U.S.

-led special operations exercise COMBINED

RESOLVE, February 21, 2021. Photo by NATO.

by Major Bjørn-Erik Solli

Norwegian Special Operations Command
Special Operations Advisor
NATO Joint Warfare Centre

THE ESSENCE
OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
What You Need to Know About Special Operations
while Serving at the Joint Operational Level
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84 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

DEN ENKELTES INNBITTE VILJE TIL Å LØSE OPPDRAG UAVHENGIG AV FORUTSETNINGER*

THE INDIVIDUAL'S RELENTLESS WILL TO SOLVE MISSIONS
REGARDLESS OF PREREQUISITES
* Norwegian Special Operations Commando's Ethos

T
HIS ARTICLE IS WRITTEN to ar-
ticulate the general knowledge need-
“Understanding There is a myriad of perspectives, de-
scriptions, and definitions of special opera-
ed to gain a general understanding
of special operations for everyone
the limits of tions. Not all are of equal quality, precision, or,
more importantly, relevance for all joint offi-
serving at the joint operational level.
The first section of the article illustrates the im-
conventional cers. They do share several general commonal-
ities that make up a relevant core for a satisfac-
portance of knowledge at the operational level. operations is a tory understanding of special operations. For
The second section briefly explains the core ele- brevity of this article, I will only list the follow-
ments of special operations. Finally, the article prerequisite to fully ing: distinction from conventional operations,
provides a basic understanding of applicability the scope and level of risk, and operational and
of special operations. All in all, the essence of understand and strategic effects.

appreciate the
special operations.
The apex god of Northern Mythology Distinction from
Odin sacrificed his right eye in exchange for
access to the well of wisdom. Yet, this was not utility of special Conventional Forces

enough for him to become all-knowing. He

hung himself half-dead from Yggdrasil, the operations.” Historically, SOF, as we know it today, is rela-
tively new, but the phenomenon of special
tree of life, where he pierced his own flesh with operations has probably existed for ages. Sto-
a spear. After nine nights of torture, he had ries, such as that of the Trojan Horse can be
sacrificed enough, and endured enough pain, described as a "special operation" at its time.7
to gain all knowledge.1 bias against special operations forces (SOF), During the 20th century, special operations
This myth illustrates how the path to be- but I thought you guys just wanted to kill them cemented themselves as a distinct form of war-
coming all-knowing requires sacrifice beyond all." This kind of prejudice is not a fault of the fare apart from the traditional land, maritime,
human capability. From a humble human per- officer, but a symptom of a greater problem and air operations.8,9,10,11,12
spective, it is therefore necessary to prioritize for the special operations community. A com- It is important to see special operations
what you want to learn, and which knowledge bination of prudent operational security that in its historical context as it has evolved both
to keep. The need for prioritizing and evenly creates mystery on the one hand, and the glori- in terms of tasks and missions. In other words,
distributing knowledge becomes even greater fication of the action representing only a small what constituted special operations once may
in complex warfare systems like the joint force percentage of the special operations portfolio now be considered conventional.13
commands (JFCs). Ideally, everyone should by Hollywood and authors, on the other hand, During this evolution, one factor has
have general knowledge of all areas of joint are to blame.4 remained more or less the same: special opera-
operations, and it is reasonable to think that An additional reputational challenge is tions have been used to solve missions that con-
general perception of special operations is at created by the acts conducted by a very few ventional forces were either not able to; or, not
an unfavourable low level,2 which can "inhibit "bad apples".5,6 This is why it is so important able to solve with an acceptable level of risk.14,15,16
sound planning and operations".3 that the special operations community itself Special operations are therefore conducted in-
During a Joint Warfare Centre (JWC)- actively works towards informing general pur- dependently, or as a supplement to convention-
directed exercise, an officer described his own pose forces and counter the misleading Hol- al operations, in a comprehensive joint opera-
prejudice in a VTC by saying: "I guess it's my lywood narrative and occasional bad publicity. tions campaign.17

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The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 85
six
escribed
cRaven d 95):
illi am H . M c ps (19
O
(Ret.) W b o ok S p e
Admiral succe ss in h is
e d,
f mission rise, Spe
secrets o on, Surp
e cu ri ty , Repetiti io ns so ldier in
, S ecial oper
at
Simplicity wise: A sp egian
ose. Clock er. A Norw
and Purp t. Brian Kest o
photo by Sg 02 , phot
0)
an (2011), exercise (2
Afghanist m an do during an l sp ec ial
m nava
erations co orwegian
special op varet. A N o by
jø rn Kj os vold, Fors er ci se (2 020), phot
by Torb du ring an ex
ld rs duri
ie ng
commando erations so
operations om an ian special op N AT O .
osvold. R 2021. Phot
o by
Torbjørn Kj EFENDER
ci se ST E ADFAST D
Exer

86 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Understanding the limits of conventional

operations is a prerequisite to fully understand Special operations
and appreciate the utility of special operations.
Generally, if the mission can be solved by con-
ventional forces, conventional forces should
be used. There is little desire within SOF to be
"conventionalized", and thereby lose their core Maritime Air
characteristics.18 If conventionalized, SOF could
operations operations

Special operations

Special operations
become redundant on the basis of not hav-
ing the required manning, being specialized
enough, or able to match conventional forces
in conducting conventional operations. Special
operations are different compared to the con-
ventional operations, where the latter tend to be
more specialized.19
A relevant but simple example can be
drawn from a recent JWC-directed exercise. Land Intelligence
Based on the fictitious scenario, a weapons sys- operations operations
tem that posed a threat to NATO's air superior-
ity was transported in the joint operations area.
During a VTC with the joint force command
leadership and the component commands, the
situation was discussed. Upon hearing the con-
Special operations
versation, the special operations component
command took the initiative to assess if there
could be a special operations solution to the
problem. Preferably, the joint force command ABOVE: Enhanced joint operational reach. The reach of each field of operations is illustrated by the
should promptly have addressed the special op- coverage of its depicted area. The areas for special operations are used to illustrate how they can
contribute to potentially increase the operational reach of joint force commands by building on the other
erations component command and tasked them fields of operations, and thereby generating complementary effects. (Graphic is authors' own)
to assess if SOF could solve the problem when a
conventional component could not. In this case,
a special operations component command- sequences given the associated uncertainties. operators and support personnel: The selection
initiated partnered-joint special operations, If the stakes are high, in that the potential ad- process of SOF operators is generally very de-
supported by the maritime component com- verse consequences can have operational, stra- manding, in order to meet some of the highest
mand, neutralized the threat, gained valuable tegic, or political impact, special operations standards in the military. The same goes for the
intelligence, and enabled host nation forces to might be the only acceptable option. This is following education and day-to-day training.
arrest smugglers that could be exploited in the particularly the case if the severity of the po- For support personnel, the requirements vary
exercise information environment. tential impact will be difficult, or impossible to specific to the functional areas, but are gener-
mitigate. Special operations have comparative ally very thorough.26
SOF complement the conventional forces as an advantages related to risk mitigation.22,23
agile, creative force multiplier that are not as af- Relative superiority: Admiral William McRa-
fected by, or that to some extent can overcome Factors of risk mitigation exclusive to special vens' theory of special operations explains how
or circumvent, the main challenges faced by operations include the following five examples: small SOF teams, given the right circumstanc-
large conventional forces, such as the Clause- es, can compensate for, and, to some extent,
witzian concept of the friction of war.20,21 A favourable ratio of support and enabling per- overcome many of the challenges conventional
sonnel to the ground forces: It is not uncom- forces are burdened with through the concept
The Scope and Level of Risk mon for 30 special forces operators "on the of relative superiority.27
ground" to be supported by more than a hun-
Risk is a key component in considering if a dred dedicated personnel on the tactical level Strict operational security: Many special op-
special operation is warranted or not. When alone. A considerable part of this support is to erations are executed with a narrow margin of
assessing risk related to military activities one enable cross service cooperation in order to error. Operational security can be paramount
must always analyse the possible outcomes, achieve joint effort.24,25 in order to enable and maintain the desired
that is, weighting the desired achievements outcomes of special operations.28 This is one of
against the severities of potential adverse con- Pre-emptive effort in selection/training of SOF the reasons why SOF can be perceived to "out

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The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 87
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Full spectrum of risk Special operations-relevant spectrum of risk SOF units from their respective services and
placed them under a joint leadership.33,34,35
Additionally, this requires direction and
prioritization from senior leadership. For this
reason, special operations should be aimed to-
wards operational and strategic goals and ef-
fects. Linking the small-scale tactical actions of
SOF to desired operational and strategic effects
remains the principal challenge for the opera-
tional level leadership.
Operation Gunnerside, the Allied sabo-
tage of Nazi Regime's efforts to build an atomic
bomb in Norway in 1943,36 and Operation Nep-
tune Spear, the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin
Laden in 2011, demonstrate how special op-
erations can have significant strategic effect.37,38
ABOVE: Relevant Levels of Risk. The full spectrum risk matrix is relevant for conventional operations. Additionally, the examples illustrate how special
For special operations, on the other hand, the limited risk matrix displays the relevant levels of risk.
The primary factor is the severity of and not the assumed likelihood of impact of potential outcomes. operations can both solve problems of strategic
(Graphic is authors' own) importance that could not be conducted by
conventional forces, and how the following pre-
sentations of the operations are skewed towards
loop" standardized staff processes by gaining over longer periods of time. Combined with the action-filled culmination of several special
access to the commanders outside of the regu- the aforementioned ability to mitigate risk, operations towards the same end state.
lar chain of command. special operations remain viable options for The lesser known, but equally signifi-
operational and strategic decision makers and cant, Operation Grouse was a prerequisite for
Unconventional creativity: In theory, every spe- are particularly suited for high-risk missions Operation Gunnerside starting five months
cial operation is unique, or at least, it can be that do not require the volume and certain earlier. Operation Grouse was the collection
conducted in a unique manner. SOF operators specialized warfighting capabilities that only and analyses of the intelligence that enabled
are, amongst other things, selected based on conventional forces can provide. the detailed planning of Gunnerside's raid.39
their problem-solving skills. SOF culture fos- History has proven a few particularly Similarly, the extensive work that enabled
ters and appreciates creativity in a bottom-up valuable lessons when it comes to conducting Neptune Spear has not been given more than
driven planning process. Thus, combined with special operations and generating the ability to a fraction of the attention that has been given
SOF's training in unconventional techniques, do so. Attempting to generate forces capable to the raid on the Al Qaida compound in Ab-
procedures and methods, special operations of conducting special operations as the need bottabad, Pakistan. This is creating a limited
are inherently unpredictable for an opponent.29 arises have proven to be challenging at best.30 appreciation for what actually transpired and
There are several examples where the hasty es- its complexity. Similarly, the decade-long Tro-
Operational and tablishment of SOF have resulted in significant jan War of Greek Mythology for the majority is
Strategic Effects shortfalls.31 Additionally, conventional leaders only known for its Trojan Horse.
given command over SOF have struggled to
As previously noted, special operations repre- utilize them effectively. Misuse of SOF has cost The Generic View of
sent an alternative, or a supplement, to con- lives, and in certain examples, almost eradicat- Special Operations
ventional operations. The decision makers ed whole SOF units on the battlefield.32
that choose between conventional and special This illustrates two distinct lessons. Special operations described up to this point
operations are serving at the operational level Limited resources must be utilized where they retains a level of ambiguity. This can be chal-
or higher. This has contributed to shaping SOF, can provide the biggest payoff. For this reason, lenging, as it does not provide a precise under-
as their development and ambitions are heav- special operations should be aimed towards standing. But it is a necessity for special opera-
ily influenced by the operational and strategic operational and strategic goals and effects. tions not to be limited by rigid definitions or
levels of war. SOF operate in small teams and, The force generation and application of most perceptions. As mentioned, in theory, the next
unlike conventional forces, are not suited for special operations require strategic patience special operations mission can be unique and
enduring or large-scale combat engagements. and early implementation in order to reach require unrestricted creativity in planning and
They are, however, suitable for kinetic strikes its full potential. This is partly the reason why execution. However, one of the more tangible
with precise use of lethal forces in order to the United States created its Joint Special Op- consequences of the last century's evolution is a
reduce the potential of collateral damage, and erations Command, and NATO members, like generally accepted consensus of three principal
alternatively, for non-kinetic covert operations Denmark and Norway, have extracted their tasks within the concept of special operations:

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88 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Killing of Osama bin Laden

Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR
Abbottabad, Pakistan, May 2, 2011
Former U.S. President Barack Obama gave the green light to
execute the assault on April 29, 2011, which was conducted
by members of "SEAL Team Six" on May 2, 2011. The team
successfully executed the operation that killed Osama bin Laden,
the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who was responsible for
the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

Learn more: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/

blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead

ABOVE: Photo by U.S. Army (left); newspapers'

photo by Carolina K. Smith, Shutterstock
I. Direct Action (DA): Kinetic action distin- environment with potentially political or
guished by the level of risk, precision and diplomatic sensitivities.41,42
techniques utilized.40 There is also a group of additional tasks,
III. Military Assistance (MA): Potentially several such as counter insurgency, counter terrorism,
II. Special Reconnaissance (SR): Creating a types of support provided to a broad spec- and hostage release operations to mention a
state of relative certainty from operations trum of local recipients. Ranging from sub- few.44 For elaborations of these tasks NATO's
conduc ted in a hostile, contested, or denied tactical units to national leadership.43 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
provide a good overview for NATO personnel.
That being said, special operations are defined
and articulated differently by "big nations",
"small nations", and in NATO. Where the U.S.
divide special operations into 12 core tasks,
Generating a generic description of smaller countries, and NATO divide special
special operations: This process can be operations into three areas.45,46
illustrated by funnelling the full spectrum
of possibilities through a funnel of national Generally speaking, special operations
and Alliance limitations. At the same time, is perceived beyond the scope of NATO on na-
SOF will always look beyond the perceived
limitations in the pursuit of possibilities. tional level, while the "big nations" also tend
(Graphic is author's own) to have a larger and more specialized SOF ar-
senal.47 A notable difference is the U.S. Army
Special Forces' concept of unconventional
warfare, which is long-term, high risk, and low
footprint operations conducted in a denied
area in order to serve a long-term strategic
goal that opposes a local government or oc-
cupying power.48,49 However, at the operational
level, it is beneficial not to exclusively focus on
the tactical nature of these tasks, but rather to
see them as how special operations give opera-
tional or strategic effects.

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The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 89
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Conclusion ENDNOTES: 20 McRaven, William. (1995). Spec Ops: Case Studies in

Special Operations Warfare: In Theory and Practice.
For personnel at the operational level that do 1 Northern Mythology: https://www.norron-mytologi. New York: Ballentine Books.
not have basic knowledge of special opera- info/gudene/odin.htm 21 Spulak, Robert G.
tions, dealing with them can feel as ominous 2 Jensen, Lars H. E. (2014). Special Operations — 22 Searle, Tom.
as having to deal with Mjølner, the god wielded Myth and Facts. København: Royal Danish Defence 23 McRaven, William. (1995) & Robert G- Spulak.
weapon of Thor from Norse mythology. It is Collage Publishing House 24 NATO Special Operations Headquarters. (2014).
even more challenging for the operational level 3 Collins, John M. (1986). United States and Soviet Special Operations Component Command Manual.
leadership whom themselves, as mere mortals, Special Operations Study. Michigan: University of Belgium: NATO
will have to wield such potent and ambiguous Michigan Library 25 Collins, John M. & NATO Standard
powers with a demanding level of precision. 4 Jensen, Lars H.E. 26 Colins, John M. Christopher Lamb, Tor Jørgen Melien,
In order to pierce through bias and my- 5 Knaus, Christopher. (2020). Australian Special Forces Susan L. Marquis, Mark Moyar & Robert G. Spulak.
thology, sober knowledge is key. The more one involved in murder of 39 Afghan civilians, war crime 27 McRaven, William. (1995).
can expect to interact with special operations, report alleges. The Guardian: https://www.theguard- 28 Collins, John M. & William McRaven (1995).
the more crucial the level of knowledge be- ian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/19/australian- 29 Ljøterud, Ståle Tom Searle & Robert G. Spulak.
comes. This is especially applicable for opera- special-forces-involved-in-of-39-afghan-civilians-war- 30 Collins, John M.
tional and strategic level leadership. crimes-report-alleges 31 Marquis, Susan L. & Moyer, Mark.
This article contains an extensive ref- 6 Associated Press. (2019). A look at the case of Navy 32 Moyar, Mark.
erence list to provide the curious and moti- Seal Eddie Gallagher. Associated Press: https://apnews. 33 Lamb, Christopher, Susan L. Marquis & Mark Moyar.
vated readers with detailed information from com/article/7371d4bfbb5348acb6727ad48acbcad8 34 Norwegian Lexicon. (2020a). Forsvaret spesialsty-
authoritative and valid sources in order to 7 Ljøterud, Ståle. (2012). Spesialoperasjoner med rker (Norwegian Defence Forces Special Operations
further develop their knowledge of special kløkt og mot (Special Operations with Smartness and Forces) https://snl.no/Forsvarets_spesialstyrker
operations. For NATO personnel, the natural Courage). In "Krigens Vitenskap en introduksjon I 35 Specialoperasjonskommandoen. (2014).
starting point is NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine militærteori" (The Science of War an Introduction to Specialoperasjonskommandoen (The Special
for Special Operations. Military Theory) Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag Operations Command). https://web.archive.org/
In closing, the general perception of 8 Moyar, Mark. (2017). Oppose Any Foe —The Rise of web/20160304115931/http://forsvaret.dk/HST/
special operations suffers from unclassified America's Special Operation Forces. Basic Books Nyt%20og%20Presse/%C3%98vrige%20nyheder/
sources that present historical examples, and 9 Melien, Tor Jørgen. (2012). Våre hemmelige soldater Documents/SOKOM%20FAKTAARK%202015.pdf
the skewed "Hollywood narrative", which cre- — Norske spesialstyrker 1940-2012 (Our Secret 36 Norwegian Lexicon. (2020b). Tungvannaksjonen. (The
ates a simplified and less than representative Soldiers — Norwegian Special Operations Forces heavy water raid) https://snl.no/tungtvannsaksjonen
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are still classified and thereby remain hidden 10 Lamb, Christopher J. & David Tucker (2007). United cial Operations. New York: Grand Central Publishing
from general military perception. Special op- States Special Operations Forces — Second Edition. 38 Moyer, Mark.
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agile supplement to, the capabilities of within 11 Ljøterud, Ståle. 40 Ljøterud, Ståle, NATO Standard, William McRaven
conventional operations. Special operations 12 Marquis, Susan L. (1997). Unconventional Warfare and Tom Searle
forces do not intend to, and most often are not — Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces. 41 Westberg, Anders. (2016). To See and Not to Be Seen:
able to, take the missions conventional forces Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. Emerging Principles and Theory of Special Reconnais-
can conduct themselves.  13 Ljøterud, Ståle. sance and Surveillance Missions for Special Operations
14 NATO Standard. (2019). AJP-3,5 — Allied Joint Forces, Special Operations Journal, 2:2, 124-134.
Doctrine for Special Operations—Edition B Version 1. 42 Ljøterud, Ståle, NATO Standard
15 Spulak, Robert G. (2007). A Theory of Special 43 Ljøterud, Ståle, NATO Standard
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Florida: Joint Special Operations Forces University 45 Kristiansen, Marius & Andreas Hedenstrøm. (2016).
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17 Ljøterud, Ståle & NATO Standard Assistance Capability Development. Monteray: Naval
18 Mattingsdal, Jostein. (2020). Konvensjonalisering: Postgraduate School.
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19 Searle, Tom. (2017). Outside the Box: A New General 49 U.S. Army Special Operations Command (2016)
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90 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021