Pakistan Journal of Criminology Volume 2, No. 3, July 2010, pp.

131 - 145
131

Police and Policing in Pakistan1

Fasihuddin
Abstract
Policing in Pakistan underwent drastic changes after the introduction of a new police law the
Police Order 2002. This article describes the existing police organization and structure in
Pakistan. It also briefly analyzes the various police reforms done in Pakistan since the British
era. Despite replacing the Police Act 1861 with the new law policing remains dysfunctional.
The reasons for this are analysed and suggestions are made in a comprehensive conclusion.

Keywords
Police, Policing, Law, Colonial Criminal Justice System, Police Order 2002, Police
Reforms, Fraser Commission, Crime Situation, Security Issues, Post 9/11, War on Terror,
Talibanization

Police are the first respondents to any breach of law in all civil societies. Police
as an organization underwent dramatic changes throughout the world in the last two
centuries, in a bid to keep pace with theories of good governance, new political
ideals, modern technologies, and to respond to the social implications of
urbanization and modernization. Similarly, policingthe way police perform their job
with their peculiar style and attributeshas evolved through a variety of stages and
shapes, right from the order-maintaining and riots-controlling policing to the
problem-oriented policing, community policing, down to the present day terrorism-
oriented community policing and intelligence-led policing, especially after 9/11, to
name a few. Copious literature is available in the market on the history and
development of police and policing in the modern world. However, little is available
on the related subjects in Pakistan, as criminology or policing sciences have never
been the topic of research and empirical studies in any educational institution or
police training colleges, except a few periodic individual efforts.
This paper is an attempt to study the police and policing in the context of
Pakistan. Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Sindh, Punjab, North-west
Frontier Province and Baluchistan) and two federally controlled territories
(Islamabad Capital Territory, and the Tribal Areas, commonly known as FATA-
Federally Administered Tribal Areas). The third federally administered territory of
Northern Areas has recently been given the status of autonomy through a
Presidential Order in 2009. The total area of Pakistan is 796,095 sq. km and the

1
This article was originally written for Police and Security Year Book, 2010 by
Manas Publication, Delhi, India and is reproduced here with the permission of the
Manas Publications.
Fasihuddin
132

current estimated population is 170 million (2009). The Constitution of Pakistan

1973 stipulates that in the provinces the responsibility for crime prevention and
control and the administration of justice primarily rests with the respective
provincial governments. That's why police are under the control of the provincial
government for all practical purposes. The federal government, however, has
jurisdiction over matters of such as the enactment of criminal laws, the training of
certain categories of criminal justice personnel, and research, apart from the direct
law and order responsibility it has for the federally controlled territories (Shoaib
Suddle, 1995). Though in all federation systems such arrangements are inevitable,
yet at times, it gives rise to problems of dichotomy, authority, resources allocation,
autonomy and overriding effects of certain laws. Pakistani police have suffered a lot
in this respect, especially after the new Police Order 2002, promulgated by the
military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf and after Pakistan joined the war on terror in
the wake of 9/11 attacks. Both decisions have far reaching effects as far as the police
department is concerned. We will discuss it shortly.

Police Structure & Organization

Pakistan inherited the colonial criminal justice system from the British Rule in
India. Since the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan has a rigid police structure,
mostly hierarchical and vertical in nature and based on command and control
system. At the top is the Inspector General of Police in a province and a Deputy
Inspector General of Police in a region or range, who is assisted by a Superintendent
of Police (SP) in a district. Below him is the Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of
Police who commands the subdivision or tehsil (sub district level), and below him is
the Station House Officer (SHO) who is incharge of a police station, mostly in the
rank of Inspector or sub-inspector. After the Police Order 2002, most of this
nomenclature is changed. The IGP is now called the Provincial Police Officer
(PPO), the SP is renamed as District Police Officer (DPO) and the DIG in the big
cities is given a new role and authority under the new title of Capital City Police
Officer (CCPO). The Investigation is being separated from the prevention or watch
and ward and has its own chain of command right from police station level to the SP
(Investigation) and Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation) at the top,
however, subject to the general command and control of the SHO in a police station,
of a DPO in a district, of a DIG in a region and of the PPO in the province.
Prosecution is altogether cut off from the police and is now an independent
department under the new Prosecution Ordinance 2005. The various levels of
entries to the police and the tree of organizational structure is given in diagram No. 1
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
133

Federal Government

Establishment Division Ministry of Interior Provincial Government

(Details with PSP Officers)

Provincial Police Officer (PPO / IGP) Home Department

BPS 22/21

Additional IGP (Investigation)

Additional IGP (Operation) BPS 21 BPS 21 Additional IGP (Headquarters) BPS 21

Administrative Staff College Course

Lahore Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) BPS 20/19

National Institute of Management Courses

of 18 to 19 & 19 to 20 District Police Officer (DPO / SP) BPS 19/18
(Mid-Career & Senior Management)

Assistant Superintendent of Police ( ASP )*** BPS 17 Deputy Superintendent of Police ( DSP )* BPS 17
(Common Training Program + Special Training Program) { Training at Police Training College (PTC) }

Upper Course at PTC Inspector (IP)

Sub - Inspector ( SI )

*Selection/ Recruitment by Provincial Public Service Commission (PPSC)

**Recruitment/Selection by Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) Assistant Sub Inspector ( ASI )*
Intermediate Course at PTC
Head Constable (HC)
Lower Course at PTC

Recruitment by DPO / Selection Committee Constable (C)

Diagram No. 1.
Police Organization and Administration with Special Reference to Recruitment
and Training.

The total strength of the police in all the four provinces and the allocated budget
for them are shown in Table I and II respectively. The police normally are not happy
with the available strength and budget and a demand for more recruitment and funds
allocation is always on the top of the police agenda.
Fasihuddin
134

Table: I Sanctioned Police Strength for 2008 - 09

Rank Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Total

PPO / IGP 1 1 1 1 4
Addl. I.G.P 18 6 2 4 30
DIG 38 18 13 13 82
AIG / SSP 37 18 10 32 97
SP / Addl. SP 215 102 66 47 430
ASP 65 333 17 5 420
DSP 797 182 222 1201
Inspector 3457 1551 442 542 5992
Sub-Inspector 15121 4190 1779 1545 22635
Assistant Sub-Inspector 12602 9146 1948 2467 26163
Head Constable 17732 15105 6201 7463 46501
Constable 117537 68074 37994 23529 247134
Grand Total 167620 98544 48655 35870 350689

Source: Office of the Director General, National Police Bureau, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Table: II Total Police Budget in Pakistan. (Figures in Millions Rupees)

Area Establishment Other Expenditure Development Total

Punjab 24500.750 4740.84 1375.24 30616.830

Sindh 21521.460 4773.86 500.00 26795.320
NWFP 5585.622 972.80 636.82 7195.2420
Balochistan 3761.380 303.36 0.00 4064.740
Total 55369.212 10790.86 2512.06 68672.132

Source: Office of the Director General, National Police Bureau, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Police Reforms in Pakistan

The history of reforms in the police is very old and of course very interesting.
The first excellent report on police reforms in the Indian subcontinent, in our view,
was that of the Fraser Indian Police Commission of 1902-03. It says:
“The perusal of the Report of the English Constabulary Force
Commissioners of 1839 inspires the Commission with hope that, if police
reform in England, initiated by Sir Robert Peel, has converted the state of
things described therein as existing sixty years ago into the state of things
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
135

now existing in the country, earnest efforts to reforms the police in India
may in due time produced incalculable benefit” (p.36).
Since then dozens of reports were compiled and debated but the desired results
of the police reforms never come true to the expectations of the general public as
well as of academics and researchers. The story of police reforms in Pakistan is
basically a story of the police image. Almost all of the more than two dozen
commissions and reports since 1947 start with some basic ailments in the police like
inefficiency, malpractices, lack of scientific investigations, political interference,
public distrust and colonial characteristics, so a rationale for police reforms is
developed on these lines. Some think that the high crime rate is the raison de'tre of
the recent police reforms which we will discuss shortly, others think that it is
basically the police integrity problems which demand a drastic shift in our policing
policies and approaches. Amongst the various reasons given by Zubair and Ivkovic
(2004) for the police misconduct in Pakistan before the new police law was enacted,
it was stated that:
“The successive governments have been unable to muster the political will to
reform the administrative structure of the police department in Pakistan. The
original police laws and rules are almost a century old and require a complete
overhaul to provide for the appropriate internal organizational accountability”.
But the problems of corruption, misconduct and complaints against the police
have never been addressed successfully by the subsequent reforms and repeal of the
century old colonial laws! Police are the reflection of a society and before studying
the behaviour and culture of a police organization, we have to take into account the
society itself with its history, traditions, composition, culture, level of development,
education and economic prosperity (Fasihuddin, 2008).
Out of all of the commissions and their reports, the Report of Abbas Khan (ex.
Inspector General of Police, Punjab) became very famous, which also contains the
recommendations of the Japanese Police Mission of 1996. This report
recommended, inter alia, the replacement of the Police Act, 1861 by a new police
act, formation of Public Safety Commissions and establishment of a National Police
Agency. It was basically influenced by the style, culture and structure of the Japan
Police. Later on, many officers, reforms activists and analysts started a kind of
movement for introducing a democratic police service in Pakistan. The Police
Commission Report of 1985 was thus overshadowed by the Report of the Focal
Group on Police Reforms in 2000. The Group after giving a bleak picture of the
existing law and order situation, criticizing the obsolete Police Act of 1861 and
outdated Police Rules of 1934, complaining about the absence of any meaningful
research in police and objecting to the protection of criminals by influential
politicians, underlined the following major concerns as a rationale for bringing
drastic structural and functional changes in the police. It was suggested that reforms
are necessary to:
Fasihuddin
136

i. Restore security, justice and establish rule of law.

ii. Safeguard the citizens against abuse of authority by police and other vested
power groups.
iii. Minimize extraneous interference, mainly political.
iv. Enhance operational capabilities alongwith improving the credibility of police
through the use of due process.
v. Institutionalise community participation.
vi. Strengthen prosecution thereby ensuring speedy justice.

The re-organization of the police in light of these major concerns was proposed
by the Focal Group as a system or service, which shall be:

i. Democratically controlled and politically neutral.

ii. Non-authoritative.
iii. People-friendly and responsive to their needs.
iv. Honest and having respect for rule of law.
v. Professionally efficient.
After a great deal of debate across every nook and corner of the country, a final
draft was promulgated by the government of Gen. Pervez Musharaf as Police Order
2002. It has now completely changed the structure of the police in Pakistan, though
the said law has become a moot point due to political reasons and as it is subject to
day to day changes and amendments due to one or other pretext. The initial salient
features of the new Police Order 2002 are:-

i. Detailed description of Responsibilities and Duties of the Police.

ii. Reconstitution and Re-organization of the existing police force, with separate
wings for prevention and investigation wings and other specialized units.
iii. Formation of Public Safety Commissions at District, Provincial and National
levels.
iv. Establishment of Police Complaint Authorities at District, Provincial and
Federal levels.
v. Establishment of Criminal Justice Coordination Committee at District Level.
vi. Establishment of National Police Management Board.
vii. Establishment of National Police Bureau.
viii. So many other qualitative and quantitative changes.
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
137

Whether it was a step forward or a jump backward is yet not clear and after
seven years of the new police law, many are not happy the way these reforms were
introduced without considerable spadework in terms of the capacity problem of the
existing police to absorb the implications of the new police law, unleashed, wittingly
or unwittingly, by such a drastic and direct grafting from the modern and highly
developed police systems in the west to an under-developed, semi-tribal, semi-
democratic and transitional society such as Pakistan. The sad event is that of the
subsequent amendments to the new police order in a couple of months, which
altogether changed the whole idea of the police reforms. A pioneer of police reforms,
ex- Inspector General of Police and who worked closely with the National
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in drafting and implementation of the new police
law, Mr. Afzal Ali Shigri bitterly responded to these subsequent changes to the
original law. In an article, 'Dismantling the Police Command Structure' he observed:
“The Police Order 2002 was a genuine attempt to address, inter alia, the
problem of strengthening the internal organization of police so that t could grow into
a cohesive and effective force….Unfortunately this law was never implemented…
The Government, instead of moving towards a progressive and modern law, has
embarked on revising the provisions that depoliticize police. Its amendments are
even worse than the 1861 Police Act, harking back to the Subadari System by Sher
Shah Suri in the sixteenth century that was meant to protect and enhance the power
of the ruler. The destruction of command structure of a modern police force and its
total subservience to the political bosses will have dreadful results for the country”.
(Daily The News, December 3, 2005).
In a comprehensive report by International Crisis Group on 'Reforming
Pakistan's Police,' it was noted that “Amendments to the Police Order have watered
down provisions that held some promise of reform, including mechanisms for
civilian accountability and internal discipline, as well as guarantees for autonomy
and safeguards against political interference in the posting, transfer and promotion
of police officials. ----
With public confidence in the police at an all-time low, reform will be difficult
and require time, patience and resources, yet it is a task the new governments at the
centre and in the provinces will ignore at their peril, as militant violence reaches new
heights” (Asia Report No 157 dated 14 July 2008).
The opponents of the reforms have some valid observations like the non-
framing of new police rules or non-implementation of the Police Order, yet we think
that instead of rolling backing the reforms process, we need more reforms, and we
should concentrate on the lessons learnt during the process. Scrapping the reforms
will create greater problems than it would solve. Contrary to the opposition of the
police reforms, some moderate thinkers and NGOs are trying to safeguard and
protect the system from further setbacks and confusion. For example, the Consumer
Rights Commission of Pakistan (CRCP) in collaboration with the Asian
Development Bank organized some public forum debates of all the stakeholders on
the topic of 'Police Reforms: New Legal Framework and Issues in Implementation'.
Fasihuddin
138

They found many good discussion points for the consideration of the stakeholders
and suggested to build ownership of reforms, and create awareness and consensus
on the issue. “The Police reforms appear not to have mustered enough public
support. This is partly due to almost absence of open public debate on the Police
Order 2002 and its implementation”, the report has rightly suggested. We would
close this discussion with the apt remarks of another analyst who is also an ex-
Inspector General of Police and a well-known writer and criminologist:
“The police is rightly considered to be the top player in crime control and the
establishment of law and order. And in this it is generally said that the police in
Pakistan have much to do. When you ask senior police administrators why this be so,
they come up with many quite valid reasons like bad recruitment, inadequate
training and lack of adequate facilities etc. That these arguments are generally 'fair
comment' has been underlined by various commissions and committees set up from
time -to-time. The Police Order 2002 has addressed many such issues, but the full
impact of the Order will not be visible for many years and that only if the Order is
allowed to take effect in its true intent and if money is made available as per the
roadmap of its implementation. Because in this country the police are given
resources on a 'as-and when available' basis” (Mohib Asad, 2009).

Pakistan's Crime Situation

As an integral and important part of the law and order machinery, police all
over the world are trying desperately to measure up to the task of prevention and
detection of crimes. The genesis and growth of crime is, therefore, relevant to a
better understanding of police, its role and performance (Chaudhry, 1997).
Pakistan's crime situation has never been a pleasant one as not only the ordinary
crimes are very rampant but also bouts of extra-ordinary situations, agitations and
riots like that of 1958 and 1968, the external migration like the three millions of
Afghan refugees in 1980s and like the recent effects of the war on terror in shape of
serious security threats and another three millions of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) from tribal areas and Malakand Division down to the cities, often aggravate
the crime scenario, however, rarely proper research and analyses are conducted in
this respect. Crime figures are available with comments only from 1947 to 1981, but
no such efforts have been seen after this by the Ministry of Interior. The total
recorded crimes in 1947 were 74, 104 and 152,782 in 1981 with a crime rate of 247
per 100,000 population in 1947 and 182.2 in 1981. This can be attributed to the
volatile situation in the post-independence scenario in 1947. If we study the
recorded crimes from 1991 onwards, it seems that the crime tide has never been gone
down considerably. Astonishingly, the police reforms were initiated in a time (2001)
when the official crime figures were going low and which steadily went up after the
promulgation of the new police law in 2002. It is still on the rise. Figure 1 shows
ample proof that police reforms of 2002 were not crime-centered only. There must
have been so many other good reasons for it.
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
139

Recorded Crime in Pakistan

537,866 538,048
600000
Number of Recorded Crimes

523,689

428,549 388,414 399,006 447,756

500000 441,907
409,167 400,680
380,659
400000 339,228 369,161
286,528 323,351 329,305
287,746 290,000
300000

200000

100000

0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Years (1991 to 2008)

Series1 Series2

Sources: Office of the Director General, National Police Bureau, Islamabad, Pakistan
(Figure 1)
Though there are many shortcomings in and aspersions about the police-
collected data, yet it is the only officially available data so for in Pakistan. There are
some important points to be remembered about crime data in Pakistan:
i. Mere statistics do not convey the seriousness of any particular crime. The
trends and levels are two different things. No one can claim with authority that
the compiled record of crime/ statistics is the complete picture of our national
crime data.
ii. The official data in Pakistan is not verified by alternative means like
victimization survey, self-report surveys, hospital admissions, and cause of
death data or at least counter checked by the data compiled by the free media.
Exchange of information indicators amongst the various components of the
criminal justice system like prison, probation, prosecution, courts and police is
another problem in Pakistan to get an authentic and consolidated data.
iii. In most cases people don't go to the police stations due to one or other reasons,
and even the police feel reluctant to register cases due to work overload and
performance checks by the seniors. This is not uncommon in Pakistan.
iv. The police data is compiled by the National Police Bureau and in most cases the
data from specialized units for some heinous crimes like money laundering,
cyber crimes, drugs issues, terrorism, white-collar crimes and children and
women abuses, etc are not included in the format of the National Police Bureau.
Specialized agencies have their own record. (Fasihuddin, 2008).
Fasihuddin
140

Police and Recent Security Issues in Pakistan

Pakistan joined the war on terror after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. The
'students-cum-rulers-cum-fighters' (now collectively called Taliban) became a
serious threat to the very integrity and solidarity of the country. Pakistan, in order to
crack down on these 'non-state actors' and to comply with the international
commitments, became a staunch ally (though to some it was a Hobson choice) in the
war on terror, and since 2003 has lost about 2000 army personnel and more than 100
pro-government tribal chieftains, in chasing the foreign and local militants in the
rugged terrain of tribal areas, especially adjacent to Afghan borders. Pakistan moved
more than 100,000 security forces to these areas with more than 1100 check posts.
Though a protracted war in the tribal areas, Pakistan pursued its policy of 3Ds
(development, dialogue and deterrence) in FATA. Pakistan's anti-terrorism and
counter-insurgency policy oscillated between the heights of periodic peace deals
with local militants and tribal population, and military operations against the
miscreants, militants, terrorists and Talibanthe various names they are called with.
(Fasihuddin, 2009) During the breathing space of peace deals and at places where
the security was weak, the militants extended their sphere of influence by a variety
of techniques and tactics, commonly known as talibanization. Taliban as retaliation
and to engage the security agencies in other places, carried out a series of terrorist
activities throughout the country, including suicide bombing, mines and improvised
explosive device (IED) blasts, target killing and kidnapping of high profile officials.
The worst setback and reprisals from these militants were received in the North-
west Frontier Province, the Province of Baluchistan and the cities of Islamabad.
Rawalpindi and Lahore during 2005-09. As an example, we would like to quote the
statistics for one province i.e; the NWFP, which is the most affected province and
adjacent to most of the tribal territories and where the military operations have been
going on in most of its northern and southern districts. Table III and Table IV show
the details of the total terrorist and suicide incidents with the human losses inflicted
on security forces as well as civilians. To some analysts, the number and extent of
casualties and damages are far more than the official figures.
Table: III Details of Terrorist Activities in NWFP (Period: 20048.6.2009)

Person Killed Person Injured

No. of Cases
Years Registered
Police FC Army Civil Total Police FC Army Civil Total

2004 27 6 1 2 4 13 3 3 7 58 71
Pakistan Journal of Criminology

2005 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2006 38 18 0 0 55 73 24 0 0 121 145

2007 359 62 32 62 253 409 172 89 162 592 1015

2008 524 117 25 52 408 602 256 86 88 885 1315

1.1.2009 to
337 58 13 38 194 303 153 42 121 658 974
8.6.2009

Grand
Total 1286 261 71 154 914 1400 608 220 378 2314 3520

Source: Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation) NWFP Peshawar.
141
Fasihuddin

Table: IV Detail of Suicidal Cases (Period: 20048.6.2009)

Person Killed Person Injured
No. of Cases
Years Registered
Police FC Army Civil Total Police FC Army Civil Total
2006 4 2 0 4 44 50 2 0 12 75 89
2007 28 45 23 57 210 335 54 43 137 351 585
2008 30 30 7 25 219 281 92 43 65 450 650
1.1.2009 to 13
13 2 26 95 136 51 34 239
8.6.2009 85 409
Grand 75 90 132 112 568 102 199 120 299 1115 1733
Total
Source: Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation) NWFP Peshawar.
142
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
143

After 9/11, Whites (2007) observes that:

“Departments have been forced to revise training, deployment, and
communication strategies and to create counterterrorism units within
their departments. Polaice now provide extra patrol and guard around
critical infrastructures such as power plants, food and water sources, and
transportation hubs. Police departments now receive briefings from
federal authorities in the FBI and Homeland Security about potential
threats and terrorist plans garnered through electronic surveillance and
interrogations of incarcerated terrorists.”
Also, there was much criticism of the American intelligence failure prior to
9/11 which is evident from the observations of the 9/11 Commission Report,
however, new laws were promulgated, new departments were established and new
policies and strategies were adopted to cope with the menace of terrorism in the
USA, the UK and other developed world. On the contrary, police in Pakistan were
not ready to face such a horrible challenge as they have never been recruited or
trained and equipped for anti or counter terrorism actions. To cope with such a
situation police have to work hard; enhance their professional capabilities; and
mobilize and reinforce their ranks with new vision, leadership and commitment.
Police, at the moment, need drastic overhauling, huge financial support, capacity-
building trainings and a realistic model of intelligence-led-policing (Fasihuddin
2009). Though some actions have been taken as protective measures against
terrorist acts and some morale boasting initiatives for the local police are introduced
by the respective provincial governments, yet no comprehensive anti-terrorism
policy at a national level is available till date. No extra resources allocation for the
police departments, and more than that no tangible individual or institutional
endeavors have been visibly noticed for a comprehensive and empirical research on
terrorism or suicide attacks or a thorough documentation and analysis of the
reported cases. This gap of knowledge or gap of understanding gives rise to many
missing links in our approach to address the issue of terrorism and human bombings
in Pakistan. An indigenous research in Pakistan will be a more relevant document
for all stakeholders of the war on terror. (Naushad, 2009).
Hassan Abbas (2009) has suggested some recommendations for improving the
police performance which in his opinion are crucial for counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism success. These include implementation of Police Order 2002 in
letter and spirit; increased salaries and better service conditions for lower ranks;
establishing Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) throughout the country on
the pattern of CPLC Karachi; up gradation of National Police Bureau to the level of a
resourceful think-tank and effective coordination amongst intelligence agencies and
the community for a better model of intelligence-led policing. Most of his
Fasihuddin
144

recommendations are theoretical and hold good, but more practical initiatives have
been suggested by Naushad Khan (2009), Fasihuddin (2008, 2009) Mohib Asad
(2009), Abdul Khalique Shaikh (2009) and others in order to bring changes in the
existing police culture, police training and education, police welfare, police
structure and functions, police administration and leadership. The aim and
objectives of these suggestions are, enhanced police professionalism; effective and
quick service delivery; improved public image; decreased crime rate; increased
public satisfaction of security; absence of stories of police excesses, torture and
human rights abuses; career and capacity-building opportunities for the officers;
creation of specialized units within the police based on modern techniques and
scientific investigation; and above all, a sense of police- friendly environment with
greater respect and dignity for the department.
Conclusion
Police performance can be assessed only in relation to particular goals and
criteria of success. Deciding what the objectives and priorities of the police should
be, however, is inevitably a contested, political matter. This suggests that there can
not be any definitive, once-and-for-all-time statement of the goals of policing
(Reiner, 1998). Many police chiefs were once asked some specific questions
relating to their organizations and functions and the situations which often have
agitated their minds. In response to a question about the greatest challenge facing
police today, the Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, replied:
“I think the greatest challenge is to meet the expectations of stakeholders,
including both the community and government. Sometimes the expectations of the
community and government are not aligned… and the police are therefore caught in
the middle. The challenge is to balance these stakeholder interests while at the same
time maintaining the organization” (Fleming, 2009).
If we compare this statement with the outcome of a survey of lower and middle
rank police officials in the NWFP, who stated that the biggest challenge to them is
terrorism, religious militancy and suicide attacks (30% in total of the respondents)
(Fasihuddin 2009), it becomes clear that the higher police leadership is sensitive and
cognizant of policy matters related to community satisfaction and political agendas
of the governments, whereas the lower and middle managers are concerned with the
imminent field issues such as attack on their and public life and property. This needs
an immediate bridge and consideration by policy makers and police leadership. This
is not uncommon in Pakistan where exists a gulf between the high police leadership
and the lower ranks and file. All our efforts for modernization and sophistication of
the police will fall short of any tangible results, if not coupled with democratization
of the police in Pakistan. Even less achievements will be praised high if there is rule
of law, accountability, fair play, transparency and single-mindedness across the
hierarchy of the police organization.
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
145

References
Fasihuddin (2008): 'The Need for Comparative Criminology and Policing in
the context of India and Pakistan'. In Fasihuddin, Expanding Criminology to
Pakistan, Unigraphics, Peshawar, Pakistan
Fasihuddin (2009): 'Police Education and Training in Pakistan'. In Pakistan
Journal of Criminology, Vol 1, Number 2, July 2009.
Fasihuddin (2009): 'Talibanization and terrorist attacks in the North-west
Frontier Province, the local police response and some recommendations'. In Samih
Teymur, et. al (ed), Combating Terrorism, First Edition, The Turkish Institute for
Security and Democracy (TISD), Washington, USA.
Fleming, Jenny (2004): 'Commissioner Mick Keelty, Australian Federal
Police'. In Police Practice and Research, Vol. 5, Number 4/5 (September/ December
2004).
Reiner, Robert (1998): 'Process or Product? Problems of Assessing Individual
Police Performance'. In Broden, Jean-Paul (ed), How to Recognize Good Policing,
Problems and Issue, Sage Publications and Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF), USA.
Chaudhry, M.A.K (1997): Policing in Pakistan, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd.
Lahore, Pakistan
Fraser Report, Report of the Indian Police Commission, 1902-3, Published by
National Institute of Public Administration, Karachi, 1965, NIPA Reprint Series 6,
Karachi, Pakistan.
Hassan Abbas (2009): Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan, Crucial
for Counterinsurgency and Counter terrorism Success. Institute for Social Policy
and Understanding
(http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20%20Police%20Reforms%20in%2
0Pakistan%20Report.pdf )
Whites, D. Michael (2007): Current Issues and Controversies in Policing,
Pearson Education, Inc. USA.
Shoab Suddle, Muhammad (1995): 'Pakistan'. In Criminal Justice Profiles of
Asia, Investigation, Prosecution and Trial, UNAFEI, Tokyo, Japan.
Office of the Director General, National Police Bureau, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police, (Investigation) NWFP,
Peshawar, Pakistan.
Fasihuddin
144

Naushad Ali Khan (2009): 'Suicide Bombing in the NWFP, The Need for
Research and Information Collection on Human Bombers'. In Pakistan Journal of
Criminology, Vol. 1, Number 1, April 2009.
Mohib Asad, Saiyed (2009): 'Improving Police Culture'. In Pakistan Journal of
Criminology, Vol. 1, Number1, April 2009.
International Crisis Group (2008): Report on Reforming Pakistan's Police,
o
Asia Report N 15714 July, 2008.
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/157_reformin
g_pakistan_s_police.pdf).
Fasihuddin (2009): 'The Long War, Peace Accords with the Militants and
US/Nato Airstrikes in Pakistan'. In IO Sphere, published by Joint Information
Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC), Winter 2009, Department of Defence,
USA.
Zubair Nawaz Chattha and Ivkovic, Sanja Kutnjak (2004): 'Police Misconduct,
The Pakistani Paradigm'. In Klockars B. Carl, IvKovic, Sanja Kutnjak and
Haberfeld, M.R. (ed), The Contours of Police Integrity, Sage Publications, London,
UK.
Consumer Rights Commission of Pakistan (2005): Police Reforms, New Legal
Framework and Issues in Implementation, Results of Public Consultations,
Islamabad, Pakistan.

The author Fasihuddin is a senior police officer, President of Pakistan Society of Criminology and
Editor- in - Chief of Pakistan Journal of Criminology. He can be reached at [email protected]