MEANING AND CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES

A Statute is a formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a country,

state, city, or county. Typically, statutes command or prohibit something, or declare
policy. The word is often used to distinguish law made by legislative bodies from the
judicial decisions of the common law and the regulations issued by Government
agencies.
- [Black, Henry Campbell (1990). Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition]
A statute is a will of legislature conveyed in the form of text. The Constitution of India
does not use the term ‘Statute’ but it uses the term ‘law’. ‘Law’ includes any ordinance,
order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law.
[Article 13 (3) (a) of the constitution].
Therefore, a Statute is the will of the legislature and Indian Statute is an Act of the
Central or State Legislature. Statutes include Acts passed by the Imperial or Provincial
Legislature in Pre-Independence days as well as Regulations. Statutes generally refer to
the laws and regulations of every sort, every provision of law which permits or prohibit
anything.
A Statute may generally be classified with reference to its duration, nature of operation,
object and extent of application. On the basis of duration, statutes are classified as
either Perpetual or Temporary. It is a Perpetual Statute when no time is fixed for its
duration and such statute remains in force until its repeal, which may be express or
implied. It is perpetual in the sense that it is not obligated by efflux of time or by non-
user. A Temporary statute is one where its duration is only for a specified time and it
expires on the expiry of the specified time unless it is repealed earlier. The duration of
temporary Statute may be extended by fresh Statute or by exercise of power conferred
under the original statute. The expired statute may be revived by re-enacting it in similar
terms or by enacting a statute expressly saying that the expired Act is herewith revived.

Some common Latin phrases used in statutory construction are:

1. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the
text. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
2. EJUSDEMGENERIS
Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature
with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the
statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however, because
the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another
item.
3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.
Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is
implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive
interpretation. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
4. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILISEST RATIO The courts may distinguish when there are facts
and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
5. CASUS OMISSUS Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing
omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, it is just the enumeration you are
looking at, not another law.
6. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.
7. REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the words should be taken distributively.

INTERPRETING THE STATUTES

Interpretation of something means ascertaining the meaning or significance of that

thing or ascertaining an explanation of something that is not immediately obvious.
Construction and Interpretation of a statute is an age-old process and as old as
language.
Interpretation of statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words
used in a statute. When the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the
rules of interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived
from the same word or sentence. It is therefore necessary to interpret the statute to find
out the real intention of the statute.
Interpretation of statutes has been an essential part of English law since Heydon's Case
in 1854 and although it can seem complex, the main rules used in interpretation are
easy to learn.
The concept of interpretation of a Statute cannot be static one. Interpretation of
statutes becomes an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise.
We can say, interpretation of Statutes is required for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain:
• Legislative Language - Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and
hence may require interpretation; and
• Legislative Intent - The intention of legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two
aspects:
i. the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and
ii. the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervailing through the
statute.
Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision
is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a
different meaning defeating the object of the statute.
The purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention
of the Legislature – not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which
the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
Some Important points to remember in the context of interpreting Statutes:
• Statute must be read as a whole in Context
• Statute should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable - if statutory
provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction
must be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the
enactment rather than that which will give none.
• The process of construction combines both the literal and purposive approaches. The
purposive construction rule highlights that you should shift from literal construction
when it leads to absurdity.
PRESUMPTIONS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Unless the statute contains express words to the contrary it is assumed that the
following presumptions of statutory interpretation apply, each of which may be rebutted
by contrary evidence. Presumptions represent the accepted judicial view of a range of
circumstances that have been predetermined to be the way in which every
manifestation of those circumstances will be viewed, until any evidence to the contrary
is produced. These tend to arise from theoretical and practical principles of the law.
• A statute does not alter the existing common law. If a statute is capable of two
interpretations, one involving alteration of the common law and the other one not, the
latter interpretation is to be preferred.
• If a statute deprives a person of his property, say by nationalization, he is to be
compensated for its value.
• A statute is not intended to deprive a person of his liberty. If it does so, clear words
must be used. This is relevant in legislation covering, for example, mental health and
immigration.
• A statute does not have retrospective effect to a date earlier than its becoming law.
• A statute generally has effect only in the country enacted. However, a statute does not
run counter to international law and should be interpreted so as to give effect to
international obligations.
• A statute cannot impose criminal liability without proof of guilty intention. Many
modern statutes rebut this presumption by imposing strict liability; for e.g. -dangerous
driving.
• A statute does not repeal other statutes. Any point on which the statute leaves a gap
or omission is outside the scope of the statute.
RULES AND AIDS OF INTERPRETATION

The interpretation of statutes is a complex area of law and also an essential one. In the
complex area of Interpretation, recourse can be had to the Rules and Aids of Statutory
Interpretation.
Rules of Interpretation
A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. It is that which is prescribed or laid
down as a guide for conduct or action; a governing direction for a specific purpose; an
authoritative enactment; a regulation; a prescription; a precept; as, the rules of various
societies; the rules governing a school; a rule of etiquette or propriety etc.
It should be remembered that these Rules are Rules of Practice and not Rules of Law.
Without these rules, it would soon become impossible to not only understand the law
but even just to apply it, as new situations are always coming to light which Parliament
and the courts could not have foreseen when the law was developed.
Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation? If yes, which rule do they use
first? – Judges rarely if ever, volunteer the information that they are now applying a
certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning
to the words used in the disputed statutory provision. However, there is no rule that
states that they must use the literal rule first.
No Legal Rules exist which state which rule of Interpretation can be used and the rules
of interpretation that have been identified, are not themselves legal rules.
Aids of Interpretation
An Aid, on the other hand is a device that helps or assists. For the purpose of
construction or interpretation, the court has to take recourse to various internal and
external aids.
Internal aids mean those materials which are available in the statute itself, though they
may not be part of enactment. These internal aids include, long title, preamble,
headings, marginal notes, illustrations, punctuation, proviso, schedule, transitory
provisions, etc. When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to
External aids. External Aids may be parliamentary material, historical background,
reports of a committee or a commission, official statement, dictionary meanings,
foreign decisions, etc.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION

There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by Courts
from time to time. Over time, various methods of statutory construction have fallen in
and out of favour. Some of the better known rules of interpretation also referred to as
the Primary Rules of Interpretation are discussed hereunder.

1. Rule of Literal Interpretation

In construing Statutes the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions Literally and
grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also
known as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of
interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The
words in an enactment have their own natural effect and the construction of an act
depends on its wording. There should be no additions or substitution of words in the
construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret words
as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when the
meanings of the words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the language is
plain and only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.
In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand
was changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within
30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of
the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the
contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The
Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the
application as invalid.
Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in
their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the
object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used,
to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical
sense.’
Meaning
To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions" sections within a statute,
which explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes
omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term.
The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the
meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a
definition itself.
According to Viscount Haldane, L.C., if the language used has a natural meaning we
cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context
directs us to do so.
According to the plain meaning rule, absent a contrary definition within the statute,
words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning. If the words are clear, they
must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been different or
the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what
the law means.
A literal construction would not be denied only because the consequences to comply
with the same may lead to a penalty. The courts should not be over zealous in searching
for ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain. (Tata Consultancy Services V.
State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308)

Understanding the literal rule

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –
i. Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in
the interpretation section.
ii. Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified
any other.
iii. Words will not be inserted by implication.
iv. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
v. It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.
When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular
sense, it is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning
which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context
in which they have been used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets
‘natural, “ordinary”, “literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost
interchangeably to convey the same idea.
For determination of the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question is
what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the
statute but when that natural or ordinary meaning indicates such result which cannot be
opposed to have been the intention of the legislature, then to look for other meaning of
the word or phrase which may then convey the true intention of the legislature. In the
case of ‘Suthendran V. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the question related to Section
14(1) of the Immigration Act, 1971, which provides that ‘a person who has a limited
leave under this Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to an
adjudication against any variation of the leave or against any refusal to vary it. The word
‘a person who has a limited leave’ were construed as person should not be included
“who has had” such limited leave and it was held that the section applied only to a
person who at the time of lodging of his complaint was lawfully in the United Kingdom,
in whose case, leave had not expired at the time of lodgment of an appeal.
Another important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact meaning
is preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament. In the case of Pritipal Singh V.
Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1413, P. 1419(1982)), it was held that there is a
presumption that the words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and
not loosely and inexactly.
Rationale for this Rule
Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in
legislative or political issues. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do
not have extensive access to secondary sources. In probate law the rule is also favored
because the testator is typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a will is
appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the
words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide for consistency in
interpretation.
Criticism of this rule
Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous
assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading
justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However,
since little else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning
survives. This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily
because judges may not legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular
interpretation may be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the
law's literal wording.

2. Golden Rule of Interpretation

The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge
to depart from a word's normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.It is a
compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning.
However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's
intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a
word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; if
the word only has one meaning, but applying this would lead to a bad decision, the
judge can apply a completely different meaning.
This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense
where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.
For example, imagine there may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under
the literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a
fire. However, this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made
the sign is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire
nearby.
The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious
to principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The
facts of a case are; a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were
required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother's family, or the son's
descendants. There was never a question of the son profiting from his crime, but as the
outcome would have been binding on lower courts in the future, the court found in
favour of the mother's family.

3. The Mischief Rule

The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the
legislator's intention. Originating from a 16th century case (Heydon’s case) in the United
Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in
question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this
remedy. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the
most firmly established rule or construction of such words “of all statutes in general be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law is the rule of
Heydon’s case. The rules laid down in this case are also known as Purposive
Construction or Mischief Rule.
The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in
order to discover Parliament's intention. It essentially asks the question: By creating an
Act of Parliament what was the "mischief" that the previous law did not cover?
Heydon’s case
This was set out in Heydon's Case [1584] 3 CO REP 7a. where it was stated that there
were four points to be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:
1. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2. What was the "mischief and defect" for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?
The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the
cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the
golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can be argued
that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes
lawmaking decisions away from the legislature.
Use of this Rule
This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain
meaning rule, in that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only
when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent
is determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises,
law review articles and corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve
ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.
In the case of Thomson vs. Lord Clan Morris, Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in
interpreting any statutory enactment regard must be had not only to the words used, but
also to the history of the Act and the reasons which lead to its being passed.
In the case of CIT vs. Sundaradevi (1957) (32 ITR 615) (SC), it was held by the Apex
Court that unless there is an ambiguity, it would not be open to the Court to depart from
the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the legislature should be
primarily to gather from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are
ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and considered on surrounding
circumstances and constitutionally proposed practices.
The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar, (AIR 1995 SC 661) applied
the mischief rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After
referring to the state of law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to
the chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by
indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different Provincial Legislatures
founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R.Das, stated “It was to cure
this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of interstate trade or
commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial
barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the constitution”.
In various Supreme Court cases it has been held that, ‘legislation both statutory and
constitutional is enacted, it is true, from experience of evils. But its general language
should not, therefore, necessarily be confined to the form that evil had taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes and new awareness
of limitations. A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it existence. This is particularly true of the constitutional
constructions which are not ephermal enactments designed to meet passing
occasions.
These are designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it’. Mischief Rule is applicable where language is capable of more than one
meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a statue which shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
Advantages -
1) The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as
opposed to the Golden or Literal rules.
2) It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Disadvantages -
1) It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when
common law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not
established.
2) It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be
undemocratic.
3) In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were
therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.
4) It can make the law uncertain.

4. Rule of Reasonable Construction

Every statute has a purpose, an objective. If the literal meaning collides with the reason
of enactment of the statute then the intention of the law should be taken up so that the
actual meaning of the statute can be properly understood.
This rule mainly stresses upon the intention of the legislature to bring up the statue and
the sensible and not the prima facie meaning of the statute. This helps us clear the
errors caused due to faulty draftsmanship. However this rule also has its own
limitations. The intent of the statute is in itself a surmise and the rule is usually avoided
to complete the quest for interpretation unless the intent in itself can be interpreted
properly.

5. Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute
then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very
simple premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be
read as a whole. The interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should
be adopted. In the case in which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions,
the court’s decision regarding the provision shall prevail.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to interpretation of any statute.
An interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole, should be the aim of
the Courts and a construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the
various sections or parts of the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a
head on clash”, in the words of the Apex Court, between the different parts of an
enactment and conflict between the various provisions should be sought to be
harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be
assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken away
by the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely explained by the
Supreme Court thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be
reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, effect should
be given to both”. A construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead
letter should be avoided since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction. It is a
settled rule that an interpretation which results in hardship, injustice, inconvenience or
anomaly should be avoided and that which supports the sense of justice should be
adopted. The Court leans in favour of an interpretation which conforms to justice and
fair play and prevents injustice (Union of India vs. B.S. Aggarwal) (AIR 1998 S.C. 1537).
The important aspects of this principle are -
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and
they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in
another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory
provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both
the provisions as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a
useless number or a dead lumbar, is not harmonious construction.
5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it loose.

6. Rule of Beneficial Construction

When the literal meaning of the statute defeats the objective of the legislature, the court
may depart from the dictionary and instead give it a meaning which will advance the
remedy and suppress the mischief. This supports the initial and modern approach that
is to effectuate the object and purpose of the act. The main objective by extending the
meaning of the statute is to ensure that its initial purpose (public safety, maintenance of
law and order) is justified. This rule looks into the reasons as per why the statute was
initially enacted and promotes the remedial effects by suppressing the mischief.
Though the rule almost covers the main grounds of the statute but cannot be applied to
Fiscal statutes.
When a word is ambiguous i.e. if it has multiple meanings, which meaning should be
understood by that word? This is the predicament that is resolved by the principle of
Beneficial Construction. When a statute is meant for the benefit of a particular class,
and if a word in the statute is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the
benefits and one which would not, then the meaning that preserves the benefit must be
adopted. Omissions will not be supplied by the court, only when multiple meanings are
possible, can the court pick the beneficial one. Thus, where the court has to choose
between a wider mean that carries out the objective of the legislature better and a
narrow meaning, then it usually chooses the former. Similarly, when the language used
by the legislature fails to achieve the objective of a statute, an extended meaning could
be given to it to achieve that objective, if the language is fairly susceptible to the
extended meaning. This is evident in the case of B Shah vs. Presiding Officer, AIR 1978,
where Section 5 of Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 was is question, where an expectant
mother could take 12 weeks of maternity leave on full salary. In this case, a woman who
used to work 6 days a week was paid for only 6x12=72 days instead of 7x12=84 days.

7. Rule of Exceptional Construction

The rule of exceptional construction stands for the elimination of statutes and words in
a statute which defeat the real objective of the statute or make no sense. It also stands
for construction of words ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘may’, ‘shall’ & ‘must’. While ‘and’ is normally
considered conjunctive so that both provisions of a statute can be satisfied, ‘or’ is used
of satisfying the clauses or either of the provisions in a statute. The word ‘may’
generally has a directory for but is also has a mandatory force where subject involves
discretion coupled with obligation, where the word ‘may’ has been used in the statute as
a matter of pure conventional courtesy and also where the word ‘may’ may defeat the
objective of the statute. Similarly ‘shall’ is considered to have a mandatory force and is
used in cases of statutes providing specific penalty. ‘Must’ on the other hand had a
directory force and is used for statutes against the government or using a mandatory
force may result in absurd results. While this rule seems simple, the draftsmanship lies
in deciding whether the statute should use a mandatory for or a directory force.

8. Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem Generis means "of the same kind and nature”. When a list of two or more
specific descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide
meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the
specific words that precede them. In this rule a specific word, class or species needs to
be mentioned so that the whole statute revolves around it and the statute will be only
meant for these specific words. However, the specific words should not have a wide
approach as they would exhaust the whole statute. This rule provides that where words
of specific meaning are followed by general words, the general words will be construed
as being limited to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those
enumerated by the specific words. To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule,
there has to be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to the
different objects of a widely differing character, but, to something, which can be called a
class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule will not be applicable. For the
invocation of the rule, there must be one distinct genus or category. The specific words
must apply not to different objects of a widely varying character but to words, which
convey things or object of one class or kind, where this generic unity is absent, the rule
cannot apply.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis applies as mentioned by the Supreme Court in
Amarchandra Chakrabotry v Collector of Excise, AIR 1972 SC 1863 when:
• The statute contains an enumeration of specific words.
• The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category.
• That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration.
• The general item follows the enumeration.
• There is no indication of a different legislative intent.

9. Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a Sociis literally means “It is known from its associates”. The rule of language
is used by the courts to help interpret legislation. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a
sociis" the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its
association with other words within the context of the phrase. This means that words in
a list within a statute have meanings that are related to each other.
In Foster v Diphwys Casson((1887) 18 QBD 428), the case involved a statute which
stated that explosives taken into a mine must be in a "case or canister". Here the
defendant used a cloth bag. The courts had to consider whether a cloth bag was within
the definition. Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been
within the statutory definition, because parliament's intention in using ‘case or
container’ was referring to something of the same strength as a canister.

10. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

The Expression literally means “the express mention of one thing excludes all others”.
Where one or more things are specifically included in some list and others have been
excluded it automatically means that all others have been excluded. However,
sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by
a word such as "includes" or “such as”.
Thus, a statute granting certain rights to "police, fire, and sanitation employees" would
be interpreted to exclude other public employees not enumerated from the legislation.
This is based on presumed legislative intent and where for some reason this intent
cannot be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a different conclusion. The
maxim has wide application and has been used by courts to interpret constitutions,
treaties, wills, and contracts as well as statutes. Nevertheless, Expressio Unius Est
Exclusio Alterius does have its limitations. Courts have held that the maxim should be
disregarded where an expanded interpretation of a statute will lead to beneficial results
or will serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted. The general meaning of
“Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another” is also known as The Negative
Implication Rule. This rule assumes that the legislature intentionally specified one set of
criteria as opposed to the other. Therefore, if the issue to be decided addresses an item
not specifically named in the statute, it must be assumed the statute does not apply.

11. Contemporanea Expositio

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissinia in lege: meaning Contemporaneous
exposition is the best and strongest in law. It is said that the best exposition of a statute
or any other document is that which it has received from contemporary authority. This
maxim has been confirmed by the Apex Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. Delhi Stock
Exchange Asson. Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1049, 1054
The maxim Contemporanea expositio as laid down by Lord Coke was applied to
construing ancient statutes, but usually not applied to interpreting Acts or statutes
which are comparatively modern. The meaning publicly given by contemporary or long
professional usage is presumed to be true one, even where the language has
etymologically or popularly a different meaning. It is obvious that the language of a
statute must be understood in the sense in which it was understood when it was
passed, and those who lived at or near that time when it was passed may reasonably be
supposed to be better acquainted than their descendants with the circumstances to
which it had relation, as well as with the sense then attached to legislative expressions.

INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

“Internal aids” mean those aids which are available in the statute itself. Each and every
part of an enactment helps in interpretation. However, it is important to decipher as to
whether these parts can be of any help in the interpretation of the statute. The Internal
aids to interpretation may be as follows:
a. Title
Long title – The Long Title of a Statute is an internal part of the statute and is
admissible as an aid to its construction. Statute is headed by a long title and it gives the
description about the object of an Act. It begins with the words- “An Act to ………….” For
e.g. The long title of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is – “An Act to consolidate and
amend the law relating to criminal procedure”. In recent times, long title has been used
by the courts to interpret certain provision of the statutes. However, its useful only to
the extent of removing the ambiguity and confusions and is not a conclusive aid to
interpret the provision of the statute.
Short Title - The short title of an Act is for the purpose of reference & for its
identification. It ends with the year of passing of the Act. E.g., “The Indian Penal Code,
1860”; “The Indian Evidence Act, 1872”. The Short Title is generally given at the
beginning with the words- “This Act may be called……………” For e.g Section 1 of The
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, says –“This Act may be called, The Indian Evidence Act,
1872”. Even though short title is the part of the statute, it does not have any role in the
interpretation of the provisions of an Act.
b. Preamble
The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute.
Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It contains the recitals
showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of the Act is clear the
preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an
ambiguous act.
If any doubts arise from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held
a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making
the statute and to have recourse to the preamble.
c. Headings and Title of a Chapter
Headings are of two kinds – one prefixed to a section and other prefixed to a group or
set of sections. Heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation and the
heading may be treated as preambles to the provisions following them. In Krishnaih V.
State of (A.P. AIR 2005 AP 10) it was held that headings prefixed to sections cannot
control the plain words of the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt,
heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing provision.
d. Marginal Notes
Marginal notes are the notes which are inserted at the side of the sections in an Act and
express the effect of the sections stated. Marginal notes appended to the Articles of the
Constitution have been held to constitute part of the constitution as passed by the
constituent assembly and therefore they have been made use of in construing the
articles.
e. Definitional Sections/ Clauses
The object of a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing
the subject matter to which the word or expression defined is intended to apply. A
definition contained in the definition clause of a particular statute should be used for
the purpose of that Act. Definition from any other statute cannot be borrowed and used
ignoring the definition contained in the statute itself.
f. Illustrations
Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the
understanding the real scope. In Mahesh Chandra Sharma V.Raj Kumari Sharma, (AIR
1996 SC 869), it was held that illustrations are parts of the Section and help to elucidate
the principles of the section.
g. Proviso
The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is
confined to that case. There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be
so clear that a proviso may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso
is construed as restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be
divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed
harmoniously with the main enactment.”
h. Explanations
An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the
words appearing in the section. An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read
with the main provision to which it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation
appended to a section or a sub-section becomes an integral part of it and has no
independent existence apart from it. The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the
scope of the main section. An Explanation is quite different in nature from a proviso; the
latter excludes, excepts and restricts while the former explains, clarifies or subtracts or
includes something by introducing a legal fiction.
i. Schedules
Schedules form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for
working out the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule
cannot override the provisions of the express enactment.
j. Punctuation
Punctuation is a minor element in the construction of a statute. Only when a statute is
carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to
punctuation. It cannot, however, be regarded as a controlling element for determining
the meaning of a statute.”
EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to external aids. The
external aids are very useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory
provisions. As opposed to internal aids to construction there are certain aids which are
external to the statute. Such aids will include parliamentary history of the legislation,
historical facts and surrounding circumstances in which the statute came to be
enacted, reference to other statutes, use of dictionaries, use of foreign decisions, etc.
Some of the external aids used in the interpretation of statutes are as follows:
a. Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances
Historical setting cannot be used as an aid if the words are plain and clear. If the
wordings are ambiguous, the historical setting may be considered in order to arrive at
the proper construction. Historical setting covers parliamentary history, historical facts,
statement of objects and reasons, report of expert committees. Parliamentary history
means the process by which an act is enacted. This includes conception of an idea,
drafting of the bill, the debates made, the amendments proposed etc. Speech made in
mover of the bill, amendments considered during the progress of the bill are considered
in parliamentary history whereas the papers placed before the cabinet which took the
decision for the introduction of the bill are not relevant since these papers are not
placed before the parliament. The historical facts of the statute that is the external
circumstances in which it was enacted in should also be taken into note so that it can
be understood that the statute in question was intended to alter the law or leave it
where it stood. Statement of objective and reasons as to why the statute is being
brought to enactment can also be a very helpful fact in the research for historical facts,
but the same if done after extensive amendments in statute it may be unsafe to attach
these with the statute in the end. It is better to use the report of a committee before
presenting it in front of the legislature as they guide us with a legislative intent and
place their recommendations which come in handy while enactment of the bill. The
Supreme Court in a number of cases referred to debates in the Constituent Assembly
for interpretation of Constitutional provisions.
Reports of Commissions including Law Commission or Committees including
Parliamentary Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill can also be referred to in
the Court as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief
or evil intended to be remedied. Law Commission’s Reports can also be referred to
where a particular enactment or amendment is the result of recommendations of Law
Commission Report. The Supreme Court in Rosy and another v State of Kerala and
others, (2000) 2 SCC 230 considered Law Commission of India, 41st Report for
interpretation of section 200 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
b. Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions
A Statute must be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were
unknown or did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute. Any relevant changes
in the social conditions and technology should be given due weightage. Courts should
take into account all these developments while construing statutory provisions.
Therefore, court has to take into account social, political and economic developments
and scientific inventions which take place after enactment of a statute for proper
construction of its provision.
c. Reference to Other Statutes:
In case where two Acts have to be read together, then each part of every act has to be
construed as if contained in one composite Act. However, if there is some clear
discrepancy then the latter Act would modify the earlier. Where a single provision of one
Act has to be read or added in another, then it has to be read in the sense in which it
was originally construed in the first Act. In this way the whole of the first Act can be
mentioned or referred in the second Act even though only a provision of the first one
was adopted. In case where an old Act has been repealed, it loses its operative force.
Nevertheless, such a repealed part may still be taken into account for construing the
unrepealed part. For the purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory
provision, courts can refer to or can take help of other statutes. It is also known as
statutory aids. The General Clauses Act, 1897 is an example of statutory aid. The
application of this rule of construction has the merit of avoiding any contradiction
between a series of statutes dealing with the same subject, it allows the use of an
earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the
same context. On the same logic when words in an earlier statute have received an
authoritative exposition by a superior court, use of same words in similar context in a
later statute will give rise to a presumption that the legislature intends that the same
interpretation should be followed for construction of those words in the later statute.
d. Dictionaries:
When a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries
to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance.
However, in the selection of one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must
always be had to the scheme, context and legislative history.
e. Judicial Decisions:
When judicial pronouncements are been taken as reference it should be taken into note
that the decisions referred are Indian, if they are foreign it should be ensured that such a
foreign country follows the same system of jurisprudence as ours and that these
decisions have been taken in the ground of the same law as ours. These foreign
decisions have persuasive value only and are not binding on Indian courts and where
guidance is available from binding Indian decisions; reference to foreign decisions is of
no use.
f. other materials
Similarly, Supreme Court used information available on internet for the purpose of
interpretation of statutory provision in Ramlal v State of Rajasthan, (2001) 1 SCC 175.
Courts also refer passages and materials from text books and articles and papers
published in the journals. These external aids are very useful tools not only for the
proper and correct interpretation or construction of statutory provision, but also for
understanding the object of the statute, the mischief sought to be remedied by it,
circumstances in which it was enacted and many other relevant matters. In the absence
of the admissibility of these external aids, sometimes court may not be in a position to
do justice in a case.