Remedial Law 2 | R.

Dizon | Mamba Mentality 2020

Rule 66 – Quo Warranto

Case Doctrines
Mendoza vs. A judgment against a public officer in regards to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
Allas however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the
nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the
person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise
any function of the office to which he lays claim
Calleja vs. As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase
Panday "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the
present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies
to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is
the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated.

Lokin, Jr. vs. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns
COMELEC a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an
election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list
organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list
organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an
action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-
Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Aratea vs. It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility
COMELEC and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he
is a resident of a particular Philippine locality when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.  In
cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies. Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a
petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a
petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.

De Castro vs. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has
Carlos original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the
jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial
court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must
be strictly observed. Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it
is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition."
A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. A
direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that
are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of
preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or
an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to
enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office. Hence, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-
CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of
the supposed usurper is immaterial.

Velasco vs. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
Belmonte franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office. In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in
G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in
SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-
General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. 

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Mendoza vs. Allas

G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999 J. Puno

Facts: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS"
and he discharged the function and duties of said office.

Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place,
respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.

Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the
Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. 

Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in favor of
petitioner hence, the court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed
the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas
was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a
consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry was
made.

Petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. The court denied the motion on the ground that the
contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to
the quo warranto petition.

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of the trial
court. But this was denied. Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner argued that "The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,
considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in holding that the a writ of execution may no longer be issued

Held: The Court ruled in the negative. The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of
the Revised Rules of Court. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise
of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right
to enjoy the privilege.

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regards to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not
applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though
such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never
directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.

In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out
before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not
against Godofredo Olores. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision

Calleja vs. Panday

G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006 J. Austria-Martinez

Facts: Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto. Respondents
alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and
officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and
stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to
Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga City.

According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City,
then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides
which was refused to receive by the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City stating that improper venue is not a ground for
transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and served summons on herein petitioners.

Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses  which among others, lack of jurisdiction, and (3)
wrong remedy of quo warranto.

RTC held that:

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The plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations, between and among
stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally under PD 902-A approved
on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try
and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A).

Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the
Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the
Court of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases."

Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on
November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000 designated certain branches of the
Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to
Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the
Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court"

Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on March 1,
2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally assigned or transmitted to the
regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear
such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and decide cases
originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear
intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide these cases to the "special courts" created under
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the
Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute.

In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss
is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated
March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A.
8799.

Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated the case to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: Whether RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur has jurisdiction

Held: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and
functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of
Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an
office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. 

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does
not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who
usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a
corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions
of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799.

It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the
Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being
questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated.

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Pursuant to Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court
that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is
situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court
designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed
by herein Respondents.

(Note: A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC: For the Fifth Judicial Region, this Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines
Sur the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:

Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.)

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based
on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been
aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated
as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch
of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.

Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010 J. Bersamin

Facts: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list
system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. 

CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives
would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names
appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis
K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi
Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales,
and (3) Borje.

CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion
seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be
thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand
total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and
Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees, the
COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC 

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was
docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, which among others,  CIBAC. The
COMELEC en banc issued another resolution that CIBAC is entitled to additional seat.

The COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin,
Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty.
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee..

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took
her oath of office

Hence, Lokin filed a petition for certiorari before this Court.

The COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales
as Representative and her assumption of that office;  The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action

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for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court. Therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction
over the matter being raised by Lokin.

Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy

Held: The Court has jurisdiction. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine
who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be
filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate.
The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any
voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the
petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be
available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated
and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a
nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization.
Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-
Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14,
2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed
in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

Aratea vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012 J. Carpio

Facts: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.

Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to
deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified
under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. 

Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor on 5 July 2010.

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May
2010 elections on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms
without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v.
People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.She claimed
her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC
Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the
striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
elections.

Aratea in his comment, asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in
his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of
Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 of the Local Government Code to succeed as
Mayor.

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order stating: Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to
cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation.

Aratea filed the present petition 

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Issue: Whether Aratea should be the Mayor of Zambales and not Antipolo

Held: The Court ruled in favor of Antipolo. The Court held that  the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.

Section 74 of the OEC requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section
74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The three-term
limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, is found
both in the Constitution and the law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate re-election for the same office in the next regular election  because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to
run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"   means having the right to
run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.

Also, it is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and
ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a
particular Philippine locality when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.  In cases of such overlap, the petitioner
should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple
remedies. Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election,
while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one
should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.

Cancellation of CoC Disqualification from candidacy or from Quo Warranto

holding public office
As to the grounds
Lack of eligibility under the pertinent The grounds are traits, conditions, Ineligibility and disloyalty to the
constitutional and statutory provisions characteristics or acts of Republic of the Philippines. This is
on qualifications or eligibility for public disqualification, individually applicable provided under Section 253 of the OEC
office; the governing provisions to a candidate, as provided under and governed by the Rules of Court as to
are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC. Sections 68 and 12 of B.P. Blg. 881; procedures. 
Section 40 of LGC 1991; and, as
discussed below, Section 8, Article X of Note: While quo warranto and
the Constitution.  cancellation share the same ineligibility
grounds, they differ as to the time
these grounds are cited. A cancellation
case is brought before the elections,
while a quo warranto is filed after (must
be initiated within ten days after the
proclamation of the election results) and
may still be filed even if a CoC
cancellation case was not filed before
elections.

As to the effects of a successful suit

A candidate whose CoC was denied due A candidate who was simply Successful quo warranto suit results in
course or cancelled is not considered a disqualified is merely prohibited from the ouster of an already elected official
candidate at all. continuing as a candidate or from from office; substitution, for obvious
assuming or continuing to assume the reasons, can no longer apply.
After this period, generally no other functions of the office
person may join the election contest. A
notable exception to this general rule is
the rule on substitution. The application
of the exception, however, presupposes a
valid CoC. Unavoidably, a
"candidate" whose CoC has been
cancelled or denied due course cannot
be substituted for lack of a CoC, to all
intents and purposes.

De Castro vs. Carlos

G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013 CJ. Sereno

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

Meanwhile, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010,
amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010. Which states that: All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-
CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and
continue to perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been

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accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first, unless they are
reappointed in the meantime.

Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,which
in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll,
and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.

Petitioner sought a clarification from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the position of
AGMO. 

In her reply, Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones (Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of
AGMO had not yet been classified and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further
stated that a perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position. In sum, she
said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.

For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO
through a letter addressed to the Office of the President on 17 December 2010.

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the
MMDA. On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.

Hence, he filed petition for the issuance writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos
(respondent) from the position of assistant general manager for operations 

Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the security of tenure of employees in the
civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not
a CES position as determined by the CESB.

On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order to have security of tenure,
petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is executive
and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP
Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the
Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: Whether the petition for quo warrant would prosper

Held: The Court ruled in the negative. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does
not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and
specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands
upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had
already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites
stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere
speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle
the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to
oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been
forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

In case at bar, the SC held that AGMO is within the coverage of the CES. First, AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of
tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter. Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level,
which is equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29. Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals
that the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial functions.

In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are grouped into three major
levels and AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the CES. In this case,
petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely
temporary.

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In Amores v. Civil Service Commission is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments in the CES. The Court held
therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity without the required CES eligibility:

Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the CESB, petitioner’s appointment
is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14 June 2011, which reads: All appointments to
positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would be deemed co-terminus with the appointing
authority.

Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s
term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto
proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a
showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.

Velasco vs. Belmonte

G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016 J. Leonardo-Deacstro

Facts: One Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as
candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC),
entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled.
(SPA No. 13-053 (DC))

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto. (SPA No. 13-053 (DC))

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were held on May 13, 2013.

The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First Division (SPA No.
13-053 (DC))

A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. Likewise, Reyes's counsel,
Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same.

Despite its receipt of the Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of
the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality in SPA No. 13-053 (DC),

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No. 207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako
Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling
her . Certificate of Candidacy

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-010,
entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the
Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of
Reyes as null and void. On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-010.

On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's petition. This Court held  that
Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.

Tan filed a Motion for Execution (in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:[A]n Order be issued granting the instant
motion; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections.

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the functions of a Member of the
House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the
June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. 

On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's motion for execution.
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of the New Provincial Board of

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Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros,
Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts.

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On the same day,
Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the
House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, (GR. No. 207264)

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate
the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that he be allowed to assume
the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction

Petitioner contends that  it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to administer the oath to [him] and to
allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque representative;" and (ii) respondent
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xx x as the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent
Reyes from the Roll ofM embers." Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him
(Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially
seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when
the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a
title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases.

As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo Warranto cases involving
Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto,
it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. " She argues that
numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is
divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction
over quo warranto cases filed against Reyes by several individuals.

Issue: Whether or not the action is one for mandamus or quo warranto

Held: The action is for mandamus. After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that
this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the
respondents.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where
the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a
right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the
respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for mandamus "when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer
the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives,

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respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of
Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque.

The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond dispute - Velasco is the
proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is
constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to
discharge her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal
situation between Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to
run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be
treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC
was promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite
knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the
winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was
proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued
proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the
COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the
administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in
character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the
registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap.
They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now
both final and executory.

It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said Representative's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. (See. Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia)

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