POLITICAL LAW

2022 BAR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. A police officer saw Harvey urinating in public. A local ordinance imposes a Php 500.00 fine for
urinating in public. The police officer shouted at Harvey: “That is against the law!” Harvey sarcastically
answered: “No, this is against the wall!” Then and there, the police officer arrested him and brought him to
the police station. At the police station, Harvey was frisked and was found in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver loaded with five live ammunition. He was subsequently charged with
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms. When the prosecution offered in evidence the unlicensed firearm
and ammunition, the defense objected on the ground that the pieces of evidence are products of an illegal
search and seizure. The prosecution contended that the pieces of evidence were lawfully seized after a
valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Was the search and seizure valid? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO. Section 3 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Here, the
firearm was discovered without a warrant and the discovery did not fall under any of the lawful
warrantless search. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the offense is
penalized by only a fine. Corollary to this, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense. The regulation is not a law or ordinance and the penalty is merely a P500 fine. Therefore,
there was supposed to be no arrest that can justify the search without a warrant as an incident thereto.

2. Pedro was the accused in a rape case. During the trial, the private complainant testified that on the
night of the incident, she was walking home when Pedro, who was her neighbor, suddenly grabbed her
and brought her to his house. There, Pedro forcibly had carnal knowledge of her. After the prosecution
rested its case, Pedro testified that the sexual intercourse between him and the private complainant was
consensual. Eventually, the trial court acquitted Pedro on reasonable doubt and found that the element of
force was not established.

The People filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that the trial
court’s decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion because the private complainant’s testimony
clearly established that Pedro had carnal knowledge of her through force and without her consent. In his
comment, Pedro sought to dismiss the petition on the ground of violation of his right against double
jeopardy.

As the CA, how would you rule on the petition? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: The petition has no merit. As a general rule, a judgment of acquittal is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation. Likewise, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. Although, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double
jeopardy, however, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted
without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

3. A city ordinance was passed providing for the removal, at the owner’s expense, of: (i) all outdoor
advertising materials displayed or exposed to the public in designated regulated areas such as residential
zones, bridges, and along main city streets; and (ii) billboards of substandard materials, or which obstruct
road signs and traffic signals. Failure to comply with said ordinance authorizes the mayor, assisted by the
police, to implement the removal of the non-compliant materials. ABC Ad Agency, owner of the billboards
removed by the city, filed a complaint because, considering the nature of its business, the removal of its
billboards amounted to taking of private property without just compensation.

Will the complainant prosper? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO. In the case of Churchill vs. Rafferty, although these billboards are located in private property,
the real and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares.

Here, considering the nature of its business where the purpose of advertising is for the public to see it,
considerations such as the grounds imposed under the subject ordinance is valid for it is the general
welfare of the public as this refers to designated regulated areas and substandard materials.
Regulation of billboard is not so much a regulation of private property but a regulation of the streets
and other public thoroughfares.

Hence, removal of billboards does not amount to taking of private property without just compensation.
It is a mere regulation of the streets and other public thoroughfares.

4. [This item has two questions.] As a reaction to China’s occupation of the Spratly Island, a rally was
organized by various civil society aggrupations at a vacant privated lot. Before the event could even start,
the police ordered the organizers not to proceed with the program because of security reasons and the
fact that the group did not have a mayor’s permit. When the organizers still proceeded with the rally, the
police dispersed the crowd and arrested the leaders of the groups.

(a) Did the actions of the police constitute a violation of the group’s constitutional right to
peacefully assemble? Explain briefly.

(b) Would your answer be the same if the rally was held at freedom park? Explain briefly.

(5 points)

A:

(a) YES. The right of the people to assemble peaceably and petition the government for redress of
grievances are constitutional rights (Article III, Section 4). The right to assembly are ajax of freedom of
speech and expression. As such, the government carries the heavy burden of showing the justification
for the imposition of such restraint applying the Clear and Present Danger Rule. Here, there is no
evidence shown to justify the restriction made on a peaceful assembly other than the bare assertion by
the police that they are conducting search for security reasons. A permit is not required if it is held in a
private place. Only the consent of the owner is necessary. In this case, there was owner’s consent
because he was present in the rally.

(b) YES. As a general rule, a written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize
and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance.

In this case where it is done in a freedom park, a mayor’s permit would no longer be necessary to
peacefully assemble.

Thus, the act of the police officers is still a violation of the right to peacefully assemble as the same
was done within the bounds of law.

5. The K-12 Law was passed with the objective to enhance the Philippine educational system by
strengthening its curriculum and adding two years of highschool. Parents of students in a science high
school sought to have the law declared unconstitutional citing the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. As well, the parents averred that the law should not apply to their children because the latter
belong to a distinct class, being gifted and advanced for their age, with the capability to learn better and
faster compared to other high school students.
Is the contention of the parents tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification if such
classification is based on: (1) substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
applies equally to present and future conditions; (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.
Here, the science high school students do not show any substantial basis to create a valid
classification between them and the rest of the high school students in the Philippines. In fact, the
Equal Protection Clause would be violated if the assailed law treated the science high school students
differently from the rest of the high school students in the country.

6. President Hidalgo, who wanted the Philippines to be part of the International Criminal Court once
again, signed the Philippines' ratification of the Rome Statute. A copy of the treaty, along with the
ratification, was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. Senator Dalisay filed a proposed “Resolution” for
the Senate to concur with the Philippines’ ratification. The proposed “Resolution” was read three times on
three separate days. Three days before the third reading, printed copies of the proposed “Resolution” in
its final form were distributed to all the Senators. The Senators then unanimously approved the
“Resolution”, and the Senate expressed its concurrence with the treaty’s ratification. A civil society group
filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the Senate’s concurrence on the
ground that the “Resolution” was void because only a “bill” becomes a law.

Rule on the petition. Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: The petition has no merit.

A simple resolution deals with matters entirely within the prerogative of one house of Congress, such
as adopting or receiving its own rules. A simple resolution is not considered by the other chamber and
is not sent to the President for his signature. Like a concurrent resolution, it has no effect and force of
a law. Simple resolutions are used occasionally to express the opinion of a single house on a current
issue. Oftentimes, it is also used to call for a congressional action on an issue affecting national
interest.

Here, the Senate expressed their concurrence validly through the approval of the subject resolution. It
merely expressed the opinion of the single house, in this case the Senate, on the concurrence of the
treaty’s ratification. It does not stand to become a law requiring the members of the Senate to concur
to begin with which would otherwise be mandatory in nature.

The petition has no merit. A bill is a general measure, which if passed upon, may become a law. A bill
may become a law in three (3) ways: (a) When it is approved by the President; (b) When the vote of the
President is overridden by a two-thirds vote of all the members of both houses; or (c) Upon failure of the
President to veto the bill and to return it with his objections, to the House where it originated, within 30
days after the date of receipt. On the other hand, a simple resolution deals with matters entirely within the
prerogative of one house of Congress, such as adopting or receiving its own rules. A simple resolution is
not considered by the other chamber and is not sent to the President for his signature. Like a concurrent
resolution, it has no effect and force of a law. Simple resolutions are used occasionally to express the
opinion of a single house on a current issue. Oftentimes, it is also used to call for a congressional action
on an issue affecting national interest.

In the case at bar, Senator Dalisay only filed a proposed Resolution for the Senate to concur with the
Philippines’ ratification of the Rome Statute. The Senate expressed their concurrence validly through the
approval of the subject resolution. It merely expressed the opinion of a single house, in this case the
Senate, on the concurrence of the treaty’s ratification. The subject Resolution is not considered by the
other chamber and is not sent to the President for his signature, thus, it has no effect and force of a law.
Therefore, the subject Resolution is not void and the petition filed by the civil society group should be
denied.
7. After Martial Law was declared over Mindanao, police officers arrested Jose Maria without any warrant
while shopping for groceries at a supermarket in Mindanao. Jose Maria questioned the validity of the
arrest as he had no pending case and was not committing any crime at the time of his arrest. The police
officers countered that the declaration of Martial Law suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and as a result, they could effect warrantless arrests.

Is the contention of the police officers correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO.

Martial law and suspension of Habeas Corpus does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state of martial law. Its implementers must
adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the military and the armed forces is the
protector of the people. They must also abide by the State’s policy to value the dignity of every human
person and guarantee full respect for human rights.

In this case, Jose Maria should not be arrested without a warrant of arrest and the same does not fall
within Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrest because he is not caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime, it is not a situation of hot pursuit and he is not an escapee.

Hence, the arrest is illegal.

NO. Under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, it provides that a state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Furthermore, what is suspended is the privilege of the writ and not the writ itself because the writ
of habeas corpus is an order of the court. The President cannot suspend the order of the court because
that is a violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

In the case at bar, Jose Maria should not be arrested without a warrant of arrest because the same does
not fall within Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests because he is not caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime, it is not a situation of hot pursuit, and he is not an escapee.
Therefore, the declaration of Martial Law did not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
as a result, the police officers could not effect a warrantless arrest against Jose Maria.

8. A law was passed exempting the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from the payment of filing fees in
collection cases on loans granted by LBP to its borrowers. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of
the Supreme Court issued a Memorandum requiring all courts to continue to collect filing fees in collection
cases filed by LBP, stating that only the Supreme Court can decide on exemptions from payment of filing
fees. LBP assails the OCA Memorandum, arguing that the exemption found in the law is within the
plenary power of Congress to enact legislation. Moreover, the law was approved by the President. Thus,
LBP argues that the act of the OCA violates the principle of separation of powers.

Is LBP correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO.

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of the government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of the Supreme Court.
In this case, the OCA Memorandum does not violate the principle of separation of powers as the
Congress could not have carved out an exemption to LBP from payment of filing fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence, i.e. fiscal
autonomy.

Hence, LBP is incorrect.

NO. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, each of the three (3) branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its constitutionally allocated sphere, each
branch cannot invade the domain of others. Any system that is violative of the principle of separation of
powers is unconstitutional and void.

In the case at bar, the OCA Memorandum does not violate the principle of separation of powers because
first, the collection of filing fees is a procedure in court and second, it will affect the fiscal autonomy of the
court. The act of Congress in passing a law exempting the LBP from the payment of filing fees in
collection cases on loans granted by LBP to its borrowers transgressed another equally important
institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence, i.e. fiscal autonomy. Therefore, the act of the OCA
did not violate the principle of separation of powers.

9. During a press conference, President Acosta explained that the Executive Department can temporarily
take over the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest to
address the shortage of hospital beds occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. She invokes Article XII,
Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which provides that: “In times of national emergency, when
the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.”

Is President Acosta correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO.

Under the Constitution, the President could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency but the exercise of emergency powers, such as taking over of privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest requires a delegation from Congress.

In this case, the Executive Department cannot solely temporarily take over the said operation since
there is no delegation from Congress, Whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether the Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.

Hence, President Acosta is incorrect.

NO. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, it provides that in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.

In the case at bar, Congress did not make any delegation of emergency powers to President Acosta. The
Executive Department cannot temporarily take over the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without any delegation from Congress. The President may declare
the existence of a state of national emergency, in this case the COVID-19 pandemic, without
congressional enactment however, the exercise of emergency powers requires a delegation from
Congress which is the repository of emergency powers. Therefore, the contention of President Acosta is
untenable.

10. Lemuel was born in 1988 to a Filipino mother and an American father, as shown in his birth certificate.
His parents, however, were not married to each other. Subsequently, his father petitioned for him, as a
result of which Lemuel received a certificate of American citizenship and an American passport. In 2022,
Lemuel filed a certificate of candidacy to run as Representative of the lone district of Batanes. Ayla, a
Filipino citizen and resident of Batanes, filed a petition for disqualification with the Commission on
Elections alleging that Lemuel is ineligible to run for public office in the Philippines as Lemuel is an
American citizen.

Is Ayla correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO.

A Certificate of Citizenship does not grant citizenship. It only recognizes and confirms the citizenship-
status already obtained by the applicant. Further, in the case of Maquiling vs. COMELEC, the use of
the foreign passport is the positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship.

In this case, Lemuel is still a Filipino citizen. A mere grant of certificate of American citizenship does
not ipso facto alter his citizenship and obtaining a foreign passport without its use does not alter one’s
nationality and citizenship as well.

Thus, Lemuel is still eligible to run for public office in the Philippines as he remains a Filipino citizen.

NO. Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, it provides that the following are citizens of the
Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4)
Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

In the case at bar, Lemuel was born in 1988 to a Filipino mother. Thus, the rules on citizenship under the
1987 Constitution applies to him and he falls under no. 2 of the above-quoted provision thereof. The fact
that Lemuel received a certificate of American citizenship and an American passport because of his
American father does not ipso facto alter his citizenship. At most, he is considered a dual citizen.
Furthermore, once a candidate files his candidacy to run for public office, he is deemed to have
renounced his foreign citizenship. In the case at bar, when Lemuel filed a certificate of candidacy to run
as Representative of the lone district of Batanes, he is deemed to have renounced his American
citizenship. Therefore, Lemuel is eligible to run for public office in the Philippines as Lemuel is a Filipino
citizen.

11. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) directed higher education institutions to remove
materials “that contain pervasive ideologies of Communist Terrorist Groups” from their libraries. According
to the CHED, the materials need to be removed because these would radicalize students against the
government.

Is the CHED directive a violation of the institutions’ academic freedom? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: YES.
Article XIV of the Constitution gurantees academic freedom which includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.

Here, it is merely presumptive that materials containing pervasive ideologies of Communist Terrorist
Groups will radicalize students against the government. There is no cogent proof that it will override
public welfare that would call such restraint.

Thus, it is a violation to the institution’s academic freedom.

12. The Congress passed a law prohibiting the sale and distribution of alcoholic drinks within 100 meters
from religious and educational institutions. A city enacted an ordinance increasing the coverage of the
prohibition to 150 meters from any religious and educational institution.

Is the city ordinance valid? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: YES. Local governments can separately exercise police power although limited because this is
merely delegated legislative power. An ordinance must not be contrary to law. The enlargement upon
the provisions of a statute of a State does not result in inconsistency. The fact that the City Ordinance
enlarges the provision of a statute requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict with the
statute, unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases

13. Pursuant to a law ordering the fixing of “just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations,
practices, or services to be furnished, observed and imposed by operators of public utility vehicles,” the
Land Transportation Franchise and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) promulgated and published a regulation
that “no car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi.” Taxi operators assailed the validity of the
regulation contending that procedural due process was violated because position papers were not asked
of them and no notice was given to them prior to the issuance of the regulation.

Were the taxi operators denied procedural due process? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO. Prior notice and hearing are only required in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, but not in
the exercise of legislative and quasi-legislative functions. Here, the promulgation of general rules
applicable to all in the same class or taxi is an exercise quasi-legislative function. Therefore, no notice
and hearing are required.

14. A foreign commercial ship was spotted by the Philippine Coast Guard dumping garbage and toxic
waste 20 nautical miles from Nasugbu, Batangas, the nearest coastline of the Philippines. The officers of
the ship were arrested and charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas for violation of
environmental laws of the Philippines. The officers of the ship filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that Philippine courts do not have territorial jurisdiction over the case since the vessel was sailing
outside the territorial sea of the Philippines when the arrest was made.

Is the ground to dismiss correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)

A: NO.

In contiguous zone, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its
laws, among others, sanitary laws and regulations within it territory or territorial sea. The contiguous
zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baseline.

Clearly, the dumping of garbage and toxic waste was 20 nautical miles from the baseline, therefore,
although it is outside the territorial sea, it is within the contiguous zone wherein, the coastal state may
exercise control and that is to arrest the responsible officers of the said act for violation of the coastal
state’s environmental laws.

Hence, the ground to dismiss is incorrect.

NO. A contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to a territorial sea of a coastal State, which may not extend
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured . In
the Philippines, the extent of the contiguous zone is 24 nautical miles from the baselines. The contiguous
zone is no longer part of a State’s territory but the State will be given certain rights, among others, the
right to impose sanitary laws.

In the case at bar, the dumping of garbage and toxic waste was 20 nautical miles from Nasugbu,
Batangas. Thus, although it is outside the territorial sea, it is considered within the contiguous zone
wherein the Philippines may exercise control and that is to arrest the responsible officers of the said act
for violation of the environmental laws of the Philippines. Therefore, Philippine courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the case.

15. [This item has two questions.] Philippine Medical Center (PMC) is a government hospital created by
law to provide healthcare to the general public, especially the less fortunate. To enable PMC to perform
its mandate, the national government provided the initial capital, land, buildings, and equipment to PMC.
PMC’s charter also authorized it, acting through its Board of Trustees: to acquire property; to enter into
contracts; to mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, convey, or dispose of its properties; and to do other acts
necessary to accomplish its purposes and objectives.

Among the properties of PMC are five lands and buildings located in Quezon City. The Quezon City
assessor issued notices of assessment for real property taxes (RPT) against PMC’s properties that are
being leased to private concessionaires. According to the city assessor, PMC’s properties leased to
private entities are subject to RPT because these properties are not being exclusively used for charitable
purposes. PMC, on the other hand, claims that, as a government instrumentality imbued with corporate
powers, it is exempt from RPT.

(a) Is PMC liable for the assessed RPT over the leased properties? Explain briefly.

(b) Supposing PMC is correct that it is not liable for RPT, may the city assessor assess the
lessees for the RPT due on PMC’s leased properties? Explain briefly.

(5 points)

A:

(a) NO. PMC is not liable for assessed RPT over the leased properties as it is a government
instrumentality exempt from real property tax.

As a general rule, government instrumentalities are exempt from real property tax. In the case of PHC
vs. Quezon City, it was held that the Republic and its instrumentalities retain their exempt status
despite leasing out their properties to private individuals. The properties only lost the exemption from
being taxed, but they did not lose their exemption from the means to collect such taxes.

Here, PMC cannot be held liable for the assessed RPT as it remained a government instrumentality
despite leasing the said properties to private individuals.

Hence, PMC is not liable.

(b) YES.

In the same case of PHC vs. Quezon City, it was held that the exemption does not extend to taxable
private entities to whom the beneficial use of the government instrumentality’s properties has been
vested.

This leaves the city assessor to assess private individuals with beneficial use of PMC’s properties for
real property taxes.

Thus, the city assessor may assess the lessees for RPT due on PMC’s leased properties.