ernst vollrath the 'rational' and the ‘political’ an essay in the semantics of politics Nowhere, so it seems, can the disastrous impact of irrationality ‘on human life be more fully studied than in the field of politics. The examples are too numerous to be quoted. Barbara W. Tuchman has correctly described this state of affairs as “The March of Folly” and has traced the path of human stupidity “From. Troy to Vietnam.” She even has elaborated a phenomenology of political irationality: ‘Misgovermment is of four kinds, often in combination. They are: 1) tyranny or oppression, of which history provides so many well-known examples that they do not need citing; (2) excessive ambition, such as Athens's attempted ‘conquest of Sicilyinthe Peloponnesian War, Philip's of England via the Amada, Germany's twice-attempted rule of Europe by a self-conceived master race, Japan's bid for an empire of Asia; (3) incompetence or decadence, as inthe case of the late Roman Empire, the late Romianovs and the last imperial dynasty of China; and finally (4) folly or stupicity."* As a resumé she quotes from a letter written by the second president of the United States of America, John Adams, to ‘Thomas Jefferson, on July 9, 1813: “While all other sciences have advanced, government is at a stand; litle better practiced now than three or four thousand years ago.”* This sad statement the more embarassing as most historians would agree to call the experiment of the American Revolution one of the mostemst vollrath successful achievements in human history. But this may be an 18 exception to the general rule that in the field of governed more by irrational motives and stupid impulses than in any other field and that their performances are nowhere as foolish as in this sphere. it seems as if the “rationat” and the “political” have parted company most frequently and, as it were, almost continually, that, infact, they form two completely diferent camps, that itis by far better for the wise man to keep away from politics, etc., etc. All experiences of our times point into the same direction. Itis easy to discover underlying all these assumptions the age- old, the venerable mistrust of philosophical speculation vis-2- vis the woridof he many, of opinion, of he uncertain, as opposed to the stable sphere of truth and of rationality. it may well be that all his is a misunderstanding on the side of the philosopher, caused by the misleading supposition that the type of rationality experienced in the field of politics must be of the same kind as that experienced in philosophy, theory, thinking, etc., i.e., experienced in the process of self-experience. That does not solve the problem. Trying to escape the central philosophical dilemma—to assess political rationality by standards that are taken from the a-political experience that almost necessarily is connected with philosophical speculation—I first want to re- formulate the problem: what Kind of rationality is adequate to political phenomena and the sphere of the poltical in general and where does it reside so that it can be grasped from there? The assumption underlying this reformulation is that there exists a political kind of rationality, which does not come from somewhere outside but from the heart and core of the political itsel.Itis the task proper to political philosophy to "extract" this particular and specific political mode of rationality.* L | want to start my reflections on the relationship between the political and the rational with some remarks on a certain development taking place in rather recent times in the vocabulary ‘of some occidental languages—particularly in my own language, German,-but at the same time in English, French and Italian, | regard the political vocabulary of a language as an indication of the perception, or awareness, of what is regarded to be “political” and what the “political”is that governs within a culture. That is to say, at the same time, that a reflection of political vocabulary does not move outside of the political sphere itselt, but on the contrary is concerned with the mostimportant political phenomenon, namely, the leading conception within that culture of the political, of political phenomena and the political quality and modality of these phenomena, ove okoe NSS ATR SANS eapolitical semantics 19 | regard the political vocabulary as the expression of that perception or awareness which governs the political understanding in all respects within a culture. To turn to political vocabulary, therefore, is by no means a void enterprise having nothing to do with real phenomena. On the contrary: It is by a careful examination of political vocabulary, by scrutinizing the ‘semantics of politics, that the theorist can gain access to that manner in which the political, all political phenomena and the political modality and quality of these phenomena, are perceived within a given culture, In my own language itis the differentiation between, on the one hand, die Poiitk and, onthe other hand, das Politische. Likewise in French we encounter a difference between /a politique and le politique; in ttalian itis the difference between /a politica and il politico. The latter term is used in a new sense. It no longer rifies the political man but the sphere or realm of politics and the specific modality according to which we may speak of phenomena—events, persons, actions, institutions, etc —as to their politcal quality. Even in the English language which, in my judgment, shows a greater reluctance to accept the development of the differentiation, one can discover such phrases as “from absolutist to anarchist no one doubts that a something denoted by such [a] term as .... ‘the political (sic!) exists and is of major import for human life and destiny.”* Later | will come back to the situation in the English language and try to formulate athesis. Linguistically all these languages have been capable of developing the differentiation and allhave done so. Inourrespect, however, itis interesting to note that the linguistic differentiation has not always been accompanied by a semantic differentiation. (On the contrary: both terms have traditionally been used indiscriminately. One could speak of aie Politik or das Politische without there being any semantic difference.* And the same held true in other languages. It is only in recent times that the linguistic. differentiation has developed into a semantic differentiation, AAs far as | can see the differentiation, although brought about explicitly for the first time in a German context, is most widely used in French political thinking. | will turn to only one instance, the most telling in our respect. In 1957 the Frenoh philosopher Paul Ricoeur published an article in the Journal Esprit which later became incorporated in his book Histoire et vérité. Its title: “Le paradoxe polltique.”” In this essay Ricoeur speaks of *Yautonomie originaire du politique” (original autonomy of the political) He can call this “ia rationalité specifique irreductible aux dialectiques & base economique” (the specific rationality that cannot be reduced tothe dialectics founded on economics).? Andernst vollrath finally he determines the differentiation between fa politique and 20 Je politique thus: “Le politique est organisation raisonnable, fa politique est decision: analyse probable de situations, pari probable sur favenir. Le politique ne va pas sans la politique’; and: *Si Ie politique est sans intermittences, on peut dire en un sens que la politique n’existe que dans les grands moments, dans les ‘crises,’ dans les ‘tournants,’ dans les noeuds de histoire" (The political is reasonable organization, politics is decision, probable analysis of situations, likely wager on the future; and: If the political exists without interruption, one could say that in a sense politics only exists in the great moments, in times of crisis, in the turning points and knots of history)."° | try to sum up the meaning of this discrimination. The concept of the political seizes that specific quality or modality of phenomena of allsorts which determines thelr political character. That is what is called by Ricoeur “la rationalité du politique” (the rationality of the political). it designates a specificity of the political, a non-deducible quality or modalty, that cannot be taken from any other phenomena or their qualities and modaities, particularly not from the field of economics. This is called “Tautonomie du politique,” “specificité du politique” (autonomy and specificity of the political) ‘The productivity of the concept of the poltical is demonstrated by its analytical capacity. Taken as a measure of the political quality and/or modaity of things it, at the same time, serves as an assessment of the deficits and perversions inthis, the political respect, of things. To put it bluntly: the concept of the political, comprising the political quality and modality in its authenticity and autonomy and used as a yardstick enablesus to judge things. (‘politcs") in this respect, Le., as to their authentic or non- authentic political character. In this regard Ricoeur speaks of “le mal politique’ (the poltical perversion) or “le mat du politique” (the perversion of the political). To frame it differently: politics ‘may exist in an authentically politcal manner or it may exist in a perverted manner and in all manner between the fulfilment of the authenticity and rationality of the political and its complete and utmost perversity, i. in an irrational manner. We may, in this respect, speak of a-poltical poltics or of non-political politics. ‘That this is not a mere play on words can be demonstrated by pointing to the *politics” of the Nazi regime. Joachim C. Fest, in his briliant biography of Hitler, has elaborated the completely irrational and perverse character of his politics, and he has called this “a politics for the non-political man.""" This simply means: we need—not only theoretically, but even more so in the proper field of politics—a measure which enables us to assess the authentically poitical character, the rationality, as it were, of politics, and this | will call from now on “the political” and its sxc be AN seas Naor Sana oe oar arbaon,political semantics concept. The concept of the political is destined to grasp in an elaborated way the perception, or awareness, of what is “political” ‘and what is apolitical, pseudopolitical, non-political. Going back to Ricoeur's differentiation between “the political” and “pols” it is necessary to be alert to the motive that induced him to introduce itThe occasion was a political event, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. This political event caused Ricoeurto criticize an axiomof the theory of Marx and of Marxism, namely, the axiom of the priority of economics and society to Politics and the political. it is his thesis that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, .¢., apolitical event, contradicts and refutes, as itwere, the fundamental assumption of every Marxian theory worth its name. This is to say: the theory of the priority of economics and society, ie., he theory of the basic non-authentic ‘and non-autonomous character of the politcal is refuted not by any theoretical endeavor but by political activity, Ntnow becomes necessary to turnto Marx's conception of politics and the political. Almost all interpreters admit its profound ambiguity. But itis dificult to understand what has caused this ambiguity and wherein it really resides. Two things are fairly ‘obvious. (1) In accordance with the mainstream of traditional political thinking in Germany Marx identities, without much feflection, “the political” with the state. To him the state is an apparatus of suppression of one class by another. The very characteristics of that apparatus—the bureaucracy, the military machine, police, financial system, etc.—are: ‘domination (Herrschaff) and force (Gewal). (2) Particularly In its relative autonomy from society and from the economic fundamentals the state is an expression of complete and utter alienation, a selt- alienation of society, the symptomatic mark being class division and class struggle. This points to an unalienated sphere, the sphere of the association of mankind that is based on non- estranged exchange of values and goods in a free—.e.. a state- free, a non-poliical—society. This sphere is truly primordial, especially in regard to the whole sphere of the state (and by implication of the politcal. ‘The heart of Marx's political thinking resides in a theory of the transformation of the present, alienated situation into the rebirth of the primordial situation of unalienated association of mankind. It this goal will be arrived at finally there will be no need for a state apparatus or a force to exercise power, an instrument of domination. The state will “wither away,” it will die in the end and there will be no sphere of the political which, particularly as regards its assumed autonomy, in the eyes of Marx and his followers is nothing but inauthenticity as such. The final goal is defined in terms of a non-political community of mankind. As re ee ee atmtonernst vollrath one of the later followers of Marx, Jorgen Habermas, has spelled 22 ut this project, itis the “transitoriness of the political as such” (die Verganglichkeit Politischen als solohem) ® that lies at the heart of Marx's politcal thinking. But this extends only to the final goal. The first and the most decisive step in this direction is a political act, the seizure of power by the proletariat. The proletariat will impose forcefully, i.e., politically, its domination ‘on the remaining parts of the old forces—the dictatorship of the proletariat—but the task of this pottical structure—and it clearly is conceived as a political structure, simply because it has to use force and exercise domination—is to transform society by changing the economic relations in such away that neither force nor domination is needed any longer in the relationship of the ‘communal association. in short: in Man's political thinking we encounter at the same time a “realism of means” (political) and an “utopianism of the goal” (non-political), a poltical realism and a transpoitical idealism, and it is the intemal relationship and mixture between these two moments that define the core of his understanding of poltics and the political. | now want to widen the horizon of my interpretation. Especially with regard to the two conceptions of political realism and transpolitical idealism, Marx is by no means an exception but rather the consequence, maybe a particularly radical consequence of the traditional perception of politics and the Political within German culture. The sociologist Norbert Elias has pointed to the fact that German culture is fundamentally centered on music, theology, religion, Philosophy, poetry, ie., not on politics and the poltical."+| think that this thesis is true in regard both to German culture and to the self-awareness and selt-interpretation of German culture. Bothbelong together andformtheunity of our culture. The causes, forthese characteristics certainly are lying n the politcal situation during the formative period of the specific political and cultural structures in modern Germany. Numerous evidences could be given to suppor the thesis of Norbert Elias and they would be taken from those who are the true representatives of German ‘culture, from the philosophers, the poets, the musicians, etc. | simply want to point to Thomas Mann’s famous essay “Reflections of the Non-Poliical” (Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen) which is not a deplorable aberration but comes from the very heart of German culture. Evenaculture thats basically non-political has to develop certain ‘conceptions of what it takes to be political and what it conceives asthe poitical. Itis my thesis that from its non-political character, itselt deeply determined by the particular politcal situation of Germany at the time our culture developed its characteristic 5 uc tt a as eT,political semantics 23 features, there are two perceptions of politics and the political, | want to call them the “teal-poitical” and the “trans-political” ‘concepts.'® By the “reat-poiitical” concept | understand the identitication of the political with the existing state as a powerful body, exercising domination over its subjects, providing security for them, claiming their obedience from them, the state, that is, that could present itself as an autonomous personality, independent from those who are its subjects. The trans-poiitical (or ideat-poitical) aspect conceives a community of freely associated persons without any constraints, stateless, based on insight alone without coercive power. The examples one could giveforsuch ameta-political perception of "politics" wouldinciude Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hélderiin, and many others. Today one could name Jdrgen Habermas with his conception of an ideal consensus community. {tis obvious that Marxinis politcal thinking has brought together the two aspects that traditionally characterize the German Perception of the political. What he is doing, in fact, is to conceive of a transition from the one aspect ("the poitical’) to the other aspect (‘the trans-political) by those means that are proper to ‘the realm of politics. ltis not necessary to enter into a more detailed discussion. My thesisis: there are two dominant perceptions of the political within the horizon of German culture. They cannot be distributed neatly to particular groups, they are not even mutually exclusive. In any case these two concepts dominate the political perception in German culture, andit is not exaggerated to say that even today, that is to say in a completely changed political situation, they still prevail now propose to look at the semantic situation in Anglo-American Political vocabulary which | have leftout so far from consideration. | seems to me that there exists a greater reluctance to accept the differentiation between “poltics/policy” and the poiticar" than can be observed in other occidental languages. Yet even here the term “the political” sometimes can be found in a senso distinguishing it from “politics.” Sheldon S. Wolin in his book Politics and Viston’® frequently makes use of it. As a central ‘weakness of Plato's political philosophy he identifies “the failure to establish a satistactory relationship between the idea of the political and the idea of politics.” Itis from the Greek language that the occidental languages have learned their main poitical vocabulary. This is by no means a simple linguistic affair. Together with the vocabulary, the dominating perception, the awareness, as itwere, of whatis political and whatiis non-politicalernst vollrath has been transferred from Greece to our times. (I do not enter 24 into a discussion of all the changes which have occurred: they are extremely important!) In my opinion even the radical alterations in almost everything did not fundamentally change the basis of the perception of what the political is. In ancient Greece, anyway, and in its awareness of the political, the confrontation and confusion of the two ideas of the political and of politics was almost inevitable. The polishas been, at the same time, the paradigm of the political and of everything that politics was about, But in our times the polis does not exist anymore, and it would have disastrous consequences to put new life into the ancient polis. Under the conditions of modernity it becomes the more necessary to differentiate between “the political” and “politics.” Although, as everybody will easily agree, almost everything has undergone radical transformation as compared to the situation in antiquity, it still belongs to our heritage that the doings of men and the outcome of their doings are performed “politically,” and this in a rational manner. This, again, presupposes an awareness, a concept, as it were, of what the political is. Back to Sheldon S. Wolin, As has been sald he quite frequently makes use of the term “the political.” designating by it the truly rational manner by which things may be done poitically, e., in a political—as opposed to a non- or a-political—modality. He even, at least once, makes use of the term “politicalness."® As a resumé Hanna F. Pitkin may be quoted: “Wolin says explicitly that there is plenty of polities in modern American life, even if ‘the polticat’ has all but disappeared.” Itis certainly true that within Anglo-American political language there exists a greater reservation to employ the differentiation ‘between “the political” and “politics/poicy” orto coin such highly artificial terms like ‘politicalness” or “politicalty" than can be observed in other languages. | think that the greater reluctance to develop that particular vocabulary has to do with the fact that the English language has preserved yet another term stemming fromthe original vocabulary, namely the term ‘polit (Irom Greek politeia). This term belongs to the whole cluster of words adopted. from the Greek by the other occidental languages; but with the words the perceptions were transferred embedded in these words.2°But although the term may be used in all other languages, itis the English language alone that has preserved it most vividly, Inall other languages the term "polity" has degenerated into the term“police.”* This is particularly true for the German language. Here, the concept of Polizei has formed an important part of political perception during the 18th century. By Polizei was not understood that force which enabled government to control and, if needed, restore public order, but this order itself. From this eppolitical semantics 25 conception of the state as public order there even developed a science of Polizei, the so-called Polizelwissenschatt, completely unknown in any other political culture, a science concerned mainly with the administration of public order But within the horizon of English political culture the concept of “polity"has a different meaning. itis, although no longer belonging to the central political vocabulary, stil in public and scientific use. Its basic meaning is: a politically qualified community in respect 10 its specific political modality.*in other words: the term ‘polity” May serve as an equivalent for the more artificial term “the political.” To my knowledge the first to use this term has been the Chief Justice of the Court of the King’s Bench, Sir John Fortescue, when he (wrongly, by the way, as to the linguistic derivation) wrote: “Poiiticia dicitura poles, quod est plures, et ycos, scientia; quo regimen politicum dicitur regimen plurium scientia sive consilio ministratum:* In order to distinguish the English public ‘order from those of the Continent, particularly from France, Sir John Fortescue distinguished two types: regimen regale (a public order based on domination alone) and regimen regale et ppoliticum (a public order wherein all acts of government finally {90 back to the assent of the community) * It is this latter type which is called “poly.” Ever since it has become almost a ‘commonplace of the selt-interpretation of political cutture in the English and American world, and this common-sensical acceptance seems to be so strong as not to be in need of explicit theoretical elaboration. The “polity” could be identified with the concrete existing system and its institutions of the political. The Polity-concept comprises the sel-awareness of these cultures in regard to the political modality of their character. They are politically® centered, and this, I think, in sharp contrast to the self-interpretation of German culture. In order to show that the polity-concept can stil be used in exactly this sense | would like to quote Christian Bay: "Let us not as political scientists rule out the possibility that a real pollty may emerge eventually—a ‘community of people giving some of their energies to political ‘as distinguished from pseudo-political reflection and action.” With regard to political terminology | have, until now, refrained from taking into consideration the situation in German vocabulary. It must be remembered that all questions of vocabulary and terminology, particularly in respect to the political ‘sphere, are questions of perception and awareness and as such belong essentially to the phenomena themselves. ‘The first to develop the differentiation between “the political” andernst vollrath ‘politics/polcy” has been the German Staatsrechtslehrer Carl 26 ‘Schmitt, illtamed for his connection with the Nazi regime. Nevertheless regarding the conception of the political the old maxim holds true: abusus non tolit usum. itis not the particular content he gave to the concept that is of interest here. As is, well known he defines it thus: “The specific political distinction to which political actions and political motives can be reduced is that between friend and foe (or enemy)" (Die spezifische politische Unterscheidung, auf welche sich die politischen ‘Handlungen und Motive zurdicktuhren lassen, ist die von Freund und Feind)* Disregarding everything else this definition can only be understood in the context of German a-political culture where “the political” always has been identified with the state, the state as autonomous personality; i.e., it presupposes the state- centered perception of the political. tis true that Carl Schmitt tries to dissolve the traditional identification of the political with the state: he defines the state from the political and not vice- versa. Nevertheless his concept of the political is stil focused ‘on the political unity which is competent to make final decisions, he., the state. What, in our context, is more importantis Carl Schmitt's definition orstatementof content, but rather as acrterion. itis this character want to take up. The concept of the poliicalis destined to serve analytically as the criterion to distinguish between the political ‘quality and modality of things and the non-political qualities and modalities, between a justified politization of things and one that is unjustifiable, or a perversion into “political” non-poitics, etc. itis this analytical capacity that makes itindispensable. As |would hasten to say: such a theoretically elaborated concept of the political is the more necessary the less the cultural awareness and self-interpretation includes an authentic perception of the Political—or, what is the same: a concept of the political in its authenticity—at least silently, i.e., most effectively. Itis clear that the theoretically elaborated concept of the political Must at least include the two moments of authenticity and autonomy. By authenticity | understand that in this respect the characteristics of the realm labelled by this term “poftical” and of all things belonging to it are neither taken from the characteristics of any other field nor deduced from or reducible tothem. Likewise by autonomyisunderstood the modalcharacter of that sphere as being genuinely so qualified, and not derivative from any other field nor inferior to any other. Taken together ‘the two moments form what Paul Ricoeur, whom | am following in this respect, rightly has called the rationality of the political. | want to go a step further and identify this autonomous authenticity, i.e., rationality, of the political with the “polity.” Inpolitical semantics 27 doing this | am deviating from Carl Schmitt who took the dissociative moment—the friend-foe distinction—as the decisive character. Quite the contrary, it is the associative moment, Polltcally speaking, the communicative qua communal moment that lies at the bottom of this concept. I regard “polity” as being the institution of the political as such, from where, taking “polity’ as the criterion, the existing institutions (and everything else ‘showing up in “politics”) can be assessed as to their authentic. (ordepreciated) politcal character, infact: their rationally political character. There is one ciffcully left. In contrast to the Anglo-American Political culture it is, for reasons indicated before, impossible within German culture to refer to the concept of “polity” simply by going back to tradition. As | have tried to demonstrate, it is just this concept of “polity” that is lacking in our culture (which means: for reasons connected with our history our culture did Rot develop that kind of perception of the political expressed by the term). Using the two terms of “real-political” and “trans- or ‘meta-political perception one could try to speak of “civil-political” Perception, of a concept of the political as civil policy, which our culture is in need of. There are, in my judgment, only very few and very small traces of such a perception in our culture. It is ‘almost impossible to simply take over such a perception from outside, from a different political culture. At least, in order to become truly a decisive moment of our own culture, it has to bbe connected with such moments that properly belong to our culture and are part and parcel of its own heritage. I, therefore, have made the proposition to connect the concept of "polity" with the notion of reflective judgment in Kant's Critique of Judgment, Itwould be too much to elaborate completely this proposition (One last word should be added. This whole conception is based upon the conviction that poltical philosophy is not, or rather not Immediately, concerned with “politics,” but with the “political.” It is the task of political philosophy to elaborate theoretically the authentic characteristics of the political modality, to form a ‘concept of the political. f this is 60, perhaps she should change her name and be called? the philosophy of the political. University of Cologne NOTES 1. BW, Tuchman, The March of Folly, From Troy to Vietnam, New York, 1984. i Lmerst vollrath 2. Ibid. p.s. 28 3. The Adams-Jefferson Letters, od. Cl. Cappon, Chapel Hil 1959, Vol. I, p. 351. 4, | More evidence will be given in my book Grundiegung einer pilesophischen Theorie “des Pitlchen, “Wirzburg, 1987 forthcoming). 5. D. Waldo, ‘Political Science: Tradition, Disciplina, Profession, Scion "in Handbook of Political Science, Fl, Greenstein i i., Vol. Political Scionce, Scope and Theory, 1975, 6. For instance: H. Froyer, "Das Pollische als Problem der Philgsaphi,"in Bitter flr Deutsche Philosophie, Bd 9, Holt 41995), pp. 3471. Z._,P. Ricoeur, "Le paradoxe poltique,” in Histolre et vérlté, 2nd ed. Paris, 1964, pp. 260 seq, 8. Ihid., p. 266, 9. Ibid. p. 281. 10. Ibid., p. 268, 11. J.C. Fest, Hitler, Eine Biographl Faber, Berlin, 1979, part. pp. S131. Bd. 1, Dor Autstiog, Bd. 2, Der 12. J. Habermas, 'Zum Bogrif der poltischen Betaligung,” in Kultur und Kritik, Verstroute Aufsdtze, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, p. 12. 13. H. Kelson, “Sozialismus und Stat,” in Archly fr dle Geschichte dos Sozialismusund dor Arbolterbewegung, Bd. IX (1921), pp. 1-12 Part p. 44f, 14. N. Elias, Uber den Prozes der Zivlisation, Soziogenetische und pevehogenetische “Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, Wandiungen de fhaltens In den waltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes, Frankturt am Main, 1976, pp. 1. 15. The allusion is to LA. von Rochau's book Grundsatze der Realpolitik, Bd. 1 (1853), Bd. 2(1867), Frankfurt am Main, 1972, inwhich the term was used forthe first time. has always aroused my intarestthat the term “realpoltk” is one of the very few taken over from the German, into English political vocabulary. want to stress, that by a "real-poliical” aspect Ido not simply understand a realistic approach to political mattors but the reduction of all politics to that aspect. 16. Sh. S, Wolin, Polltics and Vision, Continulty and Innovation in Western Political Thought, Boston, 1966. 17. Ibid, p. 43, 18, Ibid, p. 431. For the sake of curiosity it_ may be noted that N. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practica, History of a Concept from Aristotle, to Marx, Notre Dame 1967, has coined the term‘polticality"(p.28 and74) Oe eee eA a aaypolitical semantics 29 19. H. F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Polltical Thought, Berkeley, 1972, p. 215. The section is tiled: The Concept ofthe Political. 20. Art. “Poliisch, das Poliische” (E. Vollrath), in Historisches Wérterbuch der Philosophie, J.Ritter andK. Grinder, eds., Basel, Vol. 7 (forthcoming). 21. A.J. Heldenhsimer, ‘Politics, Policy and Police as Concepts in English and Continental Languages: An Attempt to Explain Divergences,” in Review of Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1986), pp. 3-30, 22. H.Maior, Dis éltera deutsche Staats-und Verwaltungslehre, 2nd ‘ed. Minchen, 1980. See also: K. Zobel, "Polizel, Geschichte und Bedeutungswandel das Wortes und seiner Zusammensetzungen, "Diss. phil. Machen, 1952; Art Polizei" (FL. Knemeyer), in Geschichtliche Grundbegritfe, Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen ‘Sprache In Deutschland, O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck, eds., Vol. 4, Stutigart, 1978, pp. 8751. 23, D, Sternberger recently has attempted to re-intraduce this concept into German poltical vocabulary: "Die neue Polio, Vorschlige 2u e) Revision der Lehre vom Verlassungsstaat,” in Jahrbuch des 8ffentichen Rechts der Gogonwart (N.F.), Vol. 33 (1984), pp. 1-40; ‘and *Politie und Leviathan, Ein Streit um den antiken und den modemen Staat,” in Herrschaft und Vereinbarung, Frankfurt am Main,1986, pp. 178-229, 24, Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Anglie (about 1468/71), ed, 8.8, Shrimes, Cambridge 1942, passim. 2. SirJohn Fortescue, The Governance ot England (about 1471), 0d. Ch. Plummer, Oxtord 1885, p. 112. This book is one of the first political tracts written in English and not in Latin (although the phrase quoted is in Latin). For the provenance of Fortascue's vocabulary: F. Gilbert, "Sir John Fortescus's ‘Dominium Ragale et Politicum, "in Med, et Hum., Vol. 2 (1944), pp. 88-97. 26. A German refugee to the U.S.A., Ernst H. Kantorowiez, could glva the te *polty-contrad kingdom" to a chapter of his marvelous book The King’s Two Bodies, A Study of Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton University Press, 1957, meaning the communal character hat is contralto the public order. 27. Ch. Bay, "Politics and Psoudopoltics, A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature,” in American Political Sclence Review, Vol.59, No. 1 (1965), p.51. 28. C. Schmitt, Der Begriffdes Polltischen, Text von 1932mit einem Vorwort und drel Corollarion, Berlin 1963, S. 26; Eng. The Concept of the Polltical, Rutgers University Pross, 1976, p. 26. 29, See my book mentioned in note 4.