Emergency Powers.

The President can proclaim an emergency when the security of India or any part of it is threatened by
war or external aggression or armed rebellion(Article 352). Such a Proclamation ceases to operate after
one month unless before that period it has been approved by resolutions in the Union Parliament.
Thereby it continues for 6 months. By repeating the resolutions every 6 months the Proclamation may
remain in force indefinitely. During the operation of the Proclamation of the emergency, the Union
executive can give directions to any State as the manner in which the latter’s executive power should be
exercised.

The President may also proclaim under Art. 356, a failure of Constitutional machinery in any State on
receipt of a report from the Governor concerned of otherwise. Such a Proclamation ceases to operate at
the expiration of two months unless approved by resolutions of both houses before that period expires.
By such approval, the Proclamation continues for a further period of six months from the date of issue
of the Proclamation. It can be thus kept in force for 1 year.

If a Proclamation under Art. 352, is also in force then by such resolutions it can be kept in force for a
maximum period of 3 years. When such a Proclamation is in force, the President may assume to himself
functions of the Government of the State concerned. The legislative power of the State will be
exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament.

 The President can proclaim a financial emergency (Article 360) when the financial stability of
India is threatened. Its duration is two months unless earlier approved by Parliament. While a
financial emergency exists, the President may reduce the salaries and allowances of all classes of
persons serving the Union including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. He
can also reduce the salaries of those serving in the State. The Union executive may give
directions to any State in regard to financial matters.

Functions connected with the Judiciary.

 The President has the right to grant pardons, and suspend, remit or commute sentences in
certain cases

 President can consult the Supreme Court in regard to any questions of law or fact of great public
importance. (Advisory Jurisdiction)

Pardoning power of the President

Art. 72. Power of President to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in
certain cases.— (1) The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or
remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any
offence—

(a) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is by a court martial;

(c) in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death.

 Pardon absolves the offender completely from all sentences and punishments and
disqualifications and places him in the same position as if he never committed any offence

 Commutation means exchange of one thing for the other – rigorous to simple etc

 Remission means reduction of the sentence

 Respite means awarding lesser punishment on special grounds, like pregnancy

 Reprieve means temporarily suspending the death sentence pending the proceedings etc.

 Art. 72 is similar to that of Art. 161.

 There are certain differences between Governor’s powers and President's power

 The President can pardon in all cases where the punishment is by a Court Martial. The
Governors do not have this power.

 the President can pardon in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. This is so even
when the matter relates to the State Legislative List.

 the President can pardon punishments in respect of offences relating to matters in List I.
Similarly the Governor’s pardoning power extends over offences relating to matters in list II.
These are mutually exclusive.

 as regards offences relating to matters in List III, the Governor’s power is subject to the Central
Law. If a particular Central Law gives the Union Executive power for the enforcement of that Law
the pardoning power would be that of the President. Otherwise, the State Executive power will
extend to such offences also and the pardoning power will remain in the Governor

 K. M. Nanavati v. State of of Bombay AIR 1961 S C112

a naval officer, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court of
Bombay. The Governor of Bombay suspended the sentence till the Supreme Court disposed of the
appeal proposed to be filed by Nanavati. Nanavati applied to the Supreme Court for special leave to
appeal. Under Rule 5 of or 21 of the Rules made by the Supreme Court a petitioner for special leave
to appeal has to submit to the sentence passed by the lower court before his petition is heard by the
Supreme Court. Nanavati contended that the Governor can suspend his sentence and so there is no
need for him to surrender to the sentence passed against him by the High Court. Rejecting this
contention it was held that the order of the Governor suspending the sentence passed against the
petitioner pending the disposal of his appeal to the Supreme Court impinged on the power of the
court and was to that extent invalid. So Nanavati’s petition for exemption from surrendering to jail
was dismissed.

 It was held that the Governor had no powers under Art. 161, to grant suspension of sentence for
the period during which the matter was pending in the Supreme Court.

 Sher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1983 S C 465

 Regarding the delay in the disposal of the petitions the court observed that Government of India
and the State Government must dispose of petitions filed under Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution or under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal P.C. expeditiously. Long and
interminable delays in the disposal of these petitions are a serious hurdle in the dispensation
of justice and indeed, such delays tend to shake the confidence of the people in the very
system of justice.

 However the court has stated That is the true implication of Art, 21 of the Constitution. But no
hard and fast rule can be laid down that "delay exceeding two years in the execution of a
sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death
to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death" on the basis that two
years are sufficient for appeal and consideration of reprieve.

 Kehar Singh v. Union of India AIR 1989 S C 653

Kehar Singh was convicted on 22-1-1986 under Secs. 120-B and 302 of I.P.C for the murder of
Mrs. Indira Gandhi,. He was sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge. The High
Court confirmed . His special leave to appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court on September 7,
1988. Subsequently, a writ petition filed before Supreme Court was dismissed. Thereupon, his
son presented a petition to President of India pleading that Kehar Singh was innocent and
requesting for personal hearing. It was not granted on the ground that there was no such
established practice. The President replied that he could not go into the merits of the case once
finally decided by the highest court rejecting the petition. The Court held that It is in his
discretion to follow any method. The court cannot give guidelines. Kehar Singh had no right for
personal hearing. The President may call for further information. It is open to him to give oral
hearing of the condemned person. The power under Art. 72 is of the widest amplitude. The
President need not give reason for his order.

 Jumnan Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 1 SCC 752,

 the court found no ground to interfere with the rejection of mercy petition by the President and
to refer for reconsideration. It was also held that Judicial review of the order of the President or
the Governor granting or refusing pardon under Article 72 or Article 161, is available and their
orders can be impugned on the following grounds :

 (a) that the order has been passed without application of mind;

 (b) that the order is mala fide;

 (c) that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations;

 (d) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration;

 (e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness.