3Republic of tbe Jbilippines

impreme QCourt
;iflflanila

EN BANC

MANILA ELECTRIC G.R. No. 198529

COMPANY,
Petitioner, Present:
PERALTA, CJ.,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
GESMUNDO,
HERNANDO,
CARANDANG,
- versus - LAZARO-JAVIER, *
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M. V.,
DELOS SANTOS,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO, and
LOPEZ, J. Y., JJ.
CITY OF MUNTINLUPA
and NELIA A. BARLIS, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 9, 202"
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed the instant Petition

for Review on Certiorari 1 to assail the Court of Appeal's January 31, 2011
Decision2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80558, which set aside the December 19, 2003
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67.

* No part due to prior participation in the proceedings in the Court of Appeals.

1
Rollo,pp.10-37.
2
Id. at 39-60;_ penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Gula-Salvador and concurred in by Associate
Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Com1).
3
Id. at 64-79; penned by Judge Mariano M. Singson, Jr.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 198529

In its assailed judgment, the CA ordered Meralco to pay a franchise tax

on the operation of public utilities pursuant to Section 25 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 93-35 (MO 93-35) or the Revenue Code of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, reckoned from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7926 (RA
~'926), 4 also known as the Charter of the City of Muntinlupa on March 1,
i995.

The Antecedents:

Meralco is a public utility corporation duly organized and existing

under Philippine laws. Pursuant to RA 9209, 5 the statute granting its franchise, ·
Meralco is enfranchised to construct, operate and maintain a distribution
system for the conveyance of electricity in the cities and municipalities in the
National Capital Region, among others.

On the flip side, the City of Muntinlupa is a local government unit that
has been converted from a municipality into a highly urbanized city by virtue
of RA 7926. Respondent Nelia A. Barlis (Barlis) was the City Treasurer of
Muntinlupa at the time Meralco was assessed to pay a franchise tax.

On January 1, 1994, MO 93-35 or the Revenue Code of the

Municipality of Muntinlupa took effect. 6 Section 25 7 thereof imposed a
franchise tax on private persons or corporations operating public utilities
within its territorial jurisdiction at the rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual
receipts of the preceding calendar year.

Subsequently, RA 7926 was enacted and approved on March 1, 1995

' Ihich converted the Municipality of Muntinlupa into a highly urbanized city,
now the City of Muntinlupa. Section 56 of the transitory and final provisions "
of RA 7926 adopted all existing municipal ordinances of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa as of March 1, 1995, and shall all continue to take effect within

4
An Act Converting the Municipality ofMuntinlupa into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
ofMuntinlupa. Approved: March 1, 1995.
5
An Act Granting the Manila Electric Company a Franchise to Construct, Operate and Maintain a
Distribution System for the Conveyance of Electric Power to the End-users in the Cities/Municipalities of
Metro Manila, Bulacan, Cavite and Rizal, and Certain Cities/Municipalities/Barangays in Batangas,
Laguna, Quezon and Pampanga. Approved: June 9, 2003.
6
Rollo, p. 140.
7
REVENUE CODE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MUNTINLUPA or Municipal Ordinance No. 93-35, p.
31.
Sec. 25. Franchise Tax on operation of public utilities. - Notwithstanding any exemption
granted by any law or other special law, the municipality may impose a tax on private persons
or corporations operating public utilities, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1 %) of
the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or
realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.
In the case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of
one percent (1%) of the capital investment. In the succeeding calendar year, regardless of when
the business started to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the preceding
calendar year, or any fraction thereof, as provided herein.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 198529

Muntinlupa as of March 1, 1995, and shall all continue to take effect within
the City of Muntinlupa unless its sangguniang panglungsod enacts an
ordinance providing otherwise.

On June 28, 1999, Barlis sent a letter to Meralco demanding payment

of the franchise tax it owed to Muntinlupa City from 1992 to 1999 pursuant
to Section 25 of MO 93-35 and paragraph 7 of the Bureau of Local
Government Finance Circular No. 20-98. Barlis likewise requested for
Meralco's certified statement of gross sales/receipts for the years 1992 to
1999 that would support the computation of the franchise tax due. 8

On July 14, 1999, Meralco requested for the deferment of the

submission of its statement of gross sales/receipts, and for a copy of MO 93-
35 .9 It also mentioned that its representatives had amicably discussed the
matter with Barlis on July 13, 1999, and that the May 5, 1999 Decision of
this Court in Manila Electric Company v. Province· of Laguna 10 is still
pending reconsideration. 11

Meralco likewise ignored the August 21, 2001 12 and the September 27,
2001 13 demand letters for payment of the franchise tax for the years 1994 to
2000 on the premise that the City of Muntinlupa, then a municipality, did not
have the power and authority to impose and collect a franchise tax. Pursuant
to Section 142 14 in relation to Sections 134, 15 137 16 and 151 17 ofRA 7160 or
the Local Government Code of 1991, the power and authority to impose and
collect a franchise tax lies with the provinces and cities.

Meralco thus instituted a Petition With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction 18 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 67 to declare Section 25 of
MO 93-35 as null and void for being contrary to law, unjust and confiscatory,
and to enjoin the City of Muntinlupa from demanding the submission of its

8
Rollo, p. 122.
9
Id. at 125.
10
366 Phil. 428 (1999).
11
Rollo, p. 125.
12
Id. at 141.
13
Id. at 142.
14
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, SECTION 142. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, municipalities may levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by
provinces.
15
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, SECTION 134. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, the province may levy only the taxes, fees, and charges as provided in
this Article.
16
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, SECTION 137. Franchise Tax. -Notwithstanding any
exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying
a franchise x x x.
17
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. -Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees and charges which the province or
municipality may impose: x x x.
18
Rollo, pp. 80-91.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 198529

certified statement of gross sales/receipts for the computation of the franchise

tax.

In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, 19 the City of

Muntinlupa mainly argued that Section 137 of RA 7160 and Articles 227 and
23 7 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) allow the imposition of
a franchise tax by a local government unit. It also averred that it is entitled to
moral damages and attorney's fees in view of Meralco's filing of a baseless
and malicious suit which tainted its reputation and constrained it to engage
i ·1e services of a counsel.

In its Reply and Answer to Compulsory Counterclaim, 20 Meralco

maintained that municipalities are not endowed with the authority to impose a
franchise tax, which power exclusively belongs to provinces and cities
pursuant to RA 7160. It argued that the presumption of validity does not
apply because Section 25 of MO 93-35 is patently discordant with existing
law and jurisprudence, and that the passage of the Charter of Muntinlupa City
cannot breathe life into an ordinance that was void from the beginning. It
countered that the City is not entitled to damages because Meralco acted in
good faith in seeking relief for a transgression of a right.

The Pre-Trial Order21 enumerated the issues for resolution as follows:

(1) whether Muntinlupa City could legally collect a franchise tax from 1992 to
1999; (2) whether Muntinlupa City could legally require Meralco to submit
certain documents for the determination of its franchise tax; (3) whether MO
93-35 as incorporated in the Charter of Muntinlupa City is a valid ordinance;
(4) whether Muntinlupa City is entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees;
and (5) whether Meralco is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
and/or permanent injunction enjoining the City of Muntinlupa from collecting
franchise tax.

On January 30, 2003, Meralco and Muntinlupa City filed a Joint Motion
; ,Jr Summary Judgment. 22

Ruling of the Regional Trial

Court:

In a Decision23 dated September 19, 2003, the trial court struck down
MO 93-35, particularly Section 25 thereof, for being ultra vires because it
was enacted when Muntinlupa was still a municipality which, as such, had no
power to levy taxes, fees or charges already conferred to the provinces
19
Id.atl71-179.
20
Id. at 180-184.
21
Id. at 185-188.
22
Id. at 189-190.
23
Id. at 64- 79.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 198529

following Sections 142 and 137 of RA 7160. It held that an ordinance that is
invalid on its face may be set aside for being inoperative, and that the 30-day
period within which an ordinance can be assailed is merely permissive by
express use of the word "may" in Section 187 of RA 7160.

The trial court declared that Article 236 (b) of the IRR cannot
contravene or go beyond Section 142 of RA 7160 which it seeks to
implement. Also, Section 56 of the Charter of Muntinlupa City adopting
Section 25 of MO 93-35 did not cure its infirmity. Thus, the trial court
granted Meralco's prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction enjoining
Muntinlupa City from collecting the franchise tax.

The fallo of the trial court's ruling states:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the implementation of Section 25 of Municipal Ordinance

No. 93-35 otherwise known as the revenue code of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa null and void ab initio for being ultra vires and contrary to law;

2. Commanding the respondents and their agents, representatives, and

successors to desist from enforcing or implementing the said Sections [sic] 25
of Municipal Ordinance No. 93-35 [,] and Article 236 (b) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Govermnent Code of 1991, as well as
from collecting any amount pursuant thereto;

3. Enjoining and commanding the respondents, their agents,

representatives, and successors to desist from demanding upon the petitioner to
submit a certified statement of its gross sales/receipts derived from its business
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Muntinlupa for the purpose of
assessing franchise tax, and from demanding payment of franchise tax from the
petitioner; and

4. On the counterclaim, dismissing and denying respondents' claim for

moral damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 24

Muntinlupa City elevated the case to the CA with the following

assignment of errors:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING AS

NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES AND CONTRARY TO
LAW SECTION 25 OF [MO] NO. 93-35.

24
Id. at 78-79.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 198529

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING AS

NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO SECTION 142 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, ARTICLE 236 (B) OF [THE IRR].

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING

[APPELLANTS] FROM IMPOSING [AND] COLLECTING THE SUBJECT
FRANCHISE TAX UPON [MERALCO], REQUIRING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE SUBMISSION OF ITS CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF
GROSS SALES/RECEIPTS DERIVED WITHIN THE CITY. 25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its January 31, 2011 Decision, 26 the appellate court concurred with
the trial court that municipalities have no authority to levy and collect a
franchise tax due to the ultra vires nature of Section 25 of MO 93-35.
However, it declared that MO 93-35 was cured of its legal infirmities when
the Municipality of Muntinlupa was converted into a highly urbanized city by
virtue of its Charter in 1995. Moreover, it held that MO 93-35 is presumed to
be valid since it had yet to be declared void by final judgment by any court at
the time of its adoption. Section 56 of the Charter of Muntinlupa City
effectively cured the defects and re-enacted Section 25 of MO 93-35, although
tµe curative effect applies prospectively. Hence, the appellate court held that
Meralco's obligation to pay franchise tax begins only from March 1, 1995, the
date when the Charter ofMuntinlupa City was enacted.

The dispositive portion of the appellate court's assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the

RTC of Pasig City, Branch 67, in Civil Case No. 68725, is SET ASIDE and a
NEW ONE ENTERED as follows:

1. Declaring Sec. 25 of Municipal Ordinance 93-35, otherwise known as

the Revenue Code of the (now) City of Muntinlupa, as having taken effect only
from the date of effectivity of RA 7926, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Muntinlupa;

2. Ordering appellee to comply with appellants' demands for a ce1iified

statement of its gross sales/receipts derived from its business within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Muntinlupa, and other documents, for the

25
Id. at 43-44.
26
Id. at 39-60.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 198529

purpose of assessing franchise tax, computed only from the date of RA 7926
took effect;

3. Ordering appellee to pay franchise tax to appellants based on said

assessment.

SO ORDERED. 27

Aggrieved, Meralco filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari28

raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER SECTION 25 OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 93-35 OF

THE THEN MUNICIPALITY OF MUNTINLUP A IMPOSING A
FRANCHISE [TAX], WHICH WAS DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES AND CONTRARY TO THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BOTH BY THE TRIAL AND THE
APPELLATE COURTS, WAS CURED BY SECTION 56 OF R.A. 7926
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF MUNTINLUPA INTO A
HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY. 29

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Section 25 of MO 93-35 is null

and void for being ultra vires.

Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista 30 enumerates the requirements for an ordinance to/

be valid, legally binding, and enforceable, to wit:

For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the

corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following
requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair
or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not
unreasonable. 31

Legaspi v. City of Cebu 32 explains the two tests in determining the

validity of an ordinance, i.e., the Formal Test and the Substantive Test. 33 The
Formal Test requires the determination of whether the ordinance was enacted
27
Id. at 59-60.
28
Id. at 10-37.
29
Id. at 20.
30
762 Phil. 233 (2015).
31
Id. at 262-263, citing Legaspi v. City of Cebu, 723 Phil. 90 (2013); White Light Corp. v. City of Manila,
596 Phil. 444 (2009); Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 699 (2008).
32
723 Phil. 90 (2013).
33
Id. at 103.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 198529

.vithin the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether the same was passed
pursuant to the procedure laid down by law. Meanwhile, the Substantive Test
primarily assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the ordinance and
significantly its compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes.

As correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, MO 93-35, particularly

Section 25 thereof, has failed to meet the requirements of a valid ordinance.
Applying the Formal Test, the passage of the subject ordinance was beyond
the corporate powers of the then Municipality of Muntinlupa, hence, ultra
vires.

Based on the Substantive Test, Section 25 of MO 93-35 deviated from

the express provision of RA 7160. While ordinances, just like other laws and
statutes, enjoy the presumption of validity, they may be struck down and set
aside when their invalidity or unreasonableness is evident on the face or has
been established in evidence. 34 In this case, Section 25 of MO 93-35 was
evidently passed beyond the powers of a municipality in clear contravention
ofRA 7160.

MO 93-35 was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of

Muntinlupa and took effect on January 1, 1994. This is plainly ultra vires
considering the clear and categorical provisions of Section 142 in relation to
ections 134, 13 7 and 151 of RA 7160 vesting to the provinces and cities the
power to impose, levy, and collect a franchise tax. Muntinlupa being then a
municipality definitely had no power or authority to enact the subject
franchise tax ordinance.

\: For emphasis, we reproduce below Sections 142, 134, 137 and 151 of RA
7'160:

ARTICLEU
Municipalities

SECTION 142. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise

provided in this Code, municipalities may levy taxes, fees, and charges not
otherwise levied by provinces.

ARTICLE I
Provinces

SECTION 134. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise

provided in this Code, the province may levy only the taxes, fees, and charges
as provided in this Article.

34
City o/Cagayan De Oro v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 224825, October 17,
2018, citing Social Justice Society v. Atienza, supra note 31; Balacuit v. Court of First Instance ofAgusan
de! Norte and Butuan City, Branch II, 246 Phil. 205 (1988).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 198529

xxxx

SECTION 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any exemption

granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1 %) of the gross ammal receipts for the preceding calendar year
based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. ·

In the case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-
twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1 %) of the capital investment. In the
succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the business started to operate, the
tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the preceding calendar year, or any
fraction thereon, as provided herein.

ARTICLE III
Cities

SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise

provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the
province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees
and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.

The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum
rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent
(50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.

The foregoing provisions clearly set out that municipalities may only
levy taxes not otherwise levied by the provinces. Section 13 7 particularly
provides that provinces may impose a franchise tax on businesses granted with
a franchise to operate. Since provinces have been vested with the power to
levy a franchise tax, it follows that municipalities, pursuant to Section 142 of
RA 7160, could no longer levy it. Therefore, Section 25 of MO 93-35 which
was enacted when Muntinlupa was still a municipality and which imposed a
franchise tax on public utility corporations within its territorial jurisdiction, is
ultra vires for being violative of Section 142 of RA 7160.

The City cannot seek refuge under Article 236(b )35 of Administrative
Order No. 270 36 (AO 270) in its bid to declare Section 25 of MO 93-35 as
valid. As mere rules and regulations implementing RA 7160, they cannot go

35
Article 236. Rates of Tax in Municipalities Within the Metropolitan Manila Area. -
xxxx
(b) The said municipalities within MMA, pursuant to A1iicle 275 ofthis·Rule, may levy and
collect the taxes which may be imposed by the province under Article 225, 226 [franchise tax],
227,228,229,230 and 231 of this Rule xx x.
36
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. Approved: February 21,
1992.
•,

J
,T· ec1s10n
••
10 G.R. No. 198529

beyond the intent of the law that it seeks to implement. The spring cannot rise
above its source.

Hence, even if Article 236(6) of AO 270 appears to vest municipalities

with such taxing power, Section 142 of RA 7160 which disenfranchised
municipalities from levying a franchise tax, should prevail. The power to levy
a franchise tax is bestowed only to provinces and cities.

In sum, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa acted without authority in

passing Section 25 of MO 93-35, hence it is null and void for being ultra
vires. 37

Section 56 of the Charter of

Muntinlupa City has no curative
effect on Section 25 of MO 93-35,
the latter being null and void.

The case of City ofPasig v. Manila Electric Company (City of Pasig}3 8 is

relevant in resolving the issue of whether Section 56 of the Charter of
},1untinlupa City cured the legal infirmities of Section 25 of MO 93-35. In
(,ity of Pasig, the City of Pasig demanded payment from Meralco of a
franchise tax based on Section 32, Artlcle 3 of Ordinance No. 25 which Pasig
enacted when it was still a municipality, hence without authority to impose
such a tax.

By virtue of RA 7829, 39 the then Municipality of Pasig was converted

into a highly urbanized city on December 8, 1994. The City of Pasig, similar
to the present suit of the City of Muntinlupa, asserted that the transitory
provision of RA 7829, particularly Section 45 thereof, cured the infirmities of
Section 32, Article 3 of Ordinance No. 25. However, said contention was
rebuffed by this Court and declared the City of Pasig's ordinance null and void
and that RA 7829 had no curative effect, to wit:

We find the instant case no different from Arabay and SMC As in

those cases, the cityhood law (R.A. No. 7829) of Pasig cannot breathe life into
Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, ostensibly by bringing it within the
ambit of Section· 151 of the LGC that authorizes cities to levy the franchise tax
under Section 137 of the same law. It is beyond cavil that Section 32 of
Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is an act that is null and void ab initio. It is even of
little consequence that Pasig sought to r,ollect only those taxes after its
a
conversion into city. A void ordinance, or provision thereof, is what it is -
a nullity that produces no legal effect. It cannot be enforced; and no right

City of Cagayan De Oro v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 224825, October 17,
2018.
38
G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018.
39
An Act Converting the Municipality of Pasig into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Pasig. Approved: December 8, 1994.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 198529

could spring forth from it. The cityhood of Pasig notwithstanding, it has no
right to collect franchise tax under the assailed ordinance.

xxxx

As we see it, the cited law [Section 45, RA 7829] does not lend any help
to the City of Pasig's cause. It is crystal clear from the said law that what shall
continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig into a city are the
municipal ordinances existing as of the time of the approval of R.A. No. 7829.
The provision contemplates ordinances that are valid and legal from their
inception; that upon the approval of R.A. No. 7829, their effectivity and
enforcement shall continue. To 'continue' means (1) to be steadfast or constant
in a course or activity; (2) to keep going: maintain a course, direction, or
progress; or (3) to remain in a place or condition. It presupposes something
already existing.

A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding force

and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 and, being so, is
outside the comprehension of Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829. 40 (Emphases
supplied)

To stress, an ordinance which is incompatible with any existing law or

statute is ultra vires, hence, null and void. In City of Manila v. Cosmos
Bottling Corporation, 41 this Court ruled that the City of Manila cannot legally
impose a local business tax based on Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 which
were void and had no legal existence.

In the same vein, Muntinlupa City cannot hinge its imposition and
collection of a franchise tax on the null and void provision of Section 25 of
MO 93-35. Moreover, Section 56 of the Charter of Muntinlupa City cannot
breathe life into the invalid Section 25 of MO 93-35. Section 56 of the
transitory provisions of the Charter of Muntinlupa City contemplates only
those ordinances that are valid and legally existing at the time of its
enactment. Consequently, Section 56 did not cure the infirmity of Section 25
· of MO 93-35 since an ultra vires ordinance is null and void and produces no
legal effect from its inception. 42

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The January 31, 2011

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80558 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The September 19, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 is hereby REINSTATED. Section 25 of
Municipal Ordinance No. 93-95 is DECLARED void.

40
City of Pasig v. Manila Electric Company, supra note 38.
41
G.R. No. 196681, June 27, 2018.
'42
City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, 810 Phil. 566,587 (2017).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 198529

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:
I

.PERALTA

ESTELA M~~BERNABE
A/.0ciate Justice Associate Justice
/

No part.
AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER
Associate Justice
Decision 13 G.R. No. 198529

HENRI
Associate Justice

EDGAC.ELOSSANTOS
Associate Justice

SAMUE~~~~
Associat.e Justice

JHOSEl~')PEZ
Associate Justice
Decision 14 G.R. No. 198529

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ClERTffrnD TRUE COPY