Jitendra Singh v.

Ministry of Environment
Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment , Civil Appeal 5109 of 2019 (25 November 2019)
Supreme Court of India

An industrial company attempted to forcibly take over and fill nearly five acres of communal
ponds in village Saini, near New Delhi, under authorization from the Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority (“GNIDA”). Para. 3. Jitendra Singh, a resident of the village and a
public-interest lawyer, complained to local officials seeking to protect the water bodies from
privatization for industrial use. Para. 2.  After various officials failed to respond to Singh’s
requests, he filed a complaint with the National Green Tribunal (“NGT”). Para. 3. The NGT
summarily dismissed the case after GNIDA submitted an affidavit claiming it was developing
larger ponds in a different location to replace those that would be destroyed. Paras. 7, 8.
GNIDA claimed its actions were justified by a regional government order allowing water
bodies to be allotted to private interests and filled for “large-scale works” under extraordinary
circumstances, provided that larger, replacement water bodies are constructed elsewhere,
and such projects serve a social public purpose or benefit local people. Para. 10. Singh
appealed to the Supreme Court of India, which considered the sole question “whether it is
permissible for the State to alienate common water-bodies for industrial activities, under the
guise of providing alternatives[.]” Para. 14. The Supreme Court did not take up issues
concerning the lack of environmental clearance or other illegalities Singh raised before the
NGT.

The Supreme Court of India overturned the NGT’s decision, ordered GNIDA to restore,
maintain and protect the water bodies and remove all obstructions from the catchment area
within three months. Paras. 22-23.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court declared that GNIDA’s decision to allocate several ponds
in village Saini to a private company for development violated the strict principle of non-
alienation of common water bodies announced in Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 11
SCC 396. Paras. 17, 22. While the principle could hypothetically be waived for projects
serving a social public purpose or benefiting local people, privatizing and destroying water
bodies for industrial use while creating larger replacement water storage sites elsewhere
does not fall within this narrow exception. Moreover, extinguishing natural water bodies
would cause unquantifiable harm to the flora, fauna, and communities that rely these water
sources, which cannot be offset by building artificial ponds in other locations. Paras. 17, 21-
22.

The Supreme Court took the additional step of declaring that any scheme to destroy
common water bodies violates constitutional duties to protect and improve the natural
environment. Paras. 18-21. The Constitution of India requires the state to “endeavor to
protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the
country,” and imposes a duty on “every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural
environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life[.]” Constitution of India, Arts. 48-A &
51A(g).

The Supreme Court reinforced previous decisions explaining that the constitutional duty of
each citizen to protect and improve the natural environment in Article 51A(g) is also an
affirmative duty that falls on the state, since “the State is nothing but a collective embodiment
of citizens, and hence collective duties of citizens can constructively be imposed on the
State.” Para. 18. The Court also invoked the the right to life under Article 21, which includes
the right to healthy environment. Because common water resources are essential to a
healthy environment, the State must protect them as part of its responsibility to uphold this
fundamental right. Paras. 15, 20. The Supreme Court explained how allocation of communal
water bodies for private development would violate the people’s rights, and allowing the
same would breach the government’s Constitutional obligations, stating:

These common areas are the lifeline of village communities, and often sustain various
chores and provide resources necessary for life. Waterbodies, specifically, are an important
source of fishery and much needed potable water. Many areas of this country perennially
face a water crisis and access to drinking water is woefully inadequate for most Indians.
Allowing such invaluable community resources to be taken over by a few is hence grossly
illegal.

The Supreme Court sharply criticized GNIDA’s claim that the artificial replacement ponds
would provide an adequate remedy to villagers. Para. 21. The Court stated:

The respondents’ scheme of allowing destruction of existing water bodies and providing for
replacements, exhibits a mechanical application of environmental protection. Although it
might be possible to superficially replicate a waterbody elsewhere, however, there is no
guarantee that the adverse effect of destroying the earlier one would be offset. Destroying
the lake at Khasra Nos. 552 and 490, for example, would kill the vegetation around it and
would prevent seepage of groundwater which would affect the already low watertable in the
area. The people living around the lake would be compelled to travel all the way to the
alternative site, in this case allegedly almost 3 kms away. Many animals and marine
organisms present in the earlier site would perish, and wouldn’t resuscitate by merely filling a
hole with water elsewhere. Further, the soil quality and other factors at the alternate site
might not be conducive to growth of the same flora, and the local environment would be
altered permanently. The respondents’ reduction of the complex and cascading effects of
extinguishing natural waterbodies into mere numbers and their attempt to justify the same
through replacement by geographically larger artificial waterbodies, fails to capture the spirit
of the Constitutional scheme and is, therefore, impermissible.

Based on its findings, the Supreme Court quashed GNIDA’s decision to allocate the
communal ponds to a private company and directed the Authority to “restore, maintain and
protect” water bodies in village Saini. Para. 23.

Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India

Facts of the case 

In this case, the Supreme Court of India suspended the environmental clearance for an
airport in the state of Goa on March 29, 2019, and directed the administration to reconsider
the decision. The approval was brought before the Supreme Court by petitioners, citizen
Hanuman Laxman Aroskar and the NGO Federation of Rainbow Warriors. 

The Court revoked the airport’s regulatory compliance certificate citing the government’s
failure to consider environmental concerns that were critical to the environmental evaluation
procedure. The court reasoned that it was essential to the resolution of this lawsuit as a
driver for sustainable development within a rule of law framework. The Court went on to say
that the Paris Agreement and India’s Nationally Determined Commitment to the Paris
Agreement were both important aspects of India’s environmental rule of law and that the
government had to strike a proper balance between environmental concerns and airport
development goals.
Issue

Whether the Government of India appropriately examined environmental impacts when it

Judgment 

The Supreme Court removed its suspension of the environmental clearance on January 16,
2020, after new statements from the airport project stakeholders, enabling the airport project
to proceed. The government enforced additional environmental requirements on the project
in response to the additional environmental impact evidence supplied, which included a
commitment to establish the airport a “zero-carbon airport operation.” The court issued that
the government has appropriately addressed concerns raised in the court’s 2019 ruling.
The National Environmental Engineering Research Institute was also established to conform
with the government’s environmental criteria, and the project developers were required to
pay the charges of monitoring.

M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath

The Indian Express published an article reporting that a private company, Span Motels
Private Ltd. (‘the Motel Company’), owner of Span Resorts, had floated an ambitious project
called Span Club. Kamal Nath who was the Minister of Environment and Forests had direct
links with this company. The company encroached upon 27.12 big has of land which also
included forest land. The land was regularized and subsequently leased out to the company
on 11th April 1994.

This encroachment had an impact on the course of river Beas. For more than 5 months the
Span Resorts management moved bulldozers and earth movers to turn the course of the
river for the second time. In September, 1993, these activities by the company caused floods
in the river and a property worth Rs. 105 Crores was destroyed.

Issues Raised

1. Whether the court has wrongly inducted Mr. Kama Nath as a Respondent in the
present petition?
2. Whether the construction activity carried out by the Motel Company justified?

Proceedings before the final judgment –

The Supreme Court took notice of a news report published in the Indian Express dated
25th February, 1996. The news reports stated that Mr. Kamal Nath, Minister of Environment
and Forests, had direct links with Span Motels Pvt. Ltd., which owns the Span Resorts. The
company had floated an ambitious venture called the Span Club. The club represented
Kamal Nath’s dream of having a house on the bank of the Beas. The report stated how the
forested land was encroached, and later regularized. The regularization was done when Mr.
Kamal Nath was the Minister of Environment and Forests.
Mr. Kamal Nath filed a counter affidavit stating that he has been wrongly arrayed as a
respondent in this petition. The Court held that it was never disputed by Mr. Harish Salve,
learned counsel appearing for Mr. Kamal Nath that almost all the shares in the Motel are
owned by the family of Mr. Kamal Nath. Mr. Kamal Nath’s family, the management of the
company took over the Motel in the year 1981 and a fresh lease was signed on
29th September, 1981.

Mr. B.L. Mathur, on behalf of Span Motels Private Limited (‘the Motel Company’) filed an
additional counter affidavit. The affidavit stated that the land was granted on a lease to Motel
for a period of 99 years. Along with the additional affidavit the correspondence between the
Motel and the Government was also annexed.

The court noted that Mr. Kamal Nath was the Minister in charge, Department of Environment
and Forests at the time clearance was given and lease was granted. The motel was writing
to the Government for the lease of additional forest land since 1988. It was only in
November, 1933, when Mr. Kamal Nath was the Minister in charge that the lease was
granted.

After carefully examining all the counter affidavits filed by therespondent parties the court established
the following facts – 

1. The lease hold area in possession of the motel is a part of the protected forest land owned
by the State Government.
2. The forest land measuring 26 bighas leased to the motel by the lease-deed dated April 11,
1994 is situated on the right back of the river.
3. A wooden bridge on the spill channel connects the main motel land and the land acquired
under the 1994 lease-deed.
4. 22.2 Bighas out of the land leased to the motel in 1994 was encroached upon by the motel.
5. The river was flooded in 1995 after which the motel has dredged the left side channel (the
main channel) of the river to increase its capacity. This was done with a view to curtail the
entry of water into the right side of the channel.
6. The Motel Company had constructed 190meter wire crates on the bank of the river. The
dredged material is piled up on the banks of the river. The dredging and channelizing of
the left bank was done on a large scale with a view to keep high intensity of flow away from
the motel.
7. The dredging of the main channel of river was done by blasting the big boulders and
removing the debris.
8. The mouth of the natural channel has been blocked by wire crates and dumping of
boulders.
9. The construction work was not done under expert advice.
10. The construction work undertaken by the motel for channelizing the main course has
divided the main stream into two which can again change its course.
The Respondents contended that the construction activity was done by the Motel on the land under its
possession to protect the lease-hold land from floods and the Divisional Forest Officer permitted the
motel to carry out such construction activities subject to the condition that the department would not
be liable to pay any amount incurred by the Motel Company for the said construction.

The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the forest lands which have been given on
lease to the Motel by the State Governments are situated at the bank of the river Beas. The Beas is a
young and dynamic river and it changes its course very often. The right bank of the river is where the
Motel is located comes under forest. The area is ecologically fragile and therefore it should not be
converted into private ownership.
Doctrine of Public Trust

The Supreme Court applied the ‘Doctrine of Public Trust’ to the present case. Doctrine of Pubic trust
is an ancient legal doctrine which states that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore,
forests and the air were held by Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the
general public.Under the Roman law these resources were either owned by no one (res Nullius) or by
everyone in common (Res Communious). Under the English common law, however, the Sovereign
could own these resources but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant these
properties to private owners if the effect was to interfere with the public interests in navigation or
fishing.

Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, water and the
forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be unjustified to make
them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature should be made freely
available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.

The public trust doctrine under the English Common Law extended only to certain traditional uses
such as navigation, commerce and fishing.However, the American Courts have expanded the concept
of the public trust doctrine[1]. The observations of the Supreme Court of California in Mono Lake case
clearly show the judicial concern in protecting all ecological resources for example fresh water,
wetlands or riparian forests.

Application of the Doctrine of Public Trust

The Court held that issues in the present case point out towards a classic struggle between those
members of the public who would preserve our ecological resources and those charged with
administrative responsibilities who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasing
complex society, find it necessary to encroach to some extent open lands heretofore considered in-
violate to change. However, no law made by any central of state legislature exists to resolve this
conflict. In the absence of such a law the executive must not fail to protect the ecological resources
and convert them into private ownership.

In the present case there is a large river basin which is a part of a protected forest land. This land was
leased by the Government of Himachal Pradesh to the Motel Company for a commercial purpose.
The Himachal Pradesh Government was held to have committed a patent breach of Public Trust by
leasing an ecologically fragile land to the Motel management.

Final Judgment

1. The public trust doctrine, as discussed by us in this judgment is a part of the law of the
land.
2. The Court quashed the lease-deed by which forested land was leased to the Motel
Company and held that the construction activity carried out by the Motel Company was not
justified.
3. The Motel was ordered to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the
environment and ecology of the area.
4. The Motel was ordered to construct a boundary wall at a distance of not more than 4
meters for the building of the motel beyond which they were not allowed to use the land of
the river basin.
5. The Court restricted the Motel from discharging untreated effluent into the river. Himachal
Pradesh Pollution Control Board was directed to inspect and keep a check.
Orissa Mining Corporation Limited Vs Ministry of Environment and Forest and
Others
Statues Referred:

1. Environment Impact Assessment Notification of 2006 – Section 12

1. Orissa Mining Corporation (OMC), approached the Supreme court seeking a writ Certiorari to quash
the order passed by Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 24.08.2010, rejecting the stage II
forest clearance for the diversion of 660.749 hectares of forest land for mining of bauxite ore in
Lanjigarh Bauxite Mines in Kalahandi and Rayagada districts of Orissa and also for consequential
beliefs.
2. OMC urged that the above order passed had the neutralizing effect of two orders passed by
Supreme Court. (Sterlite case)
3. Ministry of Environment and Forest, later, considered the request of the State of Orissa on
28.02.2005 seeking for prior approval of MOEF for diversion of 660.749 ha of forest land in
accordance with Section 2 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
4. MOEF after considering the proposal of the State Government and referring to the recommendation
of FAC dated 27.10.2006, agreed in principle for diversion for the forest land with certain conditions.
5. MOEF then granted environmental clearance to OMC vide its proceedings dated 28.04.2009
6. Four member committee was constituted headed by Dr. Naresh Saxena to study and access the
impact of various right and to make a detailed investigation. Saxena committee submitted its report
to MOEF on 16.08.2010.
7. State government then submitted their written objection on 17.08.2010 to the Ministry of
Environment and Forest on the saxena committee report.
8. Violation of the provisions of Forest Rights Act, Forest Conservation Act, 1980; Environmental
Protection Act, 1986 and also the impact on ecological and biodiversity values of the Niyamgiri hills
upon which the Dongaria Kondh and Kutia Kondh depend.
9. The primary responsibility of any ministry is to enforce the laws that have been passed by
parliament.
10. . The order dated 24.08.2010 was communicated by MOEF to the State of Orissa vide its letter
dated 30.08.2010, the legality of those orders were the subject matter to this writ petition.

Issue

What is the legality of orders passed if it violates the law passed by the parliament or either by way
violates the act passed by the parliament?

Judgement
The Supreme court bench comprising of Aftab Alam, K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ranjan Gogoi disposed
of the writ petition and held the following:

1. The aspect of the matter have not been placed before Gram Sabha for their active consideration.
Adding to it, Gram Sabha is also free to consider all community, individual as well as cultural and
religious claims which have already been received from Rayagada and Kalahandi Districts.
2. Therefore, the direction to the State of Orissa to place this issue before the Gram Sabha with notice
to the ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India and Gram Sabha would take a decision on
them within three months and communicate the same to Ministry of Environment and Forest
through the State Government. On the conclusion of the proceeding before the Gram Sabha, the
MOEF shall take a final decision on the grant of Stage II clearance for the bauxite mining project in
light of the Gram Sabha decision within two months.
3. The Alumina Refinery project as well is advised to take steps to correct and rectify the alleged
violations by it of the terms of environment clearance granted by Ministry of Environment and
Forest.
4. The proceeding of Gram Sabha was to be attended as an observer by a judicial officer of the rank of
District Judge, nominated by Chief Justice of High Court of Orissa who would sign the minutes of
proceedings, certifying that the proceedings os Gram Sabha took place independently and
completely uninfluenced either by project components or Central or State Government.
Sansar Chand v State of Rajasthan, 2010 (10) SCC 604
Fact of the Case

In 2010, the Mascot of Commonwealth Game was SHERA, a tiger which is rare to found in
today’s times as a result of organized crimes of human like poaching that have pushed
wildlife to the stage of extinction and such issue is highlighted in this case. 
The appellant (Sansar Chand) had a long history regarding his wildlife crime. He had started
the wildlife crime from the age of 16 in 1974. He was arrested for having 680 skins of
different wild animals. He also arrested for involving in the activities of poaching, illegal trade
of tiger, leopard and skins of other animals and further the appellant along with his gang
started a smuggling network in which they send the tiger and leopard’s part and skins
outside the Indian Border, especially China. He along with his gang had been booked for 57
wildlife case from year 1964-2005.
 In this case, a Balwan was arrested by police in train for having a carton containing
leopard’s skin on January 5, 2003. Balwan made disclosure statement to SHO, Bhilwara that
the two leopard skins were for the appellant Sanskar Chand. The appellant was arrested and
during trial, he was convicted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Railways), Ajmer,
Rajasthan on April 29, 2004. 
The appellant then filed an appeal against the decree to the Special Judge, SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, who upheld the conviction of the appellant and dismiss the
appeal on 19.8.2006. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the Revision Petition in the Rajasthan
High Court who also dismissed the petition. Thus, all the above courts found the appellant
guilty of the offences charged. Thus the present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. 
The appellant’s contention in the present case was that the above judgement was solely
based on the extra-judicial confession made by co-accused Balwan. And the evidence of
extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Thus no conviction should be solely
based on it. 
Issues Raised in appeal

 Whether the conviction of the appellant under the wildlife (Protection) Act is justified or not?
 Whether the conviction is solely based on the extra judicial confession or not?

 Judgement

The Supreme Court have granted the leave to hear the appeal.  The court examined the
evidence  of prosecution, oral as well documentary given in the three above court and gave
his judgement.
The prosecution’s contention was that the extra judicial confession of accused Balwan was
written by Arvind who have neither any friendship nor enmity with the accused Balwan.
Arvind had also made disposition in the court that he had written the fact in confession as
dictated by accused in custody and accused Balwan agreed on it by putting thumb
impression on each pages. 
Accused Balwan made this extra judicial confession when he was remanded to judicial
custody. Thus, confession can be held to be not made under undue influence, fear or
inducement of the Police. In confession, he told address of the accused, he confessed about
the money Rs 5000/- and Rs 10,000/- paid by the appellant. And gave information about
appellant properties purchased in Delhi in name of him and his wife’s name with the money
he made out of his illegal activities stated above.
 During investigation, Investigation officer on the basis of the information given by Balwan
under Sections 27 Evidence Act had recovered the Knife, capped gun, iron funda, nails of
Panthers Paw’s and bones of killed Panthers from the accused house and properties have
been found in the name of Sansar Chand. Thus, this extra-judicial confession of the co-
accused has been corroborated from the recoveries made in pursuance of the same, the
previous conviction of the petitioner by this Hon’ble Court and the number of pending cases
showed him as a habitual wild life trader. 
In the present case, there are concurrent findings of facts of three courts that the extra-
judicial confession made by co-accused Balwan to Arvind Kumar (a fellow prisoner) was
voluntary, reliable and trustworthy under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the
conviction of the petitioner can be based on the extra-judicial confession of Balwan and the
other corroborative evidence on record.
Verdict of the Court

 After examining the evidence, The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal and upheld the
decision of the High Court who have affirmed the decision of the learned Magistrate and the
Special Judge regarding the conviction of the appellant. Further the court also requested to
the Central and State Government and their agencies to make all effort to preserve and
protect the wild life of the country and take strict action against those who are violating the
provision of the wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

Centre for environmental law wwf-i vs union of india & others

A) Darrah-Jawaharsagar Wildlife Sanctuary, Rajasthan

B) Sitamata Wildlife Sanctuary, Rajasthan

C) Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary, Madhya Pradesh.

WII’s Research Advisory Committee conducted a field survey of the three aforementioned
sites with sufficient consideration to all the necessary factors for the relocation of Asiatic
Lions. After the survey, the committee found that the Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in Madhya
Pradesh was the most suitable site for the reintroduction of Asiatic Lions. Accordingly, a
report was made highlighting the rehabilitation plan. After this report, the State of Madhya
Pradesh undertook a massive rehabilitation package for the relocation of Asiatic Lions in the
area and obtained the permission from MoEF under section 2 of the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980, for which18 villages were rehabilitated.
In the year 2004, the Government of India constituted a monitoring committee for the
implementation of the said project. This project was conceived in three phases; however, it
was observed that the State Of Gujarat stated was uninterested in cooperating. Meanwhile,
MoEF sent a detailed proposal of the project to the Gujarat Government, but Gujarat
Government’s Tribal Affairs, Forest and Environment Ministry objected to the relocation of
Asiatic Lions to Kuno. This matter was referred to the Supreme Court, and the court directed
them to submit the proposal before the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL).

NBWL convened a meeting with Gujarat state’s minister for Wildlife and Environment and
informed them about the steps that had been taken for the relocation project at Kuno. The
government of Gujarat raised few issues and submitted a detailed report highlighting the
measures taken by them for protecting Asiatic Lions. Furthermore, the additional PCCF (WL)
of Madhya Pradesh pointed that the state had already relocated 24 villages from the
sanctuary for this project, and therefore, requested that the lions should be translocated to
Kuno at the earliest. Finally, NBWL proposed for the translocation of Asiatic Lions from
Gujarat to Kuno, which was unanimously accepted. However, the government of Gujarat
filed an affidavit objecting to the translocation of lions. The NBWL held a meeting, and the
representatives of both states were present. After taking into consideration the various
arguments put forth by all the parties, NBWL authorised MoEF to file an affidavit before the
Supreme Court. The Government of Gujarat also filed a detailed affidavit, which specifically
highlighted the issue of insufficiency of prey base at Kuno.[1]

Issues Raised
1. Was there a necessity to relocate Asiatic Lions, which is an endangered species from Gir to
Kuno, Madhya Pradesh?
2. Whether the State of Gujarat is liable to translocate the Asiatic Lions from Gir National Park
to Kuno for the reintroduction of the endangered species?
3. Whether proper research and study had been conducted by researchers for the effective
implementation of the project?

Judgement
After considering the submissions made by all the parties in this case and noticing all
possible steps that had been taken by the state of Madhya Pradesh, Ministry of
Environment, and Forests and the Union of India, the honourable Supreme court held that
Kuno wildlife sanctuary was fit for the reintroduction of Asiatic Lion along with the approval of
NBWL.

The Supreme Court indicated that the top priority is to protect endangered species of Asiatic
Lions. Therefore, the decision of MoEF, for the introduction of both the African Cheetahs and
Asiatic Lions at Kuno was arbitrary and violated statutory requirements under the Wildlife
(Protection) Act. Therefore, the suggestion of MoEF to introduce African Cheetahs was
quashed.

The two-judge bench gave importance to the translocation of Asiatic Lions and decided that
reintroduction should be done as per IUCN guidelines and with the active participation of the
experts in this field. The court also recommended constituting an expert committee
consisting of senior officials of MoEF, Chief wildlife Wardens of both MP and Gujarat, and
the experts in the field. The committee was to assess the density of the prey base and other
factors for relocation at Kuno.
The court highlighted the necessity for a legislation to deal with the preservation and
protection of endangered species, which would give directions to the Government of India in
the matters of preservation of endangered species. The court directed the Government of
India & MoEF to identify all the endangered species and study their needs to establish a
secure habitat for them. The court emphasised on the need for providing attention to the
implementation of recovery programs, which would be carried out with the commitment of
courts and environmentalists

Techi Tagi Tara v. Rajendra Singh Bhandari - Supreme Court Important Judgment
2017 - 

On 22nd September, 2017, in the case of Techi Tagi Tara v. Rajendra Singh Bhandari & Ors. [Civil
Appeal No. 1359 of 2017], the Supreme Court observed that the National Green Tribunal (NGT) had
exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the State Governments to reconsider the appointment of some
persons to the State Pollution Boards (SPCBs) and in laying down guidelines for appointment to the
SPCBs.

However, the Supreme Court also observed that such appointments “should not be made casually or
without due application of mind considering the duties, functions and responsibilities of the SPCBs”
and “there should be considerable deliberation before an appointment is made and only the best
should be appointed to the SPCB. It is necessary in this regard for the Executive to consider and
frame appropriate rules for the appointment of such persons who would add lustre and value to the
SPCB.” 

It was held that “the appointment of the Chairperson and members of the SPCBs cannot be classified
in any circumstance as a substantial question relating to the environment. At best it could be a
substantial question relating to their appointment. Moreover, their appointment is not a dispute as one
would normally understand it.”

It was held that the appointments concerned were not ‘disputes’ as such or even disputes for the
purposes of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 and “they could be disputes for a constitutional
court to resolve through a writ of quo warranto, but certainly not for the NGT to venture into. The
failure of the State Government to appoint professional and experienced persons to key positions in
the SPCBs or the failure to appoint any person at all might incidentally result in an ineffective
implementation of the Water Act and the Air Act, but this cannot be classified as a primary dispute
over which the NGT would have jurisdiction. Such a failure might be of a statutory obligation over
which, in the present context and not universally, only a constitutional court would have jurisdiction
and not a statutory body like the NGT.”

On being informed that some States have implemented the order of the NGT and removed some
members while others have approached the Supreme Court and obtained an interim stay order, the
Supreme Court observed that “those officials who were removed pursuant to the order of the NGT
(including the appellant Techi Tagi Tara) have an independent cause of action” and it is “open to them
to challenge their removal in appropriate and independent proceedings.” On the grievance relating to
the issue of guidelines by the NGT, the Supreme Court observed that “this is for each State
Government to consider and decide what is the right thing to do under the circumstances” and “that in
matters relating to the protection and preservation of the environment (through the appointment of
officials to the SPCBs) the Central Government as well as the State Governments have to walk the
extra mile.” 

Accordingly, while setting aside the judgment and order of the NGT, the Supreme Court directed “the
Executive in all the States to frame appropriate guidelines or recruitment rules within six months,
considering the institutional requirements of the SPCBs” and the law laid down by statute, by the
Supreme Court and as per the reports of various committees and authorities and ensure that suitable
professionals and experts are appointed to the SPCBs.