EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 240337. January 04, 2022 ]

FRANCIS O. MORALES PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARANDANG, J.:

1 2
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 21, 2020,
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which affirmed the Decision dated March 15, 2018 and the Resolution dated June 22, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39341. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court,
Angeles City, Branch 56 in Criminal Case No. R-ANG-15-02275-CR (MTCC Case No.
13-8513), which affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch III for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Damage to Property and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of two (2)

months and one (1) day of arresto mayor;

2) The award of lost income for one (1) month at P400 per day, or the sum of
P12,000.00, to spouses Rico and Leilani Mendoza is DELETED and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00;

3) The award of lost income for one (1) week at P400 per day, or sum of P2,800.00
to Myrna Cunanan is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay
temperate damages in the amount of P2,000.00; and

4) The award of P350,000.00 to Noel G. Garcia representing the cost of the repairs
of the jeepney is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G.
Garcia or his authorize[d] representative temperate damages in the amount of
P150,000.00.

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SO ORDERED.

Facts of the Case

On June 5, 2013, an information was filed against Francis O. Morales (petitioner) for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property and Multiple Physical Injuries. The accusatory
portion of the information reads:
That on or about 14th day of May, 2013, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the driver of a Mitsubishi Delica Van
with Plate No. XKZ-528 owned and driven by Francis O. Morales, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the
said vehicle along Sto. Rosario St. corner San Jose St., Brgy. San Jose,
Angeles City, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner and in utter
disregard of traffic laws, rules, and regulations and without taking the
necessary precaution and care to avoid accident, thereby causing such
recklessness and imprudence to hit and bump a Isuzu Jitney with Plate
No. CWR-138 owned by a certain Noel F. Garcia a resident of 333 Dela
Paz Norte, CSFP and driven by Rico M. Mendoza as a result thereof,
the driver of said Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 sustained
serious physical injuries and the three (3) other passengers namely:
Lailani Mendoza, Myrna Cunanan and Albert Vital sustained slight
physical injuries, likewise said Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138
incurred damages in the estimated amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00), Philippine Currency to the
prejudice of said complainant.

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ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution
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presented three witnesses, namely Rico Mendoza (Rico), Leilani Mendoza (Leilani), and Myrna
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Cunanan (Myrna). The defense presented petitioner as its sole witness.

The witnesses for the prosecution alleged that on May 15, 2013 at around 3:00 a.m., Rico, Leilani,
and Myrna, together with Albert Vital (Albert; collectively, private complainants), were on board a
passenger jeepney with Plate No. CWR-138. Rico was driving the jeepney. They came from Maimpis
and were traversing the road of Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City on their way to Angeles City Market.
They were on the right lane. Meanwhile, the Delica van driven by petitioner with Plate No. XKZ-528 was
on the opposite lane going to San Fernando. Petitioner suddenly overtook the vehicle in front of him,
causing him to occupy the lane of the jeepney. Rico tried to avoid the collision to no avail as petitioner
was driving in a fast speed. Petitioner bumped the jeepney resulting in physical injuries to the
passengers and driver as well as extensive damage to the jeepney amounting to P350,000.00. Rico
suffered a deep laceration in the forehead and a cervical strain. He underwent suturing and
hospitalization in the amount of P14,345.00. Leilani sustained skin and soft tissue avaltion, posterior
lateral aspect right forearm and sprain ankle, costing her hospitalization expenses in the amount of
P34,763.50. Myra suffered multiple physical injury and incurred damages in the amount of P3,045.00.
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Albert incurred hospitalization expenses in the amount of P2,895.80.

Petitioner countered that after a night of merry making, he and his friends decided to go to a gotohan
in Angeles City at the midnight of May 15, 2013. He rode his Delica van with his 13-year-old son. They
stayed at the gotohan until 3:00 a.m. On their way home, they passed Sto. Rosario Street bound for San
Fernando City. They occupied the inner lane of the road going to San Fernando. The right side of the
jeepney driven by Rico suddenly hit the Delica van. Petitioner and his son were injured and brought to
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the Sacred Heart Medical Center. The Delica van also sustained extensive damages.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

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In its Decision dated June 30, 2015, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Angeles City
convicted petitioner of the crime charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court finds accused Francisco Morales GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one
month and twenty one days to two months.

Likewise, Francisco Morales is ordered to pay the following indemnifications:

1. To Spouses Rico Mendoza and Leilani Mendoza:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P49,108.50;

b)Lost Income for one (1) month for P400 per day at a sum of P12,000.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00 each spouse.

2. To Myra Cunanan:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P3,045.00;

b)Lost income for one (1) week for P400 per day at a sum of P2,800.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00.

3. Albert Vital:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P2,895.00.

4. To Noel G. Garcia the registered owner of the passenger jeep with plate number CWR-138 or any
of his authorized representative, the amount of three hundred fifty thousand pesos (P350,000.00)
representing the cost of the repair of the damage of the passenger jeep.

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SO ORDERED.

The MTCC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the recklessness and negligence of
petitioner in driving his Delica van. Petitioner, in violation of Section 37 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136,
as amended, hastily overtook the vehicle in front of him without first determining whether the road was
clear. He was also driving his van at a fast speed, as evidenced by the extent of damage incurred by
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both vehicles in violation of the speed restriction stated in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.

The MTCC ruled that it is undisputed that the jeepney driven by Rico was traversing along its rightful
lane when the van coming from the opposite direction suddenly overtook another vehicle and
encroached on the passenger jeep. The accident would not have happened had the accused stayed on
his lane and not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle, especially not at 3:00 a.m. while the road is
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dark and not well lighted.

The MTCC held petitioner liable for: (1) the lost income of spouses Rico and Leilani as well as Myrna
who, as vendors, were earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day; (2) the medical and hospital expenses of
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Rico, Lailani, Myrna, and Albert; and (3) moral damages to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna.
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Petitioner sought reconsideration but the MTCC denied in its Order dated August 25, 2015.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

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In its Decision dated December 1, 2016, the RTC affirmed the ruling of the MTCC. It agreed with
the MTCC that petitioner's negligence in overtaking the vehicle in front of his without taking the
necessary precaution is the proximate cause of the injury and damage suffered by the private
complainants. It noted that the sketch of the incident showed that the point of impact was at the inner
lane occupied by the jeepney. This proves that petitioner encroached into the rightful lane of the jeep.
Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident tends to
throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicle's movement prior to, and at the time of the
accident. The RTC also sustained the MTCC's finding that petitioner was speeding at the time of the
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accident, which very act is indicative of imprudent behavior.

Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

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In its Decision dated March 15, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification as to the penalty
imposed and the damages granted.

Preliminarily, the CA upheld the conviction of petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple physical injuries and damage to property. It agreed with the RTC and the MTCC that it was
petitioner's act of overtaking the vehicle in front of his, without taking the necessary care and precaution
to ensure that he can safely do so, that was the proximate cause of the injury suffered by Rico and his
passengers. Petitioner was at fault because he was driving at the wrong side of the road when the
collision happened. As shown in the Traffic Accident Report (TAR) and the testimonies of the witnesses,
before the collision, the jeepney driven by Rico was cruising along its rightful lane when the Delica van
driven by petitioner, suddenly swerved and encroached its lane. The accident would not have happened
had petitioner driven his vehicle on its lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle.
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Significantly, petitioner did not deny the fact that he overtook another vehicle.

The CA noted that petitioner is presumed to be negligent at the time of the mishap pursuant to
Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, since he was violating a traffic regulation, that is, he was driving on
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the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption.

The CA also rejected petitioner's argument that Rico was at fault because the latter testified that he
saw the approaching van but failed to evade the same. It held that R.A. No. 4136, as amended, provides
that the one who is overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction
know his/her presence and not the other way around as petitioner seems to suggest. Likewise, the CA
ruled that the last clear chance doctrine does not apply in the case because it presupposes that both
parties are negligent. Here, it was established that petitioner's negligence caused the damage and the
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injury.

With respect to the penalty imposed, the CA explained that the penalty prescribed for reckless
imprudence is dependent on whether the act, if committed with intent, would have resulted in a grave
felony, less grave felony, or light felony. The CA found that the evidence presented by the prosecution
shows that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna amount only to slight physical injuries,
which is a less grave felony. Per the Certificates of Confinement, Leilani was confined for three to five
days only, Rico for two to three days, and none was mentioned for Myrna. No other proof was shown that
they were incapacitated for labor or that they required medical attendance for a longer period. Pursuant
to Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty for reckless imprudence for an act, which if it
had been intentional would have been a less grave felony, is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Since the maximum term of
imprisonment in this case, four (4) months, does not exceed one (1) year, the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application. The CA ruled that a straight penalty taken from arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed. It meted the penalty of imprisonment of
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two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.

As to the damages awarded, the CA sustained the grant of moral damages and actual damages
representing hospitalization expenses. However, on the award for lost income, Rico, Leilani, and Myrna
failed to present evidence sufficiently showing their respective income. Hence, the awards for lost
income should be deleted. Similarly, Noel G. Garcia failed to adduce competent proof of the amount
spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. The sum of P350,000.00 is merely a cost
estimate from a motor repair shop and not the actual amount expended to repair the jeep. Due to the
lack of documentary proof, the CA awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages since some
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pecuniary loss was suffered though its amount cannot be proven with certainty.

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Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated June 22, 2018.
He elevated the case before Us via a petition for review on certiorari. The People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a comment.

Proceedings Before this Court

Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner raised the following: first, the CA erred in giving full faith and credence to the TAR, which
stated that petitioner was at fault when the collision happened because he was driving at the wrong side
of the road. Petitioner insisted that the TAR was prepared without his presence since he and his child
were then being treated at the hospital for the severe injuries they suffered. The TAR was prepared at
the instance of the private complainants; thus it does not provide a truthful account of what transpired
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during the accident.

Second, the object evidence, particularly the physical depression on the vehicles, showed that Rico
instead of steering the jeepney away from petitioner's approaching van, steered right into the van's
direction head on. The point of impact of the van and the jeepney was within petitioner's lane. Rico
admitted that he saw petitioner's approaching vehicle from the opposite direction, but he did not evade it.
Thus, it was Rico who was negligent in driving his vehicle. It was he who had the last opportunity to
reflect and deliberate on the impending danger of an overtaking vehicle from the opposite direction of the
road. More, the prosecution failed to establish the actual speed of petitioner's vehicle and the
circumstances of place and time immediately prior to the collision. Neither did it prove that Rico was
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driving the jeepney with due diligence.

Third, the award of temperate damages to the private complainants has no basis because petitioner
was not shown to have been negligent when he drove his vehicle prior to, or during the collision. Private
complainants failed to adduce evidence that they sustained substantial pecuniary losses due to the
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accident or even establish their earning capacity.

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Fourth, the CA, applying Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, imposed upon the petitioner the straight
penalty of two (2) months imprisonment, an increase from the lower court's-imposed penalty of one (1)
month and twenty (20) days to two (2) months of imprisonment. R.A. No. 10951 was passed in 2017,
while the alleged infraction was committed in 2013. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 10951 is not favorable to him,
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the same should not be applied in the case.

Arguments of respondent

The OSG maintained that the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution established all the
elements of the crime charged. The MTCC's finding of guilt was based on the evidence that petitioner
overtook the vehicle without checking whether the opposite lane was clearly visible from incoming
vehicle. It also considered the evidence that it was 3:00 a.m., the road was not well lighted, and
petitioner was driving at a fast speed. The RTC, meanwhile, based its ruling on a sketch which showed
that the impact occurred at the inner lane occupied by the private complainants' jeepney. The CA
anchored its findings on the unrebutted presumption of negligence that arose because petitioner was
violating a traffic regulation during the mishap. Thus, the CA did not rely solely on the contents of the
TAR. As for the award of damages, the OSG argued that that it was in conformity with prevailing
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jurisprudence.

32
In Our assailed Resolution dated September 21, 2020, We denied the petition for failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the CA as to warrant the exercise of Our discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.

33
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present Motion for Reconsideration, repleading and reiterating the
arguments in his petition for review.

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether We should uphold petitioner's conviction.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm petitioner's conviction but modify the penalty imposed.

Petitioner was charged of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to
property. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and
"negligence." It defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his/her employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time,
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and place.

The Ivler Doctrine

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In Ivler v. Hon. Judge Modesto-San Pedro (Ivler), We emphasized that simple and reckless
imprudence are distinct species of crimes, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws. Reckless imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; (2) the
legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would have been subsumed
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty structure for quasi-crimes differ
from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime but
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is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is
to state that their commission resulted in damage, either to person or property, such as reckless
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imprudence resulting in homicide or simple imprudence causing damage to property.

In Ivler, the accused was charged of two separate offenses arising from the same vehicular accident,
which are reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property. He pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted the penalty of
public censure. He was tried for the second charge, but he moved to quash the information on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) denied the quashal finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases. The RTC dismissed the accused's petition for certiorari for lack of standing.
The accused elevated the case before Us arguing that his constitutional right against double jeopardy
bars his prosecution for the second charge, having been convicted previously in the first charge for the
same imprudent act. He maintained that there is only one offense of reckless imprudence, and the
multiple consequences of such act are material only to determine the penalty. We ruled in favor of the
accused.

We recognized in Ivler that there are two approaches in the prosecution of quasi-crimes. The first
approach applies Article 48 of the RPC while the second approach forbids its application. Article 48
deals with complex crimes. It allows the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories, namely: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Light felonies are excluded in Article 48
and must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offense. In complex
crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum penalty for the most serious crime. It is a procedural
tool for the benefit of the accused. In contrast, the second approach sanctions a single prosecution for all
the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number and severity.
After exhaustively discussing numerous case law, We declared that Article 48 of the RPC is not
applicable to quasi-crimes. We forbade the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting
acts into separate offenses (except light felonies) to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional crimes. This way, the splitting of charges under Article 365 which results to
rampant occasions of impermissible second prosecution based on the same act/s or omission/s are
avoided. We explained Our ruling in this wise:

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a
quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General's
argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only
the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x
x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the

prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant ...by
the Justice of the Peace ...of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting

of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
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conserved and diverted to proper use. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Accordingly, We laid down the rule that there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365. Only
one information shall be filed regardless of the number or severity of the consequences of the imprudent
or negligent act. The judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
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consequence alleged and proven.

Ivler Cannot Reverse a Prior En

Banc
Case Applying Article 48 to
Quasi-Offenses

While the 2010 case of Ivler comprehensively discussed the nature of Article 365 and the
inapplicability of Article 48 to quasi-offenses, it was decided by the Second Division of the Court and not
by the Court sitting En Banc. This finds significance considering the 2001 En Banc case of People v. De
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los Santos (De los Santos), where We held that Article 48 applies to crimes through negligence. De
los Santos was among the string of cases stated in Ivler, referring to the rulings which "complexed" one
quasi-crime with its multiple consequences, unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which
case charges where split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts, and on the other hand, resulting acts
amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with first level courts. Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
1987 Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc[.]" Thus,
there is a need for the Court, sitting En Banc, to clarify whether it subscribes to the view pronounced in
Ivler, thereby abandoning De los Santos.

The accused in De los Santos was charged with the complex crime of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an Information filed in the RTC of Cagayan De Oro
City. The RTC convicted the accused as charged, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims of frustrated and attempted murder. On automatic review, We found lack of
criminal intent on the part of the accused, hence he cannot be held liable for intentional felony. We
convicted him of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries and 10 counts of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries. We ruled that Article 48 applies in this wise:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the

single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the
definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable
by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the
accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was
sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two
penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,
the accused was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide
with damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a
motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight
passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other

victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional,
have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not
covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,

multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with
the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN
objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before
his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
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on him the penalty for each of them. (Emphasis supplied.; citations
omitted.)

Thus, it appears that in De los Santos, reckless imprudence is not treated as a crime itself. Rather, it
is regarded as a way of committing a crime. There, We stated that "[s]ince Article 48 speaks of felonies,
it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
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omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa)." "Crimes
through negligence" pertain to the offenses committed under Article 365.

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Subsequently, Our ruling in De Los Santos was cited in Dayap v. Sendiong, where the accused
was charged with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical
injuries, and damage to property. However, We acquitted the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. We affirmed the Municipal Trial Court's (MTC) finding that there was no evidence proving that
44
a crime has been committed and that the accused was the person responsible for it.
A survey of case law reveals that the last case which cited De los Santos is Ivler. However, as
previously stated, Ivler declared that a quasi-offense cannot be "complexed" with its resulting acts or
consequences. As opposed to De los Santos, Ivler sees reckless imprudence as a crime itself and not as
a modality or way of committing a crime. De los Santos' characterization of reckless imprudence as a
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way of committing a crime traces its roots from the 1939 case of People v. Faller (Faller), where We
categorically ruled that, "[r]eckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it
46
and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability." In Faller, the accused was charged with
the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. After hearing, the CFI found
that damage was caused through reckless imprudence. On appeal, We stated "[n]egligence being a
punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also
committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with
47
negligence."

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Conversely, in the 1955 case of Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga (Quizon), We
rejected the earlier concept that reckless imprudence is simply a way of committing a crime. We
explained, viz:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal

Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply
a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There
are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is
not a mere question of classification or terminology. In international
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen
from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through
reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is,
more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property".

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of

felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it
would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for
the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes
the penalty for reckless imprudence arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way
from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
49
crimes. (Emphasis supplied.)
Quizon is the bedrock of Ivler's dicta that simple or reckless imprudence are distinct species of
crime.

Meanwhile, at this juncture, We acknowledge the observation of Associate Justice Benjamin

50
Caguioa about the concerning volume of inconsistent jurisprudence relating to Article 365. Thus, We
shall finally settle in this case the conflicting rulings of the court on complex crimes and quasi-crimes.

Case Law after Ivler

On its face, Ivler had already settled the nature, proper designation, and treatment of quasi-crimes
and their resulting act/s, but jurisprudence after it appears to be in disarray.

51
In Dumayag v. People (Dumayag), the accused was charged before the MTC of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
and damage to property. The MTC convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide. The RTC affirmed the MTC with modification in that the accused was found liable for the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and damage to property. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. On appeal
before Us, We acquitted the accused of the crimes charged because his recklessness was not the
proximate cause of the damage. However, We did not take issue on the characterization made by the
RTC and the CA of the crime that the accused was charged and convicted of, which is "complex crime of
52
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide."

53
In Gonzaga v. People (Gonzaga), We affirmed the accused's conviction of the "complex crime" of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with double serious physical injuries and damage to property
54
under Article 365 of the RPC in relation to Article 263 of the same Code.

55
In Dr. Cruz v. Agas, Jr., We affirmed the ruling of the CA that the Department of Justice did not err
in sustaining the dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Cruz for serious physical injuries through reckless
56
imprudence and medical malpractice. Similar to Dumayag, We did not take issue or corrected the
proper designation of the offense to be reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

57
In Senit v. People (Senit), We affirmed the CA, which convicted the accused of reckless
58
imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property. The CA imposed
the penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor "since the petitioner has, by reckless
imprudence, committed an act which had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony,
59
based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the RPC."

Conversely, in other cases, We applied Our pronouncement in Ivler, to wit:

60
In Sevilla v. People, We observed that the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed by
61
the accused as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." We noted that this is
an inaccurate designation of the felony and emphasized that reckless imprudence is not simply a
modality of committing a crime but is a crime itself. Thus, the proper designation of the offense is
62
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.
63
In Esteban v. People (Esteban), the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property. We agreed with the CA that: (1) Article 48 of
the RPC does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 since the former is incongruent to the notion
of quasi-crimes; and (2) prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
64
of the number or severity of the consequences. Thus, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC (with
modification), which in turn sustained the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's (MCTC) imposition of three
separate penalties for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage
to property. The MCTC imposed the following penalties:

(a) for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, an indeterminate prison term of

four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correcional as maximum; and to pay
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Antonieto Manuel; P35,000.00 as actual
damages for funeral expenses; P602,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and
65
P25,000.00 as moral damages.

(b) for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, a straight penalty
of two month imprisonment.

(c) for damage to property, to pay the victim Librado Felix in the amount of
66
P42,996.40 as actual damages and a fine of P50,000.00.

Penalties under Article 365 of

the RPC

67
Article 365 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, reads:

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by

reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit

an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would
have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three (3) times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000).

A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) and censure

shall be imposed upon any person, who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or

lower than those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The penalties provided in Article 365 are clear and straightforward except for its third paragraph, in
instances where the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only to damage to property but also to
physical injuries. The third paragraph provides that when an imprudent or negligent act resulted in
damage to property only, the offender shall be punished by a fine. The question that arises is whether
the third paragraph still applies when there is also damage to persons. We answered in the affirmative in
68
the 1954 case of Angeles v. Jose (Angeles). There, We ruled that the third paragraph applies to the
resulting damage to property, and an additional penalty shall be imposed on the resulting injury to
69
person. The "additional penalty" pertains to the penalty scheme under Article 365.

In Angeles, the accused was charged before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the crime of damage
to property in the sum of P654.22 with less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence. The
CFI dismissed the case upon motion of the defense on the ground that the penalty prescribed by Article
365 is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the municipal court. However, the prosecution argued that the CFI has jurisdiction because the fine
that may be imposed on account of the damage to property is a sum equal to the amount of damage to
three times such amount, which in no case shall be less than P25.00. We reversed the CFI and
remanded the case for further proceedings. In effect, We held that the CFI has jurisdiction because the
70
fine for the damage to property should be considered in determining jurisdiction. We also interpreted
the third paragraph of Article 365 in this manner:

The respondent court, however, relies on the wording of the third

paragraph of said article, which reads as follows:

"When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos."

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only

damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but
if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one
for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, for
both the injuries and the damage committed were caused by one single
act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a complex crime
of physical injuries and damage to property. It is clear that the fine fixed
by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and
within that of the court of first instance. (Emphasis and underscoring
71
supplied)
Simply put, if the imprudent or negligent act covered by Article 365 results to both damage to
property and persons, a fine shall be imposed for the former and an additional penalty based on the
penalty scheme of Article 365 shall be meted for the latter. The information cannot also be split into two –
one for physical injuries and another for damage to property.

72
Nevertheless, in the 1998 case of Reodica v. Court of Appeals, which involved an Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, We held that the third
paragraph of Article 365 does not apply since the reckless imprudence did not result in damage to
property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365 which provides for arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been
73
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony.

Significantly, in Ivler, We went back to Our pronouncement in Angeles that the third paragraph of
Article 365 applies even if the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only in damage to property but also
in damage to persons, in which case an additional penalty for the latter shall be imposed aside from a
fine.

Interestingly, We did not apply this in Gonzaga where despite a finding that the accused was guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property, no
separate fine was imposed for damage to property. The same goes for Senit where the accused was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property.
There was no fine imposed for the resulting damage to property. In both these cases, the imprudent acts
and their consequences were treated as complex crimes.

Meanwhile, there is a seeming flaw in Angeles that We need to address. Angeles teaches that an
"additional penalty" should be imposed when the negligent or imprudent act resulted not only in damage
to property but also to physical injuries. Only one information shall be filed for both the injuries and the
damages. The reasoning stated in Angeles is because "the injuries and damage committed were caused
by one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a complex crime of physical injuries
74
and damage to property." Hence, on its face, Angeles is among the case law which applied Article 48
of the RPC to quasi-crimes. Ivler, by citing Angeles, seems to affirm a case which allows the
"complexing" of quasi-crimes. We now clarify Our ruling in Angeles.

The crux of the controversy in Angeles is the interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365 in
relation to determining the jurisdiction of courts. We ruled that the fine for damage to property and the
additional penalty for damage to persons should both be considered in ascertaining which court has
jurisdiction over the quasi-offense. While We referred to the "complex crime of physical injuries and
75
damage to property," Our declaration that an additional penalty should be imposed for the resulting
physical injuries defies or disregards the sentencing formula under Article 48 for complex crimes, which
is the imposition of only one penalty – the penalty for the most serious crime, the same to be applied in
76
its maximum period. Thus, the contradiction in Angeles seems to be more apparent than real.
Angeles, in prescribing an additional penalty for the resulting damage to persons, does not, in essence,
allow the "complexing" of the resulting acts of a single quasi-crime.

In fine, the Angeles and Ivler interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365 conform/dovetail with
the second approach that quasi-crimes should be prosecuted in one charge, regardless of their number
and severity, and each consequence should be penalized separately. We applied this interpretation in
the recent case of Esteban.

Jurisdiction of Courts over

Quasi-Crimes
In Angeles and the succeeding cases that cited it, both the fine for damage to property and the
penalty for damage to persons were considered in determining which court has jurisdiction. Hence, in
77
People v. Villanueva (Villanueva), which involved the complex crime of serious and less serious
78
physical injuries with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, We ruled that the CFI (now the
RTC) had jurisdiction, viz.:

Considering that it is the court of first instance that would

undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from
appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in the amount
of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense
of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with
damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction
would lie in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is against
absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a
way as to avoid absurd results. Our system of apportionment of criminal
jurisdictions among the various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory
that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more serious
79
than those triable in justice of the peace or municipal courts.
(Emphasis supplied)

80
Villanueva was followed by People v. Malabanan. However, with the amendment of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129 by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the amount of fine in criminal
negligence resulting to damage to property is no longer relevant in determining which court has
jurisdiction. Section 32(2) of BP 129, as amended, reads:

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable

with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Hence, the MeTCs, MTCs, MCTCs, and MTCCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal
negligence cases which results to damage to property, regardless of the imposable fine. Note that prior
to the amendment of BP 129, the first level courts only have jurisdiction when the imposable fine does
not exceed P20,000.00.

Similarly, BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts
over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from the crime. Thus, the first­ level courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over acts
penalized under Article 365 of the RPC. The most serious imposable penalty under Article 365 is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum period or two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six
(6) years of imprisonment. This is the imposable penalty, "[w]hen, by imprudence or negligence and with
81
violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused." The only exception is when
the offender in the foregoing offense "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
82 83
in his/her hands to give," in which case the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed. The
penalty next higher in degree to prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods is prision mayor
in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of imprisonment.
The jurisdiction for the qualified offense will now lie in the RTC.

De los Santos is no longer a

good law.

We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the "complexing" of
the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-offenses
and their resultant acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
84
felonies under the RPC. We thus declare that De los Santos is abandoned. We agree with Our
pronouncements in Ivler. Article 48 does not apply to quasi-offenses under Article 365 because
reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a mere way of committing a crime. Simple or
reckless imprudence does not strictly fall under the term "felonies" or acts or omissions
committed by fault or culpa.

Applying what We had discussed in the present case, We find that the offense charged against
petitioner was properly designated as reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and
damage to property. The Information was also correctly filed before the MTCC.

The elements of the crime of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
85
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

The prosecution was able to establish the foregoing elements beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
has exhibited, by his voluntary act, without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution in overtaking the
vehicle in front of him. He did not ensure that the road was clear and free of oncoming traffic. Section 41
of R.A. No. 4136, also known as the "Land Transportation and Traffic Code," as amended, provides that,
"the driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is
free of oncoming traffic for sufficient distance to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety."
86 87
As stated in the TAR and shown in the Sketch Plan, the point of impact occurred at the inner lane
occupied by the private complainants' jeepney. This proves that petitioner encroached on the rightful
lane of the private complainants. Petitioner was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision as
88
he was driving on the wrong side of the road. Under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, he is
89
presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident, which presumption he failed to rebut.

The CA, the RTC, and the MTCC uniformly held that petitioner failed to observe the necessary care
and precaution required of a driver who abandons his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle, which recklessness resulted in the injuries sustained by the private complainants and the
damage to the jeepney. Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
90
by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

Consequently, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. The
said doctrine presupposes that both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably at a
later point in time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose negligence or fault
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
91
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. The
documentary and testimonial evidence in this case show that petitioner was at fault.

Accordingly, the courts a quo did not err in finding that petitioner's reckless act is the proximate
cause of the injuries and damage to property. However, the said courts failed to apply Ivler in
determining the imposable penalty. While they found that petitioner was guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting to both physical injuries and damage to property, they did not impose a separate fine for
damage to property, manifesting that they treated the single imprudent act and its effects as a complex
crime. The correct approach is to impose separate penalties for each consequence of the imprudent act
alleged and proven.

More, the CA found that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna from the collision
amounted to slight physical injuries only, yet it erroneously characterized it as a less grave felony in its
92
Decision dated March 15, 2018. The Certificates of Confinement presented by the prosecution
showed that the estimated days of confinement for Leilani is only 3-5 days; for Rico 2-3 days; and none
was mentioned for Myrna. Under Article 266 (1) of the RPC, as amended, the crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished by arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) to nine (9) days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period. Arresto menor has a duration of 1-30 days of imprisonment. Hence,
pursuant to Article 9 in relation to Article 25 of the RPC, as amended, slight physical injuries is only a
light felony.

The correct penalty for the

crime

The reckless driving of petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna. As
93
previously stated, slight physical injuries is a light felony. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 365,
reckless imprudence resulting in a light felony is punishable by arresto menor in its maximum period, that
is, imprisonment of twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. On the contrary, if the reckless act of petitioner
94
was intentional, it would have been penalized under Article 266 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
10951, as a crime of slight physical injuries punishable by arresto menor or imprisonment with a duration
95
of one (1) to thirty (30) days. Evidently, the penalty under Article 266, had the act been intentional, is
equal to or lower than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365. In this connection, the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 provides that:

When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which
case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
The underlying reason for this reduction in penalty is to preserve the difference between an act
96
wilfully performed from one committed through negligence. Otherwise, a reckless or imprudent act
would be punished with the same penalty imposable to an intentional act.

Thus, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public
censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. Since that the reckless act of
petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to three persons (Rico, Leilani, and Myrna), the penalty of
public censure shall be imposed for each of the slight physical injuries committed.

With respect to the resulting damage to property, We concur with the CA that while it is evident that
the jeepney driven by Rico and owned by Noel G. Garcia (Garcia) was damaged, the prosecution failed
to present competent proof to establish the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the
wrecked jeep. The Vehicle and Equipment Work Order presented in the trial court only provided for an
estimated expense of P350,000.00. No representative from the Maglanque Motor Shop testified to
authenticate the document. Only Rico and Lailani testified that they brought the jeep for repair to the
shop and the cost of repair is P350,000.00. In any case, this will not prevent Us from imposing temperate
damages in favor of owner of the wrecked jeepney. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate
or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty. Here, We rule that the amount of P150,000.00
which the CA awarded as temperate damages to Garcia is fair and reasonable.

As to the amount of fine, petitioner should pay P150,000.00 conformably with the third paragraph of
Article 365 which states that, when the reckless act "resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three
(3) times such value, but which shall in no case be less than Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00)."

Additionally, We agree with the CA that Rico, Leilani, and Myrna suffered some pecuniary loss due to
their physical injuries, which prevented them from working. However, aside from their bare allegations
they failed to present proof that they are earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day. Therefore, the CA's award
of temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and Leilani, and P2,000.00 to
Myrna, are in order. All the monetary awards shall be subject to a legal interest at the rate of six percent
97
(6%) per annum from the finality of the Resolution until fully paid.

Lastly, for technical propriety, We shall correct the designation of the offense stated in the dispositive
portion of the Decision dated March 15, 2018 of the CA. It seems that the CA inadvertently indicated that
petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple serious physical
injuries, whereas based on the evidence presented and the body of the Decision, private complainants
only suffered slight physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED. Our Resolution dated September 21, 2020 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:

(1) petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence

resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of public censure for each of the resulting slight physical injuries
committed to private complainants Rico Mendoza, Leilani Mendoza, and Myrna
Cunanan, and to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00 as penalty for the resulting
damage to property;

(2) petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00

to Spouses Rico and Leilani Mendoza and P2,000.00 to Myrna Cunanan;

(3) petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his authorized representative

temperate damages in the amount of P150,000.00;
(4) all monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the
finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez,
Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Caguioa, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

Lazaro-Javier,* J., no part.