Lidasan v.

COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

CASE DOCTRINE Title of Bills (Section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)

FACTS  On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”

 It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are
within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that
Bayanga, Langkong, (and etc.) are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur.

 Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted such resolution

which, essentially, transfers a total of twelve barrios, coming from two
different municipalities in the Province of Cotabato, to the province of
Lanao Del Sur.

 Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the

President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by
correcting legislation.”

 Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own

interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

ISSUE/S: WON RA4790 complies with the provision of the 1987 Constitution re: Title of
Bills.

RULING: It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision
contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of
the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

The title— “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur”—projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. For, the known fact is that the legislation
has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del
Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against
the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for
the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, it stands to reason
to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act as passed by Congress.

Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179

CASE DOCTRINE Title of Bills (Section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)

FACTS  Petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12
and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

 Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of
the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to
the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of
Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.

 Respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the

Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the
matter in Fariñas v. Executive Secretary.

ISSUE/S: WON Section 12 and 14(2) of RA 9006 complies constitutionally in relation with
Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we find that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor
of the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to
reverse our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have already ruled that the title and
the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other
than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Below is a
reproduction of our exhaustive exposition on the matter in the 10 December 2003
En Banc Decision:

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes

should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.

This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House.

After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we find that the assailed Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the measures
embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the Petition and the
petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.

PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 203

CASE DOCTRINE Formalities

FACTS  The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as
implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular
No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.

 The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the abovenamed measures.

ISSUE/S: WON R.A. No. 7354 is constitutional.

RULING: ON ITS TITLE

The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the
challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

ON ITS AMENDED PROVISION

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
They stress that Sec 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond
the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding7 officers of Congress.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was
duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

ON EQUAL PROTECTION

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the
liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification.

However, in lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of
the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the
part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the
administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can
only further deepen this serious problem. It should not be hard to imagine the
increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to
every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not
expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall “be
deprived of the equal protection of the laws.”

Hence, the petition to declare the act unconstitutional is PATRIALLY granted.

Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715

CASE DOCTRINE Approval of Bills

FACTS  RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and

collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).

 The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess
of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC).

 Each Board has the duty to:

1. prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund;
2. set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
3. terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board;
4. prescribe a system for performance evaluation;
5. perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations; and
6. submit an annual report to Congress

ISSUE/S: WON RA 9335 constitutional.

RULING: ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty,
industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.

In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be
claimed if it will be either the fruit of “bounty hunting or mercenary activity” or
the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these
precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law

ON EQUAL PROTECTION

The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. Since the
subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies.

ON SEPARATION OF POWERS (Approval of Bill)

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the
said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the
issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

However, its power to do a legislative veto is highly criticized as undue

encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-
enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
un constitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as

unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD.

Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force
and effect.