “Myanmar Army Chief Urges Internally Displaced to Return to Rakhine,” Reuters, Sept. 21, 2017.
499. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 8, 60-61; Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords,” at 50-51.
500. Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 60-66.
501. UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71, para. 40.
502. UN Doc. A/HRC/31/71, para. 40; UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, para. 39; Amnesty Int’l, “Caged Without a Roof,” at 62.
When committed with the specific intent to destroy, the imposition of measures intended to prevent
births constitutes genocide.508 The ICTR found that such measures “should be construed as sexual
mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition
of marriages,” and can also include forced pregnancies.509 The Court also went on to find the
measures may be physical or mental, and in the context of rape found that “rape can be a measure
intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same
way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.”510 Courts have
also considered the procreative impacts on a group of the separation of sexes and the killing of one
gender of a group to be indicia of measures intended to prevent births.511 Notably, such measures
503. UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, para. 39; “Statement by High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein at
the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation of the minority Rohingya Muslim
population and other minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar,” Dec. 5, 2017. According to 2010 statistics, “only
38% of women with complications in 2010 were referred to a hospital; 24% reached the hospital, but 14% died en
route due to late referral or transportation delays.” UNDP et al., “Situational Analysis: Gender Equality and Women’s
Rights in Myanmar,” at XX.
504. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 31, Feb. 3, 2017.
505. OHCHR, “Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh,” at 23, Feb. 3, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Security
Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls.”
506. Human Rights Watch, “All of My Body Was Pain,” at 3.
507. Compare, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v.
Serb.), 2015 I.C.J. 3, paras. 369-72, Feb. 3, 2015 (entertaining Croatia’s claim that the denial of medical supplies
could fall within the scope of this act).
508. Rome Statute, art. 6(d).
509. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 507, Sept. 2, 1998.
510. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 508, Sept. 2, 1998.
511. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 28, Apr. 19, 2004 (affirming Krstić Trial Judgment). See also,
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88 -T, para. 866, June 10, 2010.
Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, para.5671, Mar. 24, 2016.
Conclusion
Taken together, the Burmese Security Forces’ brutal acts of sexual violence, including against
pregnant women; the deliberate sexual mutilation of women; the targeting of reproductive organs
and pregnant women’s stomachs; coupled with long-standing rhetoric and discrimination against the
size and growth of the Rohingya population, strongly support that these Forces imposed measures to
prevent birth as a part of their genocidal campaign against the Rohingya.
527. HRW, “Burma- Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls,” Feb. 6, 2017.
528. HRW, “Massacre by the River – Burmese Army Crimes Against Humanity in Tula Toli,” at 21, 2017.
529. Amnesty Int’l, “Myanmar: Parliament must reject discriminatory ‘race and religion’ laws,” at 5, Mar. 3, 2015.
530. UN Doc. S/2018/250 para. 55.
→→In line with the findings of the Myanmar FFM, refer the situation in Burma/Myanmar to the
International Criminal Court, at a minimum for those crimes occurring since 2011 in Rakhine,
Shan, and Kachin States, and support the funding of any investigations and prosecutions
resulting from any such referral.
→→Impose sanctions on Burmese military and security force leaders, including those identified
by the Myanmar FFM and on the Tatmadaw in line with their listing as a party credibly
suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual
violence in the Annex of the 2018 report of the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence.
→→Immediately cease military and security operations against the Rohingya in Rakhine State,
issue orders to cease all acts of rape and sexual violence, and permit humanitarian access
to the State.
→→Initiate impartial and independent investigations into violations of international criminal,
human rights, and humanitarian law with a view to ensuring justice and accountability and
comprehensive and transformative reparations to affected individuals and populations.
→→Cooperate with and facilitate access for all international human rights and accountability
efforts, including the Myanmar FFM, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar and other UN special procedures, the International Criminal Court, and
international human rights organizations.
→→Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and provide retroactive jurisdiction
to the entry in to force of the Statute, July 1, 2002.
→→Amend the 2008 Constitution to bring the military and security forces under civilian
oversight, and repeal provisions granting the military actors impunity for human rights
abuses, including Article 445.
→→Expeditiosly pass the Prevention (and Protection) of Violence Against Women Law in line
with international human rights standards, eliminate contradictory penal code provisions
including the definition of rape and marital rape exceptions, and ensure jurisdiction over the
military for crimes under the ambit of the law in civilian courts.
→→Amend the 1982 Citizenship Act to repeal discriminatory provisions based on national origin,
religion, and ethnicity and restore citizenship to those whose citizenship was stripped under
the law.
→→Guarantee the safe return of Rohingya and other displaced ethnic minorities, including the
repatriation of any confiscated land and ensure the equal participation of women in all
decision making processes related to these efforts.
→→Submit timely reports to international human rights bodies, including overdue reports to the
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (extraordinary
report on the situation in Rakhine State (due May 24, 2018) and interim reporting (due July
28, 2018)).
→→Take all possible measures to prevent, suppress, and punish genocide against the Rohingya
in line with obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
including by initiating proceedings against the Burmese government at the International
Court of Justice, and the imposition of arms embargoes and sanctions.
→→Support efforts at the United Nations, including the Security Council, General Assembly and
the Human Rights Council, to monitor the human rights situation in Burma and hold the
state and individuals accountable for violations of international, criminal, human rights, and
humanitarian law.
→→Use bilateral and multilateral engagement to urge the Burmese government to cease human
rights violations and initiate credible accountability proceedings.
→→Utilize universal jurisdiction to prosecute responsible individuals for international crimes,
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.