CRIM1 by Atty. Anselmo S.

Rodiel IV
1. General principles
1. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege
1. There is no crime when there is no law punishing it. (Evangelista v.
People, 2000)
2. Mala in se (evil in itself) and mala prohibita (prohibited evil)
Mala in se (CRIME Mala prohibita (CRIME
BECAUSE INHERENTLY BECAUSE PROHIBITED;
IMMORAL) NOT NECESSARILY
IMMORAL)
Definition A crime or an act that is An act that is considered
inherently immoral, such a crime because it is
as murder, arson, or rape prohibited by statute,
[Black’s Law Dictionary, although the act itself is
9th ed.] not necessarily immoral
[Black’s Law Dictionary,
9th ed.] NOTE: This
definition does not
always apply, since
hazing/child abuse are
malum prohibitum.
Applicable law General Rule: They are General Rule: Special
punished by RPC laws, i.e., hazing.
Exception: special penal Exception: Technical
laws that are inherently malversation is a malum
immoral, i.e., plunder/ prohibitum. (Ysidro v
piracy/highway robbery People, 2012)
(Estrada v
Sandiganbayan)
Intent Criminal intent is Criminal intent is
necessary immaterial. Only intent
to perpetuate the act is
necessary
Good faith Hence, good faith is a Hence, good faith is
valid defense NOT a valid defense
Degree of The degree of As a rule, they are
accomplishment accomplishment punished only when
(consummated/ consummated. The
frustrated/attempted) is exception is if the special
necessary in determining law punishes the
the penalty to be different degrees of
imposed accomplishment, i.e.,
Anti-Trafficking in
necessary
Good faith Hence, good faith is a Hence, good faith is
valid defense NOT a valid defense
Degree of The degree of As a rule, they are
accomplishment accomplishment punished only when
(consummated/ consummated. The
frustrated/attempted) is exception is if the special
necessary in determining law punishes the
the penalty to be different degrees of
imposed accomplishment, i.e.,
Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act
Persons punished The principal, As a rule, only the
accomplice, and principal is punished. The
accessory are punished. exception is if the special
law punishes the
accomplice and
accessory too, i.e., Anti-
Hazing Act.
Division of penalties Penalties may be divided There is no such division
into degrees and periods. of penalties.

3. Applicability of RPC to Special penal laws

1. Offenses which are punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Art. 10)
4. Scope and characteristics
1. Generality (Art. 14, Civil Code)
1. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (Art. 14, Civil Code)
2. This covers the PERSONS within the Philippine territory. If the
offender alleges that he is a foreign citizen, so the Philippine penal
laws shall not apply to him, then the generality principle shall
apply.
3. Exceptions:
1. Principles of public international law
1. The following are exempted from the operation of criminal
laws because of GAPIL:
1. Sovereigns and other chiefs of state (president,
chancellor, and the like); and
2. Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers
resident, and charges d’affaires.
1. Meanwhile, consuls, vice-consuls, and other
1.
commercial representatives do not possess the
same status. “Consular officials shall be IMMUNE
from jurisdiction of the receiving State in respect
to acts performed in the exercise of his consular
functions.” (Art. 9, Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations)
2. Treaty stipulations
1. An example of a treaty is the RP-US Visiting Forces
Accord, signed on February 10, 1998.
3. Laws of preferential application
1. RA 75 is an example.
1. General Rule: The following persons are exempt from
arrest and imprisonment, and their properties exempt
from distraint, seizure and attachment (AMS)
1. Ambassadors
2. Public Ministers
3. Domestic Servants of ambassadors or ministers
2. Exceptions:
1. If the servant is a citizen or inhabitant of the
Republic of the Philippines, AND the process is
founded upon a debt contracted before he
entered upon such service; or
2. If the servant is NOT registered with the DFA.
(Sec. 4, RA 75)
2. Territoriality (Art. 2, RPC)
1. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only
within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in
the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and
the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code. (Art. 2, RPC)
1. Campanilla: These 5 instances are extensions of the
1.
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. They are not
exceptions.
2. For vessel, it must be registered with BoC. For airship, it
must be registered with CAAp
3. It is the registration of the vessel or aircraft, not the
citizenship of its owner, that makes it Philippine ship or
airship.
4. Crimes committed within Philippine embassies abroad are
punishable by Philippine courts because the embassies
are deemed part of the Philippine territory.
5. The crimes that may be committed in the exercise of
pubic functions are:
1. Direct bribery
2. Indirect bribery
3. Frauds against the public treasury
4. Possession of prohibited interest
5. Malversation of public funds or property
6. Failure of accountable officers to render accounts
7. Illegal use of public funds or property (technical
malversation)
8. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property
9. Falsification by a public officer or employee
committed with abuse of his official position.
6. The crimes committed outside the Philippines but
punishable under Article 2 of the RPC shall be cognizable
by the RTC in which the charge is first filed. (Sec. 15(d),
Rule 110)
2. Exceptions:
1. Treaties
2. Laws of preferential applications
1. Warship rule
1. A warship of another country, even though docked in
the Philippines, is considered an extension of the
territory of its respective country. [Art. 27, United
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea]
2. Foreign merchant vessels
1. French rule (Flag state rule)
1. The coastal state shall not exercise jurisdiction
over the foreign merchant vessel, except if it
affects the peace of the coastal state. (Sec. 27,
Art. 27 of the UNCLOS III)
2. English rule (Coastal state rule)
1. The coastal state shall exercise jurisdiction,
1.
except when it does not affect the peace of the
flag state.
1. These rules apply only within the territorial
waters.
2. Within the internal waters, the Philippines
shall exercise jurisdiction.
3. Within the contiguous zones/EEZ, the
Philippines cannot enforce its penal laws.
3. RA 10654 - Fisheries Code
1. SEC. 3. Application of its Provisions. – The provisions of this
Code shall be enforced in:
1. all Philippine waters including other waters over which the
Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the
country’s 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and continental shelf;
2. all aquatic and fishery resources whether inland, coastal
or offshore fishing areas, including, but not limited to,
fishponds, fish pens/cages;
3. all lands devoted to aquaculture, or businesses and
activities relating to fishery, whether private or public
lands; and
4. all Philippine flagged fishing vessels operating in areas
governed by a Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (RFMO), in the high seas, or in waters of
other coastal states."
1. This is another extension to the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
2. Under the Fisheries Code, crimes committed over the
natural living and non-living resources in the EEZ/CS
of the PH, and all other waters over which the PH has
sovereignty and jurisdiction, shall be triable before
the Philippine courts.
3. Prospectively
1. A penal law cannot make an act punishable in if it was not
punishable when committed. It cannot be given a retroactive
effect. Otherwise, it will violate the rule on ex post facto laws.
2. Ex post facto laws
1. An ex post facto law is one which:
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. (In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.)
5. Interpretation of penal laws
1. Penal laws shall be strictly construed against the Government and in
favor of the accused.
2. However, the rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed
against the State may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and
there is doubt as to its interpretation. Where the law is CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS, there is no room for application of the rule. (People v
Gatchalian)
6. Pro reo principle (In dubio, pro reo)
1. The fundamental principle in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. This is in consonance with the presumption of
innocence of the accused.
2. Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of
lenity. It is the doctrine that in construing an ambiguous criminal
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, the court
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.
7. Retroactive effect of penal laws
1. General rule:
1. Penal laws shall have a prospective effect.
2. As exception:
1. “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony.” (Art. 22)
3. As exceptions to the exception: (HE)
1. The person guilty must not be a Habitual criminal (Art. 22); or
2. When the new law is Expressly made inapplicable to pending
actions. (Tavera v Valdez)
4. Art. 22 versus a specific provision of a special law
1. In case a specific law provides that the same shall be given
retroactive effect if favorable to the accused without condition,
then apply the same. Article 22 which provides for 2 conditions,
1.

one if favorable, and 2 if not HD, is general law. Special law must
prevail over the former.
5. When the repealing law fails to penalize an offense penalized under
the old law, the accused cannot be convicted under the repealing
(new) law.

2. Felonies
1. Criminal liabilities
1. Classification of felonies
1. Dolo
1. When the act is performed with deliberate intent. (Art. 3)
2. Requisites:
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Intent/Malice
3. If one requisite is absent, there is no crime, i.e., intent.
4. Dolo is not required in crimes punished by special laws
1. When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule,
intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that he has INTENT TO PERPETRATE the act prohibited by
law.
2. Hence, it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously.
2. Culpa
1. When the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of skill, or lack of skill. (Art. 3)
2. Requisites:
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, lack of skill
3. If one requisite is absent, there is no crime, i.e., lack of
negligence.
4. Culpa is a crime itself, and not merely a mode of committing a
crime.
1. The culpa is the crime itself, and the damage resulting are
the mere effects of the crime committed. Following this
view, if a person is killed, property is damaged and
another person suffered slight physical injuries through
reckless driving on the part of the accused, the
commission of reckless imprudence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is the crime itself. Hence, the
accused shall be held liable for a single crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, damage through
property and slight physical injuries. In such case, when
the accused is acquitted/convicted for the crime, he can
no longer be prosecuted for the same act. (Ivler v San
Pedro, 2010)
2. Aberratio ictus, error in personae, and praeter intentionem
1. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony,
although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended. (Art. 4)
1. “Committing a felony” - it ONLY covers acts or omissions
punishable by the RPC. It does not apply to special laws.
2. “From that which he intended” - it ONLY covers intentional
felonies, and NOT quasi-offenses.
1. A, in attempting to commit suicide by jumping out of a
window, falls on an old woman who died as a
consequence, is not criminally liable for intentional
homicide. A was not committing a felony when he
attempted a suicide.
2. If A shoots back in self-defense, but due to lack of
precision, he hit an innocent bystander, he is not
criminally liable. Why? He acted in self-defense, so he
was not committing a felony.
3. “Although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended” covers the following instances:
1. Mistake in the identity (error in personae)
1. It happens when the offender, intending to injure a
person, actually inflicts injury to another because he
wrongfully identified the latter as the former. Hence,
lack of intent to kill the deceased, because he
intended to kill another, does not relieve him of
criminal responsibility.
2. The penalty for mistake in the identity is provided by
Art. 49 - Penalty to be imposed upon the principals
when the crime committed is different from that
intended.
1. If the prescribed penalty for the crime intended is
lesser than that for the crime committed, the
former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the prescribed penalty for the crime committed
is lesser than that for the crime intended, the
former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. Mistake in the blow (abberatio ictus)
1. It happens when the offender intending to do an injury
to one person actually inflicts the injury to another
2. An illustration is A intended to shoot B. Due to lack of
precision, he shot C, causing his death.
3. The penalty for mistake in the blow is provided by Art.
48 - Complex Crimes. Why? Because a single act of
blow produced two or more grave or less grave
offenses. In such case, the penalty of the most
serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed.
3. Result exceeds the intent (praeter intentionem)
1. An illustration is when A punched B, merely intending
to hurt him. However, B hit his head on a pavement,
causing his death. In such case, A is liable for
homicide.
2. Any person who creates in another’s mind an
immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to
do something resulting in the latter’s injuries, is liable
for the resulting injuries. (People v Toling, 1975)
4. The intentional felony must be the proximate cause of the
result.
1. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would have not occurred
2. Efficient intervening cause means an active force that
intervened between the felony and the injury, and the
active force is a absolutely foreign from the felony.
3. Eggshell skull doctrine - The doctrine states that the
unexpected frailty of the injured person is not a valid
defense to the seriousness of any injury caused to them.
4. An illustration is A shot B on his foot. The bullet had rust
so B contracted tetanus, causing his death. Even if the
shot was not fatal, the shooting was the proximate cause
of the death. Hence, the accused is criminally liable.
3. Impossible crimes
1. Criminal liability is incurred by any person who performs an act
which would be an offense against persons or property:
1. if not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or
2. on account of employment of inadequate or ineffectual
manes. (Art. 4)
2. The act done must be done with evil intent.
3. The act performed should not constitute a violation of another
provision of the RPC. Otherwise, it is an actual crime.
4. Felonies against crime:
1. Parricide
2. Murder
3. Homicide
4. Infanticide
5. Abortion
6. Duel
7. Physical Injuries
8. Rape
5. Felonies against property:
1. Robbery
2. Brigandage
3. Theft
4. Usurpation
5. Culpable insolvency
6. Swindling (estafa) and other deceits
7. Chattel mortgage
8. Arson and other crimes involving destruction
9. Malicious mischief
6. Examples:
1. Persons - A shot B, not knowing that B is already dead 3
hours before. There is physical and legal impossibility in this
case.
2. Property - A, with intent to gain, took a watch from B’s pocket.
However, it was later revealed that such watch was actually
owned by A that was lost a week before. There is legal
impossibility in this case.
3. Persons - A tried to kill B by putting poison in his drink. It was
later revealed that it was actually rock salt and not poison.
There is employment of ineffectual means.
4. Persons - A intended to kill B by poisoning his drink. However,
A put an amount so small that no person may be poisoned
from it. There is employment of inadequate means.
4. Stages of execution
1. Internal acts
1. These are mere ideas in the mind of a person. They are not
punishable.
2. External acts
1. Preparatory acts
1. Ordinarily, they are not punishable.
2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are
punishable ONLY in cases in which the LAW SPECIALLY
PROVIDES A PENALTY therefor. (Art. 8, RPC)
2. Acts of execution
1. Consummated; Requisites
1. All the elements for its execution AND
accomplishment are present.
2. Frustrated; Requisites
1. Offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. Which would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But which, nevertheless, does not produce it;
4. By reason of some cause independent of the will of
the offender.
1. By reason of some cause independent of the will
of the offender - If the felony was not produced
because of the will of the offender, there is no
frustrated felony. Instead, there would be another
crime committed by the offender.
1. As example A shot B on his chest. However, A
saved B by bringing him to the hospital. Here,
there is no frustrated homicide because B did
not die due to the will of A. Further, it is not
an attempted homicide since all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony
were committed. Hence, the crime committed
is serious physical injuries only.
3. Attempted; Requisites
1. The offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts,
2. but does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony,
3. by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. (Art. 6)
1. Directly by overt acts - external acts; the act
must have direct connection to the crime
intended to be committed
1. Indeterminate offense - it is an offense
where the purpose/CRIMINAL INTENT of the
offender in performing the act is UNCERTAIN/
ambiguous. Hence, the offender will only be
convicted for the crime which has DIRECT
CONNECTION to his external act. (People v
Lamahang)
2. By reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance - all acts
of execution must not be committed because of
some cause or accident, i.e., the bullet was
dodged. If they were not committed because the
attacker spontaneously desisted, there is no
crime.
1. However, the desistance should be made
before all the acts of execution took place.
2. Example of by reason of “some cause”
1. They were unable to inflict fatal blows
was only because of the timely arrival of
neighbors who responded to the calls for
help coming from petitioner and
witnesses. (Marasigan v Fuentes, 2016,
Leonen)
3. There are crimes which do not have all the stages of execution
(non-material crimes)
1. Arson - only consummated and attempted. Why? The crime
of arson is consummated even if only a portion of the wall or
any other part of the house is burned.
2. Rape - only consummated and attempted. Why? Because
the slightest penetration or mere touching of the penis to the
labia consummates the crime of rape. (People v Sampior,
2000)
3. Corruption of public officers/Bribery - There is no
frustrated corruption or frustrated bribery because these
crimes involve concurrence of the will of the corruptor and
the public officer. Once their wills concur, the crime is
immediately consummated.
4. Estafa - there is no frustrated estafa.
5. Theft - Even if the thief was not able to freely dispose the
property stolen, the crime is already consummated when the
thief is able to take or get hold of the thing belonging to
another. Hence, there is no frustrated stage of theft
6. Robbery with violence… - The same is true for robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons.
7. Robbery with use of force… - Here, the capacity to freely
dispose is a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, there
can be frustrated robbery with use of force upon things.
8. Formal crimes - these are crimes consummated in one
instant, i.e., libel, slander, and treason
9. Crimes consummated by mere attempt or proposal or by
overt act - the offender does not have to succeed in order
to consummate the crime. Examples are corruption of minors
and flight to enemy’s country.
10. Felony by omission - there is no attempted or frustrated
stage. It is either he commits the crime or not.
5. Continuing crimes
1. This is also called a moving or transitory crime.
2. It is consummated in one place but by reason of its nature, the
violation is deemed continuing.
3. The purpose of a continuing crime is determine the proper venue
of the criminal action, validity of arrest, and commencement of
the prescriptive period.
1. For venue, the action can be filed in the court of the
municipality or city where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. Hence, in kidnapping or estafa, the action can be
filed in various places.
2. For validity of arrest, since the crime is continuing, the
offender can be arrested without a warrant because it is in
flagrante delicto.
3. For prescription, since the crime is still continuing, the period
never begins.
6. Complex crimes and composite crimes (Art. 48)
1. What are complex crimes?
1. Compound crime (delito compuesto)
1. when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies
2. Complex crime proper (delito complejo)
1. when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other
2. Effect
1. The penalty for the MOST SERIOUS CRIME shall be imposed,
to be applied in its MAXIMUM period. (Art. 48)
3. For compound crime, the proper phrase is “murder with
homicide.” For complex crime proper, it is “rape through forcible
abduction.”
4. A complex crime is only one crime, in the eyes of the law and the
conscience of the offender.(People v Hernandez)
5. It cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances due to
its complex character.
6. Notes for compound crimes
1. Light felonies produced by the same act should be treated as:
1. Separate felony; or
2. Absorbed by the grave or less grave felony.
2. Compound crime is applicable to crimes through negligence.
(People v Castro; People v Pacson)
3. Both crimes must be punished by the RPC.
4. Examples of compound crimes:
1. Single act of throwing a hand grenade/firing a shot, killing
1.
multiple people. (People v Guillen; People v Pama)
2. The act of raping a girl, causing her physical injuries
which required medical attention for about 20 days, i.e.,
rape with less serious physical injuries. (US v Andaya)
3. Stabbing a judge while hearing a case, i.e., homicide with
direct assault. (US v Montiel)
4. Stabbing a pregnant woman, i.e., abortion with homicide.
(People v Lopez)
5. Negligence - a person who accidentally discharged his
gun, killing a girl and a boy, is liable for the complex crime
of homicide through reckless imprudence. (People v
Castro)
5. Examples of NOT compound crimes
1. Light felony - A, while driving his car in a careless manner,
struck B and C. It produced injuries that required medical
attendance of 1 day. There are 2 separate counts of slight
physical injuries.
2. Light felony - A punched B, a policeman. The bruises
required a medical attendance of 1 day. There is only a
crime of direct assault, and the sight physical injuries is
absorbed.
3. Light felony - A raped B. The incident gave B injuries
which required medical attendance of 1 day. Rape absorbs
slight physical injuries herein.
4. For automatic rifles, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger, but the number of bullets produced, that
determines whether there is complex crime. Hence, a
single act of pressing its trigger, killing multiple people, is
not a complex crime. (People v Desierto)
5. When there is evidence to show the number of persons
killed by each of the several defendants, there is NO
complex crime, but separate crimes.
6. When there is evidence of conspiracy to perpetuate the
killings, there is no complex crime, because the act of one
is the act of all. (People v Elarcosa, 2010)
7. Notes for complex crime proper
1. In complex crime proper, both offenses must be punished by
the RTC.
2. “Necessary means”
1. “Necessary means” merely requires that the first crime
facilitates or insures the commission of the other crime.
(Dissenting Opinion, People v Hernandez)
2. It does not mean indispensable means. Otherwise, it
2.
becomes an integral element of the other.
3. Further, there is no complex crime proper, when one
offense is committed to CONCEAL the other.
8. Examples of complex crime proper
1. Falsification of a public document by an accountable officer
(altering the duplicate of the cedulas already issued to other
persons by erasing the names originally written thereon and
writing in their places new names) is an offense which is
necessary to commit malversation (collecting P2 from each
of them and misappropriating the amount), which is another
offense.(People v Barbas)
2. Simple seduction by means of usurpation of official functions.
(US v Hernandez)
3. Rape by means of forcible abduction
1. if the intent was to commit lewd design, but the victim
was also raped after, there is a complex crime.
2. If the intent was to kidnap, and rape was committed on
the occasion, it is special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape.
3. If the intent was to rape, rape is the crime, and forcible
abduction is absorbed.
9. Examples of NOT complex crime proper
1. RPC and special law - There can be no complex crime of
plunder through falsification of documents. Instead, there are
separate crimes.
2. RPC and special law - illegal possession of firearms cannot be
complexed with homicide. Instead, RA 10591 states that it
becomes a special aggravating circumstance.
3. Indispensable means - A, with intent to kill, burned B’s house
knowing that he is inside. The crime of arson is absorbed in
the crime of murder.
4. Conceal the other - A, after killing B, burned B’s house to
prevent discovery of DNA evidence. There are separate
crimes of homicide and arson.
5. Conceal the other - A, after misappropriating public funds,
falsified the payroll to make it appear that government
employees received their salaries where in fact, all the money
went to A.
6. Falsification of private document AND malversation/estafa -
under the Doctrine of Common element, an element used to
complete one crime cannot be legally re-used to complete the
other crime. The common element of estafa or malverstion
and falsification of private document is damage. Hence, there
is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private
document, but either of the crimes.
1. If falsification is a necessary means to commit estafa, the
crime is only falsification.
2. If falsification was used merely to conceal the estafa,bu
the crime is only estafa.
10. Special complex crimes
1. These are complex crimes as expressly provided by law
2. Examples are rape with homicide, attempted rape with
homicide, robbery with homicide, robbery with rape,
carnapping with homicide, carnapping with rape, kidnapping
with rape, and kidnapping with homicide.
11. Continued crime (delito continuado)
1. Requisites: (SOIV)
1. Several acts
2. Done in One period of time
3. Single criminal Intent or purpose
4. Single Violation of the RPC
1. Single Larceny rule- taking of several things
belonging to different or same owners at the same
time and place is but one larceny or theft. (Santiago v.
Garchitorena, December 2, 1993)
1. A thief who takes from the yard of a house two
game roosters belonging to two different persons
commits only one crime of theft. (People v De
Leon)
2. A collector of a commercial firm misappropriates
for his personal use several amounts collected by
him from different persons. There is one crime
only, because the appropriations arose from one
criminal resolution.
2. Foreknowledge Principle- in Gamboa v. CA, the
Court held that the accused cannot be held to have
entertained continuously the same criminal intent in
making the first abstraction on the first day, and the
subsequent abstractions on the following days. Why?
Because he was not possessed of any foreknowledge
of a deposit by a customer on the following day or.
Hence, he must be held liable for as many acts as
there are misappropriations.
3. KRISTEL: It was applied to the Obstruction of Justice
Law, when petitioner’s acts of allegedly preventing
Ms. Masigay from appearing and testifying in the PI
3.

and offering evidence in false affidavit were clearly

motivated by single criminal impulse in order to
realize one criminal objective which is to obstruct or
impede the PI proceedings. (Navaja v De Castro,
2015)
4. KRISTEL: Except for the example pertaining to the
theft of chickens, take the other examples with
caution because “delito continuado” is not usual in
modern decisions. Usually, they are treated as
separate crimes already.
2. A continued crime is not a complex crime
1. A continued crime is not a complex crime, because the
offender did not perform a single act, and one offense is
not a necessary means to commit the other.
2. Not being a complex crime, the penalty for continued
crime shall not be imposed in the maximum period.
2. Circumstances affecting criminal liability
1. Justifying
1. Self-defense
1. Unlawful aggression - this means actual assault or
threatened assault of an immediate or imminent kind. It does
not include mere threatening or intimidating attitude.
2. Retaliation is not self-defense because the unlawful
aggression already ceased. Hence, during the retaliation, the
unlawful aggressor is the retaliating person.
3. The unlawful aggression must come from the person who
was subsequently attacked by the accused. It must not
come from another person.
1. This is without prejudice to the proper application of
mistake of fact.
4. When the aggressor flees, unlawful aggression no longer
exists. Hence, the one making the defense has no more right
to attack the former aggressor.
5. However, if the purpose of the aggressor in retreating is to
take a more advantageous position to insure success of the
attack already begun by him, the unlawful aggression is
considered still continuing.
6. There is no unlawful aggression when there is agreement to
fight.
1. However, where there is an aggression ahead of the
stipulated time and place of the fight, there is unlawful
aggression.
7. The honest belief of the accused may be considered in
7.
determining the existence of unlawful aggression.
1. Hence, there is self-defense even if the aggressor used a
toy pistol. Why? There is unlawful aggression because of
mistake of fact.
8. Reasonable necessity of the means used to repel or
prevent it - It does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence. (People v Encomienda)
9. An attempt to rape a woman constitutes an aggression
sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense
inasmuch as the woman’s honour cannot be esteemed as a
right as precious, if not more, than her very existence.
Hence, the woman imperiled may kill her offender if that is
the only means left for her to protect her honor from so
grave an outrage. (People v Luague)
10. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself - The provocation is sufficient when it is
proportionate to the act of aggression, and adequate to stir
the aggressor in committing the act. (People v Alconga)
11. Instances when the third (3rd) requisite is present in favor of
the accused:
1. Where there is no provocation at all
2. Where there is insufficient provocation
3. Where there is sufficient provocation, but it was not given
by the person defending himself
4. Where there is sufficient provocation, and given by the
person defending himself, but it was not proximate and
immediate to the act of aggression.
1. No - Suddenly, A stabbed B, so B shot A to defend
himself.
2. Insufficient - A was the employee of B. B shouted at
A because of mediocre work. Hence, A stabbed B. As
a defense, A shot B.
3. Not COME by the person defending himself - B has
a son C. C slapped A’s face. Enraged, A stabbed B. As
a defense, B shot A.
4. Not proximate and IMMEDIATE - A slapped B. One
week later, B stabbed A, so A shot B.
12. Clear and convincing evidence
1. The prosecution must prove his guilt beyond reasonabel
doubt. However, if the accused alleged a justifying
circumstance, such as self-defense, he must show by
clear and convincing evidence all the elements of self-
1.

defense. Otherwise, conviction follows. (Mariano v

People, 2017, Leonen)
2. Defense of relative
1. Who are the relatives?
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Brothers/Sisters
5. Relatives by affinity within the same degrees; and
6. Relatives by consanguinity within the 4th civil degree
(first cousin/uncle/niece, purely by blood)
2. A stepbrother/sister is NOT a relative by consanguinity or
affinity. In fact, they can even be married.
3. The first two requisites are the same as self-defense
4. In case provocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making the defense had no part therein - this
means the relative provoked the unlawful aggressor, and the
person defending him had no part therein.
1. To illustrate, A punched B. B stabbed A. In defense of A,
his son C shot B.
2. What if in shooting B, C was motivated by revenge?
1. It is still a complete defense of relative.
3. Defense of stranger
1. Any person not included in the term “relatives” is a stranger.
2. The first two requisites are the same as self-defense.
3. The person defending is not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive
1. To illustrate, A punched B. B stabbed A. In defense of A, a
stranger X shot B. X shot B because they were also
enemies. Is there a complete defense of stranger? No,
because X was induced by revenge, or resentment when
he defended A. Hence, he is criminally liable for killing B.
2. What if A provoked the person attacked, and X had a part
therein?
1. There is still complete defense of stranger, so long as
X was not induced by revenge etc.
2. To illustrate, A and X made fun of B for being short
and stupid. Enraged, B used a bat to hit A. To defend
A, X stabbed B. Is there a complete defense of
stranger? Yes, because B was the unlawful aggressor,
there is reasonable necessity in using a knife to repel
the attack of B with a bat, and X was not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive when he
stabbed B.
4. State of necessity/Avoidance of greater evil or injury
1. Evil sought to be avoided actually exists - The evil sought
must actually exist. If it is merely expected or anticipated or
may happen in the future, this provision is not applicable.
2. Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it - The
instinct of self-preservation will always make one feel that his
own safety is of greater importance than that of another.
3. However, the injury feared should not be brought about by the
negligence/imprudence or malice of the actor-accused.
4. No other practical or less harmful means of preventing it
5. Civil liability - Here, the persons for whose benefit the harm
has been prevented, shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
5. Fulfillment of duty/Exercise of right (PINDue) - most
important is the 2nd requisite - DUE PERFORMANCE
1. Performance of duty or lawful exercise of right or office
2. Injury was caused
3. Necessary consequence of the DUE performance of duty/
right/office. (People v Oanis)
1. In Oanis, the first requisite is present because as police
officers, they were trying to capture a wanted criminal.
However, the second requisite is absent because there
was no due performance of duty. Through impatience,
over-anxiety, or in their desire to take no chances, they
exceeded their duty by killing a sleeping person whom
they believed was the criminal.
4. In fulfillment of duty, the duty of the officer requires him to
overcome his opponent. In self-defense, the private person
must merely “prevent or repel” the unlawful aggression of the
injured party.
6. Superior order
1. An order was issued by a superior
2. For some lawful purpose
3. Means to carry out the order is also lawful
1. Where the accused acted upon the orders of superior
officers which they obeyed in good faith, without being
aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on
their part, the act is not accompanied by criminal intent.
2. Why? Good faith is a defense in intentional felonies.
2. Exempting
1. Imbecile/Insane
1. In both, an imbecile or an insane person is completely
1.
deprived of intelligence while committing the act.
2. Imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal liability.
3. Insane is also exempt, unless it can be shown that he acted
during a lucid interval.
4. Insanity at the time of commission of crime compared to
insanity at the time of trial
1. When a person was insane at the time of the commission
of the felony, he is exempt from criminal liability.
2. When a person was insane ONLY at the time of the trial,
he is criminally liable. However, the trial will be suspended
until the mental capacity of the accused be restored to
afford him of a fair trial. (Rule 116)
5. Dementia praecox, is covered by the term insanity. (People v
Bonoan)
6. Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. The same is
true for kleptomania/feeblemindedness/pedophelia/amnetia.
Why? Because the accused was not completely derived of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. He
could still distinguish between right and wrong.
7. Epilepsy may be covered by the term insanity, if he suffered
the same at the time of the commission of the crime. (People
v Mancao, 1927)
8. Somnambulism or sleepwalking, where the acts of the person
afflicted are automatic, is embraced in the plea of insanity and
must be clearly proven. (People v Gimena)
9. One who was suffering from malignant malaria is covered by
insanity, because such illness affects the nervous system and
causes acute melancholia and insanity at times. (People v
Lacena)
2. 15 years old or under, at the time of the commission of the
offense
3. Over 15 years old but below 18, who acted without
discernment, at the time of the commission of the offense
1. Summary:
1. The age of absolute irresponsibility - 15 years and below
(infancy)
2. The age of conditional responsibility - 15 years and 1 day
to before 18 years
3. The age of full responsibility - 18 years of age to 70
4. The age of mitigated responsibility - 15 years and 1 day
to before 18, acting with discernment; over 70 years of
age
2. Child in conflict with the law
1. It refers to a child who is alleged as (PI), accused of
(information), or adjudged (court decision) of having
committed an offense.
3. Discernment
1. It means the capacity of the child at the time of the
commission of the offense to understand the differences
between right and wrong, and the consequences of the
wrongful act.
4. Who must prove the age of the child?
1. Any person alleging the age of the child in conflict with
the law has the burden of proving the age of such child.
Hence, the defense has to prove it.
5. Who must prove that the child acted with discernment?
1. The prosecution has the burden to prove the same.
4. Accident
1. Performing a lawful act
2. With due care
3. He causes an injury to another by accident
4. Without fault or intention of causing it
1. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual
or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
2. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand without which such other
person suffers injury. (People v Fallorina, 2004)
5. Irresistible force - (C3) - Most important is the second
requisite - COME FROM THIRD PERSON
1. Compulsion of irresistible physical force; and
2. It came from a third person, not the accused himself.
1. “Irresistible”
1. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending. Further, the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to the accused for escape. (People v
Loreno, 1984)
2. Passion or obfuscation cannot be irresistible force
because the physical force must come from “a third
person.”
6. Uncontrollable fear
1. Acted under an impulse of uncontrollable fear
2. Equal or greater injury
1. “Uncontrollable”
1. It promised an even of such gravity and imminence
that an ordinary person would have succumbed to it
uncontrollable.
2. “Fear”
1. It should be real, imminent, and reasonable, and
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear.
2. A threat of a future injury is not enough. It is not
“imminent.”
7. Fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by a
lawful or insuperable cause
1. The act is required by law to be done
2. The person fails to perform an act; and
3. His failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or
insuperable cause
3. Mitigating
1. Specific mitigating
1. This applies to a specific felony, like concealment of dishonor
in case of abortion by pregnant woman.
2. Privileged mitigating
1. RA 9344 - minority
1. The offender must be minor at the time of the commission
of the crime.
2. It will be lowered by one degree from the penalty
prescribed by law.
2. When the crime committed is NOT wholly excusable
1. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. (Art. 69)
3. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances AND no
aggravating circumstances, the court shall impose the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law. (Art. 64(5)
1. Exception: This does not apply if the penalty prescribed
by law is a single indivisible penalty. (Art. 63)
3. Ordinary mitigating
1. All the elements to justify or exempt the act are not
attendant
1. Self-defense
2. Defense of relative
3. Defense of stranger
1. If there is no unlawful aggression, there could be no
self-defense or defense of a relative/stranger,
whether complete or incomplete.
2. Further, the element lacking must be both the second
and the third one.
3. If only one is lacking, then Article 13 does not apply.
What will apply is the privileged mitigating
circumstance under Article 69.
4. State of necessity
1. If there is no evil that actually exists, there could be
no state of necessity.
2. The element lacking must be both the second and the
third one. If only one is lacking, then Article 13 does
not apply. What will apply is the privileged mitigating
circumstance under Article 69.
5. Obedience to order of superior
1. If there is no order of a superior, there could be no
obedience to order of superior.
2. The element lacking must be both the second and the
third one.
3. If only one is lacking, then Article 13 does not apply.
What will apply is the privileged mitigating
circumstance under Article 69.
6. Fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office
1. There are only two (2) requisites for this paragraph.
2. In People v Oanis, the Court applied Article 69 in
favor of the accused. It considered one of the two
requisites as constituting a “majority.”
3. Hence, the ordinary mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 1, Article 13 can never apply when the
justifying or exempting circumstance only has two
requisites. It will only be either 1) no mitigating
circumstance, or 2) privileged mitigating
circumstance.
7. Accident
1. Paragraph 1, Article 13 does not apply. The penalty
provided for such instance is specifically provided
under Article 67. The penalty in Article 67 is the same
as that in Article 365.
8. Uncontrollable fear
1. This only has two (2) requisites.
2. Hence, the principles under fulfillment of duty apply
herein.
2. Over 70 years old (minority is privileged now)
3. No intent to commit so grave a wrong
1. This is highly related to Article 4(1) of the RPC.
2. However, this applies only to result exceeds the intent
(praeter intentionem). It does not apply to mistake in the
identity and mistake in the blow.
3. This provision does not apply to culpable felonies
because of the phrase “no intention.”
4. In the same way, this provision does not apply to felonies
where intention is immaterial. An example is unintentional
abortion under Article 257 of RPC.
5. This paragraph applies to Malversation of Public Funds.
(Perez v People, 2008)
1. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of
the funds misappropriated may be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to
voluntary surrender. (People v Lumauig, 2014)
2. It can also be considered as having no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Perez v
People, 2008)
4. Sufficient provocation by the offended party
1. Provocation or threat must be sufficient
2. It must come from the offended party
3. It must immediately precede the criminal act
1. “Sufficient”
1. It means adequate to excite/stir a person to
commit the wrong and must accordingly be
proportionate to its gravity. (People v Nabora)
2. Vague threats are not sufficient
2. The threat should not be offensive and positively
strong, because, if it is, the threat becomes an
unlawful aggression which may give rise to complete
self-defense. (US v Guysayco)
3. Provocation or threat must come from the offended
party. (People v Reyes, 1976)
4. Provocation must be immediate to the commission of
the crime
1. Between the provocation by the offended party
and the commission of the crime by the person
provoked, there should NOT BE ANY INTERVAL
OF TIME.
5. Distinguish the provocation under paragraph 4, Art.
12 and provocation in incomplete self-defense under
paragraph 1, Art. 11
1. Paragraph 4 - the provocation originates from the
injured party; if the provocation is offensive and
positively strong, it can be unlawful aggression.
2. Paragraph 1 - the provocation originates from the
accused himself
5. Immediate vindication from a grave offense
1. A lapse of time is allowed between the grave offense and
the vindication
1. The word “immediate” in the English text is not the
correct translation. The Spanish text uses “proxima”
or proximate. Hence, an interval of time is allowed.
1. Hence, the killing of the paramour by the husband
one day after the adultery was still deemed
“proximate.”
2. Further, although the grave offense (the slapping by
the deceased of the accused), was not so immediate,
it was held that the influence thereof lasted until the
moment the crime was committed. (People v Parana)
3. “Grave offense” does not mean those crimes, to
which the law attaches penalties, which in any of their
periods are afflictive.
4. What is “grave” must be decided by the court, having
in mind the social status of the person, the place,
and the time when the insult was made.
1. A slap on the fact can be considered as “grave
offense.”
2. Where the injured party had insulted the father of
the accused by contemptuously telling him:
“Phse, ichura mong lalake,” the accused who
attacked the injured party acted in vindication fo
a grave offense to his father.
3. Taking into account that the American forces has
just occupied Manila, it is not strange that the
accused should have considered it then as a
grave offense when the offended party said: “You
are a Japanese spy.” (People v Luna)
5. Differentiate sufficient provocation and immediate
vindication from a grave offense
Sufficient provocation Immediate vindication of a grave
offense
The provocation must be ONLY made The grave offense may be made to the
to the person committing the felony person committing the felony, his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, his
Sufficient provocation Immediate vindication of a grave
offense
The provocation must be ONLY made The grave offense may be made to the
to the person committing the felony person committing the felony, his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, his
siblings, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees.
The provocation need not be a grave The cause that brought about the
offense commission of the felony must be a
grave offense
The felonious act must be IMMEDIATE It may be “proximate,” which admits
to the provocation. There must be NO an interval of time between the grave
interval of time. offense and the commission of the
felony.
The reason is due to the severity of the
grave offense, the law provides him a
longer time to recover his serenity.
6. Impulse so powerful as naturally produce passion or
obfuscation
1. Elements: (URLC)
1. There must be an act, both unlawful and sufficient,
to produce such condition of the mind; and
2. The act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
(People v Alanguilang)
3. Passion or obfuscation may constitute a mitigating
circumstance only when the same arose from lawful
sentiments.
4. The cause producing passion or obfuscation must
come from the offended party.
1. For passion/obfuscation, it need not be felt
seconds before the commission of the crime. It
can strengthen over time until it can no longer be
repressed. (People v Oloverio, Leonen)
7. Voluntary surrender/Voluntary confession of guilt
1. Voluntary surrender
1. The offender was not actually arrested;
2. The offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to the latter’s agent; and
3. The surrender was voluntary/spontaneous.
1. “Voluntary”
1. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated,
1.
the same must be spontaneous in such a
manner that it shows interest of the accused
to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities. (People v Gervacio, 1968; Bacerra
v People, Leonen)
2. The word “spontaneous” emphasizes the idea
of an inner impulse acting without external
stimulus.
3. The fact that the order of arrest had already
been issued is no bar to the consideration of
the circumstances because the law does not
require that the surrender be prior to the
order of arrest. (Rivera v. Court of Appeals,
2000)
4. It merely requires that he was not actually
arrested before the surrender.
5. As long as the warrant of arrest was not
served, the accused can still voluntarily
surrender to a PIA/his agent. (Bacerra v
People, Leonen)
2. “Himself”
1. The law requires that the offender must have
voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority.
2. Surrender of weapons cannot be equated
with voluntarily surrendering himself.
3. Further, merely reporting the incident is not
voluntarily surrendering himself.
3. “Person in authority” or “his agent”
1. They are defined under Art. 152.
2. Surrender done to a barangay tanod is
surrender to an agent of a person in authority.
A tanod is an agent of the barangay chairman.
4. The surrender must be by reason of the
commission of the crime for which the defendant
is prosecuted. (People v Semañada, 1958)
2. Voluntary confession of guilt
1. The offender voluntary/spontaneously confessed
his guilt
2. It was made in open court; and
3. It was made prior to the presentation of evidence
for the prosecution. (People v Crisostomo, 1988)
1. “Spontaneously”
1. A conditional plea of guilty is not a mitigating
circumstance.
2. Offer of plea of guilty to a lesser offense than
that charged, not mitigating
2. “Open court”
1. An extrajudicial confession made by the
accused is not the voluntary confession
contemplated by this provision. It must be a
JUDICIAL confession.
2. Further, plea of guilty during preliminary
investigation is not the voluntary confession
contemplated by this provision. It must be in
“open court.”
3. “Prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution”
1. This simply means that the confession must
be done before the trial begins. It may be
done during pre-trial, arraignment, or even
after the filing of information against him.
4. Plea of guilty is not mitigating in culpable felonies
and in crimes punished by special laws.
1. In the imposition of the penalties prescribed
for offenses committed through imprudence
and negligence, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. (People v. Agito, 1958)
2. Art. 10 states that the RPC does not apply to
special laws.
8. Deaf and dumb, blind, suffering from physical defect
1. If he is educated, a deaf-mute must show that the
physical defect restricts his means of action,
communication, or defense with his fellow beings.
“Educated” means he is not dumb. However, not being
educated does not mean he is already dumb.
2. Blind means total blindness of both eyes. If he can see
from one eye, then he must show that the physical defect
restricts his means of action, communication, or defense
with his fellow beings.
9. Illness diminishes will-power, without depriving
consciousness of acts
1. Illness
2. Diminish will-power
3. Without depriving consciousness of acts
4. Examples of this “illness”:
1. Feeblemindedness
2. Down syndrome
3. Autism
4. Schizophrenia
5. Acute neurosis
6. The mistaken belief of the accused that he killing of a
witch was for the public good may be considered a
mitigating circumstance for the reason that those who
have obsession that witches are to be eliminated are
in the same condition as one who, attacked with a
morbid infinity but still retaining consciousness of his
acts, does not have real control over his will.
10. Other circumstances of a similar nature or analogous
1. Over 60 years old with failing sight analogous to over 70
years old
2. Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom
analogous to vindication of grave offense to a relative
3. Outraged feeling of creditor, analogous to passion or
obfuscation
4. Impulse of jealous feeling, analogous to passion or
obfuscation
5. Manifestations of Battered Woman Syndrome, analogous
to an illness that diminishes the exercise of will-power
without depriving of consciousness of acts
6. Esprit de corps, analogous to passion or obfuscation
7. Voluntary restitution of stolen property, analogous to
voluntary surrender
8. Extreme poverty and necessity, analogous to incomplete
justification based on state of necessity
9. Testifying for the prosecution, analogous to plea of
guilty
10. Restitution in malversation case is only a mitigating
circumstance. It is a voluntary surrender under
paragraph 7, Article 13. (Perez v People, 2008); It may
also be the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed.
11. It seems that ALL mitigating circumstances are personal to
the offenders. (Reyes)
4. Aggravating
1. Four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstance
1. Generic - those than can generally apply to all crimes
2. Specific - those that are applicable only to particular crimes
3. Qualified - those that change the nature of the crime
4. Inherent - those that must of necessity accompany the
commission of the crime
2. Aggravating circumstances not alleged
1. If they are not alleged, whether qualifying or aggravating, they
shall not be considered to increase the criminal liability of the
accused. Otherwise, his right to be informed of the cause and
nature of accusation against him will be violated.
2. However, they can be considered as bases for the award of
exemplary damages, conformably to current
jurisprudence
3. Generic (Art. 14)
1. Advantage be taken of his public position
1. The public officer must use the influence, prestige, or
ascendancy which his office gives him, as the means to
realize the crime.
2. Further, it must be his position, not the position of another
person, such as his spouse who is also a public officer.
3. It is not aggravating if the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his public
position. An illustration is A, a boss in the Register of
Deeds, shot B. There is no aggravating circumstance
under paragraph 1.
4. Also, it is not aggravating when it is an integral element of
or inherent in the offense, such as in:
1. Malversation
2. Falsification of document
3. Accessories under Art. 19
4. Crimes committed by public officers
5. Wearing a civilian uniform does not prevent the
application of paragraph 1 against the offender, if the
offended party was aware that he is a policeman or a
public officer.
6. Advantage be taken of public position cannot be offset by
ordinary mitigating circumstances
1. When in the commission of the crime, advantage was
taken by the offender of his public position, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum
regardless of mitigating circumstances. (Article 62,
Paragraph 1(a))
2. In contempt of or with insult to public authorities
1. Requisites: (ENKO)
1. The public authority is Engaged in the exercise of his
functions
2. Such public authority is NOT the person against
whom the crime was committed (People v Siojo)
3. Knowledge that he is a public authority but his
presence did not prevent the offender from
committing the crime
4. It was committed Outside his office
2. Public authority is defined under Art. 152
3. This is not applicable when the crime is committed in the
presence of an agent only, i.e., chief of police (People v
Sioco)
4. If it was committed in the office of the public authority,
the aggravating circumstance is “the crime was
committed where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties.”
3. Insult or disregard to the respect due to rank/age/sex, or
in the dwelling of the offended party, without
provocation
1. This paragraph only has 1 aggravating circumstance.
2. Insult or disregard
1. This means, it is necessary to prove that in the
commission of the crime, the accused DELIBERATELY
INTENDED to offend or insult the sex, age, or rank of
the offended party. (People v Mangsant)
3. Rank, age, sex
1. “Rank” - there must be a difference in the social
condition of the offender and offended party.
2. “Age” - when the offended party could have been the
father of the offender already. It also applies when the
victim is of tender age.
3. “Sex” - this refers to the female sex, not the male sex.
1. However, if “rank” is an essential element of the
crime, such as direct assault, “rank” does not
apply. It is inherent to the crime.
2. Further, when the condition of being a woman is
indispensable in the commission of the crime, sex
is not aggravating. The examples are 1) parricide,
2) rape, 3) abduction, and 4) seduction.
3. Lastly, age and sex are absorbed in treachery.
4. “Dwelling”
1. Dwelling means a building or structure, EXCLUSIVELY
used for rest and comfort. A combination of house
1.

and store (Chinese way) or a market stall where the

victim slept is not a dwelling.
2. Dwelling includes 1) the dependencies, 2) the foot of
the staircase, and 3) the enclosure under the house.
(US v Tapan)
1. Hence, when the deceased was only about to
step on the first rung of the ladder when he was
assaulted, the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling will not be applicable. (People v
Sespeñe)
3. Further, dwelling was considered aggravating even if
it is “temporary dwelling.” (People v Badilla, 1990)
4. A room can also constitute as “dwelling.” In a case, it
was appreciated when the victim was raped in the
boarding house where she was a bedspacer. (People
v Daniel, 1978)
5. “If the latter has not given provocation”
1. Requisites:
1. Given by the owner of the dwelling
2. Sufficient provocation; and
3. Immediate to the commission of the crime.
6. Even if the offender did not enter the dwelling, the
circumstance applies
1. It is not necessary that the accused enters the
dwelling. It is enough that the victim was inside the
house when attacked, i.e., the triggerman man fired a
shot from outside, and the victim was inside. (People
v Ompaid, 1969)
7. Even if the killing took place outside the dwelling, it is
aggravating if that the commission of the crime began in
the dwelling
8. When the deceased had two houses where he used to
live, the commission of the crime in any of them is
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
9. Dwelling is aggravating in abduction or illegal detention.
10. Treachery does not include dwelling.
11. It is NOT aggravating:
1. When both the offender and the offended party are
occupants of the same house, and this is true even
if the offender is a servant of the house (People v
Caliso)
2. In trespass to dwelling, dwelling is not aggravating
because it is inherent in the crime.
3. When the robbery is committed by use of force upon
things, dwelling is not aggravating because it is an
essential element of the crime. It is inherent.
4. However, it is aggravating if the robbery is with
violence against or intimidation of persons because
this crime may be committed without trespassing the
sanctity of the offended party’s house.
5. Further, it is aggravating in robbery with homicide
because this could be accomplished without violating
the dwelling of the victim. (People v Mesias, 1991)
4. Abuse of confidence/obvious ungratefulness
1. Abuse of confidence; Requisites
1. The offended party had trusted the offender;
2. The offender abused such trust by committing a
crime against the offended party; and
3. The abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of
the crime. (People v Zea, 1984)
4. The confidence must be immediate and personal
between the offender and offended party
1. Abuse of confidence inherent in some felonies:
1. Malversation of public funds or property;
2. Qualified theft;
3. Estafa by conversion or misappropriation; and
4. Qualified seduction.
2. Obvious ungratefulness
1. It must be obvious/manifest/clear.
2. It is present in the case of the accused who killed his
father-in-law in whose house he lived in and who
partially supported him. (People v Floresca, 1956)
3. So can the same be said if the child killed the father?
1. Yes. It will be on top of alternative circumstances
of relationship - Article 15. In Floresca, it is
deemed on top.
4. The circumstance was present where a security guard
killed a bank officer and robbed the bank.
5. The circumstance exists when a visitor commits
robbery or theft in the house of his host.
5. In the palace of CE/in his presence/where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties/
place dedicated to religious worship
1. Chief executive
1. The Chief Executive need not be in Malacañang
palace. His presence ALONE in any place where the
1.

crime is committed is enough to constitute an

aggravating circumstance. This is also present even if
he is NOT engaged in the discharge of his duties in
the place where the crime is committed.
2. What if the offender committed the crime in the
Palace of the Chief Executive, and in the presence of
the Chief Executive? Would those constitute two (2)
aggravating circumstances?
1. Yes, because the circumstances under paragraph
5 are separate and distinct from each other.
2. Where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties
1. But as regards the place where the public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties, there
must be some form of public functions.
2. If the crime is committed in the office but after office
hours, it is not an aggravating circumstance under
paragraph 5.
3. Place dedicated to religious worship
1. Cemeteries are not such a place, however respect
they may be, as they are not dedicated to the worship
of God. The church is a place dedicated to religious
worship.
4. For the three (3) places in paragraph 5, the offender must
have intention to commit the crime when he entered the
place
1. In the case of People v Jaurigue, the aggravating
circumstance under paragraph 5 (religious worship)
was not appreciated because she did not intend to kill
the deceased when she entered the church. In the
words of the Court, there is no evidence to show that
she had “murder in her heart” when she entered the
chapel on that fatal night.
6. Nighttime/uninhabited place/band, when it facilitated
the commission of crime
1. There are three (3) aggravating circumstances in this
paragraph. They are separate and distinct from each
other.
2. “Whenever such circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the felony”
1. They must facilitate the commission of the crime
2. They must be especially sought for by the offender;
or
3. The offender took advantage of the same for
purposes of impunity/escape.
1. Hence, a stabbing during the night in a well-lit
mall is NOT covered by “nighttime.”
2. Further, there is no “band” in a gang war, because
both gangs are equally armed.
3. Nighttime
1. Nights are from sunset to sunrise. (Article 13, Civil
Code)
2. Nighttime is not aggravating when the crime began at
daytime
1. When the crime was the result of a succession of
acts which took place within the period of two
hours, commencing at 5PM and ending at 7PM,
without a moment’s interruption, there is no
aggravating circumstance of nighttime. (People v
Luchico)
2. Hence, the crime must be commenced during the
nighttime.
3. The offense must be actually committed in the
darkness of the night.
1. If the crime was committed in a well-lit place,
there is no “nighttime.”
2. However, the lighting of matchstick or use of
flashlights does not negate the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime.
4. Uninhabited place
1. An uninhabited place is one where there are no
houses at all, a place at a considerable distance from
town, or where the houses are scattered at a great
distance from each other.
5. Band
1. Whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors
shall have acted together for the commission of a
felony, it shall be deemed to have been committed by
a band.
1. “Stone” is included in “arms.”
2. “More than three armed malefactors” - this
means at least four persons are armed. If three
were armed and one was not armed, there is no
band.
3. All the armed men must take a direct part in the
crime. There is no band if one of them is merely a
3.

principal by inducement.
2. Abuse of superior strength, Aid of armed men, and
use of firearms are absorbed by a band.
3. Band is inherent in brigandage.
4. Band is NOT applicable to crimes against chastity.
5. Band is aggravating in crimes against property or
against persons or in the crime of illegal detention or
treason.
6. A crime committed by an organized/syndicate crime
group is also an aggravating circumstance. Further, it
cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstances. (Art. 62)
7. Aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity
1. Aid of armed men
1. The armed men were accomplices in the commission
of the crime, directly or indirectly; and
2. The accused availed himself of their aid or relied
upon them when the crime was committed.
1. “Armed men” contemplates at least two (2) armed
men who aided the offender.
2. If the armed men were co-principals/conspirators
to the crime, it is not “with aid.” Hence, it is not
covered by this paragraph.
3. Aid of armed men is absorbed by band.
8. Recidivist
1. Will be discussed later.
9. Reiteration
1. Will be discussed later.
10. In consideration of price, reward, or promise
1. This aggravating circumstance presupposes the
concurrence of two (2) or more offenders
2. Hence, this applies to BOTH the principal by inducement
and the principal by direct participation.
3. Price, reward, or promise must be for the purpose of
inducing another to perform the deed.
1. Why? It must be “in consideration of” the same.
4. If there was no promise and it was given voluntarily AFTER
the commission of the crime as an expression of his
appreciation, it is not covered by Paragraph 11.
11. On occasion of conflagration/shipwreck/earthquake/
epidemic/other calamity or misfortune
1. “Conflagration” - a fire which destroys a great deal of
1.
land or property
2. “Other calamity or misfortune” - includes destructive
typhoon.
3. The offender must take advantage of the calamity or
misfortune
1. If the accused was provoked by the offended party to
commit the crime during a calamity or misfortune, this
aggravating circumstance may not be taken into
consideration.
4. Is the COVID-19 pandemic covered by this circumstance?
1. Yes. Britannica dictionary defines pandemic as an
outbreak of infectious disease that occurs over a wide
geographical area. On the other hand, an epidemic is
one that is merely confined in one region. Hence,
when a person takes advantage of the lockdowns
during the Covid-19 pandemic, his criminal liability
shall be aggravated by this paragraph.
5. Chaotic condition and engine trouble are not covered by
this paragraph, because of the latin maxim “ejusdem
generis.”
12. By means of inundation/fire/poison/explosion/stranding
of a vessel/derailment of locomotive/use of artifice
involving great waste and ruin
1. “By means of”
1. The above circumstances must be used by the
offender as a means to accomplish the crime.
2. As example, if the offender burned the house to
remove his DNA in the crime scene, Paragraph 12 is
not applicable because “fire” was used as a means to
escape from criminal liability, and not as a means to
commit the crime. He cannot commit a crime that was
consummated already.
2. “Inundation”
1. Inundation means to drown a person in water.
3. “Fire”
1. This is inherent in the crime of arson, whether
destructive or plain. Hence, it does not aggravate the
crime.
2. The following are instances:
1. If the offender had no intent to kill, but somebody
dies as a result of the fire he started, the crime is
simply arson. “Fire” is inherent in this crime.
2. If the offender killed a person, and to escape from
2.
criminal liability, he burned down the house where
the killing took place, two crimes were committed:
1) homicide or murder, and 2) arson. Again, “fire”
is inherent in arson. Further, it is not a qualifying
circumstance for murder because “fire” was used,
not as a means to commit the crime, but as a
means to escape from criminal liability.
3. However, it the accused had intent to kill, and he
killed the victim by means of “fire”, it will qualify
the crime to murder as provided under Article
248.
4. “Poison”
1. Self-explanatory.
2. Poison is absorbed by treachery/.
5. “Explosion”
1. If a man throws a hand grenade where a family of
seven persons lives, the crime may either be 1) crime
involving destruction (Article 324) or 2) murder
(Article 248). The difference lies on whether or not
the offender had intent to kill. For Article 324, it is
inherent. For Article 248, it is a qualifying
circumstance.
6. “Stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto”
1. This is inherent in the crime of piracy. Hence, it does
not aggravate such crime.
7. “Derailment of locomotive”
1. What crime is committed if as a result of the
derailment of cars, only property is damaged? It is
damage to means of communication under Article
330
2. What crime is committed if the death of a person also
results without intent to kill on the part of the
offender? It is a complex crime of damage to means
of communication with homicide. (Articles 330 and
249, as related to Articles 4 and 48)
3. What crime is committed, if the death of a person
resulted and there was intent to kill on the part of the
offender? It is murder because it is one of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 248.
4. In all of these cases, the aggravating circumstances
of “derailment of locomotive” shall not aggravate the
crime, because it is an essential ingredient of the
crime.
13. With the aid of persons under 15, or by means of motor
vehicles/watercrafts/airships/other similar means
1. “With the aid”
1. It means the offender availed of the help of a person
under 15 years of age to commit the crime.
2. “By means of”
1. If the motor vehicle was used only in facilitating the
escape, it should not be an aggravating circumstance.
2. They must be used as a means to commit the crime
and not as a means to escape.
3. Estafa, which is committed by means of deceit or
abuse of confidence, cannot be committed by means
of motor vehicle
4. Examples of crimes committed by means of motor
vehicle:
1. A “riding-in-tandem” is a good example of
Paragraph 20. The motor vehicle was used as a
means to commit the crime, and incidentally, to
escape.
2. A, with the help of B and with lewd designs,
forcibly took and carried away a woman be means
of an automobile to another town. The crime is
forcible abduction.
3. When the accused stabbed and inflicted upon his
girlfriend mortal wounds which caused her death,
while they where in a taxi which was hired and
used by him, the aggravating circumstance of by
means of motor vehicle was present. (People v
Marasigan)
4. Even if the victims rode voluntarily in the jeepney,
since they were lured and taken to the place
where they were killed, the use of motor vehicles
was considered aggravating. (People v De la
Cruz)
3. “Or other similar means”
1. The latin maxim “ejusdem generis” is applicable
herein.
2. It should be understood as referring to “motorized”
vehicles or other efficient means of transportation
similar to automobile or airplane.
3. Hence, a bicycle is not covered by Paragraph 20
because it is not similar to a “motorized vehicle.”
4. A motorcycle, however, is covered by “similar means”
4.
as it is a “motorized” vehicle.
14. Evident premeditation
1. COMMENT: Based on countless cases you’ve read, the
Supreme Court usually finds that there is NO evident
premeditation. Hence, as a general rule, there is NO
evident premeditation. It will only be present if the facts
are clearly detailed and specified as to show evident
premeditation.
2. The requisites are: (TAL)
1. The Time when the offender determined to commit
the crime;
2. An Act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung
to his determination; and
3. A sufficient Lapse of time between the determination
and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act, and to allow his conscience
to overcome the resolution of his will. (People v
Lagarto, 1991)
3. For the first requisite, the DATE AND TIME when the
offender determined to commit the crime, under the first
requisite, are ESSENTIAL.
4. For the second requisite, the premeditation must be
based on EXTERNAL ACTS, and not presumed merely
from lapse of time.
5. For the third requisite, what is sufficient lapse of time?
1. It differs from case-to-case. However, the Court
ruled that three (3) hours or less considered sufficient
lapse of time.
6. Facts regarding "how and when the plan to kill was
hatched" are indispensable. The requirement of
deliberate planning should not be based merely on
inferences and presumptions but on clear evidence.
(People v Ordona, 2017, Leonen)
7. Conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation.
However, when conspiracy is only implied, evident
premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of
proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was
hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried
out.
8. Evident premeditation and price or reward can co-exist
with respect to the principal by direct participation. It is
absorbed by reward or promise for the principal by
inducement. (US v Manalinde)
9. When the offender decided to kill a particular person
and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he
carried out his plan, he actually killed another person,
it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the
killing of the victim. Art. 4(1) is opposite from evident
premeditation. (People v Ordina, 2017, Leonen)
10. But if the offender premeditated on the killing of any
person, it is proper to consider the aggravating
circumstance of premeditation, because whoever is
killed by him is contemplated in his premeditation.
11. Evident premeditation, while inherent in robbery, may be
aggravating in robbery with homicide if the
premeditation included the killing of the victim. (People v
Pagal, 1977)
1. Why? Because killing is not always premeditated.
15. Craft/fraud/disguise
1. “Craft” - means intellectual trickery or cunning on the
part of the offender
2. “Fraud” - means insidious words or machinations were
used to induce the victim to act in a manner which would
enable the offender to carry out his design
3. “Disguise” - means the offender resorted to any device to
conceal his identity.
1. However, if in spite of the use of handkerchief to
cover their faces, the culprits were still recognized by
the victim, disguise was NOT considered aggravating.
(People v Sonsona, 1956)
2. Further, when clothing is worn not to conceal his
identity, but as part of custom/tradition of the
country, it is not “disguise.”
16. Abuse of superior strength/Means employed to weaken
the defense
1. “Advantage be taken of superior strength”
1. To “take advantage of superior strength” means to
“purposely use excessive force out of proportion”
to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. (People v Cabiling, 1976)
2. Band is absorbed by “superior strength.”
2. “Means to weaken the defense”
1. The following are illustrations: 1) throwing a cloak over
the head of the victim before he was killed, 2) casting
sand or dirt upon the eyes of the victim before he was
killed, and 3) intoxicating the victim before he was
1.

killed.
2. However, if the intoxication is such that the victim
cannot put up any sort of defense, it is already
“treachery.”
3. These are applicable only to crimes against persons, and
sometimes against crimes against person and property,
such as robbery with homicide.
4. Superior strength, and means to weaken the defense are
absorbed in treachery.
17. Treachery
1. Requisites:
1. Offender commits any of the crimes against
persons,
2. Employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof
3. Which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution; and
4. Without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
5. The means of execution was deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender. (People v
Orozco, Leonen)
2. Applicable only to crimes against persons
1. Hence, it does not apply to robbery with homicide
(crimes against property).However, it applies to rape.
3. Employing means, methods, or form in the execution
thereof
1. Hence, the mode of attack must be consciously
adopted.
4. Which tend to directly and specially insure its execution
1. Hence, it need not insure accomplishment of the
crime.
2. The means must only insure its execution.
5. Without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make
1. Hence, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself.
6. “The means of execution was deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender”
1. In treachery, there must be WITHOUT the slightest
PROVOCATION on the part of the victim. (People v
Magallano, Leonen)
2. Why? If there was, there is no deliberate/conscious
2.
adoption of the crime.
3. Further, unexpectedness of the attack does not
always equate to treachery. (Cirera v People, Leonen)
4. Why? Because the attack may not be deliberately or
consciously adopted.
7. There is treachery in the killing of a child
1. Killing of a child is characterized by treachery
because the weakness of the victim due to his tender
age results in the absence of any danger to the
accused. Hence, the killing is murder even if the
manner of attack was not shown.
8. Intent to kill is not necessary in murder with treachery
1. An example is a man who struck another with his fist
from behind, the blow landing on the back part of his
head, causing the latter to fall and hit his head on the
pavement, causing his death.
2. Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is murder
qualified by treachery, because criminal liability is
incurred although the wrongful act be different from
that which he intended. (Art. 4)
3. Further, the mitigating circumstance of “the offender
had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed” shall be disregarded because murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty.
9. Further, it makes no difference whether or not the victim
was the same person whom the accused intended to kill
1. Why? Because of Art. 4.
10. Treachery may exist even if the attack is face to face
1. KRISTEL: In the case of People v Samuya, it was
held that when the attack against the victim is so
sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of
what assailant was about to do, there is treachery.
Frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery
so long as it was sudden and unexpected that the
deceased had no time to prepare for his defense.
11. Attack from behind is not always treachery
1. The mere fact that the attack was inflicted when the
victim had his back turned will not in itself constitute
treachery. It must appear that such mode of attack
was consciously adopted and the question of risk to
the offender must be taken into account. (People v
Baldos)
12. Must treachery be present at the beginning of the
assault?
1. When the aggression is continuous, treachery must
be present at the beginning of the assault. (People v
Cañete)
2. When the assault was not continuous, in that there
was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was
present at the moment the fatal blow was given. (US v
Baluyot)
13. When treachery is not to be considered as to the
principal by inducement
1. When it is not shown that the principal by induction
directed or induced the killer of the deceased to
adopt the means, or methods actually used by the
latter in accomplishing the murder, because the
former left to the latter the details as to how it was to
be accomplished, treachery cannot be taken into
consideration as to the principal by induction. It shall
aggravate the liability of the actual killer only. (US v
Gamao; Art. 62(4))
14. When there is conspiracy, treachery is considered
against all persons participating or cooperating in the
perpetration of the crime.
1. COMMENT: Hence, in a conspiracy, treachery is
considered against those who are cooperating or
directly participating. However, for the principal by
induction, sometimes called as the mastermind of the
crime, he should have knowledge of the employment
of treachery as the means to commit the crime.
Otherwise, treachery shall not be considered against
him.
15. Treachery, abuse of superior strength, and means
employed to weaken the defense, distinguished
1. T - it makes it impossible for the offended party to put
up defense
2. A - he only takes advantage of his superior strength
3. W - he only material weakens the resisting power of
the offended party
16. The following circumstances are absorbed by treachery:
1. Abuse of superior strength,
2. Means employed to weaken the defense
3. Aid of armed men
4. By a band
5. Nighttime
6. Craft
7. Fraud
8. Disguise
9. Age
10. Sex
11. Poison
17. However, treachery, evident premeditation, and use of
superior strength are inherent in treason by killings.
18. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion or obfuscation
18. Ignominy
1. The means employed or the circumstances brought about
must tend to make the effects of the crime “more
humiliating” or “to put the offended party to shame.”
2. Instances of ignominy:
1. Where one rapes a married woman in the presence of
her husband, there is ignominy.
2. However, where the rape of the wife was not
perpetrated in the presence or with the knowledge of
the husband or where the rape was committed AFTER
the husband was killed, there is no “ignominy.”
3. Where the accused not only did the missionary
position, but also the dog style position of sexual
intercourse.
4. Rape as ignominy in robbery with homicide - Rape
committed on the occasion of robbery with homicide
increases the moral evil of the crime. (People v
Tapales, 1979)
19. Cruelty
1. Cruelty, defined
1. There is cruelty when the culprit ENJOYS AND
DELIGHTS in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him unnecessary PHYSICAL PAIN in
the consummation of the criminal act. (People v
Dayug)
2. Requisites:
1. The injury caused (wrong done) be deliberately
augmented by causing a wrong; and
2. That is not necessary for its commission.
3. The following are instances of cruelty under Paragraph 21:
1. When the mouth of child was burned before he was
killed; and
2. When the victim’s eye was extracted and stuffing his
2.
mouth with mud before he was killed
4. Plurality of wounds alone does not show cruelty
1. The prosecution must show beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused deliberately and inhumanly
increased the physical suffering of the victim. (People
v Lacao, 1974)
5. No cruelty when other wrong was done AFTER the victim
was dead
1. An illustration is as follows: A shot B in his dead. B
was dead on the spot. Afterwards, A chopped up B’s
body. This is not an aggravating circumstance of
cruelty.
6. Ignominy distinguished from cruelty
1. I - moral suffering. It adds disgrace and obloquy to
the suffering of the victim
2. C - physical suffering. It adds unnecessary physical
pain to the commission of the crime.
7. To repeat, rape is an aggravating circumstance under
ignominy and cruelty for the crime of robbery with
homicide.
8. Also, rapes, robbery, and other forms of cruelties are
aggravating circumstances under ignominy and cruelty for
the crime of treason.
20. Unlawful entry
1. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected
in a way not intended for the purpose.
2. “Entrance is effected”
1. Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance
and NOT to escape.
2. Hence, it escape was effected through the window, it
is not aggravating.
3. To be aggravating, the entrance must be made
through the window.
3. “Not intended for the purpose”
1. Hence, if entrance was effected through the door, it is
not aggravating.
4. How is Paragraph 18 related to robbery; theft
1. If the crime is robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons, Paragraph 18 is applicable
because it is not inherent in the crime. The same is
true for robbery with homicide. The same is true for
theft.
2. However, if the crime is robbery with force upon
2.
things, paragraph 18 is not applicable because it is
inherent in the crime.
5. Unlawful entry is not aggravating in trespass to dwelling
1. The reason is unlawful entry is inherent in the crime of
trespass to dwelling.
6. Dwelling and unlawful entry are taken separately
1. When the accused gained access to the dwelling of
the victim by entering through the window, and once
inside, murdered certain persons in the dwelling,
there were two (2) aggravating circumstances which
attended the commission of the crime - dwelling and
unlawful entry. (People v Barruga)
2. Why? Because unlawful entry and dwelling are
separate from each other. Unlawful entry can even be
made in a commercial building.
21. Wall, floor, door, roof, window be broken
1. This is also called “Forcible entry.” The one in Paragraph
18 is called “unlawful entry.”
2. “As a means to commit the crime”
1. Further, the provision states “as a means to commit
the crime.” Hence, it is only aggravating when the
offender broke something to enter the house, in order
to commit the crime. If it was broken to get out of the
place, it is not aggravating.
3. “Wall, floor, door, roof, window be broken”
1. The provision does not require an entry by the
offender.
2. It only requires that there must be something broken.
3. Hence, when the window is broken so the thief can
reach the wallet of the offended party, the crime of
theft is aggravated by paragraph 19.
4. How if Paragraph 19 related to robbery; theft; trespass to
dwelling
1. Just like paragraph 18, it is inherent in robbery with
force upon things, and trespass to dwelling.
2. It is aggravating for theft and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons
5. QUESTION: If the entrance was effected by breaking a
window, would it constitute two (2) aggravating
circumstances? No. There is only one (1) aggravating
circumstance and such is covered by Paragraph 19.
22. Organized/syndicated crime group
1. The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
1.
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/
syndicated crime group.
2. It means a group of two or more persons confederating,
collaborating, or mutually helping one another for the
purposes of gain in the commission of ANY crime. (Art.
62, paragraph 1(b))
1. Hence, it cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstances.
5. Alternative
1. Definition
1. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the
nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission. (Art. 15)
2. Relationship
1. It shall be taken into consideration when the offended party
is:
1. The spouse
2. The ascendant
3. The descendant
4. Adopted, natural, or legitimate brother or sister; or
5. Relative by affinity within the same degree of the
offender.
1. However, a stepbrother, stepson, or stepmother is
included by analogy by the Court, as it is similar to
those specifically enumerated by the Code. (People v
Bersabal)
2. Relationship is neither mitigating or aggravating when
relationship is an element of the felony.
1. Examples are Parricide, adultery, concubinage, and
abortion with respect to the mother and the parents of the
mother.
3. Relationship is ALWAYS aggravating for crimes against
chastity and RAPE
1. The reason is it is shocking to our moral senses when we
hear such kind of crime.
4. Relationship is mitigating in crimes against property
1. Under Article 332, there is no crime from the commission
of crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed by: 1) the spouse, 2) ascendants,
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line and
3) brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law, if living together.
2. Hence, by analogy to Article 332, relationship is
mitigating in crimes of robbery, usurpation, fraudulent
insolvency, and arson, even though they are not
absolutory causes.
5. Relationship is mitigating in trespass to dwelling
6. Relationship in crimes against persons
1. If the offended party is a relative of a higher degree
(ascendant of the offender) or of equal degree (brother,
and spouse)
1. It is aggravating for ALL of the crime against persons,
including slight physical injuries. However, if the crime
is parricide, it is inherent.
2. If the offended party is a relative of a lower degree
(descendant of the offender)
1. The relationship can be a mitigating circumstance, an
aggravating circumstance, or shall not be considered
at all.
1. If the crime is rape, homicide, or murder, it shall
be aggravating.
2. If the crime is serious physical injuries, it shall not
be considered.
3. However, if the crime is less serious physical
injuries or slight physical injuries, relationship is
mitigating.
3. Intoxication
1. “When the offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication” - this means that the mental faculties of the
offender must be affected by drunkenness. Thus, if the
amount of liquor taken was not sufficient to affect his mental
faculties, this circumstance does not apply.
2. Mitigating - if it is 1) not habitual, or 2) not subsequent to the
plan to the commit the felony (Bacerra v People, Leonen);
3. Aggravating - if it is 1) habitual, or 2) intentional (subsequent
to the plan to commit the felony)
4. Presumption is that intoxication is accidental. (People v
Dungka)
5. Non-habitual intoxication, lack of instruction, and obfuscation,
shall not be taken separately.
1. The reason is all of them diminishes the reasoning power
of the accused. It diminishes the intelligence of the
accused. Hence, they shall be taken as one. (People v
Baterna)
4. Degree of education/instruction
1. Low degree of instruction and education
1. As general rule, low degree is mitigating.
2. Mere illiteracy is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating
circumstance, there must be LACK OF INTELLIGENCE.
3. As example, if the offender have studied up to 6th grade,
he is not entitled to this mitigating circumstance. Such
degree of instruction allows him to determine what is right
and wrong. (People v Pujinio, 1969)
2. As exceptions, low degree is NOT mitigating in the following
instances:
1. Treason - love of country should be natural feeling of
every citizen, whether unlettered or uncultured.
2. Murder - to kill is forbidden by natural law which every
rational being is endowed to know and feel.
3. Crimes against chastity and Rape - No one is so ignorant
as not to know that the crime is wrong and in violation of
the law
4. Crimes against property, such as theft, robbery, robbery
with homicide, arson, and estafa
3. High degree of instruction and education
1. It is aggravating when the offender availed himself or
took advantage of his learning in committing the crime.
2. The following are illustrations of aggravating
circumstance:
1. A lawyer who commits estafa, with abuse of his
education and learning.
2. A doctor who commits murder by poisoning, when he
used his medical knowledge to create the poison.
3. It is not aggravating when a lawyer commits serious
physical injuries. There is no proof that he used his
education and learning to commit the crime.
6. Specific rules for mitigating and aggravating circumstances (Art.
62)
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a
crime or which are included in defining a crime or which are
inherent in the crime shall NOT be taken into account
1. In themselves - by means of fire in arson
2. Included/inherent - relationship in parricide
2. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the
moral attributes/private relations/other personal cause shall only
serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those to which they
are attendant.
1. As stated, all mitigating circumstances are personal to the
1.
offender. (Reyes)
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which consist in the
material execution of the act, or the means employed to
accomplish it, shall ONLY serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of persons with KNOWLEDGE of them at the time of
execution of the act.
1. As example, treachery will not aggravate the penalty of the
principal by inducement, if he had no knowledge that
treachery will be employed in the killing.
7. Absolutory causes
1. Mistake of fact (LLF)
1. The act would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be;
2. The intention of the accused is lawful; and
3. The mistake must be without fault/negligence. (US v Bautista)
2. Battered Woman Syndrome
1. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and
civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code. (Sec.
26, RA 9262)
2. Who is a battered woman?
1. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice.
3. What is the battering cycle?
1. Tension-building phase - includes verbal or slight
physical abuse or hostile behavior
2. Acute battering incident - includes brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death.
3. Tranquil, loving phase - During this tranquil period, the
couple experience profound relief. (People v Genosa,
2004)
4. After going through the cycle at least twice, the battered
woman can kill her husband/partner even if there is no
unlawful aggression from the latter.
3. Reasonable doubt
4. Spontaneous desistance - during the attempted stage of the
felony
5. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability (Art. 20)
6. Light felony - only attempted or frustrated stage, and the crime
is not against persons or property (Art. 7)
7. Light felony - accused is an accomplice to the crime. (Art. 16)
8. Doctrine of self-help (Art. 280)
9. Theft, swindling, and malicious mischief - between relatives.
(Art. 332)
10. Physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
(Art. 247)
11. Good faith/Honest belief - because there is lack of criminal
intent.
12. Marriage - for seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and
rape
13. Prescription of crimes
14. Pardon by the offended party before the institution of
criminal action for crimes against chastity
15. Instigation
Entrapment Instigation
Definition Ways and means are The instigator practically
resorted to for the induced the would-be
purpose of trapping and accused into the
capturing the lawbreaker commission of the
in the execution of his offense and himself
criminal plan. becomes a co-principal
to the offense.
Bar Entrapment is not a bar Instigation is a bar to the
to the prosecution and prosecution and
conviction of the conviction of the
accused. It is not an accused. It is an
absolutory cause. absolutory cause.
Who originated the In entrapment, the means In instigation, the law
means in committing the originated from the mind enforcer conceives/
crime of the criminal. The idea originates the
and the resolve to commission of the crime
commit the crime come and suggests to the
from him. accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into
execution.
3. Persons liable and degree of participation
1. Principals, accomplices, and accessories
1. Principals
1. The following are considered principals:
1. Direct participation - Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act;
2. Directly force/induce - Those who directly force or induce
2.
others to commit it
3. Indispensable cooperation - Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act, without which
it would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17)
1. Wagan: If there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to
determine whether the principal is covered by
paragraph 1, 2, or 3. They are all principals, because
the act of one is the act of all.
2. Difference between principal under any of the three
paragraphs in Article 17 and a co-conspirator
1. 17 - the criminal liability is limited to his own act.
(Individual criminal responsibility)
2. C - the criminal liability includes the acts of his
fellow conspirators. The act of one is the act of
all. (Collective criminal responsibility)
(People v Peralta, 1968)
2. Direct participation
1. Requisites for two or more principals by direct
participation:
1. They participated in the criminal resolution;
2. They carried out their plan and personally took part
in its execution. (People v Ong Chiat Lay)
1. Criminal resolution
1. This means conspiracy must exist between
two or more persons.
2. To recall, conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
3. The conspiracy contemplated herein is not a
felony, but only a manner of incurring
criminal liability.
1. Art. 8 contemplates a felony, while Art. 17
contemplates a manner of incurring
criminal liability.
2. Also, note than in some special penal
laws, the principle of conspiracy applies,
i.e., plunder.
4. The prosecution must prove that the
conspirator contributed to the execution of
the crime through an overt act.
1. Companionship is not conspiracy. Hence,
facts must show that the accused
1.

contributed by overt act, whether direct

or indirect contribution. (Granada v
People, Leonen)
2. Once contribution is proven, it is not
necessary to ascertain the specific act of
each conspirator. (People v Marianon,
1991)
5. Conspiracy can be established by
circumstantial evidence, as shown from the
acts of the offenders preceding, during, and
immediately after the commission of the
crime.
6. Conspiracy is presumed when the crime is
committed by a band
1. When more than three armed malefactors
shall have acted together for the
commission of the crime, the crime was
deemed committed by a band. (Article
14)
7. Liability of participants where there is
conspiracy
1. Where conspiracy is adequately proven,
all the conspirators are equally
responsible for the acts of their co-
conspirators, regardless of the extent and
character of their participation. Why?
Because in contemplation of the law, the
act of one is the act of all. (People v De
la Cruz, 1990; People v Feliciano, Leonen)
2. Hence, even though the acts of his co-
conspirators differ from that which they
intended to commit, he is liable for the
crime actually committed.
3. What if the co-conspirators merely
agreed to rob a house, but one of them
raped the victim?
1. PERALTA: The rule in this jurisdiction
is that whenever a rape is committed
as a consequence, or on the occasion
of a robbery, all those who took part
therein are liable as principals of the
crime of robbery with rape, although
not all of them took part in the rape.
(People v Bongos, 2018)
2. KRISTEL: Art. 296 is applicable only
if there is a band.
3. Hence, even if Art. 296 is applicable
only to bands, the Court has already
ruled that all the co-conspirators are
liable for robbery with rape.
8. A person in conspiracy with others, who had
desisted before the crime was committed by
the others, is not criminally liable. (People v
Timbol, 1944)
1. Further, conspiracy alone, without the
execution of its purpose, is not a crime
punishable by law, except in special
instances. (Article 8)
9. When there is conspiracy, the fact that an
element of the offense is not present as
regards one of the conspirators is immaterial
1. As example, in abduction, all of the
offenders are the liable for such crime,
even if only one acted with lewd design.
2. Further, in malversation of public funds,
even private persons are criminally liable
if they acted in conspiracy with the public
officer.
3. Basis? Because the act of one is the act
of all.
4. Exceptions:
1. Personal circumstances - In
parricide, the element of relationship
must be present as regards all the
offenders; and
2. Knowledge of the means to
accomplish the crime/Material
execution of the crime - In murder
where treachery is an element of the
crime, all the offenders must at least
have knowledge of the employment
of treachery at the time of the
execution of their act or their
cooperation therein. (Art. 62(4)
10. When there is no conspiracy, each of the
offenders is liable only for the act performed
10.

by him.
1. Hence, the evidence of “participation in
the criminal resolution” is essential.
11. What if the accused denies that he is a
conspirator? What should be the response?
1. Common purpose and design doctrine
- the doctrine provides that if their acts
point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, or community of
interest, there is conspiracy.
12. Wheel “Circle” Conspiracy - there is single
group of persons “hub” dealing individually
with 2 or more persons as “spokes”. The rim
that closes the spokes is the goal of the
conspiracy.
13. Chain “Straight” Conspiracy- usually
involving distribution of narcotics where
there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as the
legitimate business operation between the
manufacturer and wholesaler, then to
retailer, then to the consumer.
2. They carried out their plan and personally took
part in its execution
1. Participation must either precede or be
simultaneous to the criminal act
1. If it is after, he becomes an accessory to
the crime. This will be discussed later in
Article 19.
2. There could be no conspiracy to commit an
felony through negligence
1. Conspiracy presupposes an agreement
and decision to commit a felony. Hence,
the conspirators intended to commit a
crime. In felonies through negligence, it
presupposes that the crime was
committed not with intention, but with
negligence, imprudence, lack of skill, or
lack of foresight.
3. Force/Inducement
1. Two (2) ways to become principal by induction
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime; and
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime.
2. “Directly”
1. J. Tang: “Directly” - A induced B to kill C. B induced
D to kill C. D killed C. Is A liable? No, because A did
not directly induce D to commit the crime.
3. “Directly forcing”
1. It may be committed:
1. By using irresistible force; and
2. By causing uncontrollable fear.
2. Here, the one directly forcing is criminally liable. The
one directly forced is exempted from criminal liability
(Article 12)
4. “Directly inducing”
1. It may be committed:
1. By giving price, reward, or promise; and
2. By giving words of command
2. For giving price, reward, or promise, the following are
the requisites:
1. The inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime; and
2. The inducement was the determining cause of
the commission of the crime by the material
executor/direct participant. (People v Kiichi
Omine)
1. Directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime
1. A thoughtless expression without
intention to produce the result is not an
inducement to commit the crime
2. Conspiracy was established.
Notwithstanding the fact that Mayor
Sanchez was not at the crime scene, he
was the mastermind of the ambush
slaying or the principal by inducement.
Conspiracy renders appellants liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their participation because
the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
(People v. Sanchez, 1999)
2. Determining cause of the commission of the
crime
1. It means without such inducement, the
crime would not have been committed.
1. Thus, if the principal by direct
participation had personal reason to
commit the crime, and he would
commit the crime even if there was
no inducement, this second requisite
does not exist. Hence, the accused is
not criminally liable as principal by
inducement.
2. Further, it means the inducement must
precede the act induced.
1. Thus, if the price or reward was given
after the commission of the crime,
without prior promise, it could not be
an inducement.
3. What if the the crime actually committed
is NOT contemplated by the person
giving the price, reward, or promise?
1. In such case, there is no principal by
inducement, because the inducement
was not the determine cause of the
commission of the crime by the direct
participant.
1. As illustration, A induced B to kill
C. B agreed. Later that day, B
raped C, without killing her. A is
not criminally liable as principal
by inducement. Why? Because
the inducement was not the
determining cause for the
commission of the crime of rape
by the material executor.
3. For words of command, the following are the
requisites:
1. Ascendancy or influence
2. The inducement must have the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime
3. The inducement must be so direct, so
efficacious, and so powerful as to amount to
physical or moral coercion
4. The inducement must be the determining cause
of the commission of the crime by the direct
participant.
1. The principles for price, reward, or promise
1.
are the same for words of command.
2. The difference is in words of command, the
person uttering the words must exercise
ascendancy or influence over the direct
participant.
4. Principal by inducement and the offender made
proposal to commit a felony, distinguished
1. Induce - he becomes liable only when the crime is
committed by the principal by direct participation;
it involves any crime
2. Proposal - he becomes liable by mere proposal to
commit the felony; it involves specific crimes such
as treason, rebellion, and coup d’etat
5. Effects of acquittal of principal by direct participation
upon the liability of the principal by inducement
1. One cannot be held guilty of having induced the
commission of a crime without proof that the
crime was actually committed. (People v Ong
Chiat)
1. Hence, if the alleged principal by direct
participation is acquitted, the alleged
principal by inducement is also acquitted.
2. However, if the one charged as principal by direct
participation was acquitted because of an
exempting circumstance, the principal by
inducement is not absolved from liability.
1. Why? Because a crime was actually
committed, and the principal by direct
participation was merely exempted from
liability.
4. Indispensable cooperation
1. Requisites:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution; and
2. Cooperation by performing another act without
which the crime would not have been accomplished.
1. Participation in the criminal resolution
1. Concurrence with the principal by direction
participation is sufficient.
2. The principal by indispensable cooperation,
with the others, do not have to come to an
agreement concerning the commission of the
felony, and decide to commit it.
2. Cooperation by performing another act without
2.
which it would not have been accomplished
1. “Another act” means the cooperation must be
an act which is not AN ACT OF EXECUTION.
1. In US v Javier, the act of cooperation is
the forcible taking of the girl to the place
where the rape was committed by the
other accused. In rape, the act of
execution is the sexual intercourse with
the woman against her will.
2. In US v Lim Buanco, the act of execution
in the crime of estafa is the fraudulent
cashing of the check which resulted in
the damage to the bank. The act of
cooperation of the other offender is the
certification that the check was entitled
to payment.
3. Four persons each took turns in having
sex with a girl by force. It was held that
each of them is responsible, not only for
the act of rape committed personally by
him, but also for the rape committed by
others, because while one of them was
having sexual intercourse with the girl,
the others were holding her, so that each
of them COOPERATED in the
consummation of the rape committed by
the others by acts without which the rape
would have not been accomplished.
(People v Alfaro)
2. The performance of another act must be
indispensable to commit the crime.
Otherwise, he is only an accomplice.
2. Accomplices
1. Requisites:
1. Community of design - the accomplice knows of the
design of the principal AND concurs with the latter
2. Cooperation - the accomplice cooperates in the execution
of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts
3. Relation - there is a relation between the acts by the
principal and accomplice
1. Community of design
1. The accomplice must merely CONCUR with the
criminal design of the principal.
2. If he came to an AGREEMENT with the principal
concerning the commission of the crime, and
decided to commit it, he is deemed a conspirator.
Hence, he is also a principal.
3. How is knowledge acquired?
1. When the principal informs or tells the
accomplice of the former’s criminal purpose.
2. When the accomplice saw the acts of the
principal
4. The community of design need not be the same
as the crime actually committed. It is sufficient
that the crime actually committed was a natural
and probable consequence of the intended crime.
1. However, when the owner of the gun knew
that it would be used to kill a particular
person, and the principal used it to kill
another person, the owner of the gun is not
an accomplice as to the killing of the other
person.
2. Cooperation
1. “Previous acts”
1. An example of cooperation by previous act is
the lending of a dagger or pistol to the
murderer, knowing the latter’s criminal
purpose.
2. “Simultaneous acts”
1. An example is when the offender holds one of
the hands of the victim and tried to take away
the victim’s revolver, while his co-defendant
was stabbing him.
3. “Material aid”
1. Means by external acts such as serving as a
lookout.
4. “Moral aid”
1. When an accomplice gives an advice or
encouragement to the principal, he must
know that the principal is going to commit the
crime.
2. However, if the advice or encouragement was
already the determining cause of the crime,
the person becomes principal by inducement.
1. A was punching B. Upon seeing the
incident, C shouted saying “Sige A
1.

sapakin mo pa!” B died as a result of the

punches. C is liable as accomplice
because he cooperated in its commission
by simultaneously providing moral aid to
A.
5. The wounds inflicted by the accomplice in crimes
against persons should not have caused the
death of the victim
1. The reason is if he inflicted the fatal blow, he
did not merely “cooperate” in the execution
of the crime. Instead, he becomes a principal
by direct participation already.
3. Relation
1. It is not enough that a person entertains an
identical criminal design as that of the principal.
There must be a relation between the criminal act
of the principal by direct participation and that of
the person charged as accomplice.
4. Distinguish accomplice and principal by direct
participation
Direct participation Indispensable Accomplice
cooperation
Conspiracy + Direct part Concur + Cooperation by Concur + Cooperation
in the execution of the performing another act that is not indispensable,
crime without which the crime by previous or
would not have been simultaneous acts
committed
3. Accessories
1. The crime committed must NOT be a light felony. If it is a
light felony, the accessory is not punished by RPC. (Article
16)
2. Requisites: (KPS)
1. Knowledge - having knowledge of the commission of the
crime
2. Without having participated - without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices
3. Takes part subsequent - take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1. Profiting effects - By profiting themselves or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
2. Destroying body - By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
2.

thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. Assisting escape - By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided: (AA)
1. the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or
2. whenever the author of the crime is guilty of:
(TPMAH)
1. Treason,
2. Parricide,
3. Murder, or
4. an Attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or
5. is known to be Habitually guilty of some other
crime. (Art. 19)
3. Knowledge
1. Suspicion is not enough because it is defined as
imagination of the existence of something without proof.
Such is not tantamount to knowledge.
2. Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be
acquired subsequent to the commission of the felony.
1. As example, B killed C. A only knew the commission of
the crime when B showed A the cadaver of C.
Afterwards, A helped B in burying the cadaver
beneath the ground. A is still an accessory.
4. Without having participated
1. As example, A and B took turns stabbing C. Afterwards, A
buried the body of C. A is not an accessory because he
already participated in the commission of the crime as
principal by direct participation.
2. The person who profited from the effects of the crime
must not be in conspiracy with the principal. Otherwise,
he is not an accessory, but a principal.
5. Takes part subsequent
1. The accessory must perform acts AFTER the crime had
been committed.
2. It does not mean the crime must be consummated. As
example, A shot B, but the latter was not injured because
A was an inaccurate shooter. To help A escape criminal
liability, C buried the gun used by A to commit the crime
of attempted homicide. A is an accessory to attempted
homicide.
6. Profiting effects
1. An accessory can be held liable under this paragraph and
under the Anti-Fencing law
1. Will be discussed later.
2. When is profiting by the effects of the crime punished as
the act of principal, and not the act of accessory?
1. When a person knowingly acquired or received
property taken by the brigands. (Article 307, RPC)
7. Destroying body/effects
1. If A merely assisted B in bringing down the body of C from
the house to the street, A is not liable as an accomplice.
The reason is his assistance did not prevent the body
from being discovered by people.
8. Assisting escape
1. Two (2) classes
1. Public officers - he abuses his position to assist the
escape
2. Private persons - if the author of the crime is guilty of
(TPMAH)
2. “That the principal is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime”
1. It means habitual delinquency, and the accessory
must know that the principal is a habitual delinquent
for some other crime.
9. Accessories’ liability is subordinate and subsequent to the
principal/accomplice
1. If the Court ruled that the principal did not commit a
crime, the accessory also did not commit a crime.
10. When is conviction of accessory possible, even if the
principal is acquitted?
1. If the crime was in fact committed, but the principal was
not held criminally liable, because of an exempting
circumstance (insanity/minority).
2. It cannot be justifying circumstance (self-defense). If the
act is justified, there is no crime committed. Hence, there
is also no accessory.
11. The accused can be held liable as accessory under
paragraph 3 of Article 19, even if the principal charged
with murder died before trial OR is at-large.
1. Why? Because the prosecution still has to prove the
commission of the crime charged, with the same quantum
of evidence, and the participation in it of all the persons
named in the information.
2. The accessory is still accorded the opportunity to refute
2.
the evidence of the prosecution establishing the crime
and the participation of the alleged principal.
3. Upon the evidence adduced by both parties and for
purposes of conviction of the accessory, the court can
make a finding as to whether the crime charged has been
established and the other accused is the principal thereof,
without pronouncing judgment on him.
12. However, the arraignment, trial, and conviction of accessory
during the pendency of a separate case against the principal
are null and void.
1. The arraignment, trial, and conviction of an accessory
after the fact without the principal of the crime having
first been tried and convicted in the separate case filed
and pending at the time of the arraignment, trial and
decision of the case against the accessory, is not proper
and violates the legal system of procedural orderliness.
13. Art. 19(c) is related to “Delivery of prisoners from jail”;
“Infidelity in the custody of prisoners”; and Obstruction of
Justice Law
Person of the offender + Acts Crime committed
committed
Detainee was removed from jail by a Delivery of prisoners from jail, whether
private person/public officer not in detention or convicted.
custody of him
Detainee was removed from jail by a Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
public officer in custody of him
If the person presented himself to Art. 19(c)
serve out the sentence instead of the
principal/accomplice
If the convict is still not detained and Art. 19(c)
he person facilitated his escape
In all cases Obstruction of Justice Law
14. Who are exempted from criminal liability under Art. 20?
(SADBA)
1. Spouses
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimated, adopted, and natural Brothers and sisters, or
5. Relatives by Affinity within the same degrees,
1. with the single exception of accessories falling within
the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article.
1. Relationship by affinity SURVIVES even after the
death of the deceased spouse.
1. Examples are the spouse and his brother-in-
law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, and
grandmother-in-law.
2. Does concealing of the effects of the crime to
obtain gain exempt the accessory from criminal
liability?
1. No, he is liable as an accessory. The reason is
his act was prompted by greed and not by
affection.
2. NOTE: However, check these facts. To
illustrate, A committed the crime of parricide
by killing his wife. He went to his brother, B,
to help him get rid of the body. B agreed on
the condition that A gives him P1M. A agreed
and subsequently gave B P1M. Is B exempt
from criminal liability?
1. Yes, he is exempted from liability. Even
though he obtained profit from the
concealment, the profit was not derived
from the effects of the crime of parricide.
Hence, he is exempted because his acts
still fall under paragraph 2 of Article 19.
3. Liability of a public officer when related to the
principal
1. Such a public officer does not incur any
criminal liability. Ties of blood or relationship
constitutes a more powerful incentive than
the call of duty.
4. Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
1. “Fencing” is the act of any person who:
1. with intent to gain for himself or for another,
2. shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell, or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner
deal in
3. any article, item, object, or anything of value,
4. which he knows, or should be known to him,
5. to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. (Sec. 2)
2. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery to
theft shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. (Sec. 4)
1. “Fencing” is a crime malum prohibitum, so intent is
unnecessary. (Cahulogan v People)
1. Hence, if he knows/should know that the thing
possessed is derived from robbery/theft, he is already
liable under PD 1612.
2. “Any person”
1. A principal/accomplice/accessory to the crime can be
held liable under PD 1612.
1. As example, A tasked B to steal an expensive
jewelry. B successfully stole the same. A sold the
same to C, and divided the profits between him
and B.
1. Is A an accessory? No. Since A tasked B to
steal the jewelry, he is a principal by
inducement.
2. Is A liable under PD 1612? Yes, because with
intent to gain, A sold the jewelry to C, which
he knows was derived from the proceeds of
theft.
3. “Any article, item, object, or anything of value”
1. Following the latin maxim of “ejusdem generis,” the
phrase “anything of value” must correspond to the
preceding words to which it relates. Hence, fencing
covers only personal properties and not real
properties..
4. “To have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft.”
1. Carnapping is included in the phrase “proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.” (People v Tan)
2. KRISTEL: There must be robbery or theft but there is
no need for prior conviction before a fence can be
convicted.
5. Under PD 1612, even the buyer/possessor is liable, if he
knows that the thing sold/kept was derived from the
proceeds of robbery or theft.
1. Hence, “profit” is not indispensable in PD 1612. Mere
intent to gain is enough.
5. Obstruction of Justice Law (PD 1829)
1. Any person who KNOWINGLY or willfully obstructs:
1. The apprehension/investigation/prosecution in criminal
cases, by ANY of the following acts:
1. Altering, DESTROYING, suppressing, or CONCEALING
any paper, document, record, or object WITH INTENT
1.

TO IMPAIR its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability,

or ADMISSIBILITY as evidence in any investigation of
or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be
USED in the official proceedings in criminal cases;
(Related - Art. 19(b), RPC)
2. Harboring or concealing or facilitating the ESCAPE of,
any person he KNOWS, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed ANY OFFENSE
under existing penal laws in order to prevent his
arrest, prosecution, and conviction. (Related - Art.
19(c), RPC)
Art. 19(b) and (c), RPC Obstruction of Justice Law
The spouses, ascendants, descendants, They are criminally liable, without
siblings, and relatives by affinity within the exceptions.
same degrees are EXEMPTED from
criminal liability as accessories.
There is a need 1) for the offender to No need
abuse his public position, or 2) for the
author of the crime to be guilty of
TPMAH.
2. Conspiracy and proposal
1. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in
the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
1. It states “felony.” Hence, this applies only to crimes
punishable under RPC. However, special penal laws, in some
cases, provide that conspiracy and proposal are punishable
under their laws. An example is conspiracy to commit
terrorism under the Human Security Act.
2. “Only in cases in which the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.”
1. The law means RPC. This provision is highly relevant to: 1)
conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; 2) conspiracy
and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion, or
insurrection; and 3) conspiracy (only) to commit sedition.
2. Conspiracy
1. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.
1. Two or more persons come to an agreement - There
must be meeting of the minds. The prosecution must
show that the accused agreed to the commission of a
felony. Otherwise, the accused will be acquitted.
2. Concerning the commission of a felony - The
2.
agreement must refer to committing a crime. If they
merely agreed upon that the Government is inept and
corrupt, then there is no conspiracy. There is no “felony”
in what they agreed upon.
3. Decide to commit it - The conspirators must make up
their minds to commit the crime. There must be a
determination to commit the crime, such as treason,
rebellion, and sedition.
2. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy
1. It can be inferred from the collective acts of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
2. Circumstantial evidence is also allowed to prove
conspiracy.
3. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Proposal
1. There is proposal when the person who has decided to
commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person
or persons. (Art. 8)
1. Mere proposal is criminal. It is not necessary that the
person to whom the proposal was made agrees to commit
the crime.
2. There is no criminal proposal when:
1. The person who proposes did not decide to commit
the felony
1. An illustration is A suggested to B and C the
commission of rebellion. However, he is afraid to do it
himself. There is no criminal proposal because he was
not “decided” to commit the felony. Hence, he is not
liable for proposal to commit rebellion.
2. There is no decided, concrete, or formal proposal
1. An illustration is A suggested to B and C the
commission of rebellion. There is no criminal proposal
because 1) A was still not “decided” to commit
rebellion, and 2) A did not propose its execution to B.
Hence, he is not liable for proposal to commit
rebellion.
3. It is not the execution of a felony that is proposed
1. An illustration is A has decided to commit rebellion.
However, what he proposed to B, C, and D is the
formation of an organization to increase their
membership. What was proposed is the execution of a
mere preparatory act, and not the felony (rebellion)
itself. Hence, he is not liable for proposal to commit
rebellion.
3. Proposal as an overt act (act of execution) of corruption of
public officer
1. A person who offers money to a public officer to induce
him not to perform his duties, but the offer is rejected by
the public officer, is liable for attempted corruption of
public officers. Here, the proposal is not a crime itself. It is
an overt act (act of execution) of the crime of corruption
of public officers.
3. Multiple offenders
1. Recidivism
1. A recidivist is one who,
1. At the time of his trial for one crime,
2. Shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
for another crime
3. Which is embraced in the same title of this Code. (Art.
14)
1. “At the time of his trial for one crime” includes
EVERYTHING that is done in the course of the trial,
from arraignment until after sentence is promulgated
by the judge in open court.
2. Hence, if the previous conviction became final and
executory before the judgment is rendered in the new
felony, there is recidivism.
3. However, there is NO recidivism if he was first
convicted by final judgment for a felony committed
AFTER THE COMMISSION of the felony where he is
currently on trial. (People v Baldera)
4. “Previously convicted by final judgment for another
crime” means the judgment of conviction is already
final and executory.
5. Hence, if on the same date, the accused was
adjudged as guilty for both crimes, there is no
recidivism. Why? Because there is no previous
conviction.
6. “Embraced in the same title of this Code” means
paragraph 9 will NOT apply if the two (2) crimes are
rape and seduction; rape and acts of lasciviousness;
or rape and abduction. However, it will apply if the two
(2) crimes are rape and homicide; rape and physical
injuries; homicide and physical injuries; homicide and
abortion; and homicide and parricide.
7. Since the paragraph does not distinguish, there is still
recidivism even if the lapse of time between the two
(2) felonies is more than ten (10) years.
8. Pardon and amnesty, in relation to recidivism
1. As a rule, pardon does not obliterate the fact that
the accused was a recidivist. It looks forward, and
not backward.
2. For amnesty, it obliterates the fact that the
accused was a recidivist. In the eyes of the law,
the person amnestied was never a criminal.
2. Habituality/Reiteration
1. The offender had been previously punished
2. for:
1. an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or
2. two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
(Art. 14)
1. “Previously punished” means he previously served
sentence for another offense.
2. “To which the law attaches” means the penalty
prescribed for the offense, not the penalty actually
imposed.
3. “An equal or greater penalty; lighter penalty” is self-
explanatory.
3. Recidivism and habituality, distinguished
Recidivism Habituality
Previous service of sentence is not It is necessary that the offender shall
necessary, because it only requires have served out his sentence for the
that he was previously convicted by first felony or for the first and second
final judgment for the first offense. felonies.
Penalty is immaterial The law must attach an equal or
greater penalty for the first felony, or
the law must attach a lighter penalty
for the first and second felonies.
However, the felonies must be There is no need for the felonies to be
embraced in the same title of the RPC. embraced in the same title of the RPC
3. Quasi-recidivism
1. Any person who shall commit a felony
2. After having been convicted by final judgment,
3. Before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving
the same,
4. Shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
4.
prescribed by law for the new felony. (Art. 160)
1. This is a special aggravating circumstance. Hence, it
cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstance.
2. Is the convict a quasi-recidivist if he commits another
crime after escaping from prison?
1. No, because when he committed the crime, he was
not serving his sentence.
4. Habitual delinquency
1. There is habitual delinquency when a person, within 10 years
from the date of his last release or last conviction
2. of the crimes of (SIX) serious physical injuries, less serious
physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification,
3. is found guilty for any of the said offenses for a third time or
oftener. (Art. 62)
1. Theft includes attempted theft; Robbery includes
attempted robbery or frustrated robbery; and so on.
(People v Abuyen)
2. Habitual delinquencies applies to accomplices and
accessories.
3. The date of commission is immaterial.
1. In habitual delinquency, we only consider date of last
release or last conviction.
4. Crimes committed on the same date, although
conviction on different dates (July and September 1937)
are considered as only one. (People v Albuquerque)
5. Convictions on the same day or about the same time are
considered as one only.
1. Convictions on March 3 and March 5, 1934 were
considered as one only. (People v Lopido)
6. The imposition of additional penalty is mandatory. (Art.
62)
7. Modifying circumstances must be considered and
applicable to the additional penalty in habitual
delinquency.
8. Further, it must be factored in for Article 70 - Successive
service of sentence.
1. It cannot exceed the three-fold length of the most
severe of penalties,
2. Nor can the maximum prison sentence exceed 40
years.
9. Penalty for habitual delinquency must be considered to
determine jurisdiction of the court.
10. A habitual delinquent is usually a recidivist.
1. A habitual delinquent can never be covered by
paragraph 10 - habituality. It is only paragraph 9 -
recidivism.
2. Recidivism shall be considered as aggravating
circumstance to the principal penalty. It cannot be
considered as aggravating to the additional penalty of
habitual delinquency, because it is deemed inherent.
3. However, an offender can be a habitual delinquent
without being a recidivist. An example is if A
committed the crimes of 1) serious physical injuries
(crimes against persons), 2) robbery (crimes against
property), and 3) falsification (crimes against public
interest).
11. Habitual delinquency and recidivism, distinguished
Habitual delinquency Recidivism
The crimes are specified It can be any crime as long as
embraced in the same title in the RPC
The 10-year period must be complied There is no period
with
He must be found guilty for a third time He must only be found guilty for a
or oftener second time
The additional penalty of imprisonment If not offset by mitigating
is imposed circumstance, it serves to increase the
penalty to its maximum period
12. Analyze the table below
1. For theft, it is simple. He should just be convicted of
the crime. There is still no need to compute because
this is the starting point.
2. For estafa, the starting point for the counting of the
period is either June 1915 (last conviction), or July
1916 (last release). The ending point is May 1920
because the text of the law states “is found guilty.” If
either falls within the 10-year period, and the accused
is also convicted for the crime of estafa, the second
requisite is met.
3. For less serious physical injuries, the starting point for
the counting of the period is either May 1920 (last
conviction) or October 1922(last release). The ending
point is July 1928 because the text of the law states
“is found guilty.” If either falls within the 10-year
period, and the accused is also convicted for the
crime of less serious physical injuries, the third
requisite is met. Hence, the offender is now
considered as a “habitual delinquent.”
Crimes Committed Date of Conviction Date of Release
Theft June 1915 July 1916
Estafa May 1920 October 1922
Less Serious Physical July 1928 August 1930
Injuries
Attempted Robbery August 1937 September 1940
Crime charged October 1946
4. Penalties
1. Imposable penalties
1. Principal - Those expressly imposed by the court in the judgment
of conviction
2. Accessory - Those that are deemed included in the imposition of
principal penalties
3. Subsidiary - Those imposed in lieu of the principal penalty, i.e.,
imprisonment in case of inability to pay the fine
2. Classification
1. Principal
1. Afflictive
1. Reclusion perpetua
2. Reclusion temporal
3. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
4. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
5. Prision mayor
2. Correctional
1. Prision correccional
2. Arresto mayor
3. Suspension
4. Destierro
3. Light
1. Arresto menor
2. Public censure
4. Penalties common to the three preceding classes
1. Fine
2. Bond to keep the peace
2. Accessory
1. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
2. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
3. Suspension (from public office, right to vote and be voted for,
profession or calling)
4. Civil interdiction
5. Indemnification
6. Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the
offense
7. Payment of costs
3. How can fine be afflictive, correctional, or light?
1. A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative
penalty, shall be considered:
1. An afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 1.2M pesos;
2. A correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 1.2M pesos
but is not less than 40k pesos; and
3. A light penalty if less than 40k pesos. (Art. 26)
4. Grave, less grave, and light felonies
1. Grave felonies - are those to which the law attaches the
capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods
are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this Code.
2. Less grave felonies - are those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their maximum period are correctional
3. Light felonies - are those infractions of law for the
commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine not
exceeding P40k or both
1. Example of Light Felonies (MATHS):
1. Malicious mischief when the value of the damage
does not exceed ₱40,000 or cannot be estimated
2. Alteration of boundary marks
3. Theft when the value of the thing stolen is less than
₱500 and theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated under Art. 308 (3)
4. Intriguing against Honor
5. Slight physical injuries
5. How do we interpret Art. 9 and Art. 26 if the fine is exactly P40k?
1. There is a conflict.
2. For prescription of crimes - Art. 9, so it is light
3. For prescription of penalties - Art. 26, so it is correctional
3. Duration and effects
1. Principal penalties
1. Just check the codal.
2. Accessory penalties of principal penalties
1. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
1. Civil interdiction
2. Perpetual absolute disqualification, which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned, unless the same is
expressly remitted in the pardon.
2. Prision mayor
1. Temporary absolute disqualification, during the term of
sentence
2. Perpetual special disqualification of the right of suffrage,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
3. Prision correccional
1. Perpetual special disqualification of the right of suffrage,
if the period of imprisonment exceeds 18 months, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
2. Suspension from public office, profession, or calling, if the
period of imprisonment does not exceed 18 months
4. Arresto mayor and arresto menor
1. Suspension of the right to hold office and the right to
suffrage during the term of sentence
3. Accessory penalties
Civil Perpetual or Perpetual or Suspension Perpetual or
interdiction temporary temporary from public temporary
(RP, RT) absolute special office, special
disqualificatio disqualificatio profession, disqualificatio
n (RP, RT, n of the right calling, or n for public
PM) (4) of suffrage right of office,
(PM, PC suffrage (PC profession, or
exceed 18) not exceed calling
(2) 18, AM, AM) (inapplicable
(1) )
Deprivation of Deprivation of Deprivation of
the right of public office, the office,
parental which the profession, or
authority, or offender held calling
guardianship, affected
or marital
authority,
during the
term of
sentence
Deprivation of Loss of all
the right to rights to
manage his retirement
property, and pay or other
right to pension for
dispose the any office
same by any held
act inter
vivos, during
the term of
authority,
during the
term of
sentence
Deprivation of Loss of all
the right to rights to
manage his retirement
property, and pay or other
right to pension for
dispose the any office
same by any held
act inter
vivos, during
the term of
sentence
Disqualification Disqualificatio Disqualification Disqualification
for public n for public from holding for holding
office; If office such office, or similar office,
temporary, it (temporary is similar or
shall last only inapplicable) functions, employments
during the profession, or
term of the calling, or
sentence right to
suffrage,
during the
term of the
sentence
Deprivation of Deprivation of
right to vote the right to
and be vote and be
elected; if elected
temporary, it (temporary is
shall only last inapplicable)
during the
term of the
sentence
4. Application
1. Subsidiary imprisonment
1. If the convict has no property to meet the fine
2. He shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability
3. At the rate of 1 day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in Philippines, at the time of
rendition of judgment by the trial court,
4. Subject to the following rules:
1. When the principal penalty is higher than prision
correccional - no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
2. When the principal penalty is prision correccional or
arresto AND fine - he shall remain under confinement
until the fine is satisfied, provided:
1. It does not exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence;
2. It shall not continue for more than 1 year, and
3. No fraction or part of a day shall be counted against
the prisoner.
3. When the principal penalty is fine only
1. For grave or less grave felonies,
1. It shall not exceed 6 months
2. For light felonies,
1. It shall not exceed 15 days.
4. When the principal penalty is not to be executed by
confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is
of fixed duration
1. The conviction, during the period established under
the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same
deprivations.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may
have suffered by reason of his insolvency does to relieve
him from paying the fine in case his financial
circumstances improve. (Art. 29)
5. NOTES:
1. Judgment of conviction must impose subsidiary
imprisonment in its dispositive portion
1. An accused cannot be made to undergo subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine
imposed upon him when the subsidiary imprisonment
is not imposed in the judgment of conviction. (Ramos
v Gonong, 1961)
2. Subsidiary imprisonment is not an accessory penalty
1. It is a penalty that is imposed if he fails to pay the
fine due to insolvency.
2. Hence, the culprit cannot be made to undergo
subsidiary imprisonment unless the judgment
expressly so provides. (People v Fajardo)
3. NOTE: Accessory penalties need not be declared
in the dispositive portion because it is deemed
imposed with the principal penalty.
3. No subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of other
pecuniary liabilities
1. As Article 39 is worded, there is no subsidiary
penalty for nonpayment of 1) reparation of the
1.

damage caused; 2) the indemnification of

consequential damages; and 3) the costs of the
proceedings. (Ramos v Gonong, 1961)
2. It is only applicable for fines.
4. If the fine is less than P537 (highest minimum wage
rate in the Philippines), there is no subsidiary penalty
5. When the penalty is 1) fine and 2) a penalty not to be
executed by confinement in a penal institution and
which has no fixed duration, there is no subsidiary
penalty.
1. Examples are fine and censure.
6. Subsidiary imprisonment is not imprisonment for
debt.
1. The laws which prohibit imprisonment for debt
relate to the imprisonment of debtors for liability
incurred in the fulfillment of contracts, but not to
the cases seeking enforcement of penal statues
that provide for the payment of money as a
penalty for the commission of the crime. (US v
Cara)
7. Subsidiary imprisonment, like accessory penalties, is
not essential in determining jurisdiction.
8. The additional penalty for habitual delinquency should
be included in determining whether or not subsidiary
penalty should be imposed.
1. Even if the penalty imposed is not higher than
prision correccional, if the accused is a habitual
delinquent who deserves an additional penalty of
12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, there is
no subsidiary imprisonment. (People v
Concepcion)
5. Graduation of penalties
1. Rules for graduation of penalties (degrees)
1. Single and indivisible penalty
1. The penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the indivisible penalty, as provided by Art. 71
2. Two indivisible penalties, or one or more divisible
penalties to be imposed in their full extent
1. The penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties
3. One or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period
of another divisible penalty
1. The penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of
1.
the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible
penalty and the maximum period of that immediately
following
4. Several periods, corresponding to different divisible
penalties
1. The penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of
the period immediately following the minimum prescribed
and of the two next following, which shall be taken from
the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the
penalty immediately following in the above mentioned
respective graduated scale
5. By analogy
1. The penalty next lower in degree shall be that period
immediately following the given penalty. (Art. 61)
2. Rules for application of indivisible penalties with respect to
mitigating and aggravating circumstances
1. Single indivisible penalty
1. In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts, REGARDLESS of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended
the commission of the crime. (Art. 63)
3. Rules for application of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, in general
1. Neither aggravating nor mitigating
1. Impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period
2. Only a mitigating circumstance
1. Minimum period
3. Only an aggravating circumstance
1. Maximum period
4. Both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
1. Offset
5. Two or more mitigating AND no aggravating
1. Penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law
6. Whatever may be the number of the aggravating
circumstances, the court shall not impose a greater penalty
than that prescribed by law for the crime, in its maximum
period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the
extent of the penalty. (Art. 64)
6. Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103)
1. RPC
1. Courts shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence:
1. The maximum term of which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC;
and
2. The minimum term which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.
1. “In view of the attending circumstances"
1. If there is privileged mitigating circumstance,
the starting point for determining the minimum
term is the penalty next lower from that
prescribed by the RPC.
2. If there is ordinary modifying circumstances,
they shall NOT be considered for the minimum
term. (People v Gonzales)
3. However, for determining the maximum term,
the ordinary modifying circumstances shall be
considered. (People v De Joya)
2. In determining the exact period of the maximum and
minimum term, it is left entirely within the discretion
of the court to fix it anywhere within its range. (People
v Ducosin)
2. Special law
1. Courts shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence
1. The maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the law; and
2. The minimum which shall not be less than that prescribed
by the law. (Sec. 1)
1. However, if the special law adopts the nomenclatures
of the RPC, then the rules for RPC shall apply to the
special law. (Cahulogan v People)
3. When ISLAW does not apply (national security etc.; evasion of
service; penalty; HD)
1. Treason, conspiracy and proposal to commit treason,
misprision of treason, espionage
2. Piracy
3. Rebellion or sedition
4. Conditional pardon but violated the terms
5. Evaded sentence or escaped from confinement
6. Reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
7. Penalty is other than prison sentence such as destierro
(People v Perla)
8. Maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year
9. Straight penalty, i.e., prescribed penalty is 10 years.
10. Habitual delinquent
11. Already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval
of this Act. (RA Sec. 2)
1. If the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, ISLAW applies.
2. Ginhawa doctrine
1. “Maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
1 year”
1. The issue happens the penalty prescribed by law
is prision correccional minimum period, i.e., 6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months.
2. The judge has two options:
1. To impose penalty within the range of PC
minimum period of more than 1 year, since it
is within the range of minimum of PC. Hence,
ISLAW is applicable; or
2. To impose penalty lower than 1 year. Hence,
ISLAW is not applicable, because “the
maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed 1 year.”
7. Application of RPC and ISLAW
1. Accused, minor, pleaded to direct assault with homicide. What is
the proper maximum and minimum penalty under the ISLAW?
1. For the maximum penalty, Art. 48 provides that in complex
crimes, the most severe penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Case law dictates that ordinary mitigating
circumstances shall be disregarded, while those that are
privileged shall be considered. Since minority shall be
considered and voluntary plea of guilty shall be disregarded,
the maximum penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum
period.
2. For the minimum period, ISLAW provides that the minimum
period shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. Case law dictates
that privilege mitigating circumstances shall be considered
while ordinary mitigating shall be disregarded. Hence, the
minimum penalty shall be prision correccional, because it is
the penalty next lower in degree.
3. In sum, the maximum penalty is prision mayor in its maximum
period, and the minimum penalty is to be fixed anywhere
within the range of prision correccional.
2. Accused, minor, pleaded and voluntarily surrendered to the crime
2.
of direct assault with homicide.
1. For the maximum penalty, Art. 48 provides that in complex
crimes, the most severe penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Case law dictates that privileged mitigating
circumstances shall be considered. Since minority and the
presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance are present, the maximum penalty shall be
prision correccional in its maximum period.
2. For the minimum penalty, ISLAW provides that the minimum
term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the offense. Case law dictates that
privileged mitigating circumstances shall be considered.
Hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor, because it is
the penalty next lower in degree.
3. In sum, the maximum penalty shall be prision correccional in
its maximum period, and the minimum penalty is to be fixed
anywhere within the range of arresto mayor.
3. Special law - A is convicted of illegal possession of firearm
punishable by imprisonment from one year and one day to five
years.
1. The court can impose an indeterminate sentence from 2 years
and 1 day, as the minimum term, to 4 years, as the maximum
term; or 1 year and 6 months to 3 years; or 4 years to 5 years.
2. The maximum term of each of of the different examples does
not exceed the maximum of 5 years prescribed by the law,
and he minimum term is not less than the minimum of 1 year
and 1 day prescribed by the law.
3. The judge has the discretion to set the minimum and
maximum terms within such periods.
5. Execution and service
1. Three-fold rule (Art. 70)
1. General Rule:
1. When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will
so permit.
2. Exception:
1. Otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed so that they may be
executed successively or as nearly as may be possible,
should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served
out.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding,
the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not
be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be
liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed equals the same maximum period.
3. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty
years.
3. Notes for successive service of sentence
1. “Most severe of the penalties”
1. This includes equal penalties.
2. As illustration, A is sentenced to serve 10 counts of slight
physical injuries. This crime is punishable by arresto
menor.
3. For each count, the court sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of 15 days.
4. Applying the three-fold rule, the convict’s sentence shall
not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties. Hence,
he must serve a maximum duration of confinement of 45
days. It cannot be 150 days.
2. The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve
at least four (4) sentences (Reyes)
1. The reason is if there are only three (3) sentences, the
sum of the 3 sentences will always be less than the three-
fold rule. Hence, the three-fold shall not apply.
3. All the penalties, even if by DIFFERENT COURTS AT
DIFFERENT TIMES, cannot exceed three-fold the most severe.
1. The three-fold rule applies although the penalties were
imposed for different crimes, at different times, and under
separate informations. (Torres v Superintendent)
2. As long as they will be served successively, Art. 70
applies.
4. Subsidiary penalty forms part of the penalty.
1. Fine and its subsidiary penalty are considered as
penalties.
2. Hence, the subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of fine,
together with the penalty of imprisonment shall be added,
and they must not exceed three times the length of the
most severe penalty.
5. “Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.”
1. On top of the three-fold rule, the successive service of
1.
sentence cannot exceed forty (40) years.
2. As illustration, A is convicted of 4 counts of rape,
punishable by reclusion perpetua. As provided by the last
paragraph of Article 70, the duration of perpetual
penalties shall be computed at thirty (30) years.
1. Four counts of rape times 30 years is equivalent to
120 years. This is not allowed by law as it violates 1)
the three-fold rule, and 2) the 40-year rule.
2. Three times 30 years if equivalent to 90 years. This is
still not allowed by law as it violates the 40-year rule.
Hence, A must serve a maximum period of sentence
of 40 years.
6. Does Art. 70 apply if the one is punished under the RPC
(serious physical injuries) and the other is punished under
special laws (anti-torture act)?
1. No, because offenses which are punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. (Art.
10)
2. Probation Law (PD 968)
1. What is material is the offense which the accused was found
guilty of, and not the offense he was charged with.
1. It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the
provisions of the Probation Law that in applying for
probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the
offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of.
2. Thus, upon the acceptance of the plea bargaining, regardless
of what the original charge was in the Information, the
judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the
accused pled guilty.
3. If the lesser offense is probationable, then the person guilty of
the offense can apply for probation. (Pascua v People, 2020)
2. Sec. 4 - Grant of Probation
1. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a
probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best.
2. No application for probation shall be entertained if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction:
1. Provided, That when a judgment of conviction imposing a
1.
non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the imposition of
a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision
before such decision becomes final.
1. The application for probation based on the modified
decision shall be filed in the trial court where the
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable
penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such
case has since been re-raffled.
3. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken
further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation
by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a
certified true copy of the judgment of conviction.
4. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only.
5. The filing of the application for probation shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal.
6. An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable.
3. Sec. 9 - Disqualified Offenders
1. The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(S-66-OA)
1. Convicted of any crime against the Security of the State;
2. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six (6) years;
3. Who have previously been convicted by final judgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6)
months and one day and/or a fine of not less than P1,000;
4. Who have been Once on probation under the provisions of
this Decree; and
5. Who are Already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
4. Sec. 14 - Period of Probation
1. The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed
two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed
six years.
2. When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is
made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor
to be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary
2.

imprisonment as computed at the rate established, in Article

39 of RPC.
3. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (RA 9344)
4. An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on Which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under The
Revised Penal Code (RA 10951)
RA 9344; On Diversion
DIVERSION STAGE
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted.
Diversion may be conducted at the Barangay/Police/Inquest/PI/All proceedings in
judicial.

SEC. 23. System of Diversion.

Children in conflict with the law - diversion programs - without undergoing court
proceedings - subject to these conditions:
a) Victimless crimes + Not more than six (6) years- DSWD alone may conduct
conferencing, mediation and conciliation.
b) Not more than six (6) years- Law Enforcement/Punong Barangay, with assistance
of DSWD
c) Imposable penalty exceeds six (6) years - Court only.

SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. -

A contract of diversion may be entered into during such conferencing, mediation or
conciliation proceedings.

SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. -

Child voluntarily admits to the crime + a diversion program shall be developed.
Such admission + not be used against the child in any proceedings.
Diversion program + effective and binding + accepted by the parties (accused and
offended party).

Failure to comply + contract of diversion + offended party has option to institute the
appropriate legal action.

Prescription of the offense + suspended + until completion of diversion proceedings +

not to exceed 45 days.
Prescription of the offense + suspended + during effectivity of the diversion program +
not exceeding 2 years.

COMMENT: If asked in Bar, note that prescription is SUSPENDED for 2 years while
the child is under diversion program. This is in favor of the offended party. After 2
years, it will RUN already. This is in favor of the child.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.

Recommendation of DSWD + the court dismiss the case + if it finds disposition
measures fulfilled.
The discharge + not affect the civil liability.
PENDING TRIAL
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. -
RA 9344; On Diversion
DIVERSION STAGE
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted.
Diversion may be conducted at the Barangay/Police/Inquest/PI/All proceedings in
judicial.

SEC. 23. System of Diversion.

Children in conflict with the law - diversion programs - without undergoing court
proceedings - subject to these conditions:
a) Victimless crimes + Not more than six (6) years- DSWD alone may conduct
conferencing, mediation and conciliation.
b) Not more than six (6) years- Law Enforcement/Punong Barangay, with assistance
of DSWD
c) Imposable penalty exceeds six (6) years - Court only.

SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. -

A contract of diversion may be entered into during such conferencing, mediation or
conciliation proceedings.

SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. -

Child voluntarily admits to the crime + a diversion program shall be developed.
Such admission + not be used against the child in any proceedings.
Diversion program + effective and binding + accepted by the parties (accused and
offended party).

Failure to comply + contract of diversion + offended party has option to institute the
appropriate legal action.

Prescription of the offense + suspended + until completion of diversion proceedings +

not to exceed 45 days.
Prescription of the offense + suspended + during effectivity of the diversion program +
not exceeding 2 years.

COMMENT: If asked in Bar, note that prescription is SUSPENDED for 2 years while
the child is under diversion program. This is in favor of the offended party. After 2
years, it will RUN already. This is in favor of the child.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.

Recommendation of DSWD + the court dismiss the case + if it finds disposition
measures fulfilled.
The discharge + not affect the civil liability.
PENDING TRIAL
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. -
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth
detention homes.

What instances will the child be detained pending trial?

1. no contract of diversion was perfected, or
2. the child failed to comply, and the information was filed.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.
Recommendation of DSWD + the court dismiss the case + if it finds disposition
measures fulfilled.
The discharge + not affect the civil liability.
PENDING TRIAL
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. -
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth
detention homes.

What instances will the child be detained pending trial?

1. no contract of diversion was perfected, or
2. the child failed to comply, and the information was filed.

SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence.

The child + be credited + the full time spent in actual detention.

Hence, the child need NOT execute the writing under Art. 29. Automatically, full
time spent shall be credited.
JUDGMENT
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. -
Child + under 18 at the time of the commission of the offense + found guilty +
the court place the child under suspended sentence, without need of
application.
Suspension + still be applied + even if child is already 18 + pronouncement of
guilt.

Upon suspension + the court shall impose disposition measures as provided in

the Supreme Court Rule.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.
If the court finds + disposition measures not fulfilled + the child brought court
for execution of judgment.

If child reached 18 years of age while under suspended sentence + court

determine whether:
1. to discharge
2. to order execution
3. to extend suspended sentence until 21 years of age.

COMMENT: The court must AUTOMATICALLY place the child under suspended
sentence, even if he is already 18 at the time of judgment. However, the
suspension shall only extend until he is 21 years of age.
Probation Law (5) ISLAW (11) GCTA (4)
Grounds (national Grounds (national Grounds (heinous;
security; penalty; once security; evasion; escapee; penalty)
probation) penalty; Habitual
Delinquent)
Crimes against national Treason, conspiracy and Heinous crimes
security proposal to commit
treason, misprision of
Probation Law (5) ISLAW (11) GCTA (4)
Grounds (national Grounds (national Grounds (heinous;
security; penalty; once security; evasion; escapee; penalty)
probation) penalty; Habitual
Delinquent)
Crimes against national Treason, conspiracy and Heinous crimes
security proposal to commit
treason, misprision of
treason, espionage
Piracy
Rebellion or sedition
Conditional pardon but
violated the terms
Evaded sentence or Escapee
escaped from
confinement
Reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment
Penalty is NOT a prison
sentence, such as
destierro (People v Perla)
Maximum term of Maximum term of
imprisonment exceeds imprisonment does not
6 years exceed 1 year
Previously convicted by Straight penalty, i.e., Recidivist
final judgment of an prescribed penalty is 10
offense punished by years.
imprisonment of more
than 6 months and 1 day
and/or a fine of more than
P1000.
Once on probation Habitual delinquent Habitual delinquent
under this Decree
Already serving Already sentenced by
sentence at the time of final judgment at the time
the approval of this of approval of this Act.
Decree
Further notes Further notes Further notes
GR: Appeal and probation For maximum term does What are heinous
are mutually exclusive not exceed 1 year, the crimes? (RA 7659)
remedies, so once the issue is prision 1. Treason
accused appeals, he correccional in its 2. Piracy/mutiny high
cannot apply for minimum period (6 seas
probation. months and 1 day to 2 3. Qualified bribery
EXC: if appellate court years and 4 months). 4. Plunder
modifies a non- Hence, the court has 5. Parricide
Further notes Further notes Further notes
GR: Appeal and probation For maximum term does What are heinous
are mutually exclusive not exceed 1 year, the crimes? (RA 7659)
remedies, so once the issue is prision 1. Treason
accused appeals, he correccional in its 2. Piracy/mutiny high
cannot apply for minimum period (6 seas
probation. months and 1 day to 2 3. Qualified bribery
EXC: if appellate court years and 4 months). 4. Plunder
modifies a non- Hence, the court has 5. Parricide
probationable penalty to discretion whether to 6. Murder
probationable. apply ISLAW or not. If 7. Infanticide
the sentence is prision 8. Rape
Judgment imposing non- correccional in its 9. Kidnapping
probationable + appealed medium period, the 10. Robbery with V/I
+ modified to court shall apply 11. Carnapping
probationable + offender ISLAW. Further, if ISLAW 12. Destructive arson
allowed to apply probation does not apply, a 13. Importation,
based on the modified
STRAIGHT PENALTY distribution,
decision
can be imposed by the manufacturing, sale of
Court, i.e,. Straight illegal drugs
NOTE: For first time minor
penalty of 4 months of 14. Possession of illegal
drug offenders, the court
may place the accused arresto mayor (People v drugs
under probation, even if Lumauig, 2014)
the sentence provided
under this Act is higher
than that provided under
existing law on probation.
(Sec. 70, RA 9165 -
CDDA)
6. Extinction of criminal liability
1. Modes of TOTALLY extinguishing criminal liability
1. Death of convict, as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary
penalties, it is extinguished only when the death happened before
final judgment
2. Service of sentence
3. Amnesty
4. Absolute pardon
5. Prescription of crime
6. Prescription of penalty
7. Marriage of offended woman, for rape, acts of lasciviousness,
seduction, and abduction
1. Death
1. Death extinguishes criminal liability before or after the
judgment attains finality.
2. However, civil liability ex delicto is ONLY extinguished if
death occurs before judgment attains finality, i.e., the
case was on appeal. (Hernandez v People, Leonen)
3. Other sources of obligation are not extinguished, whether
before or after final judgment.
1. The Court ruled that, the immutability of final
judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has
the power and prerogative to relax the same in order
to serve the demands of substantial justice. If the
death of the accused happened prior to the finality of
the judgement convicting him of rape and acts of
lasciviousness, but the Court was belatedly informed
of such death only after the finality of such judgment,
the case will be re-opened for purposes of dismissing
the case. (People v Layag, 2016)
2. Service of sentence
1. Service of sentence does not extinguish civil liability, as
provided under Article 113.
3. Amnesty
4. Pardon
1. A pardon shall NOT work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, UNLESS such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.
2. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence. (Art. 36)
3. In Risos-Vidal v Lim, the absolute pardon stated that “He
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.” Hence,
the Court ruled that Estrada was expressly restored of his
right to hold public office or right of suffrage.
1. It was contended that PGMA should have specifically
stated which civil and political rights were restored.
However, the Court held that Congress may not
dictate as to how the President may exercise her
power of executive clemency. Hence, Estrada’s right
to hold public office and right of suffrage were
restored because it was clearly, plainly, and
unambiguously stated that all the civil and political
rights were restored
5. Prescription of crime
1. The period of prescription of continuing crime never
commences to run. Why? Because the crime is still being
1.

committed.
2. The constructive notice rule applies in case of falsification
of public document when a notarized deed of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Prescription of
crime shall start to run from such constructive notice.
Why? It is deemed discovered at that time.
3. Prescription of crime; erroneous filing of information is
immaterial
1. The filing of the information in the court of Batangas
for estafa, even if erroneous, because it had no
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged, tolls
the running of the prescriptive period of the crime,
since the jurisdiction of a court is determined in
criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the result of proof.
4. Prescription of the offense of false testimony AGAINST
the defendant; Only commences from the time the
principal case is finally decided.
1. With regard to the crime of false testimony against
the defendant, considering that the penalties
provided therefor are made to depend upon the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the
principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not
therefore constitute an actionable offense until the
principal case is finally decided. (People v Maneja)
5. Prescription of the offense of false testimony FOR the
defendant; Commences from the time the testimony was
made
1. If the false testimony is in favor of the defendant,
there is specific penalty which does not depend upon
the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. Hence,
the period of prescription commences to run from
the time the testimony was made.
6. Prescription of penalty
1. “Evade the service of his sentence”
1. If the accused was never placed in confinement, the
period for prescription never started to run in his
favor.
2. “Goes to another country with no extradition treaty with
the government”
1. Acceptance of conditional pardon is equivalent to a
man who goes to another country with no extradition
treaty with the government. Hence, it interrupts the
1.

prescription of penalty. (People v Puntillas, 1938)

7. Marriage of the offended woman
1. Rape - marriage extinguishes the criminal liability of the
husband ONLY. (Art. 266-C)
2. Acts of lasciviousness/seduction/abduction - marriage
extinguishes the criminal liability of the husband, along
with his co-principals, accomplices, and accessories. (Art.
344)
3. Re-election is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability
(Morales v. CA and Binay)
Pardon
Amnesty

As to who grants An act of grace by the Chief Executive with the

Chief Executive alone concurrence of Congress
(Tiu v Dizon)
Nature of Act Private
Public
As to when After conviction Before or after institution
of criminal action or after
conviction
As to which crimes Generally all
Political offenses
Effect Looks forward
Looks Backward

Abolishes the Abolishes the crime and

punishment and does puts into oblivion the
NOT work the restoration offense and the accused
of the rights to hold stands as though he did
public office, or right of not commit the offense.
suffrage, UNLESS such
rights be expressly
restored by the terms
of the pardon. (Risos-
Vidal v Lim)
Judicial Notice The courts do not take The courts take judicial
judicial notice because it notice because it is a
is a private act. Hence, it public act. Hence, there
must be proved before is no need to prove
the courts. before the courts.
Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty
20 years - RP/RT 20 years - RP
15 years - PM 15 years - RT/PM
10 years - PC 10 years - PC
Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty
20 years - RP/RT 20 years - RP
15 years - PM 15 years - RT/PM
10 years - PC 10 years - PC
5 years - A. Mayor 5 years - A. Mayor
2 months - A. Menor 1 year - A. Menor
1 year - libel
6 months - slander by deed/ oral
defemation
Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty
Commence Discovery of the Evaded service of
commission of the crime sentence
(Blameless Ignorance
Doctrine)
Interrupt 1) Filing of complaint or 1) Give himself up
information 2) Captured
2) Absent from the 3) Go to foreign country
Philippines with no extradition treaty
4) Commit another crime
before expiration of
period
Run again 1) Proceedings terminate
without the accused
being convicted or
acquitted, i.e.,
information is quashed
2) Proceedings were
unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable
to him
Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty
Prescribed/Actually The penalty prescribed The penalty actually
imposed by law will be considered. imposed will be
considered. Hence,
modifying circumstances
shall be taken into
account.
Libel/oral defamation/ For libel - 1 year; For oral For libel, oral defamation,
slander by deed defamation/slander by or slander by deed, the
deed - 6 months prescription of penalties is
either 10 years or 5 years,
depending on the final
sentence.
considered. Hence,
modifying circumstances
shall be taken into
account.
Libel/oral defamation/ For libel - 1 year; For oral For libel, oral defamation,
slander by deed defamation/slander by or slander by deed, the
deed - 6 months prescription of penalties is
either 10 years or 5 years,
depending on the final
sentence.

2. Modes of PARTIALLY extinguishing criminal liability

1. Conditional pardon
2. Commutation of sentence
3. Good conduct allowances, which the culprit earned while
undergoing preventive imprisonment or while serving sentence.
1. GCTA Law (RA 10592)
1. Preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment
1. Accused agrees in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted persons,
after being informed of the effects, and with
assistance of counsel
1. They shall be credited in the service of sentence,
with the FULL TIME during which they were under
preventive imprisonment, except:
1. Recidivists/Those who have been convicted
previously twice or more times of any crime;
and
2. When upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed
to surrender voluntarily
1. In such case, only 4/5 of the time will
apply.
2. Accused does not agree in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, with the assistance of counsel
1. They shall be credited in the service of sentence,
with 4/5 of the time during which they were under
preventive imprisonment.
3. Exception:
1. The child shall be credited with the full time spent
in actual detention. (Sec. 41, RA 9344) Hence, an
agreement in writing is immaterial.
2. Preventive imprisonment shall be actual period of
detention WITH good conduct time allowance
1. However, recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees
1.
and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. (Art. 29, RPC,
as amended)
7. Civil liability in criminal cases
1. Damages when death results
1. Civil indemnity ex delicto for the death without need of evidence
other than commission of crime;
2. Actual or compensatory damages to the extent proved or
temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but the amount cannot be proved with certainty;
3. Moral damages; and
4. Exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstance (People v Parba)
2. Civil liability involving violation of BP 22
1. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto.
2. But the independent civil liability based on contract or other
sources of obligation which are deemed instituted if not filed
previously, will not be dismissed. An instance where this occurs is
BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
3. Despite the death, the court must determine the surviving civil
liability, and the private complainant is not required to file a
separate civil action based on the contract.
3. Extinction of penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil
liability where:
1. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required;
2. The court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
3. The civil liability of the accused does not arise from crime which
the accused is acquitted. In other words, the civil liability arises
from other sources of obligation.
4. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers, and proprietors
of establishments
1. Elements for the first paragraph
1. Default - In default of the persons criminally liable
(insolvency)
2. The innkeepers/tavern keepers/other persons and
corporations shall be civilly liable
3. Within establishments - For crimes committed within their
establishments
4. Violation ordinance/police - In case there is violation of
ordinance or police regulation by them or their employees
2. Elements for the second paragraph
1. Robbery or theft - Innkeepers are subsidiarily liable for
restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
2. Within their houses - Within their houses from guests
lodging therein,
3. Notified in advance - Provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and
4. Followed directions - Shall have followed the directions
which such innkeeper may have given them with respect to
the care and vigilance over such goods.
5. Violence/intimidation - No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
5. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons
1. The employer, teacher, person, or corporation is engaged in any
kind of industry.
2. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
commits a felony while in the discharge of his duties.
3. The said servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees is
insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.
1. “In any kind of industry”
1. It means an enterprise conducted as a means of livelihood
or profit. (Clemente v Foreign Mission Sisters)
2. Private persons without business or industry is not
subsidiarily liable under Article 103. An example is the
housemaid, or family driver in a household.
2. The provisions of the RPC on subsidiary penalty are deemed
written into the judgments in the cases to which they are
applicable.
1. Under Article 103 of the RPC, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees
in the event of the latter’s insolvency. This subsidiary
liability is deemed written into the judgment in the
cases to which they are applicable. (Alvarez v CA, 1988)
2. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial
court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
1. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal
case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
(Yusal v Adil)
2. The resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action, but the determination must be
based on the evidence that the offended party and
the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal
action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and
civil, has been pronounced (Ozoa v Vda de Madula,
1987); and in a hearing set for that precise purpose,
with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment. (Phil.
Rabbit Bus Lines v People, 2004)
3. The subsidiary liability may be enforced only upon a
motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the
employer and upon proof that the employee is insolvent.
(Basilio v CA, 2000)
3. Employer has right to take part in the defense of his employee
1. It is true that an employer is not a party to the criminal
case instituted against his employee, but he has
subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his
concern to see to it that his interest be protected in the
criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense
of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate
because his failure is also his. (Miranda v Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc.)
4. No defense of diligence of a good father of a family
1. The subsidiary liability is mandatory.