Land Law I
Land Law I
SCHOOL:NNAMDI
AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY
FACULTY:LAW/LEGAL
STUDIES
COURSE:LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY
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WHAT IS LAND
Generally, at common law, land is defined as covering the earth surface i.e.
("the topsoil"), the subsoil, things attached on it, such as structures or crop
and incorporeal hereditaments enjoyed in it. Whereas by section 2 of the
property and conveyancing law of the western Nigerian states. Land is
defined as including Land of any tenure, building or parts of a building,
whether the division is horizontal, vertical or made in any other way, and
other corporeal hereditaments, and also a rent and other incorporeal
hereditaments and an easement, right, privileges or benefit in, over or
derived from the land. At customary law SSC Obi, defines land as a deity, the
source of all life of food and fertility, the custodian of social norms and
morals. Both as a good and as a legal person, some form of respect and
tribute is due to mother earth.
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Customary and islamic land law are basically the principles of customary and
islamic laws which are recognised and accepted by law, statutes and case
laws. Under our evidence law, a custom may become law either by proof or
by judicial notice.
2) Received English law;
As we all know this comprises the common law principles, doctrine of equity
and SOGA. Fee simple, fee tail, mortgage, laches, estoppel, acquiescence etc
are all products of English law. Two major laws of SOGA are still applicable in
the south. Eg the conveyancing act of 1881 and the wills act of 1837. Which
many contents has been modified under the wills law.
3) The land use act;
ANALYSIS
The earth surface here mainly denotes the top soil and other surface of the
earth which is not covered by the sea.this includes stool lands. Eg lands
attached to traditional kingships like the ooni of ife, oba of Benin. Etc It also
includes Communal Lands, Which is the land that runs as a corporate unit.
And lastly, family land which belongs to the family by inheritance.
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ii) subjacent things of a physical nature;.
This consists mainly of minerals found beneath the earth surface, and
by virtue of section 3 of the minerals act, and other relevant
legislations, ownership of it is vested in the government.
iii) everything attached to the earth's surface;
This includes artificial contents like buildings and structures including trees.
And one critical question has been whether such things form an integral part
of the land so as to accrue to the owner of the land.
The attitude of the court at common law is different from what is obtainable
under customary law.
the common law position is that everything on the land forms part of the
land and vest on the owner of the land. And this is predicated on the maxm "
Quic quid plantatur solo solo cedit". Thus in Francis v Ibitoye, the plaintiff,
ignoring the warnings of the defendant, built on the defendant's land without
his consent. The court held that in the absence of laches and acquiescence
on the part of the defendant. The land and everything attached to it became
his, without any obligation to compensate the plaintiff.
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Also in UAC v Apaw, the court held that by virtue of the maxim, "quic quid
plantatur solo solo cedit", the new building in the instant case automatically
became annexed and formed part of the freehold.
Also in Oso v Olayioye, while the parcel of land was in dispute the defaulting
party proceeded in completing the building on it, after the suit was
determined against his favour. The court held that he was to forfeit the
building as he had voluntarily assumed the risk.
But on the other hand, consent on the part of the owner does not mean the
maxim "quic quid plantatur solo solo cedit" will not apply. This is so because
prima facie consent goes to the question of occupation and not ownership.
Therefore after the right of occupation is determined, title to the house
divest back to the owner of the land. Thus in Ezeani v Ejidike, the plaintiff
was duly served a quit notice by the defendant at the expiration of the 5
years agreement. He then instructed a contractor to demolish the house and
remove the materials. But the defendant refused and removed it themselves,
the plaintiff then sued in conversion and failed. The court held that since the
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right of occupation had expired ,then the house belonged to the defendants
as part of the soil.
However, it is relevant to note that the maxim "Quic quid plantatur solo solo
cedit", will not always apply rigidly, for it to apply, regards must be had to the
facts and circumstances of each case and the object or structure in question
must be put into consideration. Eg where it is a building erected on the land
of another, it automatically forms part of the land and the title divest to the
owner of the land. But there is always a difficulty where the object in
question is a chattel affixed or attached to a land or building.
As such, there is no hard and fast rule as to when such chattels become part
of the land or building. The court in Hogson v Holland, held that the true rule
is that whether a chattel affixed to a land or building, forms part of the land
will be determined as to whether the circumstances are such that show they
were intended to be part of the land. The onus being on whoever asserts the
affirmative to prove same.
Furthermore, the rigidity of the quic quid doctrine can also be hindered by
some statutory exceptions
v) ownership of all tidal waters and course ways is also vested in the state. Eg
in Amachree v Kalio, the plaintiff sued seeking an injunction to restrain the
defendant from using the open tidal navigable rivers. The court held against
him as such was under the exclusive preserve of the state and no private
individual or community could claim absolute ownership.
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THE OPERATION OF THE MAXIM UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW
Above we have discussed the effect of the maxim under common law,
however the position of the law under customary law appears distinct. At
customary law there is no general rule in support or against the maxim.
Instead what we find are conflicting cases and opinions by authors.
In Okoiko v Esadalue, the court held that at the end of a pledge transaction,
the improvement made on the land by the pledgee automatically became that
of the owner of the land. And in the more recent case of Alao v Ajani, the
supreme court considered the ruling in Sarteng v Darkwa, as being of
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doubtful validity, and held in the instant case that the lease agreement
executed by the beneficiaries of the deceased, in respect of a family land
developed by the deceased was void. since the family consent was not
obtained in the lease.
Same Principle was applied in Nwogen v Nzekime, where the court held that
the claim by the builder of the house, to demolish the house was
misconceived.
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CAN THE MAXIM APPLY UNDER CUSTOMARY TENANCY?
It therefore follows that a customary tenant during the tenancy may erect
buildings and demolish them thereafter before the expiration of the tenancy,
or he may leave it to remain and instead seek compensation from the owner
of the land. Also where the tenancy is periodic and the tenant planted
economic trees or crops on it, he may on vacating the land, harvest all his
crops or leave and then be entitled to an account of profit from the grantor.
In Eke v Elim, a customary tenant who planted economic trees was held
entitled to an account of profit upon leaving the tenancy. The rule was
stretched further in Okoh v Olotu, where the court held a person who
entered without permission of the land owner, entitled to the economic
trees planted there in, being an interest.
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OPERATION OF THE MAXIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
Under Islamic law, the maxim does not apply, ownership of land differs from
ownership of structures Thereon. Although an owner may require his land to
be restored in its former state, or claim compensation for the restoration.
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ii) possession
ANALYSIS
i) Ownership;
iii) the right of management including the right to alienate the same.
Furthermore the drawing of a will with regards to the property has also been
held to constitute a great element of ownership. In Jacobs v Oladunni Bros,
the effect of a will decided by the deceased testator, showing how his
property was to be shared amongst his heirs was held to be valid.
Aside from alienation, we also have power to manage such things, i.e. the
right to control and defend the enjoyment of the thing owned, especially
against unauthorized interference. The criminal code under section 282&293
even solidifies this concept as a person is allowed to defend his property by
the use of reasonable force without liability. And the court toed on this path
of reason in the case of R v Ebi.
According to I.O Smith, when the right of a claimant to use, possess and
dispose of land is not subject or restricted by the superior rights of another,
then ownership is said to be vested in him. Thus in Abraham v Olorunfunmi,
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the court observed to the effect that ownership connotes complete and total
right over a property, the owner in question exercises his right of alienation
and disposition without the consent of another, because no other person's
right in the property is higher than his. Katz in his "concept of ownership"
argued that the owner of a thing is the exclusive agenda setter of that thing,
all everyother persons owes is only an obligation of deference thereto.
However, it has been suggested that the owner of a thing is not necessarily
the person who at any time has the whole power of use and disposal, Eg Mr A
may own a land but Mr B and C are tenants in use of it.
Although it is submitted that the above view is wrong since individual land
holding operated in Nigeria. Nonetheless, communal and family ownership is
deemed a true reflection of the indigenous system of land holding.
Communal ownership can be traced to communal land acquired for the use
of the entire community, either by settlement by a named founder exercising
right of ownership jointly with the community, or through conquest.
The land in this case enures for the benefit of members of the community
who are entitled to portions for agricultural purposes following from a
formal grant to the individual from a political authority.
FAMILY OWNERSHIP
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The system under family ownership follows the rule in Abeje v Ogundairo,
That is land devolving by way of intestate succession from the owner to the
heir. Although in modern times, family ownership can arise by declaration in
a will, as seen in Nelson v Nelson, where the deceased in his will, indicated
his intention that the land be held by the eldest son on behalf of others as a
family property. or it may also arise by conveyance by the owner, as seen in
the case of Olowosago v Adebanjo.
INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP
State ownership originated from the Treaty of cession of 1861 which ceded
the colony of Lagos to the British crown, subject to customary rights of the
local people. Later on land acquisition statutes such as Public land
acquisition act 1917, public land acquisition (miscellaneous provisions)
decree of 1976, were promulgated under which individuals and communal
rights were compulsorily acquired in different parts of the country for
agricultural and industrial purposes.
In 1962 the land and native rights ordinance was repealed in the former
northern Nigeria and replaced with the land tenure law of 1962.
Before the enactment of the land use act. Under the law, land was under the
control of the permanent secretary who administered the same for the use
and benefit of natives, but non- natives acquired no title to occupation and
use without consent of the permanent secretary. But under the land use act,
title to land has been vested under the authority of the governor of a state, to
that extent a person enjoys only a right of occupancy.
CLAIM TO OWNERSHIP
POSSESSION
DE FACTO POSSESSION
Time begins to run at that point the right of action accrues or in cases where
the right of action is concealed, when it is discovered or should have been
discovered by the owner with due diligence.
At customary law, time does not run in favour of an adverse possessor, thus
an owner of land is not affected by statutes of limitation of actions. Therefore
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he can come to reclaim his land at any time. In view of this, the West African
Court Of Appeal, in Adu v Kuma, reversed the decision of the trial court
which granted prescriptive title to the defendant who had been in possession
of a land for 16 years.
But while this is the rule recognised and applied by the courts, the traditional
application of this rule seems to have been mitigated, in more recent times,
no court will apply the rule in circumstances in which the resultant effect
will occasion injustice. In other words, where the strict application of the
customary law rule on prescription will result in manifest injustice or
absurdity, the court will do away with it and look at the issue from an
equitable perspective.
ii) That He Took Possession Of The Land Under A Mistaken Belief That He
Had Title To It;
Knowledge in this case may be presumed not only from overt acts of the
defendant such as expenditure of money on improvement on land, but also
from long possession sufficient to impute knowledge to the plaintiff. For
instance, In Izuogu v Ibe, the family having been in undisturbed and
exclusive possession of the said land for 54 years before the outbreak of
hostilities, the court held it would be inequitable to dispose them of it, since
they have acquired a prescriptive title.
This situation may arise where the defendant has expended money on the
land, built on it or had been exercising overt acts of ownership. Eg in
Suleman v Johnson, the plaintiff who stood by for a long time allowing the
defendant to let out the land to some tenants and permitting some strangers
tap palm fruits therein failed in an action for recovery of the land. However
in Ado v Awusu, the court held that lack of evidence as to expenses and
expenditure incurred by the defendant on the said land was fatal to his case
as it cannot be said he altered his position in the absence of such. Thus the
plaintiff was held entitled to the land.
Note: the rule under Islamic law appears similar to the rule in Akpan awo v
Cookey Gam, but while the defendant under customary law is bound to
prove the essential elements such as expending money as a result of reliance
on the acquiescence of the plaintiff, under Islamic law no such requirement
exists.
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INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS
EASEMENTS
An easement is a right attached to land which allows the owner of that land
(the dominant owner) either to use the land of another person ( the servient
owner) in a particular manner or to restrict its use by that other person to a
particular extent.
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THE RIGHT TO AN EASEMENT MAY BE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE
It is positive when the person merely uses the land of another as a crossway,
but it is negative when the easement creates imposition on the land of
another, Eg easement of light, whereby the other person is restricted from
building in a particular way adjacent to another's house which may restrict
flow of light.
i) Right Of Way;
in Colls v Home & colonial stores, the defendant owned a land adjacent to
Mr Colls' clerk office, they attempted to erect a building which shielded light
from entering the office, so he sued seeking an injunction to restrain them
and succeeded as he had right of easement.
FEATURES OF AN EASEMENT
i) there must be a tenement over which the easement is exercisable (servient
tenement) and another tenement for the benefit of which the easement
exists(dominant tenement). Ie a person seeking to enforce a right in
easement must have a land to be benefited.
The easement must make the use of the land more beneficial. a pure
personal advantage is not enough. In Re Ellenborough park, the right to use
a recreational park given to persons having residential properties reasonably
close to the park was held to be an easement. But, in Hill v Turper, a right
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given to a person to solely and exclusively put a pleasure boat on the canal
was held to be a mere licence mainly for the benefit of his business, which
was not in any way connected to his occupation of the land.
NOTE; the purport of this feature is that since the servient land is meant to
benefit the dominant land, the law requires that the former must be
sufficiently closely situated to give the dominant land a practical benefit.
iv) the right claimed as an easement must be capable of being the subject of a
grant, and the nature and extent of the claim must be capable of exact
description and it's sphere of operations precise and certain.
TYPES OF GRANTS
I) Express Grants;
Implied grants stem from two sources, the first being easement granted by
statute, Eg by section 87 of the property and conveyancing law, land
conveyed goes to the purchaser alongside easement appertaining to such
land. The second being easement granted under the rule in Wheeldon v
Burrows, where for example a grantor who owns two adjoining tenements
conveys one of the tenements to another for the benefit of which he has
been in the habit of using in a particular manner Eg walking across it, the law
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implies an easement of way in favour of the grantee. In such a situation, the
right of Ownership of the grantor exercised over the tenement is known as
quasi dominant tenement and tenement over which it is exercised being
quasi servient tenement.
At common law, where the right alleged to be an easement has been enjoyed
for a long time as to give rise to a presumption at law that an easement has
been granted, then a grant is presumed. The right must be shown to have
been existing for a long period of time. For the right to be accepted as such,
the user must not have been violent, secretive or precarious. And the right of
prescription with respect to the easement may be claimed either at common
law or under the doctrine of "lost modern grant" or under the prescription
act of 1832.
For instance under the lost modern grant, after actual enjoyment of an
easement has been shown for a reasonable time, the court presumes under
this doctrine that an actual Grant was made, at the time when enjoyment
began, but that the conveyance evidencing it has been lost, And so if the use,
back to 1189 cannot be proved, and no deed is produced, but the user is
shown for 60 years, it is presumed that the deed is lost.
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On the other hand under the prescription act of 1832, section 2 provides
that 20 years is sufficient unless it is shown that it could not have been
enjoyed for that period. See Dalton v Angus, where easement of lateral
support to building for 20 years, was held to be valid.
PROFIT À PRENDRE
Profit A prendre is a right which allows another to go into the land of another
to take some profit or material from it. It is a right which exists in gross.
i) there need not be a nexus or relationship between the two persons, ie the
person entering to take and the person from whom it is taken,
ii) adjacence or proximity of land is immaterial. That is to say it exists in
gross, a person need not be an immediate neighbour or even a land owner to
enjoy a profit.
i) Common Of Pastures;
A profit or easement comes to an end where the servient tenement and the
dominant tenement merge together in the hands of one person for an estate
in fee simple.
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LEGAL AND EQUITABLE INTEREST IN LAND
Interest in land may be equitable or legal, the historical point of how equity
came in to mitigate the harshness of common law is relevant to land law. Eg
at common law, trust property was vested in the trustee as the owner, but
equity came in and recognised the trustee as true owner.
And this was thus the origin of the distinction between legal and equitable
interest, the latter can be said to have developed as encumbrances on legal
interest and the principle of constructive trust and constructive notice were
often invoked to provide a remedy where otherwise none would have existed
by strict application of the law.
a) he failed to make the usual and proper inquiries as to the vendors title
It is often said that Equitable interests avail against all of the world except a
bonafide purchaser of the legal estate for value without notice and those
claiming under him.
It therefore follows that equitable interest enjoys a security which is not too
inferior to that enjoyed by legal rights. In Ogunbambi v Abowaba, a family in
Lagos sold a portion of land to a purchaser who paid and was given a
purchase receipt with a covenant to execute conveyance on demand, he
went into possession but conveyance was never executed, later on the family
sold the same land to another purchaser being the defendant after the latter
had unsuccessfully attempted to buy the land from the first purchaser. The
plaintiff-successor to the first purchaser sued, the court held that the
contract of sale to the first purchaser was an equitable interest capable of
being converted to a legal estate by specific performance, and because the
defendant had notice of it, he must be bound by it.
It is also postulated that if not that the defendant had actual notice or
knowledge of the plaintiff's Equitable interest, he would have still been held
to have had constructive knowledge or notice, since if he had inspected the
land he would be aware that the plaintiff is in occupation of the land.
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EQUITABLE AND LEGAL INTEREST UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW
Although the concept of legal and equitable interest are creations of English
law, they are still tenable under customary law in some respects. In the sense
that under customary law, equity in a loose sense has had a distinct
application in three main areas;
iii) to also mitigate the harshness which would have otherwise accrued to an
occupier of land, due to the fact that customary law recognises no
limitation or prescriptive title. See Akpan awo v Cookey Gam.
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iv) sale of land at customary law. Eg
In Odufuye v Fatoke, the court observed that all that is necessary is that the
purchase price has been paid, there is consent of the vendor, property is
handed down in presence of witnesses and the purchaser has gone into
possession and has remained in continuous possession. It is immaterial that
no conveyance or any other form of writing has been adopted. However,
according to the court in Folami v Cole, if the purchase price has been paid
but the land has not been handed over to him in the presence of witnesses,
customary law appears not to accord him any right in the land.
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DOCTRINE OF ESTATE
The doctrine of Estate does not recognise ownership of land, it purports that
title to land in any form all boils down to possession, otherwise called
"Seisin". And the person entitled to Seisin owns an abstract entity called
"Estate" interposed between him and the land, and the person's title prevails
against all those who show no better right of Seisin.
This estate is subject to a superior title, and the holders of such estate
usually have overlords or landlords.
i) Freehold Of Inheritance;
this includes
a) Life Estate and
ANALYSIS
Freehold Of Inheritance
A fee simple estate has the largest duration consequent to the fact that it is
granted to a man and his heirs, which purports that the estate subsists as
long as the deceased holder has an heir.
The word "Fee" denotes its inheritability and the word "simple" indicates that
it is Inheritable by the general heirs of the owner for the time being, whether
they be ascendants, descendants or collaterals.
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The unique formula for its creation is the use of appropriate words of
limitation, thus; "To A and his heirs".
Note: before the enactment of the conveyancing act, the law was strict that
the word " To A and his heirs" must be used as using another word may
simply create a life estate. However by section 52 of the conveyancing act,
the expression fee simple when used as words of Inheritance, should be
sufficient to convey a fee simple in land. Also by section 28 of the wills
act,irrespective of any word used in a will, a fee simple estate is expressed by
the testator.
Infact this rule under the wills act has also been adopted for deeds in
jurisdiction in the old western and Mid Western Nigerian by virtue of section
85(1) of the property and conveyancing law.
A fee tail, unlike a fee simple, does not have much capacity for perpetual
existence. It is created by use of the appropriate words of limitation thus;
"To A and the heirs of his body".
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Under the wills act, less formal language entailed interest in a will than a
deed, any expression indicating an intention to give the devisee an estate of
inheritance descendible to his lineal issues suffices. Eg To A and his seed, or
his offspring, or his posterity etc. Same applies mutatis mutandis to an
executor of an instrument inter vivos.
A fee tail estate created prior to the promulgation of the land use act may be
expanded into a fee simple estate.
This could occur by barring or statutory conversion.
a) Barring;
b) Statutory conversion;
I) Life Estate;
A Life estate creates only a life interest in favour of the grantee. And maybe
created by express limitation or operation of law. It is created by operation of
the law where there is an ineffective creation in law of a fee simple estate or
fee tail by the grantor.
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CO-OWNERSHIP
i) Joint tenancy
ii) Tenancy
incommon
ANALYSIS
I) Joint Tenancy;
b) Right Of Survivorship
Note; for there to be joint tenancy there must be about four unities, that is;
● Unity of possession,
● Unity of title
● Unity of interest.
TENANCY IN COMMON
Where two persons advance a loan to a third party who in turn mortgaged
his property to both of them. Whether the money contributed by them
individually is equal or unequal is immaterial to the court. Equity presumes
them to hold the said property as tenants in common, rather than joint
tenancy. Thus, upon the death of any of them, the doctrine of survivorship
will not apply, instead the existing party will be deemed to hold the shares or
interest of the deceased in trust for his heirs.
c) Partnership;
a) sale,
b) partition or
c) acquisition.
NOTE: section 3(6) of the property and conveyancing law 1959, abolished
legal estate held in tenancy in common in the west. Therefore a conveyance
of land to any person in tenancy in common shall take effect, under section
61(1)or(2) of the property and conveyancing law, as if the land was conveyed
to the grantees as joint tenants upon statutory trust for sale for themselves
and on behalf of other tenants.
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One critical question under this topic has been whether or not the land use
act expropriates? Over time there are differing opinions and views as to this
question. But from the land use act itself and various literature on this
question of nationalization, two perspectives can be deduced.
i) those who maintain that all land in Nigeria have been nationalized and
that the only interest remaining in the citizen is the right of the user only. Eg
in Nkwocha v governor of Anambra state, the court per ESO JSC, clearly
interpreted section 1 of the land use act, as nationalization of all land.
ii) those who believe that land in Nigeria has not been nationalized and
that it was only a minimum power of administration that was transferred to
the state under the act. Thus, in the view of this second perspective , nothing
has changed and a right of occupancy is as good as a fee simple or allodial
ownership.
In Abioye v Yakubu, karibi Whyte observed, " that the land use act has been
credited with all kinds of achievement, the most astonishing being the view
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that it is a sufficient code of land law, this is fundamental and the basic
misconception of the land use act. The land use act has made provisions for
the law applicable to land by vesting it in the governor, and allocation is
made to individuals whether in urban or rural areas for agricultural purposes.
The inadequacies of the provisions, section 34,35 & 36 provides a guide since
the holder and occupier of the land shall continue to hold as before the
commencement of the act. It follows that the law applicable will remain the
same, the existing law, customary law, common law or statute as the case
may be.
Also in Savannah bank v Ajilo, a right of occupancy was placed on the same
pedestal with the English form of lease, there the court held to the effect
that, because a right of occupancy in line with section 8 can only be granted
for a specific term, it has same semblance with a lease, and also because the
holder has the sole right and absolute possession of all improvement on the
land during the term of a statutory right of occupancy, he does not enjoy
more rights than a lessee at common law.
In Ogunleye v Oni, the court held that the land use act never set out to
abolish all existing titles and rights to possession of land. Instead the real
effect of section 1 of the land use act is the expropriation of only radical title
in the form of absolute ownership in favour of the governor subject to the
other provisions of the act which preserve existing interest in land.
The question remains, does the land use act expropriate?
He continues further in his argument that the act made no special provisions
regarding customary law, there can be no talk as to the confirmation or
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abolition of customary law or even its modification. But it is clear that in view
of the general provisions of the act, the position of customary holding needs
re-examining.
Furthermore section 24, 25 and 29(3) of the land use act are cited as having
established the continuation of customary law in property law under the act.
To the above view, Obaseki JSC added to the effect in Abioye v Yakubu,
customary right of occupancy is a product of native law and custom and
predates the land use act, and the fact it may now be granted by the local
government has changed nothing, and the total quantum of interest
contained in a right of occupancy has to be determined by customary law of
the area.
Section 36 of the land use act, see section 36(2)(3)(4), saves land in non
urban areas, but the determinable questions are as follows;
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i) whether a community or family is a person within the meaning of section
36? ii) is land used in common by a community or family for agricultural
purposes or easement ?
iii) can a community or family properly be said to hold land of which before
the act it was the allodial owner?
Hon. Justice Umezuilike, submits that all the above questions must be
answered in the negative. In his opinion a community or family cannot be a
person in law. See Ekwuno v Ifedika.
It has also been suggested that since the language of section 34 which deals
with land in the urban areas is identical to that of section 36, what is said
about the abolition of Communal and family land tenure under section 36
also suffices.
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FORMAL PARTS OF A DEED OF CONVEYANCE
ANALYSIS
Signing;
This entails passing of interest, and may not necessarily be the physical
delivery. Delivery may be absolute or conditional also known as delivery in
escrow. A delivery is absolute when it takes effect immediately, but
conditional when its taking effect is subject to a condition. However as noted
by the court in Anambra state housing development corporation v
Emekwue, a person cannot rescind from a transaction before the condition
is fulfilled. Formal parts of a deed
1) commencement
2) date, stamping
3) parties
4) recitals
8) survey
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9) habendum
11) testimonium
Analysis
Commencement;
This is where the general nature of the document is described, the old
practice was to commence a deed by words like "this indenture", however the
modern practice now is for the commencement to describe the general or
specific nature of the document.
Date;.
A document takes effect from the date upon which it was signed, sealed and
delivered by the parties. It is also relevant for the purpose of stamp duty
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because a deed must be stamped within 30 days of its execution, and
registration within 60 days. Failure to do so may lead to imposition of a
penalty. Also by the Registration of titles law Lagos state, failure to register
within two months renders the instrument void.
parties;
There's always parties having rights and duties under a deed. A conveyance
from or to a non existing person is null and void, the parties must be fully
described by names, address and occupation.If a party is artificial, it must be
fully described as such with the address of the registration office.
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Note; in a deed of conveyance it is usually stated that the successors in title
will be bound by it, but even where it is not stated, it will be implied in the
deed, however it is more elegant to expressly state so.
Recitals(preamble)
This evidence shows a transaction between the parties, the precise subject
matter of such a transaction, the interest which the transferee is entitled to
hold.
Note; it encompasses the following;
a) testatum
b) consideration
c) receipt clause
d) capacity
e) words of grant
g) habendum
Analysis
a)Testatum;
This is the formal statement commencing the operative part of the deed
wherein the important clauses and covenants are stated. The testanum
provides as follows;
"Now this deed of assignment witnesses as follows"
b) consideration;
This states the consideration for which the property is sold or bought, and
serves two purposes;
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i) it shows that the conveyance is not voluntary ii) it is the basis for
assessment of stamp duties and other valuation fees.
The statement may run thus;
"In consideration of the sum of 50,000 now paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
c) receipt clause;
This shows that the vendor or whoever is acknowledging receipt, has
received the consideration. It reads thus; the receipt whereof the vendor
hereby acknowledges…
Note; the receipt clause serves the following purposes; i) it obviates the need
for another receipt ii) it is sufficient evidence of payment in favour of a
subsequent purchaser for value without notice, that money had not been
received iii) it is sufficient authority for the purchaser to pay the purchase
price to the solicitor when such solicitor produces the deed, and acting for
the party to whom the money is to be paid
The actual words used to denote a grant may differ depending on the nature
of the transaction.
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● If it is an "assignment", the word will be "assigns", ● if it is a lease, the
appropriate word is "demises".
● If it is a "mortgage" the proper word will be "charges".
However the core factor is to use a word that indicates the intention to
transfer interest. Thus in Re Stirrups contract, a personal representative was
selling property and used the word, "Assent" instead of "convey" the court
still held the transaction to be valid, since the Important thing was the
intention.
f) parcel clause;
g) the habendum;
This describes the estate which passes under the deed. The expression used
is normally;
"To hold unto the purchaser in fee simple or absolutely"
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Whereas in the case of assignment of a lease it will be;
"To hold unto the lessee for a term of 10 years beginning from… to…
These express the further conditions governing the transaction. In the case
of a lease, for instance, covenants to pay rent and other outgoings must be
included. Similarly, a property may be conveyed subject to certain
reservations, like the maintenance of easement.
i) testimonium;
This is the forerunner of the attestation and it may take the following form;
"In witness whereof the parties have hereto set their hands and seals the day
and year first above written"
The above format is used where the parties are natural persons. If a company
is involved, it may read thus;
"In witness whereof the vendor hereunto set his hand and seal and the
purchaser had carried his common seal to be hereunto affixed the day and year
first above written.
This comes after the schedule and it refers to the signatures and seals of the
parties to the transaction. The normal expression will run thus; "Signed,
sealed and delivered by the within named vendor" in the presence of; name
of witness….
Address….
Occupation….
"The common seal of Omaicon ltd was affixed to this deed which was duly
delivered in the presence, director …. Sign of party….
Note; if the party is illiterate or is blind, the execution must reflect the fact of
interpretation by a jurat.
k) Franking;
This merely shows the endorsement of the name and address of the solicitor
who prepared the document.
By section 22(1)(d) of the legal practitioners act, only a legal practitioner can
prepare any instrument relating to immovable property (land) for a fee or
reward.
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This is the system of land holding peculiar and indigenous to Nigeria. And
landholding means the totality of the system via which land is held, owned,
possessed, alloted and conveyed. According to Ajayi, there are various land
tenure systems in Nigeria;
i) Communal land tenure system
ii) Inheritance tenure system
iii) Leasehold tenure system
iv) Gift tenure system
(v) Rent tenure system
vi) Freehold tenure system
vii) Tenants at government will.
Analysis
In the rent tenure system a tenant pays some amount for the period of
using the land to a stated landlord. The period of rent is relatively very short
compared to leasehold systems.
In the freehold tenure system, a person pays a certain sum of money for the
right of ownership of a piece of land. Under this system, land can be used as
collateral . However, it is important to note that purchase of lands under
this system is expensive.
The rule is trite as stated by the court in Amodu Tijani v Secretary southern
provinces, that under customary law, land belongs to the village, community
or family, with the chief or headman of the family or community acting as a
manager or trustee in respect of the land on behalf of the community or
family.
It therefore follows that title to land under customary law is vested in the
community or family as a corporate unit, and no individual can lay exclusive
claim to a property nor alienate the same without the consent of the family
head.
Note: the head of the family as a trustee should not be construed in the sense
of conventional trust arrangement, in this case under customary law he is
deemed to be in the place of a caretaker in a representative capacity, and is
in fact not the sole owner of the property.
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Firstly, the court in Lewis v Bankole, noted that family means the direct
offshoot of the founder, That is the children of the founder, both male and
female, though in some Ibo societies, female children are not entitled to the
property of their late father. But the position of the law is no longer the
same, as in Mojekwu v Mojekwu, where the appeal court held that a custom
which disallowed a woman and her children from inheriting their father's
property on grounds that they were females, was repugnant to natural
justice.
It therefore means that family property is that property that is owned and
enjoyed by the family as a corporate entity, the ownership is vested in the
family holistically, and all individuals therein only enjoys the right of a user.
Note; membership of family does not include extended family members, thus
the court in Suberu v Sunmonu, held that brothers, sisters, cousins or uncles
of the deceased founder did not constitute family. However, the court in
Sogbesan v Adebisi, held that the deceased founder may by declaration
extend the family to include relatives.
But the court in Nezianya v Okagbue, held that a widow is not a member of
the deceased husband's family, nor is a Grandchild part of the family for the
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purpose of succession to the family property until the death of his parent,
who is a member of the family.
According to the court in Gaji v Paye, There are five ways in which family
property may be created;
1) by way of declaration of an intention to create family property inter vivos;
This can occur where the deceased landowner while alive expressed an
intention to designate the property as a family property for the benefit and
enjoyment of the whole family only. In Nelson v Nelson, a testator on his
deathbed left property to his eldest son to hold in charge, in favor of him
and his siblings. It was held to be a family property.
In this case a family property is created where the deceased prior to his
death declared in his will, for a prior personal property of his, to be held
collectively by his children upon his death. In Jacobs v Oladunni bros, a
testator devised his land to his four children jointly and expressed his will
that it should not be alienated or sold and the land should continue to be
owned jointly by them as a family property in accord with customary law. In
action, the court rejected the view that the will created a tenancy in common
liable to be attached in execution of a judgement debt.
4) by way of conveyance;
In this case, the owner confers property on the family by way of a valid deed
of conveyance and declares that same should be for the use and enjoyment
of the family. This was the position of the court in Olowosago v Adebanjo.
5) by way of intestacy;
The rule in Abeje v Ogundairo, purports that where an owner of land whose
estate is governed by customary law dies intestate,then the property
devolves on his heir as a family property. And it is immaterial that he has only
a sole heir or child.
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The family head is the eldest surviving male son of the founder, although
nowadays the claim of females has been recognised. He may be formally
appointed via an instrument by the founder, by acclamation of other
members of the family or otherwise by traditional method. And on his death,
the position rotates to another according to seniority, however under the
Benin and Ibo customary laws, the family headship devolves on the eldest
son and his male descendants based on the primogeniture rule.
Although the family head is considered the first amongst equals, however he
does not occupy an authoritarian position, he cannot on his own without the
consent of others effect a valid sale of the land, he is more of a caretaker.
However, Prof I.O Smith, argues that it is misleading to suggest that the
position of a family head is strict to sensu that of a trustee, this is so for the
following reasons;
● The assumption tends to suggest that the legal estate is vested in him,
whereas it is vested in the family as a unit.
● Secondly, it cannot be said that the whole factors applicable to the
English form of trust is also applicable to the position of a family head
under customary law.
● Thirdly, while a trustee is not personally liable for all debts incurred by
him on trust property, the family head will be liable because he ought
to obtain consent prior to any transaction. Eg in Arolanwon v Aromire,
the family head was sued under his personal and representative
capacity for money borrowed from the plaintiff while acting as the
head of the family, The court held him liable in his personal capacity, it
was immaterial that part of the money was used for rebuilding the
family property.
● Lastly, although a trustee and a family head may institute and defend
actions in a representative capacity, the family head will nonetheless
be personally liable for any judgement debt and cost.
● the family head is the one who allots lands to family members
and strangers and he is the only one entitled to institute and
defend actions against family property. Although in cases of
neglect to do so, other members of the family may take up the
responsibility.
● He is the one who conducts the external and internal affairs of the
family property, such as effecting Forfeitures against erring tenants.
● Just like a trustee, he is in a fiduciary position with the family property,
and is required by others to act in good faith.
In time past, the answer to this question by the courts especially in Ghana
where Non-accountability is judicially noticed, was in the negative. In "Re
Hotonu" Smith CJ, held that the family head as an administrator was not
bound to render strict account to other members. Thus in Taiwo v Dosumu,
the plaintiff brought an action against the family head for accounts of money
received from family property and for his own share. The court accepted the
argument of the familyhead that he wasn't accountable.
Also in Kosoko v Kosoko, an action for all debts and mesne profit by the
plaintiff against the familyheads was defeated on grounds of delay and the
fact that the plaintiff had absented himself from meeting for years. However
in Archibong v Archibong, the plaintiff sued the head of the Archibong house
of Duke town in Calabar, to account for compensation money paid by the
government. The court held he was to account.
In Asuro v Anjorin, the family head was first sued for accountability, to
which he rendered account up till December 1923, but thereafter he stopped
rendering accounts, an act which triggered the plaintiff to sue seeking that
the family head should render what might have been due since then. The
court held the family head was to account.
However Prof I.O Smith, notes that the true rule as regards the controversy
surrounding accountability of the family head is that;
● It cannot be said that the concept of Non-accountability is a custom
judicially noticed in Nigeria as it is in Ghana.
● The issue of accountability depends on the circumstances of every
case
The principal members are like the representatives of the branches of the
family. Eg in a polygamous family, the eldest son of each wives constitute the
principal members but in a nuclear family, every child could constitute a
principal member.
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● A member cannot occupy family land unless allotted to him for use,
and while validly in use, he has exclusive possession of it and can sue
for trespass.
● a member cannot dispose of the said land to a stranger or divest it to
his children without the consent of the family. Neither can his portion
be attached for payment of his personal debt.
the family member who carried out such improvement now owns the
property. In Sarteng v Darkwa, the court answered in the affirmative, and
held that a store built through personal efforts was now a self acquired
property that devolved on the heirs of the family member.
However the court in Owoo v Owoo, refused to follow its prior decision in
Sarteng v Darkwa, and held that a building erected by the deceased family
member automatically reverted to a family property upon his death. Also in
Alao v Ajani, a deceased family member had made substantial improvements
on a family land, upon his death the children leased it for forty years to
strangers without the consent of other family members. The court held that
such transaction was null and void.
The purport of the court in Alao v Ajani, is to the effect that while lands may
be alloted to members of the family, they cannot alienate the same without
the consent of the family head. The rule is trite that alienation of family land
without the consent of the family head is void ab initio. In Ekpendu v Erika,
the lease of a family land belonging to the onyinke family by the appellant,
without the consent of the family head was held to be void.
On the reverse, the rule is also trite that where the family head alienates
family property without the consent of principal members of the family, it is
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voidable at their instances. In Aganran v olushi, all but one principal member
of the family was not consulted in the sale of family land, he was
consequently told after the transaction had been completed. In action, the
court held the transaction to be vioidable at his instance.
NOTE: alienation in this sense is not limited to only sale, it includes leases,
pledges and any other form of transfer of interest in land.
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i) where the family head disposed of the property as though it was his
personal property;
In Foko v Foko, a family head sold a family property for the purpose of
financing his chief title ceremony. The transaction was held to be void. In
Adedubu v Makanujola, the family head disposed of the family land via a
deed of conveyance with a description to the effect that he was the personal
owner. The court held it to be void. Also in Solomon v Mogaji, the sale of a
land in a personal capacity by the family head without requisite consent was
held to be void. However the court in Akano v Ajuwon, noted that an element
of fraud on the part of the family head must be existing in order to void the
transaction. Thus in Olowu v Oshinubi, a clandestine sale of family land by
the head of the family without requisite consent was held to be tainted with
fraud and thus was void.
ii) where the family head makes a gift of the family property, the transaction
is void. and it is immaterial that the gift was made to a family member.
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In Aremu v Oshodi, a gift of family land made by chief Oloto the family head
to one Mr Bakare was held to be void.
iii) According to the court in Onasanya v Shiwoniku, where the family head
unilaterally partitions the family land without requisite consent, the
transaction is void.
where for instance a family head has disposed of family land without consent
of principal members, the transaction is voidable, meaning, any of the
principal members may choose to let go or come later to render it void i.e set
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it aside. If he chooses the latter option, then he must fulfill the following
conditions.
In essence, he must not have acted with undue delay because delay defeats
equity. Thus in Mogaji v Nuga, the appellant, ten years later, brought an
action claiming right to a land sold to the respondents by other family heads
without his consent. The court held against him since he had not acted
timeously ,ten years was too much a time to stay idle.
ii) a bona fide third party purchaser for value, must have acquired no
interest in the land; Where a third party purchaser for value, without notice,
whether actual, constructive or imputed acquires title to the land, then an
action to set it aside can no longer be sustained.
iii) there must have been no proven facts on the parts of the plaintiff that he
acquiesced of the transaction;
In Adejumo v Anyategbe, the sale of family property to a third party was held
to be void on grounds that they had been duly warned via a newspaper
publication and series of letters which they ignored. However it is necessary
to note as observed by the court in Folashade v Duroshola, that a non
consenting party to a voidable transaction may however ratify it, in which
case it becomes valid.
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notwithstanding that the first sale was without the consent of Principal
members while the second was with the consent of Principal members. Eg in
Alli v Ikusebiala, the family head without the consent of the Principal
members conveyed land to the plaintiff, and thereafter while the first
conveyance was still subsisting, he conveyed the same land to the defendant,
this time with the consent of the principal members. In action the court held
the latter transaction to be void. According to the court, although the first
was voidable, it was still valid, and secondly, 11 years time was already wasted
by the principal members who failed to void or ratify the first transaction.
NOTE; it is not also at all times that family property will be reclaimed by third
party buyers, where the transaction was void. They may simply ask the family
member to render accounts of all rents collected from the property and pay
over to it what is due.
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Sometimes there are difficulties in identifying the family head and principal
members, and also the need to ensure certainty of title, and save prospective
buyers from the sharp practises of some fraudulent members of the family,
necessitates the use of a power of attorney.
action, it was held that the act of disposing a parcel of land by way of lease
to the 1st defendant was null and void, since it was executed without the
consent of the family head.
Note: the position of the law is that the family head is required to execute the
power of attorney as one of the donors, notwithstanding that he might be
one of or the sole donee.
In other words, a family head excluded from a power of attorney can still
exercise his right of sale under customary law in respect of the same land
already sold under the attorney, and both sales will be valid, the only issue
may be that of priority. Eg which buyer has a better title.
However the position of the law now is that where the customary law
recognises absolute ownership of land, then a fee simple interests may vest
on thepurchaser notwithstanding that it is a customary law transaction. But
it is critical to note that the land use act has converted all absolute interest
in land to right of occupancy, thus the highest a person can assign is a right
of occupancy with the consent of the governor or LGA under section 5 & 6 of
the land use act.
ii) Partition;
In land law, Partition simply means the division of land amongst family
members or co-tenants, which was before, collectively owned by them.
101
Where this is done in case of family property, the land ceases to be a family
property. According to the court in Balogun v Balogun, Partition may be
carried out voluntarily or involuntarily, via a deed of partition, in the case of
the former, it is usually with the consent of the family head and the principal
members, whereas in the case of the latter, it could be by the order of the
court.
NOTE: the court will most likely order the partition of family property where
there is a dispute making the maintenance of the family property prejudicial
to the interest of peace and justice. But a plaintiff seeking partition must first
prove the land in issue is a family property and he is a member of the family.
family could not assert right under customary tenure. The court rejected his
argument, and held that it was a family property.
Prior to the enactment of the land use act, the system of land holding under
Benin customary law was indeed an interesting one. Title to all lands were
vested in Oba of Benin who acted as the trustee or legal owner of the land on
behalf of all Benin people who were beneficiaries thereof.
For the purpose of land allocation, the Oba of Benin divided the whole Benin
city into twelve wards, each having a plot allotment committee, which
recommended trouble free plots for grants to grantees, it therefore follows
that under the Benin city, all a person could have was possessory title rather
than ownership.
In Okeanya v Aguebor, and other judicial cases, the procedure for allocation
of plots to allottees has been established as judicially noticed.
For a person to be granted land, he was to direct his application to the
committee, who after receipt of such, will investigate the trouble-freeness of
the plot to be granted to avoid disputes. Thereafter if satisfied, the
committee will endorse the application and send it to the Oba for approval,
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and if approved, the person becomes the beneficial owner. Note: where a
person claims title to land in Benin, he was to show that his predecessor in
title claimed such through the oba of Benin. A mere deed of conveyance or
certificate of occupancy was not enough.
Note: where the same land was granted to two persons, the earlier grant is
superior to and better than the latter.
WHAT IS A SALE?
A sale at customary law is valid when the purchase price has been paid, and
"purchase price" as used here should be construed as the total sum as
opposed to part payment. Thus a person who makes a part payment, still has
no title. Eg in Odufuye v Fatoke, the plaintiff sold his land to the defendant
who paid 120 pounds but was in default of 30 pounds, when the latter failed
106
to consummate payment, the plaintiff sued for possession of the house, and
succeeded.
This is necessary to depict the intentions of the parties, and on the other
hand, it is also necessary that the vendée has taken possession of the land. In
Griffin v Talabi, the court held that there was no valid sale, since the buyer
paid for the land since 1928 but did not enter into possession at any time.
ii) Concurrence Of Vendors;
According to the court in Cole v Folami, this is necessary for the purpose
of adducing evidence as to the validity of the sale in case of any doubt or
uncertainty in the future. In Taiwo v Ogunsanya, failure of one Mr Adebiyi
to provide the number of witnesses present when the land was handed
over to him was held to be fatal to his case.
NOTE; compliance with the steps above is proof of sale under customary law,
and it is immaterial that the sale is not reduced into writing. It therefore
means that the parties will be entitled to all remedies accruable from normal
contractual relations, eg in Ashaye v Akerele, the vendor contracted to sell
parts of a family land to the vendee for 750 pounds of which the latter paid.
But later the vendor claimed the 750 was only a part payment with the full
payment to be paid being 3000 pounds. The buyer sued in recission of the
contract and for recovery of his money. The court held in his favour.
This decision could however be contrasted with the principle "caveat emptor"
which applies in the absence of fraud, illegality or unfairness.
NOTE; lastly, where a person has validly obtained title to land under
customary law, and the vendor sells the same land to another purchaser via a
deed of conveyance, it cannot be sustained that the latter transaction defeats
the equitable interest of the first. Although the court in Eriosho v
Owokoniran, stressed the importance of the buyer paying and concurrently
going into possession.
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But it has been held that where a transaction has already been concluded
under customary law and a deed of conveyance is conveyed later, the latter
act does not completely devalue or take from the effect of the former
transaction, but only serves as a documentary evidence of an alienation
under customary law validly effected. Eg in Cofi v Otoo, a buyer of land under
customary law while he was waiting to have a deed of conveyance executed
in his favour, the seller purported to convey the same land to another person,
but later executed in his favour a deed of conveyance for the same land. In
action, the court held in favour of the first buyer, since the first customary
transaction was valid ab initio and the second conveyance was more or less a
documentary evidence of the former.
In Kubuyi v odunjo, The plaintiff under native law and custom of awori,
purchased a piece of land subject to a customary tenancy in favor of the
defendant in which the latter always planted and reaped some palm nuts.
Thereafter the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for trespass
to land but the court held against him.
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"Caveat emptor" literally means "buyer beware", in other words a buyer must
apply caution and care in any transaction to avoid being enmeshed in an
irredeemable mess.
In view of the doctrine of caveat emptor, the critical question is at what stage
can a buyer at customary law rescind the contract and take back his money?
The law is that the rule of caveat emptor will apply against a purchaser where
he has accepted a conveyance. And under customary law, a buyer is deemed
to accept a conveyance upon completion of sale at customary law, so that in
the absence of any vitiating element he takes what he gets. However this rule
will not apply where the purchase price has not been fully paid or it is proved
that the vendor had no title to the land being sold.
mind that he shall retain it entirely. Furthermore a gift is complete when the
donee accepts.
To be valid, a gift of land must be with the concurrence of the family head
and the principal members. Where the former gifts land without the consent
of the principal members, it is void. In Aremu v Oshodi, a gift of land given by
one chief Oloto to one Mr Bakare without the consent of the family was held
to be invalid.
NOTE; once a gift of land has been made, grantor's right over it is destroyed
and the latter cannot lay claim to it thereafter. In proving gift of land, the
plaintiff must adduce credible evidence, perhaps by calling witnesses where
there is no document of grant or by proving due execution and attestation
where a document of grant exists.
111
Borrowing of land was tenable in time past, especially from persons having
excess lands to persons with few to none, the latter usually had need of it for
farming purposes.
NOTE; Borrowing of land under customary law, was usually for a short
determinable period, most times it was determined in line with the purpose
for which the land was sought. Eg a loan meant for the temporary use of
planting food crops cannot be used for cultivation of permanent cash crops
or erection of buildings. Thus the court in Adeyemo v Ladipo, held that
where the land is put into permanent use, the court is most likely to presume
customary tenancy.
112
CUSTOMARY TENANCY;
tenancy. Instead it is now accepted that so long as the grant is not absolute
like a gift, and is also not temporary like a license, then the transaction tilts
towards a customary tenancy.
The right of a customary tenant to exclude everyone from the land includes
the right to also exclude the overlord or owner. Infact where a person is a
customary tenant in a land, his right is not affected by the purchase of such
land. Eg in Lasisi v Tubi, a land subject to customary tenancy was sold by the
owners. On the question whether the purchaser could eject the tenants, it
was held by the supreme court that the purchaser had no power to do so, at
best he could only step into the shoes of the owner and become the landlord
of the customary tenant. Also In Kubuyi v odunjo, The plaintiff under native
law and custom of awori, purchased a piece of land subject to a customary
tenancy in favor of the defendant in which the latter always planted and
reaped some palm nuts. Thereafter the plaintiff brought an action against the
defendant for trespass to land but the court held against him.
115
Where a stranger and his descendants have been customary tenants for
many years, the customary owner of the land and his descendants are
estopped by their conduct from an action for possession of the land.
However, according to the court in Onia v Onyia, the tenant though enjoys
exclusive possession cannot deny the owner's title otherwise, he will be
liable to forfeiture and eviction. Furthermore his right is subject to good
behavior and any act of the tenant amounting to alienation of the land
without the owner's consent is totally not tenable. Thus in Onisiwo v
Fagbenro, the supreme court held to be void a lease of land, without consent
116
of the owner by the customary tenants, and further held that such act was a
sufficient act of misconduct itself.
i) accomplishment;
Where the purpose of the tenancy has been accomplished, the tenancy
comes to an end under customary law.
ii) abandonment;
Where the tenant leaves the land abandoned with no intent of coming back,
then the tenancy terminates, however where land is left fallow for
recuperation of the soil. The tenancy still subsists.
iii)forfeiture;
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NOTE; forfeiture is not automatic, the owner must take relevant steps to
enforce his right of forfeiture in court. Forfeiture is usually granted against
an individual, but is barely granted against a community except in rare cases,
in fact the courts are warned to be cautious of granting forfeiture against a
community especially where the misconduct was caused by a few persons.
It is not in all instances that forfeiture will be granted against a tenant, the
court may grant the tenant an equitable relief, taking into consideration the
degree of inconvenience, the length of time he has been in occupation, and
improvements carried out on the lands so far. Eg in Uwani v Akom, it was
suggested that in the event of forfeiture, the tenant was entitled to remove
and reap all crops planted so far. However a claim for equitable relief will fail
where the misconduct has been established and the tenant has been
persistent and stubborn in his misconduct.
Note; a claim by a tenant for equitable relief must be brought by way of
either originating summons or by a counterclaim in action brought by the
119
This was a land tenure,peculiar to the old Eastern Nigeria. This form of
customary law transaction on land was created, where the grantor granted
permanent interest in land to the grantee, who in return gave a kola or other
token payment as an acknowledgement of the grantor's title.
i) while a customary tenant pays tribute, a kola tenant only offered a kola or
a token payment at the commencement of the tenancy ii) a kola tenant
though could not make an absolute transfer of the land, could exercise a
limited power of disposal by creating sub tenancies, on the other hand,
which a customary tenant could not.
120
Prior to the enactment of the kola tenancy act, adopted by the states as kola
tenancy law, except otherwise by agreement, a land owner subject to kola
tenancy could not recover money realized by the kola tenant in the land.
Eg in Mgbeleke family v Madam iyayi family, the plaintiff landowner sued
under a kola tenancy, for declaration of title and sharing of the annual rent.
Whilst the original kola tenant had died before the action was instituted, it
was shown that neither an agreement nor a custom mandated the sharing of
benefits accruing to a kola tenant in the land with the land owner. The court
accordingly held against the plaintiff owner.
Note; although the right of a kola tenant can be transferred to his
descendants, the owner retains the reversionary right. And subsequent
successors of the kola tenancy must give a fresh kola in acknowledgement of
the grantor's title. And they cannot make any transfer inconsistent with the
reversionary interest of the grantor. Eg in Daniel v Daniel, it was held that
land subject to a kola tenancy could not be abandoned by the holder's
successor, notwithstanding that she contracted a Christian marriage.
By section 1 of the kola tenancy law, kola tenancy as a land tenure has been
abolished and cannot be created again as a transaction under customary law.
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While the law contains no provision against the creation of sub tenancies,
the law is that in the event of excess benefit made by the kola tenant than the
owner, then the latter can apply for the extinction of the kola tenant. But the
court can determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the owner of
the land, and upon the tenant's failure to pay, the owner can recover
possession. On the other hand, the tenant is not left to suffer, for where he
has carried out improvements on the land, he will be entitled to
compensation. Note; at the expiration of five years, fixed by the tribunal for
payment by either side, the tenant will be deemed as having all interest in the
land vested on him. And a right of appeal lies to the supreme court from a
decision of the tribunal.
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CUSTOMARY PLEDGE
Note; obviously, the substance of the agreement and the designation in the
document was contradictory, and it ought not to have been designated as a
mortgage, but a pledge rather.
The maxim once a pledge, always a pledge is an old maxim under customary
law which purports two factors;
a) that a thing pledged is never lost
It therefore follows that the right of the pledgor to redeem his property
cannot be defeated by lapse of time, According to the court in Suleman v
Musa, limitation provisions do not apply to customary pledges, the pledgor's
right to redeem is perpetual and as such cannot be defeated or clogged by
delay, subterfuge or any form of limitation. Thus in Leragun v Funlayo,a land
pledged for 30 years was held to be still redeemable. And the right may be
exercised even by the pledgor's successors in title, eg in Agbo koffi v Ado
Kofi, a land pledged around 1869 was held to be redeemable by the
successors in title, irrespective of the fact that it had taken up to 60 years.
However in Adobea v Lassey, the court held that where an order of the court
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is sought for the redemption of the pledged property, and the time frame
stipulated for redemption is not complied with, then the right to redeem is
lost and the pledgee may sell the property.
Generally the pledgee is expected to put the land into ordinary use, where he
encumbers the land with economic trees or structures, he does so at his own
peril, he is deemed to be entitled to no compensation at all. And this is
predicated on the principle of "Quic quic plantatur solo solo cedit". Thus in
Okoiko v Esadalue, The court held the land to be redeemable despite the
planting of cocoa trees and rubber by the pledgee, though a grace period was
given to the pledgee to reap the harvest and vacate the land thereafter.
him in the course of exploiting the shop which he got by a loan agreement
with the plaintiff.
Note; the pledgee has no power to unilaterally sell off pledged land to
discharge the debt, as such will be void. On the other hand, the pledgor's
right of redemption cannot be defeated by demand of a sum higher than the
actual one agreed upon, or by encumbrances such as economic trees or by
tactics of delay. Etc
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