Tan Jr v.

CA
G.R. No. 136368. January 16, 2002.

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special
Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, respondents.

Summary:
Tan and spouses Magdangal executed a deed of absolute sale over a parcel of land which turned out to be an equitable mortgage. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Tan and ordered spouses Magdangal to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision. The
CA, however, ruled otherwise. Petitioner now assails their decision. The question in this case is what rule should govern the finality of judgment
favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner? Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. (The old rule, not the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.) If the old rule on finality of judgment be applied, petitioner redeemed the subject property within the 120-day period of
redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of judgment. The CA, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively which is an error. Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should
not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the
subject lot as a substantive right.

Facts:
Tan executed a deed of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of spouses Magdangal. Simultaneously, the parties entered into another
agreement giving Tan the right to redeem or repurchase for one year, which he failed to do until his death.

Tan’s heirs filed against Sps. before the RTC for reformation of instrument, alleging that the agreement, denominated as a deed of absolute sale,
the real intent being an equitable mortgage.

On June 4,1991, RTC held that the Deed is an equitable mortgage; plaintiff Tan was ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the
finality of this decision P59,000 plu interest at 12% per annum from May 2, 1988 (the day the complaint was filed) until paid.

Sps. Magdangal filed for appeal. On September 28, 1995, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, which was received by the parties on
October 5, 1995.

On March 13, 1996 the Clerk of Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the CA decision and stated that it has become final and
executory on October 21, 1995.

On March 21, the Sps. filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of the
petitioner Tan has expired.

On June 10, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question, ruling that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the
date of Entry of Judgment in the CA (March 13).

Tan, Jr. alleged that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the CA and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the
court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. Tan, Jr., citing Cueto vs. Collantes, would then assert that the period of
redemption on his part commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment in CA.

Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution, prayed to the court to issue the corresponding writ of execution. He prayed that the Magdangals be ordered to
claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title to his name.

Issue:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?

Ruling:
Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. (The old rule, not the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.)

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided
in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when
the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final
and executory.

SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately
executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the
original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from which the case
originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue
the proper writ for its enforcement.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and
of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."

It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property within the 120-day period of
redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error. There is
no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well- delineated exceptions.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they
refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice
and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws.

Exceptions - The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted
from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice.

Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to
the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right.

Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of
redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which
if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this
procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and
the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.