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Part One – General Principles
Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court
Power of the Supreme Court 1. Dela Cruz v. National Police Commission
to Amend and Suspend G.R. No. 215545, January 7, 2019
Procedural Rules The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a
case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when
the purpose of justice requires it. Procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
requirement is in pursuance to the Bill of Rights inscribed in the
Constitution which guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
2. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
The suspension of rules of procedure, such as the requirement of a motion
for reconsideration before the SC may entertain a petition for certiorari,
may only be considered under a very narrow band of compelling reasons
and always in consideration that due process of law must be accorded to
both parties — the prosecution and the accused
3. National Power Corp. v. Southern Philippines Power Corp.
G.R. No. 219627, July 4, 2016
The liberality on earlier filings gave a reasonable ground to believe that
filing of a motion for reconsideration through the same private courier
would be considered sufficient compliance with the Energy Regulatory
Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure.
4. Republic v. Spouses Gimenez
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
The SC has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of
procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth. In all the alleged
ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set
aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the
merits at the Sandiganbayan.

Part Two – Jurisdiction

Concepts and Doctrines
Jurisdiction, in General, and 1. Castro v. Gregorio
Classification Thereof G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action.
Doctrines of Hierarchy of 1. Acosta v. Ochoa
Courts and Continuity of G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019
Jurisdiction Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, recourse must first be sought
from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
2. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Local Government
of Quezon City
G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018
The CA has full discretion on whether to give due course to any petition for
certiorari directly filed before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner’s direct
resort to it on the ground that the issue presented was a pure question of
law. No error can be ascribed to it for passing upon the issue. The principle
of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial policy designed to restrain direct
resort to this Court if relief can be granted or obtained from the lower
courts.
3. Aala v. Uy

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G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017
None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present
in this case. Significantly, although petitioners raise questions of law, other
interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties’ arguments,
which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this
case.
4. Pemberton v. De Lima
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The possibility of the
conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is
special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court’s original
jurisdiction.
5. Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education
G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
Concurrence of jurisdiction does not allow unrestricted freedom of choice
of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
6. Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Although as a general rule, courts must observe the hierarchy of courts,
this doctrine admits of exceptions. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
not an iron-clad rule. This court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari
filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of 1. Aala v. Uy
Administrative Remedies G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017
In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There are
factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition of the
case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication. The
questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners
immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had
enough time to render a decision.
2. Buena v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
The question of whether the position for which petitioner was appointed
requires career executive service eligibility is a purely legal question which
is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Actual Case or Controversy; 1. Pemberton v. De Lima
When Case Considered G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
Moot and Academic A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary
investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
2. Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016
Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a
petition for certiorari filed before the CA, or a petition for review on certiorari
filed before this court, moot and academic. A petition for certiorari assailing
a decision of the NLRC is allowed even after the NLRC’s Decision has
become final and executory, provided that the petition is filed before the
expiration of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
3. Republic v. Moldex Realty, Inc.
G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016
A party’s withdrawal of its application for land registration renders moot
and academic an appeal assailing a CA decision affirming the RTC’s grant
of said application.

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4. De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the
respondent’s warrant of arrest renders a Rule 65 petition assailing the
preliminary investigation moot.
Doctrine of Immutability of 1. Mercury Drug Corp. v. Spouses Huang
Judgment G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017
A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. It
can neither be modified nor disturbed by courts in any manner even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct perceived errors of fact or law.
Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution of the
judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
2. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp.
G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June 1, 2016
Upon execution, this Court’s decision cannot be amended by the trial court
or the sheriff. Absent an order of remand, we cannot allow attempts to
substantially or materially alter the terms of our final and executory
judgment.
3. Gadrinab v. Salamanca
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014
The doctrine of the immutability of judgment bars courts from modifying
decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the
modification is to correct errors of fact or law. This doctrine admits a few
exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice.
Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts
Supreme Court 1. Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhard
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and not of the Court of
Appeals. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 includes the proviso:
“except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court”
under the enumerated cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
CA. Further, on the issue of jurisdiction, the determination of whether to
entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which
must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot operate to automatically
divest a court of its jurisdiction.
Court of Tax Appeals 1. Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao
G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018
When a tax case is pending on appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin the levy of
taxes and the auction of a taxpayer’s properties in relation to that case.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals Decision assailed by petitioner
before the Court of Appeals was rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over the real property tax assessment of its properties. Clearly,
this falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that
this Central Board of Assessment Appeals decision constitutes one of the
cases covered by the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.
2. National Power Corp. v. Provincial Government of Bataan
G.R. No. 180654 (Resolution), March 6, 2017
A local tax case is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals. The issue of the validity and legality of the foreclosure sale
is essentially related to the issue of the demandability of the local franchise
tax.
Regional Trial Courts 1. Jaka Investments Corp. v. Urdaneta Village Association, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 204187 & 206606, April 1, 2019

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To determine if this case falls under the HLURB’s jurisdiction, it is
necessary to examine whether the controversy arose “from any of the
following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the
association; (2) between any and/or all of them and the association of
which they are members; and (3) between the association and the state
insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.”
2. Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay
G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, March 12, 2019
It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as special agrarian courts,
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the value
of just compensation. Nonetheless, the Department of Agrarian Reform still
exercises primary jurisdiction to preliminarily determine this value. This is
different from determining the validity of property transfer to the farmer-
beneficiaries and, consequently, the validity of the certificates of title issued
to them. When the issue in a case hinges on whether a beneficiary has
made insufficient or no payments for the land awarded to him or her,
primary administrative jurisdiction is under the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
3. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is
capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for the
recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the
recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of
money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
4. Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be
done in a soldier’s official capacity. If a soldier nonetheless proceeds
allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before
the civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the argument that only
courts-martial have jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, will not
lie.
5. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po
G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial
Court. It is a complaint for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and
damages. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, 1. Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
Municipal Trial Courts, G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
Municipal Trial Courts in In criminal cases, the penalty of the crime charged in the information
Cities, and Municipal Circuit determines the court’s jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot
Trial Courts be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the
reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court
is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Aspects of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the Subject 1. Amoguis v. Ballado
Matter G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018
A party is estopped from claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:
(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant; (2) the statutory right
was not invoked; (3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the
claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction; (4) the claimant actively
participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction; (5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which

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forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction; (6) irreparable damage will be
caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant’s implicit
waiver.
Jurisdiction over the 1. Aquino v. People
Territory (In Criminal Cases) G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018
Criminal acts are regarded to have been committed within the province or
city where the appellant was found and arrested.

Part Three – Civil Procedure

Rule 1 – General Provisions
Sec. 6. Construction 1. Malixi v. Baltazar
G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017
Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants
from pursuing their case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every
section in the Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect
to procedural rules are promulgated with the objective of a more efficient
judicial system. However, time and again, this Court has relaxed the
observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice
2. Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
Procedural rules must be faithfully followed and dutifully enforced. Still,
their application should not amount to “placing the administration of justice
in a straightjacket.” An inordinate fixation on technicalities cannot defeat
the need for a full, just, and equitable litigation of claims.
Liberal Construction of 1. Metrobank and Trust Co. v. G&P Builders, Inc.
Other Rules of Procedure G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
The lapse of the periods in Rule 4, Section II of the Interim Rules does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the petition for corporate
rehabilitation. This is in line with the liberal construction given to the rules
governing corporate rehabilitation.
Ordinary Civil Actions
Rule 2 – Cause of Action
Sec. 2. Cause of action, 1. Manila Electric Co. v. Nordec Philippines
defined G.R. Nos. 196020 & 196116, April 18, 2018
The beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against
distribution utility. A distribution utility is mandated to strictly comply with
the legal requisites before disconnecting an electric supply due to the
serious consequences this disconnection may have on the consumer. In
Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Chua, it was the beneficial users who
were awarded damages due to the unjust disconnection of the electric
supply, even though the service contract with Meralco was registered in
the name of another person.
2. Villamor, Jr. v. Umale
G.R. Nos. 172843 & 172881, September 24, 2014
A wrong to the corporation does not necessarily create an individual cause
of action.
Sec. 4. Splitting a single 1. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. v. Presbitero, Jr.
cause of action; effect of G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015
The simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs
from the SC and a petition for certiorari before the RTC violate the rules on
splitting cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of 1. Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos
action G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017
Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined
with the Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief as both are special
civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue as an
intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief

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becomes superfluous. The right of Santos to inspect the books of Belo
Medical Group and the appreciation for his motives to do so will necessarily
be determined by the trial court together with determining the ownership of
the shares of stock under Santos’ name.
Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Action
Sec. 1. Who may be parties; 1. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Spouses Ledesma
plaintiff and defendant G.R. Nos. 211176 & 211583, February 6, 2019
A complaint should be dismissed outright if the complaint states no cause
of action.
2. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp.
G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June 1, 2016
Atty. Roxas has no legal standing to appeal the case on RREC’s behalf
based on Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Roxas is not a party litigant
under Section 1. Only RREC, as the party seeking for the execution of
judgment, and the Republic, as the party opposing RREC’s claims, stand
to be benefited or injured by the pending case. Atty. Roxas is not a party-
in-interest under Section 2. He has no valid interest in this case as his
contingency-fee agreement with RREC is champertous and, therefore,
void. Likewise, Atty. Roxas is not a party representative under Section 3
as he is no longer RREC’s lawyer.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest 1. Piedad v. Bobilles
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a
party in interest. Petitioners claim to be Piedad’s children; thus, they assert
that they are the real parties in interest to the action begun by their father.
Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad’s rightful heirs not
only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. This Court upheld
petitioners’ personality to sue in the case of Heirs of Simeon Piedad and
sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when
the current case is merely an offshoot of their father’s original complaint for
nullity of deed of sale.
2. Lao, Jr. v. Local Government Unit of Cagayan De Oro City
G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of
a contract entered into by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no
authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local government unit which
stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in this
case. The city councilors merely represent the city in the suit.
3. Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power
Corp.
G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017
Persons not privy to a contract are not the real parties in interest to
question its validity through a petition for injunction. Actions must be
instituted by the real parties in interest; otherwise, the action may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
4. Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children
is expressly given personality by Section 9(b)1 of Republic Act No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004 (the Anti-VAWC Law), to file a civil action petitioning for the
issuance of a protection order for her child.
5. National Power Corp. v. Provincial Government of Bataan
G.R. No. 180654 (Resolution), March 6, 2017
Petitioner is a real party in interest, which stands to gain or lose from the
judgment that the trial court may render. Petitioner had to assail the
correctness of the local franchise tax assessments made against it by
instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial Court; otherwise, the
assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.

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6. Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
An aunt exercising substitute parental authority may be considered as a
real party in interest in an action for damages for the death of her niece.
7. Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v.
Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2014
The law firm to whom payment of retainer fees was disallowed by a COA
decision is a real party in interest to assail the same.
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder 1. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po
of indispensable parties G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have
already sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They
will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court
on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance.
The ruling of this Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to
reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become
separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.
2. Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
In an action for damages against the registered owner, the negligent driver
is not an indispensable party but a mere necessary party.
3. Florete, Jr. v. Florete
G.R. No. 177275, January 20, 2016
In derivative suits, the corporation concerned must be impleaded as a
party. Not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the
present rule that it must be served with process. The reason given is that
the judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the
corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring a subsequent
suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other
words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of
action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res ajudicata
against it.
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty 1. Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
of counsel Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017
Petitioners fail to show how the application of the Rules of Court was an
error of law. The only basis for petitioners’ objection to the order requiring
the appointment of an administrator for the estate of petitioner Anthony is
a liberal interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument fails.
2. Tuano v. People
G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), September 28, 2016
Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more
often in civil actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that
the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his
or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the
nature of the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the
party without the counsel’s proper manifestation.
Rule 4 – Venue of Actions
Sec. 4. When Rules not 1. Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, Inc.
applicable G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019
Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue
of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner’s personal action will be
governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules on
venue are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or
the impartial and even-handed determination of every action and
proceeding. This objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint

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or petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s whim or
caprice.
2. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a
corporation should be the actual place where its principal office has been
located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict
between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical
location of the corporation’s main office, the actual place of business
should control. Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are
treated as two distinct venues.
Rule 5 – Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts
Procedure in Regional Trial Courts
Rule 6 – Kinds of Pleadings
Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)- 1. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Clarges Corp. Realty
party complaint G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016
The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court; the
discretion is with the trial court. It bears to emphasize that the rationale for
permissive joinder of a third-party defendant who may be liable to the
original defendant is judicial economy. This practice avoids multiplicity of
actions and saves time and reduplication of effort by trying all issues
together in one action.
Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading
Sec. 4. Verification 1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Apo Cement Corp.
G.R. No. 193381, February 8, 2017
The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to
“belief” as basis. This is to ensure that the pleading is anchored on facts
and not on imagination or speculation, and is filed in good faith. To
emphasize this further, the third paragraph of Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly treats pleadings with a
verification based on “information and belief’ or “knowledge, information
and belief,” as unsigned.
Sec. 5. Certification against 1. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Reyes
forum shopping G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315 & 200684, September 18, 2019
Forum shopping may not be committed if the evil sought to be prevented
or the possible conflicting decisions of the courts will not be affected.
2. Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao
G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018
To reverse a court determination that a party has violated the rule against
forum shopping, this party must show that one or more of the requirements
for forum shopping does not exist.
3. Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona
G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.”
When the Court of Appeals denied the Office of the Solicitor General’s
Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the
latter was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping
when it filed its Petition before this Court despite a pending Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
4. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development
Co.
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
No forum shopping is committed in an ejectment case where final judgment
in the specific performance case will not affect its outcome and judgment
in the interpleader case will likewise not be res judicata against it.
5. Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos
G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017

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Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping. Their prompt
compliance of the certification against forum shopping appended to their
Petitions negates willful and deliberate intent.
6. City of Taguig v. City of Makati
G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016
Forum shopping can be committed in several ways: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where
the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes
of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata). Despite the difference in the immediacy of their effects, the
purposes of Motions for Reconsideration and Petitions for Annulment of
Judgment are fundamentally the same: the setting aside of a judgment in
order that a different, favorable, one may take its place. They “grant. . .
substantially the same reliefs.”
7. In Re: Ferrer
A.C. No. 8037 (Resolution), February 17, 2016
There is forum shopping where while the motion to withdraw the first
petition is pending, a second petition based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer is filed. Withdrawal of any case, when it has been
duly filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the discretion of the court,
and not at the behest of litigants. Once a case is filed before a court and
the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject
to that court’s jurisdiction.
8. Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank
G.R. Nos. 158622, 169441, 172958, 173194, 196958, 197120 & 205463,
January 27, 2016
No forum shopping where party filed an Application for Receivership and
at the same time filed a Petition for Writ of Possession because while the
issuance of a writ of possession or the appointment as receiver would have
the same result of granting possession of the foreclosed properties to said
party, its right to possess these properties as the winning bidder in the
foreclosure sale is different from its interest as creditor to preserve these
properties.
9. Home Guaranty Corp. v. La Savoie Development Corp.
G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015
Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits
in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask
the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action. A party commits forum shopping
when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise
stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or
more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought.
10. Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Velasco
G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. An
action for reconstitution and subsequent action for quieting of title covering

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the same Transfer Certificate of Title constitutes forum shopping because
it involves relitigating of claim of ownership over the properties.
11. Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
There is forum shopping when an appeal before the CA and a petition for
certiorari before the SC, assailing the same trial court decision, are filed.
12. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban
G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
For purposes of forum shopping, absolute identity of parties is not required
and that it is enough that there is substantial identity of parties.
Rule 8 – Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
Sec. 2. Alternative causes of 1. Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo
action or defenses G.R. No.196251, July 9, 2014
Plaintiff’s prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and
reformation of instrument is not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A
plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action
per Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the filing of
two separate cases for each of the causes of action that is prohibited since
the subsequently filed case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on splitting causes of action.
Rule 9 – Effect of Failure to Plead
Sec. 3. Default; declaration 1. Spouses Manuel v. Ong
of G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit
of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default must be
deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.
Rule 10 – Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Sec. 7. Filing of amended 1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
pleadings G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016
The procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be
indicated with appropriate marks, has for its purpose the convenience of
the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately
see the modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for
the deletions and intercalations will not affect any substantive right.
Rule 11 – When to File Responsive Pleadings
Rule 12 – Bill of Particulars
Rule 13 – Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
Sec. 2. Filing and service, 1. Gatmaytan v. Dolor
defined G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017
Service upon the parties’ counsels of record is tantamount to service upon
the parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not
considered service upon their lawyers. The reason is simple-the parties,
generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of
procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal
remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a
litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for
the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure-
either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself ifs/he does
not intend to hire a lawyer.
2. Bracero v. Arcelo
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015
Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule
admits of exceptions as in cases that would indicate that they were then
already informed of such decision.

Sec. 14. Notice of lis 1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan

pendens G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016

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Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is to molest the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Payment of Fees 1. Heirs of Dragon v. Manila Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019
Payment of filing fees in full at the time the initiatory pleading or application
is filed is the general rule. The payment of the docket fee in the proper
amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which should
be strictly construed.
2. Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. The amount of
the docket fee shall be computed from the amounts in the prayer.
Rule 14 – Summons
Summons, In General 1. Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a
protection order. This prevents the latter from being a substitute for the
former. At no point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary
protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent.
Sec. 6. Service in person on 1. People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing
defendant G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by a sheriff’s failure
to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within
this period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2)
different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she
must cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.
2. Spouses Manuel v. Ong
G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it
requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender
is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of
the defendant, not the locus of service.
Sec. 7. Substituted service 1. People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing
G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In
such cases, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in
charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service, and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted
service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service
of summons.
Sec. 11. Service upon 1. Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
domestic private juridical G.R. No.172204, July 2, 2014
entity The enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of
summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated is invalid.
Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. A
Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official
address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take

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the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a
court proceeding.
Sec. 12. Service upon 1. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebescensio
foreign private juridical entity G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
Service of summons to branch office sufficient to vest jurisdiction over
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Sec. 19. Proof of service by 1. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.
publication G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
The sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing
efforts to personally serve summons to the defendants or respondents and
the impossibility of personal service of summons. The issuance of a
judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process
rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect.
Sec. 20. Voluntary 1. People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing
appearance G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when
they participate in the proceedings despite improper service of summons.
In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre-trial
brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs.
2. Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
Voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the
jurisdiction of a court, as it is subject to special appearance as an
exception.
Rule 15 – Motions
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion 1. Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Failure to comply with the notice requirement under Rule 15, Sec. 4
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s
right to procedural due process. While the general rule is that the same is
a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still
be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice
to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing 1. Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054 (Resolution), March 27, 2017
The notice of hearing on the motion must be directed to the adverse party
and must inform him or her of the time and date of the hearing. Failure to
comply with these mandates renders the motion fatally defective,
equivalent to a useless scrap of paper.
Rule 16 – Motion to Dismiss
Sec. 1. Grounds 1. Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017
Two categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure: first, those that must be filed ahead of an answer
and second, those that may be entertained even after an answer has been
filed. Those under the second category may only plead four (4) of the 10
grounds under Rule 16, Section 1: lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. The prior filing of an
answer, therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration of six (6) other
grounds under Rule 16, Sec. 1; however, the grounds stated in a belatedly
filed motion to dismiss may still be considered provided that they were
pleaded as affirmative defenses in an answer.
2. Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency
G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017
To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss,
only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, in relation to
whether its prayer may be granted. To sufficiently state a cause of action,

14
the Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the trial court could
grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual allegations.
3. Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Fredeluces
G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016
Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any
suit subsequently filed for the same cause of action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. When there is more than one suit pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a
motion to dismiss may be filed on this ground.
4. Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Fredeluces
G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016
As a general rule, when a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of
ultimate facts are hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary facts
and conclusions of law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to
judicial notice, those which are legally impossible, inadmissible in
evidence, or unfounded, are disregarded.
Litis Pendentia 1. Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
In filing a petition for the issuance of a protection order for her child, she
avails of a remedy that is distinct from the criminal action under Section 5
of the same law. The mere filing of such a criminal complaint, without the
subsequent filing of an information in court, does not occasion litis
pendentia or res judicata that precludes the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a protection order.
2. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.
G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
No litis pendentia where no identity of parties and no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for.
Rule 17 – Dismissal of Actions
Sec. 1. Dismissal upon 1. Ching v. Cheng
notice by plaintiff G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
As a general rule, dismissals under Rule 17, Sec. 1 are without prejudice
except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused the dismissal. In
all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff,
not of the defendant.
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to 1. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Genuino
fault of plaintiff G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set
the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period,
this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case
diligently.
Rule 18 – Pre-Trial
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to 1. National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque
appear G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 provides that if it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.”
Rule on Guidelines to be 1. Cruz v. People
Observed by Trial Court G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017
Judges and Clerks of Court The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not
in the Conduct of Pre-Trial identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for
and Use of Deposition- an exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is
Discovery Measures (A.M. no hard and fast rule to determine what may constitute “good cause,”
No. 03-1-09-SC) though this Court has previously defined it as any substantial reason “that
affords a legal excuse.”
Rule 19 – Intervention

15
Sec. 1. Who may intervene 1. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene are
whether the intervenor has standing to intervene, whether the motion will
unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already established, and
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate action.
Rule 20 – Calendar of Cases
Rule 21 – Subpoena
Rule 22 – Computation of Time
Rule 23 – Depositions Pending Action
Sec. 4. Use of depositions 1. Santamaria v. Cleary
G.R. Nos. 197122 & 197161, June 15, 2016
Under the rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of
discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated, and a method
of presenting testimony. The taking of depositions has been allowed as a
departure from open-court testimony.
Rule 24 – Depositions before Action or Pending Appeal
Rule 25 – Interrogatories to Parties
Rule 26 – Admission by Adverse Party
Rule 27 – Production or Inspection of Documents or Things
Sec. 1. Motion for 1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corp.
production or inspection; G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017
order Since Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide when the
motion may be used, the allowance of a motion for production of document
rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case is pending, with
due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and
justice.
2. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery,
is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time
frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of
documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due
application and a showing of due cause.”
3. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly
discretionary on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be
arbitrarily or unreasonably denied. The test to be applied by the trial judge
in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their
description is one of reasonableness and practicability.
Rule 28 – Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
Rule 29 – Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery
Rule 30 – Trial
Sec. 5. Order of trial 1. Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic
G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018
The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case
may, therefore, be done but only if the court finds that it is for good reasons
and in the furtherance of justice. The admission is discretionary on the part
of the court and may only be set aside if the admission was done with grave
abuse of discretion.
Rule 31 – Consolidation or Severance
Rule 32 – Trial by Commissioner
Sec. 2. Reference ordered 1. National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque
on motion G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

16
When an inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the appointment
of commissioners under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 32 — not Sections 5, 6,
7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court – will be followed.
Rule 33 – Demurrer to Evidence
Rule 34 – Judgment on the Pleadings
Rule 35 – Summary Judgments
Sec. 3. Motion and 1. Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo
proceedings thereon G.R. No.196251, July 9, 2014
Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the case
can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, and other papers filed by the parties.
Rule 36 – Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof
Sec. 1. Rendition of 1. Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Entapa
judgments and final orders G.R. No. 215072, September 7, 2016
A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise,
its decisions are void. Rule 36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Judgment upon a 1. Republic v. Fetalvero
Compromise G.R. No. 198008, February 4, 2019
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has
the effect of res judicata, and its immediately final and executory unless
set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability
of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already
attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors
of face or law.
2. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. De Jesus
G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 2017
A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a
compromise agreement and a judgment on the merits of the case if it turns
out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties. The agreement stated that
the payment of the monetary award was without prejudice to the right of
the employer to file a petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee
agreed that she would no longer file any complaint or prosecute any suit of
action against the employer after receiving the payment. This Court ruled
against the employer not because the parties entered into a conditional
settlement but because the conditional satisfaction of judgment was “highly
prejudicial to the employee.”
3. Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio
G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017
Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a
compromise validly entered into by the parties. A writ of execution that
varies the respective obligations of the parties under a judicially approved
compromise agreement is void.
4. Gadrinab v. Salamanca
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014
A judgment on compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata, and
is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or
vices of consent.
Obiter Dictum 1. Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Entapa
G.R. No. 215072, September 7, 2016
Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of
law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.” It is a “a
remark made, or opinion expressed... upon a point not necessarily involved
in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument.” It “lacks the force of an adjudication and should not
ordinarily be regarded as such.
Rule 37 – New Trial or Reconsideration

17
Sec. 2. Contents of motion 1. Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services
for new trial or G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015
reconsideration and notice Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the
thereof running of the reglementary period for filing an appeal. If not served on the
other party, they are pro forma and are “mere scraps of paper” not to be
acted upon by the court. Upon lapse of the reglementary period, the
judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes immutable.
Rule 38 – Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings
Sec. 1. Petition for relief 1. City of Dagupan v. Maramba
from judgment, order, or G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014
other proceedings A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy
which allows courts to review a judgment tainted with neglect bordering on
extrinsic fraud. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
2. Madarang v. Spouses Morales
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under
exceptional circumstances. If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of
excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that their counsel’s
negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and
prudence.
Sec. 3. Time for filing 1. Madarang v. Spouses Morales
petition; contents and G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
verification To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties must file the
petition within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment and within six (6)
months after the judgment or final order was entered; otherwise, the
petition shall be dismissed outright.
Rule 39 – Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
Sec. 2. Discretionary 1. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano
execution G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. In expropriation
cases, a party cannot allege lack of due process when he or she was given
every reasonable opportunity to present his or her case before the courts.
A judgment may be executed pending appeal for good reasons, such as
where the government belatedly pays the just compensation for properties
taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Sec. 6. Execution by motion 1. Piedad v. Bobilles
or by independent action G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
To reiterate, jurisprudence is consistent that when the delay in filing a
motion or action for execution could not be attributed to the prevailing party,
a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be resorted to where
a literal and strict adherence will most likely result in miscarriage of justice.
Sec. 13. Property exempt 1. Magubay-Otamias v. Republic
from execution G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of
assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5) children.
The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory
right that may be waived.
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments 1. Webb v. Gatdula
or final orders G.R. No. 194469 (Resolution), September 18, 2019
A civil law principle, res judicata, may not be applied to criminal cases.
2. Escobar v. People
G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017

18
Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of
conclusiveness of judgment has no application in criminal law proceedings.
At most, the applicable concept of res judicata is that of res judicata in
prison grey as double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7.
3. Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017
A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude
other parties with a better right from instituting free patent applications over
it. There is no res judicata if there is no identity or substantial identity of
parties and identity of subject matter.
4. People v. Escobar
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case, not in an
interlocutory order in a criminal case. An order disposing a petition for bail
is interlocutory. This order does not attain finality when a new matter
warrants a second look on the application for bail.
5. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po
G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their
ownership over the property. Necessarily, the parties may present
evidence to support their claims. Therefore, it cannot be bound simply by
the factual findings of the land registration court alone. However, when an
issue of ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings
where the adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her
claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from
any other claim of the adverse party on the property. Nonetheless, this is
not the circumstance in the case at bar. As the Spouses Po were not able
to prove their claim in the registration proceedings, res judicata cannot
apply to their action for reconveyance.
6. Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman
G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016
Res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies when the first
judgment and the second case are the same as to parties and issues but
different as to causes of action. Since there is no judicial determination of
fraud, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment cannot apply. The ruling
in LRC Case No. 445-R cannot bar the issue of whether there was a
fraudulent expansion of the property covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832. These
Transfer Certificates of Title may still be questioned in a direct action
seeking its nullification.
7. Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
Res judicata does not apply to purely administrative proceedings, and
decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings.
8. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban
G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may very well be considered
a judgment on the merits and, thereby, operate as res judicata on a
subsequent case.
9. Pryce Corp. v. China Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014
In two separate appeals before the SC, filed by different creditors of the
same debtor, on the issue of the rehabilitation court’s order approving a
rehabilitation plan, the decision by the SC in one of the appeals renders
the issue res judicata, and the other appeal is now barred by prior judgment
as to said issue.
Appeals
Rule 40 – Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts

19
Sec. 7. Procedure in the 1. Cruz v. Spouses Christensen
Regional Trial Court G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
Generally, the rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period
provided is mandatory. Rule 40, Section 7 is jurisdictional since the
Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are specifically assigned
and properly argued in the memorandum and a trial court does not acquire
jurisdiction over an appeal where the errors have not been specifically
assigned. Liberality, however, in the application of Rule 40, Sec. 7 is
warranted in this case in view of the potential inequity that may result if the
rule is strictly applied.
Rule 41 – Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
Sec. 1. Subject of appeal 1. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 20643 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is
not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under
Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of
an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. A party may,
however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can
establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Rule 42 – Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; 1. Magat, Sr. v. Tantrade Corp.
time for filing G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period,
appellants are expressly permitted by the penultimate sentence of Rule 42,
Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is true that in seeking an
extension, rather than immediately filing a petition, appellants wager on the
Court of Appeals’ favorable action. Still, it remains that they have 15 days
to seek an extension. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period
that Rule 42 allows. In doing so, they are not “procrastinating” but are
merely exercising a legitimate option.
Rule 43 – Appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals
Sec. 1. Scope 1. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Reyes
G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315 & 200684, September 18, 2019
The rules for Agrarian Law implementation provide a mode of appeal from
the decisions of the Secretary to the Office of the President. Hence, the
appeal to the office of the president is the proper remedy.
2. Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development
Corp., Inc.
G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019
This is not to say that factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may now
be assailed before the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure emphasizes that though there may have been variances, all
appeals under its scope are to be brought before the Court of Appeals.
However, in keeping with the Construction Industry Arbitration law, any
appeal from CIAC arbitral tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.
3. Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos
G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017
A party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a
special commercial court, purely on questions of law, must raise these
issues before the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. A.M. No.
04-9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it.
4. CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc.
G.R. No. 192725, August 9, 2017
Factual findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunals may not be assailed except
only in cases where the CIAC arbitral tribunals conducted their affairs in a
haphazard, immodest manner that the most basic integrity of the arbitral
process was imperiled.

20
5. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
The Office of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative complaints may
be appealed to the CA via Rule 43, whereas its dismissal of criminal
complaints may be elevated to the SC via a special civil action under Rule
65.
6. Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.
G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
7. Metrobank and Trust Co. v. G&P Builders, Inc.
G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
An interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally
dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. It is unappealable and cannot be
assailed via the instant petition for review under Rule 43. The proper
remedy is filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
8. Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.
G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), October 13, 2014
It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision only when there is allegation of
grave abuse of discretion.
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to 1. Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Keppel Philippines Mining, Inc.
comply with requirements G.R. No. 177382, February 17, 2016
No error in CA dismissing a Rule 43 petition for non-compliance with
procedural rules — (1) it did not implead its creditors as respondents,
impleading only the Presiding Judge of the RTC, (2) it did not serve a copy
of the Petition on some of its creditors, specifically, its former employees,
and (3) it did not serve a copy of the Petition on the RTC — in the absence
of showing of a justifiable reason for the exercise of liberality in the
application of the rules.
Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Internal Rules of the Court of 1. Crispino v. Tansay
Appeals G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016
In actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, such
as a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals’ power to receive
evidence is unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals in
civil cases, criminal cases, as well as appeals involving claims for
damages. In appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only receive
evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Rule 44 – Ordinary Appealed Cases
Sec. 10. Time for filing 1. Buena v. Benito
memoranda in special cases G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Failure to file memorandum is a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Sec. 13. Contents of 1. Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers
appellant’s brief (M) Berhard
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that the appellant’s brief
must include “clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be
submitted to the court for its judgment.” The essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard, and there is no denial of the right to due process
if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend their interests in due
course.
Issues that May be Raised 1. Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner
on Appeal G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017

21
Issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower court cannot be
decided for the first time on appeal. This rule ensures fairness in
proceedings.
Rule 45 – Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with 1. Claret School of Quezon City v. Sinday
Supreme Court G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019
Under Rule 45 on certiorari, questions of facts may generally not be raised.
However, when reviewing labor cases, it may be allowed when the factual
findings and conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or
inconsistent with those of the Court of Appeals.
2. Terp Construction Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank
G.R. No. 221771, September 18, 2019
Generally, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However, an exception
exists when there are conflicting facts presented in the Regional Trial court
and the Court of Appeals. It is however in the discretion of the court on
whether or not it will deem as proper introduction of new facts as it may
deem necessary based on the circumstances surrounding the case.
3. Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
Generally, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts unless facts of weight and substance
have been overlooked or misapplied.
4. William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &
Residents Association
G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
Only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari.
Nevertheless, this Court admits of exceptions subject to its sound judicial
discretion, one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting.
5. Constantino v. People
G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019
The Supreme Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court “if
it is not convinced that [such findings] are conformable to the evidence of
record and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses.”
6. BNL Management Corp. v. Uy
G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019
Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as they dwell on the truth or falsity of
facts. Hence, the Court would have to evaluate the evidence presented. In
contrast, questions of law are those which occur when there is “doubt or
difference . . . on what the law is on a certain state of facts.”
7. Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp.
G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018
The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the
proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to
once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered
in the lower courts.
8. Chavez v. Marcos
G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to
questions of law. Further, the Rules of Court mandate that petitions for
review distinctly set forth the questions of law raised. Although this Court
may, in exceptional cases, delve into questions of fact, these exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties before this Court
may evaluate and review facts of the case.
9. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications

22
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
Considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law, petitioner
did not err in filing its appeal directly with this Court pursuant to law and
prevailing jurisprudence.
10. Kim Liong v. People
G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018
The rule, therefore, is that petitions for review on certiorari may only raise
questions of law. While it is true that this rule is subject to exceptions,
nevertheless, this Court finds that none of the exceptions applies in this
case. Even if this Court considers the facts as alleged by petitioner, it will
still arrive at the conclusion that the trial court judge did not gravely abuse
his discretion in deeming petitioner’s right to cross-examination as waived.
11. Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc.
G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018
This Court is duty-bound to respect the consistent prior findings of the
Labor Arbiter, of the National Labor Relations Commission, and of the
Court of Appeals. It must be cautious not to substitute its own appreciation
of the facts to those of the tribunals which have previously weighed the
parties’ claims and personally perused the evidence. It will not discard
consistent prior findings and award disability benefits to a seafarer who
fails to adduce even an iota of evidence, let alone substantial evidence,
and fails to draw a causal connection between his or her alleged ailment
and working conditions.
12. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development
Co.
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court to assail the RTC’s ruling upholding the MeTC
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the
SC. Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the MeTC that
it has no jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and that petitioner
committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending cases,
both of which raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the CA in a
petition for review under Rule 42. Petitioner’s direct resort to the SC,
instead of to the CA for intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules,
violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several
exceptions to the doctrine. Here, the controversy between the parties has
been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial
dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency. Moreover, this
Court’s rules of procedure permit the direct resort to the SC from a decision
of the RTC upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in
this case.
13. Tortono v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
The matter of the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmarks is a factual issue
resting on the evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally
improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of
exceptions.
14. Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Alfeche
G.R. No. 209910, November 29, 2017
The case before this Court is replete with factual issues. Ordinarily, it is not
for this Court to review factual issues in petitions such as the present Rule
45 Petition which may only raise questions of law. This rule, however,
admits certain exceptions.
15. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

23
G.R. Nos. 196072 & 208603, September 20, 2017
A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution
of the court of appeals even if the error assigned is grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law. “The existence and availability of
the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.
16. Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-
Tri Joint Venture
G.R. No. 179732, September 13, 2017
The all too-familiar rule is that the court will not, in a petition for review on
certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most compelling
and cogent reasons, like when such factual findings were drawn from a
vacuum or arbitrarily reached, or are grounded entirely on speculation or
conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the supposed evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record or when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken or absurd. This conclusion is made more compelling
by the fact that the CIAC is a quasi-judicial body whose jurisdiction is
confined to construction disputes. As the administrative agency tasked with
resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry, the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission enjoys a wide latitude in recognition of its
technical expertise and experience. Its factual findings are, thus, accorded
respect and even finality, particularly when they are affirmed by an
appellate court.
17. Lao, Jr. v. Local Government Unit of Cagayan De Oro City
G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is
permitted when only questions of law are involved. There is a question of
law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a particular
set of facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of
facts be determined or evidence be received and examined. Matters of
evidence more properly pertain to the trial courts as the trier of facts and
the appellate courts as the reviewer of facts.
18. Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017
It is a general rule that factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are
conclusive, especially when they have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.
Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule,
exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so
this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.
19. Lucido v. People
G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017
The trial court’s assessment on the trustworthiness of witnesses will not be
disturbed absent any facts or circumstances of real weight which might
have been overlooked, misappreciated, or misunderstood.
20. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
G.R. Nos. 197526 & 199676-77, July 26, 2017
The determination of whether the taxpayer duly substantiated its claim for
refund of creditable input tax is a factual matter that is generally beyond
the scope of a Rule 45 petition.
21. Heirs of Cascayan v. Spouses Gumallaoi
G.R. No. 211947 (Resolution), July 3, 2017
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not
entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts
are “final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt” when
supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts

24
will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. Thus, as a
general rule, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.
22. Granada v. People
G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
23. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Liberty Corrugated Boxes
Manufacturing Corp.
G.R. No. 184317, January 25, 2017
Factual findings of the lower courts are accorded great weight and respect,
moreso in corporate rehabilitation proceedings. Absent any of the
exceptions enumerated in Pascual, this Court will neither review nor
disturb the lower courts’ findings of fact on appeal.
24. Torres v. People
G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within
the office of the trial courts. It is a question of fact not reviewable by this
Court. The trial court’s findings on the matter are entitled to great weight
and given great respect and “may only be disregarded ... if there are facts
and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which
would substantially alter the results of the case[.]”
25. Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.
G.R. No. 205035, November 16, 2016
The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the
proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to
once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered
in the lower courts.
26. Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising
Ventures Corp.
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
A Rule 45 petition is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the
case subject of the appeal. As it is a mere continuation, a Rule 45 petition
(apart from being limited to questions of law) cannot go beyond the issues
that were subject of the original action giving rise to it.
27. Padilla, Jr. v. Malicsi
G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to analyze
or weigh all over again evidence that has already been considered in the
lower courts.
28. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
While the question of whether the Court of Appeals may resolve a motion
for intervention is a question that assails an interlocutory order and
requests a review of a lower court’s exercise of discretion, when the Court
of Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the merits
of the case, an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.
29. Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
A question of fact which falls under the exceptions, as when the lower
courts misapprehended the facts, and their findings are contradicted by the
evidence presented, may be allowed by the SC in a Rule 45 petition.
30. Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.
G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016

25
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Only arbitrariness will warrant judicial
intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.
31. Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016
The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits based on the factual findings of the labor tribunals, an issue which
does not require the evaluation of the evidence presented before the labor
tribunals, but instead entails a review of applicable laws and not whether
the alleged facts are true, is a question of law, proper in a Rule 45 petition.
32. Republic v. Spouses Gimenez
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to assail Sandiganbayan
resolutions on actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution,
and damages for ill-gotten wealth, which are also called civil forfeiture
proceedings.
33. Pascual v. Burgos
G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules,
exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so
the court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In any event, even
in such cases, this court retains full discretion on whether to review the
factual findings of the CA.
34. Mendoza v. Valte
G.R. No. 172961, September 7, 2015
Questions of fact are generally not entertained in a petition for review
before this court. In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a
decree of registration based on actual fraud must be filed before the proper
court within the one-year period provided under the relevant laws.
Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land
fraudulently granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the
one-year period, but this must be initiated by the State.
35. Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
A re-examination of the facts of the case under Rule 45 is justified (1) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based, and (2) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
36. Benito v. People
G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015
As a general rule, under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. As an exception to the rule, questions of
fact may be raised in a Rule 45 Petition when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts.
37. Protective Maximum Security Agency v. Fuentes
G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings
are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence. If the petitioner can
show that the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total
disregard of evidence material to the controversy, the factual findings of
the NLRC may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected. In addition,
if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the NLRC,
this court may examine the records of the case and the questioned findings
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
38. Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu
G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014

26
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC. In St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court
then clarified that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission
decisions shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall
be filed before the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an
aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
39. Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.
G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
In a Rule 45 petition, the SC does not address the questions of fact,
questions which require to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.”
40. Villamor, Jr. v. Umale
G.R. Nos. 172843 & 172881, September 24, 2014
There is a question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts. The test is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence. Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is doubt as to
the truth or falsehood of facts. The question must involve the examination
of probative value of the evidence presented.
Sec. 2. Time for filing; 1. Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Diaz
extension G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018
A liberal construction of the rules of procedure, including the period within
which a petition for review must be filed, requires justifiable reasons or at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them. Evidently, no
reasonable attempt has been made by petitioner to comply with the
mandatory requirement of filing within the reglementary period. Atty.
Tamaca’s excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court
of Appeals September 12, 2012 Resolution and his electoral activities do
not deserve any consideration from this Court.
Sec. 4. Contents of petition 1. Cordillera Global Network v. Paje
G.R. No 215988, April 10, 2019
For the certification against forum shopping, Altres v. Empleo stated the
general rule that non-signing petitioners will be dropped as parties to the
case. Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a
common interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification
against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial compliance
rule.
2. Orient Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co.,
Inc.
G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017
A petition that fails to state the names of the parties in the body does not
violate Rule 45, Section 4 where the names of the parties are readily
discernable from its caption.
3. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition
“be accompanied by... such material portions of the record as would
support the petition,” the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the
outright dismissal of the complaint.
4. Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu
G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014
Not all officers need board resolution to be considered authorized to sign
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Sec. 6. Review discretionary 1. Malabanan v. Malabanan, Jr.
G.R. No. 187225, March 6, 2019
The Supreme Court’s appellate review is discretionary. A question of fact
generally cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Moreover,
the findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding on this Court.
However, the rules allow certain exceptions.

27
2.
Noell Whessoe, Inc. v. Independent Testing Consultants, Inc.
G.R. No. 199851, November 7, 2018
Where a quick perusal of the parties’ evidence reveals that the RTC and
the CA may have erred in its conclusion, and if not corrected, the assailed
judgments may result in grave injustice to petitioner, Rule 45, Sec. 6 is
satisfied.
Rule 46 – Original Cases
Rule 47 – Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions
Sec. 1. Coverage 1. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.
G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
Annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the party has
availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of
those remedies through his own fault or negligence.”
2. Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the ROC is the proper remedy
when the RTC’s judgement, order, or resolution has become final and the
remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for 1. Castro v. Gregorio
annulment G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
When fraud is employed by a party to precisely prevent the participation of
any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during trial.
Sec. 3. Period for filing 1. Tortal v. Taniguchi
action G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018
An action for the annulment of judgment is an equitable recourse that is
independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases, such as
when there is no more available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47, Sec.
3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on
extrinsic fraud, should be filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud,
or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before the action is barred by laches
or estoppel.
Rule 48 – Preliminary Conference
Rule 49 – Oral Argument
Rule 50 – Dismissal of Appeal
Sec. 1. Grounds for 1. Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic
dismissal of appeal G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018
Under Rule 50, Sec. 1, the use of the permissive “may,” it has been held
that the dismissal is directory, not mandatory, with the discretion to be
exercised soundly and “in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play” and “having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.”
2. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on
the merits. The term “may” in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
means that the Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based
on the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion
when it decided that the interest of justice would be better served by
overlooking the pleading’s technical defects.
3. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.
G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
Under Rule 50, Sec. 1(f), the CA may, on its own motion or that of the
appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific
requirements under Rule 44, Sec. 13.

28
Sec. 2. Dismissal of 1.Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership
improper appeal to the Court G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014
of Appeals Appeals from the decisions of the RTC, raising purely questions of law
must, in all cases, be taken to the SC on a petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the
decision of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the CA is
proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and
questions of law.
Sec. 3. Withdrawal of appeal 1. In Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 94656 v. Mortel
A.C. No. 10117 (Resolution), July 25, 2016
Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic withdrawal
of the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to withdraw
appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this motion.
Rule 51 – Judgment
Sec. 8. Questions that may 1. Oriental Assurance Corp. v. Ong
be decided G.R. No. 189524, October 11, 2017
Exceptionally, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review
rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in certain
instances.
2. Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 188658., January 11, 2017
Petitioners’ appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court’s
dismissal of the Complaint for failure to implead an indispensable party.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on whether petitioners
were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly consider
this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete resolution of the case.
Sec. 10. Entry of judgments 1. Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals
and final resolutions G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015
The registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by
mail.” It carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official
duties that have been regularly performed and, therefore, it is presumed to
be accurate, unless proven otherwise. If this presumption is not rebutted,
the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in
the book of entries of judgments if no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules.
Rule 52 – Motion for Reconsideration
Sec. 2. Second motion for 1. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista
reconsideration G.R. No. 168406 (Resolution), January 14, 2015
A decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after
the lapse of 15 days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or
resolution. The grant of leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration
does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment
first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be
granted.
Rule 53 – New Trial
Rule 54 – Internal Business
Rule 55 – Publication of Judgments and Final Resolutions
Procedure in the Supreme Court
Rule 56A – Original Cases
Rule 56B – Appealed Cases

Part Four – Provisional Remedies

Rule 57 – Preliminary Attachment
Sec. 1. Grounds upon which 1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
attachment may issue G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016
Given the peculiarities of the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former
President Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President, gravely

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abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth suffice to constitute the case as one under
Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered under
the names of respondents — minors at the time of registration — is
sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao property was concealed, thus
satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.
Rule 58 – Preliminary Injunction
Sec. 3. Grounds for 1. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. De Leon
issuance of preliminary G.R. Nos. 236577 & 236597, August 15, 2018
injunction Absent the showing of an existing right to be protected, a party’s
application for an injunctive relief must necessarily be denied. A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an
ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may
therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for
no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
2. Bicol Medical Center v. Botor
G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing
where both parties are given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
3. Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising
Ventures Corp.
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show,
by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and
substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
4. Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. Lim
G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016
The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient
authority to conclude that an action for injunction and, consequently, a writ
of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is generally unavailable to
prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Corporations
may raise their objections to the right of inspection through affirmative
defense in an ordinary civil action for specific performance or damages, or
through a comment (if one is required) in a petition for mandamus.
5. Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
A writ of mandatory injunction is granted only upon a showing that (a) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant
is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Sec. 5. Preliminary 1. Evy Construction and Development Corp. v. Valiant Roll Forming
injunction not granted Sales Corp.
without notice; exception G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017
While Rule 58, Sec. 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary
hearing in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a
grant or denial, Rule 58, Sec. 5 requires a hearing only if an application for
preliminary injunction is granted. Rule 58, Sec. 5 states that “no preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined”. Inversely stated, an application for
preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing
separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
2. Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of the
ancillary writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58, Section 5 requires that the

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party to be enjoined must be notified and heard. He cannot be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Sec. 6. Grounds for 1. Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. Lim
objection to, or for motion of G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016
dissolution of, injunction or The Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law in disregarding the
restraining order procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs. It lifted and cancelled the
injunction via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
based on the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial
Court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, not based on a motion for
dissolution of the injunction. Thus, the Court of Appeals evaluated the
basis for the injunction granted by the Regional Trial Court rather than
whether the injunction would cause irreparable damage to respondents,
hereby dispensing with the need of submission of an affidavit or
counterbond under Rule 58, Sec. 6.
Injunction 1. Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power
Corp.
G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017
Where what is sought is a permanent injunction, Section 78 of EPIRA can
still apply. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, which invalidated a
provision that prohibited other courts beside the SC from exercising their
inherent power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, dealt only with temporary restraining orders and not permanent
injunctions, and the injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere
interlocutory action by a court but a permanent remedy.
Rule 59 – Receivership
Rule 60 – Replevin
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond 1. Enriquez v. Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018
The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to
return the van to Asuten, despite the dismissal of her action. This is an
instance not covered by the Rules of Court or jurisprudence. Forfeiture of
the replevin bond requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant’s
favor, and second, an application by the defendant for damages. Neither
circumstance appears in this case. When petitioner failed to produce the
van, equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to
the value of the van.
Rule 61 – Support ‘Pendente Lite’

Part Five – Special Civil Actions

Rule 62 – Interpleader
Sec. 5. Answer and other 1. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.
pleadings G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
A party in an interpleader case may be declared in default.
Rule 63 – Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Sec. 1. Who may file petition 1. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority
G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583, November 26, 2014
Petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 Section 1 has the following
requisites: first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation,
or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been
no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.

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Rule 64 – Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit
Sec. 1. Scope 1. City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
Sec. 2. Mode of review 1. Oriondo v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 211293, June 4, 2019
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal and a true
review that involves “digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment.” However, despite the repeated use of the word “review” in Rule
64, the remedy is principally one for certiorari that “deals exclusively with
grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is
otherwise erroneous.”
Sec. 3. Time to file petition 1. Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v.
Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2014
While ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
has a reglementary period of 60 days, when what is assailed in the petition
is the decision of the COA or COMELEC, the reglementary period is 30
days from receipt of the decision.
Rule 65 – Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari 1. Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v.
Yambao
G.R. Nos. 220632 & 220634 (Resolution), November 6, 2019
Certiorari may be used to appeal decisions that are grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However only clear
arbitrary abuse would allow the interference of the Supreme Court on
determination of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman, an
executive and investigative branch of government
2. Rotoras v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 211999, August 20, 2019
We have previously declared that it is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one that was
constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-
repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, only when the COA acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
3. Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 213957-58, August 7, 2019
This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it determined the existence of
probable cause against petitioner. Moreover, settled is the rule that a sitting
Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a predecessor
within the bounds of law.
4. BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa
G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019
There is grave abuse of discretion where the trial court judge grants a
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence beyond the five (5)-
day period under the Rules.
5. Esteva v. Wilhelm Smith Bell Manning

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G.R. No. 225899, July 10, 2019
In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample
authority to make its own factual determination. Thus, the Court of Appeals
can grant a petition for certiorari when it finds that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence material to the
controversy. In the same manner, this Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting findings by the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
6. Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 216949, July 3, 2019
Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct alleged errors of fact or law
that do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. This Court only reviews
the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of whether probable cause
exists upon a clear showing of its abuse of discretion, or when it exercised
it in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.”
7. Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
The trial court’s noncompliance with procedural rules constitutes grave
abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
8. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
Rule 65 applies to invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. It is the
remedy to “set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.”
9. Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2020
A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function and generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion that can be corrected through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
10. GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva
G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019
A writ of certiorari may only be issued when the following are alleged in the
petition and proven: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or
any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
11. Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 212416, December 5, 2018
The Supreme Court may review public respondent’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers, but only upon a clear showing that
it abused its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic
manner,” The Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s determination of whether or not probable cause exists
except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
12. Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the
Ombudsman
G.R. No. 18779, November 28, 2018

33
Disagreeing to the office of the ombudsman’s findings does not rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion. A court or tribunal is said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion if it performs an act in “a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”
Ultimately, for the petition to prosper, it would have to prove that public
respondent conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that
amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.
13. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non
for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.” This enables the court to correct
“any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there
must be a “concrete, compelling, and valid reason.” The filing of a motion
for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere procedural
technicality. These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which
must be strictly complied with.”
14. Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018
Office of the Ombudsman’s orders and decisions in criminal cases may be
elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions
in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised on appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
15. Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact—a
mistake of judgment—appeal is the remedy.
16. Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017
Under no circumstance may an administrative agency arrogate unto itself
the power of judicial review and to take cognizance of petitions for
certiorari.
17. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
No grave abuse of discretion where the Office of the Ombudsman
dismisses a case against a respondent upon its finding that there is no
sufficient evidence to support the charges.
18. Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017
Trial judge’s “obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or
procedure” is an inexcusable abuse of authority. Such level of ignorance
is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to “evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law,” or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They
must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less.
19. Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the
Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public
officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based
on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, for this Petition to

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prosper, petitioner would have to show this Court that the Ombudsman
conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.
20. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes
manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of
statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the
current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion.
21. Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.
G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016
Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision
when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. The remedy of
certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in
administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where
respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and b) in
criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of
probable cause during preliminary investigation.
22. De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
Even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of
judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the
subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
23. Manalo v. Ateneo De Naga University
G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is permitted. Parties who avail
themselves of such a remedy are not at liberty to assail an adverse ruling
on grounds of their own choosing. A petition for certiorari is confined to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
24. Pascual, Sr. v. Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative
G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015
Motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil
action for certiorari is made. This is to afford the court or tribunal the
opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to comply with this
procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for.
25. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban
G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
Where the actions of the RTC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the SC may treat a Rule 45
petition as a Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.
26. Madarang v. Spouses Morales
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
Failure to avail of a motion for reconsideration of the order denying a
petition for relief from judgment before filing a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
warrants the dismissal of the latter.
27. Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013

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Allegations of petitioner that the CA “committed grave abuse of discretion”
did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule
65. In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors
of judgment of the CA. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation
that the appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower
court. He does not impute any error with respect to the CA’s exercise of
jurisdiction.
28. Republic v. Bayao
G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
The non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration prior to the filing of a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not fatal where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court.
Sec. 2. Petition for 1. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III
prohibition G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
While Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court pertain to a tribunal’s,
board’s, or an officer’s exercise of discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of
judicial power. Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or
excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by
the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some
action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in
the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.
Sec. 3. Petition for 1. Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid
mandamus G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist
from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It
expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner’s cause.
Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to order the Court to desist
from a criminal prosecution
2. Lihaylihay v. Tan
G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018
The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery, conviction, and
punishment of tax offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that
cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus will not
issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original
jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over
those filed without exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and
when their filing amounts to an act of forum shopping.
3. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 222731 (Resolution), March 8, 2016
Mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to utilize the VVPAT feature of
the vote-counting machines as required by law.
4. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.
G.R. No. 178407, March 18, 2015
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute
or to which a substantial doubt exists.
5. In Re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
UDK-15143 (Resolution), January 21, 2015
Mandamus will not lie to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which he is not entitled by law.
6. Buena v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Mandamus lies to compel the CSC to attest an appointment.

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Sec. 6. Order to comment 1. Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
Summons need not be issued to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; the court need only issue an
order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition for certiorari.
Furthermore, by actively participating in the proceedings, one is deemed
to have made a voluntary appearance and cannot argue that the lower
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
Sec. 7. Expediting 1. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan
proceedings; injunctive relief G.R. Nos. 20643 & 210141-42, July 31 2018
The pendency of a petition for certiorari before this Court will not prevent
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
2. De Ocampo v. RPN-9/Radio Philippines Network, Inc.
G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2015
Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the
judgment or order that it assails. Unless a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is issued, the assailed decision lapses into finality.
Thereafter, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified, and
execution may ensue. This principle applies in labor cases, as it is explicitly
and specifically provided for in the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
Rule 66 – Quo Warranto
Rule 67 – Expropriation
Expropriation, In General 1. National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque
G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of
the property, an easement of right-of-way on a private property can be
considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. A
right-of-way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent
domain when there is material impairment of the value of the property or
prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.
2. National Power Corp. v. Posada
G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the
expropriation complaint should be dismissed by the trial court. However,
the expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property
ceases to be for public use. The State must first file the appropriate Motion
to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the proceedings
to determine whether respondents have already been prejudiced by the
expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred
from the commencement of the expropriation, if any.
Sec. 8. Action upon 1. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano
commissioners’ report G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
The RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, in determining just
compensation, can simply adopt the Consolidated Commissioner’s report.
The Regional Trial Court has the full discretion to make a binding decision
on the value of the properties.
Act Facilitating the 1. Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015
Site or Location for National The state and its implementing agencies must first comply with the
Government Infrastructure requirements outlined in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 before they
Projects (R.A. No. 8974) — are allowed to take possession of private property for a national
Repealed by R.A. No. 10752 infrastructure project.
2. National Power Corp. v. Posada
G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
Writ of possession should not be issued in favor of implementing agency
which fails to comply with the guidelines stated in RA 8974.
3. National Power Corp. v. Posada

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G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of
a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current
relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair
market value of the property.
Act Prohibiting Lower Courts 1. Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals
from Issuing Temporary G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
Restraining Orders, RA 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, not local
Preliminary Injunctions or government projects.
Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions on Government
Infrastructure Projects (R.A.
No. 8975)
Rule 68 – Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Extrajudicial Foreclosure 1. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solid Bank Corp. (now Metropolitan Bank
(under Act No. 3135, as and Trust Co.)
amended by Act No. 4118) G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017
The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the
newspaper is being circulated in the city where the property is located.
Markedly, what the law requires is the publication of the Notice of Sale in
a “newspaper of general circulation.”
2. Mahinay v. Dura Tire & Rubber Industries, Inc.
G.R. No. 194152, June 5, 2017
The period to redeem a property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is
not extendible. A pending action to annul the foreclosure sale does not toll
the running of the one (1)-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135.
Rule 69 – Partition
Rule 70 – Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Sec. 1. Who may institute 1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.
proceedings, and when G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019
An action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land. However, when the entry was done through
stealth, the one-year time bar is reckoned from the time the entry was
discovered.
2. Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona
G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
A case for unlawful detainer must state the period from when the
occupation by tolerance started and the acts of tolerance exercised by the
party with the right to possession. If it is argued that the possession was
illegal from the start, the proper remedy is to file an accion publiciana, or a
plenary action to recover the right of possession. Moreover, while an
ejectment case merely settles the issue of the right of actual possession,
the issue of ownership may be provisionally passed upon if the issue of
possession cannot be resolved without it. Any final disposition on the issue
of ownership, however, must be resolved in the proper forum.
3. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development
Co.
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the parties
has the better right to physical possession of a piece of property. The
defendant’s claims and allegations in its answer or motion to dismiss do
not oust a trial court’s jurisdiction to resolve this issue.
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed 1. Cruz v. Spouses Christensen
against lessee only after G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
demand The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case
for unlawful detainer if the demand to vacate is premised on the expiration

38
of the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-compliance of the
terms and conditions of the lease.
Rule 71 – Contempt
Contempt, In General 1. Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson
G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful
disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in
some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be
considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited
by the order of the court. The court’s contempt power should be exercised
with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive, purpose. Only in
cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised.
2. Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of
expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the proper administration of
justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right
to freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling
comment on public matters. Freedom of expression must always be
protected to the fullest extent possible.
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to 1. Webb v. Gatdula
be punished after charge G.R. No. 194469 (Resolution), September 18, 2019
and hearing The power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly. It should
be wielded to ensure the infallibility of justice where the defiance or
disobedience is patent and contumacious that there is an evident refusal
to obey. The presumption of innocence exists and proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary.
2. Oca v. Custodio
G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful disobedience of
an injunction, the fact that those disobeying the injunction were not parties
to the action in which it was granted, and were not personally served, is no
defense, where the injunction restrains not only the parties, but those who
act in connection with the party as attorneys, agents, or employees, and
the parties accused, with knowledge of the order and its terms, acting as
the employees of a party, willfully violate it.
3. Yu Kimteng v. Young
G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015
A disbarred lawyer’s name cannot be part of a firm’s name. A lawyer who
appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer’s name
commits indirect contempt of court.

Part Six – Special Proceedings

General Provision
Rule 72 – Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Rule 73 – Venue and Process
Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estates
Sec. 4. Liability of 1. Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas
distributees and estate G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to
require it would be superfluous considering that petitioner had already
presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto,
which respondents never disputed.

39
Rule 75 – Production of Will; Allowance of Will Necessary
Rule 76 – Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Rule 77 – Allowance of Will Proved outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary. Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration
Rule 80 – Special Administrator
Rule 81 – Bonds of Executors and Administrators
Rule 82 – Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators
Rule 83 – Inventory and Appraisal; Provision for Support of Family
Rule 84 – General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
Rule 85 – Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators
Rule 86 – Claims against Estate
Rule 87 – Actions by and against Executors and Administrators
Rule 88 – Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Rule 89 – Sales, Mortgages and Other Encumbrances of Property of the Decedent
Rule 90 – Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Rule 91 – Escheats
General Guardians and Guardianship
Rule 92 – Venue
Rule 93 – Appointment of Guardians
Rule 94 – Bonds of Guardians
Rule 95 – Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
Rule 96 – General Powers and Duties of Guardians
Rule 97 – Termination of Guardianship
Rule 98 – Trustees
Adoption (Rule on Adoption [A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC])
Rule 101 – Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons
Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus
Sec. 1. To what habeas 1. Osorio v. Navera
corpus extends G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.
The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic
2. In Re: Salibo v. Warden
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due
to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained.
Sec. 4. When writ not 1. Osorio v. Navera
allowed or discharge G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
authorized If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the
proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated
in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof 1. Sanchez v. Darroca
and Standard of Diligence G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019
Required The writ of Amparo must be based on substantial evidence. Failure to
prove such should not allow the writ of amparo to prosper.
Sec. 18. Judgment 1. De Lima v. Gatdula
G.R. No. 204528 (Resolution), February 19, 2013
The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential
for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify
and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that

40
could be subject to appeal to the SC via Rule 45, and not the order granting
the privilege of the writ.
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Rule 103 – Change of Name
Sec. 1. Venue 1. Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not
to change the name by which she is commonly known, this Court rules that
her petition is not covered by Rule 103. She is merely seeking to correct
her records to conform to her true given name. R.A. 9048 removed the
correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108
and dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical
or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or
nickname. Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction
over Gallo’s petition, not the RTC. Only if her petition was denied by the
local city or municipal civil registrar can the RTC take cognizance of her
case.
Rule 107 – Absentees
Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry
Sec. 2. Entries subject to 1. Miller v. Miller
cancellation or correction G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court emphasized that “legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack[.]” Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is
governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
2. Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
The petition to correct Gallo’s biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule
108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical
or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. It was only when Republic
Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to
biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve
a typographical or clerical error. However, this is not true for all cases as
corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive
matter.
Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register without Need
of a Judicial Order (R.A. No. 9048, as amended by R.A. No.10172)
Rule 109 – Appeals in Special Proceedings

Part Seven – Criminal Procedure

Rule 110 – Prosecution of Offenses
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute 1. Valderrama v. People
criminal actions G.R. No. 220054 (Resolution), March 27, 2017
The required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity
and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not
have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it
is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest.
2. Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Procedural law, under Rule 110, Sec. 5, basically mandates that all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. The duty
and authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the
custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. There may be rare

41
occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process).
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of 1. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
complaint or information G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
The allegation in the information as to the circumstances of wearing masks
established the intent to conceal their identities, which did not prevent him
from presenting his defense of alibi, although he did not present such.
Hence, his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him was
not violated.
2. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
An information sufficiently informs the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them even when the information against them
contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off. Since
failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial,
will not be appreciated as such, it was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. The
introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their
offenses because the information charges conspiracy among the accused.
This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal
their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them
might not have done so.
Sec. 14. Amendment or 1. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
substitution G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
Any amendment to an information which only states with precision
something which has already been included in the original information, and
therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only
a formal amendment that can be made at any time. It does not alter the
nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. While
conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if
the amendment will be allowed after his plea. Therefore, such formal
amendment after plea is not allowed.
Rule 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action
Rule 112 – Preliminary Investigation
Due Process Rights of 1. Pemberton v. De Lima
Respondent in Preliminary G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
Investigations There is no denial of due process in the preliminary investigation
proceedings where respondent had multiple opportunities to controvert the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, such as when he
was directed to file a counter-affidavit, and was given the opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the initial finding of probable cause.
Sec. 1. Preliminary 1. Marantan v. Department of Justice
investigation defined; when G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019
required A petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes
moot once an information based on the preliminary investigation is filed
before a trial court, which, in turn, would complete its own determination of
probable cause. After this judicial determination, the question of an
accused’s guilt or innocence would rest with the trial court’s own sound
discretion.
2. Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2020
A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function and generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

42
The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion that can be corrected through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
3. Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019
Resolutions made by public prosecutors in determining probable cause
shall not generally be disturbed by courts. However, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 may be filed against a public prosecutor who is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion in determining probable cause.
4. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Price Richardson Corp.
G.R. No. 197032, July 26, 2017
It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to
charge a person of a crime is an executive function, which pertains to and
lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor and the justice secretary.
If the public prosecutor finds probable cause to charge a person with a
crime, he or she causes the filing of an information before the court. The
court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its
correctness.
Sec. 3. Procedure 1. Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 213957-58, August 7, 2019
Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has
the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but he
does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-
respondents.
2. Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016
At the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility
of evidence is premature for petitioner to raise. The admissibility or
inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court
during the trial proper[,] and not in the preliminary investigation.
Sec. 5. When warrant of 1. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
arrest may issue G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man
and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law
or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Apart
from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information
and supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009
enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the warrant of
arrest.
2. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang
G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the case and has the authority to determine, among others, whether or not
the case should be dismissed. The court is “the best and sole judge of what
to do with the case before it.” The dismissal of a criminal case due to lack
of probable cause protects the accused from having to undergo trial based
on insufficient evidence.
3. Maza v. Turla
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
Judge cannot remand the case for another conduct of preliminary
investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was
improperly conducted.
4. Napoles v. De Lima
G.R. No. 213529, July 13, 2016
A decision convicting an accused moots any proceeding that questions the
determination of probable cause, either in the filing of the information in

43
court or in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Guilt beyond reasonable
doubt had then been established, and questioning whether a lower
quantum of proof exists, i.e., probable cause, would be pointless. The
prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation (an executive
function) whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. On the other hand, if done to
issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial
function.
5. Mendoza v. People
G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014
The trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause, despite the
earlier finding of probable cause of the prosecutor. Once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the
sound discretion of the court.
Ombudsman Rules of 1. Lee v. Sales
Procedure G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018
The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman does not stay the immediate execution of the penalty of
dismissal imposed upon a public office. Since decisions of the
Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it follows
that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ. It bears
noting that for an injunction to issue, the right of the person seeking its
issuance must be clear and unmistakable.
2. Canlas v. Bongolan
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018
The exoneration of public officers by the Ombudsman in a charge alleging
grave misconduct and a violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g) is
generally unappealable. Furthermore, any appeal to the Supreme Court
from such a case cannot be initiated by one who does not stand to be
benefited or injured by the results of the suit. This absence of a right to
appeal affects petitioner Canlas’ legal standing in this case. He is not a
party entitled to the relief prayed for, or one who will benefit or be injured
by the results of the suit.
3. Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016
The executive finding of probable cause requires only substantial
evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt. The Ombudsman merely depends
on evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a “more likely-
than-not” belief that a crime has been committed, thus, technical rules on
evidence cannot be made to apply to it.
Rule 113 – Arrest
Sec. 5. Arrest without 1. Villasana v. People
warrant; when lawful G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
There was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at bar primarily because
the apprehending officer was still far away from the petitioner when the
alleged crime of selling was being committed. The confidential information
given regarding the sale of prohibited drugs to the police officers was not
substantial enough to make the arrest as in flagrante delicto.
2. Manibog v. People
G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019
To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should
have personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the
totality of which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal
activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate further. The
combination of the police asset’s tip and the arresting officers’ observation
of a gun-shaped object under petitioner’s shirt already suffices as a

44
genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search
on petitioner.
3. Aparante v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) as the rule also requires that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Probable cause
may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was
being, or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that
precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two acts
were substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause.
4. Veridiano v. People
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which
are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b)
criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search
incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired
as constitutionally inadmissible.
Entrapment 1. People v. Casio
G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or
buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However, the police carry out its
entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not
been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom
thereof.
Rule 114 – Bail
Sec. 5. Bail, when 1. Reyes v. People
discretionary G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019
The grant of bail after a judgement of conviction is discretionary upon the
courts. Bail may be denied if the courts find any of the circumstances
present in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Cancellation of bail
may also be done depending on the circumstances.
Sec. 17. Bail, where filed 1. Tejano v. Marigomen
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492 (Resolution), September 26, 2017
Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the province,
city, or municipality where the case is pending has no authority to grant
bail. The last sentence of Rule 114, Sec. 17(a) is clear that for purposes of
determining whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode
required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another
province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application.
Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail 1. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang
G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
Among the instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when
the case is dismissed. Since cancellation of bail is automatic upon the
dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the
cancellation takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances
takes place. Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated when it was
not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release
Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was
automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. The release of the
amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made
to answer for any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not
succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.
Rule 115 – Rights of Accused
Sec. 1. Rights of accused at 1. Kim Liong v. People
the trial G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018

45
The right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness is a basic
fundamental constitutional right. However, this is personal to the accused,
who can waive the right. When the accused abuses its option to choose
his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his right to
confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of postponements and
changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent.
Rule 116 – Arraignment and Plea
Sec. 1. Arraignment and 1. People v. Palema
plea; how made G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019
An arraignment not only satisfies the due process clause of the
Constitution, but also affords an accused an opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him or her. Through arraignment, the
accused is placed in a position to enter his or her plea with full knowledge
of the consequences. It is a vital aspect of any criminal prosecution,
demanded by no less than the Constitution itself.
2. Lapi v. People
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused,
assisted by counsel, fails to object to its validity before arraignment.
Sec. 11. Suspension of 1. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
arraignment G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension
counted from the filing of a petition with the reviewing office. Consequently,
therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is bound
to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”
2. ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon
G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of
the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
Rule 117 – Motion to Quash
Sec. 1. Time to move to 1. Lapi v. People
quash G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he
fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment.
Sec. 4. Amendment of 1. Dio v. People
complaint or information G.R. No. 208146, June 8, 2016
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect, such as when
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, that may be cured by
amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to
amend the information.
Rule 118 – Pre-Trial
Rule 119 – Trial
Sec. 23. Demurrer to 1. BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa
evidence G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019
When a demurrer is granted in a criminal case, the private complainant can
file a Rule 65 petition on the civil aspect of the case, as long as he or she
can show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the demurrer.
Rule 120 – Judgment
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of 1. Aquino v. People
variance between allegation G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018
and proof Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense
but its description in the complaint or information. The real nature of the

46
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information.
2. Osorio v. People
G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018
If there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved,
an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the
offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense
charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved. In the present
case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration
Sec. 2. Grounds for new trial 1. Abubakar v. People
G.R. No. 202409, June 27, 2018
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of certain evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial.
Rule 122 – Appeal
Sec. 1. Who may appeal 1. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang
G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a
criminal case is final, and the remedy to question this final order is an
appeal.
Sec. 11. Effect of appeal by 1. People v. Yanson
any of several accused G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
Accused-appellant’s acquittal arising from a lack of proof of corpus delicti
favors the other accused, even if they did not appeal before this Court. This
Decision applies to them as much as it does to accused-appellant.
2. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
While the SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it
cannot disturb the penalties imposed by the CA on those who did not
appeal, when its ruling is unfavorable to those who did not appeal.
Rule 123 – Procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Rule 125 – Procedure in the Supreme Court
Rule 126 – Search and Seizure
Sec. 13. Search incident to 1. Veridiano v. People
lawful arrest G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest
must precede the search; “the process cannot be reversed.” For there to
be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.
Warrantless Searches 1. Acosta v. Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019
The government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of
applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant.
2. People v. Yanson
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
Warrantless searches based on a solitary tip, without other suspicious
circumstances which would have prompted the police officers to do an
extensive search, is invalid. In addition, the validity of a supposedly
consented warrantless search is contingent on the totality of the attendant
circumstances. This may entail an inquiry into the environment in which

47
the consent was ostensibly given, such as “the presence of coercive police
procedures.”
3. Dela Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done
without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of
the traveling public.
4. People v. Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything
less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security
of one’s person and effects.
Rule 127 – Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases

Part Eight – Evidence

Rule 128 – General Provisions
Sec. 3. Admissibility of 1. Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp.
evidence G.R. No. 181683, October 7, 2015
When evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be
competent. The weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only
after evidence has been admitted.
Exclusionary Rule 1. People v. Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
Dangerous drugs obtained from accused through an invalid warrantless
search is inadmissible in evidence.
Rule 129 – What Need Not Be Proved
Rule 130 – Rules of Admissibility
A. Object (Real) Evidence
Sec. 1. Object as evidence 1. People v. Divinagracia, Sr.
G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017
It is well-established that “physical evidence is evidence of the highest
order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.” The physical
evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA’s vagina strongly corroborates
AAA and BBB’s testimonies that AAA was raped by their father.
Chain of Custody under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended
Chain of Custody Rule 1. People v. Asaytuno
under Sec. 21 (Custody and G.R. No. 245972, December 2, 2019
Disposition of Confiscated, In dangerous drugs cases, the seized contrabands must be properly
Seized, and/or Surrendered authenticated and documented in front of authorized individuals. Not being
Dangerous Drugs, Plant able to do such may tarnish the integrity of the contrabands.
Sources of Dangerous 2. Villasana v. People
Drugs, Controlled G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
Precursors and Essential The arresting officers’ unjustified noncompliance with the legal safeguards
Chemicals, under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 compromises integrity of the
Instruments/Paraphernalia confiscated drug.
and/or Laboratory 3. People v. Ramos
Equipment) of the G.R. No. 225325, August 28, 2019
Comprehensive Dangerous Police officers are given time to prepare for a buy-bust operation and make
Drugs Act of 2002, as necessary arrangements beforehand, fully aware of the strict procedure to
amended (R.A. No. 9165, as follow under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
amended by R.A. No. Assuming that the apprehending team in this case really could not have
10640) immediately marked the seized drugs because they had no marker or

48
because the required witnesses were absent, both circumstances were
entirely of their own making. If these rendered the immediate marking
impracticable, such impracticability was ‘their fault and cannot be used as
an excuse to not immediately mark the items. If anything, the lack of
foresight that led to these circumstance shows that the team did not exert
genuine effort to comply with the chain of custody rule.
4. People v. Banding
G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the
seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody,
a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made
in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record
suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face,
the presumption cannot arise.
5. People v. Sultan
G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019
Unless an unbroken chain of custody over items allegedly seized during
drug operations is established, the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent prevails. Ultimately, doubt in the corpus delicti — the drugs and
drug paraphernalia that were the alleged objects of a drug offense —
impels the acquittal of an accused.
6. People v. Castillo
G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at
this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as
it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie
any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug.
7. People v. Merando
G.R. No. 232620, August 5, 2019
Section 21 requires the presence of the accused, representatives from the
Department of Justice and the media, and an elected public official during
the actual seizure of the evidence and their subsequent inventory and
photographing.
8. People v. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 229053, July 17, 2019
Whenever there is an unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirements, the prosecution cannot invoke the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty to conveniently disregard such lapse.
Noncompliance obliterates proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
warranting an accused’s acquittal. Thus, the constitutional right to
presumption of innocence prevails.
9. Veriño v. People
G.R. No. 225710, June 19, 2019
State agents are expected to strictly comply with the legal safeguards
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended. Should there be
noncompliance, the prosecution must prove that a justifiable cause existed
and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved for the saving clause in Section 21 to be appreciated in favor of
State agents.
10. People v. Ternida
G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019
Before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite
noncompliance with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be
identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to

49
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. It has the positive duty to establish its reasons for the
procedural lapses.
11. People v. Comoso
G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019
To secure conviction, the prosecution must overcome the presumption of
innocence by presenting evidence of the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged under Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court. Failing to do so will result in the acquittal of the accused if
it is found that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti is
preserved. In buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony
of the poseur-buyer which must prove that: “(1) proof that the transaction
or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence.” Evidence proving that a transaction took place
“must be credible and complete.”
12. People v. Sanchez
G.R. No. 216014 (Resolution), March 14, 2018
Despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies on where the seized
items were marked, these inconsistencies “[did] not impair the credibility of
the police witnesses.” What is important is that, as adequately established,
there was an “unbroken and continuous possession of the . . . shabu, from
the moment of seizure up to the time they were delivered to the laboratory
and later presented in court. Although the testimonies differed on where
the seized items were marked, the prosecution has sufficiently
demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the integrity or evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti.
13. People v. Que
G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018
The chain of custody requirements in the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act are cast in precise, mandatory language. They are calibrated to
preserve the even greater interest of due process and the constitutional
rights of those who stand to suffer from the State’s legitimate use of force,
and therefore, stand to be deprived of liberty, property, and, should capital
punishment be imposed, life. This calibration balances the need for
effective prosecution of those involved in illegal drugs and the preservation
of the most basic liberties that typify our democratic order.
14. People v. Pangan
G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, cannot be utilized to
frustrate legitimate efforts of law enforcers. Minor deviations from the
mandated procedure in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a
guilty defendant.
15. Aparante v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
Where the amount of narcotics seized is miniscule, a stricter adherence to
the requirements of R.A. 9165, Sec. 21 is required to preserve the
evidentiary value of the seized drugs.
16. People v. Caballon
G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017
The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential
part of the chain of custody. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts
a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug
presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
17. People v. Saragena
G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017
When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule, the
requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as

50
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, must be strictly
complied with. In authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must
be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the
item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
18. People v. Sagana
G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017
Unjustified lapses in the chain of custody requirement – (1) photographing
not done concurrently with marking and inventory, (2) presence of the
required third-party witnesses only during the belated photographing, and
(3) failure to present as witness persons who had direct contact with the
seized drugs – cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous
drugs.
19. People v. Segunda
G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017
In this case, a perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
reveals that the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 9165 was
not complied with “despite its mandatory nature as indicated by the use of
‘shall’ in the directives of the law.”
20. People v. Jaafar
G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution’s case provided that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence
of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds
that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165.
21. People v. Caiz
G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016
Failure to prove the preservation of the integrity of the corpus delicti in
dangerous drugs cases will lead to the acquittal of the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
22. Tuano v. People
G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), June 27, 2016
Non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 creates
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the confiscated substance.
23. People v. Dimaano
G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases
involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be
excused so long as the identity of the dangerous drugs is proved beyond
reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established with moral
certainty.
24. Lescano v. People
G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016
Compliance with Section 21’s requirements is critical. Non-compliance is
tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance
will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.
25. People v. Holgado
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014
Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity
in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia.

51
This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs
is alleged to have been taken from the accused.
DNA Evidence (Rule on 1. People v. Corpuz
DNA Evidence [A.M. No. 06- G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017
11-5-SC]) If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded
as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.
Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case, Allan is
disputably presumed to be the child’s father. This is in conformity with
Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence provides that in evaluating the
results of DNA testing, the court shall consider if the value of the Probability
of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity.
B. Documentary Evidence
1. Best Evidence Rule
2. Secondary Evidence
3. Parol Evidence Rule
Sec. 9. Evidence of written 1. Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Construction and Development Corp.
agreements G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015
Per the Parol Evidence Rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalities observed, “forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms
of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
the written contract.” However, provided that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the four items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule
130, Section 9, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the agreement.
2. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties
to the deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it.
4. Interpretation of Documents
C. Testimonial Evidence
1. Qualification of Witnesses
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their 1. People v. Corpuz
qualifications G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from
testifying in court. “He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her
ability to relate what he or she knows.” If an intellectually disabled victim’s
testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.
Sec. 24. Disqualification by 1. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
reason of privileged Management, Inc.
communication G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
A Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement does not fall under privileged
documents contemplated by law.
2. Testimonial Privilege
3. Admissions and Confessions
Sec. 33. Confession 1. People v. Lumayag
G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017
Dela Cruz’ extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that Dela
Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into
writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to
a lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not
constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel. Article III, Section 12 of the

52
Constitution states that “these rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.”
2. Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
Any admission obtained from the “request for appearance” without the
assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
Sec. 36. Testimony 1. Lopez v. People
generally confined to G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
personal knowledge; Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but,
hearsay excluded of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.
He most likely overheard the conversation between Teresita and petitioner.
Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had discussed.
4. Previous Conduct as Evidence
5. Testimonial Knowledge
6. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Sec. 42. Part of the res 1. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
gestae G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
A sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is
a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders
were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
Sec. 44. Entries in official 1. DST Movers Corp. v. People’s General Insurance Corp.
records G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016
For the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites must be
present: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Sec. 46. Learned treatises 1. Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
A published treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its
content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness
testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert
in the subject. Here, the RTC did not take judicial notice of the translator’s
and advisors’ qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify
on this matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and advisors’
credentials is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil
Code of Japan. Hence, the RTC was correct in not considering the English
translation as a learned treatise.
7. Opinion Rule
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert 1. Tortono v. Gregorio
witness G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
In the case of an expert witness, he or she must be shown to possess
knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her
testimony.
8. Character Evidence
Judicial Affidavits (Judicial Affidavit Rule [A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC])
Sec. 10. Effect of Non- 1. Lim v. Lim
Compliance with the Judicial G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
Affidavit Rule Its excuse— “for whatever reason”— cannot be considered sufficient to
allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.
Rule 131 – Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Sec. 1. Burden of proof 1. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

53
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the
party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is
ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before
quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner’s to
discharge.
Rule 132 – Presentation of Evidence
A. Examination of Witnesses
Sec. 11. Impeachment of 1. People v. Dimapilit
adverse party’s witness G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017
A witness’ inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her
credibility as long as there are no material contradictions in his or her
absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive
identification of the accused as one of the main assailants
Sec. 17. When part of 1. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
transaction, writing or record Management, Inc.
given in evidence, the G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013
remainder admissible When a party produces in court a Deed of Assignment, the adverse party
must be given the opportunity to examine the whole document.
Credibility of Witnesses 1. People v. Magallano
G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018
There is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted
with a frightful experience. Not every witness to a crime can be expected
to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind,
because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different
reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-cut, standard form of
behavior can be drawn. Delay in reporting the incident or making a
statement before the police, when adequately explained, neither impairs
the credibility of a witness nor destroys the probative value of his testimony.
2. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
Delay in reporting the crime caused by (1) the gravity of private
complainants’ injuries upon which they had to recuperate first, (2) their
desire to report to the proper authorities, and (3) the weekend, is not
enough to disprove their credibility as witnesses.
3. Cirera v. People
G.R. No.181843, July 14, 2014
The alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, specially with respect to the principal
occurrence and positive identification of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies
in the testimony even strengthen credibility as they show that the testimony
was not rehearsed. What is important is that there is consistency as to the
occurrence and identity of the perpetrator.
4. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
The belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive
identification of the appellants.
Probative Weight of In-Court 1. Concha v. People
Identifications G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018
The “probative weight of an in-court identification is largely dependent
upon an out-of-court identification.” Thus, it is necessary to determine if the
conduct of the latter is above suspicion.
Totality of Circumstances 1. People v. Nuñez
Test G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a
positive identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human
memory. The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of

54
verbal and non-verbal information that might become inappropriate cues
or suggestions to a witness.
Alibi 1. People v. Borja
G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017
The defense of alibi shall not prosper where it was not shown that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, considering that the place where the
accused allegedly is and the scene of the crime are only a few blocks away.
Child Witness 1. Ricalde v. People
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
Court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims.
Their youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity and
leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they
are relating past incidents of abuse.
B. Authentication and Proof of Documents
Sec. 19. Classes of 1. Arreza v. Toyo
documents G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
English translation of a foreign law by a private company not advertised as
a source of official translations of said foreign country’s laws is not an
official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.
2. Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp.
G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018
In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself
executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial
document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in
a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence.
3. Tortono v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the
party’s act and to verify the genuineness of his or her signature. Through
notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the
instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due
execution. It is an act that is imbued with public interest. Notarized
documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded
evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. However, any such
presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
Sec. 20. Proof of private 1. Imperial v. Heirs of Spouses Bayaban
document G.R. No. 197626, October 3, 2018
Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those
enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19. These official receipts, therefore, are
private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as
witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by
presenting an evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
Sec. 24. Proof of official 1. Racho v. Tanaka
record G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of
official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be
accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.
2. Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhard
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they
must not only be alleged; they must be proven. Our courts follow the
doctrine of processual presumption, that the party invoking the application

55
of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it
must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial 1. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po
documents G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a
public document which is presumed regular, admissible in evidence
without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution, and entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a
notarized document, the party questioning it must present “clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence.”
2. Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp.
G.R. No. 181683, October 7, 2015
Any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly
admitted by the court. A private document offered as authentic evidence
shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are
established in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
C. Offer and Objection
Rule 133 – Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Sec. 2. Proof beyond 1. People v. Balao
reasonable doubt G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017
Every conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard
does not entail absolute certainty but only moral certainty or that which
“ultimately appeals to a person’s very conscience.” The testimony of a
single eyewitness to a crime, even if uncorroborated, produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt as long as it is credible and positive.
2. People v. San Jose
G.R. No. 206916, July 3, 2017
The burden of proving the accused’s guilt rests with the prosecution. A
guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on
the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution’s evidence produces even
an iota of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice but to rule for the
accused’s acquittal.
3. Daayata v. People
G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017
The prosecution has the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying
on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of
the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds
basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly,
in the right of an accused to be “presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.” Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution. Should the prosecution fail to
discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must
be acquitted.
4. People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is
enough to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Macayan, Jr. v. People
G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015
Guilt based on proof beyond reasonable doubt places upon the
prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the
defense of an accused.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial 1. People v. ZZZ
evidence, when sufficient G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019

56
The absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is
usually necessary in proving the commission of rape. This is because the
crime “is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex
crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no
longer testify.
2. Bacerra v. People
G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact
from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements
of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no
requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After
all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that
may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and
beyond reasonable doubt.
3. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial
evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.
4. People v. Baron
G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016
Where a multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible
witnesses, points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant was
responsible for the rape and killing of the seven-year-old child, there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. Testimonies
regarding these details were given by disinterested witnesses whom the
accused himself had not managed to discredit for having any ill-motive
against him. Two (2) of the prosecution witnesses are even children of
tender age.
5. People v. Chavez
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than
one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Cirera v. People
G.R. No.181843, July 14, 2014
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction where the combination
of the circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.

Part Nine – Katarungang Pambarangay

Part Ten – Summary Procedure

II. Civil Cases
Sec. 9. Submission of 1. Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner
affidavits and position G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017
papers The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars the
consideration of other questions on appeal. This is because under Section
9, the parties were required to submit their affidavits and other evidence

57
on the factual issues as defined in the preliminary conference order. Thus,
either of the parties cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal, otherwise
it would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present
evidence against it.
III. Criminal Cases
Sec. 11. How commenced 1. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Sr.
G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
The filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor does not
toll the prescription period of the commission of the crime charged under a
city ordinance. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance. There is no distinction between the
filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.

Part Eleven – Small Claims Cases

Part Twelve – Environmental Cases

Part III – Special Civil Actions
Rule 7. Writ of Kalikasan 1. Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources
G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019
Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their
own or on others’ behalf, carry the burden of substantiating the writ’s
elements. Before private parties or public interest groups may proceed with
the case, they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the
determination of the writ’s issuance.
Rule 8. Writ of Continuing 1. Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Mandamus G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019
Every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be
clear on the guidelines sought for its implementation and its termination
point. Petitioners cannot merely request the writ’s issuance without
specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented and the period
when the submission of compliance reports may cease.

Part Thirteen – Alternative Dispute Resolution

Arbitration Clause 1. Bases Conversion Development Authority v. DMCI Project
Developers, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 173137 & 173170, January 11, 2016
An arbitration clause in a document of contract may extend to subsequent
documents of contract executed for the same purpose. Nominees of a
party to and beneficiaries of a contract containing an arbitration clause may
become parties to a proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause.
2. Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corp.
G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014
A consequence of a corporation’s separate personality is that consent by
corporation through its representatives is not consent of the representative,
personally. Its obligations, incurred through official acts of its
representatives, are its own. A stockholder, director, or representative
does not become a party to a contract. Thus, members of the board of
directors cannot be made parties to arbitration proceedings pursuant to an
arbitration clause in the contract to which the corporation is a party.
Jurisdiction of the 1. Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charter Chemical and Coating
Construction Industry Corp.
Arbitration Commission G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019

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The arbitration clause in the construction contract ipso facto vested the
CIAC with jurisdiction. This rule applies, regardless of whether the parties
specifically choose another forum or make reference to another arbitral
body. Since the jurisdiction of CIAC is conferred by law, it cannot be
subjected to any condition; nor can it be waived or diminished by the
stipulation, act or omission of the parties, as long as the parties agreed to
submit their construction contract dispute to arbitration, or if there is an
arbitration clause in the construction contract. The parties will not be
precluded from electing to submit their dispute to CIAC, because this right
has been vested in each party by law.
2. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Spouses Rune
G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015
When a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has
exclusive and original jurisdiction. However, when not being a party to the
construction agreement, petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause
and, thus, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Where a surety in a
construction contract actively participates in a collection suit, it is estopped
from raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that petitioner is privy to the
construction agreement, we cannot allow petitioner to invoke arbitration at
this late stage of the proceedings since to do so would go against the law’s
goal of prompt resolution of cases in the construction industry.

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Power of the Supreme Court to Amend and Suspend Procedural Rules

Dela Cruz v. National Police Commission

G.R. No. 215545, January 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted
only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. Procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement
is in pursuance to the Bill of Rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that all persons shall have a
right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2002, a certain Sonny H. Villarias filed before the National Police Commission a Complaint-
Affidavit, where he narrated on the night of his arrest, he was awakened by four (4) uniformed officers including
petitioner SPO4 Dela Cruz. He said that SPO4 Dela Cruz poked an armalite rifle at him, pulled him up, and
frisked him without any explanation despite him repeatedly asking what he had done wrong. They still did not
say anything even after they had handcuffed him. He only stopped asking after SPO4 Dela Cruz poked him with
his armalite rifle again and, along with the others, took him to their patrol vehicle and handcuffed him to its steering
wheel. While Villarias was in jail, his common-law wife informed him that the police officers had stolen a pair of
wedding rings, a necklace, a coin bank filled with P5.00 coins, cash worth P12,000.00, and a bottle of men’s
cologne. Later, Villarias was exonerated by the RTC.

The National Police Commission declared SPO4 Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna culpable of grave misconduct.
SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the CSC an Appeal, which was dismissed. The CSC found that the Appeal had
been filed out of time, as SPO4 Dela Cruz did so on January 14, 2011, beyond the fifteen (15)-day period after
the Decision for review was promulgated on December 15, 2010. Thus, the questioned Resolution had attained
finality. SPO4 Dela Cruz moved for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit. SPO4 Dela Cruz filed
before the CA a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA explained that, while technical
rules of procedure may be relaxed on occasion, he must first exert effort to establish the basis for it. In this case,
he merely alleged that he had timely filed his Appeal to merit relaxation of the rules, without documentary proof.

Petitioner insists that the CA erred when it held that his Appeal was filed beyond the allowable period. He points
out that the CSC reckoned his period for appeal from the Resolution’s promulgation date, December 15, 2010,
as opposed to the date he said he actually received it, which was on January 4, 2011. No proof was provided by
the Petitioner. Petitioner also argue that the evidence presented to the National Police Commission was not
sufficient to establish petitioner’s liability for grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Are the arguments of petitioner proper for review in the Supreme Court?

RULING:
No, both of petitioner’s arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this case. Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to questions of law. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court. While several exceptions to these rules were provided by
jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so the Supreme Court may
evaluate and review the facts of the case.

The findings of the National Police Commission were based on its appreciation of testimony, together with the
conclusions of the Regional Trial Court in its July 23, 2009 Decision, which, in turn, found that petitioner made
an unlawful warrantless arrest. This Court further notes that petitioner has neither denied nor explained the
circumstances surrounding Villarias’s unlawful warrantless arrest. Supported by substantial evidence, the
National Police Commission Decision was properly affirmed by the Civil Service Commission and the Court of
Appeals. There is no cogent reason to reverse their factual findings.

The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted
only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. Procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the

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worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement
is in pursuance to the Bill of Rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that all persons shall have a
right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. This is
not a case that calls for relaxation of the rules. The SC will not tolerate abuse of police authority over civilians.
Where a police officer has been shown to have committed atrocities against a civilian, such as in this case, and
is punished for his actions, he will find no relief in the SC.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no such amendments applicable to the ruling.

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Power of the Supreme Court to Amend and Suspend Procedural Rules

Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

The suspension of rules of procedure, such as the requirement of a motion for reconsideration before the SC
may entertain a petition for certiorari, may only be considered under a very narrow band of compelling reasons
and always in consideration that due process of law must be accorded to both parties — the prosecution and the
accused

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Joint Resolution and Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing petitioner Edward Joson’s administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents for graft and corruption, malversation, fraud, and grave misconduct, among others.

Due to the alleged payment to a caterer that did not provide meals for an event and the consequent
misappropriation of the amount paid, petitioner filed administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. On February 8, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the Joint
Resolution recommending the dismissal of charges, on the basis of its finding of insufficient evidence to support
the charges. He then filed his Motion for Reconsideration on February 23, 2011, which the Office of the
Ombudsman denied in its Order. Hence, this Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Does petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC?
2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative complaint?
3. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed the
administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision in a criminal case or (b)
within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision in an administrative case.
Here, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration only on February 23, 2011, which was 10 days late with
respect to the criminal case and five (5) days late with respect to the administrative case.

Thus, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar
him from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC, and even if the SC grants an exception to this case,
the petition will still fail on other procedural grounds and on its merits.

2. No, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC is not the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in an administrative complaint.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 43. Nonetheless, a party may elevate the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of a criminal
complaint to this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there
is an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”

Thus, petitioner’s failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the administrative case renders the
Office of the Ombudsman’s decision final.

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3. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges.

At the onset, this Court reiterates the policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause. Thus, an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated
before this Court can exercise its power of judicial review. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the Office
of the Ombudsman acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner.” The Office of the
Ombudsman laboriously discussed each and every charge of petitioner by enumerating the elements of each
law and pointing out where petitioner fell short in evidence. Upon its finding that there is no sufficient evidence
to support the charges against private respondents, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed them in
conformity with Rule II, Section 2 and Rule III, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Sec. 1 and Rule 43, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Power of the Supreme Court to Amend and Suspend Procedural Rules

National Power Corp. v. Southern Philippines Power Corp.

G.R. No. 219627, July 4, 2016
Leonen, J.

The liberality on earlier filings gave a reasonable ground to believe that filing of a motion for reconsideration
through the same private courier would be considered sufficient compliance with the Energy Regulatory
Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the CA Decision affirming the Energy Regulatory Commission (the
Commission)’s Decision.

The consortium of ALSONS Power Holdings Corp. and TOMEN Corp. entered into an Energy Conversion
Agreement with the National Power Corp. (NPC). Thereafter, Southern Philippines Power Corp. (SPPC)
assumed the obligations of the consortium to the agreement. SPPC informed the NPC that it installed an
additional engine with a five (5)-megawatt generating capacity. Thus, from April 2005, SPPC guaranteed to the
NPC a total capacity of 55 megawatts, equivalent to 110% of the nominal capacity allowed under the Energy
Conversion Agreement. Upon demand for payment by SPPC, NPC refused to pay for the additional 10%
capacity, claiming that it had the discretion to accept or reject Southern Philippines Power Corporation’s capacity
nomination if it exceeds 100% of the nominal capacity. The issue was submitted to the commission, which ruled
in favor of SPPC. The Commission denied NPC’s Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time. CA
affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

NPC contends that it was under the honest impression that filing a motion by private courier was sufficient
compliance with the Rules of Court, but the motion was received 4 days after due date.

ISSUE:
Was NPC’s Motion for Reconsideration filed beyond the due date?

RULING:
No. It is a basic tenet that procedural rules are necessary to facilitate an orderly and speedy adjudication of
disputes. Nonetheless, in exceptionally meritorious cases, technical rules of procedure may be suspended “in
order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of
substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.

The Commission previously allowed NPC to file its other pleadings through a private courier (such as LBC)
despite its prescribed mode on the filing of pleadings being either personally or by registered mail. This liberality
extended by the Commission on petitioner’s earlier filings gave it a reasonable ground to believe that its filing of
a motion for reconsideration through the same private courier would be considered sufficient compliance with the
Energy Regulatory Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure. NPC’s delay in filing the motion for
reconsideration was far from being intentional and dilatory. Petitioner simply followed its usual mode of filing its
pleadings, which had been previously acceptable to the Commission.

Nonetheless, the substantive issue was ruled in favor of SPPC. Hence, the petition is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied in this case is under a special law.

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Power of the Supreme Court to Amend and Suspend Procedural Rules

Republic v. Spouses Gimenez

G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

The SC has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-
gotten wealth. In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have
such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions that deemed petitioner
Republic of the Philippines to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution
and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. During trial, the Republic presented
documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of
the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic then manifested that it was “no longer presenting further
evidence.” Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 “to file its formal
offer of evidence.” On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved “for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28,
2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” The same was granted. On April 27, 2006, the Republic
moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This was
also granted.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal
Offer of Evidence. In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied
the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss based on failure
to prosecute. The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.

ISSUES:
1. Was a Petition for Review on Certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss?

RULING:
1. Yes, a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy. To determine whether a petition for review is
the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance,
revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil
forfeiture proceedings. In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the Republic had waived its right to offer evidence and in granting
the dismissal. This court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving
recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and
formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued.

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To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. This court is not unmindful
of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired
throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the
government and the people of the Republic.

The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed
as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which
the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes
on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to
grave criticism.” Furthermore, “subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules did not change the concepts discussed above.

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Jurisdiction

Castro v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA denying the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners Gregorio. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court granting respondent’s decree of adoption.

Rosario and Jose were legally married which gives birth to Joanne. Thereafter, Rosario and Jose separated due
to alleged homosexual tendencies of Jose.

On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before RTC alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.

RTC approved the adoption having ruled that there was no opposition received by the court from any person
including the government.

On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the ROC
with the CA. They alleged that Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent and that the set of birth certificates
presented as evidence provided that Jose was the father and the other set from NSO stated that Larry, Jose’s
driver and alleged lover was the father.

CA denied the petition. Admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne for the adoption,
CA ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter should
be personally notified.

CA also ruled that the alleged fraud contained in the different sets of birth certificates could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

ISSUES:
1. Did the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter even if it did not notify Rosario and Joanne
over the adoption proceedings?

2. Is the fraudulent information in the two sets of birth certificates constitutes extrinsic fraud which is a
ground under Rule 47?

RULING:
1. No. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Jose filed a petition for adoption on August 1, 2000 and therefore, it is RA
8552 which governs the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a
child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice upon Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it
never validly acquire jurisdiction.

2. Yes. The court cited the case of People vs CA and Socorro Florence stating that “extrinsic fraud refers
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced
on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court XXX”

The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they
were “forged instruments or perjured testimonies” presented during the trial. It failed to understand that

67
fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in
the proceedings when such instrument or testimony was presented in court.

When fraud is employed by a party to precisely prevent the participation of any other interested party,
as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the
use of forged documents or perjured testimony during trial.

Further, an action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery. Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filling of the
petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 47 is not affected by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Acosta v. Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019
Leonen, J.

Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, recourse must first be sought from lower courts sharing concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.

FACTS:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10591, or the
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Among the assailed provisions are Sec. 9 of both the law and the IRR. Said provisions respectively provide:

Republic Act No. 10591 2013 IRR

SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. — SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. —
Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and
payment of required fees to be determined by the xxx xxx xxx
Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be issued
the appropriate license under the following 9.6 For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the licensed citizen
categories: must comply with the inspection requirements of the
PNP. Failure on their part to comply with any of the
Type 1 license — allows a citizen to own and possess requirements herein mentioned is a ground for the
a maximum of two (2) registered firearms; cancellation of license and/or registration.

Type 2 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;

Type 3 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of ten (10) registered firearms;

Type 4 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of fifteen (15) registered firearms; and

Type 5 license — allows a citizen, who is a certified

gun collector, to own and possess more than fifteen
(15) registered firearms.

For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container

secured by lock and key or other security measures
for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.

For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply

with the inspection and bond requirements.

The PNP, in the pro forma Individual Application for New Firearm Registration, included a paragraph indicating
the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection, to be signed by the applicant. It provides that the applicant
agrees to voluntarily consent to the inspection of the firearm at the residence indicated in the application.

In petitioners’ view, this inspection is an unreasonable search prohibited in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
and a violation of their right to privacy. Further, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection
would allegedly be an invalid waiver, as it is not given “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly” by the applicant who
would just sign it, lest the application not be approved.

The Petitions herein — certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — are filed directly with the SC.

ISSUES:

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1. Is petitioners’ direct recourse to the SC in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
2. Does the inspection requirement in the law and in the IRR amount to an unreasonable warrantless search?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioners’ direct recourse to the SC in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Under this doctrine, recourse must first be sought from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. This is “to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner.”

Here, to assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591 and their
corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations, petitioners filed actions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — actions that could have been brought before a regional trial court.

Thus, petitioner should have brought the action before the RTC instead. In any case, the SC shall proceed
to resolve the merits of the case.

2. Yes, the inspection requirement in the law and in the IRR amount to an unreasonable warrantless search.

A reasonable search is different from a warrantless search. While a reasonable search arises from a reduced
expectation of privacy, a warrantless search, which is presumed unreasonable, dispenses with a search
warrant for practical reasons. This is why a search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain
view, consented search, and extensive search of moving private vehicle do not require a search warrant.
This Court holds that the inspection requirement under Republic Act No. 10591, as interpreted by the
Philippine National Police in the Implementing Rules, cannot be considered a reasonable search. There is a
legitimate, almost absolute, expectation of privacy in one’s residence. Signing the Consent of Voluntary
Presentation for Inspection does not result in a true and valid consented search. Section 9 authorizes
warrantless inspections of houses which, as has been extensively discussed, are unreasonable and,
therefore, require a search warrant.

Thus, Sec. 9 of the law and Sec. 9.3 of the 2013 IRR are unconstitutional, and the PNP is prohibited from
requiring individual applicants — either for a license to own and possess firearm or for a new firearm
registration — to sign the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection, or otherwise requiring inspection
of their houses as a requirement for a license to own and possess firearm unless, armed with a search
warrant.

It must be noted that the 2018 IRR now provides the scope and extent of the inspection, the same, however,
may still only be done with a search warrant.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the principles on warrantless searches have not been
amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules.

70
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Local Government of Quezon City

G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

The CA has full discretion on whether to give due course to any petition for certiorari directly filed before it. In this
case, it allowed petitioner’s direct resort to it on the ground that the issue presented was a pure question of law.
No error can be ascribed to it for passing upon the issue. The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial
policy designed to restrain direct resort to this Court if relief can be granted or obtained from the lower courts.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which held that the Local
Government of Quezon City (QC) may assess real property taxes on Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System’s properties located in Quezon City.

Sometime in July 2007, MWSS received several Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the Local
Government of QC, covering various taxable years, at P237,108,043.83 on the real properties owned by MWSS
in QC. The Local Government of QC warned it that failure to pay would result in the issuance of warrants of levy
against its properties. On August 7, 2007, the Treasurer’s Office of Quezon City issued Warrants of Levy on the
properties due to MWSS’s failure to pay.

On September 10, 2007, the Local Government of Quezon City listed properties owned by MWSS for auction
sale.Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition TRO prayer by MWSS. Argued that its real properties in Quezon City
were exclusively devoted to public use, and thus, were exempt from real property tax.

ISSUE:
Did the directly bringing the case to the CA instead of RTC by the petitioner a ground to deny the petition?

RULING:
No, since the issue presented was a pure question of law. The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial
policy designed to restrain direct resort to this Court if relief can be granted or obtained from the lower courts.
The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial policy designed to restrain direct resort to this Court if relief
can be granted or obtained from the lower courts. The Court explained in Aala v. Uy, the principle of the hierarchy
of courts prevents parties from randomly selecting which among these forums their actions will be directed.

In any case, the CA has full discretion on whether to give due course to any petition for certiorari directly filed
before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner’s direct resort to it on the ground that the issue presented was a pure
question of law. No error can be ascribed to it for passing upon the issue.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rules on jurisdiction is not affected by the passage of the revised rules.

71
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Aala v. Uy
G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017
Leonen, J.

None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in this case. Significantly, although
petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties’ arguments,
which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this case.

FACTS:
This resolves the petitioners’ original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, questioning the validity of
City Ordinance 558, which the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagum City enacted.

The Sangguniang conducted a public hearing for the approval of the said ordinance, which sought to adopt a
new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. Said ordinance was
passed and approved with modifications from the proposed original. Petitioner Aalala and Colonel Ferido, both
residents of Tagum City, filed an opposition/objection to said city ordinance, alleging that it violated certain
provisions of the Local Government Code. The ordinance was initially declared invalid insofar as certain
provisions were concerned, but later on was declared as valid.

Petitioners thus filed an original action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, including a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. They sought to nullify the ordinance
on the ground that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion, and invoked the SC’s original jurisdiction
under Article VII Section 5(1) of the Constitution. Respondents, in their comment, attack the propriety of certiorari
as they contend that this should be directed only against judicial and quasi-judicial acts, which does not apply
here since what is concerned is a legislative function in enacting an ordinance. Respondents further argue that
petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, stressing that the SC, CA, and RTC have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUES:
Does this case fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
Does this case fall under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:
As to an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: NO. In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-
defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when
any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when
the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare,
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent
nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in this case. Significantly, although
petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties’ arguments,
which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this case.

As to an exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, like the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-
defined exceptions. Thus, in Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, this Court excluded the case from
the strict application of the principle on exhaustion of administrative remedies, particularly for non-compliance
with Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the issue raised in the Petition was
purely legal.

In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There are factual issues that need to be addressed
for the proper disposition of the case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication. The questioned

72
ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would
have had enough time to render a decision.

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve
the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could have been properly
addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. These rules were established for a reason. While petitioners’ enthusiasm in their
advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause.

Hence, the petition is dismissed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are without change in respect of the
general principles regarding exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts and exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

73
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Pemberton v. De Lima
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
Leonen, J.

A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The possibility of the conclusion of
the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully invoke
this Court’s original jurisdiction.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari praying that the Resolutions dated January 27, 2015 and February 20,
2015 of respondent Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima in I.S. No. III-10-INV-14J-01102 be reversed and set
aside.

A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). During
the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that Pemberton’s right to file a counter-
affidavit was deemed waived.

Pemberton filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion: 1) to Determine Probable Cause on the Basis of Evidence
Submitted as of 27 October 2014; and 2) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 29 October 2014 dated
November 4, 2014.

However, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular
inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. Through the Resolution dated December 15, 2014,
it “found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder.” On the same day, an Information for
murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a
warrant of arrest.

On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the same
day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. In the Resolution dated January
27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton’s Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was “no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City.” Pemberton’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated
February 20, 2015. Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Did respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima commit grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of
probable cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby denying petitioner due process of law?
2. Has petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court instead of
the Court of Appeals?
3. Has this case been rendered moot and academic?

RULING:
1. No.

There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on
respondent De Lima’s assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that
petitioner murdered the victim. The convergence of the circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and
reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and cruelty.

2. No.

A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

74
In this case, petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited trial. Thus,
petitioner claims that it is necessary “to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to whether . . . respondent
[De Lima] committed grave abuse of discretion . . . in issuing the [a]ssailed [r]esolutions.” In his view, a direct
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is necessary. Petitioner argues that without this Court’s intervention,
a situation may result where “the trial has already concluded[,] while the issue on whether there exists probable
cause to charge [petitioner] with the crime of murder . . . has not been settled with finality.”

This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for
review of petitioner’s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner
is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. Once
there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.
Consequently, even assuming that grave abuse of discretion somehow taints an executive finding of probable
cause, such grave abuse of discretion has no effect in a trial. Whether respondent De Lima, indeed, committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant to the trial
itself.

3. Yes.

The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has already
rendered this Petition moot. It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the
judicial determination of probable cause. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her]
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel
or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent.
Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial
court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

This Petition has already been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of probable cause in
the form of the Regional Trial Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because Rules of Criminal Procedure has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

75
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education

G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
Leonen, J.

Concurrence of jurisdiction does not allow unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that respondent Department of Education’s
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be nullified and that a writ of prohibition
permanently enjoining the Department of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing the
assailed Department Order be issued.

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department
Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at
the School Level.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the above-quoted provisions
undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing
PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as other existing
laws.

ISSUE:
Was the filing of this Petition violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts?

RULING:
Yes. The Department of Education correctly points out that the present Petition was filed in violation of the
principle of hierarchy of courts. On this score alone, the Petition should be dismissed.

It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall under
the original jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals.

“[T]his Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the
extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.” Indeed, “concurrence [of jurisdiction] does not allow unrestricted
freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue this
writ should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.”

That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the country is a concern that can be addressed by
recourse to the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much like this court’s, also extends throughout the
country. Moreover, the Court of Appeals is well-equipped to render reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded
judgments in cases averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to
the Court of Appeals is not a futile exercise that results to nothing more than the clogging of court dockets.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because Rules on Special Civil Actions has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

76
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

Although as a general rule, courts must observe the hierarchy of courts, this doctrine admits of exceptions. The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has full discretionary power to take cognizance
and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials.

In 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins posted on the front walls of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. Those who voted for
the passing of the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 (RH Law) were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”. Respondent Atty. Majarucon, the Election Officer
of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove the Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for
being oversized. COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through
this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and TRO restraining
respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin. SC in
March 2013 issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter. Respondents filed
their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of Respondents

Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the notice and letter ordering the removal of the tarpaulin. It is their position that these
infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and
state and, thus, are unconstitutional.

Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is
compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim that while there are exceptions to
the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.

ISSUE:
Did the petitioners violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before the Supreme
Court?

RULING:
No. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

Although as a general rule, courts must observe the hierarchy of courts, this doctrine admits of exceptions. The
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.” As
correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

77
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the
government.

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort
on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private
citizens actively engage the public in political discourse.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine
relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural
niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

Here, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which
warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the
discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only
includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in
general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights,
therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence
yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of
suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide
substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect on the issues and ruling presented in this case.

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Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Aala v. Uy
G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017
Leonen, J.

In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There are factual issues that need to be addressed
for the proper disposition of the case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication. The questioned
ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would
have had enough time to render a decision.

FACTS:
This resolves the petitioners’ original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, questioning the validity of
City Ordinance 558, which the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagum City enacted.

The Sangguniang conducted a public hearing for the approval of the said ordinance, which sought to adopt a
new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. Said ordinance was
passed and approved with modifications from the proposed original. Petitioner Aalala and Colonel Ferido, both
residents of Tagum City, filed an opposition/objection to said city ordinance, alleging that it violated certain
provisions of the Local Government Code. The ordinance was initially declared invalid insofar as certain
provisions were concerned, but later on was declared as valid.

Petitioners thus filed an original action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, including a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. They sought to nullify the ordinance
on the ground that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion, and invoked the SC’s original jurisdiction
under Article VII Section 5(1) of the Constitution. Respondents, in their comment, attack the propriety of certiorari
as they contend that this should be directed only against judicial and quasi-judicial acts, which does not apply
here since what is concerned is a legislative function in enacting an ordinance. Respondents further argue that
petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, stressing that the SC, CA, and RTC have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUES:
Does this case fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
Does this case fall under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:
As to an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: NO. In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-
defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when
any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when
the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare,
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent
nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in this case. Significantly, although
petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties’ arguments,
which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this case.

As to an exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, like the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-
defined exceptions. Thus, in Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, this Court excluded the case from
the strict application of the principle on exhaustion of administrative remedies, particularly for non-compliance
with Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the issue raised in the Petition was
purely legal.

In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There are factual issues that need to be addressed
for the proper disposition of the case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication. The questioned

79
ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would
have had enough time to render a decision.

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve
the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could have been properly
addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. These rules were established for a reason. While petitioners’ enthusiasm in their
advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause.

Hence, the petition is dismissed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are without change in respect of the
general principles regarding exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts and exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

80
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Buena v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

The question of whether the position for which petitioner was appointed requires career executive service
eligibility is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of CA dismissing the appeal of CSC
Regional Office for Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Regional Office) for failure to file a memorandum.

Regional Governor of ARMM, Dr. Hussin, appointed Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
DEPED, Division of Lanao del Sur-1 in a temporary capacity. He was then reappointed this time in a permanent
capacity. To change the status of his appointment from temporary to permanent, Governor Hussin requested
Regional Office to attest Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment. However, Regional Director Buena returned the
appointment to the Governor stating that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive eligibility required for
the position.

Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with RTC to compel Regional Office to attest his appointment. He argued
that the position does not belong to Career Executive Service of Administrative Code of 1987 thus, the position
does not require career executive service eligibility. Dr, benito further claims that it was the ministerial duty of
Regional Office to attest his appointment and that under Article VII, Section 19 of RA 9054 the Regional Governor
of ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the region.

According to Regional Director Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall
carry on with the Civil Service Commission’s mandate under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service
laws and rules.

For Dr. Benito’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for mandamus, Regional
Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus.

Trial court granted the petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda to which Dr. Benito complied while Regional Office did not. The appeal was then dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal of CSC Regional Office for its failure to file a memorandum?
2. Was Dr. Benito’s filing of petition for mandamus against Regional Office’s refusal to attest his
appointment the proper remedy?

RULING:
1. No. The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal. Last paragraph of section 10, Rule 44 of Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that “the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period thereof
may be ground for dismissal of the appeal.” Section 1 of Rule 50 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to
file the required memorandum within the reglementary period is ground for the CA to dismiss the appeal.
However, considering the important questions raised, the court takes cognizance of the petition.

2. Yes, a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the CSC to attest Dr. Benito’s appointment.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

True, the general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of administrative

81
remedies requires that a party “exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”

Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career executive service eligible.
The question is whether the position for which he was appointed requires career executive service
eligibility. This is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect as the rules subject matter of the case are not amended by the Revised Rules.

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Actual Case or Controversy; When Case Considered Moot and Academic

Pemberton v. De Lima
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
Leonen, J.

A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered
moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari praying that the Resolutions dated January 27, 2015 and February 20,
2015 of respondent Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima in I.S. No. III-10-INV-14J-01102 be reversed and set
aside.

A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). During
the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that Pemberton’s right to file a counter-
affidavit was deemed waived.

Pemberton filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion: 1) to Determine Probable Cause on the Basis of Evidence
Submitted as of 27 October 2014; and 2) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 29 October 2014 dated
November 4, 2014.

However, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular
inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. Through the Resolution dated December 15, 2014,
it “found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder.” On the same day, an Information for
murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a
warrant of arrest.

On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the same
day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. In the Resolution dated January
27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton’s Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was “no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City.” Pemberton’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated
February 20, 2015. Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Did respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima commit grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of
probable cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby denying petitioner due process of law?
2. Has petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court instead of
the Court of Appeals?
3. Has this case been rendered moot and academic?

RULING:
4. No.

There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on
respondent De Lima’s assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that
petitioner murdered the victim. The convergence of the circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and
reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and cruelty.

5. No.

A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

In this case, petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited trial. Thus,

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petitioner claims that it is necessary “to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to whether . . . respondent
[De Lima] committed grave abuse of discretion . . . in issuing the [a]ssailed [r]esolutions.” In his view, a direct
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is necessary. Petitioner argues that without this Court’s intervention,
a situation may result where “the trial has already concluded[,] while the issue on whether there exists probable
cause to charge [petitioner] with the crime of murder . . . has not been settled with finality.”

This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for
review of petitioner’s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner
is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. Once
there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.
Consequently, even assuming that grave abuse of discretion somehow taints an executive finding of probable
cause, such grave abuse of discretion has no effect in a trial. Whether respondent De Lima, indeed, committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant to the trial
itself.

6. Yes.

The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has already
rendered this Petition moot. It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the
judicial determination of probable cause. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her]
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel
or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent.
Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial
court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

This Petition has already been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of probable cause in
the form of the Regional Trial Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because Rules of Criminal Procedure has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

84
Actual Case or Controversy; When Case Considered Moot and Academic

Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016
Leonen, J.

Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a petition for certiorari filed before the
CA, or a petition for review on certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic. A petition for certiorari
assailing a decision of the NLRC is allowed even after the NLRC’s Decision has become final and executory,
provided that the petition is filed before the expiration of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.

FACTS:
Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., (Bahia Shipping), for and on behalf of Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., hired Maricel
S. Nonay (Nonay) in 2008. Around the middle of February 2010, Nonay experienced severe headache.
Atransvaginal ultrasound conducted on Nonay revealed that she had two (2) ovarian cysts.

On March 20, 2010, Nonay was medically repatriated. Bahia Shipping referred her to the company-designated
physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center in Manila. On March 22, 2010, Nonay “was placed under the care
of an obstetrician-gynecologist[,]”also a company-designated physician. Nonay underwent endometrial dilatation
and curettage as part of her treatment.

Nonay was not declared fit to work by the end of the 120-day period from March 20, 2010, the date of her
repatriation, but she was declared “fit to resume sea duties” within the 240-day period.

On September 8, 2010, she filed a Complaint “for payment of disability benefit, medical expenses, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.” She sought to claim permanent disability benefits based on the
collective bargaining agreement she signed.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Maricel S. Nonay.

Bahia Shipping moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.

Bahia Shipping filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the
Petition for Certiorari and held that the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. It found that Nonay failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her
allegation that her illness is work-related. The Court of Appeals gave greater weight to the findings of the
company-designated physician holding that the company-designated physician “had acquired detailed
knowledge and was familiar with [Nonay’s] medical condition.”

Nonay moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.

While the Petition for Certiorari was pending before the Court of Appeals, Bahia Shipping paid Nonay the amount
of ₱3,780,040.00 pursuant to the final and executory Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

On June 5, 2013, Nonay filed a “Petition for Certiorari”35 before this court, but the contents of her Petition indicated
that it was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Nonay argues that the National Labor Relations Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
that her illness was work-related and work-aggravated since more than 120 days lapsed without any declaration
from the company-designated physician that she was fit to work. Thus, her illness was compensable.

She claims that the Petition filed before the Court of Appeals should have been considered moot and academic
since the judgment award was fully settled.

On the other hand, Bahia Shipping argues that the Petition should be dismissed because petitioner raised
questions of facts that are not allowed in petitions for review on certiorari.

Bahia Shipping also argues that Nonay is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because she “was
declared fit to work within the 240-day period[.]” She filed the Complaint before the Labor Arbiter without

85
complying with the mandated procedure that the medical assessment be referred to a third doctor in the event
that the company-designated physician and the personal physician differ in their findings, as in this case.

ISSUES:
1. Has satisfaction of the judgment award rendered the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot
and academic?
2. Should the Petition be dismissed for allegedly raising questions of fact?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the Petition for Certiorari and setting aside the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission?

RULING:
1. No.

Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a petition for certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals, or a petition for review on certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic.

A petition for certiorari assailing a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is allowed even after the
National Labor Relations Commission’s Decision has become final and executory, provided that the petition is
filed before the expiration of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.

The CA could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence
of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence,
which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all
other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the
NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or
resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution never
became final and executory.

2. No.

The Petition in this case does not raise questions of fact.

Contrary to respondent Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.’s argument, petitioner raised only questions of law. The
arguments in this Petition for Review show that petitioner does not question the findings of fact of the labor
tribunals and the Court of Appeals. The main issue raised by petitioner is whether she is entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits based on the factual findings of the labor tribunals. The other issue raised by
petitioner is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission.

Clearly, the issues raised by petitioner do not require the evaluation of the evidence presented before the labor
tribunals. The resolution of the issues raised by petitioner entails a review of applicable laws and not whether the
alleged facts are true.

3. No.

To resolve a Rule 45 petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, the
question of law that this court must determine is whether the Court of Appeals properly determined the “presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion.”

In this case petitioner was unable to present substantial evidence to show the relation between her work and the
illness she contracted. The record of this case does not show whether petitioner’s adenomyoma was pre-existing;
hence, this court cannot determine whether it was aggravated by the nature of her employment. She also failed
to fulfill the requisites of Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC for her illness to be compensable, thus, her claim
for disability benefits cannot be granted.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it held that the Complaint should have been dismissed due to lack of
cause of action. It found that petitioner’s treatment would exceed 120 days, as follows:

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Firstly, she was prescribed and given monthly Luprolex injection for six (6) months. The first injection was administered on March
30, 2010, twelve (12) days after her repatriation, and was completed on August 27, 2010. Secondly, she underwent endometrial
dilatation and curettage on July 22, 2010. Thirdly, from July 28, 2010 up to September 6, 2010, she was treated for bacterial
vaginosis and candidiasis. Fourthly, she underwent repeat transvaginal ultrasound on September 28, 2010 for reevaluation of her
medical condition and was last seen by the OBGYNE on October 21, 2010.

It bears stressing that if the employer’s failure to make a declaration on the fitness or disability of the seafarer is
due to the latter’s need for further medical attention, the period of temporary and total disability may be extended
to a maximum of 240 days. Thus, the filing by private respondent of the complaint for permanent disability
compensation benefits on September 8, 2010, or 174 days after she was medically repatriated on March 18,
2010, was premature. As such, the labor arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance the complaint for lack
of cause of action.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it does not tackle any principle amended by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

87
Actual Case or Controversy; When Case Considered Moot and Academic

Republic v. Moldex Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.

A party’s withdrawal of its application for land registration renders moot and academic an appeal assailing a CA
decision affirming the RTC’s grant of said application.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ January 6, 2006 Decision.

Moldex Realty, Inc. is an applicant for registration before the Regional Trial Court for the Lot No. 9715-A. On
February 19, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision granting the application. The Office of the
Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, appealed the Regional Trial Court’s February 19,
2002 Decision before the Court of Appeals. On January 6, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision
affirming the approval of Moldex Realty, Inc.’s application for registration. On March 2, 2006, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals
January 6, 2006 Decision. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that Moldex Realty, Inc. failed to prove that
it or its predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property in the concept of an owner from June 12, 1945 or for at least 30 years. It also argued that in affirming
the Regional Trial Court Decision, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on Naguit instead of Republic v.
Herbieto.

On March 14, 2012, this court received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex Realty, Inc. stating that although
it had already been issued a favorable decision by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, it opted to
withdraw its application for registration of the properties in its name.

ISSUE:
Has respondent Moldex Realty, Inc.’s withdrawal of its application for land registration rendered this case moot
and academic?

RULING:
Yes, respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered this case moot and academic.

This court’s power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies as provided by Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution. There is an actual case or controversy when the case presents conflicting or opposite legal
rights that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding.

Respondent’s Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has erased the conflicting
interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent’s Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to
act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when respondent filed
that Manifestation.

Nevertheless, respondent’s Manifestation should not be considered a waiver of its rights over the property. There
is nothing in the Manifestation that speaks of respondent’s abandonment of its property claims. Nor does the
Manifestation have the effect of proving that the property belongs to the public domain and the state.
Respondent’s Manifestation has the effect of a waiver of the Decisions of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals in favor of respondent. Respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration, pending resolution of
petitioner’s Petition for Review before this court and with full knowledge of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court’s Decisions in its favor, is not a means to render final and executory these Decisions.

However, dismissing this case and setting aside the Decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondent would not render a conclusive judgment on this issue. Respondent, or any interested
applicant, is not precluded from filing another application for registration involving the property.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the does not tackle any rules that has been amended by the Revised Rules.

88
Actual Case or Controversy; When Case Considered Moot and Academic

De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest renders a
Rule 65 petition assailing the preliminary investigation moot.

FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega, also known as “Doc Gerry,” was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in
Palawan. He was shot dead in Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was
arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also
implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he
alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No: 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors
(First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a
Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes. First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case.

Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new
panel.

The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on
all accused, including former Governor Reyes. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a
Petition for Review assailing the Second Panel’s Resolution.

In the meantime, an information had already been filed in court and warrant of arrest issued against former
Governor Reyes.

ISSUES:
1. Was the issuance of Department Order No. 710 an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for
certiorari or prohibition?
2. Has this petition for Certiorari been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court?

RULING:
1. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. As such, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive function of the Secretary of
Justice. However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may
be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has
already rendered this Petition moot.

89
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should
the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration
of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on petitions for certiorari, as used in this case, remains the same.

90
Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment

Mercury Drug Corp. v. Spouses Huang

G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. It can neither be modified nor disturbed
by courts in any manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived errors of fact or law. Parties
cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution of the judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari arising from the execution of a final and executory judgment for
damages. The Petition particularly assails the January 20, 2011 Decision and the July 6, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106647, which sustained the denial of the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution,
Motion for Inhibition, and Urgent Motion to Defer the Implementation of Writ of Execution filed by Mercury Drug
Corporation and Rolando J. Del Rosario.

Stephen Huang (Stephen) and his parents, Spouses Richard Y. Huang and Carmen G. Huang, filed a complaint
for damages based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug Corporation. Mercury Drug was the registered owner
of a six (6)-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an accident with Stephen’s car on the night of
December 20, 1996. As a result of the tragic incident, Stephen suffered serious spinal cord injuries. He is now a
paraplegic.RTC held Mercury Drug as liable, and the CA affirmed the same.

As a result of garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of Richard Y. Huang a Manager’s Check
in the amount of P40,434,062.00.28 Afterwards, Stephen and his parents filed a Satisfaction of Judgment before
the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioners assert that the dispositive portion of the September 29, 2004 Decision and the corresponding Writ of
Execution varied the tenor of the judgment. They point out, in particular, that the amounts of life care cost and
loss of earning capacity reflected in the dispositive portion and the writ of execution do not correspond to those
stated in the body of the decision.

According to petitioners, respondent Stephen is only entitled to a life care cost of P7,102,640.00 instead of
P23,461,062.00 based on his average monthly expenses and his life expectancy. Petitioners also point out that
the award of P10,000,000.00 as loss of earning capacity is patently excessive. Based on respondent Stephen’s
life expectancy, projected monthly salary, and the time within which he could have obtained gainful employment,
the award of loss of earning capacity should only be P5,040,000.00. Petitioners claim that there were clerical
errors in the computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity. However, at the same time, they contend
that the two (2) monetary awards were not “supported in the body of the decision or in the records of the case.”

On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners are prohibited from questioning the propriety of the
monetary awards under the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. There are no clerical errors in the
computation of the two monetary awards. Respondents contend that the reduction of these amounts would
amount to a substantial amendment of a final and executory judgment.

ISSUE:
Does the case fall under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgments?

RULING:
NO. This case does not fall under the exceptions of the said doctrine.
It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or
amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to correct
perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter
of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come to an end.
The rationale behind the rule was further explained in Social Security System v. Isip, thus:

91
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag
on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an iron-clad rule. It is subject to several
exceptions, namely:
(1) [T]he correction of clerical errors;
(2) [T]he so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) [V]oid judgments; and
(4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, the petitioner asserts that the case falls in the first exception. This Court notes that the amendments
sought by petitioners affect the very substance of the controversy. While it appears on the surface of the Petition
that they merely seek the clarification of the judgment, a careful review of petitioners’ assertions and arguments
reveal their true intention of appealing the merits of the case. This cannot be done without violating the doctrine
on immutability of judgments. A correction pertaining to the substance of the controversy is not a clerical error.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the said principle was not affected by the amendments.

92
Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment

Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp.

G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June 1, 2016
Leonen, J.

Upon execution, this Court’s decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of
remand, we cannot allow attempts to substantially or materially alter the terms of our final and executory
judgment.

FACTS:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the reclamation of the
foreshore lands along Manila Bay. On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) sued for
recovery of possession and damages with writ of preliminary injunction. This Court upheld the Republic’s
arguments. Despite the nullity of the agreement and RREC’s failure to reclaim any land, this Court awarded
RREC compensation for the work it had actually done based on quantum meruit.

RJREC and Pasay City filed before this Court a Petition seeking to declare a mistrial. This Court denied the
Petition, absent any procedural error or violation of RREC and Pasay City’s right to due process. RREC and
Pasay City were ordered, under pain of contempt, to abide by the provision on execution of judgments under
Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Once again, they were warned not to file further pleadings.

On October 24, 2000, an Entry of Judgment was issued declaring Republic v. Court of Appeals final and
executory as of July 27, 1999.

Despite this Court’s Resolutions, RREC filed Motion for Leave to re-open the case. Again, this Court expunged
the Motion from the records.

RREC moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court
issued the Writ of Execution. Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus (Sheriff De Jesus) issued a Notice of Execution and
Notice to Pay against the Republic for P49,173,064,201.17 instead of the P10.9 million ordered by this Court, to
be divided between RREC and Pasay City.

The Republic filed before the Regional Trial Court a Very Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and the
Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay but it was denied. The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari assailing the trial court’s orders and seeking injunction against the writ of execution .The Court of
Appeals granted the Petition. It ruled that Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay cannot go
beyond this Court’s judgment in Republic v. Court of Appeals.

Atty. Romeo G. Roxas (Atty. Roxas), counsel for RREC filed before this Court a Complaint against the three (3)
Court of Appeals Justices who nullified the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice. The Complaint was
for the Justices’ alleged misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, and it prayed for their disbarment. Atty. Roxas also filed a Motion for
Inhibition against the three (3) Justices. Both the Complaint and the Motion for Inhibition were filed without
RREC’s authority.

RREC terminated the services of Atty. Roxas, due to loss of confidence and breach of trust. RREC also filed a
Manifestation informing this Court that Atty. Roxas’ Complaint against the Court of Appeals Justices was filed
without RREC’s knowledge and conformity.

On August 1, 2013, Atty. Roxas filed before this Court the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 208205, referring to it
as a Petition for Review Pro Hac Vice. Although he admits that he filed his Pro Hac Vice Petition in his personal
capacity and without RREC’s authority, Atty. Roxas asserts that he is RREC’s rightful counsel.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice of Execution
and Notice to Pay as null and void?

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2. Was the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing Atty. Romeo G. Roxas as rightful counsel of RREC?

RULING:
1. No.

The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice null and void. The
Republic v. Court of Appeals has long been final and executory. This Court judiciously examined and
exhaustively discussed the issues raised in RREC’s Petition. These are the same arguments now being raised.

Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an interest in the stability of that judgment.
Parties come to the courts in order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes
if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the same claims again and again. Although judicial
determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures, not through
repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents
the embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no
reason to suppose that the second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first,
the first should be left undisturbed.

This Court’s decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of remand, we cannot
allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the judgment of this Court. Neither the Regional Trial Court nor its
sheriff can, in any way, directly or indirectly, alter this Court’s Decision through a writ of execution or a notice
purporting to implement the writ.

[Sheriffs] have no capacity to vary the judgment and deviate [from the judge’s decision] based on their own
interpretation thereof. Well settled is the rule that when writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is
their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with
their mandate. It is not their duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency of the processes committed to [them] for
service as their duty to execute a valid writ is not ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard to the exercise of [one’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the sheriff [and] he [or
she] must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

The Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay went beyond the dispositive portion in Republic v. Court of Appeals.
In his Notice, Sheriff De Jesus modified our decreed amount of P10.9 million at 6% interest per annum (beginning
May 1, 1962 until fully paid) to P49.17 billion at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to 1973 and at the rate of
12% from 1974 to present, compounded.

The sheriff cannot act as a party’s agent. He or she can only act as an officer of the court which he or she
represents. Sheriffs, as agents of the law, are duty-bound to fulfill their mandates with utmost diligence and due
care. In executing the court’s order, they cannot afford to go beyond its letter, lest they prejudice “the integrity of
their office and the efficient administration of justice.”

2. No.

Atty. Roxas’ Pro Hac Vice Petition should be denied for two (2) reasons: first, it is a wrong remedy; and second,
he has no legal standing to appeal on RREC’s behalf.

In his desire to win the reclamation case and take his slice of the pie from the judgment award, Atty. Roxas
resorted to prosecuting cases against the Court of Appeals Justices without RREC’s knowledge and authority
and against his client’s interest.

Moreover, Atty. Roxas has no legal standing to appeal the case on RREC’s behalf based on Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. Atty. Roxas is not a party litigant under Section 1. Only RREC, as the party seeking for the execution
of judgment, and the Republic, as the party opposing RREC’s claims, stand to be benefited or injured by the
pending case. Atty. Roxas is not a party-in-interest under Section 2. He has no valid interest in this case as his
contingency-fee agreement with RREC is champertous and, therefore, void. Likewise, Atty. Roxas is not a party
representative under Section 3 as he is no longer RREC’s lawyer.

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Thus, insofar as RREC and the Republic are concerned, Atty. Roxas is a complete stranger to this case.

Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals by certiorari before this Court may be had only by
the party to the case. Atty. Roxas is neither a party nor a counsel for any of the parties here. He cannot claim
legal fees by filing a petition for review on behalf of a non-client, which has moved to dismiss/expunge his petition
pro hac vice.

The action he pursued before this Court is not an available recourse under applicable laws or the Rules of Court.
He is pursuing the wrong remedy.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because the doctrine discussed by this case has no affect and does not tackle the amended rules of
the Revised Rules.

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Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment

Gadrinab v. Salamanca
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014
Leonen, J.

The doctrine of the immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained
finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law. This doctrine admits a few
exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the CA decision which dismissed petitioner Nestor Gadrinab’s appeal
and affirmed the RTC decision granting respondent Nora Salamanca’s motion for physical partition pending the
execution of a judgment on compromise agreement between the parties.

A compromise agreement was entered into by the 5 Talao siblings (3 of the siblings are the respondents, 1 is
represented by petitioner and 1 waived her right in favor of her siblings) who inherited the subject lot from their
parents. They agreed that the property will be subject for sale and the proceeds be divided among them. The
RTC approved the compromise agreement and petitioner filed a motion for execution of the compromise
agreement. However, portion of the duplex unit that petitioner refused to vacate remained unsold. This prompted
respondent Salamanca to move for the physical partition of the property before the RTC.

Petitioner argued that judgment on the compromise agreement had already been rendered and had attained
finality and had the effect of res judicata. Petitioner pointed out that there was no agreement that he must vacate
the property before it could be sold. According to him, had there been a full-blown trial on the action for partition
he would have been able to present evidence of exclusive possession of half of the property.

On the other hand, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this case fell under the exception of the rule
on immutability of judgments.The noncompliance of some of the parties with the compromise agreement
constituted an event that makes it difficult if not totally impossible to enforce the compromise agreement.
Respondent Salamanca pointed out that the grant of the motion for physical partition would still be consistent
with the intent of the compromise agreement since it would result in the proceeds being divided equally among
the parties.

ISSUE:
Should the physical partition be granted despite finality of a previous judgment on compromise?

RULING:
No. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits of the case. It has the effect of
res judicata. There is res judicata when the following concur: 1. Previous final judgment; 2. By a court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; 3. On the merits of the case; 4. Between identical parties, on
the same subject matter, and cause of action.

There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to bar by prior judgment,
embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court. The second rule refers to conclusiveness
of judgment, embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c).

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine admits a
few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice: 1.The correction of clerical errors; 2. the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; 3. void judgments; and 4. whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-
blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court. Because
a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on
the merits. In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise

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agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to
abide by the compromise agreement’s terms. This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by
disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties
themselves.

The respondents have remedies if parties to the compromise agreement refuse to abide by its terms. A party
may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right on final judgments pursuant to Section
1, Rule 39. If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ
issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71. Since a judgment on compromise
agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used
against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds
exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d)
petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment

Instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be enforced and the partition could
be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move again for the partition of the property and set aside a valid
and final judgment on compromise. This court cannot allow such motion to prosper without going against law and
established jurisprudence on judgments.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case were not amended nor affected.

97
Jurisdiction

Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhard

G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
Leonen, J.

All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and not of the Court of Appeals. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 includes the proviso: “except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” under the enumerated cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the CA. Further, on the issue of jurisdiction, the determination of whether to entertain a
case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular
case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot operate to automatically divest a court
of its jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) filed this Petition praying for the reversion and setting aside
of the CA Decision and Resolution, as well as the trial court’s Decision declaring it in default, in order for PNCC
to be allowed to file its Answer, or, the cause of action having already prescribed under Malaysian laws, the case
be dismissed outright.

PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate
company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to
construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. Various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest
Merchant Bankers were obtained to guarantee the due performance by PNCC of its construction
contracts. These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia. Due to failure to perform
the obligations, the State of Pahang demanded payment of the reduced amount of MYR 3.9M against Asiavest
Merchant Bankers’ performance bonds, pursuant to a compromise agreement. Consequently, the corporation
demanded from PNCC the amount it paid to the State of Pahang. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a
Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the RTC. It based its action on Malaysian Laws.
The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant
Bankers to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of the latter and found that Asiavest complied
with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws. The CA dismissed PNCC’s appeal.

PNCC contends it had consistently raised the propriety of impleading the two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest-
CDCP and Asiavest Holdings, and their participant liability, which are questions of fact. According to PNCC,
Asiavest-CDCP undertook to hold PNCC free and harmless from all its obligations under the agreement while
Asiavest Holdings agreed in the guaranty agreement to share with PNCC the guarantee liability on a 51% - 49%
arrangement. PNCC submits that the trial court could have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and
refused to take cognizance of the case considering the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two Malaysian
corporations and in determining PNCC’s exact liability. Further, considering that the transactions involved
originated from and occurred in a foreign country, PNCC adds that it was deprived of its day in court when its
Motion for extension to file an Answer was denied, and it was subsequently declared in default. Lastly, PNCC
submits that Asiavest Merchant Bankers already winded up, hence, the case is now moot and academic.

ISSUES:
1. May the CA dismiss appeals on the ground that only pure questions of law were raised?
2. May the Court consider questions of fact which while not enumerated in the appellant’s brief were raised in
the motion to lift order of default?
3. May a mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens operate to automatically divest a court of its
jurisdiction?
4. Did the denial of motions for extension to file an Answer, considering that the transactions involved originated
from and occurred in a foreign country, violate due process?
5. May rules on prescription based on Malaysian Laws be raised as defense in this case?

RULING:
1. Yes, because all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved is within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. This section includes the proviso: “except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction

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includes all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. In this case, the petition originated from a
default judgment against petitioner. Petitioner was not able to present evidence before the trial court. Necessarily,
the errors raised from the trial court involved only questions of law.

2. No, because Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that the appellant’s brief must include “clear
and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment.” In this case,
petitioner only assigned the following two errors: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) denial of the
motion for reconsideration as it deprived it of his day in court. The argument on the two Malaysian corporations
was raised by petitioner for the first time in its Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Merit. Further, since
this was already raised in the said Motion to Lift Order of Default and Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam filed before the trial court, these were already considered by the lower court when it ruled on both
Motions. In addition, the bases of its argument to implead the two Malaysian corporations (subcontract agreement
and guaranty agreement) were not submitted with any of its pleadings.

3. No, because the determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. Forum non conveniens, which literally translates to
‘the forum is inconvenient,’ gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. But a mere invocation of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest
a court of its jurisdiction. Here, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction because it would be more convenient
to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible,
witnesses would be readily available and it would entail less expenses in terms of legal services. Most of
petitioner’s officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely
also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this
civil suit before Malaysian courts.

4. No, because the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and there is no denial of the right to
due process if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend their interests in due course. Petitioner had been
able to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court, and later elevated its case before the CA. There is
no denial of due process if a party was given an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
also did not take advantage of the opportunities it was given to file a responsive pleading. It allowed the periods
it was given for the filing of pleadings to lapse. It never attempted to file its Answer, even belatedly. Further, it
argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, yet it did not file a Motion to Dismiss. Lastly,
in its affidavit of merit, it did not state the evidence it plans to present in the event its Motion is granted, or attach
documents in support of its claims.

5. No, because petitioner did not prove the Malaysian laws provisions regarding prescription. The Philippines
does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove
a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption, that the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. Further, prescription did not avail of the remedy of motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. It
was also not raised as an error before the CA. Nevertheless, we have ruled that prescription may be raised for
the first time before this court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 25 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because a new provision has been
added. The amendment provides that a document already accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent needs
no more proof, since the certificate or its equivalent is prima facie evidence of its due execution and genuineness.
A certificate is no longer required if the treaty or convention between the Philippines and a foreign country has
abolished such requirement or exempted the document itself from such formality.

The other rules used in this case are not affected by the new amendments under the Revised Rules of Court.

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Jurisdiction

Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao

G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.

When a tax case is pending on appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin the levy of taxes and the auction of a taxpayer’s properties in relation to that case. The
Central Board of Assessment Appeals Decision assailed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the real property tax assessment of its properties. Clearly, this
falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Central Board of Assessment Appeals
decision constitutes one of the cases covered by the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals December 15, 2008 Decision and
September 11, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 00735-MIN, dismissing the Philippine Ports Authority’s
Petition for Prohibition.

On 17 June 2004, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) received a letter from the City Assessor of Davao for the
assessment and collection of real property taxes against its administered properties located at Sasa Port. This
includes the subject properties. It appealed the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals through
the Office of the City Treasurer of Davao on 2 August 2004. The Office of the City Treasurer of Davao received
the appeal on 11 August 2004, and forwarded it to the Chairman of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, who
received it on 6 September 2004. While the case was pending, the City of Davao posted a notice of sale of
delinquent real properties, including the three (3) properties subject of this case.

The Local Board of Assessment Appeals dismissed PPA’s appeal for having been filed out of time, and for its
lack of jurisdiction on the latter’s tax exemption. The PPA appealed before the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, but this appeal was denied in the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, it filed an appeal with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

Meanwhile, the PPA filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the City of Davao’s notice
of sale of delinquent properties. While the petition with the Court of Appeals is pending, the CTA granted PPA’s
appeal and declared the subject properties exempt from real estate taxes. Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. It held that the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the matter and said that the
Philippine Ports Authority “should have applied for the issuance of writ of injunction or prohibition before the Court
of Tax Appeals.”[18] It further found the petition dismissible on the ground that the Philippine Ports Authority
committed forum shopping, as the petition raised the same facts and issues as in its appeal before the Court of
Tax Appeals.

ISSUES:
1. Does Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief prayed for by petitioner Philippine Ports
Authority
2. Was there a forum shopping?

RULING:
1. Petitioner has failed to cite any law supporting its contention that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this case. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (a)(5) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9282, provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals[.]

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals April 7, 2005 Decision assailed by petitioner before the Court of
Appeals was rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the real property tax assessment of its

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properties. Clearly, this falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Central Board
of Assessment Appeals decision constitutes one of the cases covered by the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive
jurisdiction.

Despite the clear wording of the law placing this case within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals could have issued the relief prayed for despite the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9282, considering its urgent need for injunctive relief.

Petitioner’s contention has no legal basis whatsoever and must be rejected. Urgency does not remove the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals decision from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. This
is particularly true since, as properly recognized by the Court of Appeals, petitioner could have, and should have,
applied for injunctive relief with the Court of Tax Appeals, which has the power to issue the preliminary injunction
prayed for.

2. To reverse a court determination that a party has violated the rule against forum shopping, this party must
show that one or more of the requirements for forum shopping does not exist. To this end, petitioner attempts to
differentiate the petition filed with the Court of Appeals from the appeal filed with the Court of Tax Appeals. It
argues that the right asserted before the Court of Appeals is its right to peacefully possess its ports, free from
the threat of losing the properties due to tax liabilities, whereas the right asserted before the Court of Tax Appeals
is its right to be exempt from real property tax, as a government instrumentality. Petitioner further argues that the
reliefs sought from the two (2) tribunals were not the same—it sought a final relief from payment of real property
taxes on its ports from the Court of Tax Appeals; on the other hand, it sought a temporary and immediate relief
from respondents’ acts from the Court of Appeals, while the issue of taxability was still pending with the Court of
Tax Appeals.

However, even assuming without conceding that the arguments laid down by petitioner could support its claim
that it did not forum shop, this Court cannot accept that it was what was argued before the Court of Tax Appeals
and Court of Appeals, respectively, without reading the text itself. Whether or not the rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for in the two (2) petitions were different would best determined from a reading of the appeal and petition
themselves.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it submitted only its own arguments. Neither its petition before the Court of Appeals
nor its appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals was attached to the petition filed with this Court. Without any of
these texts, this Court is in no position to determine that the elements of forum shopping are absent here.

Thus, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ finding that the rule against forum shopping was violated when
petitioner filed its Petition for Certiorari despite its pending appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions involved in this case were not amended.

101
Jurisdiction

National Power Corp. v. Provincial Government of Bataan

G.R. No. 180654 (Resolution), March 6, 2017
Leonen, J.

A local tax case is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. The issue of the validity
and legality of the foreclosure sale is essentially related to the issue of the demandability of the local franchise
tax.

FACTS:
For resolution is respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision, which
granted the petition of National Power Corporation (Napocor), and set aside the Court of Appeals’ Resolution.

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the respondent
Provincial Government of Bataan (the Province) for P45.9 million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. When
NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation pending the decision of the Supreme Court, the
Province then sent notices of tax due to the NPC. The NPC replied, however, that the Province has no right to
further assess because NPC had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26,
2001.

Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a “Warrant of Levy” on 14 real properties that it used to own in
Limay, Bataan. In March 2004 the Province caused their sale at public auction with itself as the winning bidder.
On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for declaration
of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Province, the
provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

On November 3, 2005 the RTC dismissed the NPC’s petition, stating that the franchise tax was not based on
ownership of property but on the NPC’s exercise of the privilege of doing business within Bataan.

The NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the Province moved to dismiss the same
for lack of jurisdiction of that court over the subject matter of the case because it was essentially a local tax case
questioning the validity of the Province’s imposition of the local franchise tax, therefore, be lodged with the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On November 27, 2007 the CA granted the Province’s motion and dismissed the petition on the ground cited.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction? Yes.
(2) Is petitioner NPC a real party in interest? Yes.

RULING:
(1) Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Republic Act No. 9282, which amended Republic Act No. 1125, took effect on April 23, 2004, and significantly
expanded the extent and scope of the cases that the Court of Tax Appeals was tasked to hear and adjudicate.
Under Section 7, paragraph (a)(3), the Court of Tax Appeals is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over, among others, appeals from the “decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.”

The case a quo is a local tax case that is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Parenthetically, the case arose from the dispute between Napocor and respondents over the purported franchise
tax delinquency of Napocor. Although the complaint filed with the trial court is a Petition for declaration of nullity
of foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, a reading of the petition shows that it
essentially assails the correctness of the local franchise tax assessments by the Provincial Government of
Bataan. Indeed, one of the prayers in the petition is for the court a quo to declare Napocor “as exempt from
payment of local franchise taxes.” Basic is the rule that allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought determine the nature of an action. In order for the trial court to resolve the complaint, the issues regarding

102
the correctness of the tax assessment and collection must also necessarily be dealt with. As correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, “the issue of the validity and legality of the foreclosure sale is essentially related to the
issue of the demandability of the local franchise tax.”

Therefore, the dismissal of Napocor’s appeal by the Court of Appeals was in order. Napocor’s procedural lapse
would have been sufficient to reconsider this Court’s decision and instead deny the instant petition. However, the
substantial merits of the case and the patent error committed by the Bataan Regional Trial Court compels this
Court to exercise its power of judicial review for purposes of judicial economy.

(2) Yes. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

In the instant case, petitioner’s complaint has sought not only the nullification of the foreclosure sale but also a
declaration from the trial court that it is exempt from the local franchise tax. The action began when respondent
ignored petitioner’s claim for exemption from franchise tax, and pursued its collection of the franchise tax
delinquency by issuing the warrant of levy and conducting the sale at public auction – where the Provincial
Government of Bataan was declared as purchaser – of the transmission assets, despite the purported prior
mutual agreement to suspend administrative remedies for the collection of taxes. The assets were sold to enforce
collection of a franchise tax delinquency against the petitioner. Petitioner thus had to assail the correctness of
the local franchise tax assessments made against it by instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial Court;
otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.

Certainly, petitioner is a real party in interest, which stands to gain or lose from the judgment that the trial court
may render.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rules are still the same.

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Jurisdiction

Jaka Investments Corp. v. Urdaneta Village Association, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 204187 & 206606, April 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

To determine if this case falls under the agency’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine whether the controversy
arose “from any of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association;
(2) between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members; and (3) between the
association and the state insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.”

FACTS:
This is a case resolving a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA reversing the orders
of the RTC which ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case filed by Jaka Investments Corporation (Jaka
Investments) despite allegations that the case involved an intra-association dispute.

Ayala Land, Inc., which developed and sold lots in Urdaneta Village, Makati City placed all parcels of land sold
by them subject to uniform restrictions, which are annotated on the transfer certificates of title covering the lots.
These included automatic membership in the Urdaneta Village Association, that all building[s] on this lot must be
of strong materials, and that walls on the perimeter of the property shall not exceed 2 meters in height, subject
to exceptions. Jaka Investments bought three (3) lots in Urdaneta Village.

At a general membership meeting to vote on the changes, the corporate life extension and the Deed Restrictions’
term extension was approved. Jaka Investments voted in favor of both extensions.

Jaka Investments filed for the cancellation of restrictions annotated in its TCTs with the RTC, claiming that upon
the expiration of the term of restrictions, the legal or contractual basis for the restrictions ceased and should thus
be canceled under Section 108 of The Association filed its Opposition to the Petition with Motion to Dismiss,
maintaining that this was an intra- corporate dispute on the validity of the uniform restrictions’ term extension, the
Association argued that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not the trial court, had exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, Jaka Investments was still
estopped from questioning the term extension since it had already voted in favor of it via proxy in the general
membership meeting.

The RTC ruled that despite it agreeing that the issue was intra-corporate, the trial court still held that it had
jurisdiction over the case. The CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s rulings and dismissed Jaka Investments’
Petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the trial court should have dismissed Jaka Investments’ Petition since
it had already found that the issue raised in it was an intra-corporate controversy.

ISSUES:
1. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case, notwithstanding the case involves an intra-corporate
controversy?
2. Is Jaka Investments Corporation is estopped from assailing the validity of the Deed Restrictions’ extension?

RULING:
1. No. The instant controversy falls squarely within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), now HLURB.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 535, the HIGC also assumed the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A to hear and decide cases involving:

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity;

To determine if this case falls under the agency’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine whether the controversy
arose “from any of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association;

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(2) between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members; and (3) between the
association and the state insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.”

In this case, the Association maintains that the extension is valid, while petitioner insists on its invalidity. Clearly,
the controversy arose from an intra-corporate relation between an association and its member. Accordingly, it is
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the case.

2. The resolution of this issue would necessarily involve an examination of evidence presented by the parties.
These are questions of facts, which cannot be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It has been ruled that the doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that the different levels of the judiciary can
perform its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. As the court of last resort, this court should not
be burdened with functions falling within the causes in the first instance so that it can focus on its fundamental
tasks under the Constitution. This court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating
precedents in light of new circumstances or confusion in the bench and bar. Thus, “[r]ather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices
in order that it truly performs that role.”

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the appropriate government agency to resolve whether the
extension of the Deed Restrictions is valid, and whether petitioner is estopped to question it. It has the technical
expertise to analyze contracts between petitioner and respondent Association.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because law involved in this case is not the Rules of Court.

105
Jurisdiction

Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay

G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, March 12, 2019
Leonen, J.

It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the determination of the value of just compensation. Nonetheless, the Department of Agrarian
Reform still exercises primary jurisdiction to preliminarily determine this value. This is different from determining
the validity of property transfer to the farmer-beneficiaries and, consequently, the validity of the certificates of title
issued to them. When the issue in a case hinges on whether a beneficiary has made insufficient or no payments
for the land awarded to him or her, primary administrative jurisdiction is under the Department of Agrarian Reform.

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of Petitions for Review on Certiorari separately filed by the DAR Regional Director For
Region VIII and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Leyte, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
which voided the emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in this case.

The Heirs of Spouses Abucay (respondents) filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (Regional
Adjudicator) a Complaint for proper determination of just compensation. They alleged that they inherited the 182-
hectare property upon their parents’ death and enjoyed its ownership and possession. They claimed that they
did not receive any just compensation for the 22 hectares of property that was placed under the Operation Land
Transfer Program. The Certificate of Deposit issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) as compensation
was issued to Guadalupe Cabahug (Cabahug), the property’s previous owner.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was no proper valuation of the property to determine just compensation
and that the administrative due process was not followed. Regional Adjudicator declared the emancipation
patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries void. In another Decision, the Regional Adjudicator similarly canceled
the original certificates of title and voided the emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries.

The DAR Adjudication Board reversed the Regional Adjudicator Decision and declared itself wanting of
jurisdiction over the appeal. It found that the nature of the action was an agrarian law implementation case under
the primary jurisdiction of the Regional Director of DAR and the consequent appeal, to the DAR Secretary.

ISSUE:
Does the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board have jurisdiction over cancellation of original
certificates of title and emancipation patents?

RULING:
No, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board have no jurisdiction over cancellation of original
certificates of title and emancipation patents.

It is settled that the RTC, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination of the value of just compensation. Nonetheless, the DAR still exercises primary jurisdiction to
preliminary determine value.

As the rules it has promulgated, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has taken cognizance of cases
involving either the issuance or cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and emancipation patents.
Cases involving registered certificates of land ownership awards, emancipation patents, and titles emanating
from them are agrarian reform disputes, which the DAR Adjudication Board takes cognizance. Meanwhile, cases
involving unregistered ones are agrarian law implementation cases, put under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Directors and Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

In 2009, however, Congress amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law through RA No. 9700. Under
the new Section 24, all cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land
ownership awards, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DAR Sec. He or she takes jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of titles
issued under any agrarian reform program, whether registered with the Land Registration Authority or not.

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At the time of the Complaint’s filing, the DAR Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure governed the jurisdiction of
the DAR Adjudication Board. Rule II provided that adjudications have exclusive original jurisdiction over
registered certificates of land ownership award and emancipation patents, while the DAR Adjudication Board has
appellate jurisdiction.

However, it is not sufficient that the controversy simply involves the cancellation of a certificate of land ownership
award already registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). What is of primordial consideration is the
existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.

Indeed, the emancipation patents involved here have already been registered with the LRA, and the grant of the
Complaint filed by respondents will result in the cancellation of these registered emancipation patents.
Nonetheless, respondents primarily assailed in their Complaint the land coverage under the Operation Land
Transfer Program because the original owner, Cabahug, had not been notified of it. The complaint therefore, is
essentially an Operation Land Transfer protest, which is an agrarian law implementation case belonging to the
DAR Secretary’s Jurisdiction.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

107
Jurisdiction

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of Communications

G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
Leonen, J.

To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for the
recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the
principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of
money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review filed by First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. (First Sarmiento) assailing the
Decision and Order of RTC. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) a loan, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage, claiming that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the
principal amount and accrued interest on the loan.

First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with the Regional Trial Court.
However, the Executive Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged
properties’ tax declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees. First Sarmiento then filed an “Urgent
Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation” with
the Executive Judge. The Executive Judge ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate
mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, First Sarmiento was able to file its Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage.

In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order), PBCOM asserted that the
Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento’s Complaint because the action for
annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market
value of the mortgaged properties. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed First Sarmiento’s Complaint ruling that the
court never acquired jurisdiction for First Sarmiento’s failure to pay for docket fees.

Petitioner contends that its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage has a subject incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it was not intended to recover ownership or possession of the mortgaged properties sold to
respondent during the auction sale.58 It insists that it had ownership and possession of the mortgaged properties
when it filed its Complaint; hence, it never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of their ownership or
possession.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento Corporation’s Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage?
2. Did the petitioner err in filing its appeal directly with the Supreme Court?

RULING:
1. Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be established. This finds
support in this Court’s repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought. Lapitan stressed that where the money
claim is only a consequence of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other

108
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the
first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of
June 11, 1901).

Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla likewise stressed that if the primary cause of action is based on a claim of
ownership or a claim of legal right to control, possess, dispose, or enjoy such property, the action is a real action
involving title to real property.

A careful reading of petitioner’s Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance
of the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over
them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered into with
respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement.

2. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court allows for a direct recourse to this Court by appeal from a judgment, final order,
or resolution of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, there is no question that a petitioner may file a verified petition for
review directly with this Court if only questions of law are at issue; however, if both questions of law and of facts
are present, the correct remedy is to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, the
underlying question for this Court’s resolution pertains to jurisdiction, or to be more precise, whether the Regional
Trial Court attained jurisdiction over petitioner’s Complaint with the amount of docket fees paid.

Considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law, petitioner did not err in filing its appeal directly
with this Court pursuant to law and prevailing jurisprudence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

109
Jurisdiction

Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
Leonen, J.

Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier’s official capacity. If
a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before the
civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 141332. The Court of Appeals found that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio)
was by virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan), SSgt. Osorio was
charged in two (2) Informations before Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of
the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan).

Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011. SSgt. Osorio was arrested by
Colonel Herbert Yambing and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine
Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.

Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional
Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly “service-connected.” In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman
had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case
because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.

The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio’s confinement was “by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial process.
the Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. SSgt. Osorio’s Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in the Court of Appeals February 22, 2016 Resolution.

On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari. SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being
illegally deprived of his liberty because he was charged with an “inexistent offense.” He argues that kidnapping
and serious illegal detention can only be committed by a private person, not by a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio adds that only courts-martial have
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide a criminal case against him.

ISSUES:
1. Was the writ of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio’s proper remedy?
2. Does civil court may take cognizance of a criminal case against a soldier on active duty?

RULING:
1. No. Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,

110
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest45 based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court

2. The Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of the kidnapping case against him.

Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal Code, civil courts shall have the authority to
hear, try, and decide the case.

Under this Section, the only time courts-martial may assume jurisdiction is if, before arraignment, the civil court
determines that the offense is “service-connected.” These service-connected offenses are found in Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War.

SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code.[ Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by the
Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping. 53 The processes which the trial court
issued, therefore, were valid.

Contrary to SSgt. Osorio’s claim, the offense he committed was not service-connected. The case filed against
him is none of those enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles
of War.

Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to detain a
person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the detention. Without these
legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is considered a “private
individual.” The public officer becomes liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion
perpetua, not with arbitrary detention punished with significantly lower penalties.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions involved in this case were not amended.

111
Jurisdiction

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint for
reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

FACTS:
Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a land in Cebu This property
included two lots. Ciriaco sold the two lots to Victoria Po. Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children
(Mariano Heirs). Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989
renouncing his interest over the two Lots [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto.” In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807. The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By
way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in
which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration
for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.

In 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes. Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue
City Regional Trial Court, acting as land registration court. The case was raffled to Branch 28. The trial court
granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately
subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages. The complaint
was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses
Po. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October
31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue
that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po
is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals that has this
jurisdiction. They also contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are
indispensable parties.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po’s complaint
(2) Whether the land registration court’s finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the
Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
(3) whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should
be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
(4) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties

RULING:
(1) Yes. The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint
for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. A complaint for reconveyance is an action which
admits the registration of title of another party but claims that such registration was erroneous or
wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a
superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a
title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due
process of law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is
issued. The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land

112
which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they acquired the property
from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had the property
registered without their knowledge and through fraud. Thus, they sought to recover the property and to
cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an order for the
defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief prayed for may be
granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner
rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction. An action for annulment
of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to lack of
due process of law. The remedy is premised in the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the
title that is issued. Title that is invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the
decision of a Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on the
merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on the
merits is properly alleged and proven.

Considering the Spouses Aboitiz’s fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po’s knowledge and the
latter’s assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz’ s title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of
judgment.

(2) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces two
(2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under
Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based on “the
same claim, demand, or cause of action.” It applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final
judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was “rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties”; and (d) there is “identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action” between the first and second actions. Res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the
same parties involving different causes of action.Its effect is to bar “the relitigation of particular facts or
issues” which have already been adjudicated in the other case.

In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They contend that they
were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove their claim over the property.
Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed
of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco’s favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their
favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria’s name. Additionally, they also submitted their
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz. These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of
Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration
court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po.

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po the
remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over
the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in
the land registration case.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property.
Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh these
pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound
simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.

An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his
or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of
ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full

113
opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from
any other claim of the adverse party on the property.

However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

(3) Yes. This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the
scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An appeal under Rule 45 must raise
only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence or the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are
accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.

The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial
Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter’s testimony about Mariano’s sale
of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco’s sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoria.

Furthermore, with regard to the allegations of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting
certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution,
and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized
document, the party questioning it must present “clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant
evidence.”

(4) It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests
in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured byany ruling
of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this
Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest
has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES IN RULING:

The amendments in civil procedure and evidence will not affect the ruling in this case since there was merely a
reiteration of the previously amended rules.

114
Jurisdiction

Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.

In criminal cases, the penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court’s jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the
reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA denying petitioner’s Antonio
Garcia’s motion for reconsideration.

Antonio Garcia, as the seller, and Ferro Chemicals Inc (FCI) as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute sale and
purchase of shares of stock. The deed was for the sale of shares of stock in various corporation in the name of
Garcia. The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stocks from being sold at public auction
to pay obligations of Garcia.

A deed of repurchase over the same was entered into between Garcia and FCI under which Garcia can redeem
the properties sold within the end of 180 day period. Before the period lapsed, Garcia exercised the right however,
FCI did not agree to the repurchase prompting him to file an action for specific performance and annulment of
transfer shares.

In September, an information was filed against Garcia before RTC charging with estafa for allegedly
misrepresenting to FCI that the shares were free from all liens and encumbrances. RTC acquitted Garcia for
insufficiency of evidence.

FCI filed an MR which was denied by RTC. FCI appealed the decision to CA as to the civil aspect of the case. A
petition for certiorari was also filed with SC seeking to annul the decision acquitting Garcia.

FCI argued that the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
certification against forum shopping signed by Ramon Gracia as president of CI disclosed that the notice of
appeal was filed “with respect to the civil action of the case.”

ISSUE:
1. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Does the filing of notice of appeal before the CA and the petition for certiorari assailing the same decision
amount to forum shopping?

RULING:
1. RTC did not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases,
the penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court’s jurisdiction.

The information charging Garcia with violation of article 318 of RPC has imposable penalty of arresto
mayor or imprisonment for a period of 1 month and 1 day to six months. When the information was filed
on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by
Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the case.

In the case of Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals the court held:

“Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by
the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case[.]”

2. There is forum shopping. The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata

115
in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive
of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court decision.
This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled “Notice
of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case).” The “civil aspect of the
case” referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed
to make a reservation before the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules on jurisdiction and forum shopping are not affected by amendments in the Revised
Rules.

116
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

Amoguis v. Ballado
G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018
Leonen, J.

A party is estopped from claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when: (1) there was a statutory right in favor
of the claimant; (2) the statutory right was not invoked; (3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the
claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction; (4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative
relief from the court without jurisdiction; (5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum
possesses subject matter jurisdiction; (6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the
forum and the claimant’s implicit waiver.

FACTS:
Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory
injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney’s fees against St. Joseph Realty who supposedly
rescinded their contracts of sale of lots. It appears that St. Joseph Realty already sold the lots to petitioners.

In their Answer, St. Joseph Realty argued that had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and that jurisdiction was
properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The case was archived in 1989 without
prejudice, pending the submission of a settlement by the parties. Five (5) years later, on 8 April 1994, the case
was revived upon Spouses Ballado’s motion.

It was only 1996 that Ballado Spouses were finally able to present their evidence in chief. The RTC ruled in favor
of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers. St. Joseph Realty and the
Amoguis Brothers appealed the RTC’s decision with the CA. Notably, they did not raise the issue of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, CA discussed the issue on jurisdiction, and ruled that the subject matter of the case involved
subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners estopped from questioning the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction?

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. Laches had already set in.

According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive original jurisdiction for specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman is lodged with the HLURB. The Ballado Spouses’ Complaint should have been filed
before it. The HLURB also had jurisdiction over the injunction and annulment of titles sought against petitioners
as these were incidental to St. Joseph Realty’s unsound business practices. Although the RTC has no jurisdiction,
petitioners are nevertheless considered to be estopped.

A party is estopped from claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:

(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant’s implicit
waiver.

In this case, the allegations, determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of the
Complaint. The law that determines jurisdiction of the HLURB had been in place for more than a decade when
the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative
relief from the Regional Trial Court and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, there
was no valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only in the Supreme Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this has not been amended the Revised Rules.

117
Jurisdiction over the Territory

Aquino v. People
G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Criminal acts are regarded to have been committed within the province or city where the appellant was found
and arrested.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA September 4, 2013 Decision and March 19, 2015 Resolution
which dismissed 3 out of the 7 cases against Maria Fe Cruz Aquino y Velasquez (Aquino) for lack of jurisdiction.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed her guilt under Section 19, paragraph c(2) of Republic Act No. 8239 for
Criminal Case Nos. 97-161314 to 97-161317.7 separate Informations were filed against Aquino before the RTC
of Manila charging her with 3 counts of violation of Section 19, paragraph (b)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 and 4
counts of violation of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239

On November 3, 1997, Vice Consul Ted Archibal (Archibal) of the Anti-Fraud Unit of the United States Embassy
received a call from the non-immigrant visa section through a consular officer, who suspected that the documents
submitted by a female applicant with two (2) minor children were fraudulent. Aquino was later identified as the
female applicant. The RTC found Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all offenses charged.

On appeal, the CA modified the RTC’s decision According to the CA, the Informations for Criminal Case Nos.
97-161311 to 97-161313 should have been filed before the RTC of Pasay City, and not of Manila. The violations
of Section 19, paragraph (b)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 were committed in Pasay City since the passport
applications were filed with the Department of Foreign Affairs Office in Pasay City. Hence, the CA dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 97-161311 to 97-161313 for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, the CA noted that there was an
error in the designation of the offense charged. Aquino should have been charged under paragraph (c)2, instead
of paragraph (c)1, of Republic Act No. 8239. The latter pertains to the act of forging and using the forged
documents while the former concerns “willfully or knowingly uses or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for
use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document

ISSUES:
1. Did the constitutional right of the accused to due process and the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation violated?
2. Does RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
1. No, petitioner’s claim is erroneous. Petitioner argues that her due process rights were violated because the
Information charged her under paragraph (c)1, which provides:

“1. Falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates or alters any passport or travel document or any
supporting document for a passport application, with the intent of using the same … “

She claims that the Information only alleges forgery and does not directly allege that she “willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously used” the forged documents. On the contrary, the Information reads:

Herein accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously FORGE . . . and used the same
as a supporting document in the accused’s application for a U.S. Visa in flagrant violation of the aforesaid
law. (Emphasis supplied.)

A basic reading of the Information shows that “use” of the forged documents was also alleged. The Information
was couched in parallel structure. In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, this court reiterated the variance doctrine,
axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or
information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given by the
fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in
the body of the information.

118
The RTC correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 4 counts of violation of Section 19,
paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 and not paragraph (c)2 as found by the Court of Appeals.

The elements of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 are:

1. The accused forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered any passport or travel document or any passport
validly issued, which has become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed by law; and

2. The accused used, uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document or any passport validly issued which has
become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed by law.

All the elements are present.

2. Yes, while the Petitioner argues that all the essential elements of the crime took place in the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Pasay City, and therefore, is under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.
Clearly, however, the second element of the offense, the intent to use, was committed in the premises of the
United States Embassy in Manila. Criminal acts are regarded to have been committed within the province or
city where the appellant was found and arrested.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because jurisdiction and criminal procedure were not part of the amendments of the rules.

119
Rule 1, Sec. 6

Malixi v. Baltazar
G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing their case nor are they
fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect to
procedural rules are promulgated with the objective of a more efficient judicial system. However, time and again,
this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC, praying that the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals and the Decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) be reversed and set aside.

In their Complaint, petitioners prayed before the CSC that respondent Dr. Baltazar be held administratively liable
for gross misconduct and that she be dismissed from service by reason of her invalid appointment. The CSC
dismissed the administrative complaint of herein petitioners Dr. Jose L. Malixi (Dr. Malixi), et.al. against herein
respondent Dr. Glory V. Baltazar (Baltazar) for violating the rule on forum shopping. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners on procedural grounds.

In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed out four (4) procedural infirmities: (1) the dates when the assailed
Decision was received and when [a Motion for Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not indicated; (2) the
attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies; (3) petitioner’s
counsel’s [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not indicated; and (4) there are no proofs
of competent evidence of identities.

ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing petitioners’ appeal by reason of their failure to comply with
procedural rules?

RULING:
No. Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural rules in the
adjudication of disputes has been reiterated in numerous cases. Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not
made to discourage litigants from pursuing their case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the
Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the
objective of a more efficient judicial system.

Time and again, this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice.
Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes v. Hon. Quijano
Padilla, citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of procedural rules. First,
Dr. Baltazar’s designation as Officer-In-Charge of Bataan General Hospital was signed by then DOH Sec. Duque,
as well as the Memorandum of Agreement which served as her secondment. Duque was later appointed as CSC
Chairman and signed the resolution dismissing petitioner’s complaint against Dr. Baltazar. Clearly, a conflict of
interest existed when the public officer authorizing the secondment of respondent was also the same person
dismissing the complaint questioning respondent’s secondment. Second, resolving the merits of the case would
“give more efficacy to the constitutional mandate on the accountability of public officers and employees.”

Furthermore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should avoid dismissal of cases based
merely on technical grounds. Judicial economy requires the prosecution of cases “with the least cost to the
parties” and to the courts’ time, effort, and resources.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there was no change in this Rule.

120
Rule 1, Sec. 6

Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises

G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

Procedural rules must be faithfully followed and dutifully enforced. Still, their application should not amount to
“placing the administration of justice in a straightjacket.” An inordinate fixation on technicalities cannot defeat
the need for a full, just, and equitable litigation of claims.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the assailed Resolutions of the CA
be reversed and set aside, and that the CA be directed to give due course to the dismissed appeal of petitioners.

Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). It assailed the cancellation of its transfer certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new
titles to petitioners. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties,
in violation of the just compensation requirement under P.D. No. 27, as amended. Thus, it prayed for the recovery
of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners’ transfer certificates of title. Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M.
Diloy (Regional Adjudicator Diloy) noted that there was nothing in the records to show that just compensation
was fixed or paid for the parcels. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB. DARAB initially reversed the decision of
Diloy but respondents filed an MR, which was granted. DARAB justified its ruling by saying that Larrazabal
Enterprises had been denied due process when the parcels were taken from it without having been given just
compensation.

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. The assailed dismissal
was due to several technical defects. First was an inconsistency between the listing of petitioners’ names in their
prior Motion for Extension of Time and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification
and certification of non-forum shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was
the non-inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal
Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last
was petitioners’ counsel’s failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal justified by the errors noted by the Court of Appeals?

RULING:
NO. The dismissal of the appeal was not justified by the errors. Procedural rules “are tools designed to facilitate
the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.” They provide
a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are
not to be ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a
“policy of liberal construction.”

Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to properly ventilate
and argue his or her case, “free from the constraints of technicalities.” Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that justice is better served.

In this case, the Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively ventilate and
argue their case. Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been impelled
by the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate issues of the
application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and just compensation.
The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an indication that the matters at
stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on mere technicalities. The better part of its
discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules did not affect the above-mentioned provisions.

121
Liberal Construction of Other Rules of Procedure

Metrobank and Trust Co. v. G&P Builders, Inc.

G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
Leonen, J.

The lapse of the periods in Rule 4, Section II of the Interim Rules does not automatically result in the dismissal
of the petition for corporate rehabilitation. This is in line with the liberal construction given to the rules governing
corporate rehabilitation.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the CA Decision which reversed and set aside the order of the rehabilitation court
allowing the withdrawal of the P15M deposit with petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank).

On March 17, 2003, G & P Builders, Inc. (G & P) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation alleging, among others, that it
“obtained a loan from Metrobank and mortgaged 12 parcels of land as collateral.” However, while the
rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Metrobank and G & P executed a Memorandum of Agreement (first
MOA), where the parties agreed that 4 out of the 12 parcels of land mortgaged would be released and sold. The
sale was made in an amount of P15M. In 2006, Metrobank sold G & P’s loan account for P10M to Elite Union
Investments Limited (Elite Union). Before the rehabilitation court could grant the motions, G & P, Elite Union, and
Spouses Victor and Lani Paras executed a Memorandum of Agreement (second MOA). Elite Union sold all its
rights, titles, and interests over G & P’s account to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras for the amount of P10M. G &
P and Elite Union filed a Joint Motion for the court to approve the second MOA. They also prayed that partial
judgment be rendered based on the agreement. The rehabilitation court granted the Motion and rendered a
Partial Judgment based on the agreement.

G & P filed a Motion for the Release of Unapplied Deposit with Metrobank. Metrobank opposed the Motion and
claimed that the deposit was not covered by the contract transferring G & P’s loan obligation to Elite Union. The
rehabilitation court granted G & P’s Motion and ordered the release of unapplied deposit with Metrobank. The
CA reversed and set aside the Order of the rehabilitation court. According to the CA, G & P has no interest nor
personality in asking for the release of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses Victor and
Lani Paras. Further, the petition should have been dismissed outright since the assailed April 2, 2007 Order was
a mere interlocutory order and could not be assailed through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:
1. Is an order approving the motion for release of unapplied deposit considered an interlocutory order?
2. Did the trial court act beyond its jurisdiction when it allowed the release and withdrawal of the P15M beyond
the 18-month period provided under the interim rules?

RULING:
1. Yes, because the order pertained to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15M deposit as proceeds of the
sale of properties that secured respondent G & P’s loan obligation. An interlocutory order does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides for the mode of appeal in cases
involving corporate rehabilitation, all decisions and final orders rendered by the trial court shall be appealed to
the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature. They pertained to an incidental
matter: entitlement to the P15M deposit as proceeds of the sale of properties that secured respondent G & P’s
loan obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding before the commercial court concerns the approval of the
rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules. Considering that the assailed Order merely ordered the release of
funds from a depository bank and did not completely dispose of the case but left something else to be done by
the court, the order assailed is merely interlocutory. It is unappealable and cannot be assailed via the instant
petition for review under Rule 43.

Therefore, petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals
instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the proper remedy against
an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal.

122
2. No, because the said issue was never raised before the CA. The issue that was brought before and resolved
by the Court of Appeals pertained only to the rightful person entitled to the P15,000,000.00 deposit. Further, while
under Rule 4, Section II of the Interim Rules the rehabilitation court must act on the rehabilitation plan within 18
months from the date of filing of the petition, the lapse of the periods does not automatically result in the dismissal
of the petition for corporate rehabilitation. This is in line with the liberal construction given to the rules governing
corporate rehabilitation.

In this case, the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan within the maximum period prescribed under the Interim
Rules cannot be attributed wholly to the trial court. The parties, including Elite Union, entered into multiple
agreements in relation to the loan obligation of G & P. Petitioner is estopped in assailing the trial court Orders
when it availed itself of several extensions of time, whether directly or indirectly, during the rehabilitation
proceedings. Moreover, petitioner has no standing to question this court’s jurisdiction because it sold G & P’s
loan account to Elite Union, and was substituted as creditor by Elite Union. Hence, at the time the Orders were
issued, petitioner was not a party to the suit anymore, with rights dependent on the outcome of the corporate
rehabilitation proceedings.

Therefore, considering that the said issue was never raised before the CA, the court acted within its discretion in
issuing the assailed order during the rehabilitation proceedings.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case are not affected by the 2019 amendments.

123
Rule 2, Sec. 2

Manila Electric Co. v. Nordec Philippines

G.R. Nos. 196020 & 196116, April 18, 2018
Leonen, J.

The beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against distribution utility. A distribution utility
is mandated to strictly comply with the legal requisites before disconnecting an electric supply due to the serious
consequences this disconnection may have on the consumer. In Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Chua, it
was the beneficial users who were awarded damages due to the unjust disconnection of the electric supply, even
though the service contract with Meralco was registered in the name of another person.

FACTS:
Meralco was contracted to supply electricity to Marvex Industrial Corporation (Marvex) It installed metering
devices at Marvex’s premises. Marvex was billed according to the monthly electric consumption recorded in its
meter. Meralco service inspectors inspected Marvex’s electric metering facilities and found that the main meter
terminal and cover seals had been tampered with. During a second inspection, Meralco found that the metering
devices were tampered with again. Subsequently, Meralco assessed Marvex a differential billing. Meralco sent
demand letters and disconnected Marvex’s electric service when it did not pay.

Meralco conducted another inspection of Nordec’s premises in the presence of Nordec’s president, Dr. Malvar.
The inspecting group observed that there were irregularities in Nordec’s metering devices.
The RTC dismissed Nordec’s original complaint and second supplemental complaint. It held Nordec liable for
violating its Terms and Conditions of Service with Meralco, such that Meralco was justified in disconnecting its
electric service. There was also no contractual relationship between Nordec and Meralco, since the service
contract was between Meralco and Marvex. Thus, Nordec had no cause of action against Meralco. On appeal,
the RTC Decision was set aside. The CA held that there was a contractual relationship between Nordec and
Meralco. It found that after the service contract between Meralco and Marvex, Nordec bought Marvex from the
Development Bank of the Philippines. Thus, Nordec stepped into Marvex’s shoes and assumed its rights and
obligations as its assignee or successor-in-interest. As Marvex’s right to receive electricity is not intransmissible,
it was deemed to have been transmitted to Nordec. Moreover, Meralco’s continued supply of electricity to Nordec
and Nordec’s payment for this supply indicate that there was an implied contract existing between these two (2)
parties. Meralco argues that Nordec was not Marvex’s assignee or successor-in-interest. It maintains that the
service contract was never transferred in Nordec’s name. As such, at the time Nordec filed its complaint against
Meralco, it had no authority to act on Marvex’s behalf.

ISSUE:
Does Nordec Philippines have a cause of action against Manila Electric Company?

RULING:
Cause of action “is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.” For a cause of action to exist,
there must be, first, a plaintiff’s legal right; second, defendant’s correlative obligation; and third, an injury to the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s violation of plaintiff’s right.

The beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against this distribution utility. In Manila Electric
Company v. Spouses Chua, it was the beneficial users who were awarded damages due to the unjust
disconnection of the electric supply, even though the service contract with Meralco was registered in the name
of another person.

Further, Meralco is deemed to have knowledge of the fact that Nordec was the beneficial user of Marvex’s service
contract with Meralco. It admits that the inspections of the metering devices were conducted in the presence of
Nordec’s maintenance personnel and with the consent of its manager. It further admits that it corresponded with
Nordec regarding the differential billing, and entertained Nordec’s demand for an explanation on the finding of
tampering and the recomputation of the amount to be paid by Nordec. Clearly, Meralco knew that it was dealing
with Nordec as the beneficial user of the electricity supply.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provision used in this case was not amended.

124
Rule 2, Sec. 2

Villamor, Jr. v. Umale

G.R. No. 172843 & 172881, September 24, 2014
Leonen, J.

A wrong to the corporation does not necessarily create an individual cause of action.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Alfredo Villamor
Jr., (Villamor) and the other directors of Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) assailing the decision of the CA placing
PPC under receivership and appointed an interim management committee for the corporation as prayed for by
respondent Hernando Balmores (Balmores) thereafter substituted in the present case by John Umale (Umale).

This is a consolidation of 2 cases. The cases stemmed from an incident wherein Villamor as representative of
PCC did not account for the checks constituting the rentals and goodwill money he received from PPC’s sub-
lessee, MC Home Depot. Balmores, as director and stockholder of PCC, he informed PPC’s directors (petitioners
in the first case) of the incident and expressed that Villamor should deliver and account for PPC the checks. Due
to the directors’ inaction, Balmores filed an intra-corporate controversy against PPC’s directors for their alleged
device or scheme amounting to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the interest of the corporation and its
stockholders. Balmores prayed that a receiver be appointed as well as for the accounting and remittance to PPC
of the MC Home Depot checks or their proceeds. The RTC denied Balmore’s prayer for appointment of receiver.
On appeal, the CA gave due course to Balmores’s prayer.

PPC’s directors argued that the CA erred in characterizing respondent Balmores’ suit as a derivative suit because
of his failure to implead PPC as party in the case. Hence, the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation,
and the appointment of a receiver or management committee is not valid. According to them, in case the
appointment is a proper, it is the RTC only and not the CA that must appoint them. Meanwhile, Villamor argued
that PPC’s entitlement to the checks or their proceeds was still in dispute. He further argued that Villamor also
argued that the CA’s order to place PPC under receivership and to appoint a management committee does not
endanger PPC’s assets because the MC Home Depot checks were not the only assets of PPC. Therefore, it
would not affect the operation of PPC or result in its paralysation.

On the other hand, respondent Balmores argued that Villamor’s and the directors’ petitions raise questions of
facts, which cannot be allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45. On the appointment of a receiver or
management committee, he stated that the very practice of waiving assets and income for no consideration can
in fact lead, not only to the paralyzation of business, but to the complete loss or cessation of business of PPC. It
is precisely because of this fraudulent practice that a receiver/management committee must be appointed to
protect the assets of PPC from further fraudulent acts, devices and schemes.

ISSUES:
1. Was the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 the proper remedy?
2. Was the complaint subject of a derivative suit?

RULING:
1. Yes. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. There is a question of law when there is doubt
or controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there
is doubt as to the truth or falsehood of facts. The question must involve the examination of probative value of the
evidence presented.

In this case, petitioners raise issues on the correctness of the CA’s conclusions. Specifically, petitioners ask (1)
whether respondent Balmores’ failure to implead PPC in his action with the trial court was fatal; (2) whether the
Court of Appeals correctly characterized respondent Balmores’ action as a derivative suit; (3) whether the Court
of Appeals’ appointment of a management committee was proper; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals may
exercise the power to appoint a management committee. These are questions of law that may be determined
without looking into the evidence presented. The question of whether the conclusion drawn by the CA from a set
of facts is correct is a question of law, cognizable by this court.

125
2. No. Balmores’ action in the trial court failed to satisfy all the requisites of a derivative suit. He failed to
exhaust all available remedies to obtain the reliefs he prayed for. Though he tried to communicate with PPC’s
directors about the checks in Villamor’s possession before he filed an action with the trial court, respondent
Balmores was not able to show that this comprised all the remedies available under the articles of incorporation,
bylaws, laws, or rules governing PPC. Neither did respondent Balmores implead PPC as party in the case nor
did he allege that he was filing on behalf of the corporation.

Further, Balmores has no cause of action that would entitle him to the reliefs sought. A wrong to the corporation
does not necessarily create an individual cause of action. In this case, respondent Balmores did not allege any
cause of action that is personal to him. These are wrongs that pertain to PPC. Therefore, the cause of action
belongs to PPC not to Balmores or any stockholders as individuals. Only the corporation, or arguably the
stockholders as a group, is entitled to these reliefs, which should have been sought in a proper derivative suit
filed on behalf of the corporation. PPC will not be bound by a decision granting the application for the appointment
of a receiver or management committee since it was not impleaded in the complaint, the courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. On this matter, it is an indispensable party, without which, no final determination can be had.
Hence, it is not only respondent Balmores’ failure to implead PPC that is fatal to his action, as petitioners point
out. It is the fact that he alleged no cause of action that pertains personally to him that disqualifies him from the
reliefs he sought in his complaint.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended.

126
Rule 2, Sec. 4

Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. v. Presbitero, Jr.

G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015
Leonen, J.

The simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from the SC and a petition for
certiorari before the RTC violate the rules on splitting cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.

FACTS:
Through this Petition, Dynamic Builders Co. ask for prohibition with application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction over the infrastructure venture is known as the “Construction
Shoreline Protection Project.”

On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC), published an invitation to bid for the construction of a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete
seawall along the municipality’s shoreline.

It conducted a pre-bid conference attended by six (6) prospective contractors including Dynamic Builders. Later,
it recommended that it be awarded to HLJ Construction and Enterprise. Later, Dynamic Builders requested for
the pertinent bid documents but it was denied. It also informed Dynamic Builders of the post- evaluation
examination results showing Dynamic Builders’ failure in its Financial Contracting Capability. Then Mayor
Presbitero also denied its Motion for Reconsideration. Prompting Dynamic Builders to file a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement
Reform Act.

Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders led this Petition dated September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this court in relation to Republic Act No.
8975.

ISSUE:
Does the simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from this court and a petition for
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court violate the rules on splitting cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and
forum shopping?

RULING:
YES. Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by one that had already led an
action before the Regional Trial Court without violating the basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a
cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action.” Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that “if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the ling of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” The splitting of a cause of action “violate[s] the policy
against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.”

With respect to RA 8975, even when read with Presidential Decree No. 1818, does not sanction the splitting of
a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from
this court. Furthermore, this case involves a local government infrastructure project.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, as has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

127
Rule 2, Sec. 5

Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos

G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint for
declaratory relief as both are special civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue as an
intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous. The right of
Santos to inspect the books of Belo Medical Group and the appreciation for his motives to do so will necessarily
be determined by the trial court together with determining the ownership of the shares of stock under Santos’
name.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Belo Medical Group, Inc. (Belo
Medical Group) assails the Regional Trial Court December 8, 2008 Joint Resolution in Civil Case No. 08-397.
This Joint Resolution granted respondent Jose L. Santos’ (Santos) Motion to Dismiss and Belo Medical Group’s
Complaint for interpleader and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief against Santos and Victoria G.
Belo (Belo), and declared all other pending incidents as moot.

The controversy began when Belo Medical Group received a request from Jose Santos for the inspection of
corporate records. Victoria Belo objected to this request and wrote Belo Medical Group to repudiate Santos co-
ownership of her shares and his interest in the corporation, claiming that the 25 shares in his name were merely
in trust for her, as she, and not Santos, paid for these shares.

Belo Medical Group then filed a Complaint for Interpleader to compel Belo and Santos to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims. Said complaints were raffled to the special commercial court, thus classifying them as
intra-corporate. Belo prayed that the case be tried as a civil case and not as an intra-corporate controversy,
arguing that intra-corporate controversies did not include special civil actions for interpleader and declaratory
relief, and clarified that the issue of ownership of the shares of stock must first be resolved before the issue on
inspection could even be considered ripe for determination.

Instead of filing an answer, Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss. Though a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the trial court ruled that according
to the Rules of Court, motions to dismiss are allowed in interpleader cases, while the complaint for Declaratory
Relief was struck down as improper. Belo filed her Petition for Review before the CA, which was however,
dismissed. Belo Medical Group, on the other hand, directly filed its Petition for Review with this Court

ISSUES:
1) Did Belo Medical Group commit forum shopping?
2) Did Belo Medical Group use the correct mode of appeal?
3) Was the trial court correct in dismissing Belo Medical Group, Inc.’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief?

RULING:
1) No, Neither Belo nor the Belo Medical Group is guilty of forum shopping.

Belo Medical Group filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court to appeal
against the Joint Resolution of the trial court. It did not file any other petition related to the case, as indicated
in it verification and certification against forum shopping. It was Belo, a defendant in Belo Medical Groups
Complaint, who filed a separate appeal under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals primarily to protect her
counterclaims. Belo and Belo Medical Group both filed their respective Petitions for Review on January 28,
2009, the lat day within the period allowed to do so. The Court of Appeals already ruled that litis pendencia
was present when Belo and Belo Medical Group filed their respective petitions on the same date before
different fora. The two petitions involved the same parties, rights and reliefs sought, and causes of action.
This is a decision this Court can no longer disturb.

Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and deliberate violation of the rule against
forum shopping. Their prompt compliance of the certification against forum shopping appended to their
Petitions negates willful and deliberate intent.

128
2) NO. Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal.

A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc on September 14, 2004 laid down the rules on
modes of appeal in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

2. The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the
Regional Trial Court. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule
141 as amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Hence, a party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial court, purely
on questions of law, must raise these issues before the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.101 A.M.
No. 04-9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it. Based on the policy of judicial economy and for practical
considerations,102 this Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of appeal utilized. For one, it
would be taxing in time and resources not just for Belo Medical Group but also for Santos and Belo to dismiss
this case and have them refile their petitions for review before the Court of Appeals.

3) YES. At the outset, this Court notes that two cases were filed by Belo Medical Group: the Complaint for
interpleader and the Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Under Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, a joinder of cause of action is allowed, provided that it follows the conditions enumerated below:

Section 5. Joinder of Causes of Action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

xxx
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
xxx

Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint for
declaratory relief as both are special civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue as an
intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous. The right of
Santos to inspect the books of Belo Medical Group and the appreciation for his motives to do so will necessarily
be determined by the trial court together with determining the ownership of the shares of stock under Santos’
name.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 7, Sec.5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the new rules require that the proof of
authority to execute the certification should be attached to the pleading.

129
Rule 3, Sec. 1

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Spouses Ledesma

G.R. Nos. 211176 & 211583, February 6, 2019
Leonen, J.

A complaint should be dismissed outright if the complaint states no cause of action.

FACTS:
These are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari determining the liability of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilpinas (BSP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to sugar producers for the refund of excess payments
under RA No. 7202, or the Sugar Restitution Law.

Spouses Ledesma (Sps. Ledesma) were farmers engaged in sugar farming in Negros Occidental and were
among those who suffered losses in sugar farming operations due to actions of government-owned and
controlled agencies. They obtained several crop loans from PNB and after full payment of the loans, there was
an excess payment of Php 353,529.67, as admitted by PNB and as certified by COA. Sps. Ledesma filed a
complaint against BSP and PCGG, arguing that based on RA NO. 7202, the later should compensate them for
their losses and refund the excess payment from the sugar restitution fund.

The RTC dismissed Sps. Ledesma’s complaint for lack of cause of action against BSP and PNB. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) found Sps. Ledesma’s case meritorious. CA found that the Ledesma Spouses filed their
claim in accordance with the law’s implementing rules and regulations. Both the BSP and the PNB recognized
the rights of the Sps. Ledesma to the benefits of the law.

BSP and PNB filed separately their Motions for Reconsideration, both of which were denied by the CA. Hence,
they filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari before this Court.

BSP claims that it is merely a trustee of the sugar restitution fund. Since no funds have been turned over to it for
that purpose, its obligation as trustee could not even be considered to have commenced. On the other hand,
PNB further argues that respondents have no cause of action against it, for it has neither committed an act or
omission in violation of their rights nor breached whatever obligations it has toward them.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the ruling of the RTC?

RULING:
Yes, the CA committed an error in reversing the ruling of the RTC that the Complaint states no cause of action
against petitioners.

The elements of a cause of action are: (1) The existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty
on the part of the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiffs right with
consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief.

In this case, the second and third elements are lacking. Without the sugar restitution fund, petitioners have no
correlative duty to compensate respondents for their losses. They committed neither a delict nor a wrongful act
or omission in violation of respondents’ rights.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

130
Rule 3, Secs. 1, 2, & 3

Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp.

G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June 1, 2016
Leonen, J.

Atty. Roxas has no legal standing to appeal the case on RREC’s behalf based on Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Roxas is not a party litigant under Section 1. Only RREC, as the party seeking for the execution of judgment,
and the Republic, as the party opposing RREC’s claims, stand to be benefited or injured by the pending case.
Atty. Roxas is not a party-in-interest under Section 2. He has no valid interest in this case as his contingency-fee
agreement with RREC is champertous and, therefore, void. Likewise, Atty. Roxas is not a party representative
under Section 3 as he is no longer RREC’s lawyer.

FACTS:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the reclamation of the
foreshore lands along Manila Bay. On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) sued for
recovery of possession and damages with writ of preliminary injunction. This Court upheld the Republic’s
arguments. Despite the nullity of the agreement and RREC’s failure to reclaim any land, this Court awarded
RREC compensation for the work it had actually done based on quantum meruit.

RJREC and Pasay City filed before this Court a Petition seeking to declare a mistrial. This Court denied the
Petition, absent any procedural error or violation of RREC and Pasay City’s right to due process. RREC and
Pasay City were ordered, under pain of contempt, to abide by the provision on execution of judgments under
Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Once again, they were warned not to file further pleadings.

On October 24, 2000, an Entry of Judgment was issued declaring Republic v. Court of Appeals final and
executory as of July 27, 1999.

Despite this Court’s Resolutions, RREC filed Motion for Leave to re-open the case. Again, this Court expunged
the Motion from the records.

RREC moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court
issued the Writ of Execution. Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus (Sheriff De Jesus) issued a Notice of Execution and
Notice to Pay against the Republic for P49,173,064,201.17 instead of the P10.9 million ordered by this Court, to
be divided between RREC and Pasay City.

The Republic filed before the Regional Trial Court a Very Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and the
Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay but it was denied. The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari assailing the trial court’s orders and seeking injunction against the writ of execution .The Court of
Appeals granted the Petition. It ruled that Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay cannot go
beyond this Court’s judgment in Republic v. Court of Appeals.

Atty. Romeo G. Roxas (Atty. Roxas), counsel for RREC filed before this Court a Complaint against the three (3)
Court of Appeals Justices who nullified the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice. The Complaint was
for the Justices’ alleged misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, and it prayed for their disbarment. Atty. Roxas also filed a Motion for
Inhibition against the three (3) Justices. Both the Complaint and the Motion for Inhibition were filed without
RREC’s authority.

RREC terminated the services of Atty. Roxas, due to loss of confidence and breach of trust. RREC also filed a
Manifestation informing this Court that Atty. Roxas’ Complaint against the Court of Appeals Justices was filed
without RREC’s knowledge and conformity.

On August 1, 2013, Atty. Roxas filed before this Court the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 208205, referring to it
as a Petition for Review Pro Hac Vice. Although he admits that he filed his Pro Hac Vice Petition in his personal
capacity and without RREC’s authority, Atty. Roxas asserts that he is RREC’s rightful counsel.

131
ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice of Execution
and Notice to Pay as null and void?

2. Was the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing Atty. Romeo G. Roxas as rightful counsel of RREC?

RULING:
1. No.

The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice null and void. The
Republic v. Court of Appeals has long been final and executory. This Court judiciously examined and
exhaustively discussed the issues raised in RREC’s Petition. These are the same arguments now being raised.

Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an interest in the stability of that judgment.
Parties come to the courts in order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes
if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the same claims again and again. Although judicial
determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures, not through
repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents
the embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no
reason to suppose that the second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first,
the first should be left undisturbed.

This Court’s decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of remand, we cannot
allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the judgment of this Court. Neither the Regional Trial Court nor its
sheriff can, in any way, directly or indirectly, alter this Court’s Decision through a writ of execution or a notice
purporting to implement the writ.

[Sheriffs] have no capacity to vary the judgment and deviate [from the judge’s decision] based on their own
interpretation thereof. Well settled is the rule that when writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is
their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with
their mandate. It is not their duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency of the processes committed to [them] for
service as their duty to execute a valid writ is not ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard to the exercise of [one’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the sheriff [and] he [or
she] must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

The Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay went beyond the dispositive portion in Republic v. Court of Appeals.
In his Notice, Sheriff De Jesus modified our decreed amount of P10.9 million at 6% interest per annum (beginning
May 1, 1962 until fully paid) to P49.17 billion at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to 1973 and at the rate of
12% from 1974 to present, compounded.

The sheriff cannot act as a party’s agent. He or she can only act as an officer of the court which he or she
represents. Sheriffs, as agents of the law, are duty-bound to fulfill their mandates with utmost diligence and due
care. In executing the court’s order, they cannot afford to go beyond its letter, lest they prejudice “the integrity of
their office and the efficient administration of justice.”

2. No.

Atty. Roxas’ Pro Hac Vice Petition should be denied for two (2) reasons: first, it is a wrong remedy; and second,
he has no legal standing to appeal on RREC’s behalf.

In his desire to win the reclamation case and take his slice of the pie from the judgment award, Atty. Roxas
resorted to prosecuting cases against the Court of Appeals Justices without RREC’s knowledge and authority
and against his client’s interest.

Moreover, Atty. Roxas has no legal standing to appeal the case on RREC’s behalf based on Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. Atty. Roxas is not a party litigant under Section 1. Only RREC, as the party seeking for the execution
of judgment, and the Republic, as the party opposing RREC’s claims, stand to be benefited or injured by the

132
pending case. Atty. Roxas is not a party-in-interest under Section 2. He has no valid interest in this case as his
contingency-fee agreement with RREC is champertous and, therefore, void. Likewise, Atty. Roxas is not a party
representative under Section 3 as he is no longer RREC’s lawyer.

Thus, insofar as RREC and the Republic are concerned, Atty. Roxas is a complete stranger to this case.

Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals by certiorari before this Court may be had only by
the party to the case. Atty. Roxas is neither a party nor a counsel for any of the parties here. He cannot claim
legal fees by filing a petition for review on behalf of a non-client, which has moved to dismiss/expunge his petition
pro hac vice.

The action he pursued before this Court is not an available recourse under applicable laws or the Rules of Court.
He is pursuing the wrong remedy.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because the doctrine discussed by this case has no affect and does not tackle the amended rules of
the Revised Rules.

133
Rule 3, Sec. 2

Piedad v. Bobilles
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in interest. Petitioners claim to be
Piedad’s children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the action begun by their father.
Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad’s rightful heirs not only by the Court of Appeals but also
by this Court. This Court upheld petitioners’ personality to sue in the case of Heirs of Simeon Piedad and sees
no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of
their father’s original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review filed by the Heirs of Simeon Piedad assailing the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals.

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria
and Mariano Bobilles. The RTC Branch 9 of Cebu City and the CA ruled in favor of Piedad and declared the deed
of sale as Null and Void. The CA’s decision became final and executory and the RTC Judge ordered the issuance
of a writ of demolition to Sheriff Bellones and ordered respondents to vacate the premises on December 2001.
Candelaria, on the same day, filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad
which was then raffled to another branch and was heard independently by RTC Branch 59 of Toledo City under
Judge Villarin. Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing a writ of demolition which was
granted by the Executive Judge Estrera of the RTC of Toledo City. The injunction case was then consolidated
with the probate case, upon motion of Candelaria under Judge Villarin. Because of Judge Villarin’s failure to hear
the case, it was transferred to RTC Branch 29 of Toledo City. On July 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed a Motion
Praying to Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Demolition of the Sept. 1998 Decision.

RTC Branch 29 ruled that since more than 12 years has passed when the decision became final and executory,
the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival of judgement, not a mere motion. The CA
dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy.

ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad?
(2) Should the Court allow petitioner’s motion to revive judgement instead of the required independent action
and despite the prescription period?

RULING:
(1) Yes. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in interest: “A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.” Rule 3, Section 16 then provides for the process of substitution of parties when the
original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.

Petitioners claim to be Piedad’s children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the action
begun by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad
upon his death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment.

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad’s rightful heirs not only by
the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. This Court upheld petitioners’ personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon
Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely
an offshoot of their father’s original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.

(2) Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party may move for the
execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of judgment.
If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced
by instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.
In dismissing the motion for revival, the Regional Trial Court adopted a strict interpretation of Rule 39, Section 6

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of the Rules of Court because the proper remedy was supposedly an action for revival of judgment, not just a
mere motion. The Court of Appeals, in turn, also dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy. The lowers
courts are mistaken.

In David v. Ejercito, for reasons of equity, this Court treated the motion for execution, alias writ of execution, and
motion for demolition as substantial compliance with the requirement to file an action to revive judgment if no
motion for execution is filed within five (5) years from the date of its entry of judgment. David pointed out that
petitioner’s deliberate efforts at delaying the execution of a final and executory judgment should not be condoned.

This Court, in a long line of cases, has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if
prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage.
This Court has also interrupted the tolling of the prescriptive period or deducted from the prescriptive period when
the peculiar circumstances of the case or the dictates of equity called for it.

It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and respondents was declared null and void for
being a forgery, and that the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory as early
as November 1, 1998. However, due to respondents’ schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years
to prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to
an empty victory and petitioners’ continued struggle for their rights.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because no changes were made on these Rules.

135
Rule 3, Sec. 2

Lao, Jr. v. Local Government Unit of Cagayan De Oro City

G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.

The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into by the city
mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local government unit which stands
to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in this case. The city councilors merely represent
the city in the suit.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the March 30, 2009
Resolution and May 11, 2009 Order of Branch 17, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan De Oro City. This petition is
filed by Barangay Captain Enrico D. Salcedo (Salcedo) of Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City and Cagayan De Oro City
Councilors Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. (Lao), Roger A. Abaday (Abaday), and Zaldy O. Ocon (Ocon) (collectively,
petitioners).

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed an ordinance which approved See’s unsolicited proposal “for the
redevelopment of Agora Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable Landing
Area.” The redevelopment would be under a build-operate transfer scheme.

At the time, the City Mayor was Vicente Y. Emano. On January 27, 2009, Mega Farm, through See, and the then
newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed the Build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the Redevelopment of Agora.

Petitioners filed their Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Re-Development of Agora Market and Terminal
Contract Under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Scheme and All Ordinances, Resolutions and Motions of the City
Council Relative Thereto with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) & Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
with Damages with the RTC of Misamis Oriental. This complaint was filed against City Government of Cagayan
De Oro and the incumbent Cagayan De Oro City officials, in their personal and official capacities. In their
complaint, petitioners, as public officers and in their personal capacity, questioned the execution and the contents
of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers
between Mega Farm and the City Government of Cagayan De Oro.

The Regional Trial Court held that the Agora Complex BOT Contract, which was covered by Republic Act No.
6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, was considered a national government project under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8975. Due to this classification of the project and petitioners’ failure to prove that the exceptions
applied, the trial court was prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions over
the project. Lao et al., filed a motion for reconsideration which was however denied. Regional Trial Court ruled
that the validity of the Agora Complex BOT Contract was not a constitutional issue and that petitioners were “not
parties to the contract where they may suffer actual or threatened injury.”

ISSUES:
1) Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint due to petitioners’ lack of personality to file a suit?
2) Was it proper for the petitioners to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 directly with the SC?

RULING:
1) NO. The trial court’s dismissal was incorrect.
The dismissal by the trial court of the complaint due to petitioners’ lack of personality to file suit is
erroneous. Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may file a case to question
a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without the City Council’s authority.

Rule 3. Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines the real party in interest that may institute a case:
Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.

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The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into by the city
mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local government unit which stands
to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in this case. The city councilors merely represent
the city in the suit.

As explained in City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon:

It seems clearly self-evident from the foregoing recitation of the undisputed
antecedents and factual background that the lower court gravely erred in issuing its dismissal
order on the ground of plaintiffs’ alleged lack of interest or legal standing as city councilors or
as taxpayers to maintain the case at bar. The lower court founded its erroneous conclusion on
the equally erroneous premise of citing and applying Article 1397 of the Civil Code that “the
action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted (only) by all who are thereby obliged
principally or subsidiarily.”

The lower court’s fundamental error was in treating plaintiffs’ complaint as a personal
suit on their own behalf and applying the test in such cases that plaintiffs should show personal
interest as parties who would be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Plaintiffs’ suit is
patently not a personal suit. Plaintiffs clearly and by the express terms of their complaint filed
the suit as a representative suit on behalf and for the benefit of the city of Cebu.

2) NO. Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is permitted when only questions
of law are involved. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to
a particular set of facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of facts be determined
or evidence be received and examined. Matters of evidence more properly pertain to the trial courts as
the trier of facts and the appellate courts as the reviewer of facts.

As correctly pointed out by public respondents, among the four (4) errors that petitioners assign
to the Regional Trial Court, two (2) are questions of fact. The nullity of the Agora Complex BOT Contract
due to the mayor’s alleged lack of authority to sign it and the local government’s alleged failure to
determine the project proponent’s financial capacity require the reception and examination of evidence.
These issues are questions of fact not cognizable in a petition for review under Rule 45. Nonetheless,
whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly denied the issuance of the temporary restraining order
and dismissed the complaint due to its lack of jurisdiction and petitioners’ standing is a question of law
which may be resolved by this Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions cited in this case were not affected by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

137
Rule 3, Sec. 2

Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp.

G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

Persons not privy to a contract are not the real parties in interest to question its validity through a petition for
injunction. Actions must be instituted by the real parties in interest; otherwise, the action may be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction under
Sec. 78 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).

Petitioner Power Generation Employees Association-NPC (PGEA-NPC) seeks to permanently enjoin the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement jointly executed by the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM), which provides: (1) that
NAPOCOR would perform “all functions and services necessary to successfully and efficiently operate, maintain,
and manage” power plants, generation assets, or facilities until its transfer or turnover to PSALM; (2) that
NAPOCOR must submit its proposed budget to PSALM for review and approval; and (3) that all revenues related
to the maintenance and operation of power plants, generation assets, or facilities would be considered as
PSALM’s properties.

ISSUES:
1. May petitioners file a petition for injunction under Sec. 78 of the EPIRA, of a permanent nature, in view of
the ruling of the SC in Carpio-Morales v. CA?
2. Can petitioners validly question the agreement despite not being privy thereto?

RULING:
1. Yes, Carpio-Morales dealt only with temporary restraining orders, not permanent injunctions.

Under Sec. 78 of EPIRA, no restraint or injunction whether permanent or temporary, could be issued by any
court except by the SC. However, in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court invalidated the second
paragraph of Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14 for being unconstitutional. The assailed provision prohibited
any court, except the SC, to enjoin investigations of the Ombudsman. This Court explained in Carpio-Morales
that provisional remedies found in the Rules of Court are within this Court’s constitutional prerogative to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, all courts have
the inherent power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. When Congress
passes a law that prohibits other courts from exercising this power, it encroaches upon this Court’s power to
promulgate rules of procedure, in violation of the separation of powers. However, Carpio-Morales dealt only
with temporary restraining orders, not permanent injunctions. The injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a
mere interlocutory action by a court but a permanent remedy.

Thus, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply to this case.

2. No, petitioners, not being privy to the agreement, have no cause of action, not being real parties-in-interest.

Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, are ancillary writs
issued by the court to protect the rights of a party during the pendency of the principal action. To issue an
injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be protected. Petitioners allege that
while they were not privy to the Operation and Maintenance Agreement, they will be affected by its
implementation as NAPOCOR employees since they are “the ones engaged in the operations and
maintenance of the unsold generation plants.” The Petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR
employees will be affected by the Operation and Maintenance Agreement’s implementation. Also, petitioners
have not shown how, as NAPOCOR employees, they will be affected by respondent NAPOCOR’s
submission of its budget for respondent PSALM’s approval. Finally, petitioners have failed to show how they,
as NAPOCOR employees, will be affected by the remittance of respondent NAPOCOR’s revenues to
respondent PSALM. Actions must be instituted by the real parties in interest. Otherwise, the action may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Petitioners have not established how they will benefit by enjoining the

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implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement. They have not established the injury they will
suffer if this Agreement is not enjoined.

Thus, the petition is dismissed for lack of cause of action

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 58, in particular, the concept of (permanent) injunction, and Rule 3, Sec. 2 have not been
amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

139
Rule 3, Sec. 2

Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
Leonen, J.

The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given personality by
Section 9(b)1 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004 (the Anti-VAWC Law), to file a civil action petitioning for the issuance of a protection order for her
child.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter,
they cohabited as husband and wife. 3 months into their marriage, Maria Sheila filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
Pavlow for slight physical injuries. Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include maltreatment in
relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.

Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia issued a resolution dismissing Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint, holding that
Maria Sheila failed to substantiate her allegations. Following this, Mendenilla filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition23 for Maria Sheila’s benefit, praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order or
Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-VAWC Law. Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order
in favor of Maria Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow.

Deputy Sheriff Velasco recounted that when service of summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached
was attempted on September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country.28 Thus, summons was served instead
through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow’s own residence in Unit. Pavlow filed Omnibus
Motions30 praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla’s petition, the reconsideration of the issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order, and the suspension of the enforcement of the Temporary Protection Order. He raised as
principal ground the Regional Trial Court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over his person as summons was
purportedly not properly served on him. Judge Giron-Dizon denied Pavlow’s motion to dismiss. Following Judge
Giron-Dizon’s denial of Pavlow’s motion for reconsideration, Pavlow filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. He charged Judge Giron-Dizon with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Mendenilla’s
Petition despite the alleged improper service of summons on him. Petitioner further reasoned that Mendenilla
lacked personality to file her Petition and that her filing of a petition only after Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia
dismissed Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint was considered forum shopping.

ISSUES:
(1) Does respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla have personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection
order under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Maria Sheila Mendenilla
Pavlow?
(2) Did respondent Mendenilla engage in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance of a protection
order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was dismissed by the prosecutor?
(3) Was summons properly served on petitioner Steven R. Pavlow and jurisdiction over his person was
validly acquired?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law.
However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent
Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.

More basic, the filing of Maria Sheila’s complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her
own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level
of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of
a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila’s Complaint-Affidavit
did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding
of forum shopping by her mother.

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(2) No. The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor “cannot be considered a
valid and final judgment.” As there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by the
court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have been res
judicata — actual or looming as to bar one (1) of several proceedings on account of litis pendentia — as
to bar Mendenilla’s petition for being an act of forum shopping. Res judicata is the conceptual backbone
upon which forum shopping rests.

(3) Yes. The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order. This
prevents the latter from being a substitute for the former. Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by
which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam,
brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of
an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. A protection order is not a
procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a
substantive relief. Clearly then, summons and temporary protection orders are entirely different judicial
issuances. It is true that the latter also serves the purpose of conveying information. However, this
information pertains not to the filing of an action but merely to the schedule of an upcoming hearing. The
similarities of a summons and a protection order begin and end with their informative capacity. At no
point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary protection order is the means for acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

Furthermore, Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the
Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to
substituted service has long been held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a
contrary, restrictive view is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents
who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that,
upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have arisen.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None, same rules apply with respect to the service of summons to residents temporarily out of the country. with
regard to the criminal procedure, no change.

141
Rule 3, Sec. 2

National Power Corp. v. Provincial Government of Bataan

G.R. No. 180654 (Resolution), March 6, 2017
Leonen, J.

Petitioner is a real party in interest, which stands to gain or lose from the judgment that the trial court may render.
Petitioner had to assail the correctness of the local franchise tax assessments made against it by instituting the
complaint with the Regional Trial Court; otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.

FACTS:
For resolution is respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision, which
granted the petition of National Power Corporation (Napocor), and set aside the Court of Appeals’ Resolution.

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the respondent
Provincial Government of Bataan (the Province) for P45.9 million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. When
NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation pending the decision of the Supreme Court, the
Province then sent notices of tax due to the NPC. The NPC replied, however, that the Province has no right to
further assess because NPC had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26,
2001.

Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a “Warrant of Levy” on 14 real properties that it used to own in
Limay, Bataan. In March 2004 the Province caused their sale at public auction with itself as the winning bidder.
On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for declaration
of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Province, the
provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

On November 3, 2005 the RTC dismissed the NPC’s petition, stating that the franchise tax was not based on
ownership of property but on the NPC’s exercise of the privilege of doing business within Bataan.

The NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the Province moved to dismiss the same
for lack of jurisdiction of that court over the subject matter of the case because it was essentially a local tax case
questioning the validity of the Province’s imposition of the local franchise tax, therefore, be lodged with the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On November 27, 2007 the CA granted the Province’s motion and dismissed the petition on the ground cited.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction? Yes.
(2) Is petitioner NPC a real party in interest? Yes.

RULING:
(1) Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Republic Act No. 9282, which amended Republic Act No. 1125, took effect on April 23, 2004, and significantly
expanded the extent and scope of the cases that the Court of Tax Appeals was tasked to hear and adjudicate.
Under Section 7, paragraph (a)(3), the Court of Tax Appeals is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over, among others, appeals from the “decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.”

The case a quo is a local tax case that is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Parenthetically, the case arose from the dispute between Napocor and respondents over the purported franchise
tax delinquency of Napocor. Although the complaint filed with the trial court is a Petition for declaration of nullity
of foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, a reading of the petition shows that it
essentially assails the correctness of the local franchise tax assessments by the Provincial Government of
Bataan. Indeed, one of the prayers in the petition is for the court a quo to declare Napocor “as exempt from
payment of local franchise taxes.” Basic is the rule that allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought determine the nature of an action. In order for the trial court to resolve the complaint, the issues regarding

142
the correctness of the tax assessment and collection must also necessarily be dealt with. As correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, “the issue of the validity and legality of the foreclosure sale is essentially related to the
issue of the demandability of the local franchise tax.”

Therefore, the dismissal of Napocor’s appeal by the Court of Appeals was in order. Napocor’s procedural lapse
would have been sufficient to reconsider this Court’s decision and instead deny the instant petition. However, the
substantial merits of the case and the patent error committed by the Bataan Regional Trial Court compels this
Court to exercise its power of judicial review for purposes of judicial economy.

(2) Yes. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

In the instant case, petitioner’s complaint has sought not only the nullification of the foreclosure sale but also a
declaration from the trial court that it is exempt from the local franchise tax. The action began when respondent
ignored petitioner’s claim for exemption from franchise tax, and pursued its collection of the franchise tax
delinquency by issuing the warrant of levy and conducting the sale at public auction – where the Provincial
Government of Bataan was declared as purchaser – of the transmission assets, despite the purported prior
mutual agreement to suspend administrative remedies for the collection of taxes. The assets were sold to enforce
collection of a franchise tax delinquency against the petitioner. Petitioner thus had to assail the correctness of
the local franchise tax assessments made against it by instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial Court;
otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.

Certainly, petitioner is a real party in interest, which stands to gain or lose from the judgment that the trial court
may render.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rules are still the same.

143
Rule 3, Sec. 2

Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.

An aunt exercising substitute parental authority may be considered as a real party in interest in an action for
damages for the death of her niece.

FACTS:
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Caravel Travel and Tours International, Inc. (Caravan) prays that
the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division be reversed and set aside.

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street,
United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 195 was
travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left
and hit Reyes. Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Bautista was
Caravan’s employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes’ paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was
nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista
and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is
the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes. Summons could not be served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved
to drop Bautista as a defendant. The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion.

Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in interest.
According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially
appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not “the executor or administrator of
the estate of the deceased.” According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action
based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar’s action for damages.

ISSUES:
1. Is respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages against
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes’ death?
2. Should the petitioner be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped as a party?

RULING:
1. Yes.

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in interest
in this case.

In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for damages: that she exercised
substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes’ death was caused by the negligence of petitioner and its
driver; and that Reyes’ death caused her damage.54 Respondent properly filed an action based on quasi-delict.
She is a real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest in connection with Article
216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority and Article 233 of the
Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the
same as those of actual parents.

Both of Reyes’ parents are already deceased. Reyes’ paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The
whereabouts of Reyes’ maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or
sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed
the role of Reyes’ parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes’ custodian,
respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with
Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes’ education and provided for her personal needs. To
echo respondent’s words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.

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Respondent’s right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.

First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when Reyes
died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one’s child. It
is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent seeks to be
indemnified. Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes’ actual parents would have been capacitated
to do.

2. No.

Petitioner’s argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped as a party is
equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not depend on
the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner’s assertion would render impotent the
rationale of the motor registration law in fixing liability on a definite person.

Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rather, he was a necessary party under Rule 3, Section 8. Instead of insisting that Bautista — who was nothing
more than a necessary party — should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with
Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed with
Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case does not tackle any amended principle provided by the Revised Rules.

145
Rule 3, Sec. 2

The law firm to whom payment of retainer fees was disallowed by a COA decision is a real party in interest to
assail the same.

Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision and resolution of the Commission on Audit (COA),
which disallowed the payment of retainer fees to the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
(Laguesma).

Sometimes in 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation (Clark) engaged the services of Law firm of
Laguesma to handle the corporation’s labor cases. Laguesma furnished Clark a pro forma retainership
agreement with an undertaking to submit the same to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (GCC)
for approval. In 2005, Laguesma was informed that the COA required clearance and approval of the GCC l before
it could approve the release of the Clark’s fund to settle the legal fees due the law firm. Thereafer, Clark relayed
to the GCC the approval of payment to Laguesma on the basis of quantum meruit. COA issued “third
indorsement” denying Clark’s request for clearance which prompted Laguesma to appeal the “Third
indorsement”. On September 27, 2007, COA rendered the assailed decision denying the appeal and motion for
reconsideration. Both parties filed separate motion for reconsideration but was denied on November 5, 2008.
Hence, both filed petition for certiorari on December 19, 2008.

COA argue that it is Clark, and not Laguesma, which is the real party-in-interest since the subject of the assailed
decision and resolution was the Clark’s request for clearance to pay Laguesma its legal fees. CCOA argue that
any interest Laguesma may have in the case is merely incidental

ISSUES:
(1) Is the petition for certiorari filed on time?
(2) Is Laguesma the real party-in-interest?

RULING:
(1) No. Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60
days. However, the reglementary period of assailing decisions of the constitutional commission (COA) is
thirty days from receipt of the decision. Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of procedure provides: The petition
shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed.

Here, Laguesma received the decision of the Commission on Audit on October 16, 2007. It filed a motion
for reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It received notice of the denial of its motion on
November 20, 2008. The receipt of this notice gave Laguesma nine (9) days, or until November 29, 2008,
to file a petition for certiorari. Since November 29, 2008 fell on a Saturday, Laguesma could still have filed
on the next working day, or on December 1, 2008. It, however, filed the petition on December 19,
2008, which was well beyond the reglementary period.

Thus, the petition was filed out time. Nonetheless, the court decided to relax technical rules considering that
the case involved right of Laguesma to receive due compensation on the one hand and Clark’s duty to
prevent the unauthorized disbursement of public funds on the other.

(2) Yes, Laguesma is the real party-in-interest. Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The net effect of upholding or setting aside the assailed Commission on Audit rulings would be to either
disallow or allow the payment of legal fees to Laguesma.

146
Therefore, Laguesma stands to either be benefited or injured by the suit, or entitled to its avails. It is a real
party-in-interest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64, Section 3 – no changes because the rule did not amend this provision.
Rule 3, Section 2 – no effect because no amendment was made in this specific provision.

147
Rule 3, Sec. 7

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests in the
property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court
on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether
the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable
from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

FACTS:
Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a land in Cebu This property
included two lots. Ciriaco sold the two lots to Victoria Po. Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children
(Mariano Heirs). Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989
renouncing his interest over the two Lots [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto.” In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807. The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By
way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in
which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration
for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.

In 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes. Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue
City Regional Trial Court, acting as land registration court. The case was raffled to Branch 28. The trial court
granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately
subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages. The complaint
was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses
Po. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October
31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue
that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po
is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals that has this
jurisdiction. They also contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are
indispensable parties.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po’s complaint
(2) Whether the land registration court’s finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the
Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
(3) whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should
be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
(4) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties

RULING:
(1) Yes. The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint
for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. A complaint for reconveyance is an action which
admits the registration of title of another party but claims that such registration was erroneous or
wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a
superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a
title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of

148
jurisdiction. An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due
process of law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is
issued. The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land
which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they acquired the property
from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had the property
registered without their knowledge and through fraud. Thus, they sought to recover the property and to
cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an order for the
defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief prayed for may be
granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner
rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction. An action for annulment
of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to lack of
due process of law. The remedy is premised in the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the
title that is issued. Title that is invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the
decision of a Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on the
merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on the
merits is properly alleged and proven.

Considering the Spouses Aboitiz’s fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po’s knowledge and the
latter’s assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz’ s title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of
judgment.

(2) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces two
(2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under
Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based on “the
same claim, demand, or cause of action.” It applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final
judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was “rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties”; and (d) there is “identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action” between the first and second actions. Res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the
same parties involving different causes of action.Its effect is to bar “the relitigation of particular facts or
issues” which have already been adjudicated in the other case.

In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They contend that they
were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove their claim over the property.
Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed
of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco’s favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their
favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria’s name. Additionally, they also submitted their
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz. These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of
Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration
court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po.

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po the
remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over
the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in
the land registration case.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property.
Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh these
pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound
simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.

149
An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his
or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of
ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full
opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from
any other claim of the adverse party on the property.

However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

(3) Yes. This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the
scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An appeal under Rule 45 must raise
only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence or the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are
accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.

The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial
Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter’s testimony about Mariano’s sale
of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco’s sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoria.

Furthermore, with regard to the allegations of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting
certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution,
and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized
document, the party questioning it must present “clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant
evidence.”

(4) It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests
in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured byany ruling
of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this
Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest
has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES IN RULING:

The amendments in civil procedure and evidence will not affect the ruling in this case since there was merely a
reiteration of the previously amended rules.

150
Rule 3, Sec. 7 & 8

Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.

In an action for damages against the registered owner, the negligent driver is not an indispensable party but a
mere necessary party.

FACTS:
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Caravel Travel and Tours International, Inc. (Caravan) prays that
the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division be reversed and set aside.

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street,
United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 195 was
travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left
and hit Reyes. Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Bautista was
Caravan’s employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes’ paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was
nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista
and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is
the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes. Summons could not be served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved
to drop Bautista as a defendant. The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion.

Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in interest.
According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially
appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not “the executor or administrator of
the estate of the deceased.” According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action
based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar’s action for damages.

ISSUES:
1. Is respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages against
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes’ death?
2. Should the petitioner be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped as a party?

RULING:
1. Yes.

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in interest
in this case.

In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for damages: that she exercised
substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes’ death was caused by the negligence of petitioner and its
driver; and that Reyes’ death caused her damage.54 Respondent properly filed an action based on quasi-delict.
She is a real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest in connection with Article
216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority and Article 233 of the
Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the
same as those of actual parents.

Both of Reyes’ parents are already deceased. Reyes’ paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The
whereabouts of Reyes’ maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or
sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed
the role of Reyes’ parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes’ custodian,
respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with
Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes’ education and provided for her personal needs. To
echo respondent’s words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.

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Respondent’s right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.

First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when Reyes
died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one’s child. It
is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent seeks to be
indemnified. Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes’ actual parents would have been capacitated
to do.

2. No.

Petitioner’s argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped as a party is
equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not depend on
the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner’s assertion would render impotent the
rationale of the motor registration law in fixing liability on a definite person.

Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rather, he was a necessary party under Rule 3, Section 8. Instead of insisting that Bautista — who was nothing
more than a necessary party — should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with
Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed with
Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case does not tackle any amended principle provided by the Revised Rules.

152
Rule 3, Sec. 7

Florete, Jr. v. Florete

G.R. No. 177275, January 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

In derivative suits, the corporation concerned must be impleaded as a party. Not only is the corporation an
indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The reason given is that
the judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the
suit and may not bring a subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other
words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because
judgment must be a res ajudicata against it.

FACTS:
Spouses Marcelino Florete, Sr. and Salome Florete (now both deceased) had four (4) children: Marcelino Florete,
Jr., Maria Elena Muyco, Rogelio Florete, Sr., and Teresita Menchavez, now deceased. People’s Broadcasting
Service, Inc. (People’s Broadcasting) is a private corporation authorized to operate, own, maintain, install, and
construct radio and television stations in the Philippines.

Twenty-five percent (25%) of the corporation’s authorized capital stock were then subscribed to as follows:
Stockholder Number of Shares
Marcelino Florete, Sr. (Marcelino, Sr.) 250 shares
Salome Florete (Salome) 100 shares
Ricardo Berlin (Berlin) 50 shares
Pacifico Sudario (Sudario) 50 shares
9
Atty. Santiago Divinagracia (Divinagracia), now deceased 50 shares

Berlin and Sudario resigned from their positions as General Manager and Station Supervisor, respectively. Berlin
and Sudario each transferred 20 shares to Raul Muyco and Estrella Mirasol. After Marcelino, Sr.’s stroke, their
son, Rogelio, Sr. started managing the affairs of People’s Broadcasting. People’s Broadcasting sought the
services of the accounting and auditing firm Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co. in order to determine the ownership of
equity in the corporation.

In the meantime, Rogelio, Sr. transferred a portion of his shareholdings to the members of his immediate family,
namely: Imelda Florete, Rogelio Florete, Jr., and Margaret Ruth Florete, as well as to Diamel Corporation, a
corporation owned by Rogelio, Sr.’s family.

Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco (Marcelino, Jr. Group) filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People’s Broadcasting Service,
Inc. and All Posterior Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages against Diamel Corporation, Rogelio,
Sr., Imelda Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio Florete, Jr. (Rogelio, Sr. Group).

Regional Trial Court issued a Decision dismissing the Marcelino, Jr. Group’s Complaint. It ruled that the
Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause of action against the Rogelio, Sr. Group. It also ruled that indispensible
parties were not joined in their Complaint.

According to the trial court, the indispensable parties would include: Marcelino, Sr. and/or his estate and/or his
heirs, Salome and/or her estate and/or her heirs, Divinagracia and/or his estate and/or his successors-in-interest,
Teresita and/or her estate and/or her own successors-in-interest, the other [People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc.]
stockholders who may be actually beneficial owners and not purely nominees, all the so called nominal
stockholders and the various People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. Corporate Secretaries.

The Marcelino, Jr. Group insists that they have sufficiently established causes of action accruing to them and
against the Rogelio, Sr. Group. They add that they have impleaded all indispensable parties. Thus, they claim
that it was an error for the Regional Trial Court to dismiss their Complaint.

153
ISSUE:
Has the Marcelino Group impleaded all indispensable parties?

RULING:
No, the Marcelino Group has not impleaded all indispensable parties. An indispensable party is defined as one
who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.”
If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also
as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real
finality where there is want of indispensable parties. To reiterate, the inclusion of an indispensable party is a
jurisdictional requirement.

The case filed by the Marcelino Group was a derivative suit. In derivative suits, the corporation concerned must
be impleaded as a party. Not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it
must be served with process. The reason given is that the judgment must be made binding upon the corporation
in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring a subsequent suit against the same
defendants for the same cause of action. In other words the corporation must be joined as party because it is its
cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res ajudicata [sic] against it.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on parties has not been amended.

154
Rule 3, Sec. 16

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

Petitioners fail to show how the application of the Rules of Court was an error of law. The only basis for petitioners’
objection to the order requiring the appointment of an administrator for the estate of petitioner Anthony is a liberal
interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument fails.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the August 30,
2012 Decision and the January 23, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 91410 be reversed
and set aside.

Petitioner Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center (DHLFMC) and respondent Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corporation (Asiamed) entered into a Contract of Sale. This Contract of Sale stated that DHLFMC
agreed to purchase from Asiamed a GammaMed Plus Brachytherapy machine and a Gammacell Elan 3000
blood irradiator (collectively, the machines). Asiamed alleged that DHLFMC agreed to pay the total purchase
price of P31,000,000.00 no later than two (2) days from receiving the machines. Despite receiving the machines
on May 20, 2003 and July 17, 2003, DHLFMC only paid the amounts of P3,500,000.00 on July 25, 2003,
P1,000,000.00 on September 16, 2003, and P800,000.00 on October 30, 2003. Asiamed demanded payment,
but DHLFMC refused to pay the balance. This prompted the former to file a case for sum of money, with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Anthony passed away while the case was pending, so Asiamed
filed a motion for substitution to procure the appointment of an administrator of the petitioner’s estate.

Petitioners insist that the Contract of Sale was rescinded, and that respondent conformed to this rescission. The
sale was conditioned on the loan application from Planters Bank, which was not approved. By virtue of the
rescission, the parties should have been restored to their respective positions before entering the Contract of
Sale. On the other hand, respondent argues in its Memorandum that the Contract of Sale was not rescinded.
The disapproved loan from Planters Bank has no effect on the Contract of Sale, considering it was not even
mentioned there. Respondent insists that rescission was not proven during trial and adds that the issues of the
attachment are irrelevant to their claim for the collection or a sum or money. Both RTC and CA ruled for the
respondent.

ISSUES:
1) Should the petition for review be granted considering it does not contain questions of law?
2) Was the CA wrong in grating the motion to appoint an administrator?

RULING:
1) NO. Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court It is a
general rule that factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive, especially when they have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.
Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.
Here, the Court of Appeals made a factual determination that the effectivity of the Contract of Sale did
not depend on any alleged loan application from Planters Bank. It relied on the evidence presented,
particularly the Contract of Sale, which did not mention any loan from Planters Bank.

2) NO. The Court of Appeals’ order that respondent be allowed to procure an administrator for the estate
of petitioner Anthony was based on Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the

155
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within
a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.

Petitioners fail to show how the application of the Rules of Court was an error of law. The only basis for
petitioners’ objection to the order requiring the appointment of an administrator for the estate of petitioner
Anthony is a liberal interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument fails.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions cited in this case were not affected by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

156
Rule 3, Sec. 16

Tuano v. People
G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), September 28, 2016
Leonen, J.

Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions for the substitution
of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his
or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of the action, courts cannot be
expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel’s proper manifestation.

FACTS:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165
before RTC Manila. After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto
the ruling of the RTC. Accused moved for reconsideration but the Motion was denied. The accused filed before
the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on certiorari. The Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the
accused and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The accused moved for reconsideration and prayed for
his acquittal. On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution reconsidering its earlier Resolution and
acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, an Order
of Release was issued and sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections. The Court received a letter from the
Director General of the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court that the accused died on March 1, 2015, prior
to the issuance of the June 27, 2016 Resolution.

ISSUE:
-- NO ISSUE ---

RULING:
The Court notes that counsels for accused should have informed this Court of the death of their client.

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to report the death of a party to
the court. Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions for the
substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the
death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of the action, courts
cannot be expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel’s proper manifestation.

Counsels for accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Accused died on March 1, 2015. However, his counsels
continued to file pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply dated September
16, 2015 and a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was only through the July 15, 2016 letter of the Director
General of the Bureau of Corrections did the Court find out that accused had already died – one year, four
months, and 15 days after its occurrence.

This Court resolves to set aside its June 27, 2016 Resolution and dismiss this case as the death of accused
extinguishes his criminal liability. Counsels for accused, however, are directed to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for failing to inform this Court of accused’s death.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 3.

157
Rule 4, Sec. 4

Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, Inc.

G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019
Leonen, J.

Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of
petitioner’s personal action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules on venue
are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination
of every action and proceeding. This objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to
choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s
whim or caprice.

FACTS:
From 1998 to 2009, Hygienic supplied Nutri-Asia with KG Orange Bottles and Ratchet Caps with Liners for its
banana catsup products. Every transaction was covered by a Purchase Order issued by Nutri-Asia. The Terms
and Conditions on the Purchase Order provided that arbitration of all disputes arising in connection with this
contract shall be referred to an Arbitration Committee, in accordance with the Philippine Arbitration Law.

On July 29, 2009, Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money against Nutri-Asia. It instituted the case before
the RTC of Manila pursuant to the stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales Invoices submitting themselves
to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila in any legal action arising out of their transaction.

Nutri-Asia argued that the case should be dismissed as Hygienic failed to comply with a condition precedent prior
to its filing of the Complaint. It claimed that under the Terms and Conditions of the Purchase Orders, Hygienic
should have first referred the matter to the Arbitration Committee. Hygienic countered that the allegation of
noncompliance with a condition precedent was incorrect as its cause of action was anchored on “the sales
invoices and delivery receipts duly acknowledged by Nutri-Asia through its authorized representative and that
these deliveries made by Hygienic were not properly paid by Nutri-Asia. The arbitration clause was merely an
offer from Nutri-Asia, which Hygienic rejected in its Sales Invoices. To submit the dispute to arbitration, there
should have been an unequivocal agreement between the parties.

Petitioner and respondent differ as to where their dispute should be brought for resolution. On the one hand,
petitioner contends that the venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices should be enforced. On the other hand,
respondent asserts that the arbitration clause in the Purchase Orders should be carried out.

ISSUE:
Is the action for collection of sum of money was properly filed in the RTC of Manila pursuant to the stipulation in
the Sales invoice?

RULING:
No, the action for collection of sum of money was not properly filed in the RTC of Manila pursuant to the stipulation
in the Sales invoice, neither can the arbitration clause in the Purchase Orders can be given effect. Parties are
allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue or mode of dispute resolution as part of their freedom to contract
under Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The records lack any written contract of sale containing the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the
parties. The parties failed to provide evidence of any contract, which could have contained stipulations on the
venue of dispute resolution. Nonetheless, petitioner and respondent both claim that the Sales Invoices and the
Purchase Orders, respectively, contained a stipulation on where to raise issues on any conflict regarding the sale
of plastic containers.

A closer look at the Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the signature of respondent’s
representative is the phrase, “Received the above goods in good order and condition.” To extend the effect of
the signature by including the venue stipulation would be to stretch the intention of the signatory beyond his or
her objective. This Court, then, cannot bind respondent to the other stipulations in the Sales Invoices. A scrutiny
of the Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above the signature of petitioner’s representative
is the phrase “Acknowledged By (Supplier).” It was necessary for petitioner’s representative to sign the document
for the processing of payment. The act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to acknowledging

158
respondent’s order and facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It did not bind petitioner to the terms
and conditions in the Purchase Orders, which included the arbitration clause.

Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of
petitioner’s personal action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules on venue
are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination
of every action and proceeding. This objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to
choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s
whim or caprice. He or she may be impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular
court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there was no revision on the rules of venue.

159
Rule 4, Sec. 4

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
Leonen, J.

To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the actual place
where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict
between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation’s main office,
the actual place of business should control. Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated as
two distinct venues.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the CA’s Decision and Resolution, reinstating the
Order declaring Royal Ferry Services Inc. as insolvent, which order was made by the RTC of Manila.

Royal Ferry Services Inc. (Royal Ferry), respondent herein, is a domestic corporation. It’s Articles of Incorporation
provide that its principal place of business is located in Makati City. However, it currently holds office in
Intramuros, Manila City. Royal Ferry filed a verified Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC of Manila,
such petition being approved and authorized by its Board of Directors. The RTC declared Royal Ferry insolvent.
Subsequently, petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) filed before the RTC of Manila a
Formal Notice of Claim and a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the petition for insolvency should have been filed
before the court with territorial jurisdiction over the corporation’s residence, which should have been the RTC of
Makati. The RTC initially denied Pilipinas Shell’s Motion to Dismiss, but later on reconsidered and granted the
same. The CA reversed this, and reinstated the insolvency proceedings.

Pilipinas Shell then later moved for reconsideration, and then this petition, contending that the CA should not
have taken cognizance of respondent Royal Ferry’s appeal since it “failed to comply with Section 13, paragraphs
(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h), Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner claimed that the CA erred when it held that
the “petition for voluntary insolvency [was filed] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part
of one region[.]”
Petitioner also argues that since respondent’s Articles of Incorporation states that the principal office is located
in Makati City, the petition for voluntary insolvency should have been filed in Makati, not in Manila.

ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in taking cognizance of Royal Ferry’s appeal despite its violation of Rule 44, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court?
2. Was the Petition for Insolvency properly filed?

RULING:
1. NO. We uphold the Court of Appeals Decision to rule on the merits of the case.

Petitioner alleges that respondent’s Appellant’s Brief has failed to comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs
(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, respondent argues that it has substantially
complied with the requirements under the law, claiming that the absence of page references to the record in its
“Statements of Facts and of the Case” has not automatically resulted in the dismissal of the appeal, and that
although the Appellant’s Brief did not specifically contain the phrase “statement of issues,” the three errors in
issue were identifiable through a reading of the Brief.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits. The term “may” in Rule 50,
Section 173 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on
the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest of justice
would be better served by overlooking the pleading’s technical defects.

2. YES. The Petition for Insolvency was properly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a
jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law.

160
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the Insolvency Law vests jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance-now the
Regional Trial Court.

As there is a specific law that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply. The (old Insolvency)
law places a premium on the place of residence before a petition is filed since venue is a matter of procedure
that looks at the convenience of litigants.

To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the actual place
where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict
between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation’s main office,
the actual place of business should control.

Finally, We cannot sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the “petition for voluntary insolvency [was filed]
in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region[.] This is untenable. Section 14
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides several judges to preside over the different branches assigned to Manila
and Makati. Thus, the two venues are distinct. Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated
as two distinct venues. To deem them as interchangeable venues for being in the same region has no basis in
law.

Hence, this petition is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

As to Dismissal of Appeal: No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the
same insofar as granting the court discretion on whether or not to dismiss an appeal, taking into consideration
the formal requirements provided under Rule 44, Section 13.

As to Venue: No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules are the same in providing that when a
specific law covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply.

161
Rule 6, Sec. 11

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Clarges Corp. Realty

G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016
Leonen, J.

The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court; the discretion is with the trial court. It bears to
emphasize that the rationale for permissive joinder of a third-party defendant who may be liable to the original
defendant is judicial economy. This practice avoids multiplicity of actions and saves time and reduplication of
effort by trying all issues together in one action.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 22, 2005
in CA-G.R. CV No. 56570. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision ordering the
Development Bank of the Philippines to deliver to Clarges Realty Corporation a clean title of the property subject
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1987.

To secure a loan, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation first mortgaged the property to Caltex
Philippines, Inc. A second mortgage was constituted over the property, this time in favor of the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank.

When Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation failed to pay its loan obligations, the Development Bank of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank jointly instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the
property. The mortgagee banks emerged as the highest bidders during the public sale but were unable to redeem
the property because of Caltex Philippines, Inc.’s first mortgage.

First mortgagee Caltex Philippines, Inc. foreclosed its mortgage on the property. As second mortgagee, the
Development Bank of the Philippines redeemed the property from Caltex Philippines, Inc. and the property
formed part of the Development Bank of the Philippines’ physical assets.

The Development Bank of the Philippines then offered the property for public sale, where Clarges Realty
Corporation emerged as the highest bidder. Clarges Realty Corporation offered P24,070,000.00 as payment for
the property.

The Development Bank of the Philippines (as vendor) and Clarges Realty Corporation (as vendee) executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale for the property. The parties agreed that all expenses to be incurred in connection with
the transfer of title to Clarges Realty Corporation would be borne by the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Moreover, the Development Bank of the Philippines bound itself under Clause 6 of the Deed of Absolute Sale to
deliver a title to the property “free from any and all liens and encumbrances on or before December 15, 1987.”

The Development Bank of the Philippines succeeded in having the property registered under its name.
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation’s TCT No. S-16279 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT No.
151178 was issued.

However, TCT No. 151178 contained annotations from the former TCT No. S-16279, specifically, the mortgage
lien of the Philippine National Bank and a tax lien for unpaid taxes incurred by Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation.

Thus, Clarges Realty Corporation filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages praying that the Development Bank of the Philippines be ordered to deliver a title to
the property free of liens and encumbrances as provided in Clause 6 of the Deed of Absolute Sale.

The Development Bank of the Philippines moved for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. The
Development Bank of the Philippines sought to implead the Asset Privatization Trust as a third-party defendant
and maintained that the Asset Privatization Trust had assumed the “direct and personal” obligation to pay for
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation’s tax liability and to have the partially reduced tax lien cancelled.
But the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint was denied.

162
The trial court ruled in favor of Clarges Realty Corporation and granted the Complaint for specific performance
and damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Is the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action?

RULING:
The admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court; the discretion is with the trial court. If leave is
denied, the proper remedy is to file a complaint to be docketed as a separate case.

While the Rules of Court does not provide a definite period in which a third-party complaint may be filed, Section
12, Rule 6 thereof requires leave of court before filing the same. Whether to grant such leave is entrusted to the
discretion of the court.

In the present case, there is abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in denying the leave. It bears to
emphasize that the rationale for permissive joinder of a third-party defendant who may be liable to the original
defendant is judicial economy. This practice avoids multiplicity of actions and saves time and reduplication of
effort by trying all issues together in one action. However, there is little economy in waiting to join the third-party
defendant after the original plaintiff rested its case, as [the Development Bank of the Philippines] did in this case,
especially when it tried to pass on its liability to [the Asset Privatization Trust at the very first instance. Not only
will the probable delay prejudice Clarges Realty Corporation, there is also great possibility of prejudice to the
Asset Privatization Trust. This is because the latter will be unable to defend against Clarges Realty Corporation’s]
claim upon which its liability may depend

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is still the same.

163
Rule 7, Sec. 4

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Apo Cement Corp.

G.R. No. 193381, February 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to “belief” as basis. This is to ensure that
the pleading is anchored on facts and not on imagination or speculation, and is filed in good faith. To emphasize
this further, the third paragraph of Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly
treats pleadings with a verification based on “information and belief’ or “knowledge, information and belief,” as
unsigned.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petiton for Review seeking to reverse and set aside the CTA En Banc’s Decision, affirming the
Second Division’s Resolution, which granted respondent’s Motion to Cancel Tax Assessment; and a Resolution
denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The BIR sent respondent Apo Cement Corporation (Apo Cement) a Final Assessment Notice (FAN) for deficiency
taxes for taxable year 1999. Apo Cement protested said assessment, against which the BIR issued a final
decision that Apo Cement had deficiency taxes in the amount of ₱ 144,293,840.65. Apo Cement then filed a
Petition for Review, which was followed by an application for tax amnesty under RA 9480. It then later filed Motion
to Cancel Tax Assessment. Before the court rendered its decision, respondent Apo Cement also raised defective
verification, arguing that in a resolution, petitioner CIR was directed to submit a sufficient verification, which it
failed to comply with. The CTA Second Division later granted such motion to cancel tax assessment, holding that
Apo Cement was a qualified tax amnesty applicant under RA 9480, and that it had fully complied with the
requirements of the law.

ISSUE:
Was there a defective verification on the part of petitioner CIR?

RULING:
YES. Petition is denied. In this case, petitioner did not submit a corrected verification despite the order of this
Court. This alone merits the denial of the Petition outright.

Through the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the present Petition, Deputy
Commissioner Estela V. Sales of the Legal and Inspection Group of the Bureau of Internal Revenue states that
the contents of the Petition are true and correct of her own “knowledge and belief based on authentic records.”
Petitioner would argue however that while the verification still stated “belief,” it was qualified by “based on
authentic records.” Hence, “the statement implies that the contents of the petition were based not only on the
pleader’s belief but ultimately they are recitals from authentic records.”

The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to “belief” as basis. This is to ensure that
the pleading is anchored on facts and not on imagination or speculation, and is filed in good faith. To emphasize
this further, the third paragraph of Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly
treats pleadings with a verification based on “information and belief’ or “knowledge, information and belief,” as
unsigned.

In Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52,
Bacolod City, the Court explained that the amendment in the rules was made stricter so that a party cannot be
allowed to base his statements on his belief. Otherwise, the pleading is treated as unsigned which produces no
legal effect. The court, though, in its discretion, may give the party a chance to remedy the insufficiency. Thus:

Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now
merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he
has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either
personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.

Hence, there was defective verification on the part of the CIR in this case.

164
EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:
No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same in requiring the
verification must be based on allegations that are true and correct, based on the party’s personal knowledge, or
at least based on authentic records. This is without prejudice to the additional requirements stated under the
Revised Rules in respect of the allegations to be stated in the authorization of the affiant.

165
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315 & 200684, September 18,2019
Leonen, J.

Forum shopping may not be committed if the evil sought to be prevented or the possible conflicting decisions of
the courts will not be affected.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the court of appeals on allowing certain land
in Hacienda Looc in Nasugbu Batangas to be under the Agrarian Reform law but were apparently had their
certificates cancelled because they were supposed to be excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program

Petitioner is Fil Estate Properties Inc.a company that entered into a joint venture agreement with Manila
Southcoast for the development of 10 lots covered by Certificates of land with an area totalling more than 1.200
hectares which were previously obtained from the department of agriculture which lands were located in
Hacienda Looc.The joint venture agreement prayed that the 10 lots be excluded from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Farmer beneficiares filed a petition for review arguing that the office of the president
erred in limiting its scope of the said property.

Petitioner Fil-Estate argues that the proper remedy from the decisions by the Agrarian Reform Secretary is a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, not an appeal to the Office of the president. Furthermore,
it argued that Reyes committed willful and deliberate forum shopping because 3 pleadings were filed raising the
same allegations praying for the same reliefs. Respondent argues that under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, an appeal before the office of the president is the proper remedy against the Agrarian
Reform Secretary Garilao’s orders. They also further pointed out that it was Fil Estate that sought relief despite
pendency of their appeal.

ISSUES:
Is rule 43 the proper remedy in the case at bar and not an appeal to the office of the president?
Is their forum shopping found in Rule 7 Section 5 of the rules of court.

RULING:
No the appeal to the office of the president is the proper remedy.
No there is no forum shopping.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is valid and subsisting and is correctly applied in
consonance with Republic Act No. 6657 which states the powers and procedure in cases involving Agrarian Law.
The rules for agrarian Law implementation prvide a mode of appeal from the decisions of the Secretary to the
Office of The president. On the other hand, the rules of procedure of the department of agrarian reform
adjudication board states that appeals from the decisions of such board may be brought to the court of appeals.

Forum shopping according to Rule 7 Section 5 on parts of a pleading exists when litigants resort to two different
forums for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgement.
The evil sought to be avoided by the rule on forum shopping is the proliferation of contradictory decisions on the
same controversy.

Petitioner applied for exemption from the coverage of Section 10 of Republic act no. 6657. Moreover the order
would have depended on the governing rules of procedure at that time. When Reyes received a copy of the new
rules, the Rules for agrarian law implementation had not yet been promulgated. As such Reyes did not err in
elevating the case to the Office of the President first before filling a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

It may seem that Reyes committed forum shopping by elevating the adverse order to the Office of the president
then filing to re open the case before the secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless the evil sought to be avoided
by the rule did not exist. Since the motion to re open the case had not been acted upon and the records have not
yet been elevated to the office of the President there was no existence of the evil sought to be avoided hence
there is no forum shopping.

166
Therefore there is proper use of exhaustion of administrative remedies and there is no existence of forum
shopping. Consolidated petition is ultimately denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 43 on appeal from quasi judicial bodies have not been changed.
No effect because rule 7 section 5 on pleadings have not been changed.

167
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao

G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.

When a tax case is pending on appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin the levy of taxes and the auction of a taxpayer’s properties in relation to that case. The
Central Board of Assessment Appeals Decision assailed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the real property tax assessment of its properties. Clearly, this
falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Central Board of Assessment Appeals
decision constitutes one of the cases covered by the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.

Forum shopping may not be committed if the evil sought to be prevented or the possible conflicting decisions of
the courts will not be affected.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals December 15, 2008 Decision and
September 11, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 00735-MIN, dismissing the Philippine Ports Authority’s
Petition for Prohibition.

On 17 June 2004, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) received a letter from the City Assessor of Davao for the
assessment and collection of real property taxes against its administered properties located at Sasa Port. This
includes the subject properties. It appealed the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals through
the Office of the City Treasurer of Davao on 2 August 2004. The Office of the City Treasurer of Davao received
the appeal on 11 August 2004, and forwarded it to the Chairman of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, who
received it on 6 September 2004. While the case was pending, the City of Davao posted a notice of sale of
delinquent real properties, including the three (3) properties subject of this case.

The Local Board of Assessment Appeals dismissed PPA’s appeal for having been filed out of time, and for its
lack of jurisdiction on the latter’s tax exemption. The PPA appealed before the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, but this appeal was denied in the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, it filed an appeal with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

Meanwhile, the PPA filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the City of Davao’s notice
of sale of delinquent properties. While the petition with the Court of Appeals is pending, the CTA granted PPA’s
appeal and declared the subject properties exempt from real estate taxes. Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. It held that the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the matter and said that the
Philippine Ports Authority “should have applied for the issuance of writ of injunction or prohibition before the Court
of Tax Appeals.”[18] It further found the petition dismissible on the ground that the Philippine Ports Authority
committed forum shopping, as the petition raised the same facts and issues as in its appeal before the Court of
Tax Appeals.

ISSUES:
1. Does Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief prayed for by petitioner Philippine Ports
Authority
2. Was there a forum shopping?

RULING:
1. Petitioner has failed to cite any law supporting its contention that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this case. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (a)(5) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9282, provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

168
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals[.]

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals April 7, 2005 Decision assailed by petitioner before the Court of
Appeals was rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the real property tax assessment of its
properties. Clearly, this falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Central Board
of Assessment Appeals decision constitutes one of the cases covered by the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive
jurisdiction.

Despite the clear wording of the law placing this case within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals could have issued the relief prayed for despite the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9282, considering its urgent need for injunctive relief.

Petitioner’s contention has no legal basis whatsoever and must be rejected. Urgency does not remove the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals decision from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. This
is particularly true since, as properly recognized by the Court of Appeals, petitioner could have, and should have,
applied for injunctive relief with the Court of Tax Appeals, which has the power to issue the preliminary injunction
prayed for.

2. To reverse a court determination that a party has violated the rule against forum shopping, this party must
show that one or more of the requirements for forum shopping does not exist. To this end, petitioner attempts to
differentiate the petition filed with the Court of Appeals from the appeal filed with the Court of Tax Appeals. It
argues that the right asserted before the Court of Appeals is its right to peacefully possess its ports, free from
the threat of losing the properties due to tax liabilities, whereas the right asserted before the Court of Tax Appeals
is its right to be exempt from real property tax, as a government instrumentality. Petitioner further argues that the
reliefs sought from the two (2) tribunals were not the same—it sought a final relief from payment of real property
taxes on its ports from the Court of Tax Appeals; on the other hand, it sought a temporary and immediate relief
from respondents’ acts from the Court of Appeals, while the issue of taxability was still pending with the Court of
Tax Appeals.

However, even assuming without conceding that the arguments laid down by petitioner could support its claim
that it did not forum shop, this Court cannot accept that it was what was argued before the Court of Tax Appeals
and Court of Appeals, respectively, without reading the text itself. Whether or not the rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for in the two (2) petitions were different would best determined from a reading of the appeal and petition
themselves.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it submitted only its own arguments. Neither its petition before the Court of Appeals
nor its appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals was attached to the petition filed with this Court. Without any of
these texts, this Court is in no position to determine that the elements of forum shopping are absent here.

Thus, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ finding that the rule against forum shopping was violated when
petitioner filed its Petition for Certiorari despite its pending appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions involved in this case were not amended.

169
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona

G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.” When the Court of Appeals denied
the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the latter
was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its Petition before this Court
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
Eversley is a public health facility operated by the Department of Health to administer care and treatment to
patients suffering from Hansen’s disease, commonly known as leprosy, and to provide basic health services to
non-Hansen’s cases. Since 1930, it has occupied a portion of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1936 in
Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona (the Spouses Barbarona) allege that they are the owners of Lot No.
1936 by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698. They claim that they have acquired the property
from the Spouses Tarcelo B. Gonzales and Cirila Alba (the Spouses Gonzales), whose ownership was covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-824. Per the Spouses Barbarona’s verification, OCT No. RO-824
was reconstituted based on Decree No. 699021, issued to the Spouses Gonzales by the Land Registration Office
on March 29, 1939.

On May 6, 2005, the Spouses Barbarona filed a Complaint for Ejectment (Complaint) before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Mandaue City against the occupants. In their Answer, the occupants alleged that since they
had been in possession of the property for more than 70 years, the case was effectively one for recovery of
possession, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Municipal Trial Court in Cities ordered the occupants to vacate the property, finding that the action was one for
unlawful detainer, and thus, within its jurisdiction. It likewise found that the Spouses Barbarona were the lawful
owners of Lot No. 1936 and that the occupants were occupying the property by mere tolerance.

ISSUES:
(1) Was there a violation of non-forum shopping?
(2) Does MTC have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
(1) Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have committed forum shopping when it
filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a
motion to withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to await the action
of the Court of Appeals.

Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.” When the Court of Appeals denied
the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the latter
was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its Petition before this Court
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

To rule in this manner, however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the Court of
Appeals’ failure to apply its own Internal Rules. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed
abandoned with its filing of a Motion for Extension of Time before this Court, the Court of Appeals’ August 31,2011
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, thus, has no legal effect. It is as if no motion for
reconsideration was filed at all. Considering that petitioner counted the running of the period to file its Petition
with this Court from its receipt of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision, and not of the Court of
Appeals August 31, 2011 Resolution, it does not appear that petitioner “wanton[ly] disregard[ed] the rules or
cause[d] needless delay in the administration of justice.”54 In this particular instance, petitioner did not commit a
fatal procedural error

170
(2) Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the allegations stated in the complaint. Respondents’
Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states: That [the occupants] are presently occupying the above-
mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona] without color [of] right or title. Such occupancy is purely by mere
tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants’] occupying the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not
anchored upon any contractual relations with the [Spouses Barbarona.]

Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to what acts
constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner’s occupation.

In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by filing
an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this
case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

The same situation is present in this case. Respondents failed to state when petitioner’s possession was initially
lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from the Complaint is that petitioner’s
occupation “is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with [respondents.]”

This, however, is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession, as required in
an ejectment case. On the contrary, respondents allege that petitioner’s occupation was illegal from the start.
The proper remedy, therefore, should have been to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to assert
their right of possession or their right of ownership.

Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the Municipal Trial Court, it had no jurisdiction over
the case. Any disposition made, therefore, was void. The subsequent judgments of the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void Municipal Trial Court judgment, are likewise void.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

171
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co.

G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

No forum shopping is committed in an ejectment case where final judgment in the specific performance case will
not affect its outcome and judgment in the interpleader case will likewise not be res judicata against it.

FACTS:
1998, Intramuros leased real properties of the National Government to Offshore Construction. There are 3
properties leased for 5 years from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. The lease contracts also made
reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision that the lease shall be
renewed every 5 years upon the parties’ mutual agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects
due to Offshore Construction’s non-conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th
centuries’ Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand
letters. Intramuros tolerated the occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay. However, Offshore
Construction still failed to pay. Intramuros filed a complaint for ejectment before MTC Manila. Offshore
Construction filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim and later they
filed Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros’ complaint be dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia. It argued that the Metropolitan Trial
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the relationship between the parties was not one of lessor-
lessee but governed by a concession agreement.

MTC granted the motion and dismissed the case. It found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Offshore Construction’s motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

The MTC found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had no jurisdiction over the case because
while there were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s relationship as one of concession. Under this concession agreement,
Offshore Construction undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for which it incurred
expenses. The MTC found that the issues could not be mere possession and rentals only.

ISSUES:
1. Was the direct resort of the petitioner to the Court proper?
2. Does the MTC have jurisdiction had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros
Administration?
3. Did Intramuros commit forum shopping?

RULING:
1. At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Regional Trial Court’s ruling upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional
Trial Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over
the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending
cases, one filed by respondent Offshore Construction and the other filed by respondent’s group of tenants, 4H
Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition
for review under Rule 42.

Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned
by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not

172
inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency
of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute—an ejectment case—is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.

Moreover, this Court’s rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case.

2. It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved. Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession.

To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be
examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case for unlawful
detainer if the complaint states the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment. (Citation omitted)

A review of petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made. The Metropolitan
Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint because the parties’
situation has allegedly become “more complicated” than one of lease. Respondent’s defense that its relationship
with petitioner is one of concession rather than lease does not determine whether or not the Metropolitan Trial
Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or
motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.

3. A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed
out by petitioner, respondent’s right to possess the leased premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease
and, upon their expiration, on petitioner’s tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance case cannot be the source of respondent’s
continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for respondent’s
outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation
under this agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner’s
unlawful detainer complaint.

In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case, petitioner sets up the counterclaim that “[respondent]
be ordered to pay its arrears of (P13,448,867.45) as of December 31, 2009 plus such rent and surcharges as
may be incurred until [respondent] has completely vacated the [leased] premises.” This counterclaim is exactly
the same as one of petitioner’s prayers in its ejectment complaint.

A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will likewise not be res judicata against the ejectment complaint.
The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H Intramuros, allegedly representing the tenants occupying Puerta de
Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its Complaint for Interpleader the source of its right to occupy those
premises. However, it can be determined from petitioner’s Answer and from respondent’s Memorandum that the
members of 4H Intramuros are respondent’s sublessees.

Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping by petitioner,
the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

173
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos

G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum
shopping. Their prompt compliance of the certification against forum shopping appended to their Petitions
negates willful and deliberate intent.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Belo Medical Group, Inc. (Belo
Medical Group) assails the Regional Trial Court December 8, 2008 Joint Resolution in Civil Case No. 08-397.
This Joint Resolution granted respondent Jose L. Santos’ (Santos) Motion to Dismiss and Belo Medical Group’s
Complaint for interpleader and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief against Santos and Victoria G.
Belo (Belo), and declared all other pending incidents as moot.

The controversy began when Belo Medical Group received a request from Jose Santos for the inspection of
corporate records. Victoria Belo objected to this request and wrote Belo Medical Group to repudiate Santos co-
ownership of her shares and his interest in the corporation, claiming that the 25 shares in his name were merely
in trust for her, as she, and not Santos, paid for these shares.

Belo Medical Group then filed a Complaint for Interpleader to compel Belo and Santos to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims. Said complaints were raffled to the special commercial court, thus classifying them as
intra-corporate. Belo prayed that the case be tried as a civil case and not as an intra-corporate controversy,
arguing that intra-corporate controversies did not include special civil actions for interpleader and declaratory
relief, and clarified that the issue of ownership of the shares of stock must first be resolved before the issue on
inspection could even be considered ripe for determination.

Instead of filing an answer, Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss. Though a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the trial court ruled that according
to the Rules of Court, motions to dismiss are allowed in interpleader cases, while the complaint for Declaratory
Relief was struck down as improper. Belo filed her Petition for Review before the CA, which was however,
dismissed. Belo Medical Group, on the other hand, directly filed its Petition for Review with this Court

ISSUES:
1) Did Belo Medical Group commit forum shopping?
2) Did Belo Medical Group use the correct mode of appeal?
3) Was the trial court correct in dismissing Belo Medical Group, Inc.’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief?

RULING:
1) No, Neither Belo nor the Belo Medical Group is guilty of forum shopping.

Belo Medical Group filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court to appeal
against the Joint Resolution of the trial court. It did not file any other petition related to the case, as indicated
in it verification and certification against forum shopping. It was Belo, a defendant in Belo Medical Groups
Complaint, who filed a separate appeal under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals primarily to protect her
counterclaims. Belo and Belo Medical Group both filed their respective Petitions for Review on January 28,
2009, the lat day within the period allowed to do so. The Court of Appeals already ruled that litis pendencia
was present when Belo and Belo Medical Group filed their respective petitions on the same date before
different fora. The two petitions involved the same parties, rights and reliefs sought, and causes of action.
This is a decision this Court can no longer disturb.

Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and deliberate violation of the rule against
forum shopping. Their prompt compliance of the certification against forum shopping appended to their
Petitions negates willful and deliberate intent.

2) NO. Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal.

174
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc on September 14, 2004 laid down the rules on
modes of appeal in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

2. The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the
Regional Trial Court. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule
141 as amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Hence, a party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial court, purely
on questions of law, must raise these issues before the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.101 A.M.
No. 04-9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it. Based on the policy of judicial economy and for practical
considerations,102 this Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of appeal utilized. For one, it
would be taxing in time and resources not just for Belo Medical Group but also for Santos and Belo to dismiss
this case and have them refile their petitions for review before the Court of Appeals.

3) YES. At the outset, this Court notes that two cases were filed by Belo Medical Group: the Complaint for
interpleader and the Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Under Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, a joinder of cause of action is allowed, provided that it follows the conditions enumerated below:

Section 5. Joinder of Causes of Action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

xxx
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
xxx

Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint for
declaratory relief as both are special civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue as an
intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous. The right of
Santos to inspect the books of Belo Medical Group and the appreciation for his motives to do so will necessarily
be determined by the trial court together with determining the ownership of the shares of stock under Santos’
name.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 7, Sec.5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the new rules require that the proof of
authority to execute the certification should be attached to the pleading.

175
Rule 7, Sec. 5

City of Taguig v. City of Makati

G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016
Leonen, J.

Forum shopping can be committed in several ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal
is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). Despite the difference in the immediacy of their effects, the purposes
of Motions for Reconsideration and Petitions for Annulment of Judgment are fundamentally the same: the setting
aside of a judgment in order that a different, favorable, one may take its place. They “grant. . . substantially the
same reliefs.”

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by City of Taguig (Taguig) in assailing the CA Resolution.

Taguig filed a complaint (a territorial dispute case) with the RTC against City of Makati (Makati). Taguig asserted
that the areas comprising the Enlisted Men’s Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as the area referred to as Inner Fort
in Fort Bonifacio, were within its territory and jurisdiction. RTC ruled in favor of Taguig.

Makati filed a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam with the RTC. At the same time, it filed before the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment. It contended that RTC’s Decision was been rendered without jurisdiction
and in violation of due process. It claimed that the Decision was rendered 4 days after the judge had retired, and
was merely antedated to make it appear that it was rendered before he retired. CA dismissed Makati’s petition
for being moot and premature due to the pending motion before RTC. The petition was also without a certificate
of non-forum shopping. CA also ruled that in filing a Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is a splitting of a single cause of action and resultant to forum shopping. In a Rejionder filed by Makati,
it posited that the MR Ad Cautelam was merely a precautionary measure, to which the CA agreed. In a Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Makati, CA abandoned its decision that there was forum-shopping because the
claims were based on different causes of action, but maintains that the filing of the petition for annulment was
premature. Taguig filed a Motion for Clarification. As it was not acted on, this petition was filed.

Taguig claims that CA denied it of the relief sought when it took no action on its prayer in a Motion for Clarification.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Petition for Annulment of Judgment before CA as well as the Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam
filed before RTC grant the same relief?
2. Did Makati commit forum-shopping in filing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment before CA as well as the
Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam?

RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. It is a remedy independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Whereas, Rule 37 on Motion for Reconsideration is availed of when the court finds that excessive damages have
been awarded or the judgment is contrary to the law or evidence. Despite the difference in the immediacy of their
effects, the purposes of Motions for Reconsideration and Petitions for Annulment of Judgment are fundamentally
the same: the setting aside of a judgment in order that a different, favorable, one may take its place. They “grant.
. . substantially the same reliefs.”

2. Yes. Forum shopping can be committed in several ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal
is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for

176
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining
whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the different fora upon the same issue. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought.

As previously stated, the petition and the motion are based on the same cause of action, which is the questioning
of the RTC decision due to lack of jurisdiction of the judge. They also seeks the same relief of setting aside the
decision of the trial court.

In consequence, apart from being a ground for summary dismissal, “willful and deliberate forum shopping . . .
shall constitute direct contempt, [and is] a cause for administrative sanctions.” Thus, it would be inadequate to
stop with a mere declaration that respondent City of Makati, which acted through its counsels, engaged in forum
shopping.

The petition is granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the sections applied herein were not substantially changed.

177
Rule 7, Sec. 5

In Re: Ferrer
A.C. No. 8037 (Resolution), February 17, 2016
Leonen, J.

There is forum shopping where while the motion to withdraw the first petition is pending, a second petition based
on the same cause of action and with the same prayer is filed. Withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly
filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the discretion of the court, and not at the behest of litigants. Once a
case is filed before a court and the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject to that
court’s jurisdiction.

FACTS:
This administrative complaint originated from the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 19, 2008, which
summarily dismissed the Petition for Certiorari with prejudice and found petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 79904, as
well as their counsel, Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer), guilty of direct contempt of court.

Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras, Rizal, sought to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan
(Lacayan) as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary, replacing Nolasco Vallestero (Vallestero). The appointment was
opposed by Wilfredo Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor of Baras, Rizal. He said that the position is not vacant
and that it is the vice mayor, not the mayor, who has the authority8 to appoint the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.
Garciano insisted and removed Vallestero’s name from the payroll. Vallestero sued Garciano before the
Sandiganbayan.

The Regional Trial Court ordered Garciano, et al. to release the funds and pay Vallestero’s salaries and other
benefits. Garciano, et al. did not heed the Regional Trial Court’s order; hence, they were found liable for indirect
contempt.

Appealing the trial court’s ruling, Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty. Ferrer, filed a Petition for Certiorari
(First Petition) on October 9, 2003 before the Court of Appeals. On October 16, 2003, Garciano, et al., through
Atty. Ferrer, filed another Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (Second Petition) before the Court of Appeals. On the same day, Garciano,
et al. filed before the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Petition Under
Rule 17 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. They allegedly moved to withdraw the First Petition to avail
themselves of other remedies, especially since a comment had not yet been filed.

ISSUE:
Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the rule against forum shopping?

RULING:
Yes. Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rule against forum shopping.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent could have easily filed a manifestation that the other
petitioners had yet to verify the First Petition. Respondent’s reason that the failure of other petitioners to verify
the First Petition may imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify the willful violation of
the rule against forum shopping.

Respondent must be reminded that the withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly filed and docketed with a
court, rests upon the discretion of the court, and not at the behest of litigants. Once a case is filed before a court
and the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject to that court’s jurisdiction.

Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to inform the court or division where he subsequently filed his Second
Petition that he had already filed the First Petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that courts cannot take
judicial notice of actions that have been filed either before their courts or before other courts.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because an additional provision has
been provided which states that The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of
a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.

178
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank

G.R. Nos. 158622, 169441, 172958, 173194, 196958, 197120 & 205463, January 27, 2016
Leonen, J.

No forum shopping where party filed an Application for Receivership and at the same time filed a Petition for Writ
of Possession because while the issuance of a writ of possession or the appointment as receiver would have the
same result of granting possession of the foreclosed properties to said party, its right to possess these properties
as the winning bidder in the foreclosure sale is different from its interest as creditor to preserve these properties.

FACTS:
1993, Spouses Robert Alan Limso and Nancy Lee Limso and Davao Sunrise Investment and Development
Corporation (Davao Sunrise) took out a loan secured by real estate mortgages from Philippine National Bank.

Spouses Limso and Davao Sunrise encountered financial difficulties. Despite the restructuring of their loan, they
were still unable to pay. Philippine National Bank sent demand letters. Still, Spouses Limso and Davao Sunrise
failed to pay.

In 2000, Philippine National Bank filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. In the
meantime, PNB also filed an application for its appointment as Receiver but the same was denied. The Notice of
Foreclosure was published and PNB emerged as the highest bidder in the auction. The Sheriff’s Provisional
Certificate of Sale was issued. Thereafter, PNB filed a Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Possession. Davao
Sunrise filed a Motion to Expunge and/or Dismiss said Petition.

Spouses Limso and Davao Sunrise then allege that PNB is guilty of forum shopping. They argue that PNB’s ex-
parte Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession and the application to be appointed as receiver have the
same purpose: to obtain possession of the properties. Philippine National Bank further argues that it did not
commit forum shopping since the causes of action and reliefs sought in the two cases are different. It points out
that its application to be appointed as receiver is a provisional remedy under Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, while its prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession is based on its right to possess the properties
involved.

ISSUE:
Is PNB guilty of forum shopping when it filed an application for Receivership and at the same time filed a Petition
for writ of possession?

RULING:
NO, PNB did is not guilty of forum shopping. The elements of forum shopping are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

There is no identity of parties because the party to the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession is Philippine
National Bank only, while there are two parties to application for appointment as receiver: Philippine National
Bank on one hand, and Spouses Limso and Davao Sunrise on the other.

The causes of action are also different. In the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Philippine National
Bank prays that it be granted a writ of possession over the foreclosed properties because it is the winning bidder
in the foreclosure sale. On the other hand, Philippine National Bank’s application to be appointed as receiver is
for the purpose of preserving these properties. While the issuance of a writ of possession or the appointment as
receiver would have the same result of granting possession of the foreclosed properties to Philippine National
Bank, Philippine National Bank’s right to possess these properties as the winning bidder in the foreclosure sale
is different from its interest as creditor to preserve these properties.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there has been no amendment as regards the rule on forum shopping.

179
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Home Guaranty Corp. v. La Savoie Development Corp.

G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015
Leonen, J.:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously
or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition
or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. A party commits forum shopping when
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA to be reversed and set aside when it
ordered the Stay Order to be reinstated and gave due course to the Petition for Rehabilitation.

La Savoie is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate. On April 25, 2003, it filed a petition
for declaration of state of suspension of payments with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan before RTC
Makati. RTC issued a Stay Order. Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed an Opposition even though “it was
not a creditor of Petitioner. It asserted that it had a material and beneficial interest in the Petition, in relation to
the interest of the creditors of La Savoie vis-à-vis certain properties or assets that might have been taken
cognizance of, and placed under the custody of the RTC.

RTC issued an Order denying due course La Savoie’s Petition for Rehabilitation and lifting the Stay Order. La
Savoie filed an Appeal before CA. CA reinstated the Stay Order and gave due course to the Petition for
Rehabilitation, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. On August 12, 2005, HGC filed
before SC the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 asserting that the properties comprising
the Asset Pool of La Savoie should be excluded from the rehabilitation proceedings as these have now been
assigned to it. La Savoie filed its Comment claiming that the assignment and conveyance to it was ineffectual
considering that there was a Stay Order. HGC filed its Reply to La Savoie’s Comment attaching to its Appellee’s
Brief the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance as proof thereof.

La Savoie opposed pointing that HGC engaged in forum shopping that as of the time of the filing of its Comment
another case between HGC and La Savoie, docketed as Civil Case No. 05314, was pending before the RTC
Makati. In its reply, pointed out that it could not have been guilty of forum shopping as the present case is an
offshoot of a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation while Civil Case No. 05314 sought to restrain the collections
and remission to it of funds collected by La Savoie via action for injunction, mandamus, specific performance,
and sum of money with application for TRO.

ISSUE:
Did Home Guaranty Corporation engaged in forum shopping?

RULING:
Yes. HGC engaged in forum shopping when it filed the Civil Case No. 05314 before the RTC.

Forum Shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously
or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition
or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. A party commits forum shopping when
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.

Here, the divergence in specific reliefs sought notwithstanding, Home Guaranty Corporation’s bases for these
reliefs are the same. In Civil Case No. 05314, Home Guaranty Corporation asked that La Savoie cease collecting
payments and that collected payments be remitted to it because it supposedly now owns the real estate
development projects of La Savoie that form part of the Asset Pool. In the present Appeal, Home Guaranty

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Corporation asks that the properties forming part of the Asset Pool be excluded from corporate rehabilitation
proceedings because it, and no longer La Savoie, is the owner of these properties.

Thus, in both cases, Home Guaranty Corporation is invoking the same right and is proceeding from the same
cause of action, i.e., its supposed ownership. True, there is divergence in the details of the specific reliefs it is
seeking, but Home Guaranty Corporation is seeking the same basic relief, i.e., the recognition of its alleged
ownership. The exclusion of the properties from corporate rehabilitation proceedings and the remittance to it of
payments are mere incidents of this basic relief. Accordingly, in simultaneously pursuing the present case and
Civil Case No. 05314, Home Guaranty Corporation engaged in forum shopping.

Hence, HGC was guilty of committing forum shopping.

EFFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

181
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Velasco

G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court. An action for reconstitution and subsequent action for quieting of title covering the same
Transfer Certificate of Title constitutes forum shopping because it involves relitigating of claim of ownership over
the properties.

FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve matters that have long been settled by the Supreme Court. However, petitioner
in G.R. Nos. 112564 and 128422, Dolores V. Molina, remained incessant in filing suits that led to the unnecessary
clogging of the dockets. G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564 were decided by this court on July 25, 1994.

(G.R. No. 109645) In 1991, Molina filed a Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 124088. She alleged that the
original copy was lost when the Quezon City Register of Deeds was gutted by fire. Ortigas & Company Limited
(Ortigas) found out about Molina’s Petition and filed an Opposition. Subsequently, Judge Velasco granted
Molina’s petition and was issued with a TCT. Ortigas filed a Petition for Certiorari to the SC.

(G.R. No. 112564) The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC) filed an “Annulment of TCT” against Molina alleging
that it owned several parcels of land covered by TCT No. 124088. The subject properties of TMBC’s claim were
formerly under Ortigas’ name which were mortgaged by the latter to TMBC as security for their respective loans
(and thereafter were foreclosed and titles were issued in TMBC’s name).

Ruling in G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564: SC held that Orders of Judge Velasco be nullified and set aside and
the TCT issued in the name of Molina be declared null and void. SC explained that Judge Velasco had no
jurisdiction to decide the reconstitution case since no notice was given to the owners of the adjacent properties.

(G.R. No. 128911) In 1997, Molina filed an action for quieting of title and annulment of title before the RTC of
Quezon City. The subject of the complaint was parcels of land covered several TCT which were declared null
and void by this court in G.R. No. 109645 and G.R. No. 112564. TMBC filed a Motion to Dismiss citing res
judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, bar by prior judgment, and forum shopping. In addition, the RTC cannot
annul and set aside the Decision of the SC. Molina opposed the Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, she filed an
Amended Complaint which was admitted by the RTC. TMBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied.

TMBC filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction/TRO arguing that clear that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it prays for the
court a quo to annul and set aside the final and executory decisions of the SC and the CA adjudicating in favor
of petitioner TMBC the ownership and possession of the subject properties, subject matter of the private
respondent Molina’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. It also points out that the Amended Complaint should
have been dismissed outright for being a clear case of forum shopping. Molina asserts that the reconstitution
case she previously filed was a special proceeding and did not touch upon the issue of ownership. On the other
hand, the action for quieting of title, involved the issue of ownership.

ISSUE:
Is the action for quieting of title for parcels of land covering several TCTs which were declared null and void in a
previous case constitutes a forum shopping in relation to a reconstitution case filed previously involving the same
TCTs?

RULING:
Yes. Molina’s arguments do not hold. These two cases involved relitigating her claim of ownership over the
properties covered by the nullified TCT No. 124088. That Molina actually filed an action for quieting of title, in
clear violation of this court’s ruling in G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564, constitutes deliberate forum shopping.

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Forum shopping is defined as: When a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court.

Forum shopping consists of the following elements:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. The parties in G.R. No. 112564 and this case are
the same: Molina and TMBC. For the second element, the test in determining whether the causes of action are
the same: ascertains whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. As previously
mentioned, these two cases (G.R. No. 112564 and G.R. No. 128911) involved relitigating her claim of ownership
over the properties covered by the nullified TCT No. 124088

Further, the ruling in G.R. Nos.109645 and 112564 is res judicata on this case.

The elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and
(iii) identity of cause of action.

These requisites are fulfilled. The former judgment, Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, is final
and executory. This court had jurisdiction over the former case, and the judgment was on the merits. Further,
although the causes of action may appear to be different, the end result would be the same: to determine the
validity of Molina’s claim of ownership over the properties covered by the nullified TCT No. 124088.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect on the issues and ruling presented in this case.

183
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.

There is forum shopping when an appeal before the CA and a petition for certiorari before the SC, assailing the
same trial court decision, are filed.

FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA denying petitioner’s Antonio
Garcia’s motion for reconsideration.

Antonio Garcia, as the seller, and Ferro Chemicals Inc (FCI) as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute sale and
purchase of shares of stock. The deed was for the sale of shares of stock in various corporation in the name of
Garcia. The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stocks from being sold at public auction
to pay obligations of Garcia.

A deed of repurchase over the same was entered into between Garcia and FCI under which Garcia can redeem
the properties sold within the end of 180 day period. Before the period lapsed, Garcia exercised the right however,
FCI did not agree to the repurchase prompting him to file an action for specific performance and annulment of
transfer shares.

In September, an information was filed against Garcia before RTC charging with estafa for allegedly
misrepresenting to FCI that the shares were free from all liens and encumbrances. RTC acquitted Garcia for
insufficiency of evidence.

FCI filed an MR which was denied by RTC. FCI appealed the decision to CA as to the civil aspect of the case. A
petition for certiorari was also filed with SC seeking to annul the decision acquitting Garcia.

FCI argued that the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
certification against forum shopping signed by Ramon Gracia as president of CI disclosed that the notice of
appeal was filed “with respect to the civil action of the case.”

ISSUE:
3. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?
4. Does the filing of notice of appeal before the CA and the petition for certiorari assailing the same decision
amount to forum shopping?

RULING:
3. RTC did not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases,
the penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court’s jurisdiction.

The information charging Garcia with violation of article 318 of RPC has imposable penalty of arresto
mayor or imprisonment for a period of 1 month and 1 day to six months. When the information was filed
on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by
Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the case.

In the case of Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals the court held:

“Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by
the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case[.]”

4. There is forum shopping. The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata
in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted

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and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive
of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court decision.
This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled “Notice
of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case).” The “civil aspect of the
case” referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed
to make a reservation before the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules on jurisdiction and forum shopping is not affected by amendments in the Revised
Rules.

185
Rule 7, Sec. 5

Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban

G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

For purposes of forum shopping, absolute identity of parties is not required and that it is enough that there is
substantial identity of parties.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with an application for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI under Rule 45
which prays that the assailed orders by the RTC denying petitioner Aboitiz Equity Ventures’ s (AEV) motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration be nullified and set aside and that judgment be rendered dismissing with
prejudice the complaint.

A merged shipping business named as WG&A was formed by virtue of an Agreement to transfer the shipping
assets of Aboitiz Shipping Corp. (ASC) and Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc (CAGLI) to William Lines, Inc., (WLI)
in exchange of the latter’s shares of stock. Thereafter, CAGLI sent WG&A (the renamed WLI) demand letters for
the return of or the payment for the excess of inventories. AEV alleged that to satisfy CAGLI’s demand,
WLI/WG&A returned the excess inventories. AEV became a stockholder of WG&A and the latter was
subsequently renamed Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (“ATSC’). Petitioner AEV alleged that CAGLI
resumed making demands from ATSC despite having returned the excessive inventories.

CAGLI claimed that it was unaware of the delivery to it of the excess inventories. Its claims not having been
satisfied, CAGLI filed the applications for arbitration. First, against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and
petitioner AEV, before the RTC.

In response, AEV filed a motion to dismiss and argued that CAGLI failed to state a cause of action as there was
no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI and AEV. The RTC dismissed the complaint in respect to AEV.It
sustained AEV’s assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI’s claim.
Whether by motion for reconsideration, appeal or other means, CAGLI did not contest this dismissal. The RTC
issued an order directing the parties remaining in the first complaint (after the discharge of AEV) to proceed with
arbitration.

CAGLI now joined by respondent Benjamin Gothong, filed a second application for arbitration (“second
complaint”) The second complaint was also in view of the return of the same excess inventories subject of the
first complaint. AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the following grounds: (1) forum shopping;
(2) failure to state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis pendentia.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the second complaint constitute forum shopping and/or is barred by res judicata?

RULING:
Before addressing the specific matters raised by the present petition, the Court emphasizes that AEV is in error
in seeking relief via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, the court is a
position to dismiss the present petition outright. Nevertheless, as the actions of the RTC are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the court treats the present Rule 45 petition as a
Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.

Yes. First, between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties. The first complaint was brought
by CAGLI as the sole plaintiff against Chiongbian, ATSC, and AEV as defendants. In the second complaint,
CAGLI was joined by Gothong as co-plaintiff. As to the defendants, ATSC was deleted while Chiongbian and
AEV were retained. While it is true that the parties to the first and second complaints are not absolutely identical,
this court has clarified that, for purposes of forum shopping, absolute identity of parties is not required and that it
is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. Second, there is identity in subject matter and cause of
action. There is identity in subject matter as both complaints are applications for the same relief. There is identity
in cause of action as both complaints are grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive the value of excess

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inventories. The first and second complaints are both applications for arbitration and are founded on the same
instrument. Third, the order of the RTC which dismissed the first complaint with respect to AEV, attained finality
when CAGLI did not file a motion for reconsideration, appealed, or, in any other manner, questioned the order.
Fourth, the parties did not dispute that the order was issued by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Fifth, the dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment on the merits.

In sum, the requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second complaint should, thus, have been
dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI committed an act of forum shopping in filing the second complaint.
CAGLI instituted two suits in two regional trial court branches, albeit successively and not simultaneously. It
asked both branches to rule on the exact same cause and to grant the exact same relief. CAGLI did so after it
had obtained an unfavorable decision at least with respect to AEV. These circumstances afford the reasonable
inference that the second complaint was filed in the hopes of a more favorable ruling.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect rules were not amended.

187
Rule 8 Sec. 2

Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo

G.R. No.196251, July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Plaintiff’s prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and reformation of instrument is not a ground
to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint alternatively or hypothetically,
either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is the filing of two separate cases for each of the causes of action that is prohibited since the
subsequently filed case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
splitting causes of action.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision finding the that there is no genuine controversy as to
the facts and that the RTC correctly rendered a summary judgment in favor of petitioner Benjamin Castillo
(Castillo) and against respondents Olivarez Realty Corporation (ORC) and Dr. Pablo Olivarez (Dr. Olivarez).

Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation (ORC) represented by Dr. Olivarez entered into a contract of conditional
sale over a property owned by Castillo in Laurel, Batangas. Due to an alleged breach of the contract, Castillo
filed a complaint against ORC before the RTC and prayed for the contract’s rescission. He alleged that, after
they signed the deed, ORC immediately took possession of the property by paying only P2.5M of P19,080,490
purchase price. Contrary to the agreement, it did not pay the tenants the compensation and did not file any action
against the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to cancel the title to the property. Castillo’s demand to pay was
refused by ORC.

In their defense, ORC admitted that it only paid P2.5M and alleged that Castillo failed to assist them in filing an
action against the PTA. Thus, according to them, they had all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments
to fully pay the purchase price. ORC and Dr. Olivarez added that Castillo prayed for irreconcilable reliefs of
reformation of instrument and rescission of contract. Thus, Castillo’s complaint should be dismissed.
After the pre-trial conference, Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. If
it be found improper, summary judgment may still be rendered as there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. He argued that ORC and Dr. Olivarez substantially admitted the material allegations of his complaint. On
the other hand, ORC reiterated that there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved on this case moreover
that the property was sold by Castillo to a 3rd person. Thus, a full-blown trial is required.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC validly render a summary judgment?

RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to
decide a case if from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment.

In this case, ORC admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional
sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up the following affirmative defenses: first, Castillo did
not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism Authority’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the
land of the tenants; third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is
currently being litigated before a Quezon City court. Considering that ORC and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered
an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues tendered by
ORC and Dr. Olivarez’s answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues that can be resolved
judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file; otherwise, these
issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial. The claim that Castillo sold the property to another is
fictitious and was made in bad faith to prevent the trial court from rendering summary judgment. Petitioners did
not elaborate on this defense and insisted on revealing the identity of the buyer only during trial. Even in their
petition for review on certiorari, petitioners never disclosed the name of this alleged buyer. Thus, as the trial court
ruled, this defense did not tender a genuine issue of fact, with the defense bereft of details.

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Further, Castillo’s alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and reformation of
instrument is not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per Section 2, Rule 8
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the filing of two separate cases for each of the causes of action that is
prohibited since the subsequently filed case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on splitting causes of action.

As the trial court found, ORC illegally withheld payments of the purchase price. The trial court did not err in
rendering summary judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 35 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because the new provision provides
for a new non-extendible period within which an adverse party may file a comment and serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions - 5 calendar days from receipt of the motion.

The new provision likewise provides, that unless the court orders the conduct of a hearing, judgment sought shall
be rendered.

New provision added: Any action of the court on a motion for summary judgment shall not be subject of an appeal,
or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

189
Rule 9, Sec. 3

Spouses Manuel v. Ong

G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.

Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s
motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the decision and resolution of the CA be
reversed and set aside.

Respondent Ong filed with the RTC of Benguet a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria charging spouses Manuel
with having constructed improvements—through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth—on a property
he supposedly owned.

Sheriff Sales attempted to personally serve summons issued to Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower
Bacong, Loacan, Benguet. Spouses Manuel however requested that service be made at another time considering
that Sandra Manuel’s mother was then critically ill.

Sheriff Sales made another attempt to personally serve the summons to Sandra Manuel but she refused to sign
and receive the summons. Sheriff Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and advise Sandra
Manuel to file their answer within 15 days. Spouses Manuel filed to file an answer so Ong asked the court for the
former to be declared in default.

RTC issued an order granting the motion to declare spouses Manuel in default.

Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift order of default claiming that the siblings of the spouses were the ones who
resided in the address stated in the summons so it could not have been properly served on them. RTC denied
the motion.

ISSUES:
1. Did the court acquire jurisdiction upon the persons of Spouses Manuel by tender of summons?
2. Are the spouses Manuel entitled to relief from order of default because of alleged improper service of
summons?

RULING:
1. Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly acquired because personal service of
summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales. The sheriff’s
return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons
and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions.

The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it
requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the
defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

2. The requisites for declaring a party in default were satisfied by respondent Ong.
a) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default;
b) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
c) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period
provided by the Rule.”

It is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. It is also not disputed
that the latter filed their answer after the fifteen-day period had lapsed.

190
Not only were the requisites for declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift
order of default was also shown to be procedurally infirm. In Montinola, Jr. vs. Republic Planters Bank, the
Court noted that there are three requisites that must be satisfied in order to warrant the setting of an order
of default:
a) the motion to lift order of default;
b) an affidavit showing the invoked ground - fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and
c) the party’s meritorious defense or defenses

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was not
made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts
which would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due
to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s
motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec 5 of Rule 14 is originally and
may be compared with old Sec 6 of the same rule. However, aside from change of section, the rule on tender
when the defendant whom the summons was served refused to receive and sign it is the same. The amended
section just explains what tendering means or how it is done.

191
Rule 10, Sec. 7

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

The procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be indicated with appropriate marks, has for
its purpose the convenience of the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately see the
modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect
any substantive right.

FACTS:
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Maria Imelda R. Marcos, and Irene Marcos Araneta appear to be the registered owners
of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-85026. The
Republic filed its third amended complaint on Civil Case No. 002 (Complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against the Marcoses), which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The
PCGG caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. T-85026.

Marcos, Jr. filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and pointing out that
the Cabuyao property was not mentioned in the original and amended Complaints or their annexes. The Republic
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint, with an attached Fourth Amended Complaint with
amended annex List of Assets and Other Properties. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to admit the Fourth
Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Section 7, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion
to Resolve the Omnibus Motion, while the Republic filed a Comment, seeking an order of preliminary attachment
over the Cabuyao property. The Sandiganbayan ordered the cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens on
TCT No. T-85026 and held that the Republic’s allegations were insufficient to support an application for a writ of
attachment as the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or disposed of by the Marcoses. After the
denial of a motion for reconsideration, the Republic filed this Petition for certiorari, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.

The Republic argues, among others, that the amendment of the Complaint to specifically include the Cabuyao
property is a formal amendment that may be done at any time. As to entitlement to a writ of preliminary
attachment, the Republic argues that it has demonstrated entitlement to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao
property. On the other hand, the Marcoses argue that the property is not party of the res in Civil Case No. 002.

ISSUES:
1. Is the Sandiganbayan correct in cancelling the notice of lis pendens?
2. Is the denial of the Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint proper?
2. Is the Republic entitled to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao property?

RULING:
1. No, the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is to molest the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to
be recorded. The conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not involved in the Civil Case is based on the belief
that failure to specifically mention the property in the amended Complaint automatically renders it beyond the
scope of the Civil Case.

Executive Order No. 14 specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly
applied to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict
adherence to technical rules will hamper the efforts of the PCGG. The admitted Complaint was filed to recover,
for the Republic of the Philippines, all the properties that were illegally acquired by the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers and that were manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other lawful income,
and income from legitimately acquired property.

The assailed Resolutions do not suggest that the Cabuyao property is not part of the property illegally acquired
by respondents. Thus, the conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not affected by the Civil Case is based solely
on an inference from a procedural detail.

192
2. No, the denial of the Motion is not proper.

The Sandiganbayan’s denial was primarily based on a purported failure to comply with a requirement under Rule
10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, that amendments in a pleading be indicated by appropriate marks. The
procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be indicated with appropriate marks, has for its
purpose the convenience of the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately see the
modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect
any substantive right. Certainly, its absence cannot cause the denial of any substantive right.

A reading of the Fourth Amended Complaint reveals that the Sandiganbayan’s observation was patently wrong.
Petitioner did not fail to comply with Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. There were no portions in the body
of the Fourth Amended Complaint itself that needed to be underscored or marked, considering that the text was
identical to the text of the admitted Complaint. Annex A to the Fourth Amended Complaint, the List of Assets and
Other Properties, reveals that it was amended to include the Cabuyao property in the list of assets. That entry
was underscored to reflect the amendment.

3. Yes, the Republic is entitled to a writ of preliminary attachment.

Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows for the attachment of the property of the adverse party as security
for any judgment that may be recovered in an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a wilful
violation of duty; or In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or
converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its
being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person.

The allegations in the admitted Complaint fall within Section 1(b) and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities of
the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President,
gravely abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth
suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered
under the names of respondents — minors at the time of registration — is sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao
property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.

The Sandiganbayan should have issued an order of preliminary attachment considering that the requisites of the
law — including that of Executive Order No. 14 — have been substantially met, and that there is factual basis for
the issuance of the preliminary attachment. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s Motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no substantial amendments to Rule 13, Section 14 (now Section 19), Rule 10,
Section 7, and Rule 57, Section 1 under the 2019 Rules of Court.

193
Rule 13, Sec. 2

Gatmaytan v. Dolor
G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

Service upon the parties’ counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service
upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The reason is simple-the parties,
generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an
appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative
to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest
of orderly procedure-either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself ifs/he does not intend to hire
a lawyer.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision, resolving an action for reconveyance
against petitioner Gatmaytan, and in favor of the respondents-spouses Francisco and Hermogena Dolor (Dolor
Spouses). The RTC ordered Gatmaytan to convey the subject lot to the Dolor Spouses.

Gatmaytan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Gatmaytan then filed an appeal with the CA.

The CA dismissed Gatmaytan’s appeal, ruling that the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision had already attained
finality as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day period. First, the RTC’s
Decision was rendered on March 27, 2006. Second, per the registry return receipt attached to the back portion
of the last page of the RTC’s Decision, Gatmaytan’s counsel, Atty. Raymond Palad, received a copy of the same
Decision on April 14, 2006. Finally, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on June 16, 2006.

Gatmaytan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied the same. It emphasized that the Receipt at the
back of the last page of the RTC’s Decision indicated that a copy of the same Decision was received by a certain
Maricel Luis, for and on behalf of Atty. Palad, on April 14, 2006. The CA added that previous orders of the RTC
were likewise received by Luis, and that Luis’ authority to receive for Atty. Palad had never been questioned.

Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition, insisting that the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained finality
as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel’s former address (at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City)
as opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her
counsel indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the RTC. Gatmaytan adds that the
RTC noted the change of address in an Order, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and
processes was to be made at her counsel’s updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog
Avenue, Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Was the service of the Decision to the petitioner complete when it was sent to her counsel’s former address
effectual?

RULING:
No.

Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order subject of
his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which the judgment of final order was served
upon the party himself or herself.

When, however, a party is represented and has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon his
or her counsel. As Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 2. Filing and Service, Defined. –

Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service

194
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. (Emphasis supplied)

In Delos Santos v. Elizalde, this Court explained the reason for equating service upon counsels with service upon
the parties themselves:

To reiterate, service upon the parties’ counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties
themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The
reason is simple-the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure,
specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware
of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for the
courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure-either the lawyer retained by the
party or the party him/herself ifs/he does not intend to hire a lawyer.

Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three (3) modes of service of judgments or
final orders: first, personal service; second, service by registered mail; and third, service by publication. It reads:

Section 9. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions. - Judgments, final orders or resolutions
shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed
to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also
by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

Rule 13, Section 10 specifies when the first two (2) modes - personal service and service by registered mail - are
deemed completed, and notice upon a party is deemed consummated:

Section 10. Completeness of Service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5)
days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis
supplied)

While petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006 Decision, there
is a dispute as to the date from which the 15-day period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration must be reckoned.
That is, there is a dispute as to when petitioner was given notice of the Decision. The Court of Appeals refused
to entertain petitioner’s appeal reasoning that the judgment appealed from has attained finality.This, according
to it, is because petitioner belatedly filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June 16, 2006 considering that her
counsel supposedly received notice of it on April 14, 2006. Petitioner insists that the Motion was timely filed, her
counsel having received notice of it only on June 1, 2006.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals wrongly reckoned service on April 14, 2006 as the service made on
this date was upon her counsel’s former address. She adds that service upon her counsel’s updated and correct
address was made only on June 1, 2006. Petitioner points out that her counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court
a Notice of Change of Address. She further emphasizes that the Regional Trial Court acknowledged this change
of address and issued an Order stating that, from then on, service shall be made upon the updated address.

The Supreme Court sustained the petitioner’s position that the service made on her counsel’s former address
was ineffectual. The Court ruled however, that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proving the specific
date - allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service upon her counsel’s updated address was actually made. Having
failed to establish the reckoning point of the period for filing her Motion for Reconsideration, we cannot sustain
the conclusion that petitioner insists on, and which is merely contingent on this reckoning point: we cannot
conclude that her Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to discharge her burden of proof, we
are constrained to deny her Petition.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rules regarding to service to the counsel are not affected.

195
Rule 13, Sec. 2

Bracero v. Arcelo
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015
Leonen, J.

Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits of exceptions as in cases that
would indicate that they were then already informed of such decision.

FACTS:
Nestor Bracero prays before the Supreme Court to nullify the CA’s decision affirming the RTC ruling in favor of
respondents and ask that the court be compelled to furnish his counsel the RTC’s decision so he may be granted
the 15-day period to appeal.

The root of the petition is the complaint of the Heirs of Victoriano Monisit for Quieting of Titles/Ownership,
Recovery of Possession with Damages against Rodulfo Arcelo and Nestor Bracero over a 48,632-square-meter
parcel of land located in Lubo, Sogod, Cebu. During Victoriano Monisit’s lifetime, 5,000 square meters of the land
was mortgaged to Rodulfo Arcelo’s grandmother, Damiana Mendoza. Damiana Mendoza’s death was followed
by her son’s death, and Rodulfo Arcelo inherited the right over the mortgaged portion of the property, which
Nestor Bracero, claiming to be Rodulfo Arcelo’s tenant, cultivated this 5,000-square-meter mortgaged portion of
the property. Later, he expanded his occupation of the mortgaged portion of the property to the entire 48,632
square meters.

The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs of Victoriano Monisit. On May 4, 2009, the trial court served Nestor
Bracero with a copy of its Decision. The period to appeal lapsed. The heirs of Victoriano Monisit 􏰀led a motion
for execution and furnished the counsels of Nestor Bracero and Rodulfo Arcelo with copies. The trial court issued
the Writ of Execution on October 7, 2009 without opposition. Nestor Bracero received the Notice to Vacate on
Execution. On the same day, his counsel Atty. Danilo Pilapil fied the Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution
on the ground that counsel was not furnished a copy of the RTC. But the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the receipt of petitioner’s counsel of a copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official notice of
the RTC Decision dated April 16, 2009 if he was not furnished a copy of the Decision?

RULING:
YES. Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that “[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by
the court.” Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits of exceptions as in
cases that would indicate that they were then already informed of such decision.

Petitioner Nestor Bracero, through his counsel Atty. Danilo Pilapil, had several opportunities to argue his position
before the courts but failed to take them.

Jurisprudence reiterates that “[l]itigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to
do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases.” This court has held that “equity aids the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights[,]” and a party should “periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check with
the court, and inquire about the status of the case.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Under the new rules, “Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or any other court
submission. If a party has appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be made upon his or her counsel,
unless service upon the party and the party’s counsel is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for
several parties, such counsel shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served by the opposite side.”

Also, Section 2 now mandates that if a party is represented by several counsels, such party is entitled only to
one copy of the pleading or paper, to be served upon the lead counsel. Should there be no designated lead
counsel, to anyone of the counsels of the party.

196
Rule 13, Sec. 14

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is to molest the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the right of the party who caused it to be recorded.

FACTS:
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Maria Imelda R. Marcos, and Irene Marcos Araneta appear to be the registered owners
of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-85026. The
Republic filed its third amended complaint on Civil Case No. 002 (Complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against the Marcoses), which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The
PCGG caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. T-85026.

Marcos, Jr. filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and pointing out that
the Cabuyao property was not mentioned in the original and amended Complaints or their annexes. The Republic
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint, with an attached Fourth Amended Complaint with
amended annex List of Assets and Other Properties. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to admit the Fourth
Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Section 7, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion
to Resolve the Omnibus Motion, while the Republic filed a Comment, seeking an order of preliminary attachment
over the Cabuyao property. The Sandiganbayan ordered the cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens on
TCT No. T-85026 and held that the Republic’s allegations were insufficient to support an application for a writ of
attachment as the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or disposed of by the Marcoses. After the
denial of a motion for reconsideration, the Republic filed this Petition for certiorari, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.

The Republic argues, among others, that the amendment of the Complaint to specifically include the Cabuyao
property is a formal amendment that may be done at any time. As to entitlement to a writ of preliminary
attachment, the Republic argues that it has demonstrated entitlement to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao
property. On the other hand, the Marcoses argue that the property is not party of the res in Civil Case No. 002.

ISSUES:
1. Is the Sandiganbayan correct in cancelling the notice of lis pendens?
2. Is the denial of the Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint proper?
2. Is the Republic entitled to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao property?

RULING:
1. No, the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is to molest the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to
be recorded. The conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not involved in the Civil Case is based on the belief
that failure to specifically mention the property in the amended Complaint automatically renders it beyond the
scope of the Civil Case.

Executive Order No. 14 specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly
applied to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict
adherence to technical rules will hamper the efforts of the PCGG. The admitted Complaint was filed to recover,
for the Republic of the Philippines, all the properties that were illegally acquired by the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers and that were manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other lawful income,
and income from legitimately acquired property.

The assailed Resolutions do not suggest that the Cabuyao property is not part of the property illegally acquired
by respondents. Thus, the conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not affected by the Civil Case is based solely
on an inference from a procedural detail.

2. No, the denial of the Motion is not proper.

197
The Sandiganbayan’s denial was primarily based on a purported failure to comply with a requirement under Rule
10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, that amendments in a pleading be indicated by appropriate marks. The
procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be indicated with appropriate marks, has for its
purpose the convenience of the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately see the
modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect
any substantive right. Certainly, its absence cannot cause the denial of any substantive right.

A reading of the Fourth Amended Complaint reveals that the Sandiganbayan’s observation was patently wrong.
Petitioner did not fail to comply with Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. There were no portions in the body
of the Fourth Amended Complaint itself that needed to be underscored or marked, considering that the text was
identical to the text of the admitted Complaint. Annex A to the Fourth Amended Complaint, the List of Assets and
Other Properties, reveals that it was amended to include the Cabuyao property in the list of assets. That entry
was underscored to reflect the amendment.

3. Yes, the Republic is entitled to a writ of preliminary attachment.

Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows for the attachment of the property of the adverse party as security
for any judgment that may be recovered in an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a wilful
violation of duty; or In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or
converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its
being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person.

The allegations in the admitted Complaint fall within Section 1(b) and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities of
the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President,
gravely abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth
suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered
under the names of respondents — minors at the time of registration — is sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao
property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.

The Sandiganbayan should have issued an order of preliminary attachment considering that the requisites of the
law — including that of Executive Order No. 14 — have been substantially met, and that there is factual basis for
the issuance of the preliminary attachment. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s Motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no substantial amendments to Rule 13, Section 14 (now Section 19), Rule 10,
Section 7, and Rule 57, Section 1 under the 2019 Rules of Court.

198
Payment of Fees

Heirs of Dragon v. Manila Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019
Leonen, J.

Payment of filing fees in full at the time the initiatory pleading or application is filed is the general rule. The
payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which
should be strictly construed.

FACTS:
Respondent Bank filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Renato P. Dragon. Dragon filed an
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent bank in its Decision. Both parties filed Motions for Reconsideration. Dragon
raised for the first time the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the Complaint. He alleged that
respondent bank willfully and deliberately evaded payment of the correct docket fees for the amounts it claimed.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Both parties appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, and
subsequently denied both parties’ Motions for Reconsideration. The CA found that the deficient payment of
docket fees did not automatically result in the case’s dismissal as the trial court may still allow payment of the
difference within a reasonable period, but before the expiry of the reglementary period

ISSUE:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint of respondent Bank in view of the insufficient payment of
docket fees?

RULING:
No, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction because of the insufficient payment of docket fees.

In Sun Insurance Office, the court laid down the rules concerning the payment of filing fees, taking into
consideration other rulings:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that fests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Notwithstanding the guidelines, it must be emphasized that payment of filing fees in full at the time the
initiatory pleading or application is filed is still the general rule. Exceptions that grant liberality for insufficient
payment are strictly construed against the filing party. Should there be a finding that the filing party intended
to conceal the amount of its claims to pay a smaller amount of docket fees, demonstrating an intent to defraud
the court what it is owed, then the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation, not Sun Insurance Office,
shall apply.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

199
Payment of Fees

Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla

G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
Leonen, J.

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. The amount of
the docket fee shall be computed from the amounts in the prayer.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review filed by Amanda Zacharias against respondent spouses Castillo-Revilla against the
decision of RTC and CA declaring the transfer of title to the petitioner valid and binding.

Revilla spouses are the owners of fee simple of an unregistered parcel of land in Silang Cavite covered by a Tax
Declaration. Revilla borrowed money from Zacharias secured by their parcel of land. The verbal agreement is for
Zacharias to cultivate the land and then use the earnings to pay the loan and realty taxes and upon full payment
of the loan, Zacharias would return the property to the spouses. Zacharias sold the property to the Casoria
spouses by Deed of Absolute Sale and in turn, spouses Casoria executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
spouses Sun. Upon the return of Alfredo Revilla from Saudi, he asked Amanda why she did not return the tax
declaration despite full payment of the loan. He then discovered that the property was already in the name of
Spouses Sun. Revilla spouses filed a complaint before RTC for the annulment of sales with damages against
Amanda. RTC granted the complaint ordering Zacharaias to pay damages to the plaintiffs. Zacharias appealed
to CA which dismissed it.

One of the issues raised by petitioner is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction when Revilla spouses paid
docket fees based on P50, 000.00 claim for damages in the complaint and not based on the value of the property
amounting to P12,000,000.00 as stated in their supplemental pre-trial brief citing SC Circular No. 7 and
jurisprudence holding that payment of docket fees is crucial in vesting courts with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

ISSUE:
Did the court acquire jurisdiction when spouses Revilla paid the docket fee based on the P50, 000.00 claim for
moral damages?

RULING:
Yes, the spouses Revilla paid the correct docket fees and the thus, trial court acquired jurisdiction. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.

In Manchester Development Corporation VS CA, the court “condemned the practice of counsel who is filing the
original complaint omitted from the prayer any specification of the amount of damages although the amount of
over 78 million is alleged I the body of the complaint.” The court gave the warning against this unethical practice
that serves no purpose than to avoid paying the correct filing fees.

To put a stop to this irregularity, all complaints, petitions, answers, and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer. Said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees.

This ruling was circularized through SC No. 7 addressed to all lower court judges and IBP.

However, the fact of this case differ from that of Manchester. The complaint filed by respondents Revilla included
in its prayer the amount of P50, 000.00 as actual damages, without mention of any amount in the body of the
complaint. The basis of the P12, 000, 000.00 value raised during the pre-trial is unclear and based on the
complaint, Revilla spouses paid the correct docket fees computed from the amount of the prayer.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect as the SC Circular involved in the case is not affected by the 2019 amendments of the ROC.

200
Rule 14

Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
Leonen, J.

The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order. This prevents the
latter from being a substitute for the former. At no point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary
protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter,
they cohabited as husband and wife. 3 months into their marriage, Maria Sheila filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
Pavlow for slight physical injuries. Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include maltreatment in
relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.

Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia issued a resolution dismissing Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint, holding that
Maria Sheila failed to substantiate her allegations. Following this, Mendenilla filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition23 for Maria Sheila’s benefit, praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order or
Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-VAWC Law. Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order
in favor of Maria Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow.

Deputy Sheriff Velasco recounted that when service of summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached
was attempted on September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country.28 Thus, summons was served instead
through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow’s own residence in Unit. Pavlow filed Omnibus
Motions30 praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla’s petition, the reconsideration of the issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order, and the suspension of the enforcement of the Temporary Protection Order. He raised as
principal ground the Regional Trial Court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over his person as summons was
purportedly not properly served on him. Judge Giron-Dizon denied Pavlow’s motion to dismiss. Following Judge
Giron-Dizon’s denial of Pavlow’s motion for reconsideration, Pavlow filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. He charged Judge Giron-Dizon with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Mendenilla’s
Petition despite the alleged improper service of summons on him. Petitioner further reasoned that Mendenilla
lacked personality to file her Petition and that her filing of a petition only after Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia
dismissed Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint was considered forum shopping.

ISSUES:
(1) Does respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla have personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection
order under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Maria Sheila Mendenilla
Pavlow?
(2) Did respondent Mendenilla engage in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance of a protection
order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was dismissed by the prosecutor?
(3) Was summons properly served on petitioner Steven R. Pavlow and jurisdiction over his person was
validly acquired?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law.
However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent
Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.

More basic, the filing of Maria Sheila’s complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her
own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level
of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of
a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila’s Complaint-Affidavit
did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding
of forum shopping by her mother.

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(2) No. The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor “cannot be considered a
valid and final judgment.” As there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by the
court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have been res
judicata — actual or looming as to bar one (1) of several proceedings on account of litis pendentia — as
to bar Mendenilla’s petition for being an act of forum shopping. Res judicata is the conceptual backbone
upon which forum shopping rests.

(3) Yes. The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order. This
prevents the latter from being a substitute for the former. Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by
which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam,
brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of
an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. A protection order is not a
procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a
substantive relief. Clearly then, summons and temporary protection orders are entirely different judicial
issuances. It is true that the latter also serves the purpose of conveying information. However, this
information pertains not to the filing of an action but merely to the schedule of an upcoming hearing. The
similarities of a summons and a protection order begin and end with their informative capacity. At no
point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary protection order is the means for acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

Furthermore, Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the
Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to
substituted service has long been held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a
contrary, restrictive view is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents
who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that,
upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have arisen.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None, same rules apply with respect to the service of summons to residents temporarily out of the country. with
regard to the criminal procedure, no change.

202
Rule 14, Sec. 6

People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing

G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by a sheriff’s failure to personally serve the summons
within a period of one (1) month. Within this period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two
(2) different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriffs return why
these attempts are unsuccessful.

FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) assailing the decision of the CA which granted
Respondents Edgardo Guansing and Eduardo Lizaso’s appeal and set aside the RTC’s ruling.

On February 4, 2006, Lizaso, Guansing’s employee, was driving Guansing’s truck along Legarda St., Sampaloc,
Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama’s (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact
caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair. Yokohama’s vehicle was insured
with People’s General Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which
paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement. Thus, Petitioner People’s General Insurance Corporation
(PGIC) claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing. PGIC
sought from Guansing reimbursement but despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount
claimed.

On August 28, 2006 PGIC filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages against Guansing and Lizaso.
The sheriff served the summons on Guansing’s brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff’s return did not explain
why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. PGIC argued
that summons was properly served since substituted service was an alternative mode of service.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. After several postponements by both parties, Guansing submitted
his Pre-trial Brief dated March 8, 2008, where he again raised the Issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person.
The RTC ruled against Guansing.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons?
2. Did Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his Answer and
other subsequent pleadings?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make decisions that are binding on them. Jurisdiction
over complainants or petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions, while jurisdiction
over defendants or respondents is acquired through valid service of summons or their voluntary submission to
the courts’ jurisdiction.

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service,
and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to
resort to substituted service of summons. Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Impossibility of prompt personal service is
established by a sheriffs failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this
period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the
summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.

203
In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent Guansing’s brother is not provided for in
the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious efforts to attempt to serve the
summons on the person of respondent Guansing. The sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt
personal service before he resorted to substituted service.

2. Yes, Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his answer and other
pleadings.

Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings
despite improper service of summons. In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre trial
brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Postponement and March 8, 2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs were
sought. Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the proceedings, cannot impugn the court’s
jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has established that the filing of an answer, among other pleadings,
is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court with jurisdiction over the person.

Thus, the filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure/Revised Rules on Evidence because
in the new rules, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. Thus, what must be raised must only be lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant. As to the ruling on substituted service, aside from two new additional ways for substituted
service, there is no effect because the new rules only conform to established jurisprudence.

204
Rule 14, Sec. 6

Spouses Manuel v. Ong

G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.

Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the
summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the decision and resolution of the CA be
reversed and set aside.

Respondent Ong filed with the RTC of Benguet a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria charging spouses Manuel
with having constructed improvements—through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth—on a property
he supposedly owned.

Sheriff Sales attempted to personally serve summons issued to Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower
Bacong, Loacan, Benguet. Spouses Manuel however requested that service be made at another time considering
that Sandra Manuel’s mother was then critically ill.

Sheriff Sales made another attempt to personally serve the summons to Sandra Manuel but she refused to sign
and receive the summons. Sheriff Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and advise Sandra
Manuel to file their answer within 15 days. Spouses Manuel filed to file an answer so Ong asked the court for the
former to be declared in default.

RTC issued an order granting the motion to declare spouses Manuel in default.

Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift order of default claiming that the siblings of the spouses were the ones who
resided in the address stated in the summons so it could not have been properly served on them. RTC denied
the motion.

ISSUES:
3. Did the court acquire jurisdiction upon the persons of Spouses Manuel by tender of summons?
4. Are the spouses Manuel entitled to relief from order of default because of alleged improper service of
summons?

RULING:
3. Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly acquired because personal service of
summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales. The sheriff’s
return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons
and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions.

The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it
requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the
defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

4. The requisites for declaring a party in default were satisfied by respondent Ong.
d) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default;
e) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
f) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period
provided by the Rule.”

It is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. It is also not disputed
that the latter filed their answer after the fifteen-day period had lapsed.

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Not only were the requisites for declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift
order of default was also shown to be procedurally infirm. In Montinola, Jr. vs. Republic Planters Bank, the
Court noted that there are three requisites that must be satisfied in order to warrant the setting of an order
of default:
d) the motion to lift order of default;
e) an affidavit showing the invoked ground - fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and
f) the party’s meritorious defense or defenses

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was not
made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts
which would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due
to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s
motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec 5 of Rule 14 is originally and
may be compared with old Sec 6 of the same rule. However, aside from change of section, the rule on tender
when the defendant whom the summons was served refused to receive and sign it is the same. The amended
section just explains what tendering means or how it is done.

206
Rule 14, Sec. 7

People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing

G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

Substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge.
Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and personal service of summons
is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of
summons.

FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) assailing the decision of the CA which granted
Respondents Edgardo Guansing and Eduardo Lizaso’s appeal and set aside the RTC’s ruling.

On February 4, 2006, Lizaso, Guansing’s employee, was driving Guansing’s truck along Legarda St., Sampaloc,
Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama’s (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact
caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair. Yokohama’s vehicle was insured
with People’s General Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which
paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement. Thus, Petitioner People’s General Insurance Corporation
(PGIC) claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing. PGIC
sought from Guansing reimbursement but despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount
claimed.

On August 28, 2006 PGIC filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages against Guansing and Lizaso.
The sheriff served the summons on Guansing’s brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff’s return did not explain
why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. PGIC argued
that summons was properly served since substituted service was an alternative mode of service.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. After several postponements by both parties, Guansing submitted
his Pre-trial Brief dated March 8, 2008, where he again raised the Issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person.
The RTC ruled against Guansing.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons?
2. Did Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his Answer and
other subsequent pleadings?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make decisions that are binding on them. Jurisdiction
over complainants or petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions, while jurisdiction
over defendants or respondents is acquired through valid service of summons or their voluntary submission to
the courts’ jurisdiction.

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service,
and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to
resort to substituted service of summons. Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Impossibility of prompt personal service is
established by a sheriffs failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this

207
period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the
summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.

In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent Guansing’s brother is not provided for in
the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious efforts to attempt to serve the
summons on the person of respondent Guansing. The sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt
personal service before he resorted to substituted service.

2. Yes, Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his answer and other
pleadings.

Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings
despite improper service of summons. In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre trial
brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Postponement and March 8, 2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs were
sought. Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the proceedings, cannot impugn the court’s
jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has established that the filing of an answer, among other pleadings,
is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court with jurisdiction over the person.

Thus, the filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure/Revised Rules on Evidence because
in the new rules, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. Thus, what must be raised must only be lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant. As to the ruling on substituted service, aside from two new additional ways for substituted
service, there is no effect because the new rules only conform to established jurisprudence.

208
Rule 14, Sec. 11

Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.

G.R. No.172204, July 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision remanding the case to the trial court for
respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative’s (respondent) presentation of evidence.

The farmer-beneficiaries entered into two separate agreements with respect to the properties situated in Silang,
Cavite. First with the respondent and second with the petitioner. By virtue of the said agreements, respondent
caused the annotation of its adverse claims on the farmer-beneficiaries’ certificate of title, while petitioner and
the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the properties and transfer certificate of title were also
issued in the name of petitioner. This prompted respondent’s Vice President Orlando Dela Peña (VP) to send 2
letters to petitioner to inform of respondent’s claim to the properties. However, petitioner did not respond.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its TCT with the RTC. The
petitioner served the copy twice to the respondent’s address (Brgy. Mayapa Calamba, Laguna), first via
registered mail and second through personal service. However, both services failed due to cooperative does not
exist. Petitioner was then allowed by the RTC to present its evidence ex parte.

When respondent heard that there is a case pending which involves its adverse claims, it filed a manifestation
and motion alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and the petition. Respondent moved
for the service of summons and for a copy of the petition to be sent to its address at Narra Avenue Calamba,
Laguna. Respondent argued that petitioner was not being fair when it served summons to respondent’s old
address despite knowledge of its actual address. Moreover, respondent argued that its rights over the property
should be best determined after trial.

Instead of complying with the service, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration since respondent was already
in default and that the case has already been submitted for decision. It likewise argued that respondent was
sufficiently served with summons and a copy of its petition for cancellation of annotations because it allegedly
sent these documents to respondent’s official address as registered with the Cooperative Development Authority.
Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the Cooperative Code with respect to notices.
This is because the Cooperative Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure, which pertains
only to matters of procedure.

The RTC granted the petitioner’s cancellation of annotation. On appeal by respondent to the CA, it was ruled that
no valid service of summons upon respondents and thus, court did not acquire jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Was there valid service of summons and notice of hearing to the respondent?

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that respondent was not validly served with summons or notice of the hearing. However, its
annotations of adverse claims should be cancelled for being based on a future claim.

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court procedure.
Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to
have an official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules
on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served upon a
juridical entity only through its officers. Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. —When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,

209
treasurer, or in-house counsel. The enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons upon
persons other than those officers enumerated is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons. This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If
summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be
served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.

In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal service
at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon
respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent
was not given an opportunity to present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court
an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims. Respondent was, therefore, not validly served
with summons.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 12 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The exclusive list indicated in the
old rules (Sec. 11) and in this case no longer applies. The amended provision on service upon domestic private
juridical entity added several persons to whom service may be made and other means for service of summons.

210
Rule 14, Sec. 14

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebescensio

G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
Leonen, J.

Service of summons to branch office sufficient to vest jurisdiction over foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by petitioner Saudia Arabian Airlines (Saudia), seeking to reverse the decision of Court of
Appeals in affirming the decision of the NLRC in favor of private respondents herein. Saudia is a foreign
corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudia also has an
office in the Philippines.

Private respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants. They continued their
employment until they were separated from service solely because they were pregnant. This prompted the private
respondents to file an illegal termination case before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which dismissed the same on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the NLRC, reversed the ruling of the LA, declaring that there were no
special circumstances that warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction. Saudia filed Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals to question NLRC’s award of separation pay and backwages, among others, in favor of private
respondents herein. Court of appeals, denied the same, hence, this petition.

Saudia, however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction
over it because summons were never served on it but on “Saudia Manila.” Referring to itself as “Saudia Jeddah,”
it claims that “Saudia Jeddah” and not “Saudia Manila” was the employer of respondents

ISSUE:
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Saudia by serving summons before its branch office in
Manila?

RULING:
Yes, the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Saudia by summons before its branch office in
Manila.

Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act no. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991), the phrase
Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides that
the phrase “doing business” shall include . . . opening offices, whether called “liaison” offices or
branches; A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other conclusion than
that Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the
Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.

Thus, absent distinction between “Saudia Jeddah” and “Saudia Manila”, service of summons to Saudia’s office
in Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia’s person in Philippine tribunals.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Section 14 of Rule 14’s amendment does not run counter to the supreme court’s decision as
the amended provision’s essence were not reversed even though the words “or is doing business” were added
in the latest amendment.

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Rule 14, Sec. 19

De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.

G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
Leonen, J.

The sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve summons
to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons. The issuance of a
judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers
a jurisdictional defect.

FACTS:
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title, filed
by petitioner Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan) against several defendants. One of the defendants
is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro).

Romasan alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. Sometimes in 1996, it
discovered that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo Property. When confronted about this, De
pedro was able to show title and documents evidencing ownership over the same. Upon checking with the
CENRO-DENR, it was confirmed that DENR issued free patents covering Romasan’s property. Thus, Romasan
filed complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title against defendants herein. However,
service of summons against De Pedro proved unsuccessful. She was unserved for the reason that according to
the messenger of Post Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address. Thus, Romasan filed motion
to serve summons and complaints by publication. Later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Romasan
noting that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an answer to respondent’s complaints.

Upon learning the RTC judgment, De Pedro filed for motion for new trial alleging that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of summons. She did not allege that fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly
discovered evidence that could have altered the trial court decision person When her motion for new trial was
denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege
any ground for new trial. Hence, this petition for annulment of judgment.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the service by publication faithfully and strictly comply with the requirements of substituted service
rendering it effective?
(2) Is the petitioner barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment?

RULING:
(1) No, the service by publication did not faithfully and strictly comply with the requirements of substituted
service. The sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve
summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons.

Here, the return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. The
summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there was no “Aurora N. De
Pedro” in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner’s
whereabouts.

Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be
allowed based on such defective return. The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is
a violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect.

(2) Yes, the petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

The court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where
the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy
and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.”

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Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always readily available even if there are causes for
annulling a judgment.

Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost,
with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing
and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.

Thus, petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 14 Sec. 19 - No effect since the amendment did not substantially change the essence of the provision.
Rule 47, Sec.1 - No effect because no amendment was made regarding Rule 47.

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Rule 14, Sec. 20

People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing

G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings
despite improper service of summons. In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre-
trial brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs.

FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) assailing the decision of the CA which granted
Respondents Edgardo Guansing and Eduardo Lizaso’s appeal and set aside the RTC’s ruling.

On February 4, 2006, Lizaso, Guansing’s employee, was driving Guansing’s truck along Legarda St., Sampaloc,
Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama’s (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact
caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair. Yokohama’s vehicle was insured
with People’s General Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which
paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement. Thus, Petitioner People’s General Insurance Corporation
(PGIC) claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing. PGIC
sought from Guansing reimbursement but despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount
claimed.

On August 28, 2006 PGIC filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages against Guansing and Lizaso.
The sheriff served the summons on Guansing’s brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff’s return did not explain
why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. PGIC argued
that summons was properly served since substituted service was an alternative mode of service.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. After several postponements by both parties, Guansing submitted
his Pre-trial Brief dated March 8, 2008, where he again raised the Issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person.
The RTC ruled against Guansing.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons?
2. Did Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his Answer and
other subsequent pleadings?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make decisions that are binding on them. Jurisdiction
over complainants or petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions, while jurisdiction
over defendants or respondents is acquired through valid service of summons or their voluntary submission to
the courts’ jurisdiction.

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service,
and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to
resort to substituted service of summons. Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Impossibility of prompt personal service is
established by a sheriffs failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this
period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the
summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.

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In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent Guansing’s brother is not provided for in
the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious efforts to attempt to serve the
summons on the person of respondent Guansing. The sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt
personal service before he resorted to substituted service.

2. Yes, Guansing voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he filed his answer and other
pleadings.

Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings
despite improper service of summons. In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre trial
brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Postponement and March 8, 2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs were
sought. Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the proceedings, cannot impugn the court’s
jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has established that the filing of an answer, among other pleadings,
is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court with jurisdiction over the person.

Thus, the filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure/Revised Rules on Evidence because
in the new rules, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. Thus, what must be raised must only be lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant. As to the ruling on substituted service, aside from two new additional ways for substituted
service, there is no effect because the new rules only conform to established jurisprudence.

215
Rule 14, Sec. 20

Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
Leonen, J.

Voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court, as it is subject
to special appearance as an exception.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions arose out of a pending case between Sunrise Garden Corporation (Sunrise) and
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock). First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not a party to that case.

In 1999, pursuant to an ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City approved the request of Brgy.
Cupang to construct a city road connecting Brgy. Cupang and Marcos Highway. Notices to property owners
affected were posted. As an affected owner, Sunrise executed an Undertaking where it would construct the city
road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement of tax credits. However, armed guards, allegedly hired by
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock), prevented it from using an access road to move the construction
equipment. A Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction against Hardrock was filed and granted. Unheeded, the court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI). Subsequently, Sunrise filed a Motion and Manifestation for the amendment of the
WPI “to include any and all persons from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner’s contractors in
proceeding with the construction of the city road.” Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. (First Alliance), blocked Sunrise contractor’s employees
and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. A motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt
was filed. An order to comply with the Amended WPI was then issued. However, security guards dressed in
civilian clothes under Forefront Security Agency still allegedly prevented the workers from proceeding to the
construction site. First Alliance ordered them not to allow the city road construction. Sunrise, then, filed a Motion
to cite Forefront Security Agency and First Alliance in contempt. Meanwhile, K-9 Security Agency filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, attaching photocopies of land titles to show that First Alliance was the registered owner of
the parcel of land where the pieces of construction equipment were being placed. However, the Register of Deeds
could not provide copies of First Alliance transfer certificates of title. Hence, it must comply with the Amended
WPI. First Alliance filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO before the CA. The
latter issued ex-parte a TRO valid for 60 days. Sunrise and the Republic of the Philippines separately filed
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction assailing the WPI
issued by the CA. The CA granted First Alliance’s Petition and annulled the Amended WPI.

Sunrise points out that First Alliance assuming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the person of First
Alliance, this was cured when the latter voluntarily appeared in court. First Alliance counters that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it was not impleaded as a party-litigant in the Complaint for damages
filed by Sunrise against Hardrock. Further, First Alliance claims that the construction of the city road has the
effect of appropriating and taking First Alliance’s private property for public use. But the Republic argues that
expropriation and eminent domain are different, and if compensation for the property is accepted, then there is
no need for an expropriation proceeding. In addition, First Alliance is not an affected landowner. As to the
allegation that there was no public bidding, Republic of the Philippines discussed that the City Government had
no funds for the road project, thus, it could not bid out the project. However, due to the urgent need for the
construction of the city road, the local government had to negotiate with a party “who could advance its realty
taxes.” Sunrise Garden Corporation offered to do so, and the local government found the offer favorable.

ISSUES:
1. May the prohibition on issuance of TRO against national government projects under RA 8975 be applied?
2. May a person not a party to the main suit be bound by an ancillary writ?
3. Is voluntary appearance considered submission to the jurisdiction of the court?

RULING:
1. No, because RA 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, and this case involves a local
government infrastructure project. For local government infrastructure projects, RTCs may issue provisional
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are compelling and substantial
constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable

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injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public
interests] at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweigh (a) the
inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from
the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial
courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the
injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

In this case, the notice to the public states that “the City Government of Antipolo is going to construct the 20
meters wide city road and the funds would come from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City. There is
nothing on record to show that the city road project is a national government project. Hence, the prohibition on
the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against national government projects does not apply.

2. No, because Rule 58, Section 5 requires that the party to be enjoined must be notified and heard. He cannot
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary
injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action.

It may be argued that First Alliance should have intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, First
Alliance’s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in Sunrise’s Complaint. That Complaint
was against Hardrock. Since there is nothing to prove and establish that Hardrock, Inc. and petitioners are one
and the same, then they should be treated as separate and distinct personalities. During the hearings before the
CA, counsel for Sunrise placed much emphasis on its argument that First Alliance did not prove ownership over
the property but did not refute the primary issue of lack of jurisdiction. This is an admission that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over First Alliance.

3. No, because while Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent
to service of summons, voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of
a court. Special appearance operates as an exception. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. Further, the same rule also provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.”

Here, the appearance of First Alliance and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance
because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that
they repeatedly argued and raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction at the first instance.

Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the Amended WPI against
First Alliance, the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because, under the said rules, the
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall be now be deemed a voluntary appearance.

217
Rule 15, Sec. 4

Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Leonen, J.

Failure to comply with the notice requirement under Rule 15, Sec. 4 renders the motion defective consistent with
protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process. While the general rule is that the same is a mere
scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing
so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction filed
by Marilou S. Laude (Marilou) and Mesehilda S. Laude.

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed in Olongapo City, allegedly by 19-year-old
US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling,
Marilou, against Pemberton before the City Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo. The Public
Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton, who surrendered personally to Judge Roline M.
Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-Jabalde). On December 19, 2014, Marilou filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
AFP to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail. The motion was scheduled for hearing on
December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s
counsel through registered mail. They claim to have also furnished a copy of the motion personally at the hearing
of the motion. On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners’ Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the Motion
based on the three-day rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court which, according to
them, should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances. Further, they argue that
the Judge should not have dismissed the Motion considering that the it raised issues of transcendental
importance and of primordial public interest. Lastly, they argue that the Public Prosecutor’s refusal to sign the
Motion rendered the requirement for conformity superfluous. On the other hand, public respondents argue that
petitioners’ failure to comply cannot be excused in light of the rule’s purpose. Further, they aver that the
requirement for motions to be filed in the name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor is part of the
essential, inherent, and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals. They also aver that Pemberton’s
handover specifically to the Olongapo City Jail is unnecessary. Lastly, they maintain that petitioners are not
entitled to a mandatory injunction since they have no clear and unmistakable right to the transfer of Pemberton
from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail.

ISSUES:
1. Is compliance with the three-day notice rule on motions mandatory?
2. Is the refusal of a public prosecutor to give conforme to an interlocutory relief considered abuse of discretion?
3. May a writ of mandatory injunction be issued to compel the turn-over of the custody of the accused pursuant
to a VFA agreement?

RULING:
1. Yes, because Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party
be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process. While
the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper,
an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither
cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time
to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In
this case, the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. The general rule must
apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion
orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was
able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was
correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of

218
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to
prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

2. No, because refusal to give concurrence to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of the public prosecutor’s
position. Procedural law, under Rule 110, Sec. 5, basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. The duty and authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue,
are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. There may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process). In this
case, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave
abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. That petitioners used as
bases newspaper articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of Secretary De
Lima cannot be given weight. Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have
been for petitioners to have the act reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

3. No, because the petition did not discuss the basis for their claim that they are entitled to the sought writ. A writ
of mandatory injunction is granted only upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Further, the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during
trial as contained in the VFA provides that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody. The parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties,
but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing
trial, in Camp Aguinaldo. Their claim that the detention facility is under the “control, supervision and jurisdiction
of American military authorities” is not substantiated.

Hence the petition for issuance of writ of mandatory injunction is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 15, Secs. 4 and 5 of the 2019 Amendments on Rules of Civil Procedure, because the
three-day notice rule is no longer required. Secs. 4 and 5 of the new rules provide for litigious and non-litigous
motions. What is mandatory now is the service or notice of the motion to another party and proof of such service
to the court.

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Rule 15, Sec. 5

Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054 (Resolution), March 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

The notice of hearing on the motion must be directed to the adverse party and must inform him or her of the time
and date of the hearing. Failure to comply with these mandates renders the motion fatally defective, equivalent
to a useless scrap of paper.

FACTS:
The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City 4 Informations for grave oral
defamation against Deogracia M. Valderrama pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL Vigden. During
trial Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the
Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further evidence and
required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five (5) days. The prosecution failed to formally offer
its evidence within five (5) days from the hearing. Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (Motion to
Reconsider) explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he had to manage his high blood
pressure. Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his conformity to Vigden’s
Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, and the Motion to Reconsider’s
Notice of Hearing “was defective because it was not addressed to the parties, and did not specify the date and
time of the hearing.” She further argued that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for
motions for reconsideration. She likewise pointed out that there was no medical certificate attached to the Motion
to Reconsider to prove the private prosecutor’s sickness. Finally, she contended that the eight (8)-year delay in
the prosecution of the cases violated Valderrama’s right to speedy trial.

The Metropolitan Trial Court granted Vigden’s Motion to Reconsider and set the continuation of the prosecution’s
presentation of further evidence for the last time.

Valderrama filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, the latter found no grave abuse of discretion by the lower
court and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
in its Decision

Valderrama argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the patently
defective Motion to Reconsider. She contends that the Motion to Reconsider violated procedural rules and its
grant was not a mere error of judgment. Valderrama adds that failure to comply with Rule 14, Sections 4 and 5
of the Rules of Court renders the motion “a worthless piece of paper.

ISSUE:
Whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Reconsider to allow the
prosecution to continue its presentation of evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The respondent’s Motion to Reconsider was fatally defective and should have been denied by the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

The public prosecutor’s conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is necessary as provided under Rule 110, Section
5 of the Rules of Court.

In Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, this Court ruled that the required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere
superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to
prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest.
The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public
prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the required
legal personality to pursue the case.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not denied by the private
respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the the Office of the City Prosecutor did not object to the
filing of the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the City Prosecutor was only furnished with a copy of the Motion

220
to Reconsider and it opens with the phrase “[p]rivate complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states . . .” This is not sufficient. Since
the Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, it involves the criminal aspect
of the case and, thus, cannot be considered without the public prosecutor’s conforme.

Furthermore, Respondent also did not set a hearing for the Motion to Reconsider. Instead, she simply submitted
it for Metropolitan Trial Court’s immediate consideration. The notice did not comply with Rule 15, Sections 4 and
5 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the notice of hearing on the motion must be directed to the adverse party and
must inform him or her of the time and date of the hearing. Failure to comply with these mandates renders the
motion fatally defective, equivalent to a useless scrap of paper. In De la Peña v. De la Peña, this Court
enumerated the cases where it consistently ruled that a proper notice of hearing was necessary in filing motions
for reconsideration.

Lastly, This Court notes that the Motion to Reconsider was filed outside the period allowed by the rules as set in
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Order on April 12, 2012 and
required the prosecution to formally offer its documentary evidence within five (5) days from that date.[62] The
prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from the hearing. It also failed to file the Motion
to Reconsider within 15 days. The prosecution had 15 days from April 12, 2012, or until April 27, 2012 to file its
Motion to Reconsider. The private prosecutor filed her Motion to Reconsider only on May 8, 2012, or 26 days
after the Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Order.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None. Since, the amendments did not affect the rules mentioned herein.

221
Rule 16, Sec. 1

Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

Two categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: first, those
that must be filed ahead of an answer and second, those that may be entertained even after an answer has been
filed. Those under the second category may only plead four (4) of the 10 grounds under Rule 16, Section 1: lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. The prior filing of an answer,
therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration of six (6) other grounds under Rule 16, Sec. 1; however, the
grounds stated in a belatedly filed motion to dismiss may still be considered provided that they were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in an answer.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision dismissing herein petitioner’s original petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decision of the RTC, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the presiding Judge therein.

Herein petitioner originally filed an answer to a complaint assailing the validity of a tax sale filed against him with
the RTC. After filing his answer, he then filed a motion to dismiss grounded on Rule 16, Sec. 1 (b), (g) and (j) or
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure to state cause of action by the complainant
and failure to comply with a condition precedent. Petitioner had also raised these grounds for dismissal in his
answer. Still, the RTC ultimately denied his motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss in the present case?

RULING:
Yes, the RTC was correct. Nevertheless, the Court remarked that there are two categories of motions to dismiss
that may be recognized under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: first, those that must be filed ahead of an
answer and second, those that may be entertained even after an answer has been filed. Those under the second
category may only plead four (4) of the 10 grounds under Rule 16, Section 1: lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. The prior filing of an answer, therefore, serves as a bar to
the consideration of six (6) other grounds under Rule 16, Sec. 1; however, the grounds stated in a belatedly filed
motion to dismiss may still be considered provided that they were pleaded as affirmative defenses in an answer.

There is then no waiver of the previously pleaded defenses. The belatedly filed motion to dismiss is not a useless
superfluity. It is effectively a motion for the court to hear the grounds for dismissal previously pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer, pursuant to Rule 16, Sec. 6.

Still, the continuing availability of grounds does not guarantee a dismissal. An allegation of non-compliance with
a condition precedent may be belied by antecedent facts and a claim of failure to state a cause of action may be
negated by sufficient allegations in the complaint.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 15, Sec. 12(a) of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because the amendment states
that there are now only four (4) grounds to file a motion to dismiss. Rule 16 has already been deleted.

222
Rule 16, Sec. 1

Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency

GR No. 223751, March 15, 2017
Leonen, J.

To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted. To sufficiently state a cause of action,
the Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength
of its factual allegations.

FACTS:
This a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that respondents Philippine Information Agency and DPWH be
ordered to pay the money claims of petitioners Miguel “Lucky” Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production, Co.

Petitioners filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before the RTC of Marikina City. They alleged
that… then Acting Secretary of the DPWH Victor Domingo (Domingo), consulted and discussed with them the
urgent need for an advocacy campaign. Petitioners formally submitted in a letter-proposal the concept of
“Joyride,” a documentary film showcasing milestones of the Arroyo Administration. Domingo signed a marginal
note on the letter-proposal, which read, “OK, proceed!” Petitioners allegedly worked on “Joyride” on a tight
schedule and submitted the finished product. “Joyride” was aired on NBN-Channel4. Petitioners delivered 10,000
“Joyride” comics to the DPWH, and subsequently billed the Philippine Information Agency P15,000,000.00. No
funds were released by the Philippine Information Agency.

The OSG moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. RTC granted the motion, finding that, although a contract existed between petitioners
and Acting Secretary Domingo, this contract was not binding on the government of the Philippines. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Was the Complaint properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action?

RULING:
Yes. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c)
an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Thus, to determine the
sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be
considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted. To sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint
should have alleged facts showing that the trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual
allegations.

The Complaint attempts to establish a contract that involves expenditure of public funds. The Administrative Code
of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior
requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the
contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and
auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of
these two requirements renders the contract void. The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing
requisites for the validity of contracts involving expenditure of public funds.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the
Complaint, and the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Failure to state a cause of action is no longer a ground for a motion to dismiss under the Revised Rules, but the
same may be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer.

223
Rule 16, Sec. 1

Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Fredeluces

G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any suit subsequently filed for the same
cause of action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. When there is more than one suit pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss may be filed on this
ground.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74791.

The exploration and development of the Malampaya-Camago natural gas reservoir required the construction and
operation of a shallow water platform off the coast of Palawan. Subsequently, the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority proposed a 40-hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin as a possible construction site for the concrete gravity
structure. Results of a socio-economic survey commissioned by Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. showed that
there were about 200 households living at or near the proposed construction site. Together with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. established contact
with the occupants of Sitio Agusuhin.

In May 1998, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. entered into a Lease
and Development Agreement for the construction of the concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority undertook to relocate the affected households, while Shell Philippines Exploration
B.V. undertook to give financial assistance to them.

On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages was filed against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas
Shell Foundation, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Fredeluces, et al., alleged were
“effectively evicted” from their homes in “total disregard” of their rights. Admitting that some of the claimants were
given financial assistance, Fredeluces, et al. alleged that the amounts given were “insufficient to compensate the
damages they sustained[.]” Worse, they were allegedly “pressured, coerced or . . . ‘sweet talked’“ into signing
quitclaims and waivers.

Instead of answering the Complaint, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. moved
to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of
cause of action.

Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. alleged that five (5) of the plaintiffs earlier
filed against them a Complaint for sum of money. Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. argued that the Complaint for sum of money and the Complaint for damages had substantially
similar causes of action and relief sought, rendering the subsequently filed Complaint for damages dismissible
on the ground of litis pendentia.

Apart from the existence of litis pendentia, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
insist that the Complaint for damages failed to state a cause of action. According to Pilipinas Shell Foundation,
Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V., Fredeluces, et al. failed to allege specific acts from which it may be
inferred that Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. violated the law or acted in
bad faith. Instead of alleging ultimate facts, Fredeluces, et al. repeatedly made conclusions of law in their
Complaint for damages, such as that they were “lawful residents” of Sitio Agusuhin, or that Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. “arbitrarily and unlawfully evict[ed] [Fredeluces, et al.]
from their place of abode and livelihood[.]” Fredeluces, et al. failed to specifically allege the acts from which they
inferred that they were lawful residents of Sitio Agusuhin or that they were unlawfully evicted.

Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
limiting itself with the allegations of the Complaint for damages when it ruled that Fredeluces, et al. had the right
to demand for compensation from Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. The rule
that the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically admitted when a motion to dismiss is filed is subject to

224
exceptions. Annexes to the complaint as well as matters of judicial notice may be considered in dismissing a
complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUES:
1. Were the respondents Fredeluces, et al.’s Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia?
2. Was the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action?

RULING:
1. Yes.

The Complaint for damages should have been dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground
of litis pendentia. As for the rest of respondents, their Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any suit subsequently filed for the same
cause of action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. When there is more than one suit pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss may be filed on this
ground as provided by Rule 16, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court.

Litis Pendentia has the following elements: first, “[i]dentity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing
the same interests in both actions;” second, “[i]dentity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts;” and third, “[i]dentity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.”

As to respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. Santos, they revoked the
authority to file the Complaint for sum of money on their behalf. As for the four (4) of them, there was no pending
Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was subsequently filed. The trial court, therefore,
erred in dismissing their Complaint for damages on the ground of litis pendentia.

As for respondent Bebiana San Pedro, the Complaint for sum of money was filed with her authority. The
Complaint for sum of money was pending when the Complaint for damages was filed. With both Complaints
having substantially identical parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought, litis pendentia was present. As a
ground for filing a motion to dismiss, litis pendentia ripened to res judicata when the Court of Appeals Decision
on the Complaint for sum of money became final and executory. The trial court did not err in dismissing the
Complaint for damages as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground of litis pendentia.

2. Yes.

The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court. Failure
to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the allegation of the cause of action in the complaint. A
pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it “contain[s] in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise[,]
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his [or her] claim[.]” Ultimate facts
are the “important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.” Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions
of law in a pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining whether the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action.

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a defendant “hypothetically admits
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.” Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are
omitted in pleadings, “[t]he hypothetical admission is . . . limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded
in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” However, it is mandatory that courts “consider other
facts within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence” in resolving motions to
dismiss.

There are exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals:

There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if
such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the

225
record or document included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to
the complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the
course of hearings related to the case. (Citations omitted)

Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for damages, the Complaint states no
cause of action. Respondents may have resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit
trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin
under claim of ownership for the required number of years. It follows that respondents may not ask compensation
equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand
compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the owner. Moreover, respondents may not claim damages
equivalent to the value of the structures they built and the improvements they introduced in Sitio Agusuhin. Having
admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin, they were possessors in bad faith who lose whatever they built,
planted, or sown on the land of another without right to indemnity.

Specifically with respect to respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, the allegation that they
resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the constmction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically
admitted. Based on the evidence available during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001,
respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon were indeed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin prior to the
construction of the concrete gravity structure.

As for the allegation that respondents were “pressured, coerced[,] or . . . ‘sweet-talked’“ into receiving
compensation, this is a conclusion of law that may not be hypothetically admitted. The circumstances of fraud
and mistake must be stated with particularity. Nothing in the Complaint for damages show how respondents were
particularly “pressured, coerced[,] or . . . ‘sweet-talked’“ by petitioners into receiving compensation. As found by
the trial court, respondents voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by the deletion or transposition of Rule 16 by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because the
grounds provided by Rule 16 has already been integrated with the other amended provisions. (see Amended
Rule 8, Sec. 12, Rule 15, Sec, 7, 12 and 13).

226
Rule 16, Sec. 1

Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Fredeluces

G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

As a general rule, when a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate facts are hypothetically admitted.
Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial
notice, those which are legally impossible, inadmissible in evidence, or unfounded, are disregarded.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74791.

The exploration and development of the Malampaya-Camago natural gas reservoir required the construction and
operation of a shallow water platform off the coast of Palawan. Subsequently, the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority proposed a 40-hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin as a possible construction site for the concrete gravity
structure. Results of a socio-economic survey commissioned by Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. showed that
there were about 200 households living at or near the proposed construction site. Together with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. established contact
with the occupants of Sitio Agusuhin.

In May 1998, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. entered into a Lease
and Development Agreement for the construction of the concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority undertook to relocate the affected households, while Shell Philippines Exploration
B.V. undertook to give financial assistance to them.

On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages was filed against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas
Shell Foundation, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Fredeluces, et al., alleged were
“effectively evicted” from their homes in “total disregard” of their rights. Admitting that some of the claimants were
given financial assistance, Fredeluces, et al. alleged that the amounts given were “insufficient to compensate the
damages they sustained[.]” Worse, they were allegedly “pressured, coerced or . . . ‘sweet talked’“ into signing
quitclaims and waivers.

Instead of answering the Complaint, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. moved
to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of
cause of action.

Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. alleged that five (5) of the plaintiffs earlier
filed against them a Complaint for sum of money. Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. argued that the Complaint for sum of money and the Complaint for damages had substantially
similar causes of action and relief sought, rendering the subsequently filed Complaint for damages dismissible
on the ground of litis pendentia.

Apart from the existence of litis pendentia, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
insist that the Complaint for damages failed to state a cause of action. According to Pilipinas Shell Foundation,
Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V., Fredeluces, et al. failed to allege specific acts from which it may be
inferred that Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. violated the law or acted in
bad faith. Instead of alleging ultimate facts, Fredeluces, et al. repeatedly made conclusions of law in their
Complaint for damages, such as that they were “lawful residents” of Sitio Agusuhin, or that Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. “arbitrarily and unlawfully evict[ed] [Fredeluces, et al.]
from their place of abode and livelihood[.]” Fredeluces, et al. failed to specifically allege the acts from which they
inferred that they were lawful residents of Sitio Agusuhin or that they were unlawfully evicted.

Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
limiting itself with the allegations of the Complaint for damages when it ruled that Fredeluces, et al. had the right
to demand for compensation from Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. The rule
that the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically admitted when a motion to dismiss is filed is subject to

227
exceptions. Annexes to the complaint as well as matters of judicial notice may be considered in dismissing a
complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUES:
3. Were the respondents Fredeluces, et al.’s Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia?
4. Was the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action?

RULING:
3. Yes.

The Complaint for damages should have been dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground
of litis pendentia. As for the rest of respondents, their Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any suit subsequently filed for the same
cause of action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. When there is more than one suit pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss may be filed on this
ground as provided by Rule 16, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court.

Litis Pendentia has the following elements: first, “[i]dentity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing
the same interests in both actions;” second, “[i]dentity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts;” and third, “[i]dentity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.”

As to respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. Santos, they revoked the
authority to file the Complaint for sum of money on their behalf. As for the four (4) of them, there was no pending
Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was subsequently filed. The trial court, therefore,
erred in dismissing their Complaint for damages on the ground of litis pendentia.

As for respondent Bebiana San Pedro, the Complaint for sum of money was filed with her authority. The
Complaint for sum of money was pending when the Complaint for damages was filed. With both Complaints
having substantially identical parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought, litis pendentia was present. As a
ground for filing a motion to dismiss, litis pendentia ripened to res judicata when the Court of Appeals Decision
on the Complaint for sum of money became final and executory. The trial court did not err in dismissing the
Complaint for damages as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground of litis pendentia.

4. Yes.

The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court. Failure
to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the allegation of the cause of action in the complaint. A
pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it “contain[s] in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise[,]
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his [or her] claim[.]” Ultimate facts
are the “important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.” Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions
of law in a pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining whether the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action.

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a defendant “hypothetically admits
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.” Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are
omitted in pleadings, “[t]he hypothetical admission is . . . limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded
in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” However, it is mandatory that courts “consider other
facts within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence” in resolving motions to
dismiss.

There are exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals:

There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if
such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the

228
record or document included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to
the complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the
course of hearings related to the case. (Citations omitted)

Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for damages, the Complaint states no
cause of action. Respondents may have resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit
trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin
under claim of ownership for the required number of years. It follows that respondents may not ask compensation
equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand
compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the owner. Moreover, respondents may not claim damages
equivalent to the value of the structures they built and the improvements they introduced in Sitio Agusuhin. Having
admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin, they were possessors in bad faith who lose whatever they built,
planted, or sown on the land of another without right to indemnity.

Specifically with respect to respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, the allegation that they
resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the constmction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically
admitted. Based on the evidence available during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001,
respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon were indeed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin prior to the
construction of the concrete gravity structure.

As for the allegation that respondents were “pressured, coerced[,] or . . . ‘sweet-talked’“ into receiving
compensation, this is a conclusion of law that may not be hypothetically admitted. The circumstances of fraud
and mistake must be stated with particularity. Nothing in the Complaint for damages show how respondents were
particularly “pressured, coerced[,] or . . . ‘sweet-talked’“ by petitioners into receiving compensation. As found by
the trial court, respondents voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by the deletion or transposition of Rule 16 by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because the
grounds provided by Rule 16 has already been integrated with the other amended provisions. (see Amended
Rule 8, Sec. 12, Rule 15, Sec, 7, 12 and 13).

229
Litis Pendencia

Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
Leonen, J.

In filing a petition for the issuance of a protection order for her child, she avails of a remedy that is distinct from
the criminal action under Section 5 of the same law. The mere filing of such a criminal complaint, without the
subsequent filing of an information in court, does not occasion litis pendentia or res judicata that precludes the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a protection order.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter,
they cohabited as husband and wife. 3 months into their marriage, Maria Sheila filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
Pavlow for slight physical injuries. Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include maltreatment in
relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.

Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia issued a resolution dismissing Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint, holding that
Maria Sheila failed to substantiate her allegations. Following this, Mendenilla filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition23 for Maria Sheila’s benefit, praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order or
Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-VAWC Law. Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order
in favor of Maria Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow.

Deputy Sheriff Velasco recounted that when service of summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached
was attempted on September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country.28 Thus, summons was served instead
through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow’s own residence in Unit. Pavlow filed Omnibus
Motions30 praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla’s petition, the reconsideration of the issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order, and the suspension of the enforcement of the Temporary Protection Order. He raised as
principal ground the Regional Trial Court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over his person as summons was
purportedly not properly served on him. Judge Giron-Dizon denied Pavlow’s motion to dismiss. Following Judge
Giron-Dizon’s denial of Pavlow’s motion for reconsideration, Pavlow filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. He charged Judge Giron-Dizon with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Mendenilla’s
Petition despite the alleged improper service of summons on him. Petitioner further reasoned that Mendenilla
lacked personality to file her Petition and that her filing of a petition only after Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia
dismissed Maria Sheila’s criminal complaint was considered forum shopping.

ISSUES:
(1) Does respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla have personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection
order under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Maria Sheila Mendenilla
Pavlow?
(2) Did respondent Mendenilla engage in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance of a protection
order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was dismissed by the prosecutor?
(3) Was summons properly served on petitioner Steven R. Pavlow and jurisdiction over his person was
validly acquired?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law.
However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent
Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.

More basic, the filing of Maria Sheila’s complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her
own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level
of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of
a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila’s Complaint-Affidavit
did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding
of forum shopping by her mother.

230
(2) No. The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor “cannot be considered a
valid and final judgment.” As there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by the
court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have been res
judicata — actual or looming as to bar one (1) of several proceedings on account of litis pendentia — as
to bar Mendenilla’s petition for being an act of forum shopping. Res judicata is the conceptual backbone
upon which forum shopping rests.

(3) Yes. The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order. This
prevents the latter from being a substitute for the former. Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by
which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam,
brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of
an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. A protection order is not a
procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a
substantive relief. Clearly then, summons and temporary protection orders are entirely different judicial
issuances. It is true that the latter also serves the purpose of conveying information. However, this
information pertains not to the filing of an action but merely to the schedule of an upcoming hearing. The
similarities of a summons and a protection order begin and end with their informative capacity. At no
point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary protection order is the means for acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

Furthermore, Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the
Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to
substituted service has long been held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a
contrary, restrictive view is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents
who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that,
upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have arisen.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None, same rules apply with respect to the service of summons to residents temporarily out of the country. with
regard to the criminal procedure, no change.

231
Litis Pendencia

Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.

G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
Leonen, J.

No litis pendentia where no identity of parties and no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for.

FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of
land located in Davao City. Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the PBC’s claim. Lui Enterprises replied and insisted on its
right to collect the leased property’s rent.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the PBC over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already
consigned in court the rental payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its
succeeding monthly rental payments while the interpleader case is on going. The PBC filed its answer to the
complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.

Meanwhile, Lui Enterprises filed a nullification of deed of dation in payment case involving several properties it
dationed to the bank including the property leased by Zuellig Pharma pending with the RTC of Davao. It also
raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. According to Lui Enterprises,
this case barred the filing of the interpleader case for having the same issue to resolve. To avoid possible
conflicting decisions between the trial courts, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case
be dismissed. Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss for having been filed late. Consequently,
Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default.

The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. It
denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. Lui Enterprises did not move for the
reconsideration of the order. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’
participation. Lui’s appeal brief was dismissed due to the fact that it failed to contain some of the requirements
stated by the Rules of Court, such as a subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks
and statutes cited, and the statement of issues, among others.

ISSUES:
1. Was the dismissal of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appellant’s brief failed to state required
contents valid
2. Did nullification of deed in dation in payment bar the filing of the interpleader case on the ground of res
judicata
3. Was the declaration of a party in default in an interpleader case valid

RULING:
1. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on
its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13. Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the
record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.

In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the contents
of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants’ procedural lapses. However, in this case, Lui
Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that
its appellant’s brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases,
textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” by filing an
amended appellant’s brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. Rules on appeal are designed for the
proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.

232
2. No, litis pendentia is not present in this case. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at
least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the other.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation
in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case. There is
also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation
in payment to recover ownership of the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to
extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, it did not bar the filing
of the interpleader case.

3. Yes, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be
declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the court may “render judgment barring [the
defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” The Rules would not have allowed
claimants in an interpleader case to be declared in default if it would ironically defeat the very purpose of the
suit.

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the rent
due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in
respect of one liability.” He or she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent,
remove him or her from the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to
litigate among themselves. In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation
to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not defeated”, as claimed by Lui Enterprises, when
the Makati trial court declared the latter in default.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court. The motion to dismiss, while now a prohibited pleading, was
grounded on litis pendencia, one of the grounds allowing the filing of a motion to dismiss. As to the declaration
of default, the parties are now required to file a motion for extension of time to file an answer under Rule 11, Sec.
11.

233
Rule 17, Sec. 1

Ching v. Cheng
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
Leonen, J.

As a general rule, dismissals under Rule 17, Sec. 1 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that
the plaintiff caused the dismissal. In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not
of the defendant.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of CA upholding the RTC order
dismissing the Civil Case without prejudice and omnibus order denying the petitioner’s MR.

Ramon Ching is alleged as the only child of Antonio Ching with his common-law wife Lucina. Meanwhile, Ramon
and Jaime Cheng (Chengs) claim to be Antonio Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid Mercedes Igne.
When Antonio was ill, she entrusted Lucina with the distribution of his estates, who handed all the property titles
and business documents to Ramon Ching. Antonio recovered and demanded the return of the titles to properties.
Antonio was then murdered. Ramon Ching allegedly induced Mercedes and her children to sign an agreement
and waiver in consideration of 22.5 Million pesos, and allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of estate
naming himself as sole heir.

Chengs and Mercedes filed a complaint (1st case) for declaration of nullity against Ramon Ching before RTC of
Manila. The complaint was amended to implead Po Wing Properties (Po Wing) to which Ramon Ching was a
primary stockholder. Lucina filed a motion for intervention which was granted. Po Wing filed an MTD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter which was granted by the court. Chengs and Lucina were
given 15 days to file appropriate pleading but they did not do. Chengs and Lucina filed another complaint (2nd
case) for Annulment of Agreement of Waiver, Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with prayer of TRO and writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Ramon Ching and Po Wing. Chengs and Lucina filed an MTD, praying it be
dismissed without prejudice. Ramon Ching and Po Wing filed an MR arguing that the dismissal should be with
prejudice under the “two-dismissal rule” under Rule 17, Sec. 1 in view of the previous dismissal in the first case.
During the pendency of the MR, Chengs and Lucina filed a complaint for Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity
of Agreement and Waiver” (3rd case). RTC denied the MR and MTD of the second case without prejudice. On
appeal, CA ruled that Ramon Ching’s reliance on the “two-dismissal rule” was misplaced since the rule involves
two motion for dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, the dismissal of the first case was upon motion
of the defendants.

ISSUE:
Is the “two-dismissal rule” applicable in this case?

RULING:
No. As a general rule, dismissals under section 1, Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second
time that the plaintiff caused the dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the
merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied
all the claims of the former.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon
the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss. The dismissal
of the second case was without prejudice in view of the “two-dismissal rule.”

Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only new defendants
but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was
inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not change Rule 17 substantially but amendments
only addressed gender sensitivity issue.

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Rule 17, Sec. 3

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Genuino

G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015
Leonen, J.

While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff
fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case
diligently.

FACTS:
This Petition assails the Court of Appeals February 26, 2013 Decision that dismissed BPI’s Petition for Certiorari
following the dismissal without prejudice of the BPI’s Complaint against Spouses Roberto and Teresita Genuino
for failure to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

The Spouses Genuino executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 10,000-square-meter parcel of land in
General Trias, Cavite City, together with its improvements, to secure loans and other credit accommodations
obtained or to be obtained from the bank. They availed themselves of this credit accommodation in the amount
of P8,840,000.00 as evidenced by various promissory notes. They defaulted in their installment payments, and
their failure to pay despite demand resulting to the foreclosure and consequent sale of the mortgage property for
P2,900,000.00 leaving a deficiency of P27,744,762.49. Hence, complaint was filed by BPI.

Spouses Genuino argued nullity of the auction sale for lack of notice or demand made to them before and after
the alleged foreclosure. Even assuming the auction sale was valid, they argued that BPI waived the remedy of
collection when it chose to foreclose the security. On December 2, 2009, BPI received a copy of the Answer and
opted not to file any Reply. Hence, the RTC on May 17, 2010 ordered that case be dismissed without prejudice
for lack of interest to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

In this petition, the bank submits that with the issuance of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, “it is no longer proper to dismiss
a case for failure to prosecute starting August 16, 2004 due to the non-ling by the plaintiff of a Motion to Set Case
for Pre Trial Conference but instead the Clerk of Court should issue an Order setting the case for Pre Trial
Conference.”

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of the case without prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute when BPI failed to file a motion
to set case for pre-trial conference proper?

RULING:
YES. The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. This dismissal
operated as an adjudication on the merits. Contrary to what petitioner avers A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re:
Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-
Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures took effect on August 16, 2004 and the incidents occurred prior
to its effectivity. Hence, the same is not applicable and the prevailing rule and jurisprudence at that time should
be utilized in resolving the case.

“[W]hile under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff
fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case
diligently.”

Nonetheless, this court has sustained dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault after finding that plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute or comply with the rules was without justifiable reason.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Retained and insertion of the phrase “or her.”

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Rule 18, Sec. 5

National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
Leonen, J.

The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.”

FACTS:
Spouses Margarito and Tarcinia Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land in Calbayog City,
with an area of 59,099 sqm. The National Power Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque’s land to install
transmission lines, thereby using 4,352 sqm for the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project.
Upon Spouses Asoque’s demand for just compensation, the NAPOCOR only paid for the improvements
destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352 sqm area utilized for the project, claiming that it
was only liable to pay for right-of-way at 10% of the market value.

Spouses Asoque filed before the RTC Calbayog a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages
against the NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR denied the claim that it had illegally utilized the property, alleging that it
entered the property with the Spouses’ consent as shown by the acknowledgment receipt as payment of
damaged improvements and waiver of claims to improvements damaged.

When the case was called for pretrial, the case was ordered dismissed by the trial court due to the
nonappearance of both parties and their counsel, but was later reinstated after the Spouses’ counsel explained
the reason why he arrived late. At the rescheduled pretrial, the trial court allowed Spouses Asoque to present
their evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner, noting the absence of the NAPOCOR and its
counsel. After presentation of evidence ex parte and submission of recommendation by the Commissioner, the
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Asoque and ordered the NAPOCOR to pay them just compensation
and compensation for the improvements of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision by deleting the amount awarded as compensation for damaged improvements for lack of legal basis.
NAPOCOR filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte?
2. Is the appointment of the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner proper?
3. Should petitioner be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its
transmission lines?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte.

The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.” Petitioner’s stance that it was deprived
of due process because it was not given the reasonable opportunity to attend the second pretrial setting is
likewise untenable. Petitioner and its counsel were absent during the first pretrial setting on May 8, 2000.
Respondents’ counsel attended, although he was late. Had petitioner and its counsel appeared on the first
setting, they would have been reasonably notified then and there of the second pretrial resetting on May 24, 2000
and would have had the opportunity to ask for a later date. Nonetheless, petitioner’s counsel should have tried
to inquire from the court the next schedule of the pretrial.

2. Yes, the appointment is proper and sanctioned by the Rules.

The procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive and report evidence to the court is
sanctioned by Rule 32, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, after the hearing
before the Commissioner, the Commissioner must file a written report, which may contain his or her factual
findings and conclusions of law. Hence, absent any express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of
Court Atty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual findings and

236
recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed, the Commissioner’s recommendation could have
been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act.

Besides, the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court were not for expropriation — for which petitioner itself
claims that there is no need — but were for recovery of just compensation and damages initiated by respondents.
Hence, Rule 67, Section 5 on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid was no longer applicable. A
trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

3. NAPOCOR is liable to pay just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the basis that its acquisition
of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents’ land was a taking under the power of eminent domain.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an easement of right-of-
way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. A right-of-
way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will
deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period and expose the property owners’ lives and limbs to
danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected property.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

1. This is affected by the amendment to Section 5, Rule 18, which now adds notice requirement for the provision
to apply.

2. No effect because Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 32 remains the same.

3. No effect because Rule 67 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

237
Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures

Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017
Leonen, J.

The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during trial. This
provision, however, allows for an exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine what may constitute “good cause,” though this Court has previously defined it as any
substantial reason “that affords a legal excuse.”

FACTS:
Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484 otherwise known as the Access
Devices Regulation Act of 1998. Cruz was arraigned on October 17, 2006, where he pleaded not guilty for each
charge. The trial court rendered its Judgment finding Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the corpus delicti or the alleged counterfeit credit card
is inadmissible since it was not marked and identified during pre-trial.

ISSUES:
Is the accused guilty of the crime charged? Corollary to this is whether the counterfeit access device can still be
presented in trial despite not having been presented and marked during pre-trial..

RULING:
Yes. The possession and use of a counterfeit credit card is considered access device fraud and is punishable by
law. To successfully sustain a conviction for possession and use of a counterfeit access device, the prosecution
must present not only the access device but also any evidence that proves that the access device is counterfeit.

A counterfeit access device is “any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable
component of an access device or counterfeit access device.”57 Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and
use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but
also any evidence that proves that it is counterfeit.

Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008, which bore the
name “Gerry Santos.” He used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty
Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was later proven to be a counterfeit
access device.

Next, petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the alleged counterfeit credit card should not have
been admitted as evidence because it was not pre-marked during pre-trial. The rule is that no evidence shall be
allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for an
exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard and fast rule to determine what
may constitute “good cause,” though this Court has previously defined it as any substantial reason “that affords
a legal excuse.” The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at trial even if not
previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at
trial due to the prosecution’s explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the Criminal
Investigation and Detective Group’s custody.

The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank’s certification that the access device used
was counterfeit. It is this certification that makes the possession and use of the access device illegal. Therefore,
the trial court determined that the access device could still be presented at trial since it merely formed part of an·
exhibit that had already been presented and marked during pre-trial.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES IN RULING:

No effect. Marking of evidence is still provided under the amended Rules on Civil Procedure.

238
Rule 19, Sec. 1

E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco

G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
Leonen, J.

The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene are whether the intervenor has standing
to intervene, whether the motion will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already established, and
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate action.

FACTS:
In 1987, E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed Philippine Patent Application for Angiotensin II Reception Blocking
Imidazole (losartan) before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. The application was
handled by Atty. Mapili but was later handled by Ortega et al as new counsel. In 2002, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed
a Petition for Revival, arguing that its former counsel, Atty. Mapili, did not inform it about the abandonment of the
application and it was not aware that Atty. Mapili had already died. The Director of Patents denied the Petition
for Revival for having been filed out of time. The appeal to the Director-General of the Intellectual Property Office
was also denied. E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed before the CA a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the IPO’s
Decision. The CA granted the Petition. In the interim, Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit
the Attached Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the CA’s Decision directly affects its “vested” rights to sell
its own product. The CA granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene, as it found that Therapharma had an interest
in the revival of the E.I. Dupont Nemours’ patent application since it was the local competitor for the losartan
product. Hence, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Review on Certiorari comply with Rule 45, Section 4 when petitioner failed to attach certain
documents?
2. Is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 proper?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in allowing the intervention of Therapharma, Inc. in petitioner’s appeal?

RULING:
1. Yes, there is compliance with Rule 45, Section 4. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it
may still be given due course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
requires that the petition “be accompanied by... such material portions of the record as would support the petition,”
the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.

In Magsino v. De Ocampo, this Court applied the procedural guideposts in Galvez v. Court of Appeals in
determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed a petition for review under Rule 42 for failure to
attach relevant portions of the record. Thus:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those
which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in another document already attached to the petition.
Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will
suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or
that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Although Magsino referred to a petition for review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals, the procedural
guideposts cited in Magsino may apply to this case since the contents of a pleading under Rule 42 are
substantially the same as the contents of a pleading under Rule 45.

239
The third procedural guidepost in Magsino was complied with upon the submission of documents. Petitioner,
therefore, has substantially complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 is proper. The question of whether the Court of Appeals may
resolve a motion for intervention is a question that assails an interlocutory order and requests a review of a lower
court’s exercise of discretion. Generally, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie to
raise this issue in a limited manner. There must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion for the writ of
certiorari to be issued.

However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the merits of the case,
an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

3. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in allowing the intervention.

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court has the discretion to determine whether to give due course to
an intervention. The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene are whether the intervenor
has standing to intervene, whether the motion will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already
established, and whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate action.

In this case, respondent Therapharma, Inc. filed its Motion for Leave to Intervene before the Court of Appeals,
not before the Intellectual Property Office. In assessing whether to grant the intervention, the Court of Appeals
considered respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s legal interest in the case and its other options for the protection of
its interests. Respondent Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that it had legal interest to intervene in the appeal
of petitioner’s revival of its patent application. While its intervention may have been premature as no patent has
been granted yet, petitioner’s own actions gave rise to respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s right to protect its losartan
product.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 19, Section 1 and Rule 45.

240
Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2)

Santamaria v. Cleary
G.R. Nos. 197122 & 197161, June 15, 2016
Leonen, J.

Under the rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated, and a method of presenting testimony. The taking of depositions has been allowed as
a departure from open-court testimony.

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari by the petitioners, assailing the CA Decision which reversed
RTC’s ruling in denying the Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition in Los Angeles, California filed by
Thomas Cleary.

Cleary, an American citizen with address in California, filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages
against Santamaria et al. before the RTC of Cebu. In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify “in
support of the allegations of his complaint, either on the witness stand or by oral deposition”, and expressed his
intent in availing himself “of the modes of discovery under the rules.” Cleary moved for court authorization to take
deposition. He prayed that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles
and be used as his direct testimony. Petitioners opposed, saying that the oral deposition was not intended for
discovery purposes if Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. RTC denied Cleary’s Motion, saying that depositions
are not meant to be a substitute for actual testimony in open court. Upon filing a Petition for Certiorari with CA, it
reversed the ruling. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners argue that the proposed deposition in this case is not for discovery purposes as Cleary is the plaintiff
himself, and that Cleary was not compliant with the Rules of Procedure in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
May Cleary be allowed to take his depositions?

RULING:
Yes. Under the rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated, and a method of presenting testimony. The taking of depositions has been allowed as
a departure from open-court testimony even by the party to the case. Under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Furthermore, the rules do not make any
distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. Thus, it is immaterial whether the deponent is an alien.

Here, Cleary invoked Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) and requested to have his deposition taken in Los Angeles as he
was “out of the Philippines”, which is well-recognized and allowed under the Rules of Procedure. Also, the rules
provide that taking of deposition no longer requires leave of court after an answer has been served. Furthermore,
the Court may validly allow the deposition to be admissible during trial, but that does not prove the weight of
evidence.

The petition is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule applied herein was not changed.

241
Rule 27, Sec. 1

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corp.

G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017
Leonen, J.

Since Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide when the motion may be used, the allowance of
a motion for production of document rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case is pending, with
due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice.

FACTS:
These consolidated cases consider whether “San Mig Light” is a new brand or a variant of one of San Miguel
Corp.’s existing beer brands, and whether the BIR may issue notices of discrepancy that effectively changes
“San Mig Light” ‘s classification from new brand to variant. The CIR prays for the reversal and setting aside of
the assailed Decision and Resolution, the issuance of a new one remanding the case to the CTA for the
production of evidence in respondent’s possession, or, in the alternative, the dismissal of the Petitions in CTA
Case Nos. 7052, 7053, and 7405.

In GR. No. 205723, SMC filed before the CTA Petitions for Review, assailing the denials of its Protest/Request
for Reconsideration of the deficiency excise tax assessments. SMC filed with the BIR its first refund claim, which
was ignored by said Bureau. Due to inaction, SMC filed before the CTA a Petition for Review, the first division of
which later rendering a decision in favor of SMC. The Commissioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a
Motion for Production of Documents, claiming that the admission of said documents would lead to a better
illumination of the outcome of the case. The CA First Division, however, denied the said motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
May the motion for production of documents and objects be availed of after the court has rendered judgement?

RULING:
YES. Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide when the motion may be used. Hence, the
allowance of a motion for production of document rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case is
pending, with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing
under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining
the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials
and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.

Hence, the motion for production of documents and objects may be availed of even after the court has rendered
judgment.

In this case, petitioner filed its Motion for Production of Documents after the Court of Tax Appeals Division had
rendered its judgment. According to the Court of Tax Appeals Division, the documents sought to be produced
were already discussed in the Commissioner’s Memorandum dated October 21, 2010 and were already
considered by the tax court when it rendered its Decision. If petitioner believed that the evidence in the custody
and control of respondent “would provide a better illumination of the outcome of the case,” it should have sought
their production at the earliest opportunity as it had been already aware of their existence.

Under these circumstances, there was indeed no further need for the production of documents and objects
desired by petitioner. These pieces of evidence could have served no useful purpose. On the contrary, the
production of those documents after judgment defeats the purpose of modes of discovery in expediting case
preparation and shortening trials.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same with regard to the
provisions respecting motions for production or inspection.

242
Rule 27, Sec. 1

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
Leonen, J.

The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage.
Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of
documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a showing of due
cause.”

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent herein after the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
court of appeal’s resolution and ordered the respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) in order that petitioners may inspect photocopy of the same.

Respondent raised the following points: (1) motion for production was filed out of time; (2) the production of the
LSPA would violate parol evidence rule; and (3) the LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.

Petitioners on the other hand, argued that: (1) motion for production was not filed out of time since there is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the
pre-trial; (2) Parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties to the deed of
assignment, and “they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed
of Assignment.”; (3) that “it has not been shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . . analogous
to [any of the relationships enumerated in Rule 130, Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from disclosing
information as to their transaction.”

ISSUES:
(1) Is the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, limited to the pre-trial stage?
(2) Will the presentation of the document violate the patrol evidence rule in Rule 130, Section 9?
(3) Is the LSPA considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence?

RULING:
(1) No, the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial
stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or
inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a
showing of due cause.” In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes. this court declared that depositions, as a
mode of discovery, “may be taken at any time after the institution of any action [as there is] no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.”

Thus, petitioners are allowed to avail of the motion for production.

(2) No, the parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and
do not base a claim on it.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules on Evidence provides that “when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second
paragraph is when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.

Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.

(3) No. LSPA is not considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence.

243
Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are communication between
or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between
physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. This court
has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: “(a) editors may not be compelled to
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c)
trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits” (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and intelligence information; and (f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless,

The LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute,
and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. Respondent failed to
discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged document. Respondent did not present any
law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as classified information.

Thus, the respondent may be ordered to produce the LSPA since it does not fall under the privileged
documents contemplated by law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 27, Sec. 1 - No effect because Rule 27, Section 1 was not substantially amended.

Rule 130, Sec. 9 - Section 9 of Rule 130 is renumbered to Section 10 of Rule 130. Other than the numbering, no
substantial amendments were made that would run counter the decided case abovementioned.

Rule 130, Sec. 24 - No effect because the amended section does not contradict the decision of the court.

244
Rule 27, Sec. 1

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013
Leonen, J.

Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court
judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied. The test to be applied by the trial judge in
determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and
practicability.

FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin I.
Oben (Oben) are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) through a
Complaint and currently pending proceedings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC’s outstanding loan obligations of P10,232,998.00 to
respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special purpose vehicle. Thereafter,
Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB, which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) referred to in the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent Cameron opposed the motion and argued that petitioners have not shown “good cause”
for the production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. The RTC denied
petitioners’ motion for failure to show the relevance and “good cause” for the production of the LSPA.

ISSUE:
Is the denial of the Motion for Production/Inspection proper?

RULING:
No. The provision on production and inspection of documents under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also
the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.

Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court
judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant
evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due process. The test
to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description
is one of reasonableness and practicability.

The question was whether respondent had acquired a valid title to the credit, i.e., EDC’s outstanding loan
obligation, and whether it had a right to claim from petitioners. As respondent Cameron’s claim against the
petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to
allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express
terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject matter —
the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners’ defense.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached
writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by respondent, petitioner must be given
the opportunity to examine the whole document.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court. One provision in this case was amended but only to address gender
sensitivity.

245
Rule 30, Sec. 5

Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic

G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case may, therefore, be done but only if the
court finds that it is for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice. The admission is discretionary on the part
of the court and may only be set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
This case his resolves Sindophil, Inc.’s (Sindophil) Petition for Review on Certiorari Resolutions of the CA. The
CA deemed as abandoned and, consequently, dismissed Sindophil’s joint appeal with a certain Marcelo R.
Teodoro (Teodoro) for their failure to file their Appellants’ Brief within the required period.

A 2,791-square-meter parcel of land located on Aurora Boulevard (Tramo), Pasay City is the subject of this case
which is currently in Sindophil’s possession. Later, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for revocation,
annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, and impleaded
Sindophil as one of the defendants.

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil
were all deemed to have waived their right to present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or
witness despite several settings. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda; but instead
of filing a memorandum, Sindophil filed a Motion to Re-Open Case, praying that it be allowed to present evidence
that it was a buyer in good faith. As to why it failed to present evidence during trial, Sindophil explained that its
witness, Sindophil President Victoria Y. Chalid (Chalid), suffered a stroke which prevented her from testifying
during trial.

The RTC, however, went on to decide the case without acting on Sindophil’s Motion to Re-Open Case.

Sindophil mainly argues that it was deprived of the right to “genuine” due process both by the RTC and the CA.
According to Sindophil, its failure to present evidence during trial and its failure to file the appeal brief within the
required period are “technical grounds” that the RTC and the CA could have excused in the interest of substantial
justice. As for respondent, it argues that there was no deprivation of due process because Sindophil was given
more than enough opportunity to present its case but repeatedly and unjustifiably failed to do so.

ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing Sindophil’s appeal for failure to file an appeal brief within the required period?
2. Did the RTC err in deciding the case despite Sindophil’s filing of a Motion to Re-Open Case?

RULING:
1. No, Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an appeal for failure to file the
appellant’s brief within the required period as it provides that appeal MAY be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: … (e) Failure of the appellant
to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these
Rules. With the use of the permissive “may,” it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not mandatory,
with the discretion to be exercised soundly and “in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play” and
“having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.”

In Sindophil’s Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, Sindophil’s counsel, explained that his law office
used to be located in Pasig City but transfer his office to Las Piñas City, which was near Parañaque City
where he resided. He then speculated that during the transfer, the CA’s resolution directing Sindophil to file
its appeal brief might have been one of the files lost or inadvertently disposed of by his house helpers. Atty.
Obligar’s excuse is unacceptable. Under the circumstances, the CA exercised its discretion soundly by
deeming Sindophil’s appeal as abandoned and, consequently, dismissing the appeal.

2. No, RTC did not err in deciding the case despite Sindophil’s filing of a Motion to Re-Open Case. The order
of trial is governed by Rule 30, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, with item (f) specifically governing the
reopening of a case to introduce new evidence which provides that “the parties may then respectively adduce

246
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to
adduce evidence upon their original case”.

The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case may, therefore, be done but only if
the court finds that it is for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice. The admission is discretionary on
the part of the court and may only be set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion.

To recall, Sindophil filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing a day before its scheduled initial presentation of
evidence. The RTC denied the Motion for having been filed on short notice and deemed as waived
Sindophil’s right to present evidence. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda 30
days from notice, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

Thereafter, Sindophil filed a motion for extension, praying for an additional 15 days and RTC granted the
motion, despite the grant of extension, Sindophil did not file the required memorandum. Instead, it filed the
Motion to Re-Open alleging that its witness, Sindophil President Chalid, had previously suffered a stroke.

In its Pre-Trial Brief, Sindophil indicated the Register of Deeds of Pasay City as its other witness It could
have very well presented the Register of Deeds first while Chalid recovered from her stroke. Why it did not
do so is only known to Sindophil.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 30, sec. 5 of the old and new provisions are the same except for the amendment to
address gender sensitivity.

247
Rule 32, Secs. 2 & 3

National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
Leonen, J.

When an inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the appointment of commissioners under Sections 2
and 3 of Rule 32 — not Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court – will be followed.

FACTS:
Spouses Margarito and Tarcinia Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land in Calbayog City,
with an area of 59,099 sqm. The National Power Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque’s land to install
transmission lines, thereby using 4,352 sqm for the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project.
Upon Spouses Asoque’s demand for just compensation, the NAPOCOR only paid for the improvements
destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352 sqm area utilized for the project, claiming that it
was only liable to pay for right-of-way at 10% of the market value.

Spouses Asoque filed before the RTC Calbayog a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages
against the NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR denied the claim that it had illegally utilized the property, alleging that it
entered the property with the Spouses’ consent as shown by the acknowledgment receipt as payment of
damaged improvements and waiver of claims to improvements damaged.

When the case was called for pretrial, the case was ordered dismissed by the trial court due to the
nonappearance of both parties and their counsel, but was later reinstated after the Spouses’ counsel explained
the reason why he arrived late. At the rescheduled pretrial, the trial court allowed Spouses Asoque to present
their evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner, noting the absence of the NAPOCOR and its
counsel. After presentation of evidence ex parte and submission of recommendation by the Commissioner, the
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Asoque and ordered the NAPOCOR to pay them just compensation
and compensation for the improvements of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision by deleting the amount awarded as compensation for damaged improvements for lack of legal basis.
NAPOCOR filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte?
2. Is the appointment of the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner proper?
3. Should petitioner be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its
transmission lines?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte.

The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.” Petitioner’s stance that it was deprived
of due process because it was not given the reasonable opportunity to attend the second pretrial setting is
likewise untenable. Petitioner and its counsel were absent during the first pretrial setting on May 8, 2000.
Respondents’ counsel attended, although he was late. Had petitioner and its counsel appeared on the first
setting, they would have been reasonably notified then and there of the second pretrial resetting on May 24, 2000
and would have had the opportunity to ask for a later date. Nonetheless, petitioner’s counsel should have tried
to inquire from the court the next schedule of the pretrial.

2. Yes, the appointment is proper and sanctioned by the Rules.

The procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive and report evidence to the court is
sanctioned by Rule 32, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, after the hearing
before the Commissioner, the Commissioner must file a written report, which may contain his or her factual
findings and conclusions of law. Hence, absent any express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of
Court Atty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual findings and

248
recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed, the Commissioner’s recommendation could have
been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act.

Besides, the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court were not for expropriation — for which petitioner itself
claims that there is no need — but were for recovery of just compensation and damages initiated by respondents.
Hence, Rule 67, Section 5 on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid was no longer applicable. A
trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

3. NAPOCOR is liable to pay just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the basis that its acquisition
of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents’ land was a taking under the power of eminent domain.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an easement of right-of-
way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. A right-of-
way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will
deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period and expose the property owners’ lives and limbs to
danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected property.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

1. This is affected by the amendment to Section 5, Rule 18, which now adds notice requirement for the provision
to apply.

2. No effect because Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 32 remains the same.

3. No effect because Rule 67 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

249
Rule 35, Sec. 3

Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo

G.R. No.196251, July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the case can be resolved judiciously by plain
resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers filed by the parties.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision finding the that there is no genuine controversy as to
the facts and that the RTC correctly rendered a summary judgment in favor of petitioner Benjamin Castillo
(Castillo) and against respondents Olivarez Realty Corporation (ORC) and Dr. Pablo Olivarez (Dr. Olivarez).

Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation (ORC) represented by Dr. Olivarez entered into a contract of conditional
sale over a property owned by Castillo in Laurel, Batangas. Due to an alleged breach of the contract, Castillo
filed a complaint against ORC before the RTC and prayed for the contract’s rescission. He alleged that, after
they signed the deed, ORC immediately took possession of the property by paying only P2.5M of P19,080,490
purchase price. Contrary to the agreement, it did not pay the tenants the compensation and did not file any action
against the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to cancel the title to the property. Castillo’s demand to pay was
refused by ORC.

In their defense, ORC admitted that it only paid P2.5M and alleged that Castillo failed to assist them in filing an
action against the PTA. Thus, according to them, they had all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments
to fully pay the purchase price. ORC and Dr. Olivarez added that Castillo prayed for irreconcilable reliefs of
reformation of instrument and rescission of contract. Thus, Castillo’s complaint should be dismissed.
After the pre-trial conference, Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. If
it be found improper, summary judgment may still be rendered as there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. He argued that ORC and Dr. Olivarez substantially admitted the material allegations of his complaint. On
the other hand, ORC reiterated that there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved on this case moreover
that the property was sold by Castillo to a 3rd person. Thus, a full-blown trial is required.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC validly render a summary judgment?

RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to
decide a case if from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment.

In this case, ORC admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional
sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up the following affirmative defenses: first, Castillo did
not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism Authority’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the
land of the tenants; third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is
currently being litigated before a Quezon City court. Considering that ORC and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered
an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues tendered by
ORC and Dr. Olivarez’s answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues that can be resolved
judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file; otherwise, these
issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial. The claim that Castillo sold the property to another is
fictitious and was made in bad faith to prevent the trial court from rendering summary judgment. Petitioners did
not elaborate on this defense and insisted on revealing the identity of the buyer only during trial. Even in their
petition for review on certiorari, petitioners never disclosed the name of this alleged buyer. Thus, as the trial court
ruled, this defense did not tender a genuine issue of fact, with the defense bereft of details.

Further, Castillo’s alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and reformation of
instrument is not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per Section 2, Rule 8
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the filing of two separate cases for each of the causes of action that is

250
prohibited since the subsequently filed case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on splitting causes of action.

As the trial court found, ORC illegally withheld payments of the purchase price. The trial court did not err in
rendering summary judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 35 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because the new provision provides
for a new non-extendible period within which an adverse party may file a comment and serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions - 5 calendar days from receipt of the motion.

The new provision likewise provides, that unless the court orders the conduct of a hearing, judgment sought shall
be rendered.

New provision added: Any action of the court on a motion for summary judgment shall not be subject of an appeal,
or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

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Rule 36, Sec. 1

Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Entapa

G.R. No. 215072, September 7, 2016
Leonen, J.

A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void. Rule 36, Section
1 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS:
Rosario Entapa Orpeza and her siblings instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money against the PNB.
The RTC ordered the PNB to return the initial down payment, realty taxes, damages and attorney’s fees. The
RTC Decision is four pages long which narrated the factual circumstances of the case and directly declared the
liability of the bank to pay the Entapa the amount she paid as down payment.

The PNB appealed to the CA and argued that the trial court’s Decision violated the Constitution and the Rules of
Court when it failed to state the facts and law on which its ruling is based. The CA nullified the RTC Decision and
remanded the case to it for the rendition of judgment. The PNB moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied. Aggrieved, PNB filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, alleging that the CA erred in
adjudicating on the merits of the case despite ordering its remand.

ISSUE:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in nullifying the RTC Decision?
2. Did the Court of Appeals adjudicate on the merits of the case?

RULING:
1. No, the CA Decision nullifying the RTC Decision and remanding the case to the trial court is correct.

A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void. Rule 36, Section
1 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The constitutional requirement that the basis of
the decision of our courts should be clearly articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure
fairness. It is likewise crucial to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of
reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence.

In this case, the trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner’s liability. The Decision merely
contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion.

2. No, there is no adjudication made by the Court of Appeals.

Nothing in the Court of Appeals’ Decision ordered petitioner to return to respondents their down payment and
pay them damages. The Court of Appeals, in addressing petitioner’s arguments, explained that it could not rule
on these arguments since it was brought for the first time on appeal. Even if the Court of Appeals had adjudicated
upon the merits of the case, any discussion would have been considered obiter dictum since the entire case was
remanded to the trial court.

Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it.” It is a “a remark made, or opinion expressed... upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.” It “lacks
the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such. It was not necessary for the Court of
Appeals to discuss the other issues that petitioner raised in order to determine that the case must be remanded
to the trial court. In any case, petitioner is not precluded from presenting the same arguments before the trial
court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 36.

252
Judgment upon a Compromise

Republic v. Fetalvero
G.R. No. 198008, February 4, 2019
Leonen, J.

A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is
immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct errors of face or law.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the CA Decision be reversed and RTC Orders be annulled.

Respondent owned a parcel of land in Iligan City, a portion of which was taken by the DPWH. Then the OSG
representing the Republic filed before the RTC a complaint for expropriation against respondent. Subsequently,
parties entered in a Compromise Agreement. The agreement states the price of the just compensation of Php
9,500 per square meter. Respondent filed before the trial court a motion to approve the Compromise Agreement
and for the issuance of judgment. Thereafter, trial court issued an Order approving the Compromise Agreement,
a copy of which was received by the Republic.

Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of Garnishment for the satisfaction of the trial
court’s Order. The Republic opposed the Motion, arguing that since the Compromise Agreement was not legally
binding, it cannot be the subject of a valid writ of execution or garnishment. The Trial court granted Respondent’s
Motion. It held that records reveals that the OSG was duly furnished copy of the judgment of the court approving
the Compromise Agreement. Despite the lapse of almost a year, the OSG never lifted a finger to question the
validity of said Compromise Agreement. The OSG is now precluded from questioning the validity of the
compromise agreement. It should be noted that the judgment based on compromise agreement is immediately
executory. Hence, petitioner cannot now question the validity of the said judgment without transgressing the
doctrine of immutability of judgment. The Republic moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court.

The Republic filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari against respondent. The CA denied the Petition for lack
of merit. It affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Republic, through OSG filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari against respondent.

ISSUE:
Can the Republic question the decision of the trial court after the latter has approved the compromise
agreement?

RULING:
No. A compromise agreement has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.

Petitioner’s claim is a question of fact improper in a petition for review under Rule 45. As stated under sec. 1 of
the said Rule, the petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

As distinguished from a question of law – which exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts – there is a question of fat when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged fact; or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation
to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation.

A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and its
immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct errors of face or law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

253
Judgment upon a Compromise

Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. De Jesus

G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a compromise agreement and a judgment on
the merits of the case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties. The agreement stated that the
payment of the monetary award was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a petition for certiorari
and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action
against the employer after receiving the payment. This Court ruled against the employer not because the parties
entered into a conditional settlement but because the conditional satisfaction of judgment was “highly prejudicial
to the employee.”

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari led by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese,
and Princess Cruise Lines, Limited (petitioners) assailing the August 17, 2012 Decision and October 19, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119393.

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay), the local manning agent of Princess Cruise Lines, Limited, hired
Bernardine De Jesus (Bernardine) as an Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess. Based
on the contract of employment that he signed, Bernardine was to receive a basic monthly wage of US$388.00
for a period of 10 months.

On March 9, 2006, Bernardine boarded Regal Princess and he eventually disembarked 10 months later, or on
January 16, 2007, after his contract of employment ended. Bernardine was soon diagnosed with Aortic Aneurysm
and on March 15, 2007, he had a coronary angiography. On March 21, 2007, he underwent a Left Axillofemoral
Bypass. He died on March 26, 2007. Respondent Cynthia De Jesus, Bernardine’s widow, filed a complaint
against Magsaysay for “payment of death benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages, and
attorney’s fees.” Cynthia and Magsaysay were unable to amicably settle the case; hence, they were directed to
submit their respective position papers. The Labor Arbiter granted Cynthia’s complaint and directed Magsaysay
to pay her claims for death benefits, additional benefits, burial expenses, and attorney’s fees.

Magsaysay paid Cynthia P3,370,514.40 as conditional satisfaction of the judgment award against it and without
prejudice to its Petition for Certiorari pending before the Court of Appeals. In light of the conditional settlement
between the parties, the Labor Arbiter considered the case closed and terminated but without prejudice to
Magsaysay’s pending petition before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Did the compromise agreement executed by the parties as Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award render
the petition before the CA moot and academic?

RULING:
YES. In the instant case, the parties entered into a compromise agreement when they executed a Conditional
Satisfaction of Judgment Award.

Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Parties freely enter into a
compromise agreement, making it a judgment on the merits of the case with the effect of res judicata upon them.
While the general rule is that a valid compromise agreement has the power to render a pending case moot and
academic, being a contract, the parties may opt to modify the legal effects of their compromise agreement to
prevent the pending case from becoming moot.

In the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award, respondent acknowledged receiving the sum of
P3,370,514.40 from petitioners as conditional payment of the judgment award. Both parties agreed that the
payment of the judgment award was without prejudice to the pending certiorari proceedings before the Court of
Appeals and was only made to prevent the imminent execution being undertaken by respondent and the National
Labor Relations Commission. Finally, in the event the judgment award of the labor tribunals is reversed by the
Court of Appeals or by this Court, respondent agreed to return whatever she would have received back to

254
petitioners and in the same vein, if the Court of Appeals or this Court affirms the decisions of the labor tribunals,
petitioners shall pay respondent the balance of the judgment award without need of demand. Respondent, for
herself and for her three (3) minor children with Bernardine, then signed a Receipt of Payment where she
reiterated the undertakings she took in the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgement Award.

However, in the Affidavit of Heirship, respondent was prohibited from seeking further redress against
petitioners, making the compromise agreement ultimately prejudicial to respondent:

I, CYNTHIA P. DE JESUS, with residence at 157 Isarog St., La Loma, Quezon City,
Philippines, after being duly sworn, depose and say:
xxx xxx xxx
[7.] That I understand that the payment of the judgment award of US$79,200.00 or its
peso equivalent plus of Php3,370,514.40 includes all my past, present and future expenses and
claims, and all kinds of benefits due to me under the POEA employment contract and all
collective bargaining agreements and all labor laws and regulations, civil law or any other law
whatsoever and all damages, pains and sufferings in connection with my claim;
[8.] That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners
of “REGAL PRINCESS” because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I
will not file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the Philippines, United States of
America, Liberia, Kuwait, Panama, United Kingdom or any other country against the shipowners
and/or the released parties herein after receiving the payment of US$79,200.00 or its peso
equivalent of Php3,370,514.40[.]

This prohibition on the part of respondent to pursue any of the available legal remedies should the Court of
Appeals or this Court reverse the judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action in
another country puts the seafarer’s beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage. Thus, Career Philippines is
applicable and the Court of Appeals did not err in treating the conditional settlement as an amicable settlement,
effectively rendering the Petition for Certiorari moot and academic.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provision and principle involved herein was not affected by the amendments.

255
Judgment upon a Compromise

Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio

G.R. No. 189102 June 7, 2017
Leonen, J.

Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into by the parties.
A writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties under a judicially approved compromise
agreement is void

FACTS:
Thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries instituted class suits6 for damages in the United
States against 11 foreign corporations. The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) in the 1970s up to the 1990s while working in plantations that utilized it. As a
result, these workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems. Filipino claimants
filed a complaint for damages against the same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court.

Before pre-trial the corporations entered into a worldwide settlement in the United States with all the banana
plantation workers. The parties executed a document denominated as the “Compromise Settlement, Indemnity,
and Hold Harmless Agreement” (Compromise Agreement). The Filipino claimants were represented by their
counsel, Atty. Renato Ma. Callanta (Atty. Callanta). The Compromise Agreement provided, among others, that
the settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account, which should be administered by a mediator.
After the claimants execute individual releases, the mediator shall give the checks representing the settlement
amounts to the claimants’ counsel, who shall then distribute the checks to each claimant.

The Regional Trial Court, Panabo City approved the Compromise Agreement by way of judgment on
compromise. Accordingly, it dismissed Civil Case. Shortly after the dismissal of Civil Case several claimants
moved for the execution of the judgment on compromise. The corporations, ointed out that the claimants’
execution of individual quitclaims, denominated as “Release in Full,” was an acknowledgement that they had
received their respective share in the settlement amount. The quitclaims proved that the claimants entered into
a compromise agreement and that petitioners complied with its terms.

ISSUE:
Did respondent court committed “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed orders and writs”

RULING:
Yes. A compromise validly entered into has the authority and effect of res judicata as between the parties. To
this extent, a judicial compromise and an extrajudicial compromise are no different from each other.

However, unlike an extrajudicial compromise, a compromise that has received judicial imprimatur “becomes more
than a mere contract.” A judicial compromise is regarded as a “determination of the controversy” between the
parties and “has the force and effect of [a final] judgment.” In other words, it is both a contract and “a judgment
on the merits.” It may neither be disturbed nor set aside except in cases where there is forgery or when either of
the parties’ consent has been vitiated.

The doctrine on immutability of judgments applies to compromise agreements approved by the courts in the
same manner that it applies to judgments that have been rendered on the basis of a full-blown trial. Thus, a
judgment on compromise that has attained finality cannot be “modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or
by the Highest Court of the land.”

A judgment on compromise may be executed just like any other final judgment in the manner provided in the
Rules of Court. The writ of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce and must essentially
conform to the judgment’s terms. It can neither be wider in scope nor exceed the judgment that gives it life.
Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus, in issuing writs of execution, courts must look at the terms of the judgment
sought to be enforced.

256
There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required petitioners to ensure the distribution of the
settlement amount to each claimant. Petitioners’ obligation under the Compromise Agreement was limited to
depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the other hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts
was delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr. Mills. To require proof that the settlement amounts have been
withdrawn and delivered to each claimant would enlarge the obligation of petitioners under the Compromise
Agreement.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None.

257
Judgment upon a Compromise

Gadrinab v. Salamanca
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014
Leonen, J.

A judgment on compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory
unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the CA decision which dismissed petitioner Nestor Gadrinab’s appeal
and affirmed the RTC decision granting respondent Nora Salamanca’s motion for physical partition pending the
execution of a judgment on compromise agreement between the parties.

A compromise agreement was entered into by the 5 Talao siblings (3 of the siblings are the respondents, 1 is
represented by petitioner and 1 waived her right in favor of her siblings) who inherited the subject lot from their
parents. They agreed that the property will be subject for sale and the proceeds be divided among them. The
RTC approved the compromise agreement and petitioner filed a motion for execution of the compromise
agreement. However, portion of the duplex unit that petitioner refused to vacate remained unsold. This prompted
respondent Salamanca to move for the physical partition of the property before the RTC.

Petitioner argued that judgment on the compromise agreement had already been rendered and had attained
finality and had the effect of res judicata. Petitioner pointed out that there was no agreement that he must vacate
the property before it could be sold. According to him, had there been a full-blown trial on the action for partition
he would have been able to present evidence of exclusive possession of half of the property.

On the other hand, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this case fell under the exception of the rule
on immutability of judgments.The noncompliance of some of the parties with the compromise agreement
constituted an event that makes it difficult if not totally impossible to enforce the compromise agreement.
Respondent Salamanca pointed out that the grant of the motion for physical partition would still be consistent
with the intent of the compromise agreement since it would result in the proceeds being divided equally among
the parties.

ISSUE:
Should the physical partition be granted despite finality of a previous judgment on compromise?

RULING:
No. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits of the case. It has the effect of
res judicata. There is res judicata when the following concur: 1. Previous final judgment; 2. By a court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; 3. On the merits of the case; 4. Between identical parties, on
the same subject matter, and cause of action.

There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to bar by prior judgment,
embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court. The second rule refers to conclusiveness
of judgment, embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c).

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine admits a
few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice: 1.The correction of clerical errors; 2. the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; 3. void judgments; and 4. whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-
blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court. Because
a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on
the merits. In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise
agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to

258
abide by the compromise agreement’s terms. This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by
disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties
themselves.

The respondents have remedies if parties to the compromise agreement refuse to abide by its terms. A party
may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right on final judgments pursuant to Section
1, Rule 39. If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ
issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71. Since a judgment on compromise
agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used
against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds
exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d)
petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment

Instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be enforced and the partition could
be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move again for the partition of the property and set aside a valid
and final judgment on compromise. This court cannot allow such motion to prosper without going against law and
established jurisprudence on judgments.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case were not amended nor affected.

259
Obiter Dictum

Philippine National Bank v. Heirs Entapa

G.R. No. 215072, September 7, 2016
Leonen, J.

Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it.” It is a “a remark made, or opinion expressed... upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.” It “lacks
the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.

FACTS:
Rosario Entapa Orpeza and her siblings instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money against the PNB.
The RTC ordered the PNB to return the initial down payment, realty taxes, damages and attorney’s fees. The
RTC Decision is four pages long which narrated the factual circumstances of the case and directly declared the
liability of the bank to pay the Entapa the amount she paid as down payment.

The PNB appealed to the CA and argued that the trial court’s Decision violated the Constitution and the Rules of
Court when it failed to state the facts and law on which its ruling is based. The CA nullified the RTC Decision and
remanded the case to it for the rendition of judgment. The PNB moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied. Aggrieved, PNB filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, alleging that the CA erred in
adjudicating on the merits of the case despite ordering its remand.

ISSUE:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in nullifying the RTC Decision?
2. Did the Court of Appeals adjudicate on the merits of the case?

RULING:
1. No, the CA Decision nullifying the RTC Decision and remanding the case to the trial court is correct.

A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void. Rule 36, Section
1 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The constitutional requirement that the basis of
the decision of our courts should be clearly articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure
fairness. It is likewise crucial to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of
reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence.

In this case, the trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner’s liability. The Decision merely
contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion.

2. No, there is no adjudication made by the Court of Appeals.

Nothing in the Court of Appeals’ Decision ordered petitioner to return to respondents their down payment and
pay them damages. The Court of Appeals, in addressing petitioner’s arguments, explained that it could not rule
on these arguments since it was brought for the first time on appeal. Even if the Court of Appeals had adjudicated
upon the merits of the case, any discussion would have been considered obiter dictum since the entire case was
remanded to the trial court.

Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it.” It is a “a remark made, or opinion expressed... upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.” It “lacks
the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such. It was not necessary for the Court of
Appeals to discuss the other issues that petitioner raised in order to determine that the case must be remanded
to the trial court. In any case, petitioner is not precluded from presenting the same arguments before the trial
court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 36.

260
Rule 37, Sec. 2

Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services

G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015
Leonen, J.

Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the running of the reglementary period for
filing an appeal. If not served on the other party, they are pro forma and are “mere scraps of paper” not to be
acted upon by the court. Upon lapse of the reglementary period, the judgment sought to be reconsidered
becomes immutable.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners seek to reverse the CA decision which allegedly became final
and executory upon failure of respondents to file an appeal within the reglementary period.

On 16 November 2000, Regional Director Martinez, Sr. (RD Martinez) found violations of labor standards laws
during its regular inspection of Uniden’s Cabuyao plant, to which Nationwide Security provides security
personnel. RD Martinez declared the labor inspector’s findings “final and conclusive” in an Order dated April 19,
2001, and directed Nationwide Security and Uniden to solidarily pay 40 security personnel their wage differentials
and other salary-related benefits. Nationwide Security filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and Manifestation,
arguing that its liability with Uniden is merely joint and contending that the Regional Office had no jurisdiction
over the case under Article 129 of the Labor Code. Acting on the MR, RD Martinez reversed his Order in a
Resolution, ruling that the jurisdictional amount in Article 129 of the Labor Code had already been repealed, and
that the violations had already been rectified. Petitioners, then, wrote a letter to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), alleging that respondents neither appealed nor filed a MR of the Order. Treating the Letter
as an appeal, the SOLE set aside the resolution. Respondents filed a Motion to Quash because no copy was
furnished to it and the judgment amount was already paid to the petitioners. The CA declared void both the
resolution of RD Martinez and the order of the SOLE.

Petitioners allege that respondent failed to appeal the DOLE Order within the reglementary period. Thus, it had
already become final and executory, and the CA erred in setting it aside. Respondent argue that petitioners
deprived it of its right to due process when the latter failed to furnish it a copy of their Letter-Appeal to the DOLE.

ISSUE:
Should the adverse party be served a notice of every motion for reconsideration in order to toll the running of the
period for filing an appeal?

RULING:
Yes, because under Rule 37, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in labor standards cases, a
written notice of every motion for reconsideration is required to be served on the adverse party as compliance
with the requirement of due process. If not served on the other party, such motions do not toll the running of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal, and the judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes final and
executory upon lapse of the reglementary period.

Here, as respondent failed to furnish petitioners a copy of its motion, the Resolution granting the Motion is null
and void for want of jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the MR did not toll the running of the seven-day
reglementary period under Rule II, Section 19 of the Rules on Disposition of Labor Standard Cases. Thus, the
April 19, 2001 Order became final and executory after 7 days from the filing of the Motion. The CA erred in
remanding the case to the RD. The proper course of action is to issue a writ of execution to implement the April
19, 2001 Order. Likewise, petitioners also violated the requirements of due process for failure to furnish
respondent a copy of their Letter-Appeal to the SOLE, and non-compliance with the duty to submit a
memorandum of appeal under Rule IV, Sec. 3 of the Rules on Disposition of Labor Standard Cases. They merely
filed a letter before the SOLE. Hence, the SOLE acted without jurisdiction in treating the Letter as an appeal. In
any case, the April 19, 2001 Order is already final and executory and may no longer be disturbed.

Hence, the petition is granted, and the CA decision is set aside.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used as legal basis in this case is not affected by the 2020 amendments.

261
Rule 38, Sec. 1

City of Dagupan v. Maramba

G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy which allows courts to review a judgment
tainted with neglect bordering on extrinsic fraud. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner City of Dagupan through its then mayor, Benjamin S. Lim, to: (1) reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision and resolution and (2) declare that the damages awarded to respondent Ester F. Maramba (Maramba)
are excessive.

Maramba filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order against petitioner city before the RTC. She alleged that petitioner city unlawfully
demolished the commercial fish center she constructed. In here complaint the amounts indicated contain
intercalation such as five million pesos with the word “ten” written above five and ten thousand pesos with the
word “million” above thousand. The intercalation was not explained in the records and in the proceedings.The
RTC ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded P10M actual damages, P500K moral damages and P500K
attorney’s fees.

Petitioner City filed a motion for reconsideration in which Maramba opposed for motion was not set for hearing.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Maramba. Petitioner city filed a petition for relief from judgment. The petitioner city alleged that the decision would
not be in favor of Maramba were it not for the city legal officer’s mistake of filing a motion for reconsideration
without the required notice of hearing. It further alleged that the award for damages was unconscionable,
unreasonable and completely baseless. At first, the petition for relief was denied, but it was thereafter granted
and the award was reduced to P75K. This prompted Maramba to bring the matter before the CA via petition for
certiorari which was granted arguing that petitioner city is bound by the mistake of its counsel in failing to include
a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration. This is not excusable negligence that warrants relaxation of
the rules. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Is the lack notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration, a mistake made by the city legal officer, be considered
as a ground for filing of a petition for relief from judgment?

RULING:
Yes. Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from judgment. This is an
equitable remedy allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy that will
allow for substantive justice. Section 1 of Rule 38 provides for the grounds that warrant the filing of a petition
under Rule 38: SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.—When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. Courts may set aside final and executory judgments provided
that any of the grounds for their grant are present. Nevertheless, procedural rules may, be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

Here, the city legal officer’s “mistake” was fatal considering that the trial court awarded a total amount of P11
million in favor of Maramba based merely on her testimony. Maramba was only able to prove the amount of
P75,000.00 as the appraised value of the improvements made on the leased premises. The decision also
explained that Maramba was not able to show proof of the P5 million amount of improvements made on the

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establishment, as she was claiming to have been made and”she did not show any single receipt for her traveling
expenses and for the car rental she made during her stay in the country for the purpose of prosecuting this case.
The gross disparity between the award of actual damages and the amount actually proved during the trial, the
magnitude of the award, the nature of the “mistake” made, and that such negligence did not personally affect the
legal officer of the city all contributed to a conclusion that the mistake or negligence committed by counsel
bordered on extrinsic fraud

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not amended.

However, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules is also applicable in this case since Rule 15 pertains to motions. Rule
15, as amended, classified motions into two: first, the non-litigious motions (Sec.4) and second, the litigious
motions (Sec.5). The non-litigious motions are those which shall not be set for hearing and shall be resolved by
the court within 5 calendar days from receipt thereof. Whereas, in litigious motions, Section 6 of Rule 15 as
amended provides that the court may, in the exercise of its discretion and if deemed necessary for its resolution,
call a hearing on the motion.

263
Rule 38, Sec. 1

Madarang v. Spouses Morales

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional circumstances. If the
petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that their counsel’s
negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the CA resolution dismissing petitioners Juliet
Madarang (Madarang), Romeo Bartolome (Romeo), Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Annne Bartlome’s petition for
certioarari for failure to file a motion to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief
from judgment.

Respondent Spouses Jesus and Carolina Morales (Sps. Morales) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage of the property, mortgaged to them by Sps. Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome (Sps. Bartolome) to secure
the loan obtained by the latter. In the meantime, Sps. Bartolome died so the Sps. Morales filed the complaint for
judicial foreclosure against petitioners. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate
heirs of the Sps. Bartolome. While Madarang was sued because she allegedly presented herself as Lita
Bartolome and convinced the Sps. Morales to lend money to Sps. Bartolome.

On their part, petitioners assailed the authenticity of the Sps. Bartolome’s signature in the deed of real estate
mortgage. The RTC ruled in favor or Sps. Morales. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its order dated May 25, 2010. The same order was received by petitioners on June 24, 2010. On August
11, 2010, they filed a notice of appeal. However, the RTC denied due course the notice of appeal for having been
filed out of time. According to RTC, petitioners’ counsel Atty. Arturo Tugunon (Tugonon), received a copy of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. Thus, they had 15 days from June 24 or until
July 29, 2010 to appeal. On September 24, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment blaming their
80-year-old counsel who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that
Atty.Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to old age.
On April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. It held that the petition for relief was
filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The CA likewise denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari, it found that petitioners did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a
petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period excusable
negligence?
(2) Should petitioners’ petition for certiorari be dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING:
(1) The petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-
day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the
judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a
petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments.

Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period,
petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake
or excusable negligence. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from
judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Petitioners argue that
their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an
excusable negligence due to their former counsel’s age. This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens.

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It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence.

(2) Yes. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a party before a petition for certiorari is filed.
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
the questions they raised in their petition for relief from judgment were not pure questions of law. They raise the
authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage and the allegedly
excusable negligence of their counsel. These are questions of fact which put at issue the truth of the facts alleged
in the petition for relief from judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case were not amended.

265
Rule 38, Sec. 3

Madarang v. Spouses Morales

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties must file the petition within sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment or final order was entered; otherwise, the petition
shall be dismissed outright.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the CA resolution dismissing petitioners Juliet
Madarang (Madarang), Romeo Bartolome (Romeo), Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Annne Bartlome’s petition for
certioarari for failure to file a motion to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief
from judgment.

Respondent Spouses Jesus and Carolina Morales (Sps. Morales) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage of the property, mortgaged to them by Sps. Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome (Sps. Bartolome) to secure
the loan obtained by the latter. In the meantime, Sps. Bartolome died so the Sps. Morales filed the complaint for
judicial foreclosure against petitioners. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate
heirs of the Sps. Bartolome. While Madarang was sued because she allegedly presented herself as Lita
Bartolome and convinced the Sps. Morales to lend money to Sps. Bartolome.

On their part, petitioners assailed the authenticity of the Sps. Bartolome’s signature in the deed of real estate
mortgage. The RTC ruled in favor or Sps. Morales. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its order dated May 25, 2010. The same order was received by petitioners on June 24, 2010. On August
11, 2010, they filed a notice of appeal. However, the RTC denied due course the notice of appeal for having been
filed out of time. According to RTC, petitioners’ counsel Atty. Arturo Tugunon (Tugonon), received a copy of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. Thus, they had 15 days from June 24 or until
July 29, 2010 to appeal. On September 24, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment blaming their
80-year-old counsel who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that
Atty.Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to old age.
On April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. It held that the petition for relief was
filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The CA likewise denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari, it found that petitioners did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a
petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(3) Is the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period excusable
negligence?
(4) Should petitioners’ petition for certiorari be dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING:
(3) The petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-
day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the
judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a
petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments.

Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period,
petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake
or excusable negligence. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from
judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Petitioners argue that
their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an
excusable negligence due to their former counsel’s age. This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens.

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It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence.

(4) Yes. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a party before a petition for certiorari is filed.
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
the questions they raised in their petition for relief from judgment were not pure questions of law. They raise the
authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage and the allegedly
excusable negligence of their counsel. These are questions of fact which put at issue the truth of the facts alleged
in the petition for relief from judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case were not amended.

267
Rule 39, Sec. 2

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
Leonen, J.

The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special
Agrarian Court. In expropriation cases, a party cannot allege lack of due process when he or she was given every
reasonable opportunity to present his or her case before the courts. A judgment may be executed pending appeal
for good reasons, such as where the government belatedly pays the just compensation for properties taken under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review of the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) seeking to reverse and set
aside the Court of Appeals Decision which affirmed the RTC Order. These assailed judgments upheld the Special
Agrarian Court’s determination of the just compensation to be paid.

Respondents Raul T. Manzano et. al. (respondents), were the owners of four parcels of agricultural land planted
with rubber trees in Isabela, Basilan Province with a total land area of 88.57 hectares. The enactment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. 6657) has placed respondent’s lands under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). However, respondents and the Landbank failed to agree on the purchase
price of the lands even after the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board. It was then referred to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARA) which directed Landbank to conduct a revaluation survey. Upon
Landbank’s recomputation, however, the total land value posted a net decrease, which was adopted by PARA.
The case was then referred to the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court who appointed three commissioners to
examine and ascertain the valuation of the properties. The commissioners, upon conducting several inspections,
interviews and gathering of data, determined that the just compensation of the land amounted to P9,100,711 as
compared to Landbank’s valuation of only P2,943,797 which was adopted by the RTC in its ruling.

Respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the RTC. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) Can the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, in determining just compensation, simply adopt the
Consolidated Commissioner’s report?
(2) Can the RTC grant the execution pending appeal?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The Regional Trial Court has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the
properties. Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court may accept the Consolidated
Commissioners’ Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and appoint new
commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other parts. The final determination of the Regional Trial
Court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court must be respected. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.

Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the “original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.” There is no need to exhaust
administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special
Agrarian Court for determination of just compensation. The final decision on the value of just compensation lies
solely on the Special Agrarian Court. Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction
is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law.
(2) Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), a judgment appealed before the Court of Appeals may still be
executed by the Regional Trial Court, provided there are good reasons for the judgment’s execution.

The Regional Trial Court found that respondents have been deprived of their land since 1999. They were
dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties, which were taken from them 19 years
ago without compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution pending appeal will infringe on their constitutional
right against taking of private property without compensation. Moreover, the just compensation for respondents’

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properties is not wholly payable in cash. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the payment is in bonds, which will mature
only after 10 years. By then, the monetary value of the properties would no longer be the same. Denying the
execution pending appeal can also stall the payment of respondents’ properties through the filing of frivolous
motions and appeals. In their motion for execution pending appeal, respondents “indicated [their] willingness to
return any amount in the event that the just compensation fixed by [the Regional Trial Court] is modified by the
appellate court.” This addresses petitioner’s sole objection against execution pending appeal.

Thus, this Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court that “[f]or reasons of equity, justice and fair play,
[respondents] should be paid to enable them to cope up with the loss they sustained as a result of the taking and
for their economic survival.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes on these rules.

269
Rule 39, Sec. 6

Piedad v. Bobilles
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

To reiterate, jurisprudence is consistent that when the delay in filing a motion or action for execution could not
be attributed to the prevailing party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be resorted to where
a literal and strict adherence will most likely result in miscarriage of justice

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review filed by the Heirs of Simeon Piedad assailing the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals.

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria
and Mariano Bobilles. The RTC Branch 9 of Cebu City and the CA ruled in favor of Piedad and declared the deed
of sale as Null and Void. The CA’s decision became final and executory and the RTC Judge ordered the issuance
of a writ of demolition to Sheriff Bellones and ordered respondents to vacate the premises on December 2001.
Candelaria, on the same day, filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad
which was then raffled to another branch and was heard independently by RTC Branch 59 of Toledo City under
Judge Villarin. Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing a writ of demolition which was
granted by the Executive Judge Estrera of the RTC of Toledo City. The injunction case was then consolidated
with the probate case, upon motion of Candelaria under Judge Villarin. Because of Judge Villarin’s failure to hear
the case, it was transferred to RTC Branch 29 of Toledo City. On July 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed a Motion
Praying to Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Demolition of the Sept. 1998 Decision.

RTC Branch 29 ruled that since more than 12 years has passed when the decision became final and executory,
the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival of judgement, not a mere motion. The CA
dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy.

ISSUES:
(3) Do petitioners have personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad?
(4) Should the Court allow petitioner’s motion to revive judgement instead of the required independent action
and despite the prescription period?

RULING:
(3) Yes. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in interest: “A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.” Rule 3, Section 16 then provides for the process of substitution of parties when the
original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.

Petitioners claim to be Piedad’s children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the action
begun by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad
upon his death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment.

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad’s rightful heirs not only by
the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. This Court upheld petitioners’ personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon
Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely
an offshoot of their father’s original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.

(4) Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party may move for the
execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of judgment.
If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced
by instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.
In dismissing the motion for revival, the Regional Trial Court adopted a strict interpretation of Rule 39, Section 6
of the Rules of Court because the proper remedy was supposedly an action for revival of judgment, not just a
mere motion. The Court of Appeals, in turn, also dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy. The lowers
courts are mistaken.

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In David v. Ejercito, for reasons of equity, this Court treated the motion for execution, alias writ of execution, and
motion for demolition as substantial compliance with the requirement to file an action to revive judgment if no
motion for execution is filed within five (5) years from the date of its entry of judgment. David pointed out that
petitioner’s deliberate efforts at delaying the execution of a final and executory judgment should not be condoned.

This Court, in a long line of cases, has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if
prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage.
This Court has also interrupted the tolling of the prescriptive period or deducted from the prescriptive period when
the peculiar circumstances of the case or the dictates of equity called for it.

It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and respondents was declared null and void for
being a forgery, and that the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory as early
as November 1, 1998. However, due to respondents’ schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years
to prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to
an empty victory and petitioners’ continued struggle for their rights.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because no changes were made on these Rules.

271
Rule 39, Sec. 13(1)

Magubay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016
Leonen, J.

A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5) children. The
benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right that may be waived.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioners (Edna) with the SC, assailing the CA Decision
which partially nullified RTC’s decision regarding the action for support filed by Edna against her husband Colonel
Otamias.

Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to the latter’s alleged infidelity, and the children remained with Edna.
Edna filed a complaint-affidavit against Colonel before the Provost Marshall Division of the AFP, demanding
monthly support. Colonel executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension
benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement.
Colonel retired afterwards. It was honored until sometime, during which the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the
AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. Hence, Edna filed an action for support with the RTC. RTC
Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel several times, to no avail, so substituted service was resorted to. He
was subsequently declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial court. RTC
ruled against him. The petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted. AFP
Finance Center filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the AFP Finance Center’s duty to disburse benefits is
ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP PGMC’s approval. A Notice of Garnishment was issued and
received by AFP PGMC.

AFP PGMG filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with CA, which partially nullified the RTC Decision.
According to CA, the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, “provides for the
exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from execution and attachment”. Also, the AFP
PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support; thus, it is not bound by the Decision. Hence, this
petition.

Edna contends that the CA Decision tends to disregard the Deed of Assignment between them, and that the
phrase “while in the active service” in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to the “time when the
retired officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private creditor,” who is a third person.

ISSUES:
1. Can the AFP Finance Center be directed to automatically deduct the support from Colonel’s pension?
2. Can Otamias’ pension benefits be executed upon for the financial support of his legitimate family?

RULING:
1. Yes. When Colonel executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that his
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel. His
decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even
protects the right of his family to receive support. AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree’s pension for as
long as the retiree executes a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount
for the benefit of the retiree’s beneficiary. The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the
action for support was proper, considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the
persons obliged to give support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest. Nor was the AFP PGMC
a necessary party because complete relief could be obtained even without impleading the AFP PGMC.

2. Yes. The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to this case are in apparent conflict
with each other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory. On the other
hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive pension from government is exempt from execution.

272
Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
1638, his pension cannot be executed upon. However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion
of his retirement benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil code
provisions on support and Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate
case.

Hence, the petition is granted, and the CA Decision is reversed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions which apply in this case are not changed.

273
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Webb v. Gatdula
G.R. No. 194469 (Resolution), September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.

A civil law principle, res judicata, may not be applied to criminal cases.

FACTS:
This is a petition to resolve indirect contempt for review by the Supreme Court. This case was filed against the
officers of the National Bueau of Investigation including Gatduala. It is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of
Lejano v. People where Hubert Webb was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping
Carmela Vizconde, then killing her, hermother, and her sister in 1991.

Petitioner is Hubert Webb from the Vizconde Massacre while Respondent is Gatdula, an officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation. In the case at bar Hubert Webb is requesting the NBI to submit semen specimen to DNA
analysis to show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him. After the court directed the NBA to
conduct such analysis claims of the DNA evidence have been said to have disappeared and found on different
accounts. Hence the petition for indirect contempt.

Petitioner Webb argues that the National Bureau of Investigation’s claims are belied by the records of the case.
He points out that based on the prosecution’s evidence only photographs of the slides containing the specimen
were submitted. Also, it was not mentioned by Dr. Cabanyan’s testimony that he turned over the actual slides to
the court. Respondent avers that indirect contempt is moot as the case against Webb was dismissed based on
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Is there indirect contempt?

RULING:
Yes there is indirect contempt.

According to Rule 39 Section 47 of the rules of court as to conclusiveness of judgement there should be identity
as to the parties, and identity as to the cause of action. This is used to properly invoke resjudicata which should
additionally have a judgement sought to bar the new action to be final and the adjudication of the case must be
on the judgement on the merits. Furthermore a civil law principle, res judicata, may not be applied to criminal
cases. Also according to Rule 71, section 3 there is indirect contempt when there is a disobedience of a lawful
judgement of court

As there is no identity of parties and cause of action in the decision of the case in Lejano, the indirect contempt
is not barred by res judicata. the identity of Webb and Vizconde is different from Webb and Gatdula. Furthermore
the charge of rape with homicide is different from the petition for indirect contempt. The indirect contempt in this
case is simply based on the refusal of the officers of the NBI to follow the order of the court. This refusal tends to
reduce and undermine the authority of the court. The acts of the NBI are clear to be indirect contempt from its
refusal to do the DNA examination.

Therefore the petition for indirect contempt is granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 71 and rule 39 on indirect contempt and execution have not been changed.

274
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Escobar v. People
G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment has no application
in criminal law proceedings. For criminal procedure, it is not res judicata under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules
of Court, but res judicata in prison grey as double jeopardy, under Rule 117, Section 7.

FACTS:
This is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28293. The Sandiganbayan found petitioners Perla C. Maglinte (Maglinte),
Eugene L. Alzate (Alzate), together with Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta (Zoleta), guilty of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, and petitioners Miguel D. Escobar (Escobar), Vivencia S. Telesforo (Telesforo),
and Cesar M. Cagang (Cagang), guilty of malversation.

An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan regarding the irregularities in Sarangani Province’s grant of
financial assistance to the Malungon Market Vendors Association which was not actually received by the latter.
Escobar, who was the governor of Saranggani Province denied knowledge of and participation of the crime. His
only participation in the transaction was the signing of the disbursement voucher.

In Criminal Case No. 28331, which arose from the same COA Audit Report and Ombudsman Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the testimonies of Gadian and Cailing and held that petitioner Escobar is not an
accountable officer for purposes of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argue that conclusiveness
of judgment bars these determinations of the Sandiganbayan on material facts from being litigated again.
Respondent argues that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a
continuation of Criminal Case No. 28331.

On the issue of conclusiveness of judgment, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue in Criminal Case No. 28331
was different from the issue in this case. The issue there was the malversation of financial assistance to the
Kanlaong Fishermen’s Group.

ISSUE:
Does the principle of conclusiveness of judgement in Criminal Case No. 28331 binds Sandiganbayan in this case
because the same arose from the same COA Audit Report?

RULING:
No. The principle of conclusiveness has no application in criminal cases such as this. This Court has held that
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of issues already litigated and settled in litigation between
identical parties in different causes of action, and on occasion, has applied this principle in criminal cases.
However, this Court takes this occasion to reiterate that the concept of res judicata is a civil law doctrine, not to
be applied in criminal proceedings, except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted. This is not novel.

It may be argued that other cases are not on all fours with the case at hand. Nonetheless, except with respect to
civil cases impliedly instituted, res judicata is not applicable in criminal proceedings. This Court has expressly
stated this rule multiple times. At most, the applicable concept of res judicata is that of res judicata in prison grey
as double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, which is not in question here.

Indeed, if this Court accepts the argument that conclusiveness of judgment bars this case considering that the
Sandiganbayan already found that Escobar is not an accountable officer, which was an error of law in light of
Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, it will lead to an absurd effect. Once a person has been acquitted of a crime, despite
the ground being a question of law resolved erroneously, once that decision is final, that person can commit the
exact same crime against the same party with impunity, under the claim that even where the subject matter
differs, the erroneous application of the law is forever binding on those parties. Thus, this argument cannot be
countenanced.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes made on these rules.

275
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other parties with a better right from
instituting free patent applications over it. There is no res judicata if there is no identity or substantial identity of
parties and identity of subject matter.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision dismissing outright herein petitioners’ original
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decision of the Office of the President. The CA, in denying the
petition, remarked that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 instead.

Originally, the controversy between the parties lies in the claim of petitioners that respondents are barred by the
principle of res judicata from instituting free patent applications over the property claimed by petitioners.
Petitioners insist that their predecessors.-in-interest were declared ipso jure owners of the property by the CFI of
Tarlac in 1948 and that the Office of the President gravely abused its discretion in not acknowledging that fact.

Petitioners argue that CFI recognized that their predecessors-in-interest possessed, occupied, and cultivated the
lots for more than thirty years since 1915. They allege that the 1948 Decision was an agreement that recognized
this right, as well as a valid and binding partition of a bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller portion
claimed by herein petitioners and private respondents. Thus, the principle of res judicata bars private respondents
from asserting title to the property. Private respondents contend that they are not bound by the 1948 Decision,
averting that the principle of res judicata does not apply because there is no identity of parties and subject matter.

ISSUES:
1. Is the CA correct in outright dismissing the aforementioned petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
2. Are the respondents barred by res judicata from filing their free patent application?

RULING:
1. Yes, the CA correctly dismissed the petition.

Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or
fact—a mistake of judgment—appeal is the remedy.

Given such, as the Office of the President had jurisdiction over the subject matter and had been merely
accused to have committed an error in not appreciating the 1948 Decision cited by petitioners, it may not be
said to have committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would
have warranted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the petition as clearly, herein petitioners should have filed an appeal instead.

2. No, the 1948 Decision cited by petitioners is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. However, it does not bar private respondents from instituting their free patent applications over
the property involved in this case as there is no identity or substantial identity of parties and identity of subject
matter.

Clearly, the subject of 1948 partition involved different parties. Moreover, although both cases relate to the
same property, 1948 Decision was simply an agreement partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which
embraced the smaller portion claimed by petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private
respondents’ free patent applications involved the establishment of their rights as the purported occupants
and cultivators of the Property. Evidently, there is no identity of subject matter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this portion has not been amended by the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

276
Rule 39, Sec. 47

People v. Escobar
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case, not in an interlocutory order in a criminal case. An
order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory. This order does not attain finality when a new matter warrants
a second look on the application for bail.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused’s second petition for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace
Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two
(2) other victims. Respondent Escobar filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court and by the Court of Appeals in the Decision dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent
development in the accused’s case compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition).
However, the Regional Trial Court denied this on the ground of res judicata. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals
overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.

An Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator in the
kidnapping for ransom. Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court. During the hearing
on Escobar’s bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver’s advisers.
The RTC denied Escobar’s First Bail Petition. Escobar appealed before the CA but the CA affinned the denial of
the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas’ extrajudicial confession was generally incompetent evidence
against his co-accused and was admissible against himself only for being hearsay and for violating the res inter
alias acta rule. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to this rule and held that the Regional
Trial Court “did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of Cubillas”; rather, the trial court also relied on
Cubillas’ testimony during the bail hearing.

Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before the RTC. He noted that Cubillas could not
explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before,
during, and after the kidnapping. Hence, if Rolando’s petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of
Cubillas’ testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him provisional release.

However, the Regional Trial Court denied Escobar’s Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata, reasoning
thus: “in deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already attained finality, accused’s Petition
for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail, must be necessarily denied.”

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.He appealed before the Court
of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second
Bail Petition which the same court granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to
determine the appropriate bail for Escobar’s provisional liberty. However, the Court of Appeals denied the
prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration. According to the Court of Appeals, Escobar’s Second Bail Petition was
not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an
interlocutory order. An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.

ISSUE:
Was Manuel Escobar’s second petition for bail already barred by res judicata?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative because the second bail petition is not barred by res judicata as this
doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose
guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental
right to be presumed innocent.

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Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment-”regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution”-and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong,
then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court. In this case, the imposable penalty
for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar’s bail is, thus, a matter of judicial
discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.

In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to “a matter adjudged.” This doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same
claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It likewise bars the re-
litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or
conclusiveness of judgement. Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar’s Second Bail Petition
cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits. Res judicata requires the concurrence of the
following elements, to wit: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) The decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (3) The disposition of
the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final
judgment or an interlocutory order. A final judgment “leaves nothing else to be done” because the period to
appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In contrast, an order is considered
interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that
is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy. An interlocutory order “settles only some incidental,
subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action”; in other words, something else still needs to be done in the
primary case-the rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the
merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the applicable provisions in this case were not amended.

278
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property. Necessarily,
the parties may present evidence to support their claims. Therefore, it cannot be bound simply by the factual
findings of the land registration court alone. However, when an issue of ownership has been raised in the land
registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the
findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property.
Nonetheless, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. As the Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

FACTS:
Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a land in Cebu This property
included two lots. Ciriaco sold the two lots to Victoria Po. Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children
(Mariano Heirs). Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989
renouncing his interest over the two Lots [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto.” In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807. The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By
way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in
which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration
for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.

In 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes. Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue
City Regional Trial Court, acting as land registration court. The case was raffled to Branch 28. The trial court
granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately
subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages. The complaint
was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses
Po. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October
31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue
that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po
is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals that has this
jurisdiction. They also contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are
indispensable parties.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po’s complaint
(2) Whether the land registration court’s finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the
Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
(3) whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should
be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
(4) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties

RULING:
(1) Yes. The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint
for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. A complaint for reconveyance is an action which
admits the registration of title of another party but claims that such registration was erroneous or
wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a
superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a

279
title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due
process of law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is
issued. The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land
which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they acquired the property
from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had the property
registered without their knowledge and through fraud. Thus, they sought to recover the property and to
cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an order for the
defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief prayed for may be
granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner
rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction. An action for annulment
of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to lack of
due process of law. The remedy is premised in the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the
title that is issued. Title that is invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the
decision of a Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on the
merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on the
merits is properly alleged and proven.

Considering the Spouses Aboitiz’s fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po’s knowledge and the
latter’s assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz’ s title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of
judgment.

(2) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces two
(2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under
Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based on “the
same claim, demand, or cause of action.” It applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final
judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was “rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties”; and (d) there is “identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action” between the first and second actions. Res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the
same parties involving different causes of action.Its effect is to bar “the relitigation of particular facts or
issues” which have already been adjudicated in the other case.

In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They contend that they
were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove their claim over the property.
Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed
of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco’s favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their
favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria’s name. Additionally, they also submitted their
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz. These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of
Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration
court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po.

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po the
remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over
the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in
the land registration case.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property.
Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh these

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pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound
simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.

An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his
or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of
ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full
opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from
any other claim of the adverse party on the property.

However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

(3) Yes. This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the
scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An appeal under Rule 45 must raise
only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence or the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are
accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.

The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial
Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter’s testimony about Mariano’s sale
of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco’s sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoria.

Furthermore, with regard to the allegations of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting
certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution,
and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized
document, the party questioning it must present “clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant
evidence.”

(4) It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests
in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured byany ruling
of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this
Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest
has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES IN RULING:

The amendments in civil procedure and evidence will not affect the ruling in this case since there was merely a
reiteration of the previously amended rules.

281
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman

G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334., December 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

Res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies when the first judgment and the second case are the same
as to parties and issues but different as to causes of action. Since there is no judicial determination of fraud, res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment cannot apply. The ruling in LRC Case No. 445-R cannot bar the issue of
whether there was a fraudulent expansion of the property covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-12828,
T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832. These Transfer Certificates of Title may still be questioned in a direct
action seeking its nullification.

FACTS:
These Petitions for Review assail the Amended Decision of the CA, validating several transfer certificates of title
that had been disallowed validation by the Baguio Validation Committee.

Act No. 636 was enacted to provide for the allotment of property as a government reservation in Baguio, Benguet.
The Governor of the Province of Benguet was tasked to prevent any person from settling on public lands within
the allotted area until they are opened up for sale and settlement by later legislation. However, the reservation
did not apply to private lands held under lawful title within the allotted area. Former President Ferdinand Marcos
then issued PD 1271 to provide for those who acted in good faith, mistakenly relying on the indefeasibility of
Torrens certificate of titles, and introduced substantial improvements on the lands covered by the certificates,
which decree was to be implemented by the Baguio Validation Committee.

Before the Court’s ruling in Marcos, which held that all titles issued as a result of the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O Rec. No. 211 were null and void, Rodriguez acquired several properties and
applied for separate applications for validation of 7 titles. Pending her application for validation, she filed before
the RTC a petition seeking to correct the caption of Resurvey Subdivision Plan and technical descriptions,
docketed as LRC Case No. 445-R. The Office of the Solicitor General opposed this petition, alleging that there
was an increase in the area of the subdivided lots covered by the TCT. The RTC granted the petition. Later, her
applications for validation were forwarded to the Baguio validation committee, which disapproved the applications
on account of expanded areas above the original size covered by mother titles.

Rodriguez then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, which was dismissed, ruling that the Baguio Validation
Committee did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Rodriguez’s application for validation. However,
it ruled that with respect to TCT T-12824 and T-12825, the Committee could not have acted on these since
Rodriguez did not apply for validation of the same. The CA initially ruled that there was no conclusiveness of
judgment in LRC Case No. 455-R, yet reversed this later on, holding that said LRC case had the same parties,
subject, and issues as the proceedings before the Baguio Validation Committee for the validation of Rodriguez’s
TCTs.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in holding that there was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment respecting LRC Case
No. 455-R?

RULING:
NO. The CA erred in holding that there was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-12828 to T-12832 cannot be validated based on res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Where
there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”

In LRC Case No. 445-R, the Regional Trial Court granted Rodriguez’s Petition to correct the caption of Resurvey
Subdivision Plan (LRC) No. RS-288-D and the technical descriptions of the properties in the Transfer Certificates
of Title based on Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Court of Appeals, acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration and eventually reversing its ruling, applied res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. It
declared the Baguio Validation Committee barred from determining whether there was a fraudulent expansion of
the areas covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title. The Court of Appeals found that the issue of whether there

282
was a fraudulent expansion had already been resolved; thus, the applications for validation ‘may no longer
dispute this finding. This was an error on the part of the CA.

The Regional Trial Court did not determine whether there was a fraudulent expansion of the properties covered
by the Transfer Certificates of Title. What the trial court stated was that no collateral attack can be made on the
Transfer Certificates of Title. The Regional Trial Court’s denial of the Office of the Solicitor General’s opposition
on the ground that it is a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificates of Title is not a judgment on the validity of
the Transfer Certificate of Titles. It made no finding on the validity of the titles based on Republic v. Marcos. It
did not consider any evidence of fraud.

Since there is no judicial determination of fraud, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment cannot apply. The
ruling in LRC Case No. 445-R cannot bar the issue of whether there was a fraudulent expansion of the property
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832. These Transfer
Certificates of Title may still be questioned in a direct action seeking its nullification.

Hence, the CA was not correct in holding that there was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment respecting
LRC Case No. 455-R.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same in respect of the general
principles concerning res judicata, particularly as to conclusiveness of judgment.

283
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
Leonen, J.

Res judicata does not apply to purely administrative proceedings, and decisions in administrative cases are not
binding on criminal proceedings.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the CA Decision which affirmed the RTC decision, finding
Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation’s administrator, and several men, including Cipres, found Ligtas
harvesting abaca at the plantation of Anecita Pacate (Pacate) without consent. During their confrontation, Ligtas
admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. He alleged that he had been a
tenant of Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993 for the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in
the criminal case. According to him, on June 28, 2000, he prevented the men sent by Pacate from harvesting the
abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. He likewise denied harvesting on June 29, 2000, claiming that
when the alleged harvesting happened, he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a fiesta. Ligtas filed a
Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) wherein he was declared a
bona fide tenant of the land. The formal offer of DARAB Decision as evidence was unknown, but records are
clear that it was considered by both RTC and CA without objection of the People.

The RTC held found Ligtas guilty of theft. The CA affirmed such decision, finding that Ligtas was not able to
establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. It further declared that the DARAB Decision is
irrelevant because “findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship, are merely
preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. As to the ownership of the land, the CA held that
while he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate’s title over the land. Under Rule
131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation. Further, Ligtas’ defense of alibi was doubtfully established as his attack
on the credibility of the witnesses failed to show that the case was initiated only through Pacate’s quest for
revenge.

ISSUES:
1. May the issue of tenancy, being a question of fact, be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under R45?
2. Should the DARAB Decision be considered conclusive?
3. Does the doctrine of res judicata apply in purely administrative proceedings?
4. Does a tenancy agreement negate the existence of the element of taking in the crime of theft?

RULING:
1. Yes, because the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented
corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy. While only questions of law are allowed in a petition for
review under Rule 45, the court has held that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified (1) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, and (2) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The CA erred when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution
despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole. A review
of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

2. Yes, because the findings of DARAB with regard to the existence of a tenancy relationship is supported by
substantial evidence. Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings.
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily
be binding on the other.

284
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in a
criminal proceeding, where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. The DARAB Case involves
a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship, while the criminal case involves determination of
whether petitioner committed theft. The tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements
of theft were proven by the prosecution. Hence, findings of fact of administrative agencies, as in this case, in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence, and therefore,
conclusive and binding on courts.

3. No, res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to purely administrative proceedings. However, under RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
empowered to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies which decision attains finality after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days and no appeal was interposed. therefrom by any of the parties.

In this case, the DARAB case held that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by
petitioner by substantial evidence. Examined pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant
include sworn statements showing that petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce
after harvest which petitioner had done so every harvest until he was disturbed on June 29, 2000. Further, records
are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the
Decision has long lapsed into finality.

4. Yes, because the harvesting done by the tenant pursuant to a tenancy agreement is with the landowner’s
consent. A tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner’s share in the produce
depends on the agreement between the parties.

Here, the existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The
DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,
failed to establish all the elements of theft.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions or rules in this case are not affected by the amendment.

285
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban

G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may very well be considered a judgment on the merits and, thereby,
operate as res judicata on a subsequent case.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with an application for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI under Rule 45
which prays that the assailed orders by the RTC denying petitioner Aboitiz Equity Ventures’ s (AEV) motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration be nullified and set aside and that judgment be rendered dismissing with
prejudice the complaint.

A merged shipping business named as WG&A was formed by virtue of an Agreement to transfer the shipping
assets of Aboitiz Shipping Corp. (ASC) and Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc (CAGLI) to William Lines, Inc., (WLI)
in exchange of the latter’s shares of stock. Thereafter, CAGLI sent WG&A (the renamed WLI) demand letters for
the return of or the payment for the excess of inventories. AEV alleged that to satisfy CAGLI’s demand,
WLI/WG&A returned the excess inventories. AEV became a stockholder of WG&A and the latter was
subsequently renamed Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (“ATSC’). Petitioner AEV alleged that CAGLI
resumed making demands from ATSC despite having returned the excessive inventories.

CAGLI claimed that it was unaware of the delivery to it of the excess inventories. Its claims not having been
satisfied, CAGLI filed the applications for arbitration. First, against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and
petitioner AEV, before the RTC.

In response, AEV filed a motion to dismiss and argued that CAGLI failed to state a cause of action as there was
no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI and AEV. The RTC dismissed the complaint in respect to AEV.It
sustained AEV’s assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI’s claim.
Whether by motion for reconsideration, appeal or other means, CAGLI did not contest this dismissal. The RTC
issued an order directing the parties remaining in the first complaint (after the discharge of AEV) to proceed with
arbitration.

CAGLI now joined by respondent Benjamin Gothong, filed a second application for arbitration (“second
complaint”) The second complaint was also in view of the return of the same excess inventories subject of the
first complaint. AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the following grounds: (1) forum shopping;
(2) failure to state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis pendentia.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the second complaint constitute forum shopping and/or is barred by res judicata?

RULING:
Before addressing the specific matters raised by the present petition, the Court emphasizes that AEV is in error
in seeking relief via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, the court is a
position to dismiss the present petition outright. Nevertheless, as the actions of the RTC are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the court treats the present Rule 45 petition as a
Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.

Yes. First, between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties. The first complaint was brought
by CAGLI as the sole plaintiff against Chiongbian, ATSC, and AEV as defendants. In the second complaint,
CAGLI was joined by Gothong as co-plaintiff. As to the defendants, ATSC was deleted while Chiongbian and
AEV were retained. While it is true that the parties to the first and second complaints are not absolutely identical,
this court has clarified that, for purposes of forum shopping, absolute identity of parties is not required and that it
is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. Second, there is identity in subject matter and cause of
action. There is identity in subject matter as both complaints are applications for the same relief. There is identity
in cause of action as both complaints are grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive the value of excess

286
inventories. The first and second complaints are both applications for arbitration and are founded on the same
instrument. Third, the order of the RTC which dismissed the first complaint with respect to AEV, attained finality
when CAGLI did not file a motion for reconsideration, appealed, or, in any other manner, questioned the order.
Fourth, the parties did not dispute that the order was issued by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Fifth, the dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment on the merits.

In sum, the requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second complaint should, thus, have been
dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI committed an act of forum shopping in filing the second complaint.
CAGLI instituted two suits in two regional trial court branches, albeit successively and not simultaneously. It
asked both branches to rule on the exact same cause and to grant the exact same relief. CAGLI did so after it
had obtained an unfavorable decision at least with respect to AEV. These circumstances afford the reasonable
inference that the second complaint was filed in the hopes of a more favorable ruling.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect rules were not amended.

287
Rule 39, Sec. 47

Pryce Corp. v. China Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014
Leonen, J.

In two separate appeals before the SC, filed by different creditors of the same debtor, on the issue of the
rehabilitation court’s order approving a rehabilitation plan, the decision by the SC in one of the appeals renders
the issue res judicata, and the other appeal is now barred by prior judgment as to said issue.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation, which was approved on January 17, 2005. The rehabilitation
court found the petition sufficient in form and substance and issued a stay order. The rehabilitation court gave
due course to the petition and directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate and give recommendations on
petitioner’s proposed rehabilitation plan attached to its petition. In its disposition, the court found petitioner Pryce
Corporation eligible to be placed in a state of corporate rehabilitation. The disposition likewise identified the
assets to be held and disposed of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and the manner by which its liabilities shall be
paid and liquidated.

On February 23, 2005, Respondents questioned such decision, contending that the commercial courts had no
power to render without force and effect valid contractual stipulations onto the parties, violating the mutuality of
contract and due process. And that the commercial court failed to set for hearing before it issued a stay order.
Petitioners contend that the issued order on January 17, 2005 has already attained finality, constituting res
judicata on the subject matter, and that the Court is not required to hold a hearing before the issuance of a Stay
Order.

ISSUES:
1) Did the prior order on January 17, 2005 that approved the rehabilitation plan?
2) Is the court required to hold a hearing before issuance of stay order in rehabilitation proceedings?

RULING:
1) YES. The elements for res judicata to apply are as follows: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the
court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based
on the merits; and (d) between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject
matters, and causes of action. In the present case, respondent China Banking Corporation and BPI are
creditors of petitioner Pryce Corporation and are both questioning the rehabilitation court’s approval of
the amended rehabilitation plan. Thus, there is substantial identity of parties since they are litigating for
the same matter and in the same capacity as creditors of petitioner Pryce Corporation. There is no
question that both cases deal with the subject matter of petitioner Pryce Corporation’s rehabilitation. The
element of identity of causes of action also exists.

In any case, the Interim Rules or the rules in effect at the time the petition for corporate rehabilitation
was filed in 2004 adopts the cram–down principle which “consists of two things: First, the Interim Rules
allows the rehabilitation court to “approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors
holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is
feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.” Second, it also provides that
upon approval by the court, the rehabilitation plan and its provisions “shall be binding upon the debtor
and all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been scheduled.”

2) NO. Section 6 of the Interim Rules states explicitly that “if the court finds the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, it shall, not later than five (5) days from the filing of the petition, issue an Order (a)
appointing a Rehabilitation Receiver and fixing his bond; (b) staying enforcement of all claims x x x.”
Compliant with the rules, the stay order was issued not later than five (5) days from the filing of the
petition on after the rehabilitation court found the petition sufficient in form and substance.

The issuance of a stay is not a final disposition of the case. It is an interlocutory order defined as one
that “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’

288
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court.”

Nevertheless, while the Interim Rules does not require the holding of a hearing before the issuance of a
stay order, neither does it prohibit the holding of one. Thus, the trial court has ample discretion to call a
hearing when it is not confident that the allegations in the petition are sufficient in form and substance,
for so long as this hearing is held within the five (5)–day period from the filing of the petition — the period
within which a stay order may issue as provided in the Interim Rules.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

289
Rule 40, Sec. 7

Cruz v. Spouses Christensen

G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

Generally, the rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is mandatory. Rule 40,
Section 7 is jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are specifically assigned and
properly argued in the memorandum and a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal where the
errors have not been specifically assigned. Liberality, however, in the application of Rule 40, Sec. 7 is warranted
in this case in view of the potential inequity that may result if the rule is strictly applied.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which reversed the RTC ruling and reinstated
the MTC decision dismissing herein petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer.

Procedurally, reason for the reversal of the RTC ruling is the non-compliance with the period set forth in Rule 40,
Sec. 7 on the filing of a memorandum of appeal with the RTC. Petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal nine (9)
days late but RTC still gave the appeal due course.

Substantially, CA overturned the RTC decision because of the absence of a demand letter prior to the filing of
the unlawful detainer complaint. Petitioner owns the property which respondents had leased on a month-to-month
basis from them. Petitioner argues that where the action is grounded on the expiration of the contract of lease,
as in this instance where the lease was on a month-to-month basis, the failure to pay the rentals for the month
terminates the lease, so there should no longer be a need for demand letter prior to the filing of the unlawful
detainer complaint.

ISSUES:
1. Is the reversal of the RTC decision valid by reason of petitioner’s non-compliance with Rule 40, Sec. 7?
2. Is a demand letter needed prior to filing a complaint for unlawful detainer grounded on expiration of lease?

RULING:
1. No, the Court held that the rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is
mandatory. Rule 40, Section 7 is jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are
specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum and a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over an appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned.

Procedural defects, however, should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants. Even
procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be suspended where matters of life, liberty, honor or
property warrant its liberal application.

Thus, liberality in the application of Rule 40, Sec. 7 is warranted in this case in view of the potential inequity
that may result if the rule is strictly applied.

2. No, petitioner owns the property which respondents used to lease on a month-to-month basis from them until
petitioner claimed that their lease has already expired.

Under Rule 70, Sec. 1, an action for unlawful detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property who
unlawfully withholds possession after the termination or expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70,
Sec. 2 requires that there must first be a prior demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and
to vacate before an action can be filed. The Court held, however, that the jurisdictional requirement of prior
demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of
contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded
the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents. The cause of action which would
give rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease.

Thus, in the present case, the requirement under Rule 70, Sec. 2 of a prior demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate, in the form of a demand letter is unnecessary.

290
EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:
No effect because the portion governing provisional remedies has not been amended.

291
Rule 41, Sec. 1

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 20643 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an
interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate,
plain and speedy remedy. A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can
establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary
Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption
by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies.” The
Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy
cooperatives and people’s organizations. The accused were directed to file their counter-affidavits and submit
controverting evidence. The complainants were also given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits.

In a Memorandum addressed to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales, Assistant Special Prosecutor III Lapitan
reported that a Resolution was issued in finding probable cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation. Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion
to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest Cagang argued that there was an inordinate
delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v.
Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition
of cases. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang,
Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions.

Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, essentially seeking to restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest
against him.

ISSUES:
1. May the denial of a motion to quash be the subject of a petition for certiorari?
2. Does the pendency of a petition for certiorari with this Court suspend the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan?

RULING:
1. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the
continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of
conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then
raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added
ground to overturn the latter’s ruling. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order
and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only
in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the process leading to trial.
The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and
after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the
accused and the reception by the court Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity
to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of
the accused and all his suffering due to thecharges can be most speedily acquired.

292
A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the denial
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a
recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a
“more enlightened and substantial justice;” the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that “have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;” or
judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition
for certiorari.

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court
issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of
showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.

2. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari before this Court will not
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction.

Under Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court:

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.The public
respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition
for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground
for an administrative charge.

Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed,
the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is still the same.

293
Rule 42, Sec. 1

Magat, Sr. v. Tantrade Corp.

G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are expressly permitted by
the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is true that in seeking an extension,
rather than immediately filing a petition, appellants wager on the Court of Appeals’ favorable action. Still, it
remains that they have 15 days to seek an extension. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period that
Rule 42 allows. In doing so, they are not “procrastinating” but are merely exercising a legitimate option.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that
the assailed May 31, 2011 and January 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05929
be reversed and set aside.

Respondent Tantrade Corporation (Tantrade) filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money with Damages
praying that the original defendant, now deceased Juliana S. Magat (Juliana), be ordered to pay P266,481.50
plus interest, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages, for unpaid purchases of construction
materials. MTC found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade but ordered Borja, an impleaded third party defendant to
reimburse Juliana the amount she was ordered to pay Tantrade. The RTC affirmed in toto the MTC’s decision.

Petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 in the CA,
one day before the lapse of the 15-day period. They justified their First Motion for Extension by citing financial
constraints; that the same constraints prevented the counsel from timely preparing the Petition for Review.

The CA denied the First Motion for Extension, hence a second motion was filed and an extension was sought for
the filing of their Petition for Review since they were yet to receive a copy of the May 31, 2011 Resolution. It was
only in June 29, 2011 when they received the aforementioned. The second motion was denied and the appeal
was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Was the CA wrong in dismissing the second motion of extension?

RULING:
YES. Petitioners in this case substituted as heirs for a deceased party. They crossed islands to file their appeal
before the Court of Appeals. They had to contend with their financial difficulties. Yet, they were able to meet the
periods required under Rule 42 for their motions for extension to file their petition for review. It was reversible
error, if not callousness, on the part of the Court of Appeals to have summarily dismissed their appeal. Justice
and the letter of the law demand that this case be reinstated and remanded.

It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions for extension to file Rule 42 petitions are
permissible. Rule 44 takes a particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It explicitly
enables extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40, or the rules on appeals
to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial Courts, and Rule 41, or the rules on appeals to the Court of
Appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, make no
similar reference to any extension to file such appeals. They even proscribe motions for extension to file motions
for new trial or reconsideration.

Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are expressly permitted by
the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is true that in seeking an extension,
rather than immediately filing a petition, appellants wager on the Court of Appeals’ favorable action. Still, it
remains that they have 15 days to seek an extension. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period that
Rule 42 allows. In doing so, they are not “procrastinating” but are merely exercising a legitimate option.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 42 was not amended under the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

294
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315 & 200684, September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.

The rules for Agrarian Law implementation provide a mode of appeal from the decisions of the Secretary to the
Office of the President. Hence, the appeal to the office of the president is the proper remedy.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the court of appeals on allowing certain land
in Hacienda Looc in Nasugbu Batangas to be under the Agrarian Reform law but were apparently had their
certificates cancelled because they were supposed to be excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program

Petitioner is Fil Estate Properties Inc. a company that entered into a joint venture agreement with Manila
Southcoast for the development of 10 lots covered by Certificates of land with an area totalling more than 1.200
hectares which were previously obtained from the department of agriculture which lands were located in
Hacienda Looc. The joint venture agreement prayed that the 10 lots be excluded from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Farmer beneficiaries filed a petition for review arguing that the office of the president
erred in limiting its scope of the said property.

Petitioner Fil-Estate argues that the proper remedy from the decisions by the Agrarian Reform Secretary is a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, not an appeal to the Office of the president. Furthermore,
it argued that Reyes committed willful and deliberate forum shopping because 3 pleadings were filed raising the
same allegations praying for the same reliefs. Respondent argues that under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, an appeal before the office of the president is the proper remedy against the Agrarian
Reform Secretary Garilao’s orders. They also further pointed out that it was Fil Estate that sought relief despite
pendency of their appeal.

ISSUES:
Is rule 43 the proper remedy in the case at bar and not an appeal to the office of the president?
Is their forum shopping found in Rule 7 Section 5 of the rules of court.

RULING:
No the appeal to the office of the president is the proper remedy.
No there is no forum shopping.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is valid and subsisting and is correctly applied in
consonance with Republic Act No. 6657 which states the powers and procedure in cases involving Agrarian Law.
The rules for agrarian Law implementation prvide a mode of appeal from the decisions of the Secretary to the
Office of The president. On the other hand, the rules of procedure of the department of agrarian reform
adjudication board states that appeals from the decisions of such board may be brought to the court of appeals.

Forum shopping according to Rule 7 Section 5 on parts of a pleading exists when litigants resort to two different
forums for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgement.
The evil sought to be avoided by the rule on forum shopping is the proliferation of contradictory decisions on the
same controversy.

Petitioner applied for exemption from the coverage of Section 10 of Republic act no. 6657. Moreover the order
would have depended on the governing rules of procedure at that time. When Reyes received a copy of the new
rules, the Rules for agrarian law implementation had not yet been promulgated. As such Reyes did not err in
elevating the case to the Office of the President first before filling a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

It may seem that Reyes committed forum shopping by elevating the adverse order to the Office of the president
then filing to re open the case before the secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless the evil sought to be avoided
by the rule did not exist. Since the motion to re open the case had not been acted upon and the records have not
yet been elevated to the office of the President there was no existence of the evil sought to be avoided hence
there is no forum shopping.

295
Therefore there is proper use of exhaustion of administrative remedies and there is no existence of forum
shopping. Consolidated petition is ultimately denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 43 on appeal from quasi judicial bodies have not been changed.
No effect because rule 7 section 5 on pleadings have not been changed.

296
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development Corp., Inc.
G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019
Leonen, J.

This is not to say that factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may now be assailed before the Court of Appeals.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure emphasizes that though there may have been variances, all appeals
under its scope are to be brought before the Court of Appeals. However, in keeping with the Construction Industry
Arbitration law, any appeal from CIAC arbitral tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
upholding the Arbitral Award of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

Metro Bottled Water Corporation (petitioner) and Andrada Construction (respondent) entered into a Construction
Agreement for the construction of a reinforced concrete manufacturing plant in Gateway Business Park, General
Trial, Cavite. The Construction Agreement covered all materials, labor, equipment, and tools, including any other
works required.

Respondent filed a Request for Arbitration before the CIAC, alleging that petitioner refused to pay its unpaid work
accomplishment and its corresponding interest. In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations and
counterclaimed for cost to complete and correct the project.

A preliminary conference was held. After the arbitral tribunal conducted its ocular inspection of the construction
site and the filing of the parties of their respective Memoranda, the CIAC found that respondent was entitled to
unpaid work and accomplishment and denied petitioner’s counterclaims.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Arbitral Award before the CA. The CA dismissed the Petition for lack
of merit and upheld the factual findings of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner submits that the CA and the CIAC erred in not finding that there were no factual and legal grounds for
terminating the Construction Agreement and petitioner taking over the project. It also points out that while the
tribunal’s factual findings are entitled to great respect, they may still be reviewed by the CA and the Supreme
Court when there is a conflict in the application of law, jurisprudence, or the contract between the parties.

ISSUE:
Did petitioner raised questions of law in this Petition for Review?

RULING:
No, petitioner did not raised questions of law in this Petition for Review.

Due to the highly technical nature of proceedings before the CIAC, the Construction Arbitration Law provides that
“the arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and not appealable except on questions of
law which shall be appealable to the SC. To standardize appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appeals “may be taken to the CA within the period and in the manner
herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.” The
CIAC is among the quasi-judicial agencies explicitly listed in the rule.

Jurisdiction of construction arbitration tribunals and voluntary arbitrators is vested by statute. This jurisdiction
exists independently of the will of the contracting parties due to the public interest inherent in their respective
spheres. Decisions of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), as a quasi-judicial body, is
appealable under Rule 43. However, Rule 43 must be read together with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Law, which provides that appeals of arbitral awards must only raise questions of law.

Factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal,
except when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators

297
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to at act
as such under section 9 of RA No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceed their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted to them was not made.

At first glance, petitioner appears to be raising a question of law, i.e., whether respondent complied with the
provisions of the Construction Agreement as to be entitled to compensation, which, in turn, would require the
proper interpretation of the contract between the parties. This would be a question of law since it quires the courts
to determine the parties’ rights under the contract.

To resolve this issue, however, this Court would have to accept the factual premise alleged by petitioner: that
Change Order Nos. 39 to 109 were not authorized by petitioner. This runs counter to the factual finding
established by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission that petitioner did indeed agree to the change
orders.

Petitioner has neither alleged that the arbitral tribunal arrived at its findings “in a haphazard, immodest manner”
nor questioned the integrity of the arbitrators. Absent of any proof to the contrary, this Court will not disturb its
factual findings.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

298
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos

G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

A party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial court, purely on
questions of law, must raise these issues before the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. A.M. No. 04-
9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Belo Medical Group, Inc. (Belo
Medical Group) assails the Regional Trial Court December 8, 2008 Joint Resolution in Civil Case No. 08-397.
This Joint Resolution granted respondent Jose L. Santos’ (Santos) Motion to Dismiss and Belo Medical Group’s
Complaint for interpleader and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief against Santos and Victoria G.
Belo (Belo), and declared all other pending incidents as moot.

The controversy began when Belo Medical Group received a request from Jose Santos for the inspection of
corporate records. Victoria Belo objected to this request and wrote Belo Medical Group to repudiate Santos co-
ownership of her shares and his interest in the corporation, claiming that the 25 shares in his name were merely
in trust for her, as she, and not Santos, paid for these shares.

Belo Medical Group then filed a Complaint for Interpleader to compel Belo and Santos to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims. Said complaints were raffled to the special commercial court, thus classifying them as
intra-corporate. Belo prayed that the case be tried as a civil case and not as an intra-corporate controversy,
arguing that intra-corporate controversies did not include special civil actions for interpleader and declaratory
relief, and clarified that the issue of ownership of the shares of stock must first be resolved before the issue on
inspection could even be considered ripe for determination.

Instead of filing an answer, Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss. Though a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the trial court ruled that according
to the Rules of Court, motions to dismiss are allowed in interpleader cases, while the complaint for Declaratory
Relief was struck down as improper. Belo filed her Petition for Review before the CA, which was however,
dismissed. Belo Medical Group, on the other hand, directly filed its Petition for Review with this Court

ISSUE:
1) Did Belo Medical Group commit forum shopping?
2) Did Belo Medical Group use the correct mode of appeal?
3) Was the trial court correct in dismissing Belo Medical Group, Inc.’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief?

RULING:
1) No, Neither Belo nor the Belo Medical Group is guilty of forum shopping.
Belo Medical Group filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court to appeal
against the Joint Resolution of the trial court. It did not file any other petition related to the case, as indicated
in it verification and certification against forum shopping. It was Belo, a defendant in Belo Medical Groups
Complaint, who filed a separate appeal under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals primarily to protect her
counterclaims. Belo and Belo Medical Group both filed their respective Petitions for Review on January 28,
2009, the lat day within the period allowed to do so. The Court of Appeals already ruled that litis pendencia
was present when Belo and Belo Medical Group filed their respective petitions on the same date before
different fora. The two petitions involved the same parties, rights and reliefs sought, and causes of action.
This is a decision this Court can no longer disturb.

Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and deliberate violation of the rule against
forum shopping. Their prompt compliance of the certification against forum shopping appended to their
Petitions negates willful and deliberate intent.

2) NO. Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal.

299
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc on September 14, 2004 laid down the rules on
modes of appeal in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

2. The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the
Regional Trial Court. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule
141 as amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Hence, a party assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial court, purely on
questions of law, must raise these issues before the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.101 A.M. No. 04-9-
07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it. Based on the policy of judicial economy and for practical considerations,102 this
Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of appeal utilized. For one, it would be taxing in time and
resources not just for Belo Medical Group but also for Santos and Belo to dismiss this case and have them refile their
petitions for review before the Court of Appeals.

3) YES. At the outset, this Court notes that two cases were filed by Belo Medical Group: the Complaint for
interpleader and the Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Under Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, a joinder of cause of action is allowed, provided that it follows the conditions enumerated below:
Section 5. Joinder of Causes of Action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

xxx
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
xxx

Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint
for declaratory relief as both are special civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue
as an intra-corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous. The
right of Santos to inspect the books of Belo Medical Group and the appreciation for his motives to do so will
necessarily be determined by the trial court together with determining the ownership of the shares of stock
under Santos’ name.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 7, Sec.5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the new rules require that the proof of
authority to execute the certification should be attached to the pleading.

300
Rule 43, Sec. 1

CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc.

G.R. No. 192725, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

Factual findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunals may not be assailed except only in cases where the CIAC arbitral
tribunals conducted their affairs in a haphazard, immodest manner that the most basic integrity of the arbitral
process was imperiled.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the assailed CA decision and amended
decision be reversed and set aside, and the CIAC arbitral tribunal decision be reinstated.

The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal awarded a sum of money in favor of petitioner CE Construction Corp. (CECON). On
appeal by Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI) before the CA, the CA modified the award, reducing that in favor of CECON
and increasing that in favor of ACI. While on initial impression, the issue before the SC is the characterization of
the contractual arrangement between the parties absent definitive governing instruments nor a confirmed, fixed
remuneration for services rendered, said issue requires delving into factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal.

ISSUE:
As a general rule, may the factual findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunals be assailed on appeal?

RULING:
No, factual findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunals may not be assailed except only in cases where the CIAC
arbitral tribunals conducted their affairs in a haphazard, immodest manner that the most basic integrity of the
arbitral process was imperiled.

Consistent with CIAC’s technical expertise is the primacy and deference accorded to its decisions. There is only
a very narrow room for assailing its rulings. Section 19 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law establishes
that CIAC arbitral awards may not be assailed, except on pure questions of law. Rule 43, Section 1 explicitly lists
CIAC as among the quasi-judicial agencies covered by Rule 43. Section 3 indicates that appeals through
Petitions for Review under Rule 43 are to “be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.” This is not to say that factual findings of CIAC
arbitral tribunals may now be assailed before the Court of Appeals. Section 3’s statement “whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law” merely recognizes variances in the disparate
modes of appeal that Rule 43 standardizes: there were those that enabled questions of fact; there were those
that enabled questions of law, and there were those that enabled mixed questions fact and law. Rule 43
emphasizes that though there may have been variances, all appeals under its scope are to be brought before
the Court of Appeals. However, in keeping with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, any appeal from CIAC
arbitral tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.

Factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may be revisited not merely because arbitral tribunals may have erred,
not even on the already exceptional grounds traditionally available in Rule 45 Petitions. Rather, factual findings
may be reviewed only in cases where the CIAC arbitral tribunals conducted their affairs in a haphazard, immodest
manner that the most basic integrity of the arbitral process was imperiled. In Spouses David v. Construction
Industry and Arbitration Commission:
We reiterate the rule that factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on
appeal, except when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and
willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Thus, as a general rule, the factual findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunals may not be assailed on appeal.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 43, Sec. 1 has not been amended no repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

301
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

The Office of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative complaints may be appealed to the CA via Rule 43,
whereas its dismissal of criminal complaints may be elevated to the SC via a special civil action under Rule 65

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Joint Resolution and Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing petitioner Edward Joson’s administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents for graft and corruption, malversation, fraud, and grave misconduct, among others.

Due to the alleged payment to a caterer that did not provide meals for an event and the consequent
misappropriation of the amount paid, petitioner filed administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. On February 8, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the Joint
Resolution recommending the dismissal of charges, on the basis of its finding of insufficient evidence to support
the charges. He then filed his Motion for Reconsideration on February 23, 2011, which the Office of the
Ombudsman denied in its Order. Hence, this Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Does petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC?
2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative complaint?
3. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed the
administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision in a criminal case or (b)
within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision in an administrative case.
Here, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration only on February 23, 2011, which was 10 days late with
respect to the criminal case and five (5) days late with respect to the administrative case.

Thus, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar
him from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC, and even if the SC grants an exception to this case,
the petition will still fail on other procedural grounds and on its merits.

2. No, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC is not the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in an administrative complaint.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 43. Nonetheless, a party may elevate the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of a criminal
complaint to this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there
is an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”

Thus, petitioner’s failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the administrative case renders the
Office of the Ombudsman’s decision final.

3. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges.

302
At the onset, this Court reiterates the policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause. Thus, an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated
before this Court can exercise its power of judicial review. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the Office
of the Ombudsman acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner.” The Office of the
Ombudsman laboriously discussed each and every charge of petitioner by enumerating the elements of each
law and pointing out where petitioner fell short in evidence. Upon its finding that there is no sufficient evidence
to support the charges against private respondents, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed them in
conformity with Rule II, Section 2 and Rule III, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Sec. 1 and Rule 43, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.

303
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.

G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016
Leonen, J.

Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing which set aside
the Office of the Ombudsman's decision and order in finding respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. guilty of
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and order dated August 29, 2013, which denied petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman's motion for reconsideration.

To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains
On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes,
Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the COD Division Chief.

OIC Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup reported that Agency No.
14-5005-1 had unremitted collections in the amount of ₱428,349.00 from May 21, 2001 to June 3, 2001. Nucup
also found that "there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that the partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and that the unremitted collections were
attributed to Cesar Lara, Cynthia Roldan, Catalino Alexandre Galang, Jr., who were all employed by [PCSO] as
Lottery Operations Assistants II, and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division Chief."

June 8, 2004, PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were
criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book
V of Executive Order No. 292.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered the decision finding Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of grave misconduct
and gross neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from service. The complaint for Dishonesty filed against
the respondent is however Dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Delos Reyes’ partial motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and resolution. According to the Court of Appeals, the Office
of the Ombudsman disregarded the PCSO’s findings as to Delos Reyes’ liability for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty.21 The Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt with substantial evidence,
and the ruling must be overturned. The Court of Appeals found that it was Driz who had the specific duty to
prepare and consolidate the sales reports and to remit the proceeds to the bank.

On October 29, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner argued that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the wrong remedy to
assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision before the Court of Appeals. The proper remedy is a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In any case, the petition was already filed out of time. A petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension of facts despite lack of proof of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Office of the Ombudsman. There was substantial evidence to justify the finding of gross misconduct
and gross neglect of duty. Misappreciation of facts or evidence is not equivalent to a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, citing Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner argued that “findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.”

ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court despite availability of the remedy under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?

304
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension
of facts in finding that substantial evidence exists for the administrative charge of grave misconduct and
gross neglect of duty.

RULING:
1. Yes.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion involves a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction." It must
be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power "in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention."

The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and
unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary;
and b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation.

In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available to respondent; however,
he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence
necessitated the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals. In addition, the petition for certiorari was
filed 60 days from the receipt of the copy of the denial of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was
beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal provided in the rules. Liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked
to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure.

2. Yes.

It is settled that "[f]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive." Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." We reiterate that only arbitrariness will warrant judicial intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.

In administrative cases, it is sufficient that "there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of
the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming."

In this case, we find respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. There is substantial
evidence supporting the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent intentionally failed to act on his duty
with a conscious indifference to the consequences. The alleged lack of specific internal control procedures does
not sway this court.

In sum, the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to show how the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the contested decision and order despite the presence of substantial evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is not affected by the Revised Rules because Rule 45, Sec. 1 and Rule 65, Sec. 1 have not been amended.

305
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Metrobank and Trust Co. v. G&P Builders, Inc.

G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
Leonen, J.

An interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is unappealable and cannot be assailed
via the instant petition for review under Rule 43. The proper remedy is filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the CA Decision which reversed and set aside the order of the rehabilitation court
allowing the withdrawal of the P15M deposit with petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank).

On March 17, 2003, G & P Builders, Inc. (G & P) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation alleging, among others, that it
"obtained a loan from Metrobank and mortgaged 12 parcels of land as collateral." However, while the
rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Metrobank and G & P executed a Memorandum of Agreement (first
MOA), where the parties agreed that 4 out of the 12 parcels of land mortgaged would be released and sold. The
sale was made in an amount of P15M. In 2006, Metrobank sold G & P's loan account for P10M to Elite Union
Investments Limited (Elite Union). Before the rehabilitation court could grant the motions, G & P, Elite Union, and
Spouses Victor and Lani Paras executed a Memorandum of Agreement (second MOA). Elite Union sold all its
rights, titles, and interests over G & P's account to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras for the amount of P10M. G &
P and Elite Union filed a Joint Motion for the court to approve the second MOA. They also prayed that partial
judgment be rendered based on the agreement. The rehabilitation court granted the Motion and rendered a
Partial Judgment based on the agreement.

G & P filed a Motion for the Release of Unapplied Deposit with Metrobank. Metrobank opposed the Motion and
claimed that the deposit was not covered by the contract transferring G & P's loan obligation to Elite Union. The
rehabilitation court granted G & P's Motion and ordered the release of unapplied deposit with Metrobank. The
CA reversed and set aside the Order of the rehabilitation court. According to the CA, G & P has no interest nor
personality in asking for the release of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses Victor and
Lani Paras. Further, the petition should have been dismissed outright since the assailed April 2, 2007 Order was
a mere interlocutory order and could not be assailed through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:
1. Is an order approving the motion for release of unapplied deposit considered an interlocutory order?
2. Did the trial court act beyond its jurisdiction when it allowed the release and withdrawal of the P15M beyond
the 18-month period provided under the interim rules?

RULING:
1. Yes, because the order pertained to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15M deposit as proceeds of the
sale of properties that secured respondent G & P's loan obligation. An interlocutory order does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides for the mode of appeal in cases
involving corporate rehabilitation, all decisions and final orders rendered by the trial court shall be appealed to
the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature. They pertained to an incidental
matter: entitlement to the P15M deposit as proceeds of the sale of properties that secured respondent G & P's
loan obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding before the commercial court concerns the approval of the
rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules. Considering that the assailed Order merely ordered the release of
funds from a depository bank and did not completely dispose of the case but left something else to be done by
the court, the order assailed is merely interlocutory. It is unappealable and cannot be assailed via the instant
petition for review under Rule 43.

306
Therefore, petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals
instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the proper remedy against
an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal.

2. No, because the said issue was never raised before the CA. The issue that was brought before and resolved
by the Court of Appeals pertained only to the rightful person entitled to the P15,000,000.00 deposit. Further, while
under Rule 4, Section II of the Interim Rules the rehabilitation court must act on the rehabilitation plan within 18
months from the date of filing of the petition, the lapse of the periods does not automatically result in the dismissal
of the petition for corporate rehabilitation. This is in line with the liberal construction given to the rules governing
corporate rehabilitation.

In this case, the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan within the maximum period prescribed under the Interim
Rules cannot be attributed wholly to the trial court. The parties, including Elite Union, entered into multiple
agreements in relation to the loan obligation of G & P. Petitioner is estopped in assailing the trial court Orders
when it availed itself of several extensions of time, whether directly or indirectly, during the rehabilitation
proceedings. Moreover, petitioner has no standing to question this court's jurisdiction because it sold G & P's
loan account to Elite Union, and was substituted as creditor by Elite Union. Hence, at the time the Orders were
issued, petitioner was not a party to the suit anymore, with rights dependent on the outcome of the corporate
rehabilitation proceedings.

Therefore, considering that the said issue was never raised before the CA, the court acted within its discretion in
issuing the assailed order during the rehabilitation proceedings.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case are not affected by the 2019 amendments.

307
Rule 43, Sec. 1

Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.

G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), October 13, 2014
Leonen, J.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision only when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC assailing the decision of CA setting
aside the Ombudsman decision finding respondent Delos Rees guilty of misconduct and gross neglect of duty.

PCSO maintains Online Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. Delos Reyes is the
Division Chief of Central Operations Division of PCSO. PCSO auditor submitted a consolidated report based on
a surprise audit conducted finding that the case and cash items under Delos Reyes’ control were in order and
recommended that the lotto proceeds be deposited in a bank instead of keeping it inside Delos Reyes’ office.
Thereafter, OIC division Chief of Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup (Nucup) was
instructed to conduct an account validation and verification to reconcile the amounts due to substantial balances.
Nuccup found that there was unremitted collection and a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales
report; that the partial remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections and that the unremitted
collections were attributed to Operations Assistants of PCSO and one Elizabeth Driz (Driz), assistant Division
Chief. PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Ombudsman administratively charging Delos Reyes and Driz
with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. Office of the Ombudsman rendered decision finding Delos Reyes and
Driz guilty and ordering their dismissal. Delos Reyes filed a partial MR which was denied prompting him to file a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted the petition and reverses the decision of Ombudsman.

Petitioner argued that the Rule 65 petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy to assail the Office of the
Ombudsman’s decision before the CA. The proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 43. In any case,
the petition was already filed out of time. A petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in taking cognizance of the Rule 65 certiorari despite availability of remedy under Rule 43?

RULING:
Yes. CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision only when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. The prevailing
view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable
where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; xxx Furthermore,
the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted when “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. . . .” Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases of the Office of the Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 43 which prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available to respondent; however,
he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence
necessitated the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 43 is not affected by the Revised rules of Civil Procedure.

308
Rule 43, Sec. 7

Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Keppel Philippines Mining, Inc.

G.R. No. 177382, February 17, 2016
Leonen, J.

No error in CA dismissing a Rule 43 petition for non-compliance with procedural rules — (1) it did not implead its
creditors as respondents, impleading only the Presiding Judge of the RTC, (2) it did not serve a copy of the
Petition on some of its creditors, specifically, its former employees, and (3) it did not serve a copy of the Petition
on the RTC — in the absence of showing of a justifiable reason for the exercise of liberality in the application of
the rules.

FACTS:
On October 4, 2005, Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. (Viva Shipping Lines) filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation
before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Regional Trial Court initially denied the Petition for failure to
comply with the requirements in Rule 4, Sections 2 and 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation. Subsequently, it filed its an Amended Petition. However, allegations thereof were contrary to the
attached documents in the Amended Petition.

The Regional Trial Court found that Viva Shipping Lines’ assets all appeared to be non-performing. Further, it
noted that Viva Shipping Lines failed to show any evidence of consent to sell real properties belonging to its
sister company.

Aggrieved, Viva Shipping Lines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the Court
of Appeals. It only impleaded Hon. Adolfo V. Encomienda, the Presiding Judge of the trial court that rendered
the assailed decision. It did not implead any of its creditors, but served copies of the Petition on counsels for
Metrobank, Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc., Pilipinas Shell, City of Batangas, Province of Quezon, and City of
Lucena. Viva Shipping Lines neither impleaded nor served a copy of the Petition on its former employees or their
counsels.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Viva Shipping Lines’ Petition for Review in the Resolution dated January 5,
2007. It found that Viva Shipping Lines failed to comply with procedural requirements under Rule 43.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals should have given due course to its Petition and excused its non-
compliance with procedural rules. For petitioner, the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
mandates a liberal construction of procedural rules, which must prevail over the strict application of Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing petitioner Viva Shipping Lines’ Petition for Review on procedural
grounds?

RULING:
No.

Any final order or decision of the Regional Trial Court may be subject of an appeal. In Re: Mode of Appeal in
Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission, this court clarified that all decisions
and final orders falling under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation shall be appealable to
the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner did not comply with some of the requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 43. First, it did not implead
its creditors as respondents. Instead, petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule 43. Second, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on some of its creditors,
specifically, its former employees. Finally, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on the Regional Trial Court.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition as a consequence of non-compliance with
procedural rules. Rule 43, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.

309
Petitioner admitted its failure to comply with the rules. It begs the indulgence of the court to give due course to
its Petition based on their belated compliance with some of these procedural rules and the policy on the liberal
construction of procedural rules.

There are two kinds of “liberality” with respect to the construction of provisions of law. The first requires ambiguity
in the text of the provision and usually pertains to a situation where there can be two or more viable meanings
given the factual context presented by a case. Liberality here means a presumption or predilection to interpret
the text in favor of the cause of the party requesting for “liberality.”

Then there is the “liberality” that actually means a request for the suspension of the operation of a provision of
law, whether substantive or procedural. This liberality requires equity. There may be some rights that are not
recognized in law, and if courts refuse to recognize these rights, an unfair situation may arise. Specifically, the
case may be a situation that was not contemplated on or was not possible at the time the legal norm was drafted
or promulgated.

Liberality lies within the bounded discretion of a court to allow an equitable result when the proven circumstances
require it. Liberality acknowledges a lacuna in the text of a provision of law. This may be because those who
promulgated the rule may not have foreseen the unique circumstances of a case at bar. Human foresight as laws
and rules are prepared is powerful, but not perfect.

Liberality is not an end in itself. Otherwise, it becomes a backdoor disguising the arbitrariness or despotism of
judges and justices.

The factual antecedents of a plea for the exercise of liberality must be clear. There must also be a showing that
the factual basis for a plea for liberality is not one that is due to the negligence or design of the party requesting
the suspension of the rules. Likewise, the basis for claiming an equitable result—for all the parties—must be
clearly and sufficiently pleaded and argued. Courts exercise liberality in line with their equity jurisdiction; hence,
it may only be exercised if it will result in fairness and justice.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no amendments made under Revised Rules of Civil Procedure from Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court onwards.

310
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals

Crispino v. Tansay
G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

In actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, such as a special civil action for certiorari,
the Court of Appeals’ power to receive evidence is unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals
in civil cases, criminal cases, as well as appeals involving claims for damages. In appeals in civil cases, the Court
of Appeals may only receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the decision and resolution of the CA.

Anatolia Tansay filed a civil case against petitioners Luz Anatolia Crispino, Caridad Echaves, and Zenaida
Echaves before the RTC for revocation of trust, declaration of nullity of transfer and cancellation of titles. Anatolia
acquired a parcel of land which was later called the Tansay Compound. This compound was later divided into 3
lots. Anatalia allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-1 in favor of Zenaida (the mother of Luz Anatolia and Caridad), and
Lot. No. 1048-3 in favor of Caridad.

Zenaida later found out that the titles to the lots were missing and filed a petition for reconstitution of the
certificates of titles, which the RTC granted. Meanwhile, Anatolia filed a case for revocation of trust, declaration
of nullity of transfer, and cancellation of title. The court ruled that petitioners herein did not pay any monetary or
other valuable consideration, and thus, the deeds of sale were held as invalid. Petitioners appealed before the
CA. During the pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died and was substituted by Lilian Yap. Petitioners then filed an
Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for Re-Opening of Trial, anchoring their motion on an affidavit
(Confirmation of Previous Sales) allegedly executed by Anatolia.

The CA, in a resolution, denied the said urgent motion, and treated the same as a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. It then explained that the affidavit the
Confirmation of Previous Sales was not the kind of newly discovered evidence contemplated by the Rules that
would warrant a new trial.

Petitioners now come to this Court, questioning the propriety of the CA’s ruling, which considered their urgent
motion as a motion for new trial. They allege that the CA should have considered their urgent motion as a motion
to receive further evidence under Section 9 of BP 129, which grants the CA the power to “receive all kinds of
evidence to resolve factual issues within its original and appellate jurisdiction.”

ISSUES:
Did the CA err in treating petitioners’ motion to remand as a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of
Court?
Is the CA’s power to receive evidence limited to motions based on newly discovered evidence?

RULING:
No. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly treated petitioners’ motion to remand as a motion for new
trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Section 9 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended, is empowered to receive evidence to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction. However, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, should be read and
construed together with the Court of Appeals’ internal rules.

In actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, such as a special civil action for certiorari,
the Court of Appeals’ power to receive evidence is unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals
in civil cases, criminal cases, as well as appeals involving claims for damages.

Said internal rules, under Section 3(b) of Rule 6 provides that the CA may receive evidence: “In appeals in civil
cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule
53 of the Rules of Court.”

311
Although the Court of Appeals has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded powers under Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this power is not without limit. The Court of Appeals cannot simply accept
additional evidence from the parties. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only receive
evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall under the concept of newly
discovered evidence. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to
be considered newly discovered: (1) the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court
below by exercise of due diligence; and (2) it is of such character as would probably change the result.

While it could not have been discovered by petitioners prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, the document
is not of such character that would probably change the lower court’s judgment. The nature of the deeds of sale
executed would not have been affected even if the Confirmation of Previous Sales was admitted in evidence
since the validity of a contract is determined by law and not by the stipulation of the parties.

Thus, the CA did not err in treating petitioners’ motion to remand as a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the
Rules of Court. Neither is the CA’s power to receive evidence limited to motions based on newly discovered
evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same insofar as the CA’s
power to receive evidence is concerned. There are no changes in respect of this principle.

312
Rule 44, Sec. 10

Buena v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

Failure to file memorandum is a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of CA dismissing the appeal of CSC
Regional Office for Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Regional Office) for failure to file a memorandum.

Regional Governor of ARMM, Dr. Hussin, appointed Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
DEPED, Division of Lanao del Sur-1 in a temporary capacity. He was then reappointed this time in a permanent
capacity. To change the status of his appointment from temporary to permanent, Governor Hussin requested
Regional Office to attest Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment. However, Regional Director Buena returned the
appointment to the Governor stating that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive eligibility required for
the position.

Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with RTC to compel Regional Office to attest his appointment. He argued
that the position does not belong to Career Executive Service of Administrative Code of 1987 thus, the position
does not require career executive service eligibility. Dr, benito further claims that it was the ministerial duty of
Regional Office to attest his appointment and that under Article VII, Section 19 of RA 9054 the Regional Governor
of ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the region.

According to Regional Director Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall
carry on with the Civil Service Commission’s mandate under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service
laws and rules.

For Dr. Benito’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for mandamus, Regional
Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus.

Trial court granted the petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda to which Dr. Benito complied while Regional Office did not. The appeal was then dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal of CSC Regional Office for its failure to file a memorandum?
2. Was Dr. Benito’s filing of petition for mandamus against Regional Office’s refusal to attest his
appointment the proper remedy?

RULING:
1. No. The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal. Last paragraph of section 10, Rule 44 of Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that “the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period thereof
may be ground for dismissal of the appeal.” Section 1 of Rule 50 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to
file the required memorandum within the reglementary period is ground for the CA to dismiss the appeal.
However, considering the important questions raised, the court takes cognizance of the petition.

2. Yes, a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the CSC to attest Dr. Benito’s appointment.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

True, the general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that a party “exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”

313
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career executive service eligible.
The question is whether the position for which he was appointed requires career executive service
eligibility. This is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect as the rules subject matter of the case are not amended by the Revised Rules.

314
Rule 44, Sec. 13

Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhard

G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
Leonen, J.

Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that the appellant’s brief must include “clear and concise
statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment.” The essence of due process
is the opportunity to be heard, and there is no denial of the right to due process if there was an opportunity for
the parties to defend their interests in due course.

FACTS:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) filed this Petition praying for the reversion and setting aside
of the CA Decision and Resolution, as well as the trial court’s Decision declaring it in default, in order for PNCC
to be allowed to file its Answer, or, the cause of action having already prescribed under Malaysian laws, the case
be dismissed outright.

PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate
company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to
construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. Various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest
Merchant Bankers were obtained to guarantee the due performance by PNCC of its construction
contracts. These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia. Due to failure to perform
the obligations, the State of Pahang demanded payment of the reduced amount of MYR 3.9M against Asiavest
Merchant Bankers’ performance bonds, pursuant to a compromise agreement. Consequently, the corporation
demanded from PNCC the amount it paid to the State of Pahang. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a
Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the RTC. It based its action on Malaysian Laws.
The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant
Bankers to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of the latter and found that Asiavest complied
with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws. The CA dismissed PNCC’s appeal.

PNCC contends it had consistently raised the propriety of impleading the two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest-
CDCP and Asiavest Holdings, and their participant liability, which are questions of fact. According to PNCC,
Asiavest-CDCP undertook to hold PNCC free and harmless from all its obligations under the agreement while
Asiavest Holdings agreed in the guaranty agreement to share with PNCC the guarantee liability on a 51% - 49%
arrangement. PNCC submits that the trial court could have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and
refused to take cognizance of the case considering the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two Malaysian
corporations and in determining PNCC’s exact liability. Further, considering that the transactions involved
originated from and occurred in a foreign country, PNCC adds that it was deprived of its day in court when its
Motion for extension to file an Answer was denied, and it was subsequently declared in default. Lastly, PNCC
submits that Asiavest Merchant Bankers already winded up, hence, the case is now moot and academic.

ISSUES:
1. May the CA dismiss appeals on the ground that only pure questions of law were raised?
2. May the Court consider questions of fact which while not enumerated in the appellant’s brief were raised in
the motion to lift order of default?
3. May a mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens operate to automatically divest a court of its
jurisdiction?
4. Did the denial of motions for extension to file an Answer, considering that the transactions involved originated
from and occurred in a foreign country, violate due process?
5. May rules on prescription based on Malaysian Laws be raised as defense in this case?

RULING:
1. Yes, because all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved is within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. This section includes the proviso: “except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
includes all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. In this case, the petition originated from a
default judgment against petitioner. Petitioner was not able to present evidence before the trial court. Necessarily,
the errors raised from the trial court involved only questions of law.

315
2. No, because Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that the appellant’s brief must include “clear
and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment.” In this case,
petitioner only assigned the following two errors: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) denial of the
motion for reconsideration as it deprived it of his day in court. The argument on the two Malaysian corporations
was raised by petitioner for the first time in its Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Merit. Further, since
this was already raised in the said Motion to Lift Order of Default and Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam filed before the trial court, these were already considered by the lower court when it ruled on both
Motions. In addition, the bases of its argument to implead the two Malaysian corporations (subcontract agreement
and guaranty agreement) were not submitted with any of its pleadings.

3. No, because the determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. Forum non conveniens, which literally translates to
‘the forum is inconvenient,’ gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. But a mere invocation of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest
a court of its jurisdiction. Here, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction because it would be more convenient
to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible,
witnesses would be readily available and it would entail less expenses in terms of legal services. Most of
petitioner’s officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely
also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this
civil suit before Malaysian courts.

4. No, because the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and there is no denial of the right to
due process if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend their interests in due course. Petitioner had been
able to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court, and later elevated its case before the CA. There is
no denial of due process if a party was given an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
also did not take advantage of the opportunities it was given to file a responsive pleading. It allowed the periods
it was given for the filing of pleadings to lapse. It never attempted to file its Answer, even belatedly. Further, it
argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, yet it did not file a Motion to Dismiss. Lastly,
in its affidavit of merit, it did not state the evidence it plans to present in the event its Motion is granted, or attach
documents in support of its claims.

5. No, because petitioner did not prove the Malaysian laws provisions regarding prescription. The Philippines
does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove
a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption, that the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. Further, prescription did not avail of the remedy of motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. It
was also not raised as an error before the CA. Nevertheless, we have ruled that prescription may be raised for
the first time before this court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 25 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because a new provision has been
added. The amendment provides that a document already accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent needs
no more proof, since the certificate or its equivalent is prima facie evidence of its due execution and genuineness.
A certificate is no longer required if the treaty or convention between the Philippines and a foreign country has
abolished such requirement or exempted the document itself from such formality.

The other rules used in this case are not affected by the new amendments under the Revised Rules of Court.

316
Issues that May be Raised on Appeal

Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner

G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

Issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower court cannot be decided for the first time on appeal. This
rule ensures fairness in proceedings.

FACTS:
British national Turner initiated via Chinatrust-Ayala Branch the telegraphic transfer of US$430.00 to the account
of “MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, Citibank, Heliopolis Branch” in Cairo, Egypt. The amount was partial payment
to Turner’s travel agent for his and his wife’s 11-day tour in Egypt. Turner paid a service fee of US$30.00. Both
amounts were debited from his dollar savings account with Chinatrust. Chinatrust remitted the funds through the
Union Bank of California, its paying bank, to Citibank-New York, to credit them to the bank account of Min
Travel/EsmatAzmy in Citibank-Cairo, Egypt. Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo’s telexnotice about the latter’s
inability to credit the funds it received because the “beneficiary name did not match their books. Chinatrust
claimed that it relayed the discrepancy to Turner and requested him to verify from his beneficiary Turner allegedly
informed Chinatrust that he was able to contact Esmat Azmy, who acknowledged receipt of the transferred funds.
Turner, however, had to cancel his travel-tour because his wife got ill and requested from Chinatrust the refund
of his money. According to Chinatrust, it explained to Turner that since the funds were already remitted to his
beneficiary’s account, they could no longer be withdrawn or retrieved without Citibank-Cairo’s consent. Turner
allegedly insisted on withdrawing the funds from Chinatrust.

Turner filed a Complaint against Chinatrust before the MTC. After the parties had submitted their respective
position papers in accordance with the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTC dismissed the case. On appeal,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City rendered a decision the Regional Trial Court ruled that this was not sufficient
basis to absolve Chinatrust of any responsibility. The trial court found insufficient evidence to show that Chinatrust
was not negligent in the performance of its obligation under the telegraphic transfer agreement. It held that no
“discrepancy notice” from Citibank-Cairo was even presented in evidence. The CA upheld the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUES:
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s decision granting the refund of respondent’s US$430.00 telegraphic funds
transfer despite its successful remittance and credit to respondent’s beneficiary Min Travel’s account with
Citibank-Cairo?

RULING:
Yes. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner was negligent in failing to
immediately address respondent’s queries and return his money and was consequently liable for the anguish
suffered by respondent. They ruled on an issue that was not raised by respondent in the lower court, thereby
violating petitioner’s right to due process.

It is an established principle that “courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party.” The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Teston, where this Court held that it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of the relief sought
by the pleadings.

The bank’s supposed negligence in the handling of respondent’s concerns was not among respondent’s causes
of action and was never raised in the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent’s cause of action was based on the
theory that the telexed funds transfer did not materialize, and the relief sought was limited to the refund of his
money and damages as a result of the purported non-remittance of the funds to the correct beneficiary account.

Furthermore, the case was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Accordingly, no trial was conducted as, after the conduct of a preliminary conference, the parties
were made to submit their position papers. There was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual
trial. However, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure calls for the submission of witnesses’
affidavits together with a party’s position paper after the conduct of a preliminary conference. The determination
of issues at the preliminary conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal. This is because

317
under Section 9 above, the parties were required to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual
issues as defined in the preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the parties cannot raise a new factual issue
on appeal, otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence against
it.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect since what was discussed here is a principle of law not specifically mentioned under the Rules of Court.

318
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Claret School of Quezon City v. Sinday

G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019
Leonen, J.

Under Rule 45 on certiorari, questions of facts may generally not be raised. However when reviewing labor cases,
it may be allowed when the factual findings and conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or inconsistent
with those of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Supreme court on the decision of the court of appeals which
orederd that Madelyn Sinday was a regular employee and was illegally dismissed.

Claret School, an educational institution is the petitioner in this case for appeal while the respondent is Sinday,
the wife of Wencil Sinday, one of Claret’s long time drivers. Sinday initially worked as a releasing clerk for books,
then a filing clerk at Human Resources Department and at a Claret technical vocational testing center. This was
way back in 2011. However on 2013, she was asked be Fr. Manubag tosign a probationary employment contract.
After acting as a substitute, when the permanent teacher arrived Sunday lost her job.

Petitioner avers that Sunday was merely a part time fixed term contractual employee wom the school
accomodated because her husband was its longime driver. Further argued is that respondent was well aware of
her fixed term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which showed her employment’s
duration. Respondent on the other hand argued that she was a regular employee because she performed various
jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual course of businees of Claret.

ISSUE:
Is the petition procedurally infirm because it presents questions of facts?

RULING:
No the petition under rule 45 is not procedurally infirm.

According to the rule 45 on certiorari in labor cases, generally questions of fact may not be raised in the appeal
on certiorary and are therefore not reviewable by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless the court has recognized that
this is not a hard and fast rule. Judicial review in labor cases may also resolve questions of facts when the factual
findings and conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or inconsistent with those of the court of appeals.

Therefore the case was allowed to be reviewed by the supreme court amidst the possible violation of the
procedure. Furthermore upon the review of the facts of the case, the court decided that Madelyn Sinday was a
regular employee on the basis that her employment is in the course of regular business of the school. She was
also ruled to be illegally dismissed as the proper procedure was not followed and there was absence of any just
or authorized causes.

Hence there was no procedural infirmity in applying rule 45.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 45 on certiorari has not been changed.

319
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Terp Construction Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank

G.R. No. 221771, September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.

Generally the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However an exception exists when there are conflicting facts
presented in the Regional Trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is however in the discretion of the court on
whether or not it will deem as proper introduction of new facts as it may deem necessary based on the
circumstances surrounding the case.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the decision of the regional trial court ordering Terp Construction to pay Banco Filipino Savings interest
differentials of P18,104,431.33.0

Petitioner is Terp Construction, a company that planned to develop a housing project called the Margarita
Eastville and a condominium called Margarita Plaza. Respondent on the other hand is Banco Filipino, a purchaser
of the Margarita Bonds, the guaranty of Terp Construction for the loans secured in three different companies.
Terp Construction began the Margarita Eastville and Margarita Plaza but due to the economic collapse in 1997,
it suffered unrealized income and could not proceed with the construction. As the Margarita Bonds matured,
Banco Filipino demanded the payment of the interest on its investment which was refused by Terp Construction.

Petitioner Terp Construction alleges that it agreed to pay only 7% additional interest on the condition that all the
asset pool funds would be released to Terp Construction for it to pay the interest but such funds of the asset pool
were never released to it. More importantly petitioner submits that while a petition under rule 45 is limited to
questions of law, an exception is when the factual findings of the trial court and the court of appeals are
conflictiong. Respondent on the other hand contends that after no payment of interest on the bonds had been
made, the guarantor paid only 8.5% intereset instead of 15% interest which Terp Construction committed to pay.
Furthermore conflicting findings of fact between the trial court and the court of appeals do not automatically grant
petitioner an exception to the general rule in Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Is Rule 45 proper even though the Supreme Court is generally not a trier of facts?

RULING:
No, Rule 45 is not proper.

According to rule 45 of the the Rules of Court, as a general rule only questions of law may be brought in a petition
for review on certiorari. This court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts if they are not supported
by substantial evidence. There are of course exceptions to this including the claim of the petitioner that there
were inconsistencies in the facts presented in the Regional Trial Court versus in the Court of Appeals.

Upon further investigation and proper assessment it has been ruled that the argument of petitioner is lacking in
merit. As the general rule of the Supreme Court as not a trier of facts has not been overturned by the apparent
exception of conflicting set of facts presented in the Regional Trial court and the Court of Appeals. Due to the
insufficiency of such, the petition has to be denied. Furthermore, the proof of other facts stated before showing
the payment of the interest in multiple situations of a certain Escalona is a ratification of such debt on the interest.

Therefore the petition for reversal is denied on the failure to allow presentation of new facts and the proof that
there was ratification of payment of interest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 45 on appeal by certiorari have not been changed.

320
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
Leonen, J.

Generally, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
unless facts of weight and substance have been overlooked or misapplied.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting Joseph Villasana y Cabahug of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

Petitioner is Joseph Villasana y Cabahug was charged with the violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs
act of 2002 for illegal possession of one self-sealing transparent plastic bag containing 0.15 gram of white
crystalline substance Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. Respondent on the other hand is the people
of the Philippines or the prosection as the violation is a crime against the citizens of the Philippines. PO3 Martinez
received information regarding the rampant selling of drugs in Valenzuela against the petitioners. The entrapment
operation was successful and Villasana was apprehended together with the sachet of shabu which was
documented and marked in the barangay. Villasana says that that he was just seized by the police officers after
alighting from the jeepney. He was then brought to the narcotics department wherein when the siblings arrived
they were asked for 50,000 php areglo. He was also then asked to sign a document saying that he will be charged
for a drug related offense.

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was invalid and the drug seized from him was inadmissible in
evidence and that there were irregularities in the handling of the seized shabu such as inconsistent markings and
the marking were not done at the place of arrest including non-compliance with inventory and photograph
requirements. respondent counters that petitioner purely raises questions of fact that are proscribed in a Rule 45
petition. Furthermore that since the petitioner entered his plea without objection he waived his right to question
the illegality of his arrest.

ISSUES:
1. Is Rule 45 proper even though the supreme court is generally not a trier of facts?
2. Was the arrest proper as in flagrante delicto arrest?
3. Was the integrity of the drugs seized compromised?

RULING:
1. Yes rule 45 is proper.
2. No there was no proper in flagrante delicto arrest.
3. Yes the integrity of the drugs seized was compromised.

According to rule 45 of the the Rules of Court, as a general rule only questions of law may be brought in a petition
for review on certiorari. This court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts if they are not supported
by substantial evidence. There are of course exceptions to this including the claim of the petitioner that there
were factual findings which were overlooked, disregarded and could change the outcome of the case.

According to Rule 113 Section 5 of the revised criminal procedure, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. The two elements of the person to be arrested has just
commiteed is commiting or attempting to commit a crume and in the presence of the arresting officer.

Also According to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 the apprehending team must seize, mark and document
the drugs confiscated in the presence of the accused or from whom which drugs were seized. This in effect helps
protect the integrity of the drugs seized.

Based on the sound discretion of the Supreme court the allowance of the facts stated by petitioner even in Rule
45 is allowed as one of the exceptions. This led to the reversal of the decision of the case.

321
There was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at bar primarily because the apprehending officer was still far
away from the petitioner when the alleged crime of selling was being committed. The confidential information
given regarding the sale of prohibited drugs to the police officers was not substantial enough to make the arrest
as in flagrante delicto.

Lastly the proper initial marking and documentation in front of authorized personnel upon apprehension of the
contraband was not followed. This led to the integrity of the drugs to be compromised. As there has been doubt
in the chain of authentication, the possibility of tampering existed.

Therefore with all the premises being considered the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Case is dismissed against the petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 45 on appeal by certiorari has not been changed.
No effect because rule 113 section 5 on warrantless arrest has not been changed
No effect because R.A. No. 9165 has not been changed.

322
Rule 45, Sec. 1

William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association

G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

Only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court admits of exceptions subject to its sound judicial
discretion, one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting,

FACTS:
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA’s decision in setting aside the Office of the
President’s (Office) Decision and found the “No Sticker, No ID, No Entry” Policy valid and issued within the
authority of the homeowners’ association.

Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision in Balibago, Angeles City, Pampanga with several commercial
establishments (including beer houses, karaoke bars, night clubs, and other drinking joints) operating within it.
Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision,
exposing its residents to incidents of robbery, akyat-bahay, prostitution, rape, loud music, and noise that would
last until the wee hours of the morning. Hence, a No Sticker, No ID, No Entry” Policy (the Policy) was proposed
by respondent Diamond Homeowners. After several meetings and consultations, it was then implemented within
the subdivision. Petitioner William G. Kwong (Kwong), a resident of Diamond Subdivision for more than 38 years,
who runs three (3) motels in the subdivision under his company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc. contested
the Policy.

When Diamond Homeowners did not heed his objection, Kwong filed a complaint before the HLURB Regional
Office, arguing that the Policy was invalid because the subdivision roads have been donated to the City of
Angeles in 1974 and were, thus, public roads that must be open for public use. Likewise, he contended that the
screening of visitors would be cumbersome for his customers, affecting his businesses. The HLURB ruled in
favor of respondents. It ruled that the protection and security of Diamond Subdivision’s residents were the primary
and utmost concern and that the Policy either prohibited or impaired the use of the roads. Moreover, the roads
were still for public use, and the public was still allowed to pass as long as they presented identification cards.
Upon appeal, the HLURB Arbiter affirmed the Regional Office. On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of
the HLURB, the Arbiter’s ruling was reversed. The Board found that the Policy turned the subdivision roads into
private roads-inaccessible, not open to the public, and under the control of Diamond Homeowners and that the
homeowners failed to present evidence of peace and security issues within the subdivision.

The Office affirmed the Board of Commissioner’s Decision, while the CA reversed the Office, finding merit on
Diamond Homeowners’ Petition. Upon appeal before the SC, petitioner insists that the HLURB has the technical
expertise and special competence on matters involving the business of developing subdivisions and
condominiums. Thus, its factual findings should be respected.

ISSUE:
Should the factual findings of the HLURB be entitled to respect?

RULING:
Yes, the said factual findings should be respected.

It has been ruled that the factual findings of administrative agencies with special competence should be respected
if supported by substantial evidence. To begin with, the proper procedure was followed. The matter was brought
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, which exercised jurisdiction and ruled on the merits of the
case. The appellate process then took place from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter to the
Board of Commissioners, to the Office of the President, to the Court of Appeals, and now, to this Court.

However, because the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal.
Since the factual findings are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on
appeal and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this Court may determine what is more consistent with
the evidence on record. While only questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions, this rule is not without

323
exceptions. One of the exceptions is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Since the findings of the lower
tribunals are conflicting as to whether there were security concerns within Diamond Subdivision that would
warrant the issuance of the Policy, this Court may exercise its discretion to resolve this factual issue.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case is not covered by the amendments.

324
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Constantino v. People
G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019
Leonen, J.

The Supreme Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court “if it is not convinced that [such findings]
are conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses.”

FACTS:
This is a case for Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the RTC Judgement
finding Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino (Constantino) guilty of falsification of a public document under Article
171(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

An Information was filed against Constantino and Teresita C. Saliganan (Saliganan), charging them with
falsification of a public document. It stated that Constantino had taken advantage of his being a notary public for
Laoag City and Ilocos Norte, together with Saliganan, made it appear in the last will and testament executed by
Severino C. Cabrales in favor of the Saliganan that the testator and the attesting witnesses acknowledge the last
will and testament before Constantino while in truth they never appeared to acknowledge the same.

The RTC found Constantino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document under Article
171(2) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision. Further, it was stated that petitioner
raises questions of fact improper in a Rule 45 petition. Maintaining that there was no error in the finding of guilt,
it asserts that all the elements of the crime of falsification of a public document under Article 171 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code were duly proven by the evidence on record. Hence the current case.

ISSUE:
Does the Petition present questions of fact not cognizable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court?

RULING:
Yes. However, the Court ruled that the SC may still review the findings of the RTC.

The Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court “if it is not convinced that [such findings] are
conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses.” Significant
facts and circumstances may have been overlooked, which, if properly considered, could affect the result of the
case.

Here, however, the factual findings are not disputed. The prosecution’s theory, however, is that a falsity in a
public document occurred because petitioner failed to delete Dr. Asuncion’s name in the Joint Acknowledgment
although Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it had been notarized by Atty. Constantino.
Petitioner’s main defense, on the other hand, is that he ordered the testator, Severino, not to delete Dr.
Asuncion’s name.

NOTE: The Court ruled that there is no falsity. The SC held that “since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint
Acknowledgment before it was notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed to its due
execution at the time of its notarization. Thus, when Atty. Constantino certified that the persons who attested and
subscribed to the document were present before him, there could have been no falsity.” Hence, Constantino was
acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

325
Rule 45, Sec. 1

BNL Management Corp. v. Uy

G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
they dwell on the truth or falsity of facts. Hence, the Court would have to evaluate the evidence presented. In
contrast, questions of law are those which occur when there is “doubt or difference . . . on what the law is on a
certain state of facts.”

FACTS:
This is a case for Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the
RTC which dismissed the complaint for damages filed by BNL Management Corporation (BNL Management) and
its president, Romeo David (David), against the Imperial Bayfront Tower Condominium Association (the
Association).

BNL Management leased 6 condominium units to its clients under separate contracts of lease and held exclusive
rights to 3 parking spaces of Imperial Bayfront Tower Condominium. In a letter to the building administrator, it
brought up complaints concerning Imperial Bayfront’s management and maintenance.. Later, BNL declared that
it would withhold paying monthly dues and instead deposit them and its arrears in a bank as escrow, which could
be withdrawn by the Association only after it has complied with the demands in the letter. In response, Building
Administrator Erma Abella explained that the issues complained about were due to BNL Management not
submitting the necessary documents to the Association, and a lack of funds as a result of BNL Management’s
nonpayment of association dues.

After reiterating its complaints, BNL Management received a letter containing a breakdown of its arrears in the
payment of association dues. It received two other notices thereafter. Later, lights in the hallway leading to its
units and its water services had been turned off due to its nonpayment of association dues.

Since the Association refused to restore its electricity and water, BNL Management and David filed before the
RTC a complaint for damages and specific performance with preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction. The
RTC dismissed the Complaint. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was affirmed. It held that BNL Management
bound itself to the House Rules and Regulations when it purchased the units. Thus, it could neither claim
ignorance of these rules nor assert that it was never informed of the consequences of not paying dues, especially
when it received two (2) notices stating that should it fail to pay, utility services would be interrupted. Petitioners
thereafter filed a Petition for review with the SC. Respondents filed a Comment/Opposition to the Petition for
Review on the ground that the issues raised by petitioners are not questions of law, but of fact

ISSUE:
May the Supreme Court rule on the attestations of BNL, notwithstanding that the issues raised by them are not
questions of law, but of fact?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court is generally not a trier of facts.

The SC can no longer review this finding, being a question of fact. Questions of fact are not reviewable in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as they dwell on the truth or falsity of facts.
Hence, the Court would have to evaluate the evidence presented. In contrast, questions of law are those which
occur when there is “doubt or difference . . . on what the law is on a certain state of facts.” Petitioners fail to
present a compelling reason for this Court to review these factual findings. They have not shown how the lower
courts failed to appreciate the evidence they presented, or that their findings are wholly lacking in basis in the
record, or that they have committed a misapprehension of facts. In the instant case, defendants are justified in
cutting off plaintiffs’ water and electric services pursuant to paragraph 5 of the House Rules and Regulations of
the IBTCA. The cutting off of the utility services in plaintiffs’ units was the last option that the association has to
compel plaintiff to pay its dues.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions discussed were not amended.

326
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp.

G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018
Leonen, J.

The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45
since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to once
again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

FACTS:
This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental Mindoro, which Your Own Home Development
Corp. (YOHDC) entered into with its partner, Archangel Corporation. Iris’ husband, Tarcisius was hired as the
project coordinator/manager. He found a property owned by Rosillas who agreed to sell the land for
P1,200,000.00. However, Tarcisius misrepresented to the partner corporations that Rosillas had asked for
P4,000,000.00 instead.

Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2) installments. Despite this, Tarcisius still requested for two (2) more
checks in Rosillas’ name, each for P500,000.00, insisting that the land was acquired for P4,000,000.00. He
requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor of Rosillas’ property, Engineer Delos Reyes, in the amount
of P254,400.00 each. For these, YOHDC issued four (4) Metrobank checks. Tarcisius and his wife, Iris,
(collectively, the Rodriguez Spouses), deposited two (2) checks totaling P754,400.00 in their personal BPI
Account and other two (2) checks were deposited in their other personal BPI bank account.

YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas’ and Delos Reyes’ checks. They found out that while
the checks were for two (2) different people, they were deposited in the same BPI accounts and that during this
time, Iris worked as a bank teller at BPI. YOHDC contacted Rosillas and Delos Reyes regarding the checks who
confirmed that they never received, endorsed, encashed, or deposited any of the four (4) checks.

Hence, YOHDC demanded from Tarcisius the amount of the checks which he failed to return. YOHDC first sought
reimbursement from Metrobank, which advised it to direct its claim against BPI. BPI suggested that YOHDC
course its documents through Metrobank. Pursuant to Metrobank’s instructions, YOHDC submitted Rosillas’ and
Delos Reyes’ Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which, in turn, forwarded them to BPI.

BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so
that it could respond to YOHDC’s complaint to which they complied. However, they requested BPI to suspend its
action on YOHDC’s claim and instructed it not to deduct the amount until they have clarified the matter but BPI
denied this request and sent Metrobank Special Clearing Receipt No. 065273 to reimburse the amounts of the
four (4) checks totaling P1,508,000.00. Thereafter, Metrobank credited the amount to YOHDC.

Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for Damages against YOHDC, BPI, Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos
Reyes, among others. The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas’ Checks were received by Rosillas’ agent,
Godofredo Syquioco. As for Delos Reyes’ Checks, the Rodriguez Spouses asserted that Delos Reyes received
P424,000.00 from the proceeds of Metrobank Check Nos. 181043813 and 181043841. They claimed that all four
(4) checks were encashed through BPI with the assistance of Iris.

The RTC dismissed the case against Rosillas, Delos Reyes, Metrobank, and BPI. The CA modified the RTC’s
decision and ruled that YOHDC is not liable to the Spouses Rodriguez in the amount of PhP 424,000.00 and it
is not also liable to the latter for attorney’s fees. Taricius died during the pendency of the proceeding. Iris filed a
MFR but it was denied.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari where she argues that in Delos Reyes’ Answer filed with the
Regional Trial Court, he admitted the existence of his Acknowledgment and receipt of the amount of P424,000.00.
In its Comment, YOHDC asserts that in arguing that Delos Reyes was paid P424,000.00, Iris raised a question
of fact, which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. YOHDC also contends that Delos Reyes never
appeared in court to confirm or prove the allegations in his Answer. It also points out that in Delos Reyes’ Affidavit,
he categorically stated that he did not receive, deposit, encash, or endorse his Checks, or receive their proceeds.

ISSUES:

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1. Is a factual issue proper on a Petition for Review on Certiorari?
2. Is the affidavit more competent to take into account over the belatedly issued acknowledge?

RULING:
1. No. In the first place, Iris raised a factual issue which is not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This
Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It only entertains questions of law—those which ask
to resolve which law applies on a given set of facts. It does not rule on questions which determine “the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts.”

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion.” The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court’s function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

The question of whether Delos Reyes has been paid the amount of P424,000.00 is a question of fact. It does not
simply ask to resolve which law properly applies given the set of facts in this case. It requires a review of the
evidence and the determination of the truth or falsity of the parties’ allegations. Clearly, Iris is raising a question
of fact which is not proper in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

2. This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more credence to Delos Reyes’ Affidavit, which
is a public document.

A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary weight with respect to its
due execution. As such, it need not be proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it is
entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and effect. To nullify a notarized document on
account of flaws and defects, there must be a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity.

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, this Court ruled that to contradict statements in a notarial document, there
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence against it. A subsequent notarial
document retracting the previous statement is not even sufficient. In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial
document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document.
What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial document is clear and convincing
evidence. The rationale for this rule is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.

In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they could be admitted in evidence. To establish
their authenticity, the best proof available must be presented. In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp., whether a
document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public documents are
admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other hand,
private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated. During authentication in
court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed
or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. While there is
no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document,
the best proof available must be presented.

However, authentication may not be necessary where the document’s genuineness and due execution were
admitted by the adverse party.

In Chua v. Court of Appeals:

The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in
evidence. On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved
and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. There is
also no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due
execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.

In the case at bar, Delos Reyes’ Acknowledgement is a private document. Thus, for Iris to rely on it, she must
have first proven its genuineness and authenticity by presenting the best proof available. As such, she should

328
have presented Delos Reyes to testify on its genuineness and due execution. However, Iris merely relied on
Delos Reyes’ Answer and Acknowledgement on their faces. Delos Reyes neither appeared in court to attest to
the allegations of his Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as Iris’ witness.

Assuming that the statements in Delos Reyes’ Answer are binding admissions, these admissions only pertain to
the existence of his Acknowledgment. He neither categorically stated its genuineness and authenticity, nor
admitted its allegations. Moreover, while he admitted the receipt of P424,000.00, he excluded from his admission
that it was from the Metrobank checks stated in the Rodriguez Spouses’ Complaint. Thus, the amount he received
cannot be assumed to have been from the proceeds of his Checks or that it was payment made to him on behalf
of YOHDC as these claims must still be proven. Moreover, this Court notes that Delos Reyes never denied his
notarized Affidavit’s allegations even though his Acknowledgement’s allegations are inconsistent with them.
Hence, this Court assumes that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of a retraction. This Court has consistently
held that retractions are looked upon with disfavor because of its unreliable nature and the likely probability that
it may again be repudiated.

Again, in Rufina Patis Factory: For retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction, it is necessary to
examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible motives for reversing the previous declaration, as these
motives may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them hook, line and sinker
would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the doors to fraud.

In the case at bar, assuming Delos Reyes’ Acknowledgement is genuine, he provided no satisfactory explanation
for his contradictory statements in his Affidavit. He did not appear in court to clarify the matter or elucidate any
circumstance that could explain what happened between the executions of these two (2) documents. The only
logical explanation that could reconcile the two (2) documents is if this Court assumes that the Rodriguez
Spouses paid Delos Reyes the amount of P424,000.00 sometime after he executed his Affidavit. However, if this
is the case, that payment on behalf of YOHDC is not authorized since the Rodriguez Spouses did not represent
YOHDC in any manner. Moreover, it can be assumed that Tarcisius’ authority to represent YOHDC had been
impliedly revoked considering the incidents on Delos Reyes’ and Rosillas’ Checks. Thus, if Delos Reyes was
paid by the Rodriguez Spouses on behalf of YOHDC, this payment is unauthorized. Iris’ cause of action is with
Delos Reyes, and not with YOHDC.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 and Rule 132, Sec 19(b) are still the same.

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Rule 45, Sec. 1

Chavez v. Marcos
G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018
Leonen, J.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to questions of law. Further, the Rules of Court
mandate that petitions for review distinctly set forth the questions of law raised. Although this Court may, in
exceptional cases, delve into questions of fact, these exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by
the parties before this Court may evaluate and review facts of the case.

FACTS:
This case involves 33 consolidated criminal cases filed against Imelda R. Marcos (Imelda), among others, for
violations of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, in relation to Section 34 RA No. 265, or the Central Bank
Act.

Central Bank of the Philippines issued dollar-denominated treasury notes (dollar t-notes for brevity) in the total
amount of $125-million, U.S. currency. $75-million of these notes were purchased by three Swiss banks holding
the hidden wealth of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his wife Imelda Romualdez Marcos (the Marcoses,
for brevity). The purchases were recorded in the Central Bank under the name of the Marcoses’ front man, then
Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto. Of this $75-million, $50-million came from Bank Hofmann, $10-million from
the Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC), and $15-million from Banque Paribas. The purchases by Bank Hofmann and
SBC were made through accounts owned by foundations called Avertina, Maler I, and Maler II, which were owned
by the Marcoses, and which act of opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without CB
authorization is a violation of Sec. 4 of the CB’s Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in 1983 in CB
Circular No. 960. The transactions came to light only after the so-called EDSA People Power Revolution when
documents relating to the Marcoses’ Swiss bank accounts and dollar t-note purchases were found in Malacanang
Palace after the Marcos family had fled. The request for assistance was eventually granted by Swiss investigating
magistrate Peter Cosenday who issued a freeze order on all the Swiss banks where the Marcoses and their
foundations had accounts, and he further required these banks and the foundations to submit relevant documents
and information concerning the accounts.

The PCGG thereupon decided to request the Solicitor General (now Francisco Chavez) to file the appropriate
cases against the estate of the late President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, and other members of their family based on
documents already turned over and still to be turned over by the Swiss authorities. The prosecution presented
only two (2) witnesses. Its first witness was former ASG and PCGG Commissioner Del Rosario who identified
Swiss bank documents and testified that they were personally received by Chavez before they were referred to
him for determination of probative value. He said that he assisted in drafting the complaints connected to the
recovery of the Marcos’ properties. As its second witness, the prosecution presented Chavez as an expert
witness in the field of law, and he corroborated Del Rosario’s testimony. He testified on the formation of the task
force, of which Del Rosario was a member and which prepared the criminal complaints against the Marcoses
and their cronies. However, petitioner’s presentation as a witness was hampered by a series of scheduling issues,
which resulted in several postponements and absences. Chavez’s claim of bias was based largely on his
perception of how RTC Presiding Judge Pampilo scheduled his testimony, combined with what transpired when
he failed to testify on April 24, 2007.

On the matter of scheduling, the RTC issued its January 10, 2007 Order, requiring Chavez to appear in court on
January 16, 17, 23, 24, 30, 31, and February 6, 7, 13, 14, 20, 21, 27, and 28, 2007 to testify. In his January 11,
2007 letter, Chavez advised the RTC that his entire calendar for January and the beginning of February 2007
were full, and requested later dates for his testimony, including February 20, 21, 27, and 28. The RTC reset
Chavez’s examination to February 21, 27, and 28, again with the warning that these trial dates were not
transferable. Prosecutor Yarte filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing of April 11, 2007, on the ground that he would
be attending the National Prosecutors League of the Philippines’ Annual Convention in Boracay Island from April
11 to 13. Thereafter, Chavez asked to be excused from attending the April 10, 2007 hearing due to an
intransferrable Court Martial setting in Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal but advised the RTC that he would be
available to testify on the April 11 and 24, 2007 hearings. Thus, Chavez did not attend the April 10, 2007 hearing.

He attended the succeeding hearing on April 11, 2007. However, he was unable to testify as the documents he
was supposed to identify were with Prosecutor Yarte, who was attending the prosecutors’ annual convention in

330
Boracay. Subsequently, Chavez was scheduled to continue his direct testimony on April 24, 2007. However, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Inhibit, seeking Judge Pampilo’s inhibition, and set it to be heard on April 24, 2007.
Chavez explained in a letter dated April 23, 2007 that he would not appear in court. Atty. Galit, a lawyer from the
PCGG, appeared before the court with a memorandum from then Secretary of Justice Gonzales, authorizing him
to prosecute the consolidated cases.

After the April 24, 2007 hearing, Chavez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with the CA
praying that it Judge Pampilo’s denying the motion to inhibit declare null and void and for him to be mandated to
inhibit himself in the criminal cases against Imelda. CA denied it on the basis that Judge Pampilo’s alleged bias
was not sufficiently substantiated.

RTC acquitted Imelda and Hector T. Rivera on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner claims that the CA should have appreciated Judge Pampilo’s demeanor and over-eagerness to decide
the case as evidence of grave abuse of discretion. He characterized Judge Pampilo’s scheduling of the
prosecution’s witness as a “noose-tightening tactic.” He claimed that due to the unreasonableness of the
schedule for his testimonies, it was inevitable that the prosecution would have to request for adjustments, and
thereafter accept any resetting with the warning that its presentation of evidence would be deemed terminated.
Judge Pampilo made it impossible for petitioner or for Department of Justice State Prosecutor Yarte to appear at
the hearing dates set by the court. By orally denying the Motion to Inhibit on April 24, 2007, Judge Pampilo
essentially forced the prosecution to present its evidence on the very same day, or end its presentation of
evidence. Petitioner also claims that Judge Pampilo, Atty. Galit, and Atty. Robert Sison (Atty. Sison) all acted
with a common objective of railroading the cases.

Respondent Imelda argues that the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact. Further, the
undisputed facts on record constitute sufficient justification for Judge Pampilo’s decision to tenninate the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence.

ISSUE:
Should the petition be dismissed for raising questions of fact?

RULING:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to questions of law. Further, the Rules of Court
mandate that petitions for review distinctly set forth the questions of law raised.

Essentially, petitioner takes issue with how the Court of Appeals interpreted the acts of Judge Pampilo and found
no manifest partiality, which are clearly not questions of law. He did not even attempt to frame the issues as
questions of law. By claiming that Judge Pampilo violated a writ of injunction, petitioner attempts to cloak the
second alleged error with some semblance of being a question of law. However, petitioner does not provide any
legal basis or coherent legal argument to support the claim that a writ of injunction was violated, and this claim
is totally specious. Although this Court may, in exceptional cases, delve into questions of fact, these exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties before this Court may evaluate and review facts of the
case.

Petitioner having failed to establish the basis for this Court to evaluate and review the facts in this case, the
petition may be dismissed on this ground.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 remains the same.

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Rule 45, Sec. 1

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of Communications

G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
Leonen, J.

Considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law, petitioner did not err in filing its appeal directly
with this Court pursuant to law and prevailing jurisprudence.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review filed by First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. (First Sarmiento) assailing the
Decision and Order of RTC. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) a loan, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage, claiming that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the
principal amount and accrued interest on the loan.

First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with the Regional Trial Court.
However, the Executive Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged
properties’ tax declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees. First Sarmiento then filed an “Urgent
Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation” with
the Executive Judge. The Executive Judge ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate
mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, First Sarmiento was able to file its Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage.

In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order), PBCOM asserted that the
Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento’s Complaint because the action for
annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market
value of the mortgaged properties. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed First Sarmiento’s Complaint ruling that the
court never acquired jurisdiction for First Sarmiento’s failure to pay for docket fees.

Petitioner contends that its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage has a subject incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it was not intended to recover ownership or possession of the mortgaged properties sold to
respondent during the auction sale. It insists that it had ownership and possession of the mortgaged properties
58

when it filed its Complaint; hence, it never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of their ownership or
possession.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento Corporation’s Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage?
2. Did the petitioner err in filing its appeal directly with the Supreme Court?

RULING:
1. Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be established. This finds
support in this Court’s repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought. Lapitan stressed that where the money
claim is only a consequence of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)

332
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the
first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of
June 11, 1901).

Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla likewise stressed that if the primary cause of action is based on a claim of
ownership or a claim of legal right to control, possess, dispose, or enjoy such property, the action is a real action
involving title to real property.

A careful reading of petitioner’s Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance
of the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over
them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered into with
respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement.

2. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court allows for a direct recourse to this Court by appeal from a judgment, final order,
or resolution of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, there is no question that a petitioner may file a verified petition for
review directly with this Court if only questions of law are at issue; however, if both questions of law and of facts
are present, the correct remedy is to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, the
underlying question for this Court’s resolution pertains to jurisdiction, or to be more precise, whether the Regional
Trial Court attained jurisdiction over petitioner’s Complaint with the amount of docket fees paid.

Considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law, petitioner did not err in filing its appeal directly
with this Court pursuant to law and prevailing jurisprudence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

333
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Kim Liong v. People

G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

The rule, therefore, is that petitions for review on certiorari may only raise questions of law. While it is true that
this rule is subject to exceptions, nevertheless, this Court finds that none of the exceptions applies in this case.
Even if this Court considers the facts as alleged by petitioner, it will still arrive at the conclusion that the trial court
judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in deeming petitioner’s right to cross-examination as waived.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 113152. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
Orders of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court, Manila declaring Kim Liong (Liong) to have waived his right to cross-
examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela Rama (Dela Rama).

On January 28, 2002, Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite
demand, a total of US$50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar account The first prosecution
witness, Antonio Dela Rama (Dela Rama), was finally presented as scheduled on June 8, 2006. His direct
examination was terminated on January 25, 2007, and the initial date for his cross-examination was set on March
15, 2007. However, the cross examination was reset several times upon motion of the accused who engaged
the services of the new counsel. Witness Antonio dela Rama was hospitalized. Thus, private prosecutor Atty.
Ma. Julpha Maningas moved that Liong be declared to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama. It
averred that the cross examination of witness Antonio dela Rama had been reset a number of times due to the
fault of the accused who kept on changing his counsel; that accused was given more than sufficient opportunities
to cross examine the said witness but simply delayed the proceedings of this case until it lapsed two (2) years.
The Motion was granted by the trial court.

Liong filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was denied. Liong tiled his Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court. Respondent People of the Philippines counters that petitioner raises a question
32

of fact, specifically on which of the resettings are not attributable to him. It contends that questions of facts are
not allowed in a Rule 45 Petition, and therefore, this Court is “not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the [trial court and the Court of Appeals].

ISSUES:
(1) Does Petition for Review on Certiorari should be denied for raising factual issues?
(2) Was there a proper waiver of petitioner Kim Liong’s right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio
Dela Rama?

RULING:
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and rightfully so. Supreme Court, as the court of last resort, should focus
more on performing “the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” The rule,
therefore, is that petitions for review on certiorari may only raise questions of law. Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency.

It is true that this rule is subject to exceptions. This Court may review factual issues if any of the following is
present:

334
(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 53

Nevertheless, this Court finds that none of the exceptions applies in this case. Even if this Court considers the
facts as alleged by petitioner, it will still arrive at the conclusion that the trial court judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion in deeming petitioner’s right to cross-examination as waived. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not
err in denying petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari.

Rule 115, Section 1(f) on the right to cross-examine provides:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:
....
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in
the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It “is a personal one which may be waived
43

expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.” When an 44

accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed
to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony given during direct examination will remain on record. If this
45 46

testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of the right of confrontation.

In People v. Narca, the trial court deferred to another date the cross examination of the prosecution witness on
47

the instance of the accused. However, in the interim, the prosecution witness was murdered. Thus, the accused
moved that the testimony of the prosecution witness be stricken off the record for lack of cross-examination. This
Court rejected the argument, finding that the accused waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution witness
when they moved for postponement. It said that “mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the
essence of the right to cross-examine.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved were not amended.

335
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc.

G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

This Court is duty-bound to respect the consistent prior findings of the Labor Arbiter, of the National Labor
Relations Commission, and of the Court of Appeals. It must be cautious not to substitute its own appreciation of
the facts to those of the tribunals which have previously weighed the parties’ claims and personally perused the
evidence. It will not discard consistent prior findings and award disability benefits to a seafarer who fails to adduce
even an iota of evidence, let alone substantial evidence, and fails to draw a causal connection between his or
her alleged ailment and working conditions.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126939 be reversed and set aside. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission which, in
turn, affirmed Labor Arbiter Lilia S. Savari’s (Labor Arbiter Savari) Decision, dismissing Ariel A. Ebuenga’s
(Ebuenga) complaint for permanent disability benefits.

Ebuenga was hired by Southfield Agencies, Inc. (Southfield) as a chief cook aboard respondent Wilhemsen Ship
Management Holding Ltd.’s. Ebuenga’s request to be repatriated was acted favorably on this request and he was
repatriated.

Without consulting Southfield’s designated physician, Ebuenga had himself checked at St. Luke’s Medical Center
where he underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging and it revealed that he was afflicted with “Multilevel Disk
Dessication, from C2-C3 to C6-C7. Thereafter, he consulted Dr. Misael Jonathan A. Ticman, who issued a
Disability Report, finding him to be permanently disabled and no longer fit to work as a seafarer. Consequently,
Ebuenga filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits.

Labor Arbiter Savari dismissed Ebuenga’s complaint. Labor Arbiter Savari explained that Ebuenga failed to prove
that he had suffered an illness or injury while on board the M/V Super Adventure. She added that Ebuenga may
no longer claim disability benefits for failing to undergo a post-employment medical examination with the
company-designated physician. The National Labor Relations Commission denied Ebuenga’s appeal in its June
29, 2012 Decision.

On April 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission. It also denied Ebuenga’s Motion for Reconsideration in its July 26, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, Ebuenga filed the present Petition.

ISSUE:
May the Court render judgment on petitioner’s failure to have himself examined by the company-designated
physician bar him from pursuing his claim?

RULING:
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the
findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute
our “own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is
credible.” The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.

Labor Arbiter Savari, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals are consistent in finding
that petitioner’s claim of presenting himself for examination is direly unsupported by evidence. The Court of
Appeals emphasized that “petitioner’s narration of facts is bereft of details as to the alleged report.” Petitioner
could not even state when he actually wanted to have himself examined. He could neither identify the person he
approached for his request nor disclose the exact manner and circumstances of his being rebuffed. Ultimately,
petitioner has nothing more than a scant, one-sentence story: he went to Southfield’s office, was refused, and
had to go to another doctor.

336
Given petitioner’s slew of allegations, coupled with his burden of repudiating the uniform findings of the three (3)
tribunals, it is glaring that petitioner annexed nothing to his Petition and Reply except the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution. His plea for this Court to overturn the uniform antecedent findings of the three
(3) tribunals demands more than attaching a copy of the immediately preceding judgments. Attaching a copy of
the assailed judgments to a Rule 45 Petition does not even manage to accomplish any evidentiary purpose. One
could hazard that petitioner’s scant annexes were included only out of conventional compliance with Rule 45,
Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because his Petition would otherwise have been denied outright.

It is true that there are exceptions to the rule that Petitions for Review on Certiorari may only be concerned with
pure questions of law. But these exceptions are not occasioned by their mere invocation. A party who files a Rule
45 Petition and asserts that his or her case warrants this Court’s review of factual questions bears the burden of
proving two (2) things. First is the basic exceptionality of his or her case such that this Court must go out of its
way to revisit the evidence. Second is the specific factual conclusion that he or she wants this Court to adopt in
place of that which was made by the lower tribunals. This dual burden requires a party to not merely plead or
aver. He or she must demonstrate and prove. His or her evidentiary task persists before this Court precisely
because he or she pleads this Court to sustain different factual conclusions.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended.

337
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co.

G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the
RTC’s ruling upholding the MeTC instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.
Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the MeTC that it has no jurisdiction over the ejectment
complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending cases, both of
which raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the CA in a petition for review under Rule 42. Petitioner’s
direct resort to the SC, instead of to the CA for intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules, violates the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court
has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging
on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and
design, a summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency. Moreover, this Court’s rules of
procedure permit the direct resort to the SC from a decision of the RTC upon questions of law, such as those
which petitioner raises in this case.

FACTS:
In 1998, Intramuros leased real properties of the National Government to Offshore Construction. There are 3
properties leased for 5 years from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. The lease contracts also made
reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision that the lease shall be
renewed every 5 years upon the parties’ mutual agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects
due to Offshore Construction’s non-conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th
centuries’ Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand
letters. Intramuros tolerated the occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay. However, Offshore
Construction still failed to pay. Intramuros filed a complaint for ejectment before MTC Manila. Offshore
Construction filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim and later they
filed Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros’ complaint be dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia. It argued that the Metropolitan Trial
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the relationship between the parties was not one of lessor-
lessee but governed by a concession agreement.

MTC granted the motion and dismissed the case. It found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Offshore Construction’s motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

The MTC found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had no jurisdiction over the case because
while there were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s relationship as one of concession. Under this concession agreement,
Offshore Construction undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for which it incurred
expenses. The MTC found that the issues could not be mere possession and rentals only.

ISSUES:
1. Was the direct resort of the petitioner to the Court proper?
2. Does the MTC have jurisdiction had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros
Administration?
3. Did Intramuros commit forum shopping?

RULING:
1. At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Regional Trial Court’s ruling upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

338
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional
Trial Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over
the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending
cases, one filed by respondent Offshore Construction and the other filed by respondent’s group of tenants, 4H
Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition
for review under Rule 42.

Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned
by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not
inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency
of the situation being litigated.76 Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010,
which should not be the case when the initial dispute—an ejectment case—is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.

Moreover, this Court’s rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case.

2. It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved. Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession.

To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be
examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case for unlawful
detainer if the complaint states the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment. (Citation omitted)

A review of petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made. The Metropolitan
Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint because the parties’
situation has allegedly become “more complicated”90than one of lease. Respondent’s defense that its relationship
with petitioner is one of concession rather than lease does not determine whether or not the Metropolitan Trial
Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or
motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.

3. A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed
out by petitioner, respondent’s right to possess the leased premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease
and, upon their expiration, on petitioner’s tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance case cannot be the source of respondent’s
continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for respondent’s
outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation
under this agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner’s
unlawful detainer complaint.

In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case, petitioner sets up the counterclaim that “[respondent]
be ordered to pay its arrears of (P13,448,867.45) as of December 31, 2009 plus such rent and surcharges as
may be incurred until [respondent] has completely vacated the [leased] premises.” This counterclaim is exactly
the same as one of petitioner’s prayers in its ejectment complaint. A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader
will likewise not be res judicata against the ejectment complaint. The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H
Intramuros, allegedly representing the tenants occupying Puerta de Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its
Complaint110 for Interpleader the source of its right to occupy those premises. However, it can be determined

339
from petitioner’s Answer and from respondent’s Memorandum that the members of 4H Intramuros are
respondent’s sublessees.

Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping by petitioner,
the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

340
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Tortono v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

The matter of the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on the evidence presented during
trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC praying that the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision be reversed and set aside. This assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the
RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now petitioners (Teodoro Tortono et. al.), in their
action for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants, now respondents (Julian Gregorio et.
al.).

This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed) allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina Casimiro
(Rufina), the purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of
Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. Petitioners asserted that their mother was illiterate and only
affixed her thumbmark on documents and was always assisted by one of her children which was not the case
here. They also presented several documents bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. The NBI
fingerprint examiner Eriberto Gomez (Gomez) conducted an examination on the thumbmark on the documents
presented by petitioners and the thumbmark on the Deed and reported that the same were different (first report).
In another report, Gomez observed that the while the standard thumbmarks lack the necessary ridge
characteristics to warrant positive identification, all the standard are all in the same finger print pattern.

The RTC concluded that the Deed was a forgery and ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA reversed the RTC
ruling and found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption
of regularity. It held that, ultimately, petitioners failed to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the
thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. Respondents here assail the qualification of the
NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee”.

ISSUES:
1. Is it proper to raise factual issues resting on the evidence presented during trial under Rule 45?
2. Did the CA err in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine because it was notarized?
3. Should the Court accept Gomez’s testimony as an expert witness?

RULING:
1. As a general rule, no. The matter of the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on the
evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions.

Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.

Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals
conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court.

341
2. Yes. Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to verify the
genuineness of his or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the
instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is imbued with
public interest. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary weight
as regards their due execution. However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.

Petitioners successfully discharged this burden. With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina’s
apparent thumbmarks on the demonstrated disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks
on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable
presumption, and sought to affirm this presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose
very act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose credibility was shown to be
wanting, and who is himself potentially liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also endeavored to
undermine petitioners’ expert witness by dismissively characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee.”

3. Yes. Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the testimonies
of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing “special knowledge, skill, experience or training”. Testimonies of
expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a wide latitude of discretion in
giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual circumstances of the case. Respondents
here assail the qualification of National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding
him as “just an ordinary employee.”

Contrary to respondents’ dismissiveness towards Gomez, his performance of such tasks as taking fingerprints,
even if, for a time it was his main duty, does not, per se, discount competence. A history of performing this
function does not negate any “special knowledge, skill, experience or training” that Gomez possesses.
Incidentally, this case is not the first instance that this Court sustained Gomez’s competence and credibility. The
credibility of an expert witness does not inhere in his or her person. Rather, he or she must be shown to possess
knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her testimony. The Regional Trial Court’s
recollection indicates, most notably, that Gomez was not handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners’
request, Gomez appeared to have been designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself to conduct the
examination. Thus, any such determination of Gomez’s expertise was not borne by petitioners’ innate preference
for him or of their insistence upon him, but by the National Bureau of Investigation’s own confidence in him.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no changes on Rule 45. There is also no effect on the Ruling under the Amended
Rules on Rule 130, Sec. 49 because the amendment only included “education” as an additional way of proving
the credibility of an expert witness.

342
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Alfeche

G.R. No. 209910, November 29, 2017
Leonen, J.

The case before this Court is replete with factual issues. Ordinarily, it is not for this Court to review factual issues
in petitions such as the present Rule 45 Petition which may only raise questions of law. This rule, however,
admits certain exceptions.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution be reversed and set aside.

On the night of January 6, 1998, a fire broke out at 11th Street, South Poblacion, San Fernando, Cebu, which
burned down the house and store of respondent Emilio and his son, respondent Gilbert (the Alfeches), and the
adjacent watch repair shop owned by respondent Manugas. It was alleged that the cause of the fire was the
constant abrasion of VECO’s electric wire with M. Lhuillier’s signboard. The Alfeches and Manugas sent a letter
to the management of VECO asking for financial assistance, which VECO denied. VECO asserted that the fire
was due, not to its fault, but to that of M. Lhuillier. As their initial claim for financial assistance was not satisfied,
the Alfeches and Manugas filed a Complaint for Damages against VECO and M. Lhuillier before the RTC of Cebu
City.

The RTC found that “had not defendant [M.] Lhuillier installed its signage in such a manner that it will come in
contact with the secondary lines of defendant VECO, there could have been no short circuit which caused the
fire.” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that “one VECO post was affected by the road widening
work. Due to the transfer, the VECO wire already touched the signboard of M. Lhuillier pawnshop.”

ISSUES:
1. Is it proper to raise factual issues presented during trial under Rule 45?
2. Are the evidence presented enough to justify the Court of Appeals in ruling that VECO is liable for the fire
which destroyed respondent’s properties?

RULING:
1. As a general rule, no. The case before this Court is replete with factual issues. Ordinarily, it is not for this
Court to review factual issues in petitions such as the present Rule 45 Petition which may only raise questions
of law. This rule, however, admits certain exceptions: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5)
when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and (10)when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

The findings of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals differ in this case. In the interest of arriving
at a definite determination of the attendant liabilities, this Court exercises its power of review.

2. Yes. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are consistent in holding that proximity, abrasion,
and short circuiting led to the fire. Common sense dictates that the wires and signage could never have
rubbed against each other, or the wires abraded and short circuited, had they not been in close proximity.
Common sense also shows that they could not have been in close proximity had not either the wires or the
signage moved closer to the other. The testimonies of Solon and Camuta were definite that when M.
Lhuillier’s signage was installed in 1995, it was free from any obstacle. No allegation was made, let alone
proof presented, that the signage had been relocated in the interim. In contrast, a plethora of evidence attests
to the relocation of VECO’s posts and wires. Heeding VECO’s position demands not only this Court’s

343
disregard of the preponderant evidence against VECO but also this Court’s acceptance of the absurdity and
the impossibility that VECO’s posts and wires must have moved closer to Lhuillier’s signage by some unseen,
even supernatural, force.

VECO’s position is not only inherently impossible. Credible testimonies also militate against it. These testimonies
remain credible despite VECO’s attempts at undermining them. VECO has attempted to discredit the statements
of its own witness, Engr. Lauronal. On cross examination, Engr. Lauronal indicated that VECO’s posts were
transferred ahead of the fire. He definitely stated that VECO’s posts were affected by the drainage project and
that they had to be relocated. Also contrary to VECO’s suggestion that Engr. Lauronal was incompetent on the
matters he had testified to, his testimony deserves great weight, he having testified in his capacity as the
municipal engineer overseeing and liaising local projects. It is also particularly notable that Engr. Lauronal
maintained a sense of objectivity and neutrality, speaking plainly of the facts, as he knew them, despite having
been presented as VECO’s own witness.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no amendments made on Rule 45.

344
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 196072 & 208603, September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the court of appeals even if the error
assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law. “The existence and availability of the right
of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there
should be no appeal.

FACTS:
This case is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the November 26, 2010 Decision and March 10, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106103.

Steamship was a Bermuda-based Protection and Indemnity Club, managed outside London, England. It insures
its members-shipowners against “third party risks and liabilities” for claims arising from (a) death or injury to
passengers; (b) loss or damage to cargoes; and (c) loss or damage from collisions. Sulpicio insured its fleet of
inter-island vessels with Steamship. One (1) of these vessels was the M/V Princess of the World, evidenced by
a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance issued by Steamship, the certificate incorporated by reference an arbitration
agreement set forth in its Club Rules.

On July 7, 2005, M/V Princess of the World was gutted by fire while on voyage from Iloilo to Zamboanga City,
resulting in total loss of its cargoes. Sulpicio claimed indemnity from Steamship. Steamship denied the claim and
subsequently rescinded the insurance coverage, on the ground that “Sulpicio was grossly negligent in conducting
its business regarding safety, maintaining the seaworthiness of its vessels as well as proper training of its crew.”

Sulpicio then filed a Complaint with the RTC of Makati City. Steamship filed its Motion to Dismiss and/or to Refer
Case to Arbitration pursuant to RA No. 9285, or the ADR Act of 2004, and to Rule 4716 of the 2005/2006 Club
Rules, which supposedly provided for arbitration in London of disputes between Steamship and its
members. The RTC Makati of denied the motions to dismiss. It held that arbitration did not appear to be the most
prudent action, considering that the other defendants had already filed their respective answers.

Steamship assailed trial court orders before the Court of Appeals through a Rule 65 Petition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 106103. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its November 26, 2010 Decision. It found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Steamship’s Motion to Dismiss and/or to
Refer Case to Arbitration or any convincing evidence to show that a valid arbitration agreement existed between
the parties. Steamship’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1. Should the petition be dismissed based on procedural grounds since Steamship’s Petition for Review should
have been a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?
2. Was there a valid arbitration agreement between the parties?

RULING:
1. NO. The petition should not be dismissed because Steamship used the right remedy.

The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special
civil action under Rule 65.[53] Rule 45, Section 1 is clear that:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A patty desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals even if the
error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law. “The existence and availability of the
right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there
should be no appeal.”

345
Allegations in the petition of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals do not ipso facto render
the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal
Computer Center Corporation,
this Court discussed the distinction between a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45:

Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be
deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction is clear: A
petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes
in the court’s findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision
on all other questions arising in the case an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. (Citations
omitted)

In this case, what Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court of Appeals.
These errors pertain to Steamship’s allegations of the Court of Appeals’ failure to rule that a valid arbitration
agreement existed between the parties and to refer the case to arbitration. It does not impute any error with
respect to the Court of Appeals’ exercise of jurisdiction, As such, the Petition is simply a continuation of the
appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals, and to this Court
via Rule 45.

2. YES. The acceptance of the Certificate of Entry and Acceptance manifests its acquiescence to all its
provisions. Hence, Sulpicio is bound by the arbitration provisions it contains.

It is the State’s policy to promote party autonomy in the mode of resolving disputes. Under the freedom of contract
principle, parties to a contract may stipulate on a particular method of settling any conflict between them.
Arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution methods like mediation, negotiation, and conciliation are
favored over court action. Republic Act No. 9285 expresses this policy.

Arbitration, as a mode of settling disputes, was already recognized in the Civil Code. 129 In 1953, Republic Act
No. 876 was passed, which reinforced domestic arbitration as a process of dispute resolution. Foreign arbitration
was likewise recognized through the Philippines’ adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, otherwise known as the New York Convention. Republic
Act No. 9285 sets the basic principles in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Philippines.

In domestic arbitration, the formal requirements of an arbitration agreement are that it must “be in writing and
subscribed by the party sought to be charged, or by his lawful agent.” In international commercial arbitration, it is
likewise required that the arbitration agreement must be in writing.

An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained (1) in a document signed by the parties, (2) in an exchange
of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement, or (3)
in an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by a party
and not denied by another. The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes
an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause
part of the contract.

Thus, an arbitration agreement that was not embodied in the main agreement but set forth in another document
is binding upon the parties, where the document was incorporated by reference to the main agreement. The
arbitration agreement contained in the Club Rules, which in turn was referred to in the Certificate of Entry and
Acceptance, is binding upon Sulpicio even though there was no specific stipulation on dispute resolution in this
Certificate.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provision and special law involved herein were not affected by the amendments.

346
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture

G.R. No. 179732, September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.

The all too-familiar rule is that the court will not, in a petition for review on certiorari, entertain matters factual in
nature, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when such factual findings were drawn from a
vacuum or arbitrarily reached, or are grounded entirely on speculation or conjectures, are conflicting or are
premised on the supposed evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record or when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken or absurd. This conclusion is made more compelling by the fact that the CIAC is a quasi-
judicial body whose jurisdiction is confined to construction disputes. As the administrative agency tasked with
resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission enjoys
a wide latitude in recognition of its technical expertise and experience. Its factual findings are, thus, accorded
respect and even finality, particularly when they are affirmed by an appellate court.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 20, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 88953 and 88911, which affirmed the March 1, 2005 Award of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

On April 29, 1999 the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed “Contract Agreement for the
Construction of Contract Package 6MI-9, Pagadian-Buug Section, Zamboanga del Sur, Sixth Road Project, Road
Improvement Component Loan No. 1473-PHI” (Contract) for a total contract amount of P713,330,885.28.

On October 23, 2002 while the project was ongoing the Joint Venture’s truck and equipment were set on fire. On
March 11, 2003, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture’s hatching plant located at Brgy. West Boyogan, Kumalarang,
Zamboanga del Sur. According to reports, the bombing incident was caused by members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front.

The Joint Venture made several written demands for extension and payment of the foreign component of the
Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle the unpaid Payment Certificates amounting to
P26,737,029.49. Thus, only the foreign component of US$358,227.95 was up for negotiations subject to further
reduction of the amount on account of payments subsequently received by the Joint Venture from DPWH. In a
letter dated September 18, 2003, BCEOM French Engineering Consultants recommended that DPWH promptly
pay the outstanding monies due the Joint Venture. The letter also stated that the actual volume of the Joint
Venture’s accomplishment was “2,732m2 of hardrock and 4,444m3 of rippable rock,” making the project 80%
complete when it was halted.

On March 3, 2004, the Joint Venture filed a Complaint against DPWH before Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC). Meanwhile, the Joint Venture sent a “Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract”, to DPWH
requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the arbitration case. Then DPWH Acting Secretary
Florante Soriquez accepted the Joint Venture’s request for mutual termination of the contract. The CIAC
promulgated an Award directing DPWH to pay the Joint Venture its money claims plus legal interest. CIAC,
however, denied the Joint Venture’s claim for price adjustment due to the delay in the issuance of a Notice to
Proceed under Presidential Decree No. 1594 or the “Policies, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations for Government
Infrastructure Contracts.”

DPWH and the Joint Venture filed their respective petitions for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated September 20, 2007, sustained CIAC’s Award with certain modifications and
remanded the case to CIAC for the determination of the number of days’ extension that the Joint Venture is
entitled to.

Petitioner contends that the filing of the claim before CIAC was premature, since under CIAC rules, there must
be an exhaustion of administrative remedies first before government contracts are brought to it for arbitration.

ISSUE:

347
Did the Court of Appeals err in rendering the assailed decision because it completely ignored, overlooked, or
misappreciated facts of substance, which, if duly considered, would materially affect the outcome of the case?
RULING:
NO. The Court of Appeals did not gravely err in rendering the assailed decision because as a general rule,
findings of fact of CIAC, a quasi-judicial tribunal which has expertise on matters regarding the construction
industry, should be respected and upheld.

CIAC was created under Executive Order No. 1008, or the “Construction Industry Arbitration Law.” It was
originally under the administrative supervision of the Philippine Domestic Construction Board which, in turn, was
an implementing agency of the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines. The Construction Industry
Authority of the Philippines is presently a part of the Department of Trade and Industry as an attached agency.
CIAC’s specific purpose is the “early and expeditious settlement of disputes” in the construction industry as a
recognition of the industry’s role in “the furtherance of national development goals.”

CIAC’s authority to arbitrate construction disputes was then incorporated into the general statutory framework on
alternative dispute resolution through Republic Act No. 9285, the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.”
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 9285 specifically referred to the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, while
Section 35 confirmed CIAC’s jurisdiction.

As a general rule, findings of fact of CIAC, a quasi-judicial tribunal which has expertise on matters regarding the
construction industry, should be respected and upheld. In National Housing Authority v. First United Constructors
Corp., this Court held that CIAC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be overturned
except as to the most compelling of reasons:
As this finding of fact by the CIAC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and it being apparent that the CIAC
arrived at said finding after a thorough consideration of the evidence presented by both parties, the same may
no longer be reviewed by this Court. The all too-familiar rule is that the Court will not, in a petition for review
on certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when such factual findings were drawn from a vacuum or arbitrarily reached, or are grounded entirely on
speculation or conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the supposed evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record or when the inference made is manifestly mistaken or absurd. This conclusion is made more
compelling by the fact that the CIAC is a quasi-judicial body whose jurisdiction is confined to construction
disputes. Indeed, settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect since the law and principle involved was not affected by the amendments.

348
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Lao, Jr. v. Local Government Unit of Cagayan De Oro City

G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.

Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is permitted when only questions of law are
involved. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a particular set of
facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of facts be determined or evidence be received
and examined. Matters of evidence more properly pertain to the trial courts as the trier of facts and the appellate
courts as the reviewer of facts.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the March 30, 2009
Resolution and May 11, 2009 Order of Branch 17, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan De Oro City. This petition is
filed by Barangay Captain Enrico D. Salcedo (Salcedo) of Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City and Cagayan De Oro City
Councilors Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. (Lao), Roger A. Abaday (Abaday), and Zaldy O. Ocon (Ocon) (collectively,
petitioners).

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed an ordinance which approved See’s unsolicited proposal “for the
redevelopment of Agora Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable Landing
Area.” The redevelopment would be under a build-operate transfer scheme.

At the time, the City Mayor was Vicente Y. Emano. On January 27, 2009, Mega Farm, through See, and the then
newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed the Build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the Redevelopment of Agora.

Petitioners filed their Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Re-Development of Agora Market and Terminal
Contract Under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Scheme and All Ordinances, Resolutions and Motions of the City
Council Relative Thereto with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) & Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
with Damages with the RTC of Misamis Oriental. This complaint was filed against City Government of Cagayan
De Oro and the incumbent Cagayan De Oro City officials, in their personal and official capacities. In their
complaint, petitioners, as public officers and in their personal capacity, questioned the execution and the contents
of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers
between Mega Farm and the City Government of Cagayan De Oro.

The Regional Trial Court held that the Agora Complex BOT Contract, which was covered by Republic Act No.
6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, was considered a national government project under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8975. Due to this classification of the project and petitioners’ failure to prove that the exceptions
applied, the trial court was prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions over
the project. Lao et al., filed a motion for reconsideration which was however denied. Regional Trial Court ruled
that the validity of the Agora Complex BOT Contract was not a constitutional issue and that petitioners were “not
parties to the contract where they may suffer actual or threatened injury.”

ISSUES:
1. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint due to petitioners’ lack of personality to file a suit?
2. Was it proper for the petitioners to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 directly with the SC?

RULING:
1. NO. The trial court’s dismissal was incorrect.
The dismissal by the trial court of the complaint due to petitioners’ lack of personality to file suit is erroneous.
Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may file a case to question a contract entered
into by the city mayor allegedly without the City Council’s authority.

Rule 3. Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines the real party in interest that may institute a case:
Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

349
The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into by the city
mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local government unit which stands
to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in this case. The city councilors merely represent
the city in the suit.

As explained in City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon:

It seems clearly self-evident from the foregoing recitation of the undisputed antecedents and factual background
that the lower court gravely erred in issuing its dismissal order on the ground of plaintiffs’ alleged lack of interest
or legal standing as city councilors or as taxpayers to maintain the case at bar. The lower court founded its
erroneous conclusion on the equally erroneous premise of citing and applying Article 1397 of the Civil Code that
“the action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted (only) by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily.”

The lower court’s fundamental error was in treating plaintiffs’ complaint as a personal suit on their own behalf
and applying the test in such cases that plaintiffs should show personal interest as parties who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment sought. Plaintiffs’ suit is patently not a personal suit. Plaintiffs clearly and by the
express terms of their complaint filed the suit as a representative suit on behalf and for the benefit of the city of
Cebu.

2. NO. Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is permitted when only questions of
law are involved. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a particular
set of facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of facts be determined or evidence be
received and examined. Matters of evidence more properly pertain to the trial courts as the trier of facts and the
appellate courts as the reviewer of facts.

As correctly pointed out by public respondents, among the four (4) errors that petitioners assign to the Regional
Trial Court, two (2) are questions of fact. The nullity of the Agora Complex BOT Contract due to the mayor’s
alleged lack of authority to sign it and the local government’s alleged failure to determine the project proponent’s
financial capacity require the reception and examination of evidence. These issues are questions of fact not
cognizable in a petition for review under Rule 45. Nonetheless, whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly
denied the issuance of the temporary restraining order and dismissed the complaint due to its lack of jurisdiction
and petitioners’ standing is a question of law which may be resolved by this Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions cited in this case were not affected by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

350
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

It is a general rule that factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive, especially when they have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. Although
jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved
by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the August 30,
2012 Decision and the January 23, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 91410 be reversed
and set aside.

Petitioner Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center (DHLFMC) and respondent Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corporation (Asiamed) entered into a Contract of Sale. This Contract of Sale stated that DHLFMC
agreed to purchase from Asiamed a GammaMed Plus Brachytherapy machine and a Gammacell Elan 3000
blood irradiator (collectively, the machines). Asiamed alleged that DHLFMC agreed to pay the total purchase
price of P31,000,000.00 no later than two (2) days from receiving the machines. Despite receiving the machines
on May 20, 2003 and July 17, 2003, DHLFMC only paid the amounts of P3,500,000.00 on July 25, 2003,
P1,000,000.00 on September 16, 2003, and P800,000.00 on October 30, 2003. Asiamed demanded payment,
but DHLFMC refused to pay the balance. This prompted the former to file a case for sum of money, with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Anthony passed away while the case was pending, so Asiamed
filed a motion for substitution to procure the appointment of an administrator of the petitioner’s estate.

Petitioners insist that the Contract of Sale was rescinded, and that respondent conformed to this rescission. The
sale was conditioned on the loan application from Planters Bank, which was not approved. By virtue of the
rescission, the parties should have been restored to their respective positions before entering the Contract of
Sale. On the other hand, respondent argues in its Memorandum that the Contract of Sale was not rescinded.
The disapproved loan from Planters Bank has no effect on the Contract of Sale, considering it was not even
mentioned there. Respondent insists that rescission was not proven during trial and adds that the issues of the
attachment are irrelevant to their claim for the collection or a sum or money. Both RTC and CA ruled for the
respondent.

ISSUES:
1. Should the petition for review be granted considering it does not contain questions of law?
2. Was the CA wrong in grating the motion to appoint an administrator?

RULING:
1. NO. Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court It is a general
rule that factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive, especially when they have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. Although jurisprudence has
provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so
this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. Here, the Court of Appeals made a factual determination
that the effectivity of the Contract of Sale did not depend on any alleged loan application from Planters Bank. It
relied on the evidence presented, particularly the Contract of Sale, which did not mention any loan from Planters
Bank.

2. NO. The Court of Appeals’ order that respondent be allowed to procure an administrator for the estate of
petitioner Anthony was based on Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death
of the fact thereof and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment

351
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.

Petitioners fail to show how the application of the Rules of Court was an error of law. The only basis for petitioners’
objection to the order requiring the appointment of an administrator for the estate of petitioner Anthony is a liberal
interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument fails.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions cited in this case were not affected by the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

352
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Lucido v. People
G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017
Leonen, J.

The trial court’s assessment on the trustworthiness of witnesses will not be disturbed absent any facts or
circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked, misappreciated, or misunderstood.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision and resolution affirming with modification the
RTC decision finding petitioner guilty of child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of RA 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

During trial, the prosecution presented, among others, the victim, AAA, who was placed by her parents in
petitioner’s custody, and Hinampas, their neighbor. The RTC convicted petitioner, which conviction was affirmed
by the CA. Hence, this present petition.

Among others, petitioner avers that Hinampas’ testimony of having heard the victim being maltreated several
times by Lucido is incredible, exaggerated, and unworthy of belief. She also claims that the charge against her
was ill-motivated. She highlights the ongoing enmity between her and Hinampas. Finally, she imputes ill-motive
on AAA in falsely testifying against her after having been scolded for damaging her cellphone. On the other hand,
respondent argues that the petition must be denied because it raises questions of fact, which could not be done
in a petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Can the issue of the credibility of prosecution witnesses be raised in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari?

RULING:
No, absent any facts or circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked, misappreciated, or
misunderstood, the trial court’s assessment on the trustworthiness of witnesses will not be disturbed.

The issues submitted by petitioner — the prosecution’s failure to prove that the abuse suffered by the victim had
prejudiced her normal development and want of credibility of the prosecution witnesses — are fundamentally
factual. However, this Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, “only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.” It is not the function of this Court to review and weigh anew the evidence
already passed upon by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals absent any showing of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or palpable error. Petitioner did not present any substantive or compelling reason for this Court
to apply the exception in this case. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment on the trustworthiness of AAA and
Hinampas will not be disturbed, absent any facts or circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked, misappreciated, or misunderstood. Through its firsthand observations during the entire proceedings,
the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
witness to believe.

Thus, the credibility of prosecution witnesses as found by the trial court shall not be disturbed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

353
Rule 45, Sec. 1

CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. Nos. 197526 & 199676-77, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

The determination of whether the taxpayer duly substantiated its claim for refund of creditable input tax is a
factual matter that is generally beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of two (2) petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

CE Luzon filed before the CTA a judicial claim for refund of unutilized creditable input tax for the second to fourth
quarters of taxable year 2003. In its decision, the CTA Second Division partially granted CE Luzon’s claim for
unutilized creditable input tax, disallowing part of its claim for failing to substantiate the same. Similarly, the CTA
En Banc, in deciding the petitions for review filed by both parties, partially granted CE Luzon’s claim for refund
but disallowed part of the claim because of non-compliance with the documentation and invoicing requirements.
Hence, these petitions.

The CIR questions CE Luzon’s entitlement to the refund of input VAT for the second quarter of taxable year 2003,
arguing that it failed to substantiate this claim.

ISSUE:
Will the SC, in a Rule 45 petition, disturb the CTA’s factual findings on whether the taxpayer has substantiated
its claim for refund absent any showing that the case falls under the exceptions?

RULING:
No, the SC, in a Rule 45 petition, will not disturb the CTA’s factual findings on whether the taxpayer has
substantiated its claim for refund absent any showing that the case falls under the exceptions.

In a Rule 45 Petition, only questions of law may be raised. This Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of
whether CE Luzon duly substantiated its claim for refund of creditable input tax for the second quarter of taxable
year 2003 is a factual matter that is generally beyond the scope of a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Unless a
case falls under any of the exceptions, this Court will not undertake a factual review and look into the parties’
evidence and weigh them anew. In the Petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 199676-77, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue failed to establish that this case is exempted from the general rule.

Thus, this Court will no longer disturb the Court of Tax Appeals’ findings on the matter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

354
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Heirs of Cascayan v. Spouses Gumallaoi

G.R. No. 211947 (Resolution), July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. This court
is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are “final,
binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt” when supported by substantial evidence. Factual
findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. Thus, as a general rule,
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Court of Appeals
decision96900 be reversed and set aside.

All heirs of Cayetano Cascayan filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Demolition, and Damages against
the spouses Oliver and Evelyn Gumallaoi before the RTC. Cascayan Heirs alleged that by virtue of a free patent
application, they were co-owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 20028. They affirmed that the
Spouses Gumallaoi bought Lot No. 20029, an adjacent lot. The Spouses Gumallaoi built a residential house on
Lot No. 20029 which the Cascayan Heirs alleged encroached on Lot No. 20028 after renovations and
improvements. Thus, the Cascayan Heirs prayed that the Spouses Gumallaoi be directed to vacate Lot No.
20028 and to restore it to their possession. In response, the Spouses Gumallaoi maintained that they were the
true owners of both Lot Nos. 20029 and 20028. They claimed that the Cascayan Heirs secured a free patent to
Lot No. 20028 through manipulation. They asserted that the supporting affidavits for the Cascayan Heirs’ free
patent application were obtained through fraud and deception.

Sometime in the year 1984, a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 20028 surveyed for Marcelino Alupay as
shown in the technical description issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO). Almost 20 years after the said survey plaintiffs through La Paz Cascayan filed an Application for Free
Patent over the said lot. The applicant submitted affidavits attesting that plaintiffs as heirs of Cayetano Cascayan
have continuously occupied and cultivated Lot No. 20028 and stating that the lot was declared in the name of
Cayetano Cascayan under a tax declaration. From this evidence of the plaintiffs, there is clear and serious
disconnect in their claim that the parcel of land declared earlier in the name of their predecessor is the same as
Lot No. 20028. For, if the plaintiffs were the owners of Lot No. 20028, the court wonders why the survey thereof
was conducted for Marcelino Alupay and not for Cayetano Cascayan who, as per another technical description
also issued by the CENRO, was the claimant in the survey also conducted in 1982 of Lot No. 20033 which is just
adjacent to the lot in question. In other words, plaintiffs obviously applied for a free patent without any basis. It is
clear from their evidence that they were never in possession of the property in suit before they applied for the
free patent. While plaintiffs submitted affidavits to show that they have occupied and cultivated Lot No. 20028
and that it was declared in the name of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan in support of their application for free
patent, it appears that such evidences have been manipulated. It appears that while they were not in fact
cultivating the property and that it was declared in the name of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan only in 2003,
they were able to present false information about their true status as claimants.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The Cascayan Heirs filed a Motion for New Trial dated February 19, 2010,
citing mistake as a ground. They claimed that despite the agreement for the trial court to consider only the
Commissioner’s Report to resolve the case, it also examined fraudulent affidavits. Thus, the Cascayan Heirs
prayed that the RTC Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted. The RTC denied the motion. The
Cascayan Heirs appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioners herein argue that regardless of any application for free patent that may have been filed, Lot No. 20028
had long been owned by Cayetano since 1925. This is shown by evidence submitted to the RTC namely, a Tax
Declaration for the year 1925 and the presence of the debris of his residence, still intact on Lot No. 20028.
Moreover, petitioners insist that it has been proven that they have possessed Lot No. 20028 since time
immemorial. They also claim that none of the evidence shows that respondents own Lot No. 20028.

ISSUE:
Was the filing of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 proper?

355
RULING:
No. Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall pertain only to questions of law. In Pascal v. Burgos the
Supreme Court explained that review of appeals filed before this court is “not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion[.]” This court’s action is discretionary. Petitions filed “will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons[.]” This is especially applicable in this case, where the issues have been fully ventilated
before the lower courts in a number of related cases.

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. This court
is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are “final,
binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt” when supported by substantial evidence. Factual
findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. Thus, as a general rule,
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.

Quoting the RTC, the CA determined, based on the evidence presented, that petitioners obtained their title to Lot
No. 20028 through fraud and misrepresentation. Plaintiffs obviously applied for a free patent without any basis.
It is clear from their evidence that they were never in possession of the property in suit before they applied for
the free patent. While plaintiffs submitted affidavits to show that they have occupied and cultivated Lot No. 20028
and that it was declared in the name of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan in support of their application for free
patent, it appears that such evidences (sic) have been manipulated. It appears that while they were not in fact
cultivating the property and that it was declared in the name of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan only in 2003,
they were able to present false information about their true status as claimants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the applicable provision was not amended nor affected by the revised rules.

356
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Granada v. People
G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari, which assail the
Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 and the Resolution4 dated January 12, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 23459, finding petitioners Venancio R. Nava (Nava), Susana B. Cabahug (Cabahug), Aquilina B.
Granada (Granada), Carlos Bautista (Bautista), Felipe Pancho (Pancho), and Jesusa Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz)
guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Teresita C. Lagmay (Lagmay), Eden Jane R. Intencion, and Mabini S. Reyes of the Commission on Audit, Region
XI, Davao City, submitted a Joint-Affidavit with an attached Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit
Director, Davao City. The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and construction materials
purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, now Department of Education DEPED Division
Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building Program were priced above the prevailing market prices,
leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount,
and the filing of a criminal or administrative action against the public officials who participated in the transactions.

The Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, found that there was sufficient evidence to indict several DEPED
officials for violating Section 3(g) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioners Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and
Dela Cruz were subsequently charged with Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioners and the other accused.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioners. The Sandiganbayan
also ruled that there was a concerted effort by the petitioners to facilitate the release of funds and make it appear
that a public bidding took place

Nava filed a petition for certiorari, while Cabahug, Granada and Dela Cruz filed their respective petitions for
review of the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution

ISSUE:
Was Nava’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy to take?

RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.

Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al. emphasized that the proper remedy to take from a judgment of conviction by the
Sandiganbayan is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45:

At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of certiorari is not the proper
remedy to challenge a judgment conviction rendered by the [Sandiganbayan]. Petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

357
Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the . . .
Sandiganbayan . . . whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition . . . shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth.” Section 2 of Rule 45 likewise provides that the petition should be filed
within the fifteen-day period from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution, or of the
denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of judgment.94
(Underscoring in the original, citation omitted)

The assailed Decision and Resolution convicted Nava and the other petitioners of the crime of entering into a
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract or transaction on behalf of the government.

Thus, the proper remedy to take is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Nonetheless, inasmuch as Nava’s Petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Section 2 of Rule
45, this Court treated it as an appeal and did not dismiss it outright. While procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect since they serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in support of the speedy disposition of
cases mandated by the Constitution, “[a] liberal interpretation . . . of the rules of procedure can be resorted to
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rules are still the same.

358
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp.
G.R. No. 184317, January 25, 2017
Leonen, J.

Factual findings of the lower courts are accorded great weight and respect, moreso in corporate rehabilitation
proceedings. Absent any of the exceptions enumerated in Pascual, this Court will neither review nor disturb the
lower courts’ findings of fact on appeal.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on certiorari, assailing the CA’s resolution, affirming the RTC’s order which
approved Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp’s rehabilitation plan.

Respondent Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp. (Liberty) is a domestic corporation, that obtained
various credit accommodations and loan facilities from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank). Liberty, however, defaulted on the loans. It later filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation, which
the RTC approved. The RTC issued a Stay Order, finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, and set
an initial hearing for the petition. Metrobank filed its comment/opposition, arguing that Liberty was not qualified
for corporate rehabilitation, that its plan for such was defective, and that rehabilitation was not feasible. The RTC
gave due course to the rehabilitation plan. Metrobank later appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC’s findings.
Metrobank moved for reconsideration, but said motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s findings that the Petition for rehabilitation was sufficient and that the
rehabilitation was reasonable?

RULING:
NO, the CA did not err. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s findings that the Petition for
rehabilitation was sufficient and that the rehabilitation plan was reasonable. Petitioner contends that the Petition
was insufficient for its failure to include maturity dates in the attached inventory; that the Regional Trial Court
failed to determine whether petitioner’s opposition was manifestly unreasonable; and that the rehabilitation plan
was not feasible as it lacked materially significant financial commitments. These are questions of fact.

Pascual v. Burgos reiterates that only questions of law should be raised in petitions for certiorari under Rule 45:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Absent any of the exceptions enumerated in Pascual, this Court will neither review nor disturb the lower courts’
findings of fact on appeal.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ findings are misapprehensions of the facts of the case, and that
these findings are conclusions without citations of their specific factual bases, claiming that the CA ignored
respondent’s failure to attach the maturity dates and merely relied on respondent’s self-serving assertions. It also
argues that the CA failed to refute petitioner’s observations on the defects of respondent’s rehabilitation plan.

Petitioner fails to convince. Hence, the CA had legal and factual bases for approving the Petition for rehabilitation.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same insofar as holding that
only questions of law are to be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since the court in such case is not a trier of
facts, as well as in providing exceptions thereto.

359
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Torres v. People
G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017
Leonen, J.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial courts. It is a
question of fact not reviewable by this Court. The trial court’s findings on the matter are entitled to great weight
and given great respect and “may only be disregarded ... if there are facts and circumstances which were
overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter the results of the case[.]”

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on certiorari assails the CA’s decision, affirming the RTC’s decision convicting Torres
for violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610.

Accused Van Clifford Torres was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of RA 7610. With
intent to harm and humiliate, he was alleged to have slapped and whipped AAA, a 14-year-old minor, with a t-
shirt hitting his neck and shoulder, and causing AAA to fall down from the stairs. Said acts were alleged as
humiliating and prejudicial to the development of the victim. The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Trial ensued, and the RTC convicted Torres, which was affirmed by the CA. Torres moved for reconsideration,
but was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner invites this Court to review the factual findings on the ground that the judgment was rendered based
on a misapprehension of facts. He argues that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals disregarded
certain material facts, which, if properly considered, would have justified a different conclusion. In particular,
petitioner challenges the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Respondent counters that the questions raised
by petitioner are questions of fact, which are generally proscribed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in making its assailed decisions?

RULING:
NO, the CA did not err. We affirm petitioner’s conviction.

It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding
and conclusive on this Court. A departure from the general rule may only be warranted in cases where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported
by the evidence on record.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial courts. It is a
question of fact not reviewable by this Court. The trial court’s findings on the matter are entitled to great weight
and given great respect and “may only be disregarded ... if there are facts and circumstances which were
overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter the results of the case[.]”

This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither disregarded nor
overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the case. The presence or absence
of one person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding that petitioner whipped AAA
three (3) times with a wet t-shirt.

Hence, the CA did not err in making its assailed decisions.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same insofar as holding that
only questions of law are to be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since the court in such case is not a trier of
facts.

360
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.

G.R. No. 205035, November 16, 2016
Leonen, J.

The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45
since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to once
again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

FACTS:
Spouses Gemino and Juliet Miano are users of the electric service provided by the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). In 1996, their first electric meter was installed to service their residence. In 2002, their second
electric meter was installed to service their sari-sari store. Upon inspection, MERALCO personnel discovered
that there were two jumpers on their meter service connection. MERALCO disconnected the electrical service
for their residence and sari-sari store and issued a billing differential representing the unbilled amount of electricity
consumed due to the jumpers. MERALCO refused to reconnect Spouses Miano’s electricity service due to their
nonpayment of the billing differential.

Spouses Miano filed a Complaint for damages and injunction with Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against MERALCO. The RTC dismissed the Complaint and ordered them to settle the billing
differential. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC decision and ruled that due to MERALCO’s failure
to notify Spouses Miano prior to disconnection, MERALCO should pay the Spouses moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals ordered MERALCO to restore their electricity connection
and Spouses Miano to pay the billing differential. Spouses Miano filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari with
a prayer that the portion ordering them to pay the billing differential be reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering Spouses Miano to pay the billing differential?

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals’ decision is correct.

The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to once again
analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

However, the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists
down the recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

While there are well-settled exceptions to the general rule, none of the exceptions to justify the reevaluation of
the findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are present in this case. On the contrary, the
findings of fact by the lower court are well-supported by the evidence on record. The trial court found that the
disconnection of Spouses Miano’s electricity supply was based on sufficient and reasonable grounds. The trial
court ruled that Spouses Miano failed to controvert charges of violations and differential billings against them,
since they were not able to overturn the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty with their
mere denials.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

361
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.

G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
Leonen, J.

A Rule 45 petition is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the case subject of the appeal. As it is a
mere continuation, a Rule 45 petition (apart from being limited to questions of law) cannot go beyond the issues
that were subject of the original action giving rise to it.

FACTS:
City Advertising Ventures Corporation (CAVC) entered into a lease agreement with the MERALCO Financing
Services Corporation for the use of 5,000 of MERALCO’s lampposts to display advertising banners. When
Typhoon Milenyo hit in September 2006, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown by strong winds and fell.
In its wake, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 160, directing the
DPWH to conduct field investigations, evaluations and assessments of all billboards. The DPWH announced that
they would start dismantling billboards. During its operations, it was able to remove 250 of CAVC lamppost
banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps.

CAVC filed before the RTC Makati its Complaint (Civil Case No. 06-899) for Violation of A.O. No. 160, Tort,
Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, asserting that DPWH exceeded its authority when it dismantled its banners and other fixtures and
impeded the pursuit of legitimate business and unlawfully deprived it of property, income, and income
opportunities without due process. After summary hearings, RTC Makati granted the prayer for temporary
restraining order. The RTC also granted CAVC’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. DPWH
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that CAVC failed to show a clear legal right worthy of protection and
that it did not stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury. RTC denied DPWH’s motion. Thereafter, the DPWH
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. DPWH then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, praying that the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals be set aside, that the RTC be prohibited from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-899, and that said Civil Case be ordered dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Court order the RTC to dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899?
2. Is the RTC’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of CAVC proper?

RULING:
1. No, the Court cannot entertain the prayer that the RTC be ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899.

A Rule 45 petition is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the case subject of the appeal. As it is a
mere continuation, a Rule 45 petition (apart from being limited to questions of law) cannot go beyond the issues
that were subject of the original action giving rise to it.

Rule 45 petitions engendered by prior Rule 65 petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition are, therefore, bound by
the same basic issue at the crux of the prior Rule 65 petition, that is, “issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.” The question before the Court of Appeals was limited to the matter of whether the Regional Trial
Court’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On appeal from
the original action brought before the Court of Appeals, it is this same, singular issue that confronts the Court.

This Court cannot, at this juncture, entertain petitioners’ prayer that the Regional Trial Court be ordered to dismiss
Civil Case No. 06-899. Ruling on the complete cessation of a civil action on grounds other than those permitted
by Rule 16 compels an examination of the merits of the case. The entire process of litigation will be frustrated
were this Court to rule on Civil Case No. 06-899’s dismissal on the basis only of allegations made in reference
to provisional relief extended before trial even started.

2. Yes, the RTC acted in keeping with the standards for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and did
not gravely abuse its discretion.

362
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some
of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites of preliminary
injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there
is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In satisfying these requisites, parties
applying for a writ of preliminary injunction need to set out their claims by prima facie evidence.

Respondent’s lease agreement with MERALCO Financing Services Corporation and its having secured permits
from local government units, for the specific purpose of putting up advertising banners and signages, gave it the
right to put up such banners and signages. Respondent had in its favor a property right, of which it cannot be
deprived without due process. This is respondent’s right in esse, that is, an actual right. Petitioners’ admitted and
pronounced course of action directly obstructed respondent’s ability to avail itself of its rights under its lease
agreement and the permits it secured from local government units. What petitioners sought to restrict was the
very essence of respondent’s activity as a business engaged in advertising via banners and signages.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 and Rule 58 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

363
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Padilla, Jr. v. Malicsi

G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
Leonen, J.

The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to analyze or
weigh all over again evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

FACTS:
Spouses Pablo M. Padilla, Jr. and Maria Luisa P. Padilla bought a parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. Sometime
in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino and Agrifino Guanes constructed houses
on their lot. The Spouses made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi et al. to vacate the premises
and pay a monthly rental but the latter refused to heed the demands. After failure of conciliation attempts,
Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Malicsi et al. In their Answer, Malicsi et al.
alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged to Toribia Vda de Mossessgeld who
allegedly gave them permission to possess the land and build their houses. RTC ruled that Malicsi et al cannot
be considered builders in good faith. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
and gave credence to Malicsi et al’s allegation that they relied on De Mossessgeld’s representation that she
owned the land and gave them permission to build their houses on it.

Spouses Padilla elevated the case to the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari. In their Comment,
respondents maintain that the question of whether they were builders in good faith has already been settled by
the Court of Appeals and that there is no reason to deviate from its findings.

ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court can review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in this case. The Rules of Court
requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to analyze or weigh all over again
evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts. However, these rules admit exceptions. However,
these rules admit exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists down 10 recognized exceptions: (1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s finding that respondents were not
builders in good faith. However, that the findings of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are opposite does
not warrant this Court’s automatic review of factual findings. This only presents a prima facie basis for recourse
to this Court. A careful study of the records leads this Court to conclude that this case falls under the exceptions
cited in Medina, particularly in that “the inference made is manifestly mistaken”; and that “[t]he findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, necessitating a review of the question of fact raised
before this Court.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

364
Rule 45, Sec. 1

E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco

G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
Leonen, J.

While the question of whether the Court of Appeals may resolve a motion for intervention is a question that
assails an interlocutory order and requests a review of a lower court’s exercise of discretion, when the Court of
Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the merits of the case, an appeal through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

FACTS:
In 1987, E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed Philippine Patent Application for Angiotensin II Reception Blocking
Imidazole (losartan) before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. The application was
handled by Atty. Mapili but was later handled by Ortega et al as new counsel. In 2002, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed
a Petition for Revival, arguing that its former counsel, Atty. Mapili, did not inform it about the abandonment of the
application and it was not aware that Atty. Mapili had already died. The Director of Patents denied the Petition
for Revival for having been filed out of time. The appeal to the Director-General of the Intellectual Property Office
was also denied. E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed before the CA a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the IPO’s
Decision. The CA granted the Petition. In the interim, Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit
the Attached Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the CA’s Decision directly affects its “vested” rights to sell
its own product. The CA granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene, as it found that Therapharma had an interest
in the revival of the E.I. Dupont Nemours’ patent application since it was the local competitor for the losartan
product. Hence, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Review on Certiorari comply with Rule 45, Section 4 when petitioner failed to attach certain
documents?
2. Is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 proper?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in allowing the intervention of Therapharma, Inc. in petitioner’s appeal?

RULING:
1. Yes, there is compliance with Rule 45, Section 4. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it
may still be given due course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
requires that the petition “be accompanied by... such material portions of the record as would support the petition,”
the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.

In Magsino v. De Ocampo, this Court applied the procedural guideposts in Galvez v. Court of Appeals in
determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed a petition for review under Rule 42 for failure to
attach relevant portions of the record. Thus:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those
which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in another document already attached to the petition.
Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will
suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or
that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Although Magsino referred to a petition for review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals, the procedural
guideposts cited in Magsino may apply to this case since the contents of a pleading under Rule 42 are
substantially the same as the contents of a pleading under Rule 45.

365
The third procedural guidepost in Magsino was complied with upon the submission of documents. Petitioner,
therefore, has substantially complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 is proper. The question of whether the Court of Appeals may
resolve a motion for intervention is a question that assails an interlocutory order and requests a review of a lower
court’s exercise of discretion. Generally, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie to
raise this issue in a limited manner. There must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion for the writ of
certiorari to be issued.

However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the merits of the case,
an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

3. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in allowing the intervention.

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court has the discretion to determine whether to give due course to
an intervention. The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene are whether the intervenor
has standing to intervene, whether the motion will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already
established, and whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate action.

In this case, respondent Therapharma, Inc. filed its Motion for Leave to Intervene before the Court of Appeals,
not before the Intellectual Property Office. In assessing whether to grant the intervention, the Court of Appeals
considered respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s legal interest in the case and its other options for the protection of
its interests. Respondent Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that it had legal interest to intervene in the appeal
of petitioner’s revival of its patent application. While its intervention may have been premature as no patent has
been granted yet, petitioner’s own actions gave rise to respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s right to protect its losartan
product.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 19, Section 1 and Rule 45.

366
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
Leonen, J.

A question of fact which falls under the exceptions, as when the lower courts misapprehended the facts, and their
findings are contradicted by the evidence presented, may be allowed by the SC in a Rule 45 petition.

FACTS:
Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of P.D. 533 for stealing one female carabao belonging to Teresita
Perez (Perez).

Apparently, Lopez untied a carabao from a tree and asked his errand boy Felix Alderete (Alderete) to deliver it
to the former’s boss named Boy Platan. Alderete followed the instructions, not knowing whether Lopez was the
owner of the carabao. The next day, Alderete learned about Perez’s missing carabao. Aftraid of being accused,
Alderete went to the barangay police, and Lopez followed afterwards. During a commotion with Perez, Lopez
admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay indemnification. PO3 Leo Lorazito testified as to what
transpired during the confrontation, and that the parties failed to settle. He was found guilty or cattle-rustling.
Lopez filed an appeal with CA, which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Lopez argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao
owned by Perez. Alderete testified that the carabao he and Lopez took was still pregnant while Perez said their
carabao had an offspring. Perez also could not confirm the date the carabao was stolen. Lopez also alleges that
the request for appearance issued by PO3 Lozarito was in violation of his custodial rights.

ISSUES:
1. Should the petition be denied for raising questions of fact?
2. Were all the elements of the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt?
3. Was Lopez’s uncounseled admission at the barangay police admissible in evidence?

RULING:
1. No. The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
However, there are instances when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review. These
instances include the following: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded
on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7)
when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the
facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Here, the question of fact falls under the exceptions, as when the lower courts misapprehended the facts, and
their findings are contradicted by the evidence presented. He had no personal knowledge of the appearance of
the carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez. He himself doubted whether theft was committed.

2. No. To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty.
Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Alderete’s description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any distinguishing mark on the
carabao that petitioner allegedly stole.

3. No. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. SC ruled against CA’s ruling that it was admissible
because the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not

367
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits
having committed the crime.

The record shows that Lopez’s appearance was not voluntary since there was a “request for appearance” from
the barangay police, which is no different from an “invitation” by police officers for custodial investigation. When
he was requested to appear, he was already singled out as the probable culprit, falling within the definition of
custodial investigation. Also, the explanation that the police did not ask questions but merely let Lopez and Perez
confront each other attempts to circumvent the law.

As to PO3 Lozarito’s testimony, it is considered as hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what
the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. He most likely overheard the
conversation between Teresita and petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had
discussed.

Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of CA is reversed. Lopez shall be acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied were not substantially revised.

368
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.

G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016
Leonen, J.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Only
arbitrariness will warrant judicial intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.

FACTS:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing which set aside
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and order in finding respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. guilty of
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and order dated August 29, 2013, which denied petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration.

To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains
On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes,
Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the COD Division Chief.

OIC Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup reported that Agency No.
14-5005-1 had unremitted collections in the amount of ₱428,349.00 from May 21, 2001 to June 3, 2001. Nucup
also found that “there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that the partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and that the unremitted collections were
attributed to Cesar Lara, Cynthia Roldan, Catalino Alexandre Galang, Jr., who were all employed by [PCSO] as
Lottery Operations Assistants II, and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division Chief.”

June 8, 2004, PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were
criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book
V of Executive Order No. 292.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered the decision finding Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of grave misconduct
and gross neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from service. The complaint for Dishonesty filed against
the respondent is however Dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Delos Reyes’ partial motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and resolution. According to the Court of Appeals, the Office
of the Ombudsman disregarded the PCSO’s findings as to Delos Reyes’ liability for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty.21 The Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt with substantial evidence, and
the ruling must be overturned. The Court of Appeals found that it was Driz who had the specific duty to prepare
and consolidate the sales reports and to remit the proceeds to the bank.

On October 29, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner argued that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the wrong remedy to
assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision before the Court of Appeals. The proper remedy is a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In any case, the petition was already filed out of time. A petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension of facts despite lack of proof of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Office of the Ombudsman. There was substantial evidence to justify the finding of gross misconduct
and gross neglect of duty. Misappreciation of facts or evidence is not equivalent to a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, citing Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner argued that “findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.”

ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court despite availability of the remedy under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?

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2. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension
of facts in finding that substantial evidence exists for the administrative charge of grave misconduct and
gross neglect of duty.

RULING:
1. Yes.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion involves a “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.” It must
be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power “in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.”

The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and
unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary;
and b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation.

In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available to respondent; however,
he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence
necessitated the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals. In addition, the petition for certiorari was
filed 60 days from the receipt of the copy of the denial of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was
beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal provided in the rules. Liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked
to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure.

2. Yes.

It is settled that “[f]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive.” Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” We reiterate that only arbitrariness will warrant judicial intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.

In administrative cases, it is sufficient that “there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of
the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.”

In this case, we find respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. There is substantial
evidence supporting the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent intentionally failed to act on his duty
with a conscious indifference to the consequences. The alleged lack of specific internal control procedures does
not sway this court.

In sum, the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to show how the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the contested decision and order despite the presence of substantial evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is not affected by the Revised Rules because Rule 45, Sec. 1 and Rule 65, Sec. 1 have not been amended.

370
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016
Leonen, J.

The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits based on the factual findings
of the labor tribunals, an issue which does not require the evaluation of the evidence presented before the labor
tribunals, but instead entails a review of applicable laws and not whether the alleged facts are true, is a question
of law, proper in a Rule 45 petition.

FACTS:
Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., (Bahia Shipping), for and on behalf of Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., hired Maricel
S. Nonay (Nonay) in 2008. Around the middle of February 2010, Nonay experienced severe headache.
Atransvaginal ultrasound conducted on Nonay revealed that she had two (2) ovarian cysts.

On March 20, 2010, Nonay was medically repatriated. Bahia Shipping referred her to the company-designated
physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center in Manila. On March 22, 2010, Nonay “was placed under the care
of an obstetrician-gynecologist[,]”also a company-designated physician. Nonay underwent endometrial dilatation
and curettage as part of her treatment.

Nonay was not declared fit to work by the end of the 120-day period from March 20, 2010, the date of her
repatriation, but she was declared “fit to resume sea duties” within the 240-day period.

On September 8, 2010, she filed a Complaint “for payment of disability benefit, medical expenses, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.” She sought to claim permanent disability benefits based on the
collective bargaining agreement she signed.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Maricel S. Nonay.

Bahia Shipping moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.

Bahia Shipping filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the
Petition for Certiorari and held that the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. It found that Nonay failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her
allegation that her illness is work-related. The Court of Appeals gave greater weight to the findings of the
company-designated physician holding that the company-designated physician “had acquired detailed
knowledge and was familiar with [Nonay’s] medical condition.”

Nonay moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.

While the Petition for Certiorari was pending before the Court of Appeals, Bahia Shipping paid Nonay the amount
of ₱3,780,040.00 pursuant to the final and executory Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

On June 5, 2013, Nonay filed a “Petition for Certiorari”35 before this court, but the contents of her Petition indicated
that it was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Nonay argues that the National Labor Relations Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
that her illness was work-related and work-aggravated since more than 120 days lapsed without any declaration
from the company-designated physician that she was fit to work. Thus, her illness was compensable.

She claims that the Petition filed before the Court of Appeals should have been considered moot and academic
since the judgment award was fully settled.

On the other hand, Bahia Shipping argues that the Petition should be dismissed because petitioner raised
questions of facts that are not allowed in petitions for review on certiorari.

Bahia Shipping also argues that Nonay is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because she “was
declared fit to work within the 240-day period[.]” She filed the Complaint before the Labor Arbiter without

371
complying with the mandated procedure that the medical assessment be referred to a third doctor in the event
that the company-designated physician and the personal physician differ in their findings, as in this case.

ISSUES:
1. Has satisfaction of the judgment award rendered the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot
and academic?
2. Should the Petition be dismissed for allegedly raising questions of fact?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the Petition for Certiorari and setting aside the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission?

RULING:
1. No. Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render a petition for certiorari filed before
the Court of Appeals, or a petition for review on certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic.

A petition for certiorari assailing a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is allowed even after the
National Labor Relations Commission’s Decision has become final and executory, provided that the petition is
filed before the expiration of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.

The CA could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence
of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence,
which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all
other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the
NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or
resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution never
became final and executory.

2. No. The Petition in this case does not raise questions of fact.

Contrary to respondent Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.’s argument, petitioner raised only questions of law. The
arguments in this Petition for Review show that petitioner does not question the findings of fact of the labor
tribunals and the Court of Appeals. The main issue raised by petitioner is whether she is entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits based on the factual findings of the labor tribunals. The other issue raised by
petitioner is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission.

Clearly, the issues raised by petitioner do not require the evaluation of the evidence presented before the labor
tribunals. The resolution of the issues raised by petitioner entails a review of applicable laws and not whether the
alleged facts are true.

3. No. To resolve a Rule 45 petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
the question of law that this court must determine is whether the Court of Appeals properly determined the
“presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion.”

In this case petitioner was unable to present substantial evidence to show the relation between her work and the
illness she contracted. The record of this case does not show whether petitioner’s adenomyoma was pre-existing;
hence, this court cannot determine whether it was aggravated by the nature of her employment. She also failed
to fulfill the requisites of Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC for her illness to be compensable, thus, her claim
for disability benefits cannot be granted.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it held that the Complaint should have been dismissed due to lack of
cause of action. It found that petitioner’s treatment would exceed 120 days, as follows:

Firstly, she was prescribed and given monthly Luprolex injection for six (6) months. The first injection
was administered on March 30, 2010, twelve (12) days after her repatriation, and was completed on
August 27, 2010. Secondly, she underwent endometrial dilatation and curettage on July 22, 2010.
Thirdly, from July 28, 2010 up to September 6, 2010, she was treated for bacterial vaginosis and

372
candidiasis. Fourthly, she underwent repeat transvaginal ultrasound on September 28, 2010 for
reevaluation of her medical condition and was last seen by the OBGYNE on October 21, 2010.

It bears stressing that if the employer’s failure to make a declaration on the fitness or disability of the seafarer is
due to the latter’s need for further medical attention, the period of temporary and total disability may be extended
to a maximum of 240 days. Thus, the filing by private respondent of the complaint for permanent disability
compensation benefits on September 8, 2010, or 174 days after she was medically repatriated on March 18,
2010, was premature. As such, the labor arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance the complaint for lack
of cause of action.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it does not tackle any principle amended by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

373
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Republic v. Spouses Gimenez

G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to assail Sandiganbayan resolutions on actions for reconveyance,
revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth, which are also called civil forfeiture
proceedings.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions that deemed petitioner
Republic of the Philippines to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution
and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. During trial, the Republic presented
documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of
the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic then manifested that it was “no longer presenting further
evidence.” Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 “to file its formal
offer of evidence.” On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved “for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28,
2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” The same was granted. On April 27, 2006, the Republic
moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This was
also granted.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal
Offer of Evidence. In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied
the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss based on failure
to prosecute. The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.

ISSUES:
1. Was a Petition for Review on Certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss?

RULING:
1. Yes, a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy. To determine whether a petition for review is
the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance,
revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil
forfeiture proceedings. In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the Republic had waived its right to offer evidence and in granting
the dismissal. This court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving
recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and
formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued.

374
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. This court is not unmindful
of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired
throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the
government and the people of the Republic.

The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed
as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which
the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes
on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to
grave criticism.” Furthermore, “subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules did not change the concepts discussed above.

375
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Pascual v. Burgos
G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Although jurisprudence has provided
several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so the
court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In any event, even in such cases, this court retains full
discretion on whether to review the factual findings of the CA.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the CA Decision which reversed and ordered the trial court to
disallow redemption of the property and to consolidate ownership upon respondents. The CA reversed the factual
findings of the trial court.

Ernesto and Remedios Pascual (Pascual Spouses) and Benito Burgos, et al. (Burgos, et al.) co-own a fishpond
situated in Bulacan which was subjected to an auction sale pursuant to the trial court Decision apportioning to
Burgos, et al. 17% and to the Pascual Spouses 83% of the fishpond. The Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan held an
auction sale and the Pascual Spouses’ share of the fishpond was sold for P95,000.00 to Burgos, et al. After
almost a year, the Pascual Spouses assailed the Writ of Execution, alleging irregularities in the sale. In a Petition
for Review filed by Pascual Spouses, the CA ordered the remand of the case for reception of evidence to
determine the fair market value of the fishpond at the time of the auction sale and whether equity demands that
the Pascual Spouses still be allowed to redeem the property. The Pascual Spouses presented 3 witnesses to
prove that the fair market value of the fishpond was P200,000 per hectare. One of them was Antonio Gonzales,
the former President of Precillano Gonzales Development Corporation which purchased the property for the
corporation. He clarified that P4M was paid in cash to the seller and the seller’s loan of P6M to PNB was assumed
by the buyer, totaling P10M. On the other hand, Burgos, et al. presented 2 witnesses to prove that the fishpond’s
fair market value was only PI0,000.00 to P20,000.00 per hectare. One of them presented tax declarations which
state the market value of the fishpond. Another was the Municipal Assessor in Bulacan who identified and showed
in his Book of Tax Declarations the tax declaration presented by the other witnesses.

The trial court gave credence to the evidence presented by the Pascual Spouses but did not give any weight to
the tax declarations presented by Burgos, et al. On appeal, the CA found that there was a discrepancy between
the testimony of Gonzales and the provisions in the Deed of Sale presented. On the other hand, the tax
declarations presented by Burgos, et al., being public documents, are prima facie evidence of the statements
written there, including the market value of the property.

ISSUE:
Does the conflicting findings of the lower courts automatically warrant a review of factual findings of the case?

RULING:
No, because a review of appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Since this court is not a
trier of facts, the general rule is that the appellate court’s findings are conclusive, but this rule is not without some
recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. However, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and
proved by the parties so the court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

In this case, petitioner failed to show why the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are without any basis.
Petitioner does not dispute the tax declarations relied upon by the Court of Appeals. Instead, petitioner insists
that the testimony of Antonio Gonzales should be given weight despite the valid and substantial basis provided
by the CA to find otherwise. She still failed to clarify and explain the anomaly between Antonio Gonzales’
testimony on the purchase price of the fishpond sold to Precillano Gonzales Development Corporation and the
provision on the purchase price in the Deed of Sale presented.

376
Therefore, the review being a matter of sound judicial discretion, this Court finds no compelling reason to review
the factual findings of the CA.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

377
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Mendoza v. Valte
G.R. No. 172961, September 7, 2015
Leonen, J.

Questions of fact are generally not entertained in a petition for review before this court. In any event, petitions for
a review or reopening of a decree of registration based on actual fraud must be filed before the proper court
within the one-year period provided under the relevant laws. Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the
reversion of land fraudulently granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period, but
this must be initiated by the State.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the CA Decision and prays that the Office of the President Decision
be reinstated.

Sometime in 1978, Reynosa Valte (Valte) filed a free patent application for a 7.2253-hectare parcel of land. The
Bureau of Lands approved Valte’s application, issued Free Patent No. 586435, and in 1979, the Cabanatuan
City Register of Deeds issued OCT No. P-10119. In 1982, Pedro Mendoza (Mendoza) and Jose Gonzales
(Gonzales) filed a protest, alleging that Valte procured the Free Patent by means of fraud, misrepresentation,
and connivance. The DENR conducted an ocular investigation, and the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the Brgy.
Captain stated that there is no barangay resident with the name of Valte. Mendoza and Gonzales alleged that
Mendoza was in actual possession and cultivation of 4 hectares, Gonzales of two (2) hectares, and Procopio
Vallega of the rest. The ocular inspection of the DENR was appealed before the Office of the President (OP),
which ordered a formal hearing and thorough investigation. Mendoza and Gonzales reiterated their claim of
ownership and possession of the land since 1930 and the nullity of Valte’s title. Valte countered that her father
bought the land in 1941, and her mother ceded the land to her in 1978. She maintained that Mendoza and
Gonzales were tenants with no preferential right over the land. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Certification states that Mendoza and Gonzales are tenants of a combined area of 2.6367 hectares.

In her Comment, Valte counters that Mendoza and Gonzales cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue
arising from Gonzales’ claim over the lot with 3 hectares. If only petitioners raised the said issue below, then
respondent could have proven that petitioner Gonzales’ land is distinct and separate from respondents’ 7
hectares land. On the other hand, Mendoza and Gonzales submit that Valte failed to present evidence of
ownership of the land, as the free patent application was for Lot 1035-B that has 2 hectares.

ISSUES:
1. May a factual issue on land identity be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45?
2. May a petition for a review or reopening of a decree of registration be filed on the ground of actual fraud?

RULING:
1. No, because a petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual findings by
the CA, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties and are no
longer reviewable. As the court of last resort, this court should not be burdened with functions falling within the
causes in the first instance so that it can focus on its fundamental tasks under the Constitution.

This rule admits of exceptions, and petitioners invoked one of these, in that the factual findings of the CA and
OP are at variance with each other. However, petitioners only filed their protest against respondent’s free patent
application, raising fraud regarding who has actual possession and cultivation of the land. They did not question
land identity. The Decisions of the DENR, OP, and the CA only dealt with petitioners’ submission that respondent
employed fraud in claiming actual possession and cultivation of the land. Petitioners cannot now raise the factual
issue on land identity. A change of theory on appeal offends due process and fair play.

2. Yes, but it must be filed before the proper court within the one-year period. Here, petitioners did not explain
why they did not file the proper petition before the trial court or within the one-year period. Their right to action,
thus, already prescribed. In any event, petitioners failed to overcome their burden to prove fraud by respondent
in her claim of continuous occupation and cultivation of the land.

378
Further, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land fraudulently granted
to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period, but this must be initiated by the state.
However, the state has not yet initiated such case.

Lastly, the Director of Lands, subject to review by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary, has exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition and management of public lands. Questions on the
identity of the land require its technical determination. Petitioners did not allege nor show any irregularity in the
free patent application proceedings before the Director of Lands on the 7.2255-parcel of land; thus, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied in this case are not affected by the amendments.

379
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
Leonen, J.

A re-examination of the facts of the case under Rule 45 is justified (1) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based, and (2) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the CA Decision which affirmed the RTC decision, finding
Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation’s administrator, and several men, including Cipres, found Ligtas
harvesting abaca at the plantation of Anecita Pacate (Pacate) without consent. During their confrontation, Ligtas
admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. He alleged that he had been a
tenant of Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993 for the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in
the criminal case. According to him, on June 28, 2000, he prevented the men sent by Pacate from harvesting the
abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. He likewise denied harvesting on June 29, 2000, claiming that
when the alleged harvesting happened, he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a fiesta. Ligtas filed a
Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) wherein he was declared a
bona fide tenant of the land. The formal offer of DARAB Decision as evidence was unknown, but records are
clear that it was considered by both RTC and CA without objection of the People.

The RTC held found Ligtas guilty of theft. The CA affirmed such decision, finding that Ligtas was not able to
establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. It further declared that the DARAB Decision is
irrelevant because “findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship, are merely
preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. As to the ownership of the land, the CA held that
while he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate’s title over the land. Under Rule
131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation. Further, Ligtas’ defense of alibi was doubtfully established as his attack
on the credibility of the witnesses failed to show that the case was initiated only through Pacate’s quest for
revenge.

ISSUES:
1. May the issue of tenancy, being a question of fact, be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under R45?
2. Should the DARAB Decision be considered conclusive?
3. Does the doctrine of res judicata apply in purely administrative proceedings?
4. Does a tenancy agreement negate the existence of the element of taking in the crime of theft?

RULING:
1. Yes, because the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented
corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy. While only questions of law are allowed in a petition for
review under Rule 45, the court has held that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified (1) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, and (2) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The CA erred when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution
despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole. A review
of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

2. Yes, because the findings of DARAB with regard to the existence of a tenancy relationship is supported by
substantial evidence. Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings.
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily
be binding on the other.

380
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in a
criminal proceeding, where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. The DARAB Case involves
a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship, while the criminal case involves determination of
whether petitioner committed theft. The tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements
of theft were proven by the prosecution. Hence, findings of fact of administrative agencies, as in this case, in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence, and therefore,
conclusive and binding on courts.

3. No, res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to purely administrative proceedings. However, under RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
empowered to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies which decision attains finality after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days and no appeal was interposed. therefrom by any of the parties.

In this case, the DARAB case held that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by
petitioner by substantial evidence. Examined pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant
include sworn statements showing that petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce
after harvest which petitioner had done so every harvest until he was disturbed on June 29, 2000. Further, records
are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the
Decision has long lapsed into finality.

4. Yes, because the harvesting done by the tenant pursuant to a tenancy agreement is with the landowner’s
consent. A tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner’s share in the produce
depends on the agreement between the parties.

Here, the existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The
DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,
failed to establish all the elements of theft.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions or rules in this case are not affected by the amendment.

381
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Benito v. People
G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

As a general rule, under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As
an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 Petition when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA’s Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC-Quezon City
convicting Angelita Benito of estafa, finding that she conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in misappropriating the
pieces of jewelry the latter received in trust from Dorie Cruz-Abadilla.

In 1994, Agbulos and Benito were charged with estafa punished under Article 315 (1)(b) of the RPC. As per
prosecution witness-complainant Abadilla, she knew Agbulos and Benito through a friend, Pamintuan. Abadilla
and Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry. In all these transactions, Benito
accompanied Agbulos. Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos would return
the pieces of jewelry if Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued Abadilla checks for the value of the jewelries
received. When Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos issued to her, all were dishonored by reason of “closed
account.” Abadilla then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found. After several months,
Abadilla learned that the jewelries she turned over to Agbulos were pawned at E. Ochoa Pawnshop by a certain
“Linda Chua” appearing on the pawn tickets. Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described
in the pawn tickets. She also learned that the “Linda Chua” who pawned her jewelry was Benito.

In her defense, Benito denied that she was the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s jewelry. Agbulos supported
the testimony of her co-accused Benito, stating that the latter “had no participation in her transactions with
Abadilla.” Agbulos likewise denied that Benito accompanied her to Abadilla’s residence whenever she received
jewelry from Abadilla.

RTC found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit
estafa. CA sustained the finding that Benito was the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s jewelry as testified to
by the pawnshop appraiser, Diloria. Thus, even assuming that Agbulos alone transacted with Abadilla, it was the
action of Benito that paved the way to the misappropriation or conversion of the jewelry, to the prejudice of
Abadilla.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Benito raises questions of fact. Specifically, she prays that SC examine
the truth of the following findings: that she received jewelry from Abadilla and that she posed as “Linda Chua”
and pawned the jewelry she received from Abadilla.

ISSUE:
Can Benito in her Petition for Review on Certiorari raise question of fact praying that SC examine the truth of the
following findings that she received jewelry from Abadilla and that she posed as “Linda Chua” and pawned the
jewelry she received from Abadilla?

RULING:
Yes. Benito can raise question of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari as an exception to the general rule
because the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts of this case.

As a general rule, under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a Petition
for Review on Certiorari. As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 Petition when
the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts. A question of fact exists “when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.” On the other hand, a question of law exists
“when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.”

Here, despite Benito raising questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari, we nevertheless take
cognizance of her Petition because the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts of this case. The
identification of Benito as the “Linda Chua” who pawned the jewelry is “open to serious doubt.” As testified to by

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Diloria, she saw Benito in E. Ochoa Pawnshop only on two occasions: on June 6 and 17, 1994. Moreover, there
is evidence that Diloria was not the pawnshop appraiser who entertained “Linda Chua” but by another a co-
worker. Therefore, as Benito argues, there is no special reason why the Linda Chua transaction stuck to Deloria’s
mind, such that she was able to remember the face of a complete stranger and positively identify her more than
three (3) months after the alleged transaction.” Further, based on Diloria’s testimony, “Linda Chua” first went to
E. Ochoa Pawnshop on June 6, 1994. This date was prior to the first time Agbulos received pieces of jewelry
from Abadilla on June 9, 1994. There is thus some reasonable doubt as to whether the jewelry “Linda Chua”
pawned on June 6, 1994 belonged to Abadilla.

Clearly, there is a serious doubt to hold Benito in conspiracy with Agbulos in the crime of estafa.

EFFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

383
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Protective Maximum Security Agency v. Fuentes

G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard
of the evidence. If the petitioner can show that the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total
disregard of evidence material to the controversy, the factual findings of the NLRC may be subjected to review
and ultimately rejected. In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the NLRC,
this court may examine the records of the case and the questioned findings in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. seeks to set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC.

Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc., an agency providing security services, hired Fuentes in 1999 as a
security guard. He was assigned to Picop Resources, Inc in Agusan Del Sur. In 2000, while he was posted to a
security checkpoint (Post 33), a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took several live ammunitions,
agency-issued uniforms and personal items. Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to PNP.
PNP, after its initial investigation, found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with the
NPA. A complaint for robbery was filed against Fuentes, but this was dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor.

In 2002, Fuentes filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Protective and Picop before NLRC-Butuan.
Fuentes claimed that right after the criminal complaint for robbery against him was dismissed, he demanded to
return to work but he was refused entry on the ground that he was a member of the NPA. On the other hand,
Protective claims that as was usual and routine, Fuentes should have reported to his Team Leader. Since the
incident, Fuentes has not yet reported to his Team Leader or to any of the officers of Protective.

Labor Arbiter (LA) Legaspi rendered a decision in favor of Protective. NLRC reversed LA’s decision and found
that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. Protective filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC asserting that the evidence and the records showed that Fuentes was never
dismissed because he had been missing until the day he filed the Complaint with the LA. CA dismissed the
Petition finding that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the Decision of the NLRC is based on
substantial evidence. It would not reverse these findings absent any showing of patent error.

Petitioner assails the Decision of CA and states that the findings of fact and conclusions of LA are accorded great
weight since they have the opportunity to determine the facts surrounding the case and the necessary expertise
to resolve such matters. Petitioner prays that this court reverse the findings of fact of the NLRC which were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court reverse the findings of fact of NLRC which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals?

RULING:
No. SC’s power to decide a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, particularly in labor cases, has its limits.

The general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this court will not review the factual
determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the findings of fact by the CA. The CA can
conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the NLRC has committed grave abuse of discretion.
In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently,
it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.

The rule, however, is not without exception. Thus, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon
and reviewed by this Court in the following instances, none of which obtain in the instant petition: (1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the

384
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8)When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

In labor cases, if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC, the
assailed CA ruling (in the Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed. Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion
when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence. If the petitioner can show that
the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy,
the factual findings of the NLRC may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected. In addition, if the findings of
fact of the LA are in direct conflict with the NLRC, this court may examine the records of the case and the
questioned findings in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. It is the petitioner’s burden to justify the existence of
one of the exceptions to the general rule for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find that
petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

EFFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

385
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu

G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014
Leonen, J.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
Labor Relations Commission, this Court then clarified that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission
decisions shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it
further ruled that such petitions shall be filed before the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an
aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

FACTS:
Arlene was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. (Fuji) as a news correspondent/producer. In 2009, Arlene
was diagnosed with cancer, hence, she was made to sign the non-renewal contract wherein it was stipulated that
her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration. Arlene filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled against her favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the same. Both parties filed
certiorari before the CA which ruled that Arlene was a regular employee and was illegally dismissed.

In a petition for review filed by Fuji, Arlene filed a manifestation stating that the petition for review should be
dismissed because Corazon, designated by Mr. Shuji as the attorney in fact of Fuji Inc., was not duly authorized
to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping because
Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the secretary’s certificate to delegate his authority to sign the necessary
pleadings, including the verification and certification against forum shopping.

ISSUES:
1. Is the petition for review dismissible on the ground that Corazon was not duly authorized to sign the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping?
2. Does the SC have jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC?

RULING:
1. No, the petition for review is not dismissible since Fuji Inc., substantially complied with the requirement of
authority on the part of Corazon.

In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR, it was held that: In sum, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or
Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

Corazon’s affidavit states that she is the “office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of Fuji
Television Network, Inc.” and that she has “held the position for the last twenty-three years.” As the office
manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau
Office and is in a position to verify “the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition.”

Thus, Corazon was duly authorized to sign the verification and certificate of forum shopping.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC. Article 223 of the Labor Code
does not provide any mode of appeal for decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. It merely
states that “[t]he decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof by the parties.” Being final, it is no longer appealable. However, the finality of the
National Labor Relations Commission’s decisions does not mean that there is no more recourse for the
parties.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court then clarified that judicial
review of National Labor Relations Commission decisions shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall be filed before the

386
Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 45, no effect because the same has not been amended

387
Rule 45, Sec. 1

Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.

G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.

In a Rule 45 petition, the SC does not address the questions of fact, questions which require to rule on “the truth
or falsehood of alleged facts.”

FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision and resolution of CA ordering
petitioner Loria to pay respondent Munoz P2,000,000 in actual damages with 12% interest per annum from the
filing of the complaint until full payment.

Loria invited Munoz to advance P2,000,000 for a subcontract in a P50,000,000 river-dredging project in
Guinobatan. Since Munoz had known Loria for five years, he accepted Loria’s proposal. Munoz requested Allied
Bank to release P3,000,000 from his joint account with his business partner to a certain Delos Santos. Loria then
obtained the money from Delos Santos. Four days later, P1,800,000 of the P3,000,000 was returned to Munoz.
Loria then collected the P800,000 balance from Munoz but after deducting Loria’s personal loans, Munoz issued
a check to Loria amounting to only P481,000. The project was subjected to bidding and it was awarded to the
lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction. Sunwest allegedly finished the dredging project without subcontracting
Munoz. Because of this, Munoz demanded Loria to return his P2,000,000, but the latter did not return the money.

Munoz filed a complaint for sum of money against Loria. MTC ordered Loria to return the amount. On appeal,
CA sustained the trial court’s findings, hence the petition for review. Loria maintained that Munoz failed to prove
the receipt of P3,000,000 through a certain Delos Santos. Munoz however argued that Loria’s petition raises
questions of fact and law that the trial and appellate courts have already passed upon and resolved in his favor.

ISSUE:
Is the remedy proper when Loria raised only question of fact in his petition?

RULING:
No. The petition for review on certiorari is not proper since the question of whether Loria received P3,000,000 is
a question of fact that the trial court and the appellate court have already resolved. In a Rule 45 petition, we do
not address the questions of fact, questions which require to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.”

Rule 45, section 1 of the ROC provides that:

A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

In the case of Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, it provides the exceptions that the courts may
review questions of facts in a Rule 45 petition:
. . . (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are
pre premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Loria failed to convince the court to make an exemption. The court agreed that the pieces of evidence duly proved
Loria’s initial receipt of the P3,000,000.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 is not affected by the amendments in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

388
Rule 45, Sec.1

Villamor, Jr. v. Umale

G.R. No. 172843 & 172881, September 24, 2014
Leonen, J.

There is a question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. The
test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is doubt as to the truth or falsehood of facts. The question must
involve the examination of probative value of the evidence presented.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Alfredo Villamor
Jr., (Villamor) and the other directors of Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) assailing the decision of the CA placing
PPC under receivership and appointed an interim management committee for the corporation as prayed for by
respondent Hernando Balmores (Balmores) thereafter substituted in the present case by John Umale (Umale).

This is a consolidation of 2 cases. The cases stemmed from an incident wherein Villamor as representative of
PCC did not account for the checks constituting the rentals and goodwill money he received from PPC’s sub-
lessee, MC Home Depot. Balmores, as director and stockholder of PCC, he informed PPC’s directors (petitioners
in the first case) of the incident and expressed that Villamor should deliver and account for PPC the checks. Due
to the directors’ inaction, Balmores filed an intra-corporate controversy against PPC’s directors for their alleged
device or scheme amounting to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the interest of the corporation and its
stockholders. Balmores prayed that a receiver be appointed as well as for the accounting and remittance to PPC
of the MC Home Depot checks or their proceeds. The RTC denied Balmore’s prayer for appointment of receiver.
On appeal, the CA gave due course to Balmores’s prayer.

PPC’s directors argued that the CA erred in characterizing respondent Balmores’ suit as a derivative suit because
of his failure to implead PPC as party in the case. Hence, the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation,
and the appointment of a receiver or management committee is not valid. According to them, in case the
appointment is a proper, it is the RTC only and not the CA that must appoint them. Meanwhile, Villamor argued
that PPC’s entitlement to the checks or their proceeds was still in dispute. He further argued that Villamor also
argued that the CA’s order to place PPC under receivership and to appoint a management committee does not
endanger PPC’s assets because the MC Home Depot checks were not the only assets of PPC. Therefore, it
would not affect the operation of PPC or result in its paralysation.

On the other hand, respondent Balmores argued that Villamor’s and the directors’ petitions raise questions of
facts, which cannot be allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45. On the appointment of a receiver or
management committee, he stated that the very practice of waiving assets and income for no consideration can
in fact lead, not only to the paralyzation of business, but to the complete loss or cessation of business of PPC. It
is precisely because of this fraudulent practice that a receiver/management committee must be appointed to
protect the assets of PPC from further fraudulent acts, devices and schemes.

ISSUES:
1. Was the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 the proper remedy?
2. Was the complaint subject of a derivative suit?

RULING:
1. Yes. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. There is a question of law when there is doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. The test is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Meanwhile, there is a question of
fact when there is doubt as to the truth or falsehood of facts. The question must involve the examination of
probative value of the evidence presented.

In this case, petitioners raise issues on the correctness of the CA’s conclusions. Specifically, petitioners ask (1)
whether respondent Balmores’ failure to implead PPC in his action with the trial court was fatal; (2) whether the
Court of Appeals correctly characterized respondent Balmores’ action as a derivative suit; (3) whether the Court
of Appeals’ appointment of a management committee was proper; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals may
exercise the power to appoint a management committee. These are questions of law that may be determined

389
without looking into the evidence presented. The question of whether the conclusion drawn by the CA from a set
of facts is correct is a question of law, cognizable by this court.

2. No. Balmores’ action in the trial court failed to satisfy all the requisites of a derivative suit. He failed to exhaust
all available remedies to obtain the reliefs he prayed for. Though he tried to communicate with PPC’s
directors about the checks in Villamor’s possession before he filed an action with the trial court, respondent
Balmores was not able to show that this comprised all the remedies available under the articles of
incorporation, bylaws, laws, or rules governing PPC. Neither did respondent Balmores implead PPC as party
in the case nor did he allege that he was filing on behalf of the corporation.

Further, Balmores has no cause of action that would entitle him to the reliefs sought. A wrong to the corporation
does not necessarily create an individual cause of action. In this case, respondent Balmores did not allege any
cause of action that is personal to him. These are wrongs that pertain to PPC. Therefore, the cause of action
belongs to PPC not to Balmores or any stockholders as individuals. Only the corporation, or arguably the
stockholders as a group, is entitled to these reliefs, which should have been sought in a proper derivative suit
filed on behalf of the corporation. PPC will not be bound by a decision granting the application for the appointment
of a receiver or management committee since it was not impleaded in the complaint, the courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. On this matter, it is an indispensable party, without which, no final determination can be had.
Hence, it is not only respondent Balmores’ failure to implead PPC that is fatal to his action, as petitioners point
out. It is the fact that he alleged no cause of action that pertains personally to him that disqualifies him from the
reliefs he sought in his complaint.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended.

390
Rule 45, Sec. 2

Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Diaz

G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

A liberal construction of the rules of procedure, including the period within which a petition for review must be
filed, requires justifiable reasons or at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them. Evidently, no
reasonable attempt has been made by petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing within the
reglementary period. Atty. Tamaca’s excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court of Appeals
September 12, 2012 Resolution and his electoral activities do not deserve any consideration from this Court.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118549. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-1407- 2003/NLRC LAC No.
043647-05. It found that Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego were illegally dismissed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (the Cooperative).

Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego worked for the Cooperative as Accounting Clerk, Loan Officer and Verifier, and
Lending Supervisor, respectively. Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego learned that Matel and Sengson allegedly
claimed that they were all in a conspiracy in the anomalous transactions. The next day, Diaz, Cabigting, and
Samaniego were forced to admit their participation despite their denial. They were placed under a 30-day
preventive suspension. After the period lapsed, they tried to return to work but were told that the Cooperative
had already terminated their employment. Thus, they filed illegal dismissal case against the Cooperative. LA
dismissed the case. Subsequently, the NLRC ruled to dismiss them based on just cause.

Thus, respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the NLRC’s decision.
The Court of Appeals granted respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and ruled that they were illegally dismissed.

Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court its Urgent Motion to Admit Attached Petition, with an attached Petition for
Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego. In the motion, petitioner’s counsel explained that his belated filing of
the Petition for Review before this Supreme Court was due to the Court of Appeals’ resolution being misplaced
during the holiday season, and that he went to the province to prepare for elections.

ISSUE:
Should Petition for Review be denied for being filed out of time?

RULING:
Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court clearly provides for the period within which a petition for review must be
filed:

Section 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme
Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it, within the period prescribed
under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party’s loss of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory
right, must “be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law.” 55 Failure to file one’s
appeal within the reglementary period is fatal to a party’s cause, “precluding the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case.”

Atty. Tamaca cannot disclaim responsibility for the false allegation in the Petition by arguing that both September
and December are months covered by the “Christian holidays” averred in it.61 Clearly, the lapse of more than six
(6) months from petitioner’s receipt of the September 12, 2012 Resolution until the filing of the Petition on April
5, 2013 is beyond the contemplation of Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.

391
Moreover, even if petitioner received a copy of the September 12, 2012 Resolution in December 2012 as it
alleges, the Petition would have still been filed out of time, four (4) months having already elapsed from notice
until filing.

The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing them to be ignored or lightly dismissed to
suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was impermissible. Such rules, often derided as merely
technical, are to be relaxed only in the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal construction
in exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt
at compliance with them.

Evidently, no reasonable attempt has been made by petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing
within the reglementary period. Atty. Tamaca’s excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court
of Appeals September 12, 2012 Resolution and his electoral activities do not deserve any consideration from this
Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45, Sec. 2 was not amended.

392
Rule 45, Sec. 4

Cordillera Global Network v. Paje

G.R. No 215988, April 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

For the certification against forum shopping, Altres v. Empleo stated the general rule that non-signing petitioners
will be dropped as parties to the case. Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a common
interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the
substantial compliance rule.

FACTS:
This is a case for resolving a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Cordillera Global Network, representing
concerned residents of Baguio City, assailing the CA decision upholding the Decision of the RTC declaring that
Cordillera failed to prove their allegations of irregularity in the issuance of the amended Environmental
Compliance Certificate, building permit, and tree-cutting and earth-balling permit.

Few years after the completion of SM City Baguio, the company wanted to expand its existing mall on Luneta
Hill to increase parking and commercial spaces that will require cutting of 182 trees. In connection to the
expansion project, SM Investments submitted an amendment on their original ECC which was later granted on
by DENR. The DENR granted their clearance and permit to the cut trees which was subject to several conditions,
including conduct of public consultation with stakeholders.

Later, the Cordillera Global Network filed an environmental case on the ground that the expansion project will
severely damage the environment and health of the residents and a temporary environment protection order to
prevent SM from cutting tress but was later on resumed upon go signal to cut trees from the Executive Director
of DENR. Upon RTC Hearing, temporary protection order was extended but later on lifted since SM argued that
they strictly complied with the requirements. The RTC the dismissed the case and held that though the petitioners
possess the necessary personality under the principle of transcendental importance, petitioners did not exhaust
administrative remedies. Additionally, they failed to prove that the removal of trees would have a detrimental
effect that will cause irreparable damage. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and added that
petitioners failed to prove their allegation in the irregularity of the amended ECC.

The case was brought to the SC and petitioners maintained that SM violated the zoning and city ordinance limit
that they needed to obtain a separate ECC, that there was no public consultation, the case was exempted from
to exhaustion of administrative remedies. SM also states that the case is moot because the permits have already
expired and the trees have already been removed.

ISSUES:
1. Must the Petition be dismissed for defective certification against forum shopping?
2. Is the case raised to the Supreme Court is a question of fact?
3. Should the Petition be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies?
4. Were the permits issued are valid and regularly issued or is the amended ECC enough?

RULING:
1. No. Failure of all petitioners to sign the document is not a sufficient ground for the Petition’s outright dismissal.

In this case, there were around 200 petitioners in the two (2) environmental cases on appeal before this Court;
yet, only 30 petitioners signed the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. However, contrary to
private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center Management Corporation’s assertions, the
failure of all petitioners to sign the document is not a sufficient ground for the Petition’s outright
dismissal. Jurisprudence confirms that petitioners substantially complied with the verification requirement. The
30 signatories provided the guarantee that: (1) they had ample knowledge as to the truth of the allegations in the
Petition; and (2) the Petition was made in good faith.

For the certification against forum shopping, Altres v. Empleo stated the general rule that non-signing petitioners
will be dropped as parties to the case. Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a common
interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the
substantial compliance rule.

393
Here, petitioners all share a common interest, which is to declare the cutting or earth-balling of the trees affected
by the Expansion Project illegal. Hence, the signature of 30 petitioners to the certification against forum shopping
amounts to substantial compliance with the requirement under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes. However, this case falls under the exceptions in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. and may thus be raised with
the SC.

It is well-established that a review of appeals filed before this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion.” these rules do admit of 10 exceptions. Upon careful review, this Court finds that this case falls under
the exceptions in Medina, particularly: “(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts”; and “(8)
[w]hen the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.”

3. No. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule and may be subject to certain
exceptions.

The general rule is to first exhaust the available administrative remedies before a party can bring the case to a
court for judicial review.” In connection with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, courts will hold off from determining a controversy involving a question
within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, particularly when its resolution demands the “special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact.” It may be disregarded when any of the exception in Pagara v. Court of Appeals.

In this case, the appeal provided for under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30 is still applicable. Such action is
based on the first sentence thereof, that if the person or entity charged with the duty to exhaust the administrative
remedy of appeal to the appropriate government agency has been a party or has been made a party in the
proceedings wherein the decision to be appealed was rendered.

4. The permits issued are valid and regularly issued.

Petitioners failed to support their allegation that the issued locational clearances were improperly issued. If the
petitioners wanted to challenge the locational clearance issued by the Planning and Development Office of
Baguio City, they should have filed an appeal before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. While
Executive Order No. 72 may have devolved the agency’s power to issue locational clearances to cities and
municipalities, it did not remove its appellate jurisdiction over actions of local and regional planning and zoning
bodies.

Furthermore, no separate environmental compliance certificate was needed prior to the tree removal and
transplanting operations. While this Court acknowledges and lauds private respondents efforts to plant a
considerable amount of pine seedlings in and around Baguio City, it cannot make up for the removal or replanting
of the trees affected by the Expansion Project, which was patently illegal.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

394
Rule 45, Sec. 4

Orient Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

A petition that fails to state the names of the parties in the body does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 where the
names of the parties are readily discernable from its caption.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
Resolution of the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision finding that petitioner Orient Freight International, Inc.’s
(Orient Freight) negligence caused the cancellation of Keihin-Everett Forwarding Company, Inc.’s (Keihin-
Everett) contract with Matsushita Communication Industrial Corporation of the Philippines (Matsushita).

Kehin-Everett filed a complaint for damages against Orient Freight with the RTC, which ruled in favor of the
former. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA then subsequently denied Orient Freight’s
motion for reconsideration. This prompted Orient Freight to file this present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. The petition, however, does not contain the full names of the parties in its body. However, the full names
appear in its caption. In its comment thereto, Keihin-Everett argues that the petition does not contain the names
of the parties in violation of Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, to which Orient Freight, in its reply, responded
that a cursory reading of the petition would readily show the parties to the case.

ISSUE:
Does failure to state the names of the parties in the body, but which names are readily discernible from the
caption, constitute a fatal defect?

RULING:
No, failure to state the names of the parties in the body, but which names are readily discernible from the caption,
does not constitute a fatal defect.

The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for failing to state the names of the parties
in the body. The names of the parties are readily discernable from the caption of the petition, clearly showing the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent.

In addition, here, the Court of Appeals had also been erroneously impleaded in the petition. However, this Court
in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals ruled that inappropriately impleading the lower court as respondent does not
automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal. This is a mere formal defect.

Thus, there is no fatal defect in the petition.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45, Sec. 4 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

395
Rule 45, Sec. 4

E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco

G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
Leonen, J.

Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition “be accompanied by... such material
portions of the record as would support the petition,” the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright
dismissal of the complaint.

FACTS:
In 1987, E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed Philippine Patent Application for Angiotensin II Reception Blocking
Imidazole (losartan) before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. The application was
handled by Atty. Mapili but was later handled by Ortega et al as new counsel. In 2002, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed
a Petition for Revival, arguing that its former counsel, Atty. Mapili, did not inform it about the abandonment of the
application and it was not aware that Atty. Mapili had already died. The Director of Patents denied the Petition
for Revival for having been filed out of time. The appeal to the Director-General of the Intellectual Property Office
was also denied. E.I. Dupont de Nemours filed before the CA a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the IPO’s
Decision. The CA granted the Petition. In the interim, Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit
the Attached Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the CA’s Decision directly affects its “vested” rights to sell
its own product. The CA granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene, as it found that Therapharma had an interest
in the revival of the E.I. Dupont Nemours’ patent application since it was the local competitor for the losartan
product. Hence, E.I. Dupont Nemours filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Review on Certiorari comply with Rule 45, Section 4 when petitioner failed to attach certain
documents?
2. Is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 proper?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in allowing the intervention of Therapharma, Inc. in petitioner’s appeal?

RULING:
1. Yes, there is compliance with Rule 45, Section 4. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it
may still be given due course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
requires that the petition “be accompanied by... such material portions of the record as would support the petition,”
the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.

In Magsino v. De Ocampo, this Court applied the procedural guideposts in Galvez v. Court of Appeals in
determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed a petition for review under Rule 42 for failure to
attach relevant portions of the record. Thus:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those
which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in another document already attached to the petition.
Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will
suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or
that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Although Magsino referred to a petition for review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals, the procedural
guideposts cited in Magsino may apply to this case since the contents of a pleading under Rule 42 are
substantially the same as the contents of a pleading under Rule 45.

396
The third procedural guidepost in Magsino was complied with upon the submission of documents. Petitioner,
therefore, has substantially complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 is proper. The question of whether the Court of Appeals may
resolve a motion for intervention is a question that assails an interlocutory order and requests a review of a lower
court’s exercise of discretion. Generally, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie to
raise this issue in a limited manner. There must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion for the writ of
certiorari to be issued.

However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of intervention and the merits of the case,
an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

3. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in allowing the intervention.

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court has the discretion to determine whether to give due course to
an intervention. The only questions the court need to consider in a motion to intervene are whether the intervenor
has standing to intervene, whether the motion will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already
established, and whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate action.

In this case, respondent Therapharma, Inc. filed its Motion for Leave to Intervene before the Court of Appeals,
not before the Intellectual Property Office. In assessing whether to grant the intervention, the Court of Appeals
considered respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s legal interest in the case and its other options for the protection of
its interests. Respondent Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that it had legal interest to intervene in the appeal
of petitioner’s revival of its patent application. While its intervention may have been premature as no patent has
been granted yet, petitioner’s own actions gave rise to respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s right to protect its losartan
product.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 19, Section 1 and Rule 45.

397
Rule 45, Sec. 4

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu

G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014
Leonen, J.

Not all officers need board resolution to be considered authorized to sign verification and certification of non-
forum shopping.

FACTS:
Arlene was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. (Fuji) as a news correspondent/producer. In 2009, Arlene
was diagnosed with cancer, hence, she was made to sign the non-renewal contract wherein it was stipulated that
her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration. Arlene filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled against her favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the same. Both parties filed
certiorari before the CA which ruled that Arlene was a regular employee and was illegally dismissed.

In a petition for review filed by Fuji, Arlene filed a manifestation stating that the petition for review should be
dismissed because Corazon, designated by Mr. Shuji as the attorney in fact of Fuji Inc., was not duly authorized
to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the
secretary’s certificate to delegate his authority to sign the necessary pleadings, including the verification and
certification against forum shopping.

ISSUES:
1. Is the petition for review dismissible on the ground that Corazon was not duly authorized to sign the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping?
2. Does the SC have jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC?

RULING:
1. No, the petition for review is not dismissible since Fuji Inc., substantially complied with the requirement of
authority on the part of Corazon.

In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR, it was held that: In sum, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or
Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

Corazon’s affidavit states that she is the “office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of Fuji
Television Network, Inc.” and that she has “held the position for the last twenty-three years.” As the office
manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau
Office and is in a position to verify “the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition.”

Thus, Corazon was duly authorized to sign the verification and certificate of forum shopping.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the NLRC. Article 223 of the Labor Code
does not provide any mode of appeal for decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. It merely
states that “[t]he decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof by the parties.” Being final, it is no longer appealable. However, the finality of the
NLRC’s decisions does not mean that there is no more recourse for the parties.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court then clarified that judicial
review of National Labor Relations Commission decisions shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall be filed before the
Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 45, no effect because the same has not been amended

398
Rule 45, Sec. 6

Malabanan v. Malabanan, Jr.

G.R. No. 187225, March 6, 2019
Leonen, J.

The Supreme Court’s appellate review is discretionary. A question of fact generally cannot be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari. Moreover, the findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding on this Court.
However, the rules allow certain exceptions.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of the Appeals that set aside the RTC which
ruled in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner is the widow of Jose Malabanan. They acquired a 310 sq. meter lot out of a 2,000 square meter land
registered under Maria Rodriguez. A Transfer Certificate of Title (T-188590) was subsequently issued to the
spouses (“Jose, married to Melinda”), covering the disputed property, which they built a house and lot.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against Spouses Ramon and Prescila
Malabanan (Malabanan Spouses) and Francisco Malabanan. The said parties were the sibling and father of
petitioner’s deceased husband who, without petitioner’s consent, sold the disputed property to the Montano
Spouses. Petitioner then filed an Amended Complaint to implead Montano Spouses. Petitioner claimed that the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA), which was the basis of the sale to the Montano spouses, was void as her
signature it in was forged.

RTC ruled in favor of Melinda. It found that she has proved her ownership over the property, which was
fraudulently transferred through Francisco’s clever scheme. It nullified the SPA and the subsequent transactions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the trial court’s ruling and ordered the Complaint’s dismissal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review but it was denied by the CA holding that the arguments raised were
extensively discussed in its Decision. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Should the Supreme Court allow to review the case when the issue raised is a question of fact?

RULING:
Yes, the SC is allowed the review on certiorari the case even if it involves a question of fact.

The SC’s appellate review is discretionary. A question of fact generally cannot be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari. Moreover, the findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court. These rules allow certain
exceptions, and one of which is when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court.

Here, while the finding of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court, this does not at once permit a factual
review, but simply presents a prima facie basis for such. While a conflict in their findings may prima facie provide
basis for a recourse to this Court, only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or extraordinary
misperception or manifest bias in the Appellate Court’s reading of the evidence will justify this Court’s intervention
by way of assuming a function usually within the former’s exclusive province.

Petitioner urges this Court to review the factual findings in this case as “some facts or circumstances that my
affect the result of the case have been overlooked.” In other words, she alleges that there was a misapprehension
of facts. This Court agrees.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

399
Rule 45, Sec. 6

Noell Whessoe, Inc. v. Independent Testing Consultants, Inc.

G.R. No. 199851, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Where a quick perusal of the parties’ evidence reveals that the RTC and the CA may have erred in its conclusion,
and if not corrected, the assailed judgments may result in grave injustice to petitioner, Rule 45, Sec. 6 is satisfied.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed assailing the CA Decision Resolution which affirmed the RTC’s
finding that Noell Whessoe, Inc. was solidarily liable with Liquigaz Philippines Corporation (Liquigaz) and
Petrotech Systems, Inc. (Petrotech) to Independent Testing Consultants, Inc. for unpaid fees of P1,063,465.70.

Petrotech, a subcontractor of Liquigaz, engaged the services of Independent Testing Consultants to conduct
non-destructive testing on Liquigaz’s piping systems and liquefied petroleum gas storage tanks. Independent
Testing Consultants conducted the agreed tests and billed Petrotech, on separate invoices, the amounts of
P474,617.22 and P588,848.48 for its services. However, despite demand, Petrotech refused to pay.

Petitioner asserts that it should not have been made solidarity liable to respondent Independent Testing
Consultants since it had no privity of contract with the latter. It maintains that the Contract Agreement was
between Liquigaz and Whessoe UK, an entity separate and distinct from petitioner. It explained that the
Conditions of Contract for Supply of Professional, Technical and Management Services between Whessoe UK
and petitioner was not intended to be a deed of assignment.

ISSUE:
Can a question of fact, error in interpretation of the provisions of the Conditions of Contract for Supply of
Professional, Technical and Management Services, and the Letter, be raised on a petition for review on certiorari?

RULING:
Yes, as a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The distinction between a question of fact and a question of law is settled. There is a question
of law if the issue can be determined without reviewing or evaluating the evidence on record. Otherwise, the
issue raised is a question of fact.

The party claiming an exception “must demonstrate and prove” that a review of the factual findings is necessary.
Petitioner has not alleged that it raised a question of fact, much less allege that this case falls under any of the
exceptions. This would have merited the denial of the Petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. Petitioner,
however, argues that this case falls under the considerations stated in Rule 45, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
which provides that a review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor.

A quick perusal of the parties’ evidence reveals that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals may have
erred in finding that petitioner was still liable to respondent Independent Testing Consultants for its unpaid fees.
If not corrected, the assailed judgments may result in grave injustice to petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 was not amended.

400
Rule 47, Sec.1

De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.

G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
Leonen, J.

Annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.”

FACTS:
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title, filed
by petitioner Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan) against several defendants. One of the defendants
is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro).

Romasan alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. Sometimes in 1996, it
discovered that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo Property. When confronted about this, De
pedro was able to show title and documents evidencing ownership over the same. Upon checking with the
CENRO-DENR, it was confirmed that DENR issued free patents covering Romasan’s property. Thus, Romasan
filed complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title against defendants herein. However,
service of summons against De Pedro proved unsuccessful. She was unserved for the reason that according to
the messenger of Post Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address. Thus, Romasan filed motion
to serve summons and complaints by publication. Later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Romasan
noting that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an answer to respondent’s complaints.

Upon learning the RTC judgment, De Pedro filed for motion for new trial alleging that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of summons. She did not allege that fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly
discovered evidence that could have altered the trial court decision person When her motion for new trial was
denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege
any ground for new trial. Hence, this petition for annulment of judgment.

ISSUES:
Is the petitioner barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment?

RULING:
Yes, the petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

The court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the
party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and
lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.” Thus, an
action for annulment of judgment is not always readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.

Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost, with
both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making
a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.

Thus, petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because no amendment was made regarding Rule 47.

401
Rule 47, Sec. 1

Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Leonen, J.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the ROC is the proper remedy when the RTC’s judgement, order, or
resolution has become final and the remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.

FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s resolutions dismissing the petition for
annulment of trial court’s judgment declaring Celerina Santos presumptively dead.

RTC declared Celerina presumptively dead after her husband Ricardo filed a petition for declaration of absence
or presumptive death in 2007 for the purpose of remarriage. Ricardo alleged that she worked in Hongkong as
Domestic Helper and she never came back. It was also alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina by going
to her parents’ house in Cubao and by inquiring from her other relatives and friends. Ricardo also claimed it was
almost 12 years from the date of his petition with RTC since Celerina left.

Celerina claimed she learned about Ricardo’s petition only in October 2008 when she could no longer avail of
the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. Celerina then filed a petition
for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud arguing that Ricardo’s
misrepresentations deprived her of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition.

CA issued a resolution dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for being wrong mode of remedy.
According to CA, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Did CA err in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment as proper mode of remedy by Celerina?

RULING:
Yes. CA erred in dismissing the petition as annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the ROC is the proper
remedy when the RTC’s judgement, order, or resolution has become final and the remedies of appeal, petition
for relief or other remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment
of judgment are extrinsic frauds and lack of jurisdiction.

Court citing Stilianopulos vs City of Legaspi states that there is extrinsic fraud when a litigant commits acts outside
of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from representing all of his cases, such that there
is no fair submission of the controversy.

Celerina’s allegations that Ricardo deliberately made false allegations with respect to her residence, that she
was absent for 12 years sufficient to constitute ground for annulment of judgment. Also, there was no other
sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of fraud perpetrated on her.

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be
a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 47 is not affected by the amended Rules of Civil Procedure.

402
Rule 47, Sec 2

Castro v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.

When fraud is employed by a party to precisely prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this
case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during trial.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA denying the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners Gregorio. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court granting respondent’s decree of adoption.

Rosario and Jose were legally married which gives birth to Joanne. Thereafter, Rosario and Jose separated due
to alleged homosexual tendencies of Jose.

On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before RTC alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. RTC approved the
adoption having ruled that there was no opposition received by the court from any person including the
government.

On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the ROC
with the CA. They alleged that Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent and that the set of birth certificates
presented as evidence provided that Jose was the father and the other set from NSO stated that Larry, Jose’s
driver and alleged lover was the father. CA denied the petition. Admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court
to Rosario and Joanne for the adoption, CA ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse
and legitimate child of the adopter should be personally notified.

CA also ruled that the alleged fraud contained in the different sets of birth certificates could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE:
Does the fraudulent information in the two sets of birth certificates constitute extrinsic fraud which is a ground
under Rule 47?

RULING:
Yes. The court cited the case of People vs CA and Socorro Florence stating that “extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
such as by keeping him away from court XXX”

The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were
“forged instruments or perjured testimonies” presented during the trial. It failed to understand that fraud is
considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings
when such instrument or testimony was presented in court.

When fraud is employed by a party to precisely prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this
case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during trial.

Further, an action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery.
Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filling of the petition on October
18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 47 is not affected by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

403
Rule 47, Sec. 3

Tortal v. Taniguchi
G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018
Leonen, J.

An action for the annulment of judgment is an equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed
only in exceptional cases, such as when there is no more available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47, Sec. 3
then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within 4 years
from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before the action is barred by laches or
estoppel.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Jerson E. Tortal (Tortal) assailing the CA decision and Resolution in
CA. The assailed judgments upheld the RTC Decision, which annulled the levy and sale of a house and lot
covered by a compromise agreement between Tortal and Sevillana P. Sales (Sales).

Tortal married Chizuru Taniguchi (Taniguchi). They lived in a 250m house and lot in BF Homes, Parañaque City,
registered in the name of Tortal, married to Taniguchi. Later, Taniguchi filed a petition for the nullity of her
marriage with Tortal. The RTC granted the petition and annulled their marriage. In addition, the RTC declared the
house and lot to be Taniguchi’s exclusive property. Tortal did not move for the reconsideration of this decision.
Hence, it became final and executory. However, while the petition for nullity of marriage was pending, Sales filed
a complaint for collection of sum of money against Tortal and they eventually entered into a compromise
agreement, which was approved by the RTC. Tortal and Taniguchi’s house and lot was levied upon in accordance
with the Compromise Judgment.

Taniguchi filed a Complaint for Reivindication of Title, Annulment of Levy and Sale in Execution, Injunction,
against Tortal and Sales. On October 28, 2011, the RTC of Parañaque City nullified the levy and the sale of the
house and lot to Sales, and made permanent the injunction against the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.

Tortal and Sales appealed the RTC October 28, 2011 Decision but it was denied by the CA and upheld the RTC’s
decision. The CA pointed out that this Decision had long become final and executory. It also stressed that Tortal
should have assailed the RTC Decision nullifying his marriage with a petition for annulment of judgment, not in
the present case which only questioned the nullity of the levy and sale of the house and lot to Sales. Petitioner
claims that he failed to participate in the proceedings for the nullity of his marriage ecause summons was never
served on him.

ISSUE:
Can Tortal assail a final and executory judgment nullifying his marriage with respondent Chizuru Taniguchi in his
appeal of the Court of Appeals, which granted Taniguchi’s petition for annulment of levy and sale in execution?

RULING:
No, if indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner, then his remedy was to file a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of judgment is an equitable
recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases, such as when there is no more
available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47, Sec. 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if
based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of
jurisdiction, then before the action is barred by laches or estoppel. Instead of directly assailing the Regional Trial
Court August 25, 2003 Decision, which granted the nullity of his marriage in an action for annulment of judgment,
petitioner chose to tackle the issue in his appeal of the Regional Trial Court October 28, 2011 Decision, which
nullified the levy and sale by auction of the house and lot to Sales. This is clearly not the correct remedy.

Without a ruling from the Court of Appeals nullifying the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003 Decision, which
granted the nullity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage and declared respondent as the exclusive owner of
the house and lot, this Decision remains valid and subsisting.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions on Petition for Annulment of Judgement are not amended.

404
Rule 50, Sec. 1

Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic

G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Under Rule 50, Sec. 1, the use of the permissive “may,” it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory, with the discretion to be exercised soundly and “in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play”
and “having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.”

FACTS:
This case his resolves Sindophil, Inc.’s (Sindophil) Petition for Review on Certiorari Resolutions of the CA. The
CA deemed as abandoned and, consequently, dismissed Sindophil’s joint appeal with a certain Marcelo R.
Teodoro (Teodoro) for their failure to file their Appellants’ Brief within the required period.

A 2,791-square-meter parcel of land located on Aurora Boulevard (Tramo), Pasay City is the subject of this case
which is currently in Sindophil’s possession. Later, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for revocation,
annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, and impleaded
Sindophil as one of the defendants.

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil
were all deemed to have waived their right to present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or
witness despite several settings. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda; but instead
of filing a memorandum, Sindophil filed a Motion to Re-Open Case, praying that it be allowed to present evidence
that it was a buyer in good faith. As to why it failed to present evidence during trial, Sindophil explained that its
witness, Sindophil President Victoria Y. Chalid (Chalid), suffered a stroke which prevented her from testifying
during trial.

The Regional Trial Court, however, went on to decide the case without acting on Sindophil’s Motion to Re-Open
Case.

Sindophil mainly argues that it was deprived of the right to “genuine” due process both by the RTC and the CA.
According to Sindophil, its failure to present evidence during trial and its failure to file the appeal brief within the
required period are “technical grounds” that the RTC and the CA could have excused in the interest of substantial
justice. As for respondent, it argues that there was no deprivation of due process because Sindophil was given
more than enough opportunity to present its case but repeatedly and unjustifiably failed to do so.

ISSUE:
Did the CA erred in dismissing Sindophil’s appeal for failure to file an appeal brief within the required period?

RULING:
No, Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an appeal for failure to file the
appellant’s brief within the required period as it provides that appeal MAY be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: … (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and
file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules. With the
use of the permissive “may,” it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not mandatory, with the discretion to
be exercised soundly and “in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play” and “having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.”

In Sindophil’s Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, Sindophil’s counsel, explained that his law office used
to be located in Pasig City but transfer his office to Las Piñas City, which was near Parañaque City where he
resided. He then speculated that during the transfer, the CA’s resolution directing Sindophil to file its appeal brief
might have been one of the files lost or inadvertently disposed of by his house helpers. Atty. Obligar’s excuse is
unacceptable. Under the circumstances, the CA exercised its discretion soundly by deeming Sindophil’s appeal
as abandoned and, consequently, dismissing the appeal.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 50 of the old and new provisions are the same except for the amendment to address
gender sensitivity.

405
Rule 50, Sec. 1

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
Leonen, J.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits. The term “may” in Rule 50,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on
the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest of justice
would be better served by overlooking the pleading’s technical defects.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the CA’s Decision and Resolution, reinstating the
Order declaring Royal Ferry Services Inc. as insolvent, which order was made by the RTC of Manila.

Royal Ferry Services Inc. (Royal Ferry), respondent herein, is a domestic corporation. It’s Articles of Incorporation
provide that its principal place of business is located in Makati City. However, it currently holds office in
Intramuros, Manila City. Royal Ferry filed a verified Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC of Manila,
such petition being approved and authorized by its Board of Directors. The RTC declared Royal Ferry insolvent.
Subsequently, petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) filed before the RTC of Manila a
Formal Notice of Claim and a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the petition for insolvency should have been filed
before the court with territorial jurisdiction over the corporation’s residence, which should have been the RTC of
Makati. The RTC initially denied Pilipinas Shell’s Motion to Dismiss, but later on reconsidered and granted the
same. The CA reversed this, and reinstated the insolvency proceedings.

Pilipinas Shell then later moved for reconsideration, and then this petition, contending that the CA should not
have taken cognizance of respondent Royal Ferry’s appeal since it “failed to comply with Section 13, paragraphs
(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h), Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner claimed that the CA erred when it held that
the “petition for voluntary insolvency [was filed] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part
of one region[.]”
Petitioner also argues that since respondent’s Articles of Incorporation states that the principal office is located
in Makati City, the petition for voluntary insolvency should have been filed in Makati, not in Manila.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in taking cognizance of Royal Ferry’s appeal despite its violation of Rule 44, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court?

RULING:
Yes. The Petition for Insolvency was properly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a
jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the Insolvency Law vests jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance-now the
Regional Trial Court.

As there is a specific law that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply. The (old Insolvency)
law places a premium on the place of residence before a petition is filed since venue is a matter of procedure
that looks at the convenience of litigants.

To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the actual place
where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict
between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation’s main office,
the actual place of business should control.

Finally, We cannot sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the “petition for voluntary insolvency [was filed]
in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region[.] This is untenable. Section 14
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides several judges to preside over the different branches assigned to Manila
and Makati. Thus, the two venues are distinct. Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated

406
as two distinct venues. To deem them as interchangeable venues for being in the same region has no basis in
law.

Hence, this petition is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same insofar as granting the
court discretion on whether or not to dismiss an appeal, taking into consideration the formal requirements
provided under Rule 44, Section 13.

407
Rule 50, Sec. 1

Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.

G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
Leonen, J.

Under Rule 50, Sec. 1(f), the CA may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Sec. 13.

FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corp. entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land
located in Davao City. Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the PBC’s claim. Lui Enterprises replied and insisted on its
right to collect the leased property’s rent.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the PBC over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already
consigned in court the rental payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its
succeeding monthly rental payments while the interpleader case is on going. The PBC filed its answer to the
complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.

Meanwhile, Lui Enterprises filed a nullification of deed of dation in payment case involving several properties it
dationed to the bank including the property leased by Zuellig Pharma pending with the RTC of Davao. It also
raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. According to Lui Enterprises,
this case barred the filing of the interpleader case for having the same issue to resolve. To avoid possible
conflicting decisions between the trial courts, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case
be dismissed. Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss for having been filed late. Consequently,
Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default.

The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. It
denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. Lui Enterprises did not move for the
reconsideration of the order. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’
participation. Lui’s appeal brief was dismissed due to the fact that it failed to contain some of the requirements
stated by the Rules of Court, such as a subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks
and statutes cited, and the statement of issues, among others.

ISSUES:
Was the dismissal of the CA on the ground that the appellant’s brief failed to state required contents valid?

RULING:
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its
own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13. Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.

In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the contents of
the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants’ procedural lapses. However, in this case, Lui
Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that its
appellant’s brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks,
and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” by filing an amended
appellant’s brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. Rules on appeal are designed for the proper and prompt
disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

The issue in the case is not affected because the rule involved is not covered by the 2019 amendments.

408
Rule 50, Sec. 2

Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership

G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014
Leonen, J.

Appeals from the decisions of the RTC, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the SC on
a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the CA is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or
both questions of fact and questions of law.

FACTS:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 5-B-2 in
Pasig City. Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondent reserved a
portion of its property for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-
meter portion of its property, for the road widening. It also caused the annotation on its title an encumbrance that
it was for road widening and subject to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.

The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 sq.m of the property allotted. This
caused respondent to further subdivide the designated property into two lots -- one of which was Lot 5-B-2-A-1,
the portion actually used for road widening.

Respondent Ortigas filed with the RTC a petition for authority to sell to the government the subject lot to facilitate
the processing of its compensation. It was alleged during trial that respondent Ortigas was not compensated for
the use of its property, and it was requested by the DPWH to convey the utilized property to the government. The
petition was granted by the RTC. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging that
respondent Ortigas’ property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of
P.D. No. 1529.

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the appeal of Petitioner on mere technicality proper?

RULING:
Yes, but on a different ground. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that no appeal can be taken on
interlocutory orders. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government
was not an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not
cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals,
however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.

The ground for the dismissal should be under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable
by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it
shall be dismissed outright.

Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be
taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice
of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law. The sole
issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’
property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No.
1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of
Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

409
Rule 50, Sec. 3

In Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 94656 v. Mortel

A.C. No. 10117, July 25, 2016
Leonen, J.

Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic withdrawal of the appeal. The next-level court,
before which a motion to withdraw appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this motion.

FACTS:
This case involves an administrative complaint against Atty. Gideon Mortel (Mortel) with disobedience of lawful
court orders amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect in connection to a case he handled
before the CA.

On that said case, CA a notice for Mortel to file an appellant’s brief on behalf of his client Angelita De Jesus within
the reglementary period of 45 days from notice. During such time, Mortel recently moved out of his office and
used an address on record to be that of MFV Jose Law Office upon acceding to his request. The firm’s messenger
Randy Lucero (Lucero) was tasked to inform Mortel whenever there was a resolution or order relating to the
case. Initially, Randy De Leon (De Leon), Mortel’s messenger, went to the firm to inquire if it had received notices
for Mortel, but none came at that time, so they agreed to communicate with each other for updates. Mortel moved
to withdraw his client’s appeal in light of an amicable settlement, upon which the court directed Mortel to secure
his client’s written conformity to the motion within 5 days from notice, with which he did not comply. Subsequently,
he was ordered again to submit the written conformity with warning of disciplinary action upon his failure to
comply. Upon another failure, CA denied the motion and made an order to file the appellant’s brief. The
Resolution was sent to De Jesus’ address but it was returned with the notation “moved out”, for which the CA
ordered Mortel to inform the court of her address, but the order was ignored thrice. Mortel was found liable for
indirect contempt. He did not pay the fine. CA suspended him from legal practice for 6 months.

Afterwards, Mortel filed an Omnibus Motion and Manifestation with Profuse Apologies, including prayers for the
reinstatement of the Motion to Withdraw Appeal, the acceptance of his compliance with the resolutions of CA,
grant of his Motion, and the recall of all previous orders or resolutions. In his comment, he averred that the filing
of a motion to withdraw appeal is a matter of right, which did not need his client’s conformity. He invoked Rule
50, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, saying that withdrawal of appeal is a matter of right before the filing of the
appellee’s brief. He claims to have honestly believed that the filing of the motion had the effect of withdrawal of
appeal and forgot all about it.

ISSUE:
Is there a valid withdrawal of the appeal?

RULING:
No. Contrary to Mortel’s contention, filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic withdrawal of
the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to withdraw appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this
motion. As the court may either grant or deny a motion, or otherwise defer action on it until certain conditions are
met, lawyers have the obligation to apprise themselves of the court’s resolution, and not to simply second-guess
it. The conformity of the client to the withdrawal needed to be seen, and the absence thereof necessarily led to
the denial of the motion.

Hence, the Omnibus Motion filed by Mortel is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provision was not changed under the Revised Rules.

410
Rule 51, Sec. 8

Oriental Assurance Corp. v. Ong

G.R. No. 189524, October 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

Exceptionally, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned
as errors in the appeal in certain instances.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which affirmed that the RTC validly dismissed
herein petitioner’s complaint for having already prescribed.

Petitioner argues that the CA cannot rule on the issue of prescription as the same was not included in the
petitioner’s assignment of errors, nor was the issue properly argued by any of the parties in their respective briefs
filed before the CA.

ISSUE:
Can the CA validly rule on the issue of prescription even if it has not been included in the submitted assignment
of errors?

RULING:
Yes, the CA can rule on the issue of prescription.

Rule 51, Sec. 8 provides that only errors which have been stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued
in the brief will be considered by the appellate court. In Mendoza v. Bautista (G.R. No. 143666, March 18, 2005),
however, the Court held that an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are
not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances:

(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation
of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent.

As the issue of prescription has been threshed out by the RTC, the Court remarks that the present case falls
under (d) and (e) of the above enumeration.

Hence, the CA may validly rule that the case has already prescribed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this portion has not been amended by the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

411
Rule 51, Sec. 8

Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

Petitioners’ appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court’s dismissal of the Complaint for failure to implead
an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on whether petitioners were able to
prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly consider this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete
resolution of the case.

FACTS:
This resolves a petition for certiorari assailing the CA’s decision and resolution, affirming the decision of the RTC
which dismissed the complaint of petitioners Heirs of Loyola for annulment of free patent and original certificate
of title, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages.

The Heirs of Teodora Loyola (Heirs) filed a complaint for annulment of free patent and original certificate of title,
reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages against respondent Alicia Loyola (Alicia). The
petitioner Heirs claimed that the property belonged to the parents of their mother, Teodora, who had been in
possession of the property since time immemorial, and that they since had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property until present. Alicia allegedly was able to obtain a free patent and OCT
over the property through fraud and misrepresentation. In her Answer, Alicia denied the allegations of fraud and
illegality of registration.

During trial, the Heirs relied on testimonial and documentary evidence to prove their claim over the property. The
RTC did not rule on the merits, and instead dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to plead an
indispensable party, who were successors of one of the heirs. The Heirs then filed an appeal before the CA,
which upheld the RTC’s dismissal, and ruled that while the RTC erred in finding that there was failure to implead
an indispensable party, the evidence presented by the Heirs was insufficient to overcome the presumption of
regularity of the free patent and OCT issued to Alicia.

Petitioners now claim, through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in going beyond the issues raised on appeal, claiming that
the CA touched on factual findings of the RTC although not contested by respondent.

ISSUE:
Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it went beyond the issue of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency
of petitioners’ evidence before the RTC?

RULING:
NO. Petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. They should have filed a petition for review under Rule
45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in - dismissing petitioners’ Complaint. It had
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the case, and there is no showing that it whimsically or
capriciously exercised this jurisdiction. [Rule 51, Section 8] likewise states that the Court of Appeals may review
errors that are not assigned but are closely related to or dependent on an assigned error. The Court of Appeals
is allowed discretion if it “finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution
of the case.”

While petitioners assert that the respondent did not controvert the findings of the RTC, and thus the CA should
have just accorded respect to these findings, it must be pointed out that the RTC did not actually make any
findings on any matter in favor of any party. Rather, it limited its evaluation and discussion to the issue of failure
to implead indispensable parties. The Regional Trial Court Decision stated the various pieces of evidence
presented by the parties, but it gave no particular weight to any of this. The trial court made, no explicit conclusion
as to which of the parties was more entitled to the property.

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are binding when, in fact,
these do not exist. In any case, the Court of Appeals has the authority to reverse the factual findings of the

412
Regional Trial Court if these are not in accord with evidence. Hence, it did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it went beyond the issue of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners’ evidence before the RTC.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure are the same insofar as granting the
CA wide discretion in taking cognizance of errors not assigned on appeal are concerned.

413
Rule 51, Sec. 10

Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015
Leonen, J.

The registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by mail.” It carries the presumption that it
was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed and, therefore, it is presumed to
be accurate, unless proven otherwise. If this presumption is not rebutted, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments if no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for preliminary and/or mandatory
injunction to set aside the Court of Appeals’ Entry of Judgment, and RTC Cebu’s Order convicting petitioner
Henry Ong Lay Hin (Ong) and Leo Obsioma, Jr. (Obsioma, Jr.) of estafa for failing to pay MBTC in violation of
their trust receipt agreement.

In 2000, RTC Cebu convicted petitioners of Estafa. Ong filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court
denied in its Order dated March 31, 2000. Ong filed a Notice of Appeal, which the trial court gave due course.
The trial court then transmitted the case records to the CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.

In his Petition for Certiorari, Ong alleges that his counsel never received a copy of the CA Resolution denying
his Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, the Decision of the CA never became final and executory, and
the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment. The People argues that the registry return
card “carries the presumption that ‘it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed and must be presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise.’” In this case, the registry return card
corresponding to the copy of the CA Resolution sent to Ong’s former counsel indicates that his counsel received
the same on April 29, 2003. This date, therefore, must be presumed to be the date of receipt of the Resolution.

ISSUE:
Was there a grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA in issuing the entry of judgment?

RULING:
No. Petitioner failed to prove the CA and RTC’s grave abuse of discretion.

In the case, the registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by mail.” It “carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed and, therefore,
it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise.

Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. The affidavits of petitioner’s wife and mother-in-law stating that
petitioner’s former counsel told them that the law office never received a copy of the Resolution, are inadmissible
in evidence for being hearsay. Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s false claim, his former counsel had notice that
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration as early as April 21, 2004 when his counsel received a copy of the
trial court’s Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner. With petitioner failing to rebut
this presumption, it must be presumed that his former counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 29,
2003 as indicated in the registry return card. The 15-day period to appeal commenced from this date. Since
petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15 days from April 29, 2003, the Decision became final and executory on
May 15, 2003.

Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on “Judgment,” “if no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes
executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry.” Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse
its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment, which declared petitioner’s conviction final and executory as of
May 15, 2003.

EFFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

414
Rule 52, Sec. 2

Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista

G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015
Leonen, J.

A decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties’
receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration
does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the
second Motion for Reconsideration be granted.

FACTS:
Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the employees of Club Filipino, Inc.
CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc. entered into previous collective bargaining agreements, the last of which expired
on May 31, 2000.

In 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. For the violation of the rule on notice of
strikes, the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal. The NLRC then denied the appeal and reconsideration for
lack of merit. Aggrieved, CLUFEA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA partly
granted the Petition and set aside the LA’s decision for being null and void, and ordered the payment of full
backwages and benefits to them from the time of their dismissal up to the finality of the CA’s decision.

Upon acting on Club Filipino Inc.’s petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the finding that
the LA gravely abused its discretion and denied Petition in its Resolution dated 13 July 2009. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality on 9 September 2009. Thereafter, Solis, Medina, Limpingco
and Fajardo entered its appearance for Club Filipino, Inc. and simultaneously filed a Motion for leave to file and
admit the attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The SC granted the leave and noted the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. However, because of this court’s resolution dated September 9, 2009,
an Entry of Judgment was issued on October 26, 2010, declaring that this case had become final and executory
as of October 26, 2009.

ISSUE:
Did the filing of the supplemental motion for consideration prevent the court’s resolution dated July 13, 2009 from
becoming final and executory?

RULING:
No. The filing of the supplemental motion for consideration did not prevent the court’s resolution from becoming
final and executory.

As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is prohibited.
Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the
second Motions must present “extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained

The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, however, did not prevent this court’s July
13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and
executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of
leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the Entry
of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect since the provision was not amended.

415
Rule 57, Sec. 1

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

Given the peculiarities of the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President Marcos taking advantage of his
powers as President, gravely abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao
property was registered under the names of respondents — minors at the time of registration — is sufficient to
allege that the Cabuyao property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Maria Imelda R. Marcos, and Irene Marcos Araneta appear to be the registered owners
of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-85026. The
Republic filed its third amended complaint on Civil Case No. 002 (Complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against the Marcoses), which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The
PCGG caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. T-85026.

Marcos, Jr. filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and pointing out that
the Cabuyao property was not mentioned in the original and amended Complaints or their annexes. The Republic
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint, with an attached Fourth Amended Complaint with
amended annex List of Assets and Other Properties. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to admit the Fourth
Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Section 7, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion
to Resolve the Omnibus Motion, while the Republic filed a Comment, seeking an order of preliminary attachment
over the Cabuyao property. The Sandiganbayan ordered the cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens on
TCT No. T-85026 and held that the Republic’s allegations were insufficient to support an application for a writ of
attachment as the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or disposed of by the Marcoses. After the
denial of a motion for reconsideration, the Republic filed this Petition for certiorari, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.

The Republic argues, among others, that the amendment of the Complaint to specifically include the Cabuyao
property is a formal amendment that may be done at any time. As to entitlement to a writ of preliminary
attachment, the Republic argues that it has demonstrated entitlement to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao
property. On the other hand, the Marcoses argue that the property is not party of the res in Civil Case No. 002.

ISSUES:
1. Is the Sandiganbayan correct in cancelling the notice of lis pendens?
2. Is the denial of the Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint proper?
2. Is the Republic entitled to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao property?

RULING:
1. No, the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is to molest the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to
be recorded. The conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not involved in the Civil Case is based on the belief
that failure to specifically mention the property in the amended Complaint automatically renders it beyond the
scope of the Civil Case.

Executive Order No. 14 specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly
applied to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict
adherence to technical rules will hamper the efforts of the PCGG. The admitted Complaint was filed to recover,
for the Republic of the Philippines, all the properties that were illegally acquired by the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers and that were manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other lawful income,
and income from legitimately acquired property.

The assailed Resolutions do not suggest that the Cabuyao property is not part of the property illegally acquired
by respondents. Thus, the conclusion that the Cabuyao property is not affected by the Civil Case is based solely
on an inference from a procedural detail.

416
2. No, the denial of the Motion is not proper.

The Sandiganbayan’s denial was primarily based on a purported failure to comply with a requirement under Rule
10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, that amendments in a pleading be indicated by appropriate marks. The
procedural rule, which requires that amendments to a pleading be indicated with appropriate marks, has for its
purpose the convenience of the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately see the
modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect
any substantive right. Certainly, its absence cannot cause the denial of any substantive right.

A reading of the Fourth Amended Complaint reveals that the Sandiganbayan’s observation was patently wrong.
Petitioner did not fail to comply with Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. There were no portions in the body
of the Fourth Amended Complaint itself that needed to be underscored or marked, considering that the text was
identical to the text of the admitted Complaint. Annex A to the Fourth Amended Complaint, the List of Assets and
Other Properties, reveals that it was amended to include the Cabuyao property in the list of assets. That entry
was underscored to reflect the amendment.

3. Yes, the Republic is entitled to a writ of preliminary attachment.

Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows for the attachment of the property of the adverse party as security
for any judgment that may be recovered in an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a wilful
violation of duty; or In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or
converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its
being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person.

The allegations in the admitted Complaint fall within Section 1(b) and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities of
the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President,
gravely abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth
suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered
under the names of respondents — minors at the time of registration — is sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao
property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.

The Sandiganbayan should have issued an order of preliminary attachment considering that the requisites of the
law — including that of Executive Order No. 14 — have been substantially met, and that there is factual basis for
the issuance of the preliminary attachment. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s Motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no substantial amendments to Rule 13, Section 14 (now Section 19), Rule 10,
Section 7, and Rule 57, Section 1 under the 2019 Rules of Court.

417
Rule 58, Sec. 3

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. De Leon

G.R. Nos. 236577 & 236597, August 15, 2018
Leonen, J.

Absent the showing of an existing right to be protected, a party’s application for an injunctive relief must
necessarily be denied. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It arose from the Equipment
Lease Agreement executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation. The Equipment Lease Agreement provided that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, as lessee, will lease the lottery equipment and accessories of the Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation, as lessor, for the operation of its online lottery in Luzon. The term of the Equipment Lease
Agreement was eight (8) years or until 2003.

In 2011, the Equipment Lease Agreement was investigated by the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. The investigation was conducted due to an alleged “lapse in financial judgment” when the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office rented lottery machines for US$148,000,000.00, instead of purchasing them for
US$25,000,000.00. After investigation, the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended that the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office proceed with the renegotiation of the rental fee “to ensure that the basis
for the fees is commensurate to the cost of the subject of the lease and that the amount thereof is not unduly
burdensome to the public. Pursuant to the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendation, the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office sought the renegotiation of the lease rental rate with the Philippine Gaming
and Management Corporation, and Pacific Online. Pacific Online conceded for the reduction of the lease rental
to 7.85% of the gross lotto sales.

While the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was still in effect, the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation argued that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office “violated a Court order confirming its exclusive
right.” Then Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay (Judge Baybay) issued a Resolution granting the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials filed a Petition for Certiorari against Judge Baybay before the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation executed a Supplemental and Status Quo Agreement. They agreed to extend the term
of the Equipment Lease Agreement.

Pursuant to the Interim Settlement, and the Supplemental and Status Quo Agreement, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials filed on January 20, 2016 two (2) motions to dismiss: (1) a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss before the Court of Appeals; and (2) a Consolidated Motion to Revive and
to Dismiss Cases Based on Status Quo Agreement before RTC of Makati City. They sought to dismiss the
Petition for Certiorari against Judge Baybay. The CA issued a Resolution granting the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials’ Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss and directed the Division
Clerk of Court to issue an Entry of Judgment.

Meanwhile, since the term of the Equipment Lease Agreement was about to expire in August 2018, the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office started preparations for the public bidding of the Nationwide On-line Lottery System.

Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation filed a new application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It sought for the cessation of the nationwide bidding for
the procurement of the Nationwide On-line Lottery System. Judge De Leon issued a Resolution granting the
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

418
Did respondent Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon commit grave abuse of discretion when he granted
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation’s application for injunctive relief?

RULING:
This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation’s application for injunctive relief. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is issued “to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.”
The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:

(a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action
or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

“For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing
right before trial, a material and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.”

Respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation’s claim of exclusive rights, as stated in the Interim
Settlement and which was brought to arbitration, pertained to its rights under the Amendments to Equipment
Lease Agreement, which will expire on August 21, 2018. It failed to provide proof that the Amendments to
Equipment Lease Agreement was extended beyond August 21, 2018. It cannot claim that it has alleged exclusive
rights to be protected and that it will suffer irreparable injury if petitioner continued with the Nationwide On-line
Lottery System bidding process.

Thus, the petition is granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is still the same.

419
Rule 58, Sec. 3

Bicol Medical Center v. Botor

G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which directed the RTC to issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of herein respondents.

Petitioner constructed a steel gate to control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital
premises, along Road Lot No. 3. Herein respondent Botor then wrote to the Naga City Mayor, asking for the
reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance. The Sangguniang Panlungsod authorized the
mayor to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling it, the mayor filed an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioner.

The RTC denied the application, but the CA opined that the public character of Road Lot No. 3, considering the
tax map presented proved that the general public had been using it since time immemorial. The CA, however,
did not consider the DOH certificate of title and the City Engineer’s categorical statement that the road within the
hospital premises is not included in the list of city roads under Naga City’s control.

ISSUE:
Did the CA validly rule in favor of the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the present case?

RULING:
No, the CA’s ruling in favor of the issuance of the writ is incorrect.

This Court finds that the CA erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence presented by
respondents and in disregarding altogether petitioners’ evidence, which had the effect of squarely rebutting
respondents’ assertions. The CA failed to appreciate the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary
injunction. To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties
are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.

As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, there was no reason for the CA to reverse the trial court’s
denial of respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents were unable
to present prima facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3 by simply presenting
a tax map.

Hence, the CA ruling which directed the RTC to issue the writ is incorrect.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the portion governing provisional remedies has not been amended.

420
Rule 58, Sec. 3

Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.

G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
Leonen, J.

For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing
right before trial, a material and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.

FACTS:
City Advertising Ventures Corporation (CAVC) entered into a lease agreement with the MERALCO Financing
Services Corporation for the use of 5,000 of MERALCO’s lampposts to display advertising banners. When
Typhoon Milenyo hit in September 2006, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown by strong winds and fell.
In its wake, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 160, directing the
DPWH to conduct field investigations, evaluations and assessments of all billboards. The DPWH announced that
they would start dismantling billboards. During its operations, it was able to remove 250 of CAVC lamppost
banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps.

CAVC filed before the RTC Makati its Complaint (Civil Case No. 06-899) for Violation of A.O. No. 160, Tort,
Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, asserting that DPWH exceeded its authority when it dismantled its banners and other fixtures and
impeded the pursuit of legitimate business and unlawfully deprived it of property, income, and income
opportunities without due process. After summary hearings, RTC Makati granted the prayer for temporary
restraining order. The RTC also granted CAVC’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. DPWH
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that CAVC failed to show a clear legal right worthy of protection and
that it did not stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury. RTC denied DPWH’s motion. Thereafter, the DPWH
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. DPWH then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, praying that the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals be set aside, that the RTC be prohibited from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-899, and that said Civil Case be ordered dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Court order the RTC to dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899?
2. Is the RTC’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of CAVC proper?

RULING:
1. No, the Court cannot entertain the prayer that the RTC be ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899.

A Rule 45 petition is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the case subject of the appeal. As it is a
mere continuation, a Rule 45 petition (apart from being limited to questions of law) cannot go beyond the issues
that were subject of the original action giving rise to it.

Rule 45 petitions engendered by prior Rule 65 petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition are, therefore, bound by
the same basic issue at the crux of the prior Rule 65 petition, that is, “issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.” The question before the Court of Appeals was limited to the matter of whether the Regional Trial
Court’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On appeal from
the original action brought before the Court of Appeals, it is this same, singular issue that confronts the Court.

This Court cannot, at this juncture, entertain petitioners’ prayer that the Regional Trial Court be ordered to dismiss
Civil Case No. 06-899. Ruling on the complete cessation of a civil action on grounds other than those permitted
by Rule 16 compels an examination of the merits of the case. The entire process of litigation will be frustrated
were this Court to rule on Civil Case No. 06-899’s dismissal on the basis only of allegations made in reference
to provisional relief extended before trial even started.

2. Yes, the RTC acted in keeping with the standards for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and did
not gravely abuse its discretion.

421
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some
of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites of preliminary
injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there
is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In satisfying these requisites, parties
applying for a writ of preliminary injunction need to set out their claims by prima facie evidence.

Respondent’s lease agreement with MERALCO Financing Services Corporation and its having secured permits
from local government units, for the specific purpose of putting up advertising banners and signages, gave it the
right to put up such banners and signages. Respondent had in its favor a property right, of which it cannot be
deprived without due process. This is respondent’s right in esse, that is, an actual right. Petitioners’ admitted and
pronounced course of action directly obstructed respondent’s ability to avail itself of its rights under its lease
agreement and the permits it secured from local government units. What petitioners sought to restrict was the
very essence of respondent’s activity as a business engaged in advertising via banners and signages.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 and Rule 58 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

422
Rule 58, Sec. 3

Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. Lim

G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient authority to conclude that an action for
injunction and, consequently, a writ of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is generally unavailable to
prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Corporations may raise their objections to the right
of inspection through affirmative defense in an ordinary civil action for specific performance or damages, or
through a comment (if one is required) in a petition for mandamus.

FACTS:
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to restrain Pablito Lim, Manuel Agcaoili,
and Consuelo Padilla from demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records. The RTC issued an
Order granting PASAR’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and held that the right to inspect should be
limited to the ordinary records as identified and classified by PASAR. Lim, Agcaoili, and Padilla filed a Motion for
Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, alleging among others that no irreparable injury is caused to
PASAR which justifies the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC denied the Motion on the ground
that the writ does not completely result in unjust denial of petitioners’ right to inspect the books of the corporation.

Lim, Agcaoili and Padilla filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The CA held that there was
no basis to issue an injunctive writ and cancelled the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. Hence,
PASAR filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari

Petitioner argues, among others, that respondents’ request for inspection of confidential corporate records and
documents violates and breaches petitioner’s right to peaceful and continuous possession of its confidential
records and documents and that respondents’ Motion for Dissolution before the Court of Appeals did not comply
with Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. Is injunction available to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to inspect?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs?

RULING:
1. No, injunction is not available to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to inspect.

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for grounds for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued. In Duvaz Corp
v. Export and Industry Bank, the Court held that a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin
requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.

In this case, petitioner invokes its right to raise the limitations provided under Section 74 of the Corporation Code.
However, petitioner provides scant legal basis to claim this right because it does not raise the limitations as a
matter of defense. The act of PASAR in filing a petition for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
is uncalled for. The petition is a preemptive action unjustly intended to impede and restrain the stockholders’
rights. If a stockholder demands the inspection of corporate books, the corporation could refuse to heed to such
demand. When the corporation, through its officers, denies the stockholders of such right, the latter could then
go to court and enforce their rights. It is then that the corporation could set up its defenses and the reasons for
the denial of such right.

The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient authority to conclude that an action for
injunction and, consequently, a writ of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is generally unavailable to
prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Corporations may raise their objections to the right
of inspection through affirmative defense in an ordinary civil action for specific performance or damages, or
through a comment (if one is required) in a petition for mandamus.

423
Thus, the proper remedy available for the enforcement of the right of inspection is undoubtedly the writ of
mandamus to be filed by the stockholders and not a petition for injunction filed by the corporation.

2. No, the CA did not err in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs.

Petitioner invokes Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Court and assails respondents’ failure to submit any affidavit
or counter-bond pertaining to irreparable damage and compensation of damages that may be suffered if the
injunction is dissolved.

However, the injunction was lifted and cancelled via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, not based on a motion for dissolution of the injunction. Thus, the Court of Appeals evaluated the basis for
the injunction granted by the Regional Trial Court rather than whether the injunction would cause irreparable
damage to respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 58.

424
Rule 58, Sec. 3

Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Leonen, J.

A writ of mandatory injunction is granted only upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction filed
by Marilou S. Laude (Marilou) and Mesehilda S. Laude.

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed in Olongapo City, allegedly by 19-year-old
US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling,
Marilou, against Pemberton before the City Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo. The Public
Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton, who surrendered personally to Judge Roline M.
Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-Jabalde). On December 19, 2014, Marilou filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
AFP to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail. The motion was scheduled for hearing on
December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s
counsel through registered mail. They claim to have also furnished a copy of the motion personally at the hearing
of the motion. On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners’ Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the Motion
based on the three-day rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court which, according to
them, should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances. Further, they argue that
the Judge should not have dismissed the Motion considering that the it raised issues of transcendental
importance and of primordial public interest. Lastly, they argue that the Public Prosecutor’s refusal to sign the
Motion rendered the requirement for conformity superfluous. On the other hand, public respondents argue that
petitioners’ failure to comply cannot be excused in light of the rule’s purpose. Further, they aver that the
requirement for motions to be filed in the name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor is part of the
essential, inherent, and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals. They also aver that Pemberton’s
handover specifically to the Olongapo City Jail is unnecessary. Lastly, they maintain that petitioners are not
entitled to a mandatory injunction since they have no clear and unmistakable right to the transfer of Pemberton
from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail.

ISSUES:
1. Is compliance with the three-day notice rule on motions mandatory?
2. Is the refusal of a public prosecutor to give conforme to an interlocutory relief considered abuse of discretion?
3. May a writ of mandatory injunction be issued to compel the turn-over of the custody of the accused pursuant
to a VFA agreement?

RULING:
1. Yes, because Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party
be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process. While
the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper,
an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither
cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time
to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In
this case, the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. The general rule must
apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion
orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was
able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was
correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to
prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

425
2. No, because refusal to give concurrence to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of the public prosecutor’s
position. Procedural law, under Rule 110, Sec. 5, basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. The duty
and authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the
Public Prosecutor. There may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process). In this case, petitioners have not shown why
the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Public
Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. That petitioners used as bases newspaper articles for
claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of Secretary De Lima cannot be given weight.
Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have been for petitioners to have the
act reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

3. No, because the petition did not discuss the basis for their claim that they are entitled to the sought writ. A writ
of mandatory injunction is granted only upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Further, the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during
trial as contained in the VFA provides that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody. The parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties,
but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing
trial, in Camp Aguinaldo. Their claim that the detention facility is under the “control, supervision and jurisdiction
of American military authorities” is not substantiated.

Hence the petition for issuance of writ of mandatory injunction is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 15, Secs. 4 and 5 of the 2019 Amendments on Rules of Civil Procedure, because the
three-day notice rule is no longer required. Secs. 4 and 5 of the new rules provide for litigious and non-litigious
motions. What is mandatory now is the service or notice of the motion to another party and proof of such service
to the court.

426
Rule 58, Sec. 5

Evy Construction and Development Corp. v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corp.
G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

While Rule 58, Sec. 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every application for temporary
restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Sec. 5 requires a hearing only if an application for
preliminary injunction is granted. Rule 58, Sec. 5 states that “no preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined”. Inversely stated, an application for
preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the summary
hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which affirmed that the RTC validly denied
herein petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO.

Petitioner purchased a parcel of land from a certain Ang and Uyan. Later on, the lot turned out to be encumbered,
being the subject of a pending litigation between Ang and herein respondent. Ultimately, respondent prevailed in
the case against Ang and secured a writ of execution and notice of levy over the lot and over other properties
Ang owned. Petitioner opposed the execution, filing an application for pa writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
the sale of the lot, and also a TRO against the Register of Deeds (RD), claiming that the latter compelling
petitioner to surrender its TCT over the lot in question, petitioner would suffer irreparable injury and damage.

The RTC denied both applications in the same summary hearing. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Can the two aforementioned applications for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of a lot and a TRO
against the RD be decided in the same summary hearing?

RULING:
Yes, the two aforementioned applications may be decided in the same summary hearing if court will simply deny
the application for writ of preliminary injunction the application, regardless of the result in the TRO application.

While Rule 58, Sec. 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every application for
temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Sec. 5 requires a hearing only if an
application for preliminary injunction is granted. Rule 58, Sec. 5 states that “no preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined”. Inversely stated, an
application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of
the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Thus, the two applications filed by the petitioner in the present case may be heard and decided upon in the same
summary hearing if the court will simply deny the preliminary injunction along with the TRO application.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the portion governing provisional remedies has not been amended.

427
Rule 58, Sec. 5

Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
Leonen, J.

A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction.
Rule 58, Section 5 requires that the party to be enjoined must be notified and heard. He cannot be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions arose out of a pending case between Sunrise Garden Corporation (Sunrise) and
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock). First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not a party to that case.

In 1999, pursuant to an ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City approved the request of Brgy.
Cupang to construct a city road connecting Brgy. Cupang and Marcos Highway. Notices to property owners
affected were posted. As an affected owner, Sunrise executed an Undertaking where it would construct the city
road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement of tax credits. However, armed guards, allegedly hired by
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock), prevented it from using an access road to move the construction
equipment. A Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction against Hardrock was filed and granted. Unheeded, the court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI). Subsequently, Sunrise filed a Motion and Manifestation for the amendment of the
WPI “to include any and all persons from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner’s contractors in
proceeding with the construction of the city road.” Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. (First Alliance), blocked Sunrise contractor’s employees
and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. A motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt
was filed. An order to comply with the Amended WPI was then issued. However, security guards dressed in
civilian clothes under Forefront Security Agency still allegedly prevented the workers from proceeding to the
construction site. First Alliance ordered them not to allow the city road construction. Sunrise, then, filed a Motion
to cite Forefront Security Agency and First Alliance in contempt. Meanwhile, K-9 Security Agency filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, attaching photocopies of land titles to show that First Alliance was the registered owner of
the parcel of land where the pieces of construction equipment were being placed. However, the Register of Deeds
could not provide copies of First Alliance transfer certificates of title. Hence, it must comply with the Amended
WPI. First Alliance filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO before the CA. The
latter issued ex-parte a TRO valid for 60 days. Sunrise and the Republic of the Philippines separately filed
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction assailing the WPI
issued by the CA. The CA granted First Alliance’s Petition and annulled the Amended WPI.

Sunrise points out that First Alliance assuming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the person of First
Alliance, this was cured when the latter voluntarily appeared in court. First Alliance counters that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it was not impleaded as a party-litigant in the Complaint for damages
filed by Sunrise against Hardrock. Further, First Alliance claims that the construction of the city road has the
effect of appropriating and taking First Alliance’s private property for public use. But the Republic argues that
expropriation and eminent domain are different, and if compensation for the property is accepted, then there is
no need for an expropriation proceeding. In addition, First Alliance is not an affected landowner. As to the
allegation that there was no public bidding, Republic of the Philippines discussed that the City Government had
no funds for the road project, thus, it could not bid out the project. However, due to the urgent need for the
construction of the city road, the local government had to negotiate with a party “who could advance its realty
taxes.” Sunrise Garden Corporation offered to do so, and the local government found the offer favorable.

ISSUES:
1. May the prohibition on issuance of TRO against national government projects under RA 8975 be applied?
2. May a person not a party to the main suit be bound by an ancillary writ?
3. Is voluntary appearance considered submission to the jurisdiction of the court?

RULING:
1. No, because RA 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, and this case involves a local
government infrastructure project. For local government infrastructure projects, RTCs may issue provisional
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are compelling and substantial

428
constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable
injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public
interests] at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweigh (a) the
inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from
the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial
courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the
injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

In this case, the notice to the public states that “the City Government of Antipolo is going to construct the 20
meters wide city road and the funds would come from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City. There is
nothing on record to show that the city road project is a national government project. Hence, the prohibition on
the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against national government projects does not apply.

2. No, because Rule 58, Section 5 requires that the party to be enjoined must be notified and heard. He cannot
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary
injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action.

It may be argued that First Alliance should have intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, First
Alliance’s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in Sunrise’s Complaint. That Complaint
was against Hardrock. Since there is nothing to prove and establish that Hardrock, Inc. and petitioners are one
and the same, then they should be treated as separate and distinct personalities. During the hearings before the
CA, counsel for Sunrise placed much emphasis on its argument that First Alliance did not prove ownership over
the property but did not refute the primary issue of lack of jurisdiction. This is an admission that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over First Alliance.

3. No, because while Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent
to service of summons, voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of
a court. Special appearance operates as an exception. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. Further, the same rule also provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.”

Here, the appearance of First Alliance and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance
because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that
they repeatedly argued and raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction at the first instance.

Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the Amended WPI against
First Alliance, the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 14, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because, under the said rules, the
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall be now be deemed a voluntary appearance.

429
Rule 58, Sec. 6

Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. Lim

G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

The Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive
writs. It lifted and cancelled the injunction via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based
on the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction,
not based on a motion for dissolution of the injunction. Thus, the Court of Appeals evaluated the basis for the
injunction granted by the Regional Trial Court rather than whether the injunction would cause irreparable damage
to respondents, hereby dispensing with the need of submission of an affidavit or counterbond under Rule 58,
Sec. 6.

FACTS:
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to restrain Pablito Lim, Manuel Agcaoili,
and Consuelo Padilla from demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records. The RTC issued an
Order granting PASAR’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and held that the right to inspect should be
limited to the ordinary records as identified and classified by PASAR. Lim, Agcaoili, and Padilla filed a Motion for
Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, alleging among others that no irreparable injury is caused to
PASAR which justifies the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC denied the Motion on the ground
that the writ does not completely result in unjust denial of petitioners’ right to inspect the books of the corporation.

Lim, Agcaoili and Padilla filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The CA held that there was
no basis to issue an injunctive writ and cancelled the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. Hence,
PASAR filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari

Petitioner argues, among others, that respondents’ request for inspection of confidential corporate records and
documents violates and breaches petitioner’s right to peaceful and continuous possession of its confidential
records and documents and that respondents’ Motion for Dissolution before the Court of Appeals did not comply
with Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. Is injunction available to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to inspect?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs?

RULING:
1. No, injunction is not available to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to inspect.

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for grounds for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued. In Duvaz Corp
v. Export and Industry Bank, the Court held that a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin
requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.

In this case, petitioner invokes its right to raise the limitations provided under Section 74 of the Corporation Code.
However, petitioner provides scant legal basis to claim this right because it does not raise the limitations as a
matter of defense. The act of PASAR in filing a petition for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
is uncalled for. The petition is a preemptive action unjustly intended to impede and restrain the stockholders’
rights. If a stockholder demands the inspection of corporate books, the corporation could refuse to heed to such
demand. When the corporation, through its officers, denies the stockholders of such right, the latter could then
go to court and enforce their rights. It is then that the corporation could set up its defenses and the reasons for
the denial of such right.

The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient authority to conclude that an action for
injunction and, consequently, a writ of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is generally unavailable to
prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Corporations may raise their objections to the right
of inspection through affirmative defense in an ordinary civil action for specific performance or damages, or
through a comment (if one is required) in a petition for mandamus.

430
Thus, the proper remedy available for the enforcement of the right of inspection is undoubtedly the writ of
mandamus to be filed by the stockholders and not a petition for injunction filed by the corporation.

2. No, the CA did not err in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs.

Petitioner invokes Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Court and assails respondents’ failure to submit any affidavit
or counter-bond pertaining to irreparable damage and compensation of damages that may be suffered if the
injunction is dissolved.

However, the injunction was lifted and cancelled via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, not based on a motion for dissolution of the injunction. Thus, the Court of Appeals evaluated the basis for
the injunction granted by the Regional Trial Court rather than whether the injunction would cause irreparable
damage to respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court did not amend Rule 58.

431
Injunction

Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp.

G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

Where what is sought is a permanent injunction, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply. Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, which invalidated a provision that prohibited other courts beside the SC from exercising their inherent
power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, dealt only with temporary restraining
orders and not permanent injunctions, and the injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere interlocutory action
by a court but a permanent remedy.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction under
Sec. 78 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).

Petitioner Power Generation Employees Association-NPC (PGEA-NPC) seeks to permanently enjoin the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement jointly executed by the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM), which provides: (1) that
NAPOCOR would perform “all functions and services necessary to successfully and efficiently operate, maintain,
and manage” power plants, generation assets, or facilities until its transfer or turnover to PSALM; (2) that
NAPOCOR must submit its proposed budget to PSALM for review and approval; and (3) that all revenues related
to the maintenance and operation of power plants, generation assets, or facilities would be considered as
PSALM’s properties.

ISSUES:
1. May petitioners file a petition for injunction under Sec. 78 of the EPIRA, of a permanent nature, in view of
the ruling of the SC in Carpio-Morales v. CA?
2. Can petitioners validly question the agreement despite not being privy thereto?

RULING:
1. Yes, Carpio-Morales dealt only with temporary restraining orders, not permanent injunctions.

Under Sec. 78 of EPIRA, no restraint or injunction whether permanent or temporary, could be issued by any
court except by the SC. However, in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court invalidated the second
paragraph of Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14 for being unconstitutional. The assailed provision prohibited
any court, except the SC, to enjoin investigations of the Ombudsman. This Court explained in Carpio-Morales
that provisional remedies found in the Rules of Court are within this Court’s constitutional prerogative to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, all courts have
the inherent power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. When Congress
passes a law that prohibits other courts from exercising this power, it encroaches upon this Court’s power to
promulgate rules of procedure, in violation of the separation of powers. However, Carpio-Morales dealt only
with temporary restraining orders, not permanent injunctions. The injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a
mere interlocutory action by a court but a permanent remedy.

Thus, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply to this case.

2. No, petitioners, not being privy to the agreement, have no cause of action, not being real parties-in-interest.

Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, are ancillary writs
issued by the court to protect the rights of a party during the pendency of the principal action. To issue an
injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be protected. Petitioners allege that
while they were not privy to the Operation and Maintenance Agreement, they will be affected by its
implementation as NAPOCOR employees since they are “the ones engaged in the operations and
maintenance of the unsold generation plants.” The Petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR
employees will be affected by the Operation and Maintenance Agreement’s implementation. Also, petitioners
have not shown how, as NAPOCOR employees, they will be affected by respondent NAPOCOR’s
submission of its budget for respondent PSALM’s approval. Finally, petitioners have failed to show how they,
as NAPOCOR employees, will be affected by the remittance of respondent NAPOCOR’s revenues to

432
respondent PSALM. Actions must be instituted by the real parties in interest. Otherwise, the action may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Petitioners have not established how they will benefit by enjoining the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement. They have not established the injury they will
suffer if this Agreement is not enjoined.

Thus, the petition is dismissed for lack of cause of action

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 58, in particular, the concept of (permanent) injunction, and Rule 3, Sec. 2 have not been
amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

433
Rule 60, Sec. 2

Enriquez v. Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018
Leonen, J.

The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to Asuten, despite the
dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or jurisprudence. Forfeiture of the
replevin bond requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant’s favor, and second, an application by the
defendant for damages. Neither circumstance appears in this case. When petitioner failed to produce the van,
equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the value of the van.

FACTS:
Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Asuten before the RTC of Pampanga for the recovery of her
Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00. Asuten allegedly refused to return her van, claiming that it was given
by Enriquez’s son as a consequence of a gambling deal. She applied for a replevin bond from Mercantile
Insurance which issued Bond No. 138 for P600,000.00, which had a period of one (1) year or until February 24,
2004 and also executed an indemnity agreement with Mercantile Insurance, where she agreed to indemnify the
latter “for all damages, payments, advances, losses, costs, taxes, penalties, charges, attorney’s fees and
expenses of whatever kind and nature” that it would incur as surety of the replevin bond.

On May 24, 2004, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the Complaint without prejudice due to Enriquez’s
continued failure to present evidence. It found that Enriquez surrendered the van to BPI San Fernando Branch
but did not comply when ordered to return it to the sheriff. She also did not comply with prior court orders to prove
payment of her premiums on the replevin bond or to post a new bond. Thus, the RTC declared Bond No. 138
forfeited. Mercantile Insurance was given 10 days to produce the van or to show cause why judgment should not
be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. Thereafter, RTC held a hearing on the final forfeiture of the
bond where it was found that Mercantile Insurance failed to produce the van, and that Bond No. 138 had already
expired. The RTC ordered on that same day for Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten the amount of P600,000.00.

Mercantile Insurance wrote to Enriquez requesting the remittance of P600,000.00 to be paid on the replevin bond
but the latter failed to pay hence the former paid Asuten P600,000.00 in compliance with the RTC order. It was
also constrained to file a collection suit against Enriquez with the RTC. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
Mercantile Insurance. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Enriquez moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Should petitioner Milagros P. Enriquez be made liable for the full amount of the bond paid by respondent The
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. as surety, in relation to a previous case for replevin filed by petitioner?

RULING:
Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief.
When utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of personal property that may have
been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the
contested property during the pendency of the action. In Tillson v. Court of Appeals:

The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels
claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court
and return the goods if defeated in the action;” The term therefore may refer either to the action itself,
for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which
possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action. In this jurisdiction, the provisional remedy is identified in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court as an order
for delivery of personal property.

As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the delivery of the property before the commencement
of the action or at any time before an answer is filed. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking the
issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a bond in an amount that is double the value of the
property.

434
In Civil Case No. 10846, there was no trial on the merits. The RTC’s dismissal for failure to prosecute was a
dismissal without prejudice to re-filing. In this particular instance, any writ of seizure, being merely ancillary to the
main action, becomes functus oficio. The parties returned to the status quo as if no case for replevin had been
filed. Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for petitioner to return the van to Asuten. Petitioner
argues that she should not have been made liable for the bond despite her failure to return the van, considering
that it was effective only until February 24, 2004, and that she did not renew or post another bond.

De Guia v. Alto Surety & Insurance, Co. requires that any application on the bond be made after hearing but
before the entry of judgment. Otherwise, the surety can no longer be made liable under the bond:

Construing and applying these provisions of the Rules, we have held in a long line of cases that said
provisions are mandatory and require the application upon the bond against the surety or bondsmen
and the award thereof to be made after hearing and before the entry of final judgment in the case; that
if the judgment under execution contains no directive for the surety to pay, and the proper party fails to
make any claim for such directive before such judgment had become final and executory, the surety or
bondsman cannot be later made liable under the bond. The purpose of the aforementioned rules is to
avoid multiplicity of suits.

For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or
terminated. This condition is deemed incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the surety,
regardless of whether they failed to expressly state it.

Civil Case No. 10846 is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved due to the dismissal without
prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has yet to be finally terminated by the Regional Trial Court.

The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to Asuten, despite the
dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or jurisprudence. In its discretion,
the Regional Trial Court proceeded to rule on the forfeiture of the bond. As a result, respondent paid Asuten twice
the value of the van withheld by petitioner. Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount from petitioner,
despite the van only being worth half the amount of the bond.

Forfeiture of the replevin bond requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant’s favor, and second, an
application by the defendant for damages.

Neither circumstance appears in this case. When petitioner failed to produce the van, equity demanded that
Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the value of the van. The Regional Trial Court would have erred in
ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten’s favor, considering that there was no trial on the merits or an
application by Asuten for damages. This judgment could have been reversed had petitioner appealed the
Regional Trial Court’s May 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No. 10846. Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was,
thus, constrained to follow the Regional Trial Court’s directive to pay Asuten the full amount of the bond.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is still the same.

435
Rule 62, Sec. 5

Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp.

G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014
Leonen, J.

A party in an interpleader case may be declared in default.

FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of
land located in Davao City. Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the PBC’s claim. Lui Enterprises replied and insisted on its
right to collect the leased property’s rent.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the PBC over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already
consigned in court the rental payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its
succeeding monthly rental payments while the interpleader case is on going. The PBC filed its answer to the
complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.

Meanwhile, Lui Enterprises filed a nullification of deed of dation in payment case involving several properties it
dationed to the bank including the property leased by Zuellig Pharma pending with the RTC of Davao. It also
raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. According to Lui Enterprises,
this case barred the filing of the interpleader case for having the same issue to resolve. To avoid possible
conflicting decisions between the trial courts, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case
be dismissed. Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss for having been filed late. Consequently,
Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default.

The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. It
denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. Lui Enterprises did not move for the
reconsideration of the order. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’
participation. Lui’s appeal brief was dismissed due to the fact that it failed to contain some of the requirements
stated by the Rules of Court, such as a subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks
and statutes cited, and the statement of issues, among others.

ISSUES:
1. Was the dismissal of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appellant’s brief failed to state required
contents valid
2. Did nullification of deed in dation in payment bar the filing of the interpleader case on the ground of res judicata
3. Was the declaration of a party in default in an interpleader case valid

RULING:
1. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on
its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13. Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the
record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.

In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the contents
of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants’ procedural lapses. However, in this case, Lui
Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that
its appellant’s brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases,
textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” by filing an
amended appellant’s brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. Rules on appeal are designed for the
proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.

436
2. No, litis pendentia is not present in this case. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at
least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the other.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation
in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case. There is
also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation
in payment to recover ownership of the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to
extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, it did not bar the filing
of the interpleader case.

3. Yes, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be
declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the court may “render judgment barring [the
defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” The Rules would not have allowed
claimants in an interpleader case to be declared in default if it would ironically defeat the very purpose of the
suit.

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the rent
due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in
respect of one liability.” He or she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent,
remove him or her from the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to
litigate among themselves. In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation
to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not defeated”, as claimed by Lui Enterprises, when
the Makati trial court declared the latter in default.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court. The motion to dismiss, while now a prohibited pleading, was
grounded on litis pendencia, one of the grounds allowing the filing of a motion to dismiss. As to the declaration
of default, the parties are now required to file a motion for extension of time to file an answer under Rule 11, Sec.
11.

437
Rule 63, Sec. 1

City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority

G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583, November 26, 2014
Leonen, J.

Petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 Section 1 has the following requisites: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan
separately filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)

EPZA was created by virtue PD No. 66 in 1972 to manage the export processing zones established in the country.
Under Section 21 of the same decree, EPZA was declared exempt from payment of real property taxes. In 1995,
EPZA became PEZA by virtue of Republic Act of 7916. Subsequently, the city of Lapu-Lapu demanded from
PEZA payment of real property taxes. The City pointed out that no provision in RA 7916 specifically exempted
the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly
provided for EPZA’s exemption. The City made subsequent demands on the PEZA prompting the same to file a
petition for declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it
exempt from payment of real property taxes. The trial court ruled that PEZA is exempt from paying property
taxes. The city filed motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Upon appeal to the Court of appeals,
the court denied the same. Hence, this petition for Certiorari.

The city insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief because
the case involves real property located in the City of Lapu-lapu. Hence, the same should have been filed before
the City of Lapu-lapu.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC of Pasay have jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against
the City of Lapu-Lapu?

RULING:
No, the RTC of Pasay does not have jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.

Petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 Section 1 has the following requisites: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.

We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The City had
already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s
alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached.

Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 63, Section 1: No effect. No amendment was made in respect of this provision.

438
Rule 64, Sec. 1

City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
Leonen, J.

It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.

FACTS:
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., passed Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed
together with its implementing rules and regulations, designed “to entice those employees who were unproductive
due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package. The
ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty
(50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of the
incentives under the program. In other words, the ordinance “provides for separation benefits for sickly
employees who have not yet reached retirement age.”

In a letter, the city’s audit team leader, through its supervising auditor, sent a query on the legality of the ordinance
to respondent Commission on Audit’s director for Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. In an indorsement,
respondent Commission’s regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s Office
of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector, for a more authoritative opinion. The Office of General Counsel
issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. The opinion explained that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes
of a supplementary retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
as amended, prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans from
the time the Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while those plans already existing when
the charter was enacted were declared abolished.

Hence Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the Opinions issued by the COA was made with grave
abuse of discretion

ISSUE:
May a party question an Opinion issued by the COA through a petition for certiorari?

RULING:
YES. This court has consistently held that findings of administrative agencies are generally respected, unless
found to have been tainted with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion. It is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created
not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Moreover, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Rule 64, Section 2 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure also provides that “a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and

439
the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule
65, except as hereinafter provided.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

440
Rule 64, Sec. 2

Oriondo v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 211293, June 4, 2019
Leonen, J.

A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal and a true review that involves “digging into the
merits and unearthing errors of judgment.” However, despite the repeated use of the word “review” in Rule 64,
the remedy is principally one for certiorari that “deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not
exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous.”

FACTS:
This is a Petition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by former officers of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA) who had received honoraria and cash gifts for concurrently rendering services to Corregidor Foundation,
Inc., assailing the Commission on Audit’s Decision disallowing the payment of the honoraria and cash gifts to
them for being contrary to Department of Budget and Management Budget Circular No. 2003-5 and Section 8 of
the Constitution.

The PTA Board of Directors adopted a Resolution approving the creation of a foundation for the development of
Corregidor. The Corregidor Foundation Inc. was incorporated under SEC. PTA executed a MOA with the said
foundation and agreed to release its operating funds based on its budget for its approval. Thereafter the audit
team noted that the petitioners, former officers of PTA concurrently rendering service to the foundation received
gifts and honoraria which is contrary to Department of Budget Management Circular No. 2003-5. Thus, the Legal
and Adjudication Office-Corporate of the COA issued a notice of disallowance to the said petitioners.

The petitioners contended that Corregidor foundation is a private corporation created by the Corporation code,
thus cannot be audited by the COA. Such was denied. The Adjudication Settlement Board held that the
foundation is a government-owned controlled corporation (GOCC) and under the audit powers of the COA, and
the same is a non-stock corporation which receives funds from the government through the PTA. However, the
petitioners insist that the Corregidor Foundation is not a GOCC because the same is neither organized as a stock
corporation nor created by a special law. They filed a Petition designated as a “Petition for Review on
Certiorari” under Rule 64 of the Rules of Courtclaiming that the COA has no power to determine whether an
entity is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners maintain that the Commission on Audit had
no jurisdiction to conduct a post-audit of Corregidor Foundation, Inc.’s disbursements on the basis of its own
determination of Corregidor Foundation’s status as a government-owned or controlled corporation.

The COA argues that it has the jurisdiction to determine whether an entity is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, pursuant to its constitutional duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and expenditures of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, the determination
of the status of an entity as a government-owned or controlled corporation is but a “necessary incident to [the]
performance of its duties and the discharge of its functions.”

Furthermore, the COA argues that the Petition was erroneously denominated as a “Petition for Review on
Certiorari” under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and contends that the Petition should be treated as one for
certiorari, specifically, to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Audit in disallowing the grant of honoraria and cash gifts to petitioners.

ISSUES:
1. Was the denomination as a “Petition for Review on Certiorari” under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court erroneous?
2. Does the Commission on Audit have jurisdiction to determine if Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government
- owned or controlled corporation?

RULING:
1. Yes. A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal and a true review that involves “digging
into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment.” However, despite the repeated use of the word “review” in
Rule 64, the remedy is principally one for certiorari that “deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which
may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous.”

441
The Court ruled that the Petition was filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court given that the Petition refers to
Rule 64 and was filed within 30 days from notice of the Resolution dated December 6, 2013 denying petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission on Audit. Therefore, the COurt shall resolve the Petition in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.

2. Yes. The COA has the competency to determine the status of corporations such as Corregidor Foundation,
Inc. as government-owned or controlled, and correctly found that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is, indeed, a
government-owned or controlled corporation under its audit jurisdiction.

The COA generally has audit jurisdiction over public entities. In the Administrative Code’s Introductory Provisions,
the COA is even allowed to categorize government-owned or controlled corporations for purposes of the exercise
and discharge of its powers, functions, and responsibilities with respect to such corporations. Its audit authority
even extends to non-governmental entities that receive subsidy or equity from or through the government.

The Court thus ruled that the COA has the competency to determine whether or not an entity is a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Jurisdiction is “the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong,” and the determination of whether or not an entity is the proper subject
of its audit jurisdiction is a necessary part of the Commission’s constitutional mandate to examine and audit the
government as well as non-government entities that receive subsidies from it. To insist on petitioners’ argument
would be to impede the Commission on Audit’s exercise of its powers and functions.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

442
Rule 64, Sec. 3

Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2014
Leonen, J.

While ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60 days,
when what is assailed in the petition is the decision of the COA or COMELEC, the reglementary period is 30 days
from receipt of the decision.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision and resolution of the Commission on Audit (COA),
which disallowed the payment of retainer fees to the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
(Laguesma).

Sometimes in 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation (Clark) engaged the services of Law firm of
Laguesma to handle the corporation’s labor cases. Laguesma furnished Clark a pro forma retainership
agreement with an undertaking to submit the same to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (GCC)
for approval. In 2005, Laguesma was informed that the COA required clearance and approval of the GCC l before
it could approve the release of the Clark’s fund to settle the legal fees due the law firm. Thereafer, Clark relayed
to the GCC the approval of payment to Laguesma on the basis of quantum meruit. COA issued “third
indorsement” denying Clark’s request for clearance which prompted Laguesma to appeal the “Third
indorsement”. On September 27, 2007, COA rendered the assailed decision denying the appeal and motion for
reconsideration. Both parties filed separate motion for reconsideration but was denied on November 5, 2008.
Hence, both filed petition for certiorari on December 19, 2008.

COA argue that it is Clark, and not Laguesma, which is the real party-in-interest since the subject of the assailed
decision and resolution was the Clark’s request for clearance to pay Laguesma its legal fees. CCOA argue that
any interest Laguesma may have in the case is merely incidental

ISSUES:
(1) Is the petition for certiorari filed on time?
(2) Is Laguesma the real party-in-interest?

RULING:
(1) No. Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60
days. However, the reglementary period of assailing decisions of the constitutional commission (COA) is
thirty days from receipt of the decision. Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of procedure provides: The petition
shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed.

(2) Yes, Laguesma is the real party-in-interest. Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The net effect of upholding or setting aside the assailed Commission on Audit rulings would be to either
disallow or allow the payment of legal fees to Laguesma.

Therefore, Laguesma stands to either be benefited or injured by the suit, or entitled to its avails. It is a real
party-in-interest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64, Section 3 – no changes because the rule did not amend this provision.
Rule 3, Section 2 – no effect because no amendment was made in this specific provision.

443
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Yambao

G.R. Nos. 220632 & 220634 (Resolution), November 6, 2019
Leonen, J.

Certiorari may be used to appeal decisions that are grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However only clear arbitrary abuse would allow the interference of the Supreme Couty on
determination of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman, an executive and investigative branch of
government

FACTS:
Case is with thhe Supreme Court from a petition for certiorari under rule 65 against the resolution of the office of
the Ombudsman. The office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case of falsification of public documents and
perjury on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner is the Department of Finance Revenue Integrity
Protection Service while the respondent is Yambao.

Yambao, a customs operation officer at the Bureau of customs was accused of falsification of public documents
and perjury. Her non filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some of her non disclosures in her statement
of assests and liabilities were particularly in issue in the case.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman disregarded the evidence that established a prima facie presumpton of
ill gotten wealth and insists that sufficient evidence has been presented. Respondent avers that special civil
actions for certiorari do not correct errors of fact or law that do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Was there grave abuse of discretion in determining probable cause?

RULING:
No. There was no grave abuse of discretion.

Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct errors of fact or law. This is because the office of the Ombudsman
is beholden the excecutive power to investigate the existence of probable cause. As such the Supreme Court
generally does not interfere with the office of the ombudsman when there is no showing that it acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner.

Upon investigation, the office of the Ombudsman did not see enough probable cause as to merit conviction
against Yambao. Proof was also submitted by respondent regarding the submission of here 2000 and 2003
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth with stamps in the bureau of customs. Lastly there was no proof
regarding the alleged falsification and tampering of Yambao’s other statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth.

Therefore, without showing that there was an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and despotic manner in the
determination of the existence of probable cause by the Office of the ombudsman, then the petition for certiorari
rule 65 is to be denied. It is clear and convincing that probable cause against Yambao is inexistent therefore
resulting in the affirmation of the Office of the Ombudsman.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on certiorari as a special civil action, Rule 65, has not been repealed.

444
Rule 65, Sec 1

Rotoras v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 211999, August 20, 2019
Leonen, J.

We have previously declared that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, only when the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 assailing the Decision and Resolution of COA affirming
the disallowances of grants of additional honoraria to members of governing boards of state universities and
colleges. The governing boards of 21 state universities and colleges granted honoraria to board members for
attendance in board meetings. These honoraria were in addition to the P2,000.00 mandated by DBM, and were
sourced from these state universities and colleges’ income from tuition fees, otherwise called the special trust
fund. Subsequently, various audit team leaders of the COA issued audit observation memoranda. These resulted
in Notices of Disallowance for the payments of the honoraria on the ground of lack of legal basis.

COA denied the appeal and subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by said universities and colleges
holding that the members of the governing boards were only entitled to receive compensation in the form of per
diem and reimbursement of actual expenses, if any. They should not be entitled to any other benefit or allowance.
COA also held that the special trust fund should not be used to pay compensation, per diems, or honoraria. Thus,
Ricardo E. Rotoras, as the president of the Philippine Association of Universities and Colleges, filed this Petition
for Certiorari, assailing the Decision of COA.

ISSUE:
Did COA commit grave abuse of discretion warranting the granting of this petition for certiorari?

RULING:
No. Only when the Commission on Audit commits grave abuse of discretion will this Court grant petitions for
certiorari questioning its findings. In Yap v. Commission on Audit:

We have previously declared that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, only when the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.

There being no legal basis for the additional honoraria for members of the state universities and colleges’
governing boards, respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the disallowances.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on certiorari as a special civil action, Rule 65, has not been repealed.

445
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 213957-58, August 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it determined the existence of probable cause against petitioner. Moreover, settled is the rule that a sitting
Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a predecessor within the bounds of law.

FACTS:
This involves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify the Office of the Ombudsman’s Resolution
adding then Makati City Mayor Elenita S. Binay among the accused in both the Information for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for malversation.

It was revealed in an audit conducted by COA that the City of Makati, through its General Services Department
Head and former Mayor Binay, entered into a contract with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies (Apollo) for
the purchase from Apollo of hospital beds and bedside cabinets for the Ospital ng Makati. The manufacturer’s
invoice for the transaction showed that the items’ actual total cost was merely P2,447,376.14, which was well
below P36,431,700.00, the amount paid to Apollo. As a result, two (2) Complaints were filed separately before
the Office of the Ombudsman. On May 9, 2011, the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to indict 15 officials. No probable cause was found against Mayor Binay.

Two (2) Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan based on the Ombudsman Resolution. Thereafter,
three (3) MRs were filed by some of the officials who were indicted. They argued that they could not be held
liable for malversation because they were not the funds’ custodians. They averred that it was Mayor Binay who
not only was the custodian, but was also the approving authority in their disbursement. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued a Consolidated Resolution recommending the inclusion of Mayor Binay as an accused in the
two mentioned cases which was later approved by Ombudsman Carpio Morales. Subsequently, the Informations
filed before the Sandiganbayan were amended to include Mayor Binay as accused. Mayor Binay filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but this was denied.

Thus, Mayor Binay comes to this Court through a Petition for Certiorari seeking, among others, to nullify public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s Consolidated Resolution finding probable cause against her.

ISSUES:
1) Did the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against
petitioner?
2) Was petitioner’s right to due process violated when she was not served with a copy of her co-accused’s
Motions for Reconsideration?

RULING:
The Petition lacks merit.

1) This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it determined the existence of probable cause against petitioner. The May 9, 2011 Resolution had not
yet attained finality when the Ombudsman received the initial finding.

“The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.” Only when
all the parties have been given an opportunity to file their respective motions for reconsideration will the
preliminary investigation be completed.

Moreover, settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. In Alvarez v. People, this Court decreed:

The Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke,
repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. And Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez
teaches that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance

446
for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and
the evidence already submitted.

2) Contrary to petitioner’s postulation, her failure to receive a copy of the Motions for Reconsideration does not
result in a violation of her right to due process.

In Reyes v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this Court explained that a preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial. Consequently, it need not be subjected under the same due process requirements mandated during
trial.

A person’s rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law. Rule 112,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following

manner:
....
(b) . . . .
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present
against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and
other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies
thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her
co-respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

447
Rule 65, Sec. 1

BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa

G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

There is grave abuse of discretion where the trial court judge grants a motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence beyond the five (5)-day period under the Rules.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA, affirming
the orders of the RTC, granting respondent Antonio Choa (Choa)’s Demurrer to Evidence.

An information was filed before the RTC against Choa, then president and general manager of Camden
Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was charged with violating the Trust Receipts Law, to the prejudice of BDO
Unibank, Inc. (BDO), the private complainant. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented Gerard K. Santiago
(Santiago) and Froilan Carada (Carada) as its witnesses. On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the trial court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. On September
25, 2014, Choa filed his Comment. Later, on October 13, 2014, Choa filed a Motion for Leave (To file Demurrer
to Evidence), attached to which was his Demurrer to Evidence. In its October 20, 2014 Order, the trial court
directed the prosecution to comment on Choa’s pleading, and Choa’s counsel to reply on the comment if needed.
On October 30, 2014, the prosecution filed its Opposition. Arguing that the Motion for Leave should be expunged
from the records, it claimed that the pleading was pro-forma for being filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary
period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner insists that the Motion for Leave was not timely filed. It avers that under Rule 119, Section 23 of the
Rules of Court, respondent should have filed his Motion for Leave within five (5) days from September 12, 2014,
when the prosecution supposedly rested its case after its documentary evidence had been admitted by the trial
court judge. Respondent counters that his Motion for Leave was not belatedly filed. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,
the period of his Motion’s filing did not start on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the
prosecution’s exhibits. Respondent asserts that since the trial court directed him to comment on the evidence in
the same Order, the trial court did not yet rule on the evidence’s admissibility.

ISSUES:
1. Did petitioner BDO Unibank, Inc. possess legal personality to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA?
2. Did the RTC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Order granting respondent Choa’s
Demurrer to Evidence?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioner had legal personality to file said petition.

Jurisprudence provides that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Furthermore, in a special
civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the
State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the
case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.

Here, although petitioner discussed respondent’s criminal liability in its Petition for Certiorari, the totality of its
arguments concerns the civil aspect of the case.

2. Yes, the RTC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued said order.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section 23 of Rule 119 provides that the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after
the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5)

448
days from its receipt. If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period often (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a
similar period from its receipt.

A review of the case records reveals that when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
on August 20, 2014, it included a reservation in its Prayer, which states that “With the admission of the foregoing
exhibits and the testimonies of Messrs. Gerard Santiago and Froilan Carada, for the purposes for (sic) which
they are offered, plaintiff People of the Philippines hereby rests its case.” Hence, the prosecution is deemed to
have rested its case on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted its documentary evidence. However,
the counting of the five (5)-day period did not commence on August 20, 2014, when the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; or on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the evidence.
Instead, it started upon respondent’s receipt of the September 12, 2014 Order, for only then was he notified that
the prosecution had rested its case.

Nonetheless, respondent filed his Motion for Leave and Demurrer to Evidence on October 13, 2014. To recall,
the September 12, 2014 Order had also directed respondent to submit his comment/opposition, which he then
submitted on September 25, 2014. Even if there is no record of when respondent received a copy of the Order,
it can be surmised that he received it before September 25, 2014. It follows that the Motion for Leave and the
Demurrer to Evidence were filed beyond the five (5)-day period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, then, should have denied these pleadings outright.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

449
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Esteva v. Wilhelm Smith Bell Manning

G.R. No. 225899, July 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to make its own factual
determination. Thus, the Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when it finds that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence material to the controversy. In the same manner, this Court
is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting findings by the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA, finding that Jessie C. Esteva (Esteva)
was not entitled to the payment of total and permanent disability benefits.

Respondent Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc. (Smith Bell Manning), on behalf of its principal, Wilhelmsen
Ship Management, hired Esteva as a seafarer for nine (9) months. While he was onboard the vessel, Esteva
began to suffer severe back pains. After several check-ups, it was revealed that his condition required a specialist
treatment and possible operation and that it was recommended that he undergo immediate repatriation.
Wilhelmsen Ship Management also wrote a letter requesting that Esteva be examined by the company-
designated physician in the Philippines. After several medical examinations, the company-designated physician
issued a Medical Certificate indicating that Esteva’s disability grading was Grade 8, which meant that he was
only entitled to partial disability compensation, not total and permanent disability. Later on, Esteva consulted a
third-party doctor who issued a Medical Certificate indicating that his condition will no longer allow him to return
to his previous occupation as an able bodied seaman. Thus, Esteva filed a Complaint for total permanent
disability benefits.

The LA and NLRC ruled in favor Esteva, giving weight to the findings of Esteva’s own doctors that his disability
was total and permanent over that of the company-designated physician. Smith Bell Manning filed before the CA
a Petition for Certiorari, where the latter annulled the judgments of the LA and NLRC, upholding the company-
designated physician’s assessment. The CA doubted the certifications of the third-party doctor due to the
discrepancy in dates. Upon appeal before the SC, petitioner asserts that a writ of certiorari may not be used to
correct a lower tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. He argues that since the labor tribunals
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in their judgments, there is no reason to overturn their findings.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in making its own factual determination in the special civil action for certiorari?

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in making its own factual determination in the said special civil action.

Jurisprudence dictates that in a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to
make its own factual determination. Thus, the Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when it finds
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To
make this finding, the Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own factual
determination. In the same manner, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are
conflicting findings by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.

Here, despite the factual and evidentiary issues involved, the Court of Appeals correctly made its own factual
determination in resolving respondents’ Petition for Certiorari. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Court of
Appeals can have a factual finding, even if it is contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

450
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 216949, July 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct alleged errors of fact or law that do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. This Court only reviews the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of whether probable cause
exists upon a clear showing of its abuse of discretion, or when it exercised it in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
or despotic manner.”

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, dismissing the
charges against then Mexico, Pampanga Mayor Teddy C. Tumang (Mayor Tumang), then Barangay San Antonio
Captain Rafael P. Yabut (Barangay Captain Yabut), and Pantaleon Martin (Martin), respondents.

Petitioner Eduardo T. Batac (Batac) averred that in 2005, he was informed that his property in Mexico, Pampanga
was being quarried without his consent under the instructions of Mayor Tumang for the acquisition of lahar
deposits. Batac then wrote Mayor Tumang, asking why the property was being quarried without his permission
and requesting that it be stopped. Mayor Tumang provided Batac a copy of an affidavit executed by Martin who
was claiming to be a tenant of the quarried property. Batac, in response, said that Martin had never been a tenant
of his land and that he further asserted that a tenant does not have the authority to request that any part of the
land be removed without the landowner’s permission. Based on these, Batac filed before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman a complaint against Mayor Tumang and his co-perpetrators for violation of RA 3019. In a joint review
order, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed all charges against the respondents, failing to find any probable
cause to file said complaints against respondents. Petitioner asserts that the Office of the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion for failure find probable cause to file complaints against the respondents.

On the other hand, public respondent, through the OSG, emphasizes that a writ of certiorari may be issued only
in case of grave abuse of discretion, not against a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it
maintains that its finding of lack of probable cause for a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 is supported by law and
substantial evidence, since the lahar deposits are naturally-occurring inorganic substances, they are minerals
and are, thus, owned by the State under Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution and Sec. 4 of the Philippine Mining
Act. Petitioner, therefore, has no right to possess the lahar deposits, and cannot be injured by its hauling.

ISSUE:
Did the Office of the Ombudsman act with grave abuse of discretion when it did not find any probable cause to
file complaints against respondents for corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019?

RULING:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is,
therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a
finding of probable cause. This function is executive in nature. As the SC is not a trier of facts, we defer to the
sound judgment of the Ombudsman. Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the
Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. The functions of the courts will be grievously hampered
by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it.

Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct alleged errors of fact or law that do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. As an exception to the abovementioned rule, the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of whether
probable cause exists upon a clear showing of its abuse of discretion, or when it exercised it in an “arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical[,] or despotic manner.” Absent the existence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court
generally shall not disturb public respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s determination as to whether probable
cause exists in this case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

451
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

The trial court’s noncompliance with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be
remedied by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the RTC in ruling that the MTCC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits of the
prosecution’s witnesses.

Petitioner Ronald Lim (Ronald), filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against
his brother Respondent Edwin Lim (Edwin). Acting favorably on the Complaint, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed an Information against Edwin before the MTCC. On arraignment, Edwin pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. The case was set for pre-trial; however, the same was reset thrice. At the pre-trial, the prosecution,
among others, moved that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses later
that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits earlier, but “for whatever reason,” was not able
to submit them. Despite the defense counsel’s insistent opposition, the MTCC granted the Motion via an Order
and gave the prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the MTCC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits. The prosecution argued that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over them since no summons had been served upon Ronald and the Office of the Solicitor
General. In addition, they contended that a resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy of
appeal was still available to them. RTC ruled in favor of Edwin.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines?
2. Was the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition the proper remedy to question the Order the MTCC?
3. Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits?

RULING:
1. Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines.

Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, summons need not be issued in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall
issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. Furthermore, when a party participates in
a proceeding despite improper service of summons, he or she is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
court’s jurisdiction. Here, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court a Comment/Opposition to the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a Comment/Opposition to the Petition.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Office of the Solicitor General should have been served with a copy of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. However, under the Rules of Court, when a petition for certiorari is filed
assailing an act of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a private respondent, and is then
mandated to appear and defend both on his or her own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected
by the proceedings. The public respondent shall not be required to comment on the petition unless required by
the court.

2. Yes, the said petition was the proper remedy.

A petition for certiorari is a remedy directed not only to correct errors of jurisdiction, but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

452
Here, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly disregarding the clear wording of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses
not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall
be deemed to have waived their submission.

3. Yes, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing such.

Section 9 and 10 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule clearly states that the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial
affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the
time prescribed, they shall be deemed to have waived their submission. Nevertheless, if the belated submission
of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay once as long as it “would not unduly
prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine.

Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution’s belated submission of their Judicial Affidavits
despite the repeated postponements of the scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the pre-trial was reset thrice. In spite
of that, the prosecution failed to submit their Judicial Affidavits within the time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse—
“for whatever reason”— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

453
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III

G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
Leonen, J.

Rule 65 applies to invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. It is the remedy to “set right, undo] and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.”

FACTS:
This is a case resolving a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, praying that a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the
following issuances: (1) Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013; (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated
September 20, 2013; and (3) Circular No. 2013-010[4] dated October 2, 2013 (collectively, the assailed
issuances). Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with representatives from recognized labor centers, labor federations,
party-list groups, and Social Security System members (collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the case
against government officials and agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.

The SSS issued the first issuance which provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members’
contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to
P16,000.00. The second issuance resulted in the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit. The third provided the revised schedule of contributions that would result in the employer and the
employee equally shouldering the 0.6% increase in contributions.

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, questioning the validity of the assailed
issuances, claiming, among others, that they were issued per an unlawful delegation of power to respondent
Social Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the Social Security Act since no adequate legal
guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority.

ISSUES:
1. Can the SC exercise its power of judicial review in this case through petitions for certiorari and prohibition?
2. Did the petitioners succeed in exhausting their administrative remedies and therefore is able to invoke the
SC’s power of judicial review?

RULING:
1. Yes. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

While Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court pertain to a tribunal’s, board’s, or an officer’s exercise of
discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of
judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III, the SC differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65
is the remedy to “set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions.”

As explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough
to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition
is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

454
Here, petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to determine whether respondents Social
Security System and Social Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed
issuances.

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must
be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.

2. No. The petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they “have no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the ordinary
course of law except through the instant Petition.” However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear
that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage,
benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available before seeking review from the courts.

Jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress’ determination that the
Social Security Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act
with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The Commission has not
even been given a chance to render a decision on the issue raised by plaintiff herein, because the latter has not
appealed to the Commission from the action taken by the System in insisting upon the enforcement of Circular
No. 34.

Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court’s power of judicial review in violation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

NOTE: The SC declared the assailed issuances valid since the delegation in the Social Security Act was not only
complete in its terms, but also contained a sufficient standard for the SSC to fix the monthly contribution rate and
the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

455
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas

G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2020
Leonen, J.

A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function and generally lies
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion that can be corrected through the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer that the decision by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas (Respondent Office) be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Maria Tupaz filed a Criminal Complaint with Respondent Office for falsification (penalized under Art.
171 of the RPC) and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against private respondents
Atty. Fernando Abella, the Registrar of Deeds of Catamaran, Nothern Samar, and Macrina Espina. The Criminal
Complaint maintained that Atty. Abella: (1) issued a spurious owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT No. 15609,
representing the land owned by her Mother; tolerated the use of an qually spurious Certificate Authorizing
Registration and Deed of Conveyance; and (3) enable the issuance of specious transfer certificats of titles, with
Genaro (represented by Macrina) as beneficiary. Hence, she filed her Complaint, asserting that Atty. Abella,
along with Macrina, were liable for falsification, graft and corrupt practices, misconduct, dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Respondent Office dismissed petitioner’s complaint for being “premature” and declined to file criminal
information. When Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant Office denied it maintaining that the
complaint was premature and that she has the option to again lodge the same complaint as long as the issue on
ownership of the subject property has been settled by the proper court.

ISSUE:
Did respondent office commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing complaint of petitioner?

RULING:
Yes, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint.

As a general rule, a public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of
filing an Information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale
of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

This case is not unique. In the past, this Court has overturned the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution not
finding probable cause in criminal complaints concerning titles whose issuance was allegedly occasioned by
falsification perpetrated by a registrar of deeds who may have violated Section 3(e).

The charge of falsification cannot prosper. Nonetheless, respondent Office failed in addressing the charges of
graft and corruption. Private respondent Abella’s official acts fell miserably short of the standards apropos to his
office. While he did not act with private respondent Macrina out of a shared malevolent design, he nonetheless
relied on manifestly defective and tellingly suspicious documents that private respondent Macrina presented.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case are not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

456
Rule 65, Sec. 1

GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva

G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019
Leonen, J.

A writ of certiorari may only be issued when the following are alleged in the petition and proven: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

FACTS:
This is a case involving a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus filed by the GSIS Family Bank
Employees Union (GSIS Union), praying that GSIS Family Bank be declared outside the coverage of Republic
Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011 and, therefore, be directed to negotiate a new collective
bargaining agreement with its employees.

On May 2, 2012, Emmanuel L. Benitez (Benitez), GSIS Family Bank’s president, sought opinion from the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas as to whether GSIS Family Bank may be considered as a government-owned or controlled
corporation or government bank under Republic Act No. 10149. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas advised GSIS Family
Bank to seek the opinion of the Governance Commission for Government- Owned or Controlled Corporations
(Governance Commission), the implementing agency of Republic Act No. 10149. The Governance Commission
replied that as a government financial institution, GSIS Family Bank was unauthorized to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with its employees “based on the principle that the compensation and position
classification system is provided for by law and not subject to private bargaining.”

GSIS Union, in demand letter for payment of Christmas bonus alleged that Republic Act No. 10149 does not
apply to GSIS Family Bank, as it was a private bank created and established under the Corporation Code. For
GSIS Family Bank’s refusal to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, the GSIS Union filed a Complaint
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, and later, a Notice of Strike.

On January 30, 2014, petitioner GSIS Union filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, asserting that GSIS
Family Bank is a private bank; thus, it is not covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 10149. Petitioner
claims that in filing its Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, it has “no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law which will promptly and immediately relieve them from the injurious effects of the
unconstitutional and patently unwarranted and illegal acts of the Respondents.”

ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy so as to warrant resort to Petition for Certiorari
in Rule 65?

RULING:
No, resort to Petition for Certiorari was not proper. Judicial power is the court’s authority to “settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the
redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.” Judicial power includes the power to enforce rights conferred by
law and determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or instrumentality. Jurisprudence has
consistently referred to these two (2) as the court’s traditional and expanded powers of judicial review. The SC’s
expanded power of judicial review requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion by any government
branch or instrumentality. This broad grant of power contrasts with the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, which
is limited to the review of judicial and quasi- judicial acts. Nonetheless, the SC, by its own power to relax its rules,
allowed Rule 65 to be used for petitions invoking the courts’ expanded jurisdiction.

A writ of certiorari may only be issued when the following are alleged in the petition and proven: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

457
The Governance Commission possesses neither judicial nor quasi-judicial powers; thus, it cannot review or settle
actual controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally demandable rights. It is not
a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that may properly be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. Petitioner failed to prove that it had no other “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law” aside from its present Petition. The Governance Commission is an attached agency of the Office
of the President; hence, petitioner could have elevated the advisories to the Office of the President to question
the Governance Commission’s legal opinion.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is no revision applicable in this case.

458
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Degamo v. Office of the Ombusman

G.R. No. 212416, December 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

The Supreme Court may review public respondent’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, but
only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner,”
The Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of whether or not probable
cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power
is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or
in contemplation of law.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution and order dismissing petitioner
Negros Oriental Governor Roel R. Degamo’s complaint against private respondent Mario L. Relampagos.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (Council) requested the release of
P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental province (provincial government) to finance the rehabilitation of various
infrastructures damaged by Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. The Office of the President
approved the request. The Department of Budget and Management, issued on June 5, 2012 Special Allotment
Release Order which covered the approved amount. In a June 18, 2012 letter to Budget and Management
Secretary Florencio Abad (Abad), Public Works and Highways Secretary Rogelio L. Singson requested the
Department not to indicate the recipient local government unit in the Special Allotment Release Order yet, since
the Department of Public Works and Highways needed to evaluate the local government units’ capability to
implement projects prior to the release of a fund. Thus, Abad ordered Relampagos to withdraw the previously
issued Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation.

In a June 19, 2012 letter-advice, Relampagos informed Degamo that the Department is withdrawing the Special
Allotment Release Order because its release did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund releases for
infrastructure projects. Degamo informed Relampagos that the provincial government would not be returning the
funds and claimed that he was illegally withdrawing funds unbeknownst to higher authorities.

Degamo filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions
against Relampagos. He alleged that when Relampagos wrote the June 19, 2012 letter-advice, Relampagos
falsely posed himself to have been authorized by the President. Degamo added that Relampagos usurped the
official functions of the Executive Secretary, who had the sole authority to write and speak for and on behalf of
the President. In his Counter-Affidavit, Relampagos maintained that he wrote the letter as the Department’s
Undersecretary for Operations. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint. It found no probable
cause to charge Relampagos with Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions since he signed the letter in his
own name and under the words, “By Authority of the Secretary.”

ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court review the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial
powers?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court may review public respondent’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers,
but only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic
manner. In a special civil action for certiorari, this Court cannot correct errors of fact or law not amounting to
grave abuse of discretion. The Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of whether
or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists
where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.

Private respondent did not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent, officer, or representative of the
government. He is a public official himself, the Department’s Undersecretary for Operations, whom public

459
respondent had found to have signed the letter in his own name and under the words, “By Authority of the
Secretary.” Clearly, the facts presented by petitioner do not constitute the crime of usurpation of authority. Public
respondent was not in grave abuse of discretion when it found that there was no sufficient evidence to support
an indictment for usurpation of authority against private respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there has been no revision on Rule 65.

460
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 18779, November 28, 2018
Leonen, J.

Disagreeing to the office of the ombudsman’s findings does not rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. A
court or tribunal is said to have committed grave abuse of discretion if it performs an act in “a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.” Ultimately, for the petition to prosper, it would
have to prove that public respondent conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.

FACTS:
The case is a Petition for certiorari filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assailing
the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution and order, dismissing the PCGG’s complaint again Luis S. Hofilena,
et.al. (Private Respondents), for insufficiency of evidence.

On January 15, 1962, Pioneer Glass applied for an industrial loan of P999,368.99 with Development Bank of the
Philippines (Development Bank). This loan was for the purchase of machinery and construction of a building and
warehouse for its silica processing business. From 1963 to 1977, Development Bank and Pioneer Glass entered
into a total of 12 industrial loan and guarantee agreements.

By January 31, 1978, Pioneer Glass’ obligations to Development Bank reached P55,602,884.44, with
P7,600,000.00 already past due. Furthermore, Development Bank expected Pioneer Glass’ arrears to only
increase since its sales proceeds could not cover its operational expenses. On February 27, 1987, as part of the
government’s program to rehabilitate select government financial institutions, Development Bank transferred
some of its assets and liabilities to the National Government through a Deed of Transfer.Pioneer Glass was one
(1) of the 283 nonperforming accounts included in the transfer. On April 4, 1994, the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans sent President Ramos its Terminal Report, which was a summary of its
inventory and review of the loan accounts transferred by government financial institutions to Asset Privatization
Trust. It included Pioneer Glass among the 130 companies or accounts with behest loans.

PCGG Legal Consultant Rene B. Gorospe filed an Affidavit-Complaint against several officials of Pioneer Glass
and Development Bank for violating Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman found nothing questionable or irregular with Development Bank’s approval of
Pioneer Glass’ loan applications or its guarantees in favor of Pioneer Glass because the loans and guarantees
were backed by numerous properties as collateral.

ISSUE:
Did the Office of the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint filed by
PCGG?

RULING:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court generally does not
interfere with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s finding or lack of finding of probable cause out of
respect for its constitutionally granted investigatory and prosecutory powers. The Office of the Ombudsman’s
power to determine probable cause is executive in nature and with its power to investigate, it is in a better position
than the Supreme Court to assess the evidence on hand to substantiate its finding of probable cause or lack of
it. Despite this well-established principle, the Court can interfere with public respondent’s assessment on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, disagreeing with public respondent’s findings does not rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion.

A court or tribunal is said to have committed grave abuse of discretion if it performs an act in “a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.” Ultimately, for the petition to prosper, it would
have to prove that public respondent conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law. Petitioner failed to do this.

461
The records corroborate the assertions of respondent bank officials and support the findings of public respondent
that the release of loans to Pioneer Glass was preceded by a careful study and evaluation of the loan application.
The careful study and evaluation of the loan application negated the existence of manifest partiality, gross
inexcusable negligence, or evident bad faith in the eventual approval of the loan application

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there has been no revision on Rule 65.

462
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.”
This enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a “concrete, compelling, and valid
reason.” The filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere procedural technicality.
These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with.”

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assails Order and Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular) of RTC in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The assailed
Order granted the prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito
Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime charged.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto
and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him.

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla (wife of the deceased) also
filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Bonifacio (Asst. Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with
the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the
case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties.
Subsequently, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the Bling of an
amended information before the Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where
he reinstated the RTC October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against
Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular granted the motion to amend the information and to admit
the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against Corpus.

Priscilla claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no
basis since petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim. The OSG also adds that
the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended information will not affect
Samonte’s substantial rights.

ISSUES:
1. Was the non-filing of motion for reconsideration to RTC fatal to this case?
2. May the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period
suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
3. Did respondent err when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and
jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused?
4. Did respondent has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr.?

RULING:
1. The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order
or decision. Certiorari, therefore, “is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration.”
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari.” This enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the

463
legal and factual circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a “concrete,
compelling, and valid reason.”
Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court.
Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by respondent
Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or
Memorandum.
It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere
procedural technicality. These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly
complied with.” Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before filing this Petition is fatal.
2. Yes. Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an
arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the DOJ. It does not suspend the execution of a
warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of
arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending
petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”

Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.1Thus,
the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with
the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

3. Yes, but it is only a formal amendment which prejudiced the other accused. Petitioners question the inclusion
of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended
information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her
arraignment.

After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it does
not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if
it is beneficial to the accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot
invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is
only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the
essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original
information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
“conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the
prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the amendment is merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for murder against Samonte was dated
June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano’s affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, Corpus was implicated as the one who
instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This prompted the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, which
resulted in the filing of the amended information.

It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the
amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not

464
be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment
after plea is not allowed.

4. Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is required for the judge to “personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.” In case the evidence on record fails
to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a discussion showing both the
factual and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original information until the filing of the
Motion to Amend Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the incidents of this
case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant,
a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case.

Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended information that
constrained him to find probable cause in issuing the warrant.
The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.
Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information and supporting documents,
the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the
warrant of arrest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rules on criminal procedure was not amended.

465
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon

G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

Office of the Ombudsman’s orders and decisions in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65
petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised on appeal to the Court
of Appeals.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review filed by petitioners assailing the CA Resoultion, which dismissed their petition for certiorari
for lack of jurisdiction.

Manuel S. Tabunda of Amellar Solutions, wrote to then Mayor Raul Bendaña (Bendaña) of Lemery, Batangas
with an offer to automate various municipal operations. The Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery,
Batangas authorizing Mayor Raul Bendaña (Bendaña) to enter into an P8.25M loan agreement with Land Bank
for the computerization of the municipality’s revenue collection system. Bendaña issued Administrative Order
forming a Technical Evaluation Committee on Computerization to evaluate the unsolicited computerization
proposals received by the municipality.

On August 5, 2004, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution authorizing Bendaña to “acquire a proprietary
information technology project for Lemery, Batangas. Eventually, Bendaña and Amellar Solutions executed an
agreement for the computerization of Lemery’s revenue generation system. The Sangguniang Bayan
appropriated the Landbank loan proceeds for the municipality’s computerization program. However, the
Commission on Audit disallowed the municipality’s direct procurement of computer equipment and software from
Amellar Solutions.

A complaint affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. They accused members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of violating Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 9184,
or the Government Procurement Reform Act, when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct contract with
Amellar Solutions. The accused members were Niego Suayan, Melecio Vidal, Christopher Jones Bello, Ivan
Ornales, Shirley Atienza, Eguia, Magnaye, Vergara, De Castro, and Ornales. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon issued indicted the Sangguniang Bayan members for violating Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and of Republic Act No. 3019. It also recommended that they be found guilty of grave misconduct.

Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye assailed the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon’s
decision with a Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. They also impleaded the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon in their petition. However, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction?

RULING:
No, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman, as a quasi-judicial agency, in administrative disciplinary cases
may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition. While Republic Act No. 6770 may have
been silent on the remedy available to a party aggrieved with the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause in a criminal case, Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario clarified that the remedy in this instance is not an appeal, but a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

This Court has repeatedly pronounced that the Office of the Ombudsman’s orders and decisions in criminal cases
may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases may be raised on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the
petition questioning public respondent’s finding of probable cause for lack of jurisdiction

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the modes of appeal on decisions of ombudsman is not amended.

466
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or
fact—a mistake of judgment—appeal is the remedy.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision dismissing outright herein petitioners’ original
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decision of the Office of the President. The CA, in denying the
petition, remarked that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 instead.

Originally, the controversy between the parties lies in the claim of petitioners that respondents are barred by the
principle of res judicata from instituting free patent applications over the property claimed by petitioners.
Petitioners insist that their predecessors-in-interest were declared ipso jure owners of the property by the CFI of
Tarlac in 1948 and that the Office of the President gravely abused its discretion in not acknowledging that fact.

Petitioners argue that CFI recognized that their predecessors-in-interest possessed, occupied, and cultivated the
lots for more than thirty years since 1915. They allege that the 1948 Decision was an agreement that recognized
this right, as well as a valid and binding partition of a bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller portion
claimed by herein petitioners and private respondents. Thus, the principle of res judicata bars private respondents
from asserting title to the property. Private respondents contend that they are not bound by the 1948 Decision,
averting that the principle of res judicata does not apply because there is no identity of parties and subject matter.

ISSUES:
1. Is the CA correct in outright dismissing the aforementioned petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
2. Are the respondents barred by res judicata from filing their free patent application?

RULING:
1. Yes, the CA correctly dismissed the petition.

Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or
fact—a mistake of judgment—appeal is the remedy.

Given such, as the Office of the President had jurisdiction over the subject matter and had been merely
accused to have committed an error in not appreciating the 1948 Decision cited by petitioners, it may not be
said to have committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would
have warranted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the petition as clearly, herein petitioners should have filed an appeal instead.

2. No, the 1948 Decision cited by petitioners is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. However, it does not bar private respondents from instituting their free patent applications over
the property involved in this case as there is no identity or substantial identity of parties and identity of subject
matter.

Clearly, the subject of 1948 partition involved different parties. Moreover, although both cases relate to the
same property, 1948 Decision was simply an agreement partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which
embraced the smaller portion claimed by petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private
respondents’ free patent applications involved the establishment of their rights as the purported occupants
and cultivators of the Property. Evidently, there is no identity of subject matter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this portion has not been amended by the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

467
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

Under no circumstance may an administrative agency arrogate unto itself the power of judicial review and to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision and resolution finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent DARAB in granting respondent LBP’s petition for certiorari against
an order and alias writ of execution issued by Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) Miñas.

Zoleta offered for sale to the government, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, a parcel of land.
Due to disagreement as to the amount of just compensation, the same was referred to the Office of RARAD.
RARAD Miñas then fixed the amount, to which LBP disagreed, prompting the latter to file a petition for just
compensation before the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Unsuccessfully opposed by LBP, Zoleta’s
motion for execution of judgment before RARAD Miñas was granted by the latter.

Hence, LBP filed before DARAB a “petition for certiorari pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule VIII of the 1994
DARAB New Rules of Procedure,” ascribing “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction” RARAD Miñas in issuing the order and the alias writ of execution. DARAB then granted said petition.
On a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, the CA held that DARAB’s actions were
sustained by its general “supervisory authority” and appellate jurisdiction over rulings of RARADs and PARADs.

ISSUE:
Can the DARAB, an administrative agency, take cognizance of and grant petitions for certiorari?

RULING:
No, DARAB, an administrative agency, cannot arrogate unto itself the power of judicial review and to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari.

Jurisprudence has settled that DARAB possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari. This Court calibrates the
pronouncements made in DARAB v. Lubrica. It is true that the lack of an express constitutional or statutory grant
of jurisdiction disables DARAB from exercising certiorari powers. Apart from this, however, is a more fundamental
reason for DARAB’s disability. As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial
power, DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of statutorily
stipulated competence but a question that hearkens to the separation of government’s tripartite powers:
executive, legislative, and judicial. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests judicial power
in this Court “and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” It identifies two (2) dimensions of judicial
power. First is “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.” Second is these courts’ same duty “to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.” To effect the second dimension and pursuant to this Court’s power to “[p]romulgate rules
concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,” Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines the parameters for availing the writ of certiorari. With or without a law enabling it, DARAB has no power
to rule on jurisdictional controversies via petitions for certiorari. DARAB’s self-serving grant to itself of the power
to issue writs of certiorari in the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure is itself a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running afoul of the Constitution. Administrative
agencies may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they exercise
supervisory authority over these officers or organs.

Thus, the DARAB, an administrative agency, cannot take cognizance of and grant petitions for certiorari.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

468
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

No grave abuse of discretion where the Office of the Ombudsman dismisses a case against a respondent upon
its finding that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charges.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Joint Resolution and Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing petitioner Edward Joson’s administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents for graft and corruption, malversation, fraud, and grave misconduct, among others.

Due to the alleged payment to a caterer that did not provide meals for an event and the consequent
misappropriation of the amount paid, petitioner filed administrative and criminal complaints against private
respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. On February 8, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the Joint
Resolution recommending the dismissal of charges, on the basis of its finding of insufficient evidence to support
the charges. He then filed his Motion for Reconsideration on February 23, 2011, which the Office of the
Ombudsman denied in its Order. Hence, this Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Does petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC?
2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative complaint?
3. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed the
administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar him
from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision in a criminal case or (b)
within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision in an administrative case.
Here, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration only on February 23, 2011, which was 10 days late with
respect to the criminal case and five (5) days late with respect to the administrative case.

Thus, petitioner’s belated filing of his motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman bar
him from instituting a petition for certiorari before the SC, and even if the SC grants an exception to this case,
the petition will still fail on other procedural grounds and on its merits.

2. No, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the SC is not the proper remedy to assail the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in an administrative complaint.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 43. Nonetheless, a party may elevate the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of a criminal
complaint to this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there
is an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”

Thus, petitioner’s failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the administrative case renders the
Office of the Ombudsman’s decision final.

3. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents upon its finding of insufficiency of
evidence to support the charges.

469
At the onset, this Court reiterates the policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause. Thus, an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated
before this Court can exercise its power of judicial review. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the Office
of the Ombudsman acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner.” The Office of the
Ombudsman laboriously discussed each and every charge of petitioner by enumerating the elements of each
law and pointing out where petitioner fell short in evidence. Upon its finding that there is no sufficient evidence
to support the charges against private respondents, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed them in
conformity with Rule II, Section 2 and Rule III, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it dismissed
the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Sec. 1 and Rule 43, Sec. 1 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.

470
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

Trial judge’s “obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure” is an inexcusable abuse of
authority. Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to “evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,” or in essence, grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly
in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by Marvin Cruz and his bondsman, Francisco Cruz for being the wrong remedy. They
filed the Petition before the Court of Appeals to assail the Regional Trial Court’s denial of their Motion to Release
Cash Bond after the criminal case against Cruz was dismissed.

In an Information, Marvin, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and
by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and a copper pipe collectively.
Cruz posted bail through a cash. The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of
Desistance stating that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Marvin. Then, the Assistant
City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by the RTC. Marvin, through his bondsman
Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond which was denied on the ground that the case was dismissed
through desistance and not through acquittal. Marvin and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the motion, which was likewise
dismissed. Hence, this Petition was filed.

Petitioners Marvin and Francisco herein insist that the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper since the RTC’s
denial of their motion amounted to grave abuse of discretion. They point out that under Rule 114, Section 22 of
the Rules of Court, bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case regardless of whether
the case was dismissed through acquittal or desistance. However, the Office of the Solicitor General points out
that while Rule 114, Section 22 calls for automatic cancellation, the cancellation is without prejudice to any
liabilities on the bond. Thus, it posits that while the cancellation is automatic, the release of the bond is still subject
to further proceedings. It adds that if the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners’ motion, the error is perhaps a
mistake in the application of the law and not grave abuse of discretion, which should not be the subject of a
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to
release cash bond proper?

RULING:
No. Under Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be
deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the
judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.
The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances:
(1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction.
The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused. The comment made
by the Office of the Solicitor General has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear:
the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond. Non-compliance with the
Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse of
authority the trial judge’s “obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure.” Such level of
ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to

471
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,” or in essence, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith
as judicial competence requires no less.

Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners’
remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Section 1 and Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court was not amended nor
revised.

472
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional
mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman
wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-
interference is based on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, for this Petition to prosper, petitioner would have to show this Court that the
Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty under the law.

FACTS:
the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357, prohibiting the
“storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up (‘pagpabuto’) of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law,
commonly called ‘firecrackers’ or ‘pabuto’ within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market.”
On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at
the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010. A fire befell the Bansalan Public Market.
It caused extensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private
respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a complaint dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao (Ombudsman-Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and issuance of
a mayor’s permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. He claimed that this
permit caused the fire the previous year.

By order of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, Chief of Police de Castilla, Fire Marshall Andres, and Permits and
Licensing Officer Designate Domingo were made respondents in the case, considering that they recommended
the approval of the mayor’s permit’s. After concluding the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Resolution and found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a
quo were public officers during the questioned acts. 13 Both the government and private stall owners suffered
undue injury due to the fire at the Bansalan Public Market.14 While the mayor’s permit was not the proximate
cause of the fire, it nonetheless, “gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors ... [to sell]
firecrackers in the public market despite existing prohibition.” 15 The issuance of the mayor’s permit was “patently
tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence.”

Petitioner filed this petition, arguing that public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion considering
there was no legal basis to support the finding of probable cause against petitioner. Petitioner argues that there
was no probable cause, insisting that there was not enough basis for the finding of bad faith, manifest partiality,
or gross inexcusable negligence in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining that probable cause against
petitioner exists.

RULING:
No. As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the
Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The
rule on non-interference is based on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to
investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment
of the Ombudsman. Despite this well-established principle, petitioner would have this Court interfere with the
Ombudsman’s assessment on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. However, disagreement with the
Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Thus, for this Petition to prosper,
petitioner would have to show this Court that the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a
way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.

473
Here, the Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his
co-respondents a quo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Based on opinion, reasonable belief, and
the evidence on record, the Ombudsman found that the elements of the crime punishable under Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 existed.54 Petitioner and his co-respondents a quo did not deny that they were public
officers when the alleged acts were committed. There was “unwarranted benefit and advantage [given] to the
firecracker vendors.” The issuance of the mayor’s permit was “tainted with bad faith” or gross inexcusable
negligence.

Furthermore, Petitioner avers that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner points out that the initial
complaint against him and his co-respondents a quo did not mention giving unwarranted benefit to the firecracker
vendors. Yet, he was charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit
to the firecracker vendors. Petitioner states that this charge was based on co-respondent a quo Andres’ affidavit,
which he was not given. Because he had no opportunity to respond to Andres’ affidavit, he asserts that he was
deprived of due process. This argument is untenable. Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted
only to establish whether probable cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process
requirements that must be present during trial.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None, since this case involves criminal procedure

474
Rule 65, Sec. 1

David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject
of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory
provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered
grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As
an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
and turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar. On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting
the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.

Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth. She was
naturalized and granted American citizenship and was given a United States passport. After her adoptive father’s
death, she decided to return to the Philippines with her family. Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines and filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA9225,
which was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Between 2006 and 2009, Senator Poe made
several trips to USA using her United States Passport, after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship. In 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American Citizenship. In 2013, Senator Poe ran
for the Senatorial Elections and won.

Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari praying for the nullification
of the Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David
which sought to unseat private respondent as a Senator.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate Electoral Tribunal act with grave abuse of discretion?
2. Is circumstantial evidence a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings?
3. Did the burden of evidence shift to Poe upon a mere showing that she is a foundling?

RULING:
1. No, the Court finds no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The viability of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.”
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the
Constitution. Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown,
considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father or mother.
It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was
without judicial precedent. Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established personal circumstances of private
respondent. The Senate Electoral Tribunal arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof

475
required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt
or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

2. Yes, circumstantial evidence may be used as a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings.

A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
substantially proves that either or both of one’s parents is a Filipino citizen. Since proving Poe’s biological
parentage is practically impossible, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence in lieu of direct
evidence. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation
of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice
to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

3. No, the claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent is a serious error.

“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;
that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue.” Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another.
What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her
favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has
ostensibly been established against him or her. In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in
the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner’s to discharge. Once the petitioner makes
a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent’s admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner.
While it does establish that the identities of private respondent’s biological parents are not known, it does not
automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino. The most that petitioner had in his favor
was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and
shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

1. No effect because Rule 65 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.
2. No effect since Rule 133, Section 4 remains the same, but with an added last sentence.
3. No effect since the 2019 Rules of Court has added burden of evidence, the definition of which is the same as
what was applied in this case.

476
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.

G.R. No. 208976 (Resolution), February 22, 2016
Leonen, J.

Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse
of discretion. The remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable
where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and b) in criminal
cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation.

FACTS:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing which set aside
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and order in finding respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. guilty of
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and order dated August 29, 2013, which denied petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration.

To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains
On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes,
Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the COD Division Chief.

OIC Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup reported that Agency No.
14-5005-1 had unremitted collections in the amount of ₱428,349.00 from May 21, 2001 to June 3, 2001. Nucup
also found that “there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that the partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and that the unremitted collections were
attributed to Cesar Lara, Cynthia Roldan, Catalino Alexandre Galang, Jr., who were all employed by [PCSO] as
Lottery Operations Assistants II, and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division Chief.”

June 8, 2004, PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were
criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book
V of Executive Order No. 292.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered the decision finding Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of grave misconduct
and gross neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from service. The complaint for Dishonesty filed against
the respondent is however Dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Delos Reyes’ partial motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and resolution. According to the Court of Appeals, the Office
of the Ombudsman disregarded the PCSO’s findings as to Delos Reyes’ liability for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty.21 The Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt with substantial evidence, and
the ruling must be overturned. The Court of Appeals found that it was Driz who had the specific duty to prepare
and consolidate the sales reports and to remit the proceeds to the bank.

On October 29, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner argued that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the wrong remedy to
assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision before the Court of Appeals. The proper remedy is a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In any case, the petition was already filed out of time. A petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension of facts despite lack of proof of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Office of the Ombudsman. There was substantial evidence to justify the finding of gross misconduct
and gross neglect of duty. Misappreciation of facts or evidence is not equivalent to a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, citing Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner argued that “findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.”

477
ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court despite availability of the remedy under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension
of facts in finding that substantial evidence exists for the administrative charge of grave misconduct and
gross neglect of duty.

RULING:
1. Yes.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion involves a “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.” It must
be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power “in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.”

The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final and
unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary;
and b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation.

In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available to respondent; however,
he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence
necessitated the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals. In addition, the petition for certiorari was
filed 60 days from the receipt of the copy of the denial of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was
beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal provided in the rules. Liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked
to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure.

2. Yes.

It is settled that “[f]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive.” Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” We reiterate that only arbitrariness will warrant judicial intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.

In administrative cases, it is sufficient that “there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of
the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.”

In this case, we find respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. There is substantial
evidence supporting the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent intentionally failed to act on his duty
with a conscious indifference to the consequences. The alleged lack of specific internal control procedures does
not sway this court.

In sum, the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to show how the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the contested decision and order despite the presence of substantial evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is not affected by the Revised Rules because Rule 45, Sec. 1 and Rule 65, Sec. 1 have not been amended.

478
Rule 65, Sec. 1

De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

Even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega, also known as “Doc Gerry,” was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in
Palawan. He was shot dead in Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was
arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also
implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he
alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No: 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors
(First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a
Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes. First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case.

Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new
panel.

The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on
all accused, including former Governor Reyes. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a
Petition for Review assailing the Second Panel’s Resolution.

In the meantime, an information had already been filed in court and warrant of arrest issued against former
Governor Reyes.

ISSUES:
1. Was the issuance of Department Order No. 710 an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for
certiorari or prohibition?
2. Has this petition for Certiorari been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court?

RULING:
1. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. As such, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive function of the Secretary of
Justice. However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may
be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

479
2. Yes, the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has
already rendered this Petition moot.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should
the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration
of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on petitions for certiorari, as used in this case, remains the same.

480
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Manalo v. Ateneo De Naga University

G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015
Leonen, J.

Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
permitted. Parties who avail themselves of such a remedy are not at liberty to assail an adverse ruling on grounds
of their own choosing. A petition for certiorari is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari prays for the reversal and setting aside of the CA decision, and the
reinstatement of the December 13, 2000 Decision of Labor Arbiter Jesus Orlando M. Quiñones (LA Quiñones)
which ruled that Jovita S. Manalo (Manalo) was constructively dismissed.

Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the Accountancy Department of Ateneo de
Naga University’s College of Commerce, as well as a part-time Manager of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(Cooperative). During her stint as Cooperative Manager, she came into conflict with Bernal, Dean of College of
Commerce, who supposedly charged Manalo with various offenses as regards the management of the
Cooperative. The Cooperative’s Board of Directors dismissed Manalo on the basis of these charges. Bernal then
wrote to Fr. Tabora, the President, recommending the termination of her employment on the grounds of serious
business malpractice, palpable dishonesty, and questionable integrity. Fr. Tabora opted to transfer Manalo to
teach Economics in the Department of Social Sciences. Manalo filed a complaint alleging that her transfer
constituted constructive dismissal. LA Quiñones found that Manalo was constructively dismissed and ordered
her reinstatement. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the rulings of LA
Quiñones and of the NLRC, and ordered Manalo’s Complaint dismissed, noting that there was factual basis for
Manalo’s transfer, well within the scope of the University’s prerogatives. Aggrieved, Manalo filed the present
Petition, insisting that their findings are conclusive and binding on the CA and that alternative findings could not
have been the basis for reversing their rulings.

ISSUE:
May the CA reverse findings of both LA and the NLRC which coincided with each other?

RULING:
Yes, because in judicial review of decisions of the NLRC, it is the CA’s business to determine whether there had
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC is permitted. However, this review is through a petition for certiorari (i.e., special civil action for certiorari)
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, rather than through an appeal. Parties who avail themselves of such a
remedy are not at liberty to assail an adverse ruling on grounds of their own choosing. Rather, a petition for
certiorari is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Further, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is an original action. It is independent of the action that gave rise to the assailed ruling.

It is incorrect to insist that the figurative hands of the CA were tied just because the findings of the LA and of the
NLRC coincided with each other. Had it found that there was none, the proper course of action would have been
to dismiss the Rule 65 Petition and to sustain the rulings of LA Quiñones and of the NLRC. Petitioner should not
fault the CA both for examining the records and evidence at its disposal and for embarking on its own analysis
of whether LA Quiñones and the NLRC properly performed their duties. Here, petitioner’s role as an educator
made it imperative for her to impart her profession’s values and ideals to her students, not least of all by her own
example. Because she had failed in this, respondents were well in a position to seek to prevent one whom they
considered to have engaged in unethical and unprofessional behavior from pursuing her didactic engagement
with their students. As such, LA Quiñones and the NLRC committed such gross errors as amounting to an
evasion of their positive duty to render judgment after only a meticulous consideration of the circumstances of a
case.

Therefore, the CA is correct in entertaining alternative findings than those of the LA and NLRC.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not affected by the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

481
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Pascual, Sr. v. Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative

G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015
Leonen, J.

Motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari is made. This is
to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to comply with this procedural
requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for.

FACTS:
The Petition seeks to reverse the Resolutions dated April 7, 2006 and May 30, 2006 of the CA which dismissed
outright petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction for being premature and denied its motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioners Celso F. Pascual, Sr. (Pascual) and Seran Terencio (Terencio) were appointed by the former Board
of Directors of Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative (CCDC) to act as the cooperative’s General
Manager and Collection Manager, respectively, from start of operations until they reach the compulsory age of
retirement of 65.

Despite their retirement, they continued to hold their positions until on August 13, 2005, the Board of Directors of
CCDC passed Resolution Nos. 05- 08-127 and 05-08-128, terminating their services. However, they refused to
vacate their positions.

Thus, prompting CCDC to file complaint with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to RTC-Bulacan Branch 12, which later granted the same. Pascual and Terencio led a
Motion to Dismiss with prayer to defer all proceedings. They also questioned the RTC’s jurisdiction because the
case allegedly involves a labor dispute in the guise of an injunction. Motion was denied. Upon appeal, CA
dismissed outright petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Is the outright dismissal by the CA on the ground of prematurity of the petition for review under Rule 65 proper?

RULING:
YES. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action
for certiorari is made.

This is to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to comply with this
procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for. We find no exceptional circumstance
to justify petitioners’ omission to file a motion for reconsideration. Their allegation that the trial court was unable
to resolve their many motions for a long time is belied by the facts on record.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

482
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongban

G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Where the actions of the RTC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the SC may treat a Rule 45 petition as a Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with an application for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI under Rule 45
which prays that the assailed orders by the RTC denying petitioner Aboitiz Equity Ventures’ s (AEV) motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration be nullified and set aside and that judgment be rendered dismissing with
prejudice the complaint.

A merged shipping business named as WG&A was formed by virtue of an Agreement to transfer the shipping
assets of Aboitiz Shipping Corp. (ASC) and Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc (CAGLI) to William Lines, Inc., (WLI)
in exchange of the latter’s shares of stock. Thereafter, CAGLI sent WG&A (the renamed WLI) demand letters for
the return of or the payment for the excess of inventories. AEV alleged that to satisfy CAGLI’s demand,
WLI/WG&A returned the excess inventories. AEV became a stockholder of WG&A and the latter was
subsequently renamed Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (“ATSC’). Petitioner AEV alleged that CAGLI
resumed making demands from ATSC despite having returned the excessive inventories.

CAGLI claimed that it was unaware of the delivery to it of the excess inventories. Its claims not having been
satisfied, CAGLI filed the applications for arbitration. First, against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and
petitioner AEV, before the RTC.

In response, AEV filed a motion to dismiss and argued that CAGLI failed to state a cause of action as there was
no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI and AEV. The RTC dismissed the complaint in respect to AEV.It
sustained AEV’s assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI’s claim.
Whether by motion for reconsideration, appeal or other means, CAGLI did not contest this dismissal. The RTC
issued an order directing the parties remaining in the first complaint (after the discharge of AEV) to proceed with
arbitration.

CAGLI now joined by respondent Benjamin Gothong, filed a second application for arbitration (“second
complaint”) The second complaint was also in view of the return of the same excess inventories subject of the
first complaint. AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the following grounds: (1) forum shopping;
(2) failure to state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis pendentia.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the second complaint constitute forum shopping and/or is barred by res judicata?

RULING:
Before addressing the specific matters raised by the present petition, the Court emphasizes that AEV is in error
in seeking relief via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, the court is a
position to dismiss the present petition outright. Nevertheless, as the actions of the RTC are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the court treats the present Rule 45 petition as a
Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.

Yes. First, between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties. The first complaint was brought
by CAGLI as the sole plaintiff against Chiongbian, ATSC, and AEV as defendants. In the second complaint,
CAGLI was joined by Gothong as co-plaintiff. As to the defendants, ATSC was deleted while Chiongbian and
AEV were retained. While it is true that the parties to the first and second complaints are not absolutely identical,
this court has clarified that, for purposes of forum shopping, absolute identity of parties is not required and that it
is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. Second, there is identity in subject matter and cause of
action. There is identity in subject matter as both complaints are applications for the same relief. There is identity
in cause of action as both complaints are grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive the value of excess

483
inventories. The first and second complaints are both applications for arbitration and are founded on the same
instrument. Third, the order of the RTC which dismissed the first complaint with respect to AEV, attained finality
when CAGLI did not file a motion for reconsideration, appealed, or, in any other manner, questioned the order.
Fourth, the parties did not dispute that the order was issued by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Fifth, the dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment on the merits.

In sum, the requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second complaint should, thus, have been
dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI committed an act of forum shopping in filing the second complaint.
CAGLI instituted two suits in two regional trial court branches, albeit successively and not simultaneously. It
asked both branches to rule on the exact same cause and to grant the exact same relief. CAGLI did so after it
had obtained an unfavorable decision at least with respect to AEV. These circumstances afford the reasonable
inference that the second complaint was filed in the hopes of a more favorable ruling.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect rules were not amended.

484
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Madarang v. Spouses Morales

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Failure to avail of a motion for reconsideration of the order denying a petition for relief from judgment before filing
a Rule 65 petition for certiorari warrants the dismissal of the latter.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the CA resolution dismissing petitioners Juliet
Madarang (Madarang), Romeo Bartolome (Romeo), Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Annne Bartlome’s petition for
certioarari for failure to file a motion to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief
from judgment.

Respondent Spouses Jesus and Carolina Morales (Sps. Morales) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage of the property, mortgaged to them by Sps. Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome (Sps. Bartolome) to secure
the loan obtained by the latter. In the meantime, Sps. Bartolome died so the Sps. Morales filed the complaint for
judicial foreclosure against petitioners. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate
heirs of the Sps. Bartolome. While Madarang was sued because she allegedly presented herself as Lita
Bartolome and convinced the Sps. Morales to lend money to Sps. Bartolome.

On their part, petitioners assailed the authenticity of the Sps. Bartolome’s signature in the deed of real estate
mortgage. The RTC ruled in favor or Sps. Morales. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its order dated May 25, 2010. The same order was received by petitioners on June 24, 2010. On August
11, 2010, they filed a notice of appeal. However, the RTC denied due course the notice of appeal for having been
filed out of time. According to RTC, petitioners’ counsel Atty. Arturo Tugunon (Tugonon), received a copy of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. Thus, they had 15 days from June 24 or until
July 29, 2010 to appeal. On September 24, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment blaming their
80-year-old counsel who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that
Atty.Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to old age.
On April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. It held that the petition for relief was
filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The CA likewise denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari, it found that petitioners did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a
petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period
excusable negligence?
2. Should petitioners’ petition for certiorari be dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING:
1. The petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-
day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of
the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month
period. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied
with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is
because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final
judgments.

Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period,
petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a
mistake or excusable negligence. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former counsel’s age. This argument stereotypes

485
and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to
incompetence. This cannot be done. There is also no showing that the negligence could have been
prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s
negligence.

2. Yes. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a party before a petition for certiorari is
filed. In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is
the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves
of this remedy. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari. Contrary to
petitioners’ claim, the questions they raised in their petition for relief from judgment were not pure questions
of law. They raise the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage
and the allegedly excusable negligence of their counsel. These are questions of fact which put at issue the
truth of the facts alleged in the petition for relief from judgment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case were not amended.

486
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013
Leonen, J.

Allegations of petitioner that the CA “committed grave abuse of discretion” did not ipso facto render the intended
remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65. In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors
of judgment of the CA. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold
the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the CA’s exercise of
jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It was incorporated to operate
ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign trade. Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from
public respondent Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named
the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, Development Bank of the Philippines required that certain conditions
be met.

According to petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Ruperto V. Tankeh approached him sometime in 1980. Ruperto
informed petitioner that he was operating a new shipping line business. Petitioner claimed that respondent, who
is also petitioner’s younger brother, had told him that petitioner would be given one thousand (1,000) shares to
be a director of the business. The shares were worth ₱1,000,000.00. Petitioner then signed the Assignment of
Shares of Stock with Voting Rights. Petitioner then signed the promissory note. He was the last to sign this note
as far as the other signatories were concerned.7 The loan was approved by respondent Development Bank of
the Philippines.

Petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he was severing all ties and terminating
his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., that the Board issue a resolution to that effect, and to notify
the DBP. However, he was still bound by the promissory note he signed. Hence, Petitioner filed several
Complaints against respondents, praying that the promissory note be declared null and void and that he be
absolved from any liability from the mortgage of the vessel and the note in question, alleging deceit and fraud.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, but upon appeal with the CA, it was reversed, ordering the dismissal
of the complaint.

In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh stated that the Court of Appeals (CA) seriously erred
and gravely abused its discretion in acting and deciding as if the evidence stated in the Regional Trial Court’s
(RTC) Decision did not exist. He averred that the ruling of lack of cause of action had no leg to stand on, and the
CA had unreasonably, whimsically, and capriciously ignored the ample evidence on record proving the fraud and
deceit perpetrated on the petitioner by the respondent. He stated that the CA failed to appreciate the findings of
fact of the RTC, which are generally binding on CA. He also maintained that he is entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees due to the deceit and machinations committed by the respondent.

Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh averred that petitioner had chosen the wrong remedy. Collectively, respondents
argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, petitioner’s failure to show that there was neither appeal nor any other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the dismissal of the Complaint

ISSUE:
Was the appeal filed by Petitioner an appeal under Rule 65?

RULING:
No. The remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable
PCI Bank, this Court made the distinction between a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari:

Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: When a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction

487
being exercised when the error is committed . . . . Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct able through the original civil action of certiorari.

In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court of Appeals.
These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of
the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals’ exercise of jurisdiction.
Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals “committed grave
abuse of discretion” did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat
a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition
is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion,
there is no need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.

Petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing a Petition for Review. His Petition assigns errors
of judgment and appreciation of facts and law on the part of the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition was
designated as one that sought the remedy of certiorari, this Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as a
Petition for Review in the interest of substantial justice.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court, as it deals with prescriptive period of a violation of an ordinance.

488
Rule 65, Sec. 1

Republic v. Bayao
G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
Leonen, J.

The non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration prior to the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not
fatal where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court.

FACTS:
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of
SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in
the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. Department of
Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana issued a memorandum directing the Officer-In-
Charge to transfer all regional offices to Korondal City.

Private respondents opposed the implementation of the said memorandum stating that former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of
Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not covered by the suspension of E.O.
No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Tourism (DOT), and Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE). But this opposition was left unheeded. This prompted private respondents to
file on a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. This was granted by the RTC.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the assailed Order of the trial court is
contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, but the petition was denied.
Hence the present petition under Rule 45. Private oppose the present petition arguing that Petitioners failed to
file a motion for Reconsideration. That petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal. They
contend that this is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the exceptions are present
in this case. Petitioner argues that this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior
to filing a Petition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Was the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before filing a Petition for Certiorari fatal to their appeal?

RULING:
No, petitioner is correct. Generally, a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
Petition for Certiorari because its purpose is to allow the court, through the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of this case, to correct any actual or perceived error. However, this rule admits well-defined
exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The second exception is present in this case. The issues in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already
been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The lower court,
therefore, passed upon them prior to its issuance of its Order dated 9 October 2006.

Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitioner
should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA and presented the same arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had
the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the

489
injunction. We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent’s case falls
within the exceptions. Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already
been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

490
Rule 65, Sec. 2

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III

G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
Leonen, J.

While Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court pertain to a tribunal’s, board’s, or an officer’s exercise of
discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of
judicial power. Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action
of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself,
while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

FACTS:
This is a case resolving a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, praying that a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the
following issuances: (1) Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013; (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated
September 20, 2013; and (3) Circular No. 2013-010[4] dated October 2, 2013 (collectively, the assailed
issuances). Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with representatives from recognized labor centers, labor federations,
party-list groups, and Social Security System members (collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the case
against government officials and agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.

The SSS issued the first issuance which provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members’
contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to
P16,000.00. The second issuance resulted in the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit. The third provided the revised schedule of contributions that would result in the employer and the
employee equally shouldering the 0.6% increase in contributions.

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, questioning the validity of the assailed
issuances, claiming, among others, that they were issued per an unlawful delegation of power to respondent
Social Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the Social Security Act since no adequate legal
guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority.

ISSUES:
1. Can the SC exercise its power of judicial review in this case through petitions for certiorari and prohibition?
2. Did the petitioners succeed in exhausting their administrative remedies and therefore is able to invoke the
SC’s power of judicial review?

RULING:
1. Yes. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

While Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court pertain to a tribunal’s, board’s, or an officer’s exercise of
discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of
judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III, the SC differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65
is the remedy to “set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions.”

As explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough
to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

491
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition
is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

Here, petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to determine whether respondents Social
Security System and Social Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed
issuances.

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must
be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.

2. No. The petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they “have no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the ordinary
course of law except through the instant Petition.” However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear
that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage,
benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available before seeking review from the courts.

Jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress’ determination that the
Social Security Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act
with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The Commission has not
even been given a chance to render a decision on the issue raised by plaintiff herein, because the latter has not
appealed to the Commission from the action taken by the System in insisting upon the enforcement of Circular
No. 34.

Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court’s power of judicial review in violation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

NOTE: The SC declared the assailed issuances valid since the delegation in the Social Security Act was not only
complete in its terms, but also contained a sufficient standard for the SSC to fix the monthly contribution rate and
the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

492
Rule 65, Sec. 3

Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid

G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
Leonen, J.

The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of criminal
cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner’s cause.
Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to order the Court to desist from a criminal prosecution.

FACTS:
This is a case resolving a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 filed by Roderick D. Sumatra (Sumatra), also
known as Ha Datu Tawahig, praying that respondent Judge Estela Alma Singco (Judge Singco) and her co-
respondents, all public prosecutors from Cebu City, be compelled to honor a Resolution issued by a body known
as the “Dadantulan Tribal Court,” and be required to put an end to Sumatra’s criminal prosecution. The
Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra, a tribal leader of the Higaonon Tribe, of liability for charges of rape
and discharged him from criminal, civil, and administrative liability.

Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a case before the Cebu City Prosecutor charging Sumatra with rape. He was
thereafter arrested and subsequently filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to Quash, citing as bases
Sections 15 and 65 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
person of the accusedsince the present controversy is purely a dispute involving indigenous cultural communities
over which customary laws must apply in accordance with their tribal justice system and under the jurisdiction of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

The motion to quash was denied on the ground that such law does not apply to this case. A “Motion to Release
the Indigenous Person,” which was founded on grounds substantially the same as the Motion and Supplemental
Motion to Quash was thereafter filed.

Relying on the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and “other related laws concerning cases involving indigenous
peoples,” petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to “uphold and
respect” the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and “[t]hereby releas[e] [Sumatra] from jail to stop [his]
continued arbitrary detention.”

ISSUE:
May the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to desist from proceeding with the rape case
against petitioner?

RULING:
No. The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act will not shield him from prosecution and prospective liability for crimes.

A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.”

Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, it was respondents’ duty to desist from
proceeding with the case against him. His plea for relief, therefore, falls under the first situation. For a writ of
mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a concurrence between: (1) a clear, duly established
legal right pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondent, which
that respondent unlawfully neglects.

The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of criminal
cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner’s cause.
Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.

The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State’s police power. [73] It inheres in “the
sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and

493
defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.”

It was never the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act’s intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view of self-
governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of
national unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to
undermine penal statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.

Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to even speak
of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction
over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

494
Rule 65, Sec. 3

Lihaylihay v. Tan
G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018
Leonen, J.

The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax offenses is a discretionary
quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus will not issue unless
it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this
Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed
without exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of
hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an act of forum shopping.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment. In his Petition,
erstwhile presidential candidate Lihaylihay identified himself as a “Confidential Informant of the State (CIS)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).” Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two
(2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning information on former
President Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth.

Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner Buñag, demanding
payment of 25% informer’s reward on the ₱118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the Philippine
government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the
government to collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation’s tax deficiencies amounting to ₱97,039,862,933.40, to
recover ₱47,500,000,000,000.00 of Marcos’ deposits in Switzerland, and to deliver to him the informer’s rewards
corresponding to the recovery of these. Lihaylihay wrote to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, insisting on the
need to recover the Marcos’ wealth that he identified and his corresponding entitlement to an informer’s reward.

Acting on Lihaylihay’s letter, Assistant Executive Secretary Lynn Danao-Moreno referred the matter to the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, which eventually referred the matter to the Department of
Finance. Without waiting for Secretary Teves’ and Treasurer Tan’s official actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed
the present Petition, dubbed a Petition for “Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of
Garnishment.’’ Insisting on his entitlement to informer’s rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and Secretary
Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of ₱11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands; and that the Governor of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor ₱50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from former
First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents then Treasurer of the
Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds
and properties representing 25% informer’s reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338?

RULING:
This Petition should clearly be denied. A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, “when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled.”

The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty
incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by law.

Petitioner’s legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective entitlement that is
yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that “[m]andamus will not issue to
establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already established.” Mandamus will not issue to control the

495
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.

In Sanson v. Barrios: Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments
and consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty, in
contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of
discretion of an inferior tribunal ..., when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial. . . . It is the
proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of judicial discretion.

Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it, is shown that “there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.” This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus.

The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery of tax offenses is currently governed by Section 282 of the
NIRC of 1997, which was amended by RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Petitioner’s entitlement to
an informer’s reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite the contrary, its determination requires a review of
evidentiary matters and an application of statutory principles and administrative guidelines. Its determination is a
discretionary, quasi-judicial function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain
public officers. The mere consideration of a claim is contingent on several factual findings. Making these findings
demands proof, the appraisal of which is to be done by certain public officers. Hence, it demands the exercise of
discretion. The information supplied must be new or not yet known to the BIR. It must not pertain to a pending or
previously investigated case, and must have actually led to or was the actual cause for discovering frauds upon
tax laws. Acting on the information, the government’s response must have actually led to the recovery of sums
relating to the fraud, as well as the conviction and/or punishment of the liable persons. The grant of an informer’s
reward for the discovery of tax offenses is effectively a quasi-judicial function, which “determine[s] questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and ... [is] decide[d] in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” None of the respondents deviated from legally
mandated norms and neglected to consummate a ministerial, legally-mandated duty, thereby enabling the
issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Petitioner, too, has not shown that he has a clear legal right to an informer’s reward. First and most glaringly, the
objects of petitioner’s attempts at obtaining an informer’s reward are not even tax cases. It is obvious from the
evolved statutory provisions that an informer’s reward under their auspices is proper only in cases of “frauds
upon the internal revenue or customs laws, or violations of any of the provisions thereof. It may be true that the
many cases brought against the Marcos family and their cronies tangentially involve violations of tax laws. This,
however, does not suffice. The statutory provisions governing informer’s rewards demand specificity because
confused indiscriminate averments would be of no real help in either securing convictions for tax offenses or
recovering proceeds that should have otherwise been paid to the government as taxes.

Second, petitioner failed to demonstrate that his supplied information was the principal, if not exclusive, impetus
for the State’s efforts at prosecuting the Marcoses and their cronies for possible tax offenses and recovering from
them their ill-gotten wealth. He thereby failed to show that his information did, “not refer to a case already pending
or previously investigated or examined.

Third, petitioner failed to prove that he was the sole and exclusive source of information leading to the discovery
of fraud and violations of tax laws, which specifically resulted in the recovery of sums from the Marcos family
and/or their conviction and punishment for violations of tax laws.

A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another “plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” This, of course, is the processing of his claims by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by the Secretary of Finance.

Petitioner’s own recollection of antecedents reveals his initial attempt at complying with the prescribed procedure
with the BIR, but also his own impatience for these pending proceedings. This Court cannot indulge his

496
impetuosity for proceedings in progress. It cannot legitimize a manifest attempt at infringing statutorily
institutionalized processes.

The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a Petition for Mandamus before this Court similarly
demonstrates that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Apart from his non-compliance with the
specific requirements of Rule 65, Section 3, petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies represents a
distinct ground for dismissing the present Petition as it effectively lacks a cause of action. It is settled that non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is
one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

This Court’s competence to issue writs of mandamus does not also mean that petitioner was free to come to this
Court and ignore the concurrent jurisdiction of inferior courts equally competent to entertain petitions for
mandamus. It is basic that “although the CA and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum”:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with
the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another,
are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy
that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

Thus, the petition is dismissed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65 was not affected by the amendments.

497
Rule 65, Sec. 3

Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 222731 (Resolution), March 8, 2016
Leonen, J.

Mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to utilize the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines as required
by law.

FACTS:
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.) and Former
Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition for mandamus before this court to compel respondent
Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature.

Petitioners claim that the Commission on Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT function based on fears that
the security feature may aid in vote-buying, and that the voting period may take longer.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections’ fears are “baseless and speculative.”

Petitioners claim that under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9369, amending Section 35 of Republic Act No. 8436,
anyone “interfering with and impeding . . . the use of computer counting devices and the processing, storage,
generation and transmission of election results, data or information” commits a felonious act. The Commission
on Elections allegedly did so when it refused to implement VVPAT.

In view of the foregoing, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. They ask this court to compel the Commission on Elections to comply with the provisions of
Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

ISSUE:
May the Commission on Elections be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections?

RULING:
Yes.

Through a writ of mandamus, the courts “compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty
imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent” by operation of his or her office, trust, or station. The petitioner
must show the legal basis for the duty, and that the defendant or respondent failed to perform the duty.

The inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines fails
to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to “[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” One of the laws that the Commission
on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires
the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.

The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding
the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures. The Commission on Elections has the
power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and
balance it with the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because Rules on Special Civil Actions has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

498
Rule 65, Sec. 3

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.

G.R. No. 178407, March 18, 2015
Leonen, J.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.

FACTS:
This petition seeks the reversal of the CA decision which held that leave of court must be obtained from the
insolvency court whether the foreclosure suit was instituted judicially or extrajudicially so as to afford the insolvent
estate’s proper representation (through the assignee) in such action and “to avoid the dissipation of the insolvent
debtor’s assets in possession of the insolvency court without the latter’s knowledge.”

Sometime in April 1997, Spouses Rommel Naguiat and Celestina Naguiat and S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.
(S.F. Naguiat) executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank)
to secure certain credit accommodations obtained from the latter amounting to P17 million. The mortgage was
constituted over the following properties: (1) TCT No. 58676 — a parcel of land in the Barrio of Pulung Bulu,
Angeles, Pampanga, with an area of 489 square meters; and (2) TCT No. 310523 — a parcel of land in Marikina,
Rizal, with an area of 1,200.10 square meters. Later, S.F. Naguiat filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency with
Application for the Appointment of a Receiver pursuant to Act No. 1956, as amended, before the RTC-Angeles.
Among the assets declared was the property covered by TCT No. 58676. An order was issued declaring S.F.
Naguiat insolvent, appointing a receiver, and directing creditors to submit their comment. Metrobank manifested
its intention to foreclose the property extrajudicially. Eventually, S.F. Naguiat defaulted in payment and Metrobank
proceeded with the foreclosure. However, the Certificate of Sale was not approved by the Executive Judge in
view of the order issued by the insolvency court. Appeal was not granted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is mandamus proper to compel Executive Judge Gabita-Erum to approve and sign a certificate of sale in an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding where doubt exists?

RULING:
NO. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt
exists.

There was a valid reason for Executive Judge Gabitan-Erum to doubt the propriety of the foreclosure sale. Her
verification with the records of the Clerk of Court showed that a Petition for Insolvency had been filed and had
already been acted upon by the insolvency court prior to the application for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. Among the inventoried unpaid debts and properties attached to the Petition for Insolvency
was the loan secured by the real estate mortgage subject of the application for extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
With the pendency of the insolvency case, substantial doubt exists to justify the refusal by Executive Judge
Gabitan-Erum to approve the Certificate of Sale as the extrajudicial foreclosure sale without leave of the
insolvency court may contravene the policy and purpose of Act No. 1956.

Act No. 3135 is silent with respect to mortgaged properties that are in custodia legis, such as the property in this
case, which was placed under the control and supervision of the insolvency court. This court has declared that
“[a] court which has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same, retains all incidents
relative to the conduct of such property. No court, except one having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction
in the premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession.” The extrajudicial foreclosure and sale
of the mortgaged property of the debtor would clearly constitute an interference with the insolvency court’s
possession of the property.

Furthermore, Executive Judge Gabitan-Erum noticed that the President of the highest bidder in the public auction
sale may be related to the owners of S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.

Hence, mandamus will not lie to compel Executive Judge Gabitan-Erum.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 65, Sec. 3 has not been amended.

499
Rule 65, Sec. 3

In Re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

Mandamus will not lie to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which he is not entitled
by law.

FACTS:
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and replacing it with the
“Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the
national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used.

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress.

Mijares, through a letter, signed and addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court the matter alleging that he is “a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer.” He filed this petition as part of
his “continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution” because he believes in the rule of law. He is
concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance
Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014. The complaint
implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases show
a threat to judicial independence.

Petitioner argues that Congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.” He points out that Congress is exercising its power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the JDF of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Has Mijares sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus?

RULING:
No. The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel SC to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress will not lie because the requisites
for its issuance is not shown.

Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.— When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial. An act is ministerial when it
does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate. In a
petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is entitled to the performance of a
legal right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie “to compel
an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.”

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence, this court cannot be
compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect on the issues and ruling presented in this case.

500
Rule 65, Sec. 3

Buena v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

Mandamus lies to compel the CSC to attest an appointment.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of CA dismissing the appeal of CSC
Regional Office for Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Regional Office) for failure to file a memorandum.

Regional Governor of ARMM, Dr. Hussin, appointed Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
DEPED, Division of Lanao del Sur-1 in a temporary capacity. He was then reappointed this time in a permanent
capacity. To change the status of his appointment from temporary to permanent, Governor Hussin requested
Regional Office to attest Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment. However, Regional Director Buena returned the
appointment to the Governor stating that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive eligibility required for
the position.

Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with RTC to compel Regional Office to attest his appointment. He argued
that the position does not belong to Career Executive Service of Administrative Code of 1987 thus, the position
does not require career executive service eligibility. Dr, benito further claims that it was the ministerial duty of
Regional Office to attest his appointment and that under Article VII, Section 19 of RA 9054 the Regional Governor
of ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the region.

According to Regional Director Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall
carry on with the Civil Service Commission’s mandate under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service
laws and rules.

For Dr. Benito’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for mandamus, Regional
Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus.

Trial court granted the petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda to which Dr. Benito complied while Regional Office did not. The appeal was then dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal of CSC Regional Office for its failure to file a memorandum?
2. Was Dr. Benito’s filing of petition for mandamus against Regional Office’s refusal to attest his
appointment the proper remedy?

RULING:
1. No. The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal. Last paragraph of section 10, Rule 44 of Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that “the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period thereof
may be ground for dismissal of the appeal.” Section 1 of Rule 50 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to
file the required memorandum within the reglementary period is ground for the CA to dismiss the appeal.
However, considering the important questions raised, the court takes cognizance of the petition.

2. Yes, a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the CSC to attest Dr. Benito’s appointment.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

True, the general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that a party “exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”

501
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career executive service eligible.
The question is whether the position for which he was appointed requires career executive service
eligibility. This is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect as the rules subject matter of the case are not amended by the Revised Rules.

502
Rule 65, Sec. 6

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

Summons need not be issued to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
the court need only issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition for certiorari.
Furthermore, by actively participating in the proceedings, one is deemed to have made a voluntary appearance
and cannot argue that the lower courts did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the RTC in ruling that the MTCC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits of the
prosecution’s witnesses.

Petitioner Ronald Lim (Ronald), filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against
his brother Respondent Edwin Lim (Edwin). Acting favorably on the Complaint, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed an Information against Edwin before the MTCC. On arraignment, Edwin pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. The case was set for pre-trial; however, the same was reset thrice. At the pre-trial, the prosecution,
among others, moved that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses later
that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits earlier, but “for whatever reason,” was not able
to submit them. Despite the defense counsel’s insistent opposition, the MTCC granted the Motion via an Order
and gave the prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the MTCC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits. The prosecution argued that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over them since no summons had been served upon Ronald and the Office of the Solicitor
General. In addition, they contended that a resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy of
appeal was still available to them. RTC ruled in favor of Edwin.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines?
2. Was the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition the proper remedy to question the Order the MTCC?
3. Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits?

RULING:
1. Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines.

Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, summons need not be issued in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall
issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. Furthermore, when a party participates in
a proceeding despite improper service of summons, he or she is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
court’s jurisdiction. Here, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court a Comment/Opposition to the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a Comment/Opposition to the Petition.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Office of the Solicitor General should have been served with a copy of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. However, under the Rules of Court, when a petition for certiorari is filed
assailing an act of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a private respondent, and is then
mandated to appear and defend both on his or her own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected
by the proceedings. The public respondent shall not be required to comment on the petition unless required by
the court.

2. Yes, the said petition was the proper remedy.

503
A petition for certiorari is a remedy directed not only to correct errors of jurisdiction, but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Here, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly disregarding the clear wording of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses
not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall
be deemed to have waived their submission.

3. Yes, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing such.

Section 9 and 10 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule clearly states that the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial
affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the
time prescribed, they shall be deemed to have waived their submission. Nevertheless, if the belated submission
of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay once as long as it “would not unduly
prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine.

Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution’s belated submission of their Judicial Affidavits
despite the repeated postponements of the scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the pre-trial was reset thrice. In spite
of that, the prosecution failed to submit their Judicial Affidavits within the time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse—
“for whatever reason”— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

504
Rule 65, Sec. 7

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 20643 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

The pendency of a petition for certiorari before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to
trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary
Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption
by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies.” The
Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy
cooperatives and people’s organizations. The accused were directed to file their counter-affidavits and submit
controverting evidence. The complainants were also given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits.

In a Memorandum addressed to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales, Assistant Special Prosecutor III Lapitan
reported that , a Resolution was issued in finding probable cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation. Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion
to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest Cagang argued that there was an inordinate
delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v.
Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition
of cases. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang,
Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions.

Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, essentially seeking to restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest
against him.

ISSUES:
1. May the denial of a motion to quash be the subject of a petition for certiorari?
2. Does the pendency of a petition for certiorari with this Court suspend the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan?

RULING:
1. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation
of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is
rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of
his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the
latter’s ruling. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an
appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither
can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or
any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the process leading to trial.
The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and
after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the
accused and the reception by the court Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity
to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of
the accused and all his suffering due to the charges can be most speedily acquired.

A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the denial
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:

505
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a
recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a
“more enlightened and substantial justice;” the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that “have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;” or
judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition
for certiorari.

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court
issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of
showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.

2. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari before this Court will not prevent
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction.

Under Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court:

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.The public
respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition
for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground
for an administrative charge.

Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed,
the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is still the same.

506
Rule 65, Sec. 7

De Ocampo v. RPN-9/Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2015
Leonen, J.

Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails. Unless a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the assailed decision lapses into finality. Thereafter, it
can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified, and execution may ensue. This principle applies in labor cases,
as it is explicitly and specifically provided for in the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 sought for a recomputation of the monetary award already
received by Melanie De Ocampo (De Ocampo) pursuant to a final judgment.

De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal against Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9)
and several RPN-9 officers. Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) Manansala rendered the Decision finding that illegal
dismissal exists, and ordering RPN-9 to pay her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full backwages. The
NLRC affirmed, and denied RPN-9’s Motion for Reconsideration. RPN-9 then filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The CA issued a TRO preventing the NLRC from
enforcing its ruling for a period of 60 days, but the period lapsed without a writ of preliminary injunction being
issued. Thus, the ruling of ELA Manansala became final and executory. A Writ of Execution was then issued.

The full satisfaction of the original award notwithstanding, De Ocampo filed a Motion to Recompute the Monetary
Award with Motion to Issue Alias Writ of Execution. She sought the payment of an additional amount representing
additional backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay. This was denied on the ground that the Decision
fixing the amounts of the monetary award had become final and executory. The NLRC sustained the Decision,
and denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The CA dismissed De Ocampo’s Petition for Certiorari, and likewise
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this present Petition.

ISSUE:
May a pending petition for certiorari stay the judgment or order it assails in labor cases?

RULING:
No, since the NLRC Rules of Procedure explicitly and specifically makes the principle, that a pending petition for
certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order it assails unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued, applicable to decisions of labor arbiters and of the NLRC. A judgment can no longer
be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and executory. The only exceptions to the general
rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. Consistent with the principle of finality of judgments, it follows that no appeal
may be taken from orders of execution of judgments. Filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued. Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails.

None of the four exceptions mentioned is availing in this case. What petitioner seeks is not a mere clerical
correction but an overhaul of ELA Manansala’s Decision. Petitioner does not merely seek an entry into the
records of acts done but not entered (i.e., nunc pro tunc entries). Petitioner does not claim that ELA Manansala’s
Decision is void, only that its computation of monetary awards is inadequate. The Decision having attained
finality, there remains no opening for revisiting, amending, or modifying ELA Manansala’s judgment. De Ocampo
failed “to assert a right within a reasonable time, and this warranted a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.” Stated otherwise, petitioner may be imputed estoppel by
laches.

Hence, pursuant to the NLRC Rules of Procedure, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or
order that it assails unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied in this case are not affected by the amendments.

507
Rule 67

National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
Leonen, J.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an easement of right-of-
way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. A right-of-
way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

FACTS:
Spouses Margarito and Tarcinia Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land in Calbayog City,
with an area of 59,099 sqm. The National Power Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque’s land to install
transmission lines, thereby using 4,352 sqm for the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project.
Upon Spouses Asoque’s demand for just compensation, the NAPOCOR only paid for the improvements
destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352 sqm area utilized for the project, claiming that it
was only liable to pay for right-of-way at 10% of the market value.

Spouses Asoque filed before the RTC Calbayog a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages
against the NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR denied the claim that it had illegally utilized the property, alleging that it
entered the property with the Spouses’ consent as shown by the acknowledgment receipt as payment of
damaged improvements and waiver of claims to improvements damaged.

When the case was called for pretrial, the case was ordered dismissed by the trial court due to the
nonappearance of both parties and their counsel, but was later reinstated after the Spouses’ counsel explained
the reason why he arrived late. At the rescheduled pretrial, the trial court allowed Spouses Asoque to present
their evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner, noting the absence of the NAPOCOR and its
counsel. After presentation of evidence ex parte and submission of recommendation by the Commissioner, the
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Asoque and ordered the NAPOCOR to pay them just compensation
and compensation for the improvements of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision by deleting the amount awarded as compensation for damaged improvements for lack of legal basis.
NAPOCOR filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte?
2. Is the appointment of the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner proper?
3. Should petitioner be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its
transmission lines?

RULING:
1. No, the RTC did not err in allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte.

The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed “to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.” Petitioner’s stance that it was deprived
of due process because it was not given the reasonable opportunity to attend the second pretrial setting is
likewise untenable. Petitioner and its counsel were absent during the first pretrial setting on May 8, 2000.
Respondents’ counsel attended, although he was late. Had petitioner and its counsel appeared on the first
setting, they would have been reasonably notified then and there of the second pretrial resetting on May 24, 2000
and would have had the opportunity to ask for a later date. Nonetheless, petitioner’s counsel should have tried
to inquire from the court the next schedule of the pretrial.

2. Yes, the appointment is proper and sanctioned by the Rules.

The procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive and report evidence to the court is
sanctioned by Rule 32, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, after the hearing
before the Commissioner, the Commissioner must file a written report, which may contain his or her factual
findings and conclusions of law. Hence, absent any express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of

508
Court Atty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual findings and
recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed, the Commissioner’s recommendation could have
been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act.

Besides, the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court were not for expropriation — for which petitioner itself
claims that there is no need — but were for recovery of just compensation and damages initiated by respondents.
Hence, Rule 67, Section 5 on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid was no longer applicable. A
trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

3. NAPOCOR is liable to pay just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the basis that its acquisition
of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents’ land was a taking under the power of eminent domain.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an easement of right-of-
way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. A right-of-
way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will
deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period and expose the property owners’ lives and limbs to
danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected property.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 67 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.

509
Rule 67

National Power Corp. v. Posada

G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expropriation complaint should be
dismissed by the trial court. However, the expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property
ceases to be for public use. The State must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court
having jurisdiction over the proceedings to determine whether respondents have already been prejudiced by the
expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from the commencement of the
expropriation, if any.

FACTS:
This is a Motion filed by the National Power Corporation (Napocor) seeking to withdraw its Petition for Review.
The Petition sought to reverse the Decision of the CA affirming the trial court’s Decision recalling the Writ of
Possession issued in the Napocor’s favor.

Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land
in Catandanues owned by respondents Posada. The expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of
its Substation Island Grid Project. RTC of Virac Catanduanes confirmed Napocor’s right to expropriate and
ordered the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
Napocor filed a Notice to Take Possession before the court on the basis of Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a Writ of Possession in view of its deposit (564,360.83) with the Land Bank
of the Philippines alleging that it represented the provisional value of the properties as per zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). RTC granted the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The court appointed
commissioners recommended a fair market value of P827,000 for the value of land, structures, and the
improvements on the land. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift and/or Suspend the Issuance of the writ which the
RTC granted. RTC based on the value determined by the commissioners and ordered Napocor to deposit an
additional amount, however Napocor failed to do so. In view of this, RTC recalled its order granting the issuance
and cancels the Writ of Possession. CA affirmed holding that Napocor must first pay respondents the amount
determined by the trial court. In the absence of proof that respondents were paid, the Napocor cannot take
possession of the property. Hence, it filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.

In a turn of events, Napocor informed its counsel that it no longer needed the properties as it was set to acquire
an alternative site. Thus, Napocor filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal, praying for the withdrawal of its
appeal before the SC and, ultimately, for its Amended Complaint before the trial court to be dismissed.

ISSUES:
(1) Should the Writ of Possession be issued on the basis of Napocor’s deposit of the alleged provisional value
with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents?
(2) Is the payment of the provisional value the same as the determination of the just compensation contemplated
under the law?
(3) May Napocor be allowed to withdraw its Petition for Review and whether the withdrawal has the effect of
dismissing its Amended Complaint before the trial court?

RULING:
(1) No. The Writ of Possession should not be issued for failure to comply with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 8974.

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and
R.A. No. 8974. The purpose for the taking of private property was for the construction of Napocor’s Substation
Island Grid Project. According to IRR of R.A. No. 8974, projects related to “power generation, transmission and
distribution” are national infrastructure projects covered by the law. Napocor must first comply with the guidelines
stated in R.A. No. 8974 before it can take possession of respondents’ property.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974, unlike Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requires immediate payment
to the landowner of 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR.

510
It is the BIR, not the court, which determines the zonal value. Thus, the trial court committed error in basing the
value of the improvements on the property on the determination made by the commissioners.

As a result, the trial court erred when it issued a Writ of Possession on the basis of the Napocor’s deposit of the
alleged provisional value with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents.
Considering that the National Power Corporation failed to comply with the guidelines in R.A. No. 8974, a Writ of
Possession should not have been issued.

(2) No. The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from
the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the
current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property. It serves a double
purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings
are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the
prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to be considered in the determination of
just compensation. Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair market value of
the property. It has been described as “the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount
equivalent to the full BIR zonal valuation does not substitute for the judicial determination of just compensation.
The payment to the property owner of a preliminary amount is one way to ensure that property will not be
condemned arbitrarily. The payment of a provisional value may also serve as indemnity for damages in the event
that the expropriation does not succeed.

The Napocor was only required to pay the provisional value so that it could take possession of respondents’
properties. However, once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it stands to reason that this is
the amount that must be paid to the landowner as compensation for his or her property. Here, the trial court had
already determined the amount of just compensation even before the Napocor could take possession of the
properties. Payment of the provisional value is not anymore enough. Government, then, must pay the proper
amount of just compensation, instead of the provisional value in order to enter and take the private property.

(3) Yes. When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expropriation complaint should
be dismissed by the trial court.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. Considering that eminent domain is the taking of
private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to be expropriated will
not be for public use. However, the expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases
to be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding
is always subject to judicial discretion.

Here, respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the Napocor was never able to take
possession. As such, this case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents have
already been prejudiced by the expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from
the commencement of the expropriation, if any.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect herein because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

511
Rule 67, Sec. 8

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
Leonen, J.

The RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, in determining just compensation, can simply adopt the
Consolidated Commissioner’s report. The Regional Trial Court has the full discretion to make a binding decision
on the value of the properties.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review of the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) seeking to reverse and set
aside the Court of Appeals Decision which affirmed the RTC Order. These assailed judgments upheld the Special
Agrarian Court’s determination of the just compensation to be paid.

Respondents Raul T. Manzano et. al. (respondents), were the owners of four parcels of agricultural land planted
with rubber trees in Isabela, Basilan Province with a total land area of 88.57 hectares. The enactment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. 6657) has placed respondent’s lands under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). However, respondents and the Landbank failed to agree on the purchase
price of the lands even after the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board. It was then referred to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARA) which directed Landbank to conduct a revaluation survey. Upon
Landbank’s recomputation, however, the total land value posted a net decrease, which was adopted by PARA.
The case was then referred to the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court who appointed three commissioners to
examine and ascertain the valuation of the properties. The commissioners, upon conducting several inspections,
interviews and gathering of data, determined that the just compensation of the land amounted to P9,100,711 as
compared to Landbank’s valuation of only P2,943,797 which was adopted by the RTC in its ruling.

Respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the RTC. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) Can the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, in determining just compensation, simply adopt the
Consolidated Commissioner’s report?
(2) Can the RTC grant the execution pending appeal?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The Regional Trial Court has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the properties.
Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court may accept the Consolidated
Commissioners’ Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and appoint
new commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other parts. The final determination of the
Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court must be respected. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an
administrative rule.

Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the “original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.” There is no need to exhaust
administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special
Agrarian Court for determination of just compensation. The final decision on the value of just compensation
lies solely on the Special Agrarian Court. Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate
jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law.

(2) Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), a judgment appealed before the Court of Appeals may still be executed
by the Regional Trial Court, provided there are good reasons for the judgment’s execution.

The Regional Trial Court found that respondents have been deprived of their land since 1999. They were
dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties, which were taken from them 19
years ago without compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution pending appeal will infringe on their
constitutional right against taking of private property without compensation. Moreover, the just compensation

512
for respondents’ properties is not wholly payable in cash. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the payment is in bonds,
which will mature only after 10 years. By then, the monetary value of the properties would no longer be the
same. Denying the execution pending appeal can also stall the payment of respondents’ properties through
the filing of frivolous motions and appeals. In their motion for execution pending appeal, respondents
“indicated [their] willingness to return any amount in the event that the just compensation fixed by [the
Regional Trial Court] is modified by the appellate court.” This addresses petitioner’s sole objection against
execution pending appeal.

Thus, this Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court that “[f]or reasons of equity, justice and fair play,
[respondents] should be paid to enable them to cope up with the loss they sustained as a result of the taking and
for their economic survival.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes on these rules.

513
RA 8974

Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez

G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015
Leonen, J.

The state and its implementing agencies must first comply with the requirements outlined in Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974 before they are allowed to take possession of private property for a national infrastructure project.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the ruling of the CA setting aside the Republic’s authority to take
possession of the property but affirming the Order to appoint commissioners to determine the amount of just
compensation.

The Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez are the owners of an 11, 165-square meter property (Certificate of Title No.
T-139051) in Barangay Tuyo, Balanga. The Republic on behalf of DPWH, filed a Verified Complaint for
Expropriation against the Heirs of Fernandez and Sotera Santuyo for the intended construction of a four-lane
highway in Barangay Tuyo. It further alleged that it was necessary to acquire the properties to the Heirs of
Fernandez and Santuyo for the purpose, but its offer to purchase was refused. The Republic prayed that that a
Writ of Possession be issued in its favor upon the filing of the Petition and the deposit of the value of the properties
“as provisionally ascertained and fixed by the court, which should not be more than P 50.00 per square meter”.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly set aside Republic's authority to take possession of the property on the ground of failure to
comply to R.A. No. 8974?

RULING:
YES. The proper zonal value of the property` is P50.00 per square meter. The incorrect amount paid by the
petitioner Republic cannot be considered as sufficient pre-payment since it was less than the amount required in
Sec. 4 of Rep.Act. 8974.

Before the state may expropriate private property for a national infrastructure project, it must first comply with the
requisites in Republic Act No. 8974, otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site
or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes.

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of the expropriation
complaint, immediately pay the property owner an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the value of any improvements or
structure on a replacement cost method. The law further mandates that courts may issue a Writ of Possession
only upon the presentation by the implementing agency of a certificate of availability of funds.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because what is involved in the case at bar is a special law, not amended by the Revised Rules.

514
RA 8974

National Power Corp. v. Posada

G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

Writ of possession should not be issued in favor of implementing agency which fails to comply with the guidelines
stated in RA 8974.

FACTS:
This is a Motion filed by the National Power Corporation (Napocor) seeking to withdraw its Petition for Review.
The Petition sought to reverse the Decision of the CA affirming the trial court’s Decision recalling the Writ of
Possession issued in the Napocor’s favor.

Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land
in Catandanues owned by respondents Posada. The expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of
its Substation Island Grid Project. RTC of Virac Catanduanes confirmed Napocor’s right to expropriate and
ordered the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
Napocor filed a Notice to Take Possession before the court on the basis of Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a Writ of Possession in view of its deposit (564,360.83) with the Land Bank
of the Philippines alleging that it represented the provisional value of the properties as per zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). RTC granted the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The court appointed
commissioners recommended a fair market value of P827,000 for the value of land, structures, and the
improvements on the land. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift and/or Suspend the Issuance of the writ which the
RTC granted. RTC based on the value determined by the commissioners and ordered Napocor to deposit an
additional amount, however Napocor failed to do so. In view of this, RTC recalled its order granting the issuance
and cancels the Writ of Possession. CA affirmed holding that Napocor must first pay respondents the amount
determined by the trial court. In the absence of proof that respondents were paid, the Napocor cannot take
possession of the property. Hence, it filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.

In a turn of events, Napocor informed its counsel that it no longer needed the properties as it was set to acquire
an alternative site. Thus, Napocor filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal, praying for the withdrawal of its
appeal before the SC and, ultimately, for its Amended Complaint before the trial court to be dismissed.

ISSUES:
(1) Should the Writ of Possession be issued on the basis of Napocor’s deposit of the alleged provisional value
with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents?
(2) Is the payment of the provisional value the same as the determination of the just compensation contemplated
under the law?
(3) May Napocor be allowed to withdraw its Petition for Review and whether the withdrawal has the effect of
dismissing its Amended Complaint before the trial court?

RULING:
(1) No. The Writ of Possession should not be issued for failure to comply with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 8974.

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and
R.A. No. 8974. The purpose for the taking of private property was for the construction of Napocor’s Substation
Island Grid Project. According to IRR of R.A. No. 8974, projects related to “power generation, transmission and
distribution” are national infrastructure projects covered by the law. Napocor must first comply with the guidelines
stated in R.A. No. 8974 before it can take possession of respondents’ property.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974, unlike Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requires immediate payment
to the landowner of 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR.
It is the BIR, not the court, which determines the zonal value. Thus, the trial court committed error in basing the
value of the improvements on the property on the determination made by the commissioners.

As a result, the trial court erred when it issued a Writ of Possession on the basis of the Napocor’s deposit of the
alleged provisional value with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents.

515
Considering that the National Power Corporation failed to comply with the guidelines in R.A. No. 8974, a Writ of
Possession should not have been issued.

(2) No. The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from
the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the
current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property. It serves a double
purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings
are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the
prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to be considered in the determination of
just compensation. Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair market value of
the property. It has been described as “the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount
equivalent to the full BIR zonal valuation does not substitute for the judicial determination of just compensation.
The payment to the property owner of a preliminary amount is one way to ensure that property will not be
condemned arbitrarily. The payment of a provisional value may also serve as indemnity for damages in the event
that the expropriation does not succeed.

The Napocor was only required to pay the provisional value so that it could take possession of respondents’
properties. However, once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it stands to reason that this is
the amount that must be paid to the landowner as compensation for his or her property. Here, the trial court had
already determined the amount of just compensation even before the Napocor could take possession of the
properties. Payment of the provisional value is not anymore enough. Government, then, must pay the proper
amount of just compensation, instead of the provisional value in order to enter and take the private property.

(3) Yes. When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expropriation complaint should
be dismissed by the trial court.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. Considering that eminent domain is the taking of
private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to be expropriated will
not be for public use. However, the expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases
to be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding
is always subject to judicial discretion.

Here, respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the Napocor was never able to take
possession. As such, this case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents have
already been prejudiced by the expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from
the commencement of the expropriation, if any.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect herein because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

516
RA 8974

National Power Corp. v. Posada

G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the
payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current
relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

FACTS:
This is a Motion filed by the National Power Corporation (Napocor) seeking to withdraw its Petition for Review.
The Petition sought to reverse the Decision of the CA affirming the trial court’s Decision recalling the Writ of
Possession issued in the Napocor’s favor.

Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land
in Catandanues owned by respondents Posada. The expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of
its Substation Island Grid Project. RTC of Virac Catanduanes confirmed Napocor’s right to expropriate and
ordered the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
Napocor filed a Notice to Take Possession before the court on the basis of Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a Writ of Possession in view of its deposit (564,360.83) with the Land Bank
of the Philippines alleging that it represented the provisional value of the properties as per zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). RTC granted the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The court appointed
commissioners recommended a fair market value of P827,000 for the value of land, structures, and the
improvements on the land. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift and/or Suspend the Issuance of the writ which the
RTC granted. RTC based on the value determined by the commissioners and ordered Napocor to deposit an
additional amount, however Napocor failed to do so. In view of this, RTC recalled its order granting the issuance
and cancels the Writ of Possession. CA affirmed holding that Napocor must first pay respondents the amount
determined by the trial court. In the absence of proof that respondents were paid, the Napocor cannot take
possession of the property. Hence, it filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.

In a turn of events, Napocor informed its counsel that it no longer needed the properties as it was set to acquire
an alternative site. Thus, Napocor filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal, praying for the withdrawal of its
appeal before the SC and, ultimately, for its Amended Complaint before the trial court to be dismissed.

ISSUES:
(1) Should the Writ of Possession be issued on the basis of Napocor’s deposit of the alleged provisional value
with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents?
(2) Is the payment of the provisional value the same as the determination of the just compensation contemplated
under the law?
(3) May Napocor be allowed to withdraw its Petition for Review and whether the withdrawal has the effect of
dismissing its Amended Complaint before the trial court?

RULING:
(1) No. The Writ of Possession should not be issued for failure to comply with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 8974.

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and
R.A. No. 8974. The purpose for the taking of private property was for the construction of Napocor’s Substation
Island Grid Project. According to IRR of R.A. No. 8974, projects related to “power generation, transmission and
distribution” are national infrastructure projects covered by the law. Napocor must first comply with the guidelines
stated in R.A. No. 8974 before it can take possession of respondents’ property.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974, unlike Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requires immediate payment
to the landowner of 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR.
It is the BIR, not the court, which determines the zonal value. Thus, the trial court committed error in basing the
value of the improvements on the property on the determination made by the commissioners.

517
As a result, the trial court erred when it issued a Writ of Possession on the basis of the Napocor’s deposit of the
alleged provisional value with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents.
Considering that the National Power Corporation failed to comply with the guidelines in R.A. No. 8974, a Writ of
Possession should not have been issued.

(2) No. The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from
the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the
current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property. It serves a double
purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings
are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the
prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to be considered in the determination of
just compensation. Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair market value of
the property. It has been described as “the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount
equivalent to the full BIR zonal valuation does not substitute for the judicial determination of just compensation.
The payment to the property owner of a preliminary amount is one way to ensure that property will not be
condemned arbitrarily. The payment of a provisional value may also serve as indemnity for damages in the event
that the expropriation does not succeed.

The Napocor was only required to pay the provisional value so that it could take possession of respondents’
properties. However, once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it stands to reason that this is
the amount that must be paid to the landowner as compensation for his or her property. Here, the trial court had
already determined the amount of just compensation even before the Napocor could take possession of the
properties. Payment of the provisional value is not anymore enough. Government, then, must pay the proper
amount of just compensation, instead of the provisional value in order to enter and take the private property.

(3) Yes. When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the expropriation complaint should
be dismissed by the trial court.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. Considering that eminent domain is the taking of
private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to be expropriated will
not be for public use. However, the expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases
to be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding
is always subject to judicial discretion.

Here, respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the Napocor was never able to take
possession. As such, this case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents have
already been prejudiced by the expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from
the commencement of the expropriation, if any.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect herein because the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

518
RA 8975

Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
Leonen, J.

RA 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, not local government projects.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions arose out of a pending case between Sunrise Garden Corporation (Sunrise) and
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock). First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not a party to that case.

In 1999, pursuant to an ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City approved the request of Brgy.
Cupang to construct a city road connecting Brgy. Cupang and Marcos Highway. Notices to property owners
affected were posted. As an affected owner, Sunrise executed an Undertaking where it would construct the city
road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement of tax credits. However, armed guards, allegedly hired by
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (Hardrock), prevented it from using an access road to move the construction
equipment. A Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction against Hardrock was filed and granted. Unheeded, the court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI). Subsequently, Sunrise filed a Motion and Manifestation for the amendment of the
WPI “to include any and all persons from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner’s contractors in
proceeding with the construction of the city road.” Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. (First Alliance), blocked Sunrise contractor’s employees
and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. A motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt
was filed. An order to comply with the Amended WPI was then issued. However, security guards dressed in
civilian clothes under Forefront Security Agency still allegedly prevented the workers from proceeding to the
construction site. First Alliance ordered them not to allow the city road construction. Sunrise, then, filed a Motion
to cite Forefront Security Agency and First Alliance in contempt. Meanwhile, K-9 Security Agency filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, attaching photocopies of land titles to show that First Alliance was the registered owner of
the parcel of land where the pieces of construction equipment were being placed. However, the Register of Deeds
could not provide copies of First Alliance transfer certificates of title. Hence, it must comply with the Amended
WPI. First Alliance filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO before the CA. The
latter issued ex-parte a TRO valid for 60 days. Sunrise and the Republic of the Philippines separately filed
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction assailing the WPI
issued by the CA. The CA granted First Alliance’s Petition and annulled the Amended WPI.

Sunrise points out that First Alliance assuming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the person of First
Alliance, this was cured when the latter voluntarily appeared in court. First Alliance counters that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it was not impleaded as a party-litigant in the Complaint for damages
filed by Sunrise against Hardrock. Further, First Alliance claims that the construction of the city road has the
effect of appropriating and taking First Alliance’s private property for public use. But the Republic argues that
expropriation and eminent domain are different, and if compensation for the property is accepted, then there is
no need for an expropriation proceeding. In addition, First Alliance is not an affected landowner. As to the
allegation that there was no public bidding, Republic of the Philippines discussed that the City Government had
no funds for the road project, thus, it could not bid out the project. However, due to the urgent need for the
construction of the city road, the local government had to negotiate with a party “who could advance its realty
taxes.” Sunrise Garden Corporation offered to do so, and the local government found the offer favorable.

ISSUE:
May the prohibition on issuance of TRO against national government projects under RA 8975 be applied?

RULING:
No, because RA 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, and this case involves a local
government infrastructure project. For local government infrastructure projects, RTCs may issue provisional
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are compelling and substantial
constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable
injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public
interests] at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweigh (a) the
inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from

519
the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial
courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the
injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

In this case, the notice to the public states that “the City Government of Antipolo is going to construct the 20
meters wide city road and the funds would come from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City. There is
nothing on record to show that the city road project is a national government project. Hence, the prohibition on
the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against national government projects does not apply.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

The ruling is not affected because it is not one of those included in the 2019 Amended Rules.

520
Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solid Bank Corp. (now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.)
G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being circulated in the city
where the property is located. Markedly, what the law requires is the publication of the Notice of Sale in a
“newspaper of general circulation”.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Gotesco Properties, Inc.
(Gotesco) for the annulment of the foreclosure proceeding. The Court of Appeals also upheld the issuance of a
writ of possession for respondent Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank), now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank).

Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of ₱300 million through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go) which
was covered by three promissory notes.To secure the loan, Gotesco was required to execute a Mortgage Trust
Indenture (Indenture) naming Solidbank-Trust Division as Trustee. The Indenture obliged Gotesco to mortgage
several parcels of land in favor of Solidbank. One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a
property located in San Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also irrevocably appointed
Solidbank-Trust Division as Gotesco’s attomey-in-fact. Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to “at all times
maintain the Sound Value of the Collateral.” When the loan was about to mature, Gotesco found it difficult to
meet its obligation because of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Gotesco sent a letter to Solidbank proposing to
restructure the loan obligation. The loan restructuring agreement proposed to extend the payment period to seven
(7) years. The suggested period included a two (2)- year grace period.

Solidbank informed Gotesco of a substantial reduction in the appraised value of its mortgaged properties. Since
the necessary collateral to loan ratio was 200%, Solidbank held that there was a deficiency in the collateral,
which Gotesco had to address. Solidbank required Gotesco to replace or add to the mortgaged properties.
Gotesco construed the February 9, 2000 letter as Solidbank’s implied agreement to the loan restructuring
proposal. However, Gotesco found it unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the collateral.

Solidbank sent a demand letter to Gotesco as the loan became due. Despite having received this demand letter,
Gotesco failed to pay the outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of the lot. The public auction was held and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.

Thereafter, Gotesco filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings,
Specific Performance, and Damages against Solidbank, Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Gotesco assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceeding claiming that it was premature
and without legal basis. According to Gotesco, the jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135
were not complied with. First, Solidbank did not furnish Gotesco copies of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure,
notice of sale, and certificate of sale. Second, the filing fees were not paid. Lastly, even assuming the original
period for loan payment was not extended, the prerequisites for the foreclosure proceeding provided in the
Indenture were not met.

ISSUE:
Was the foreclosure proceeding invalid citing grounds such as prematurity and devoid of any legal basis?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 provides:

Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public
places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of

521
Sale be a) physically posted in three (3) public places and b) be published once a week for at least three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is situated.

Were the interpretation of the trial court is to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the ‘Manila
Bulletin,’ the ‘Philippine Daily Inquirer,’ or ‘The Philippine Star’ which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the
country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of their publication. But this is not
the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the
place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which
it was intended. If notices are only published in newspapers printed in the city where the property is located, even
newspapers that are circulated nationwide will be disqualified from announcing auction sales outside their city of
publication. This runs contrary to the spirit of the law which is to attain wide enough publicity so all parties
interested in acquiring the property can be informed of the upcoming sale. The Supreme Court noted that it can
take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than posting on bulletin
boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or notice published in a newspaper
of general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted
in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence,
the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than sufficient
compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had
been effected such that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the law had been
thereby subserved.

The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being circulated in the city
where the property is located. Markedly, what the law requires is the publication of the Notice of Sale in a
“newspaper of general circulation,” which is defined as: To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough
that “it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription
list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals” . . . The newspaper need not have the largest
circulation so long as it is of general circulation. Verily, there is clear emphasis on the audience reached by the
paper; the place of printing is not even considered.

Therefore, the foreclosure proceeding is valid.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect the applicable law was not affected by the amendments.

522
Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Mahinay v. Dura Tire & Rubber Industries, Inc.

G.R. No. 194152 June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

The period to redeem a property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not extendible. A pending action to
annul the foreclosure sale does not toll the running of the one (1)-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135.

FACTS:
The parcel of land is located in Barrio Kiot, Cebu City, was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
111078 under the name of A&A Swiss International Commercial, Inc. The property was mortgaged to Dura Tire
and Rubber Industries, Inc, a corporation engaged in the supply of raw materials for tire processing and
recapping, as security for credit purchases to be made by Move Overland Venture and Exploring, Inc.. Under the
mortgage agreement, Dura Tire was given the express authority to extrajudicially foreclose the property should
Move Overland fail to pay its credit purchases.

A&A Swiss sold the property to Mahinay for the sum of ₱540,000.00. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mahinay
acknowledged that the property had been previously mortgaged by A&A Swiss to Dura Tire, holding himself liable
for any claims that Dura Tire may have against Move Overland.

For Move Overland’s failure to pay its credit purchases, Dura Tire applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
property. Mahinay protested the impending sale and filed a third-party claim before the Office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Cebu. Despite the protest, Sheriff Romeo Laurel proceeded with the sale and issued a Certificate of
Sale in favor of Dura Tire, the highest bidder at the sale. Mahinay filed a Complaint for specific performance and
annulment of auction sale before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City

ISSUE:
Whether the one (1)-year period of redemption was tolled when Mahinay filed his Complaint for annulment of
foreclosure sale.

RULING:
No. By force of law, specifically, Section 6 of Act No. 3135, Mahinay’s right to redeem arose when the mortgaged
property was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction.1âwphi1 There is no dispute that Mahinay had
a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage. Consequently, he had the right to buy it back from the
purchaser at the sale, Dura Tire in this case, “from and at any time within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale.”

The “date of the sale” referred to in Section 6 is the date the certificate of sale is registered with the Register of
Deeds. This is because the sale of registered land does not ‘“take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land’ until
it is registered.”60

The right of redemption being statutory,61 the mortgagor may compel the purchaser to sell back the property
within the one (1)-year period under Act No. 3135. If the purchaser refuses to sell back the property, the
mortgagor may tender payment to the Sheriff who conducted the foreclosure sale. 62 Here, Mahinay should have
tendered payment to Sheriff Laurel instead of insisting on directly paying Move Overland’s unpaid credit
purchases to Dura Tire.

As early as 1956, this Court held in Mateo v. Court of Appeals that “the right of redemption ... must ... be exercised
the mode prescribed by the statute.” The one (1)-year period of redemption is fixed, hence, non-extendible, to
“avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership of the thing sold.”

Since the period of redemption is fixed, it cannot be tolled or interrupted by the filing of cases to annul the
foreclosure sale or to enforce the right of redemption. “To rule otherwise ... would constitute a dangerous
precedent. A likely offshoot of such a ruling is the institution of frivolous suits for annulment of mortgage intended
merely to give the mortgagor more time to redeem the mortgaged property.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None because the rules involved in this case are not included in the 2019 amendments.

523
Rule 70, Sec. 1

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.

G.R. No. 214546 October 9,2019
Leonen, J.

An action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the date of actual entry on the land,. However,
when the entry was done through stealth, the one year time bar is reckoned from the time the entry was
discovered.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review by the Supreme court on the decision of the court of appeals which orederd PLDT to
realighn its transmission lines and restitute the premises to Citi Appliance M.C. corporation. The law allegedly
infringes upon the right to bear arms, right to property and right to privacy.

PLDT is the petitioner in this case for appeal while the respondent is Citi Appliance M.C. Corp. Citi Appliance
was required by the Cebu City zoning board to construct a one level parking area. However upon excavation,
respondent found that there were telephone lines, cables and manholes underground their property place by
PLDT. Citi appliance demanded from PLDT that these cables be removed or that they should shoulder the
parking exemption fee.

Petitioner argued that their telephone lines did not encroach on Citi Appliance’s property as they were properly
positioned alongside and underneath a public sidewalk. Furthermore, it argued that the case should be dismissed
because the action for forcible entry has already prescribed. That the one-year prescriptive period within which
to bring an action for forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the alleged unlawful
entry, not the last demand to vacate. Respondent argue that the location of the telephone lines is not part of
public domain because there was no evidence presented showing expropriation by the government. Also, that
the prescriptive period should be counted from the last demand to vacate in cases of clandestine entry.

ISSUE:
Has the prescriptive period prescribed for the unlawful entry?

RULING:
Yes the prescriptive period has prescribed.

According to the law on ejectment for forcible entry there must be prior physical possession of the land in
question, that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth and that
the action was filed within one year from the time the owners of legal possessors learned of their deprivation of
the physical possession of the property.

There is no proof that respondents had period physical possession. There was no actual possession mere legal
ownership of the said land. As such the 1st requisite is absent. Furthermore the prescriptive period begins to run
upon discovery iof the encroachment, not from the date of the last demand to vacate. Based on the fact of
applying for exemption from payment of parking fees, respondent already knew of the encroachment on April
2003. A year has elapsed into April 2004 and the case was not yet filed hence the period of has already
prescribed.

Therefore, the decision is hereby reversed granting the petitioner PLDT to not remove its telephone lines. As the
forcible entry has not prescribed the court is forced to rule and decide in favor of PLDT as the respondent has
slept on his right and allowed the prescription of the forcible entry. Technical as it may be the law is the law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on ejectment has not been changed.

524
Rule 70, Sec. 1

Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona

G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

A case for unlawful detainer must state the period from when the occupation by tolerance started and the acts of
tolerance exercised by the party with the right to possession. If it is argued that the possession was illegal from
the start, the proper remedy is to file an accion publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the right of possession.
Moreover, while an ejectment case merely settles the issue of the right of actual possession, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally passed upon if the issue of possession cannot be resolved without it. Any final
disposition on the issue of ownership, however, must be resolved in the proper forum.

FACTS:
Eversley is a public health facility operated by the Department of Health to administer care and treatment to
patients suffering from Hansen’s disease, commonly known as leprosy, and to provide basic health services to
non-Hansen’s cases. Since 1930, it has occupied a portion of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1936 in
Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona (the Spouses Barbarona) allege that they are the owners of Lot No.
1936 by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698. They claim that they have acquired the property
from the Spouses Tarcelo B. Gonzales and Cirila Alba (the Spouses Gonzales), whose ownership was covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-824. Per the Spouses Barbarona’s verification, OCT No. RO-824
was reconstituted based on Decree No. 699021, issued to the Spouses Gonzales by the Land Registration Office
on March 29, 1939.

On May 6, 2005, the Spouses Barbarona filed a Complaint for Ejectment (Complaint) before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Mandaue City against the occupants. In their Answer, the occupants alleged that since they
had been in possession of the property for more than 70 years, the case was effectively one for recovery of
possession, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Municipal Trial Court in Cities ordered the occupants to vacate the property, finding that the action was one for
unlawful detainer, and thus, within its jurisdiction. It likewise found that the Spouses Barbarona were the lawful
owners of Lot No. 1936 and that the occupants were occupying the property by mere tolerance.

ISSUES:
(1) Was there a violation of non-forum shopping?
(2) Does MTC has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
(1) Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have committed forum shopping when it
filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a
motion to withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to await the action
of the Court of Appeals.

Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.” When the Court of Appeals denied
the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the latter
was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its Petition before this Court
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

To rule in this manner, however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the Court of
Appeals’ failure to apply its own Internal Rules. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed
abandoned with its filing of a Motion for Extension of Time before this Court, the Court of Appeals’ August 31,2011
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, thus, has no legal effect. It is as if no motion for
reconsideration was filed at all. Considering that petitioner counted the running of the period to file its Petition
with this Court from its receipt of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision, and not of the Court of
Appeals August 31, 2011 Resolution, it does not appear that petitioner “wanton[ly] disregard[ed] the rules or

525
cause[d] needless delay in the administration of justice.”54 In this particular instance, petitioner did not commit a
fatal procedural error

(2) Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the allegations stated in the complaint. Respondents’
Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states: That [the occupants] are presently occupying the above-
mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona] without color [of] right or title. Such occupancy is purely by mere
tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants’] occupying the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not
anchored upon any contractual relations with the [Spouses Barbarona.]

Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to what acts
constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner’s occupation.

In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by filing
an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this
case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

The same situation is present in this case. Respondents failed to state when petitioner’s possession was initially
lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from the Complaint is that petitioner’s
occupation “is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with [respondents.]”

This, however, is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession, as required in
an ejectment case. On the contrary, respondents allege that petitioner’s occupation was illegal from the start.
The proper remedy, therefore, should have been to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to assert
their right of possession or their right of ownership.

Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the Municipal Trial Court, it had no jurisdiction over
the case. Any disposition made, therefore, was void. The subsequent judgments of the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void Municipal Trial Court judgment, are likewise void.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

526
Rule 70, Sec. 1

Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co.

G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the parties has the better right to physical
possession of a piece of property. The defendant’s claims and allegations in its answer or motion to dismiss do
not oust a trial court’s jurisdiction to resolve this issue.

FACTS:
1998, Intramuros leased real properties of the National Government to Offshore Construction. There are 3
properties leased for 5 years from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. The lease contracts also made
reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision that the lease shall be
renewed every 5 years upon the parties’ mutual agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects
due to Offshore Construction’s non-conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th
centuries’ Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand
letters. Intramuros tolerated the occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay. However, Offshore
Construction still failed to pay. Intramuros filed a complaint for ejectment before MTC Manila. Offshore
Construction filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim and later they
filed Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros’ complaint be dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia. It argued that the Metropolitan Trial
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the relationship between the parties was not one of lessor-
lessee but governed by a concession agreement.

MTC granted the motion and dismissed the case. It found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Offshore Construction’s motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

The MTC found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had no jurisdiction over the case because
while there were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s relationship as one of concession. Under this concession agreement,
Offshore Construction undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for which it incurred
expenses. The MTC found that the issues could not be mere possession and rentals only.

ISSUES:
1. Was the direct resort of the petitioner to the Court proper?
2. Does the MTC have jurisdiction had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros
Administration?
3. Did Intramuros commit forum shopping?

RULING:
1. At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Regional Trial Court’s ruling upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional
Trial Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over
the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending
cases, one filed by respondent Offshore Construction and the other filed by respondent’s group of tenants, 4H
Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition
for review under Rule 42.

527
Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned
by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not
inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency
of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute—an ejectment case—is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.

Moreover, this Court’s rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case.

2. It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved. Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession.

To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be
examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case for unlawful
detainer if the complaint states the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment. (Citation omitted)

A review of petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made. The Metropolitan
Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint because the parties’
situation has allegedly become “more complicated” than one of lease. Respondent’s defense that its relationship
with petitioner is one of concession rather than lease does not determine whether or not the Metropolitan Trial
Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or
motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.

3. A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed
out by petitioner, respondent’s right to possess the leased premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease
and, upon their expiration, on petitioner’s tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance case cannot be the source of respondent’s
continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for respondent’s
outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation
under this agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner’s
unlawful detainer complaint.

In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case, petitioner sets up the counterclaim that “[respondent]
be ordered to pay its arrears of (P13,448,867.45) as of December 31, 2009 plus such rent and surcharges as
may be incurred until [respondent] has completely vacated the [leased] premises.” This counterclaim is exactly
the same as one of petitioner’s prayers in its ejectment complaint.

A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will likewise not be res judicata against the ejectment complaint.
The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H Intramuros, allegedly representing the tenants occupying Puerta de
Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its Complaint for Interpleader the source of its right to occupy those
premises. However, it can be determined from petitioner’s Answer and from respondent’s Memorandum that the
members of 4H Intramuros are respondent’s sublessees.

Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping by petitioner,
the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved in this case were not amended.

528
Rule 70, Sec. 2

Cruz v. Spouses Christensen

G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case for unlawful detainer if the demand to
vacate is premised on the expiration of the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-compliance of the
terms and conditions of the lease.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which reversed the RTC ruling and reinstated
the MTC decision dismissing herein petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer.

Procedurally, reason for the reversal of the RTC ruling is the non-compliance with the period set forth in Rule 40,
Sec. 7 on the filing of a memorandum of appeal with the RTC. Petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal nine (9)
days late but RTC still gave the appeal due course.

Substantially, CA overturned the RTC decision because of the absence of a demand letter prior to the filing of
the unlawful detainer complaint. Petitioner owns the property which respondents had leased on a month-to-month
basis from them. Petitioner argues that where the action is grounded on the expiration of the contract of lease,
as in this instance where the lease was on a month-to-month basis, the failure to pay the rentals for the month
terminates the lease, so there should no longer be a need for demand letter prior to the filing of the unlawful
detainer complaint.

ISSUES:
1. Is the reversal of the RTC decision valid by reason of petitioner’s non-compliance with Rule 40, Sec. 7?
2. Is a demand letter needed prior to filing a complaint for unlawful detainer grounded on expiration of lease?

RULING:
1. No, the Court held that the rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is mandatory.
Rule 40, Section 7 is jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are specifically
assigned and properly argued in the memorandum and a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an
appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned.

Procedural defects, however, should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants. Even
procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be suspended where matters of life, liberty, honor or
property warrant its liberal application.

Thus, liberality in the application of Rule 40, Sec. 7 is warranted in this case in view of the potential inequity
that may result if the rule is strictly applied.

2. No, petitioner owns the property which respondents used to lease on a month-to-month basis from them until
petitioner claimed that their lease has already expired.

Under Rule 70, Sec. 1, an action for unlawful detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property who
unlawfully withholds possession after the termination or expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70,
Sec. 2 requires that there must first be a prior demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and
to vacate before an action can be filed. The Court held, however, that the jurisdictional requirement of prior
demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of
contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded
the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents. The cause of action which would
give rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease.

Thus, in the present case, the requirement under Rule 70, Sec. 2 of a prior demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate, in the form of a demand letter is unnecessary.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the portion governing provisional remedies has not been amended.

529
Rule 71

Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson

G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019
Leonen, J.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and
dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the
order of the court. The court’s contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not
vindictive, purpose. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised.

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Contempt filed by Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
(POPARMUCO) against Respondent Regional Director Inson of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region VII,
Cebu City.

Sometime in 2003, a 394.9020-hectare portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo
Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the
Department of Agrarian Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation.
Polo Coconut’s title was canceled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. It was registered on January 30,
2004 in favor of POPARMUCO members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform
beneficiaries.

Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its
property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and assailed the eligibility of the identified agrarian
reform beneficiaries. When elevated to the SC, SC ruled that the Department of Agrarian Reform could not be
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion just because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of Polo
Coconut. Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, it ruled, does not limit qualified beneficiaries
to tenants of the landowners. The decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008. On June 30,
2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for Inclusion as qualified
beneficiaries and Exclusion of those named as beneficiaries therein (Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion). On July 1,
2009, Alcantara, et al. filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction to
preserve their legal rights while the administrative proceedings for the inclusion/exclusion of farmer beneficiaries
were pending resolution. Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order.

On July 23, 2009, POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion
to Quash the Cease and Desist Order with Motion for Reconsideration and later filed before the SC a Petition for
Contempt on ground that respondent defied this Court’s September 3, 2008 Decision, which ruled with finality on
the qualification of petitioner’s members as beneficiaries in Polo Coconut’s landholding.

ISSUE:
Does respondent’s act of taking cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries
constitutes an indirect contempt of court?

RULING:
No, respondent’s act does not constitute indirect contempt of court. The cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules
and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and
not the DARAB. The identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.

Petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion constituted defiance of
the September 3, 2008 Decision does not lie. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s
order, hut such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute

530
or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must
be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. The court’s contempt power should be exercised
with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive, purpose. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal
to obey should the power be exercised.

Here, respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the Department’s
exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of agrarian reform
beneficiaries. Still, respondent’s erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed
as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for
contempt.

The SC finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of respondent. His acts do not qualify as a willful
disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no revisions that apply in this case.

531
Rule 71

Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff

G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
Leonen, J.

This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on occasion,
for the proper administration of justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to
freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters. Freedom of
expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible.

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque,
Jr. against respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for
violating Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court.

Jeffrey Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott
Pemberton. Police had not been able to obtain Pemberton' s latent fingerprints and oral swabs, because he was
confined by his superiors on a ship and placed under their custody. Pemberton was eventually transferred from
his ship to a facility in the headquarters of the AFP. However, Philippine authorities maintained that until a case
was filed against Pemberton, custody over him remained with the United States of America. News broke out that
Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo.

Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way inside the premises of the Mutual Defense
Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been instructed by Military Police personnel
not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were closed. As narrated by respondents, petitioner
fomented disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter fence, to see Pemberton. Respondents allege that
the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been subject of various national television, radio, internet,
and print media publications. Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. On the same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference at Camp Aguinaldo, and
publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner. Respondent Cabunoc also
distributed a press statement, which reads: Press Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint against Atty. Harry
Roque.

Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted from, by media. Petitioner
asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Further, petitioner claims that respondents' acts put to question his professional and personal reputation.
Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious acts prescribed under Section
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The subject of the disbarment case pertains to a serious breach of security of a
military zone. The statements were official statements made in the performance of a public function to address
a public concern. The circumstances, which led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the acts alleged
therein were witnessed by the public and duly reported by the media. The filing of the disbarment case was not
meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that transpired at Camp Aguinaldo.
Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of public interest, which is a defense in contempt proceedings such
as this. With the Laude Murder case being of public concern, petitioner has attained the status of a public figure,
susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case. In any case, respondents instituted the
disbarment complaint against petitioner in good faith. They are laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality
rule.

ISSUE:
May respondent officials be punished with contempt?

RULING:
No. The power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of expression, especially when it may
have the effect of stifling comment on public matters. The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without
careful consideration of the circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the
act. Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved, this Court has given a restrictive interpretation
as to what constitutes contempt.

532
The Court, in deciding Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals, ruled that an article which does not impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice is not contumacious.

"Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice.” (Cabansag v. Fernandez quoting Craig v Hamey)

“The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” (Cabansag, supra,
quoting Schenck vs. U.S.).

“The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is
confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their
independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that
the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed
by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the
protection of the courts against contempt.” (Cabansag, supra, quoting Gilbert vs. Minnesota)

“This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a
right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.” (Cabansag, supra, quoting Gitlow vs. New York)

Given these circumstances, citing respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise of this Court's
contempt power.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rules regarding to contempt are not affected.

533
Rule 71, Sec. 3

Webb v. Gatdula
G.R. No. 194469 (Resolution), September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.

The power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly. It should be wielded to ensure the infallibility of
justice where the defiance or disobedience is patent and contumacious that there is an evident refusal to obey.
The presumption of innocence exists and proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary.

FACTS:
This is a petition to resolve indirect contempt for review by the Supreme Court. This case was filed against the
officers of the National Bureau of Investigation including Gatduala. It is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of
Lejano v. People where Hubert Webb was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping
Carmela Vizconde, then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991.

Petitioner is Hubert Webb from the Vizconde Massacre while Respondent is Gatdula, an officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation. In the case at bar Hubert Webb is requesting the NBI to submit semen specimen to DNA
analysis to show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him. After the court directed the NBA to
conduct such analysis claims of the DNA evidence have been said to have disappeared and found on different
accounts. Hence the petition for indirect contempt.

Petitioner Webb argues that the National Bureau of Investigation’s claims are belied by the records of the case.
He points out that based on the prosecution’s evidence only photographs of the slides containing the specimen
were submitted. Also, it was not mentioned by Dr. Cabanyan’s testimony that he turned over the actual slides to
the court. Respondent avers that indirect contempt is moot as the case against Webb was dismissed based on
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Is there indirect contempt?

RULING:
Yes there is indirect contempt.

According to Rule 39 Section 47 of the rules of court as to conclusiveness of judgement there should be identity
as to the parties, and identity as to the cause of action. This is used to properly invoke res judicata, which should
additionally have a judgement sought to bar the new action to be final and the adjudication of the case must be
on the judgement on the merits. Furthermore a civil law principle, res judicata, may not be applied to criminal
cases. Also according to Rule 71, Section 3 there is indirect contempt when there is a disobedience of a lawful
judgement of court

As there is no identity of parties and cause of action in the decision of the case in Lejano, the indirect contempt
is not barred by res judicata. the identity of Webb and Vizconde is different from Webb and Gatdula. Furthermore
the charge of rape with homicide is different from the petition for indirect contempt. The indirect contempt in this
case is simply based on the refusal of the officers of the NBI to follow the order of the court. This refusal tends to
reduce and undermine the authority of the court. The acts of the NBI are clear to be indirect contempt from its
refusal to do the DNA examination.

Therefore the petition for indirect contempt is granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 71 and rule 39 on indirect contempt and execution have not been changed.

534
Rule 71, Sec. 3

Oca v. Custodio
G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful disobedience of an injunction, the fact that those
disobeying the injunction were not parties to the action in which it was granted, and were not personally served,
is no defense, where the injunction restrains not only the parties, but those who act in connection with the party
as attorneys, agents, or employees, and the parties accused, with knowledge of the order and its terms, acting
as the employees of a party, willfully violate it.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
RTC Decision, which found petitioners Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Cirila N. Mojica, Alejandro N.
Mojica, Josefina Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc.
(petitioners) guilty of Indirect Contempt.

This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate controversy among the Board of Trustees of
petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers
agreed to give the necessary supervision to establish the school’s academic foundation. The incorporators and
the La Salle brothers formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of Agreement, under which De La Salle
Greenhills would supervise the academic affairs of St. Francis School to increase enrollment. La Salle appointed
supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting rights. Petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca became a member
of St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the Board of Trustees and was later elected
as its Chairman and St. Francis School’s President. Petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua was also admitted as a La
Salle-appointed supervisor and sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of St. Francis School.

The members of the Board of Trustees came into a disagreement regarding the school’s administrative structure
and La Salle’s supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted to expand the
scope of La Salle’s supervision to include matters relating to the school’s finances, administration, and
operations. This was opposed by Custodio. After several incidents relating to the disagreement, Custodio filed a
complaint against St. Francis School, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua with the RTC alleging that Bro. Oca and
Bro. Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees and also prayed for a Temporary Restraining
Order to prevent Bro. Oca from calling a special membership meeting to remove her from the Board of Trustees.
However, this case was dismissed and Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as
Curriculum Administrator.

Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the Corporation Code with the RTC and she
sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare void all
their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively. Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the
trial court clarify to whom the school’s fees should be paid while her Complaint and Motion were still pending.
Petitioners allegedly manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to Alejandro. However,
Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the school cashier. The RTC issued an Order designating Ms.
Herminia Reynante to act as school cashier “with authority to collect all fees” and, together with Custodio, “to pay
all accounts. The, Custodio manifested that petitioners did not even substantially comply the order of the court
because it excluded from its accounting and turnover the certain amounts. Custodio also claimed that petitioners
violated the trial court order that only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts of St.
Francis School.

The RTC found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for failing to comply with the Orders of the RTC. When
appealed, the CA ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious conduct, which “tended to
prejudice St. Francis School’s operations due to lack of operational funds.”

ISSUES:
(1) Are petitioner’s guilty of willful disobedience?
(2) Are Alejandro Monica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that
they are not parties to the case.

535
RULING:
(1) The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and found petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina
as guilty of indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the RTC
Orders. Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority,
justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which “tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice” or
“interfere with or prejudice parties[‘] litigant or their witnesses during litigation.”

There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii) indirect contempt. Indirect
contempt is committed under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit: xxx (b) Disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto. Xxx Indirect contempt is only punished after a written
petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged.

In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through “disobedience of or resistance
to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court.” Therefore, the decision which ruled petitioners
as guilty of indirect contempt shall be upheld.

(2) No. In Ferrer v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court ruled persons who are not parties in a proceeding may
be declared guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty
of conspiracy with any of the parties in violating the court’s order. However, there is no evidence of
conspiracy in this case. The power to punish contempt must be “exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
judiciously.” Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the non-litigants are guilty of
contempt. This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold both Alejandro and
Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 71, Section 3 of the rules of court was not amended.

536
Rule 71, Sec. 3

Yu Kimteng v. Young
G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015
Leonen, J.

A disbarred lawyer’s name cannot be part of a firm’s name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name that contains
a disbarred lawyer’s name commits indirect contempt of court.

FACTS:
Through this Petition, petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo
(Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation wherein this court ordered the liquidation
of Ruby Industrial in Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al. case. The liquidation
proceedings were presided by Judge Calo. Respondents entered their appearance in the said proceedings as
counsels for the liquidator. Later, an Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009 following the En Banc Resolution in A.C. No.
7054 entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr.

Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty.
Young could still appear for the liquidator as long as his appearance was under the Young Law Firm. However,
such firm does not exists. Hence, petitioners filed herein petition to cite respondents for contempt.

ISSUE:
Is the appearance of a lawyer under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer’s name tantamount to indirect
contempt of court?

RULING:
YES. The use of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.

This court has defined contempt of court as: a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad
sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as
to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court
is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In
addition, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility when they retained the name of
respondent Revilla in their firm name.

Therefore, a disbarred lawyer’s name cannot be part of a firm’s name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name
that contains a disbarred lawyer’s name commits indirect contempt of court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 amended provisions do not include provisions under this Rule

537
Rule 74 Sec. 4

Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas

G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017
Leonen, J.

In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous
considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto,
which respondents never disputed.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of CA in dismissing the petitioner Lolita Bas Cpablanca’s
complaint against the respondent Heirs of Pedro Bas in a complaint for the cancellation of the titles held by the
respondents.

Andres and Pedro Bas acquired a parcel of land. Thereafter, Pedro sold to Faustino Manreal his portion to the
lot, as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale. Upon Faustino and her husband’s deaths, their heirs executed a
notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration and Deed of Absolute Sale, conveying a portion of the lot to Alejandra
Balorio. Balorio sold such lot to Edith Deen who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy Deen. Upon the latter’s death, the
heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate excluding Lot 2535, with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor
of Norberto Bas who took possession of and built a house on it. When Norberto died, he was succeeded by his
niece Lolita Bas. Upon learning that the TCT issued in the names of Andres and Bas was based on a reconstituted
Deed of Conveyance, the respondent heirs filed a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of the lot against Lolita.
The parties then executed a Partition Agreement of the property. When Lolita sought the registration of her
portion, the Register of Deeds denied her application because TCTs were issued in the name of the heirs. Lolita
filed a complaint with the RTC for cancellation of the titles with prayer for damages which was granted on the
ground that there was substantial proof of Lolita’s long possession of the lot. Upon appeal by the heirs of Bas,
the CA reversed the decision.

In this petition, the petitioner claims that the CA erred in stating there is a need of a judicial declaration of heirship
in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of the deceased.

ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have the capacity to assert a right to the property as an heir despite not judicially declaring
her heirship?

RULING:
Yes, she has the right to the property as an heir of Norberto.

Her claim arises from the sale made in favor of Norberto who passed the property to her by succession. It then
shows that her right is superior over that of the heirs of Bas, the original owner. As to the heirship of Lolita, the
Court in previous jurisprudence held that declaration of heirship is no longer necessary as it would hamper justice.
Furthermore, the failure to object to Lolita’s claim by a motion to dismiss is deemed as a waiver of such objection.
Finally, a declaration of heirship is made only in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action. To require

Lolita to file first a special proceeding is not consistent with the purpose of the law.

In this case, the CA based its ruling erroneously on a dismissal of previous cases which is not based on the lack
of declaration of heirship. This is especially so because her filiation and heirship to Norberto was already proven
by evidence, which the respondents never disputed. In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special
proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to
establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never disputed.

EFFECT OF THE REVISED RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect since the case falls under special proceedings.

538
Rule 102, Sec. 1

Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
Leonen, J.

A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 141332. The Court of Appeals found that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio)
was by virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan), SSgt. Osorio was
charged in two (2) Informations before Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of
the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan).

Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011. SSgt. Osorio was arrested by
Colonel Herbert Yambing and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine
Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.

Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional
Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly “service-connected.” In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman
had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case
because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.

The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio’s confinement was “by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial process.
the Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. SSgt. Osorio’s Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in the Court of Appeals February 22, 2016 Resolution.

On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari. SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being
illegally deprived of his liberty because he was charged with an “inexistent offense.” He argues that kidnapping
and serious illegal detention can only be committed by a private person, not by a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio adds that only courts-martial have
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide a criminal case against him.

ISSUE:
Was the writ of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio’s proper remedy?

RULING:
No. Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person

539
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions involved in this case were not amended.

540
Rule 102, Sec. 1

In Re: Salibo v. Warden

G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015
Leonen, J.

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the
person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision reversing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo’s Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. Later,
Salibo returned to the Philippines and he learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station suspected him
to be Butukan S. Malang (Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre who had a pending warrant of arrest). Hence,
Salibo presented himself to the police officer and explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could
not have participated in the Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. While Salibo
was assured that he was not going to be arrested, he was still apprehended and detained at the Datu Hofer
Police Station and at Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City afterwards. Thereafter, Salibo
was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. He then filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty and maintained that he is not the accused
Malang.

Respondent argued that Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed since Salibo was charged
under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. Thus a petition for habeas corpus was “no longer availing.”
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest
referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating
that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre,
Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention because he was not duly charged in court.

ISSUE:
Is the Habeas Corpus a proper remedy for a person detained due to mistaken identity?

RULING:
YES. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.” In the present case, Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him
of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of
his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 amended provisions do not include Rule 102.

541
Rule 102, Sec. 4

Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018
Leonen, J.

If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 141332. The Court of Appeals found that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio)
was by virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan), SSgt. Osorio was
charged in two (2) Informations before Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of
the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan).

Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011. SSgt. Osorio was arrested by
Colonel Herbert Yambing and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine
Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.

Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional
Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly “service-connected.” In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman
had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case
because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.

The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio’s confinement was “by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial process.
the Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. SSgt. Osorio’s Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in the Court of Appeals February 22, 2016 Resolution.

On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari. SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being
illegally deprived of his liberty because he was charged with an “inexistent offense.” He argues that kidnapping
and serious illegal detention can only be committed by a private person, not by a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio adds that only courts-martial have
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide a criminal case against him.

ISSUE:
Was the writ of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio’s proper remedy?

RULING:
No. Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,

542
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because provisions involved in this case were not amended.

543
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec. 17

Sanchez v. Darroca
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019
Leonen, J.

The writ of Amparo must be based on substantial evidence. Failure to prove such should not allow the writ of
amparo to prosper.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the RTC Decision denying Vivian A. Sanchez’s petition
for a writ of amparo.

Sanchez learned that her estranged husband was among the seven alleged members of the NPA who were
gunned down by the PNP. She then went to the funeral home to verify the news. At the funeral home, the police
officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. A few hours after, PO2 Dela Cruz, a close
friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The following day, Sanchez
went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to
apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for
her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband's body.

In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle
that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband’s wake. She also noticed someone
shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children’s safety.

Sanchez then filed before the RTC of San Jose, Antique a Petition for Writ of Amparo against Police
Superintendent Marc Anthony D. Darroca (Police Superintendent Darroca), Police Senior Superintendent Leo
Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers under their authority.

Eventually, the RTC denied the petition, holding that Sanchez failed to substantiate her assertion that she
became a person of interest to the police after she had identified her husband’s dead body. This was because
she was unable to specifically allege the police officers’ acts or the acts they sanctioned which threatened her
security and liberty.

ISSUE:
Was there substantial evidence to allow the writ of Amparo to prosper?

RULING:
Yes. The totality of petitioner’s evidence undoubtedly showed that she became a person of interest after she had
first visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by
claiming that petitioner’s photo was not “posted” in the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling
petitioner that she saw petitioner’s photo at the police station. Whether petitioner’s photo was actually posted
and distributed at the police station or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters
petitioner’s claims that she was being monitored by the police.

Respondents try to paint petitioner’s claims as the ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but
even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they
set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and her
family.

The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that petitioner and her children were the subject of
surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's Army, creating a real
threat to their life, liberty, or security.

Hence, the petition is granted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on the Writ of Amparo did not change.

544
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec. 18

De Lima v. Gatdula
G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013
Leonen, J.

The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify
and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the SC
via Rule 45, and not the order granting the privilege of the writ.

FACTS:
Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a “Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo” against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, Director Nonnatus Rojas and Deputy
Director Reynaldo Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (“De Lima, et al.”). The RTC issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an answer, and set the case for hearing. During that hearing, De
Lima, et al. argued that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.

In an Order, Judge Pampilo insisted that “since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but
answer”. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised
Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a
hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda. The court further decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer. The RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed
for. In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012
filed by De Lima, et al.

ISSUE:
Was the procedure that Judge Pampilo ordered in the Writ of Amparo proper?

RULING:
No. The RTC’s Decision and Order are incorrect. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of
the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but
decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.

The judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits
submitted “with the attendant circumstances detailed”. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ
of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of
the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer,
the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to
detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. Hence, the court’s
insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It was also irregular to the hold a hearing on the main case
prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been
properly joined.

The RTC erred in requiring a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al. The
Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be
done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party
litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute
for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More importantly, a
memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The fourth irregularity was the Decision itself. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from
the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the

545
evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents
that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial relief to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic
or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.” Moreover, Rules on Summary Procedure do not
apply to Writ of Amparo cases. A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It
is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to
avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses
cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.”

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic
or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

546
Rule 103, Sec. 1

Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. She is merely seeking to correct
her records to conform to her true given name. R.A. 9048 removed the correction of clerical or typographical
errors from the scope of Rule 108 and dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname. Therefore, it is the civil registrar
who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo’s petition, not the RTC. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or
municipal civil registrar can the RTC take cognizance of her case

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which denied the
Republic of the Philippines’ appeal from the RTC Order granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo’s
(Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth (Birth Cert).

Gallo prayed before the RTC for the correction of her name in her Birth Cert from “Michael” to “Michelle” and of
her biological sex from “Male” to “Female” under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as she has never been known
as Michael and she has always been female. She also asked for the inclusion of her parents’ middle names and
their marriage date, as these were not recorded. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma,
voter’s certification, official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother’s birth certificate, and parents’
marriage certificate.

The RTC granted the petition, giving credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections
sought were “harmless and innocuous”. The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the applicable rule should
be Rule 103 for Petitions for Change of Name and Gallo should state the cause of the change of name. The CA
denied the appeal and found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought
were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.

ISSUE:
Does Gallo’s request involve a substantive change under Rule 103 instead of mere correction of clerical errors?

RULING:
No. In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of
Gallo’s biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all
other corrections sought.

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to
change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name. The lower courts have
determined that she has been known as “Michelle” all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her
records to conform to her true given name.

Rule 108 does not apply in this case. The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo’s name is R.A. No. 9048
because the amended law (R.A. No. 10172) was enacted only on August 19, 2012, 2 years after Gallo filed her
Petition. R.A. 9048 removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also
dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil
register, or changes of first name or nickname. Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo’s middle name, the middle
names of her parents and the date of her parents’ marriage fall under clerical or typographical errors. Therefore,
it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo’s petition, not the RTC. Only if her petition was
denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the RTC take cognizance of her case. However, for reasons
of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-
compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent
filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.

547
However, the petition to correct Gallo’s biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial
change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. It was only when
Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be
administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error. However, this is not true
for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes made under Rule 103.

548
Rule 108, Sec. 2

Miller v. Miller
G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019
Leonen, J.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court emphasized that
“legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack[.]” Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family
Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC
Judgment denying the Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller.

Petitioner Glenn Miller is a legitimate child of John Miller. After John’s death, Joan Miller, through her mother
Lennie Espenida, filed before the RTC a Petition for Partition and Accounting of John’s estate. Alleging that she
is John’s illegitimate child with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to be her
registered father.

Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan’s Certificate of Live Birth be canceled. With it, he also prayed
that the Local Civil Registrar be directed to replace Joan’s surname, Miller, with Espenida, and that Joan use
Espenida instead of Miller in all official documents. After trial, RTC rendered a decision ordering that Glenn’s
petition be dismissed, that Joan continue using the surname Miller, and that the Local Civil Registrar maintain
the status quo and never to amend nor change the certificate of live birth of Joan Miller. The CA denied Glenn’s
appeal.

Evelyn Miller, et al., who substituted Glenn as his surviving legal heirs, filed before SC this Petition for Review
on Certiorari. They argued that since private respondent was born on June 25, 1982, the applicable provision is
Article 368 of the Civil Code, which states that illegitimate children shall bear their mother’s surname. Thus,
private respondent should use her mother’s surname in her birth certificate.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller is proper to change her
surname to her mother’s surname, Espenida.

RULING:
No. This Court stresses that Glenn’s initiatory pleading before the RTC is a Petition for Correction of Entries in
the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida. This type of petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

In In re: Barretto v. The Local Registrar of Manila, this Court explained that:
. . . the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to “innocuous or clerical errors, such as
misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding” or
corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private
respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent’s filiation will be gravely affected, as
changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity,
but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court emphasized that
“legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack[.]” Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family
Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions are not included in the 2019 amended rules of procedure.

549
Rule 108, Sec. 2

Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

The petition to correct Gallo’s biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial change
excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. It was only when Republic
Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be administratively
corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error. However, this is not true for all cases as
corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which denied the
Republic of the Philippines’ appeal from the RTC Order granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo’s
(Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth (Birth Cert).

Gallo prayed before the RTC for the correction of her name in her Birth Cert from “Michael” to “Michelle” and of
her biological sex from “Male” to “Female” under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as she has never been known
as Michael and she has always been female. She also asked for the inclusion of her parents’ middle names and
their marriage date, as these were not recorded. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma,
voter’s certification, official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother’s birth certificate, and parents’
marriage certificate.

The RTC granted the petition, giving credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections
sought were “harmless and innocuous”. The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the applicable rule should
be Rule 103 for Petitions for Change of Name and Gallo should state the cause of the change of name. The CA
denied the appeal and found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought
were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.

ISSUE:
Does Gallo’s request involve a substantive change under Rule 103 instead of mere correction of clerical errors?

RULING:
No. In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of
Gallo’s biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all
other corrections sought.

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to
change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name. The lower courts have
determined that she has been known as “Michelle” all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her
records to conform to her true given name.

Rule 108 does not apply in this case. The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo’s name is R.A. No. 9048
because the amended law (R.A. No. 10172) was enacted only on August 19, 2012, 2 years after Gallo filed her
Petition. R.A. 9048 removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also
dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil
register, or changes of first name or nickname. Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo’s middle name, the middle
names of her parents and the date of her parents’ marriage fall under clerical or typographical errors. Therefore,
it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo’s petition, not the RTC. Only if her petition was
denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the RTC take cognizance of her case. However, for reasons
of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-
compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent
filing of a motion to dismiss based
on that ground by way of laches.

However, the petition to correct Gallo’s biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial
change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. It was only when

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Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be
administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error. However, this is not true
for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes made under Rule 103.

551
Rule 110, Sec. 5

Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

The required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a
criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as
it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest.

FACTS:
The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City 4 Informations for grave oral
defamation against Deogracia M. Valderrama pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL Vigden. During
trial Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the
Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further evidence and
required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five (5) days. The prosecution failed to formally offer
its evidence within five (5) days from the hearing. Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (Motion to
Reconsider) explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he had to manage his high blood
pressure. Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his conformity to Vigden’s
Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, and the Motion to Reconsider’s
Notice of Hearing “was defective because it was not addressed to the parties, and did not specify the date and
time of the hearing.” She further argued that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for
motions for reconsideration. She likewise pointed out that there was no medical certificate attached to the Motion
to Reconsider to prove the private prosecutor’s sickness. Finally, she contended that the eight (8)-year delay in
the prosecution of the cases violated Valderrama’s right to speedy trial.

The Metropolitan Trial Court granted Vigden’s Motion to Reconsider and set the continuation of the prosecution’s
presentation of further evidence for the last time.

Valderrama filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, the latter found no grave abuse of discretion by the lower
court and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
in its Decision

Valderrama argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the patently
defective Motion to Reconsider. She contends that the Motion to Reconsider violated procedural rules and its
grant was not a mere error of judgment. Valderrama adds that failure to comply with Rule 14, Sections 4 and 5
of the Rules of Court renders the motion “a worthless piece of paper.

ISSUE:
Whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Reconsider to allow the
prosecution to continue its presentation of evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The respondent’s Motion to Reconsider was fatally defective and should have been denied by the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

The public prosecutor’s conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is necessary as provided under Rule 110, Section
5 of the Rules of Court.

In Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, this Court ruled that the required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere
superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to
prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest.
The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public
prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the required
legal personality to pursue the case.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not denied by the private
respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the the Office of the City Prosecutor did not object to the
filing of the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the City Prosecutor was only furnished with a copy of the Motion

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to Reconsider and it opens with the phrase “[p]rivate complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states . . .” This is not sufficient. Since
the Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, it involves the criminal aspect
of the case and, thus, cannot be considered without the public prosecutor’s conforme.

Furthermore, Respondent also did not set a hearing for the Motion to Reconsider. Instead, she simply submitted
it for Metropolitan Trial Court’s immediate consideration. The notice did not comply with Rule 15, Sections 4 and
5 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the notice of hearing on the motion must be directed to the adverse party and
must inform him or her of the time and date of the hearing. Failure to comply with these mandates renders the
motion fatally defective, equivalent to a useless scrap of paper. In De la Peña v. De la Peña, this Court
enumerated the cases where it consistently ruled that a proper notice of hearing was necessary in filing motions
for reconsideration.

Lastly, This Court notes that the Motion to Reconsider was filed outside the period allowed by the rules as set in
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Order on April 12, 2012 and
required the prosecution to formally offer its documentary evidence within five (5) days from that date.[62] The
prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from the hearing. It also failed to file the Motion
to Reconsider within 15 days. The prosecution had 15 days from April 12, 2012, or until April 27, 2012 to file its
Motion to Reconsider. The private prosecutor filed her Motion to Reconsider only on May 8, 2012, or 26 days
after the Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Order.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

None. Since, the amendments did not affect the rules mentioned herein.

553
Rule 110, Sec. 5

Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Leonen, J.

Procedural law, under Rule 110, Sec. 5, basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. The duty and authority
to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public
Prosecutor. There may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action
on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process).

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction filed
by Marilou S. Laude (Marilou) and Mesehilda S. Laude.

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed in Olongapo City, allegedly by 19-year-old
US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling,
Marilou, against Pemberton before the City Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo. The Public
Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton, who surrendered personally to Judge Roline M.
Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-Jabalde). On December 19, 2014, Marilou filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
AFP to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail. The motion was scheduled for hearing on
December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s
counsel through registered mail. They claim to have also furnished a copy of the motion personally at the hearing
of the motion. On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners’ Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the Motion
based on the three-day rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court which, according to
them, should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances. Further, they argue that
the Judge should not have dismissed the Motion considering that the it raised issues of transcendental
importance and of primordial public interest. Lastly, they argue that the Public Prosecutor’s refusal to sign the
Motion rendered the requirement for conformity superfluous. On the other hand, public respondents argue that
petitioners’ failure to comply cannot be excused in light of the rule’s purpose. Further, they aver that the
requirement for motions to be filed in the name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor is part of the
essential, inherent, and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals. They also aver that Pemberton’s
handover specifically to the Olongapo City Jail is unnecessary. Lastly, they maintain that petitioners are not
entitled to a mandatory injunction since they have no clear and unmistakable right to the transfer of Pemberton
from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail.

ISSUES:
1. Is compliance with the three-day notice rule on motions mandatory?
2. Is the refusal of a public prosecutor to give conforme to an interlocutory relief considered abuse of discretion?
3. May a writ of mandatory injunction be issued to compel the turn-over of the custody of the accused pursuant
to a VFA agreement?

RULING:
1. Yes, because Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party
be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process. While
the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper,
an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither
cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time
to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In
this case, the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. The general rule must
apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion
orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was
able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was
correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of

554
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to
prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

2. No, because refusal to give concurrence to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of the public prosecutor’s
position. Procedural law, under Rule 110, Sec. 5, basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. The duty and authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue,
are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. There may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process). In this
case, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave
abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. That petitioners used as
bases newspaper articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of Secretary De
Lima cannot be given weight. Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have
been for petitioners to have the act reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

3. No, because the petition did not discuss the basis for their claim that they are entitled to the sought writ. A writ
of mandatory injunction is granted only upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Further, the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during
trial as contained in the VFA provides that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody. The parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties,
but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing
trial, in Camp Aguinaldo. Their claim that the detention facility is under the “control, supervision and jurisdiction
of American military authorities” is not substantiated.

Hence the petition for issuance of writ of mandatory injunction is denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 15, Secs. 4 and 5 of the 2019 Amendments on Rules of Civil Procedure, because the
three-day notice rule is no longer required. Secs. 4 and 5 of the new rules provide for litigious and non-litigous
motions. What is mandatory now is the service or notice of the motion to another party and proof of such service
to the court.

555
Rule 110, Sec. 6

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
Leonen, J.

The allegation in the information as to the circumstances of wearing masks established the intent to conceal their
identities, which did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi, although he did not present such. Hence,
his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him was not violated.

FACTS:
This case involves separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the accused-appellants Christopher Soliva,
Warren Zipangan, and Robert Alvir, seeking the reversal of the SC’s decision in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and attempted murder of Fortes, Natalicio, Lachica (Lachica),
Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston resulting from fraternity-related violence. SC previously reversed the decision of
the CA which ruled that the other accused are only guilty of slight physical injuries, thereby reverting to RTC’s
decision.

Soliva contends that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio’s sole testimony, which
he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. He points out that prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was
able to witness the attack on Natalicio but was unable to identify him as the attacker. Also, Alvir argues that
Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his forearms, which created doubt that
he was able to see his attackers. He argues that Lachica’s statement that he was still able to raise his head while
parrying blows was impossible, and that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime,
Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and Zingapan.

Zipangan argues that the information filed against him was insufficient as to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The aggravating circumstance of “masks and/or
other forms of disguise” was alleged in the Information to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers
intended to conceal their identities.

Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police Officers Romeo Cabrera
(Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the
Philippines Infirmary should have been given credibility by this Court, and that the victims’ delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries
of Cabrera and Salvador since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers.

Alvir argues that the decision of the SC in the review did not apply to his co-accused who did not appeal to this
Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla.

ISSUES:
1. Are Natalicio’s and Lachica’s testimonies sufficient to prove the appellants’ identity?
2. Was Zingapan’s right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him violated?
3. Are the victims credible witnesses despite delay in the reporting of the incident?
4. Does the SC Decision affect those accused who did not appeal the case?

RULING:
1. Yes. The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Natalicio’s and Tan’s testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio’s position during the attack. Natalicio explained
that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his
attackers. This is consistent with Tan’s testimony that he saw the incident but failed to identify the attackers only
because he did not know their names. As to Alvir’s contention, the Court ruled that it is the most natural reaction
of victims to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner of the commission of
the crime, creating a lasting impression. Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants.
Private complainants’ testimonies were clear and categorical.

556
2. No. An information shall state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The allegation in the information as to the circumstances of wearing masks established the intent to conceal their
identities, which did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi, although he did not present such. Hence,
his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him was not violated.

3. Yes. Even if Natalicio denied knowing his attackers, it did not cast doubt on accused-appellants’ guilt due to
the conditions prevailing within the campus at the time of the incident must also be taken into account, that is, all
students involved in fraternity rumbles are expelled. As to the delay in reporting the crime, the alleged delay in
reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants’ injuries upon which they had to recuperate first, as
well as their desire to report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These circumstances are not enough to
disprove their credibility as witnesses.

4. No. The Court ruled that while SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it cannot disturb
the penalties imposed by CA on those who did not appeal, namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with
Rule 122, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

CA reviewed the case with regard to all the accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of
appeal since the sentence imposed is death penalty pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. However,
CA lowered some of the imposable penalties of accused-appellants, which was then brought back to
the higher offense of attempted murder by the SC. Since such ruling is unfavorable to the accused-appellants, it
shall therefore not apply to those who did not join the appeal.

Furthermore, as the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the appeal before the CA, the highest
penalty the CA could impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of a CA Decision by the SC will never be
mandatory or automatic because as previously applied under the rules, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment
cases were brought before the SC via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed on automatic
review. Hence, Feliciano and Medalla cannot be bound by the appeal of the accused-appellants since a notice
of appeal is required.

Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision on the Rules for Criminal Procedure.

557
Rule 110, Sec. 6

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
Leonen, J.

An information sufficiently informs the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against them even
when the information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off. Since failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such, it was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. The
introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of
their right to be informed of their offenses because the information charges conspiracy among the accused. This
would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later
on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization, and one of them died from his injuries.

Four days after the incident, the victims reported the incident to the NBI. Thereafter, an information for murder
was filed. Separate informations for attempted murder were also filed. The informations included the following
statement: “the above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating
with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually
helping one another.” At the trial, among those presented as witness by the prosecution were several bystanders.

ISSUES:
1. Did the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them?
2. Are the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae?
3. Did the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies?

RULING:
1. Yes, the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them.

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise” in the information does not violate their constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in
the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. The
introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their
identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The information charges conspiracy among the
accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had

558
been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them
might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

Thus, the information was not violative of the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

2. Yes, the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae.

As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, . . .” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is
when the evidence is part of res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

Thus, the statements made by the bystanders are admissible in evidence.

Nonetheless, the statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety
of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that
of the victims.

3. No, the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies.

The fact that they went to the NBI four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their credibility since
most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity moves
as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well enough to go to
the NBI headquarters in order to give their statements. The decision to report the incident to the NBI instead
of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the NBI more equipped to
handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely
following the legal advice of their counsel.

Thus, the belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive identification of the appellants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

As for Rule 110, Sec. 1, and our principles on the credibility of witnesses, they have not been amended nor
repealed by the Revised Rules.

As for Rule 130, Sec. 42, the Revised Rules on Evidence renumbered the same to Sec. 44 and now expressly
states that the statements made must be “under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence.”

559
Rule 110, Sec. 14

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been included
in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a formal
amendment that can be made at any time. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the
offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. While conspiracy is merely
a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed after his plea. Therefore, such
formal amendment after plea is not allowed.

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assails Order and Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular) of RTC in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The assailed
Order granted the prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito
Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime charged.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto
and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him.

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla (wife of the deceased) also
filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Bonifacio (Asst. Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with
the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the
case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties.
Subsequently, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the Bling of an
amended information before the Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where
he reinstated the RTC October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against
Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular granted the motion to amend the information and to admit
the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against Corpus.

Priscilla claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no
basis since petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim. The OSG also adds that
the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended information will not affect
Samonte’s substantial rights.

ISSUE:
1. Was the non-filing of motion for reconsideration to RTC fatal to this case?
2. May the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period
suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
3. Did respondent err when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and
jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused?
4. Did respondent has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr.?

RULING:
1. The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order
or decision. Certiorari, therefore, “is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration.”

560
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari.” This enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a “concrete,
compelling, and valid reason.”

Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court.
Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by respondent
Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or
Memorandum.

It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere
procedural technicality. These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly
complied with.” Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before filing this Petition is fatal.

2. Yes. Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an
arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the DOJ. It does not suspend the execution of a
warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of
arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending
petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”

Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.1Thus,
the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with
the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

3. Yes, but it is only a formal amendment which prejudiced the other accused. Petitioners question the inclusion
of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended
information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her
arraignment.

After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it does
not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if
it is beneficial to the accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot
invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is
only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the
essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original
information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
“conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the
prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the amendment is merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for murder against Samonte was dated
June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano’s affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, Corpus was implicated as the one who
instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This prompted the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, which
resulted in the filing of the amended information.

561
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the
amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not
be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment
after plea is not allowed.

4. Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is required for the judge to “personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.” In case the evidence on record fails
to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a discussion showing both the
factual and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original information until the filing of the
Motion to Amend Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the incidents of this
case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant,
a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case.

Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended information that
constrained him to find probable cause in issuing the warrant.

The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information and supporting documents,
the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the
warrant of arrest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rules on criminal procedure was not amended.

562
Due Process Rights of Respondent in Preliminary Investigations

Pemberton v. De Lima
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
Leonen, J.

There is no denial of due process in the preliminary investigation proceedings where respondent had multiple
opportunities to controvert the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, such as when he was
directed to file a counter-affidavit, and was given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the initial finding of
probable cause.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari praying that the Resolutions dated January 27, 2015 and February 20,
2015 of respondent Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima in I.S. No. III-10-INV-14J-01102 be reversed and set
aside.

A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). During
the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that Pemberton’s right to file a counter-
affidavit was deemed waived.

Pemberton filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion: 1) to Determine Probable Cause on the Basis of Evidence
Submitted as of 27 October 2014; and 2) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 29 October 2014 dated
November 4, 2014.

However, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular
inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. Through the Resolution dated December 15, 2014,
it “found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder.” On the same day, an Information for
murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a
warrant of arrest.

On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the same
day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. In the Resolution dated January
27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton’s Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was “no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City.” Pemberton’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated
February 20, 2015. Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Did respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima commit grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of
probable cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby denying petitioner due process of law?
2. Has petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court instead of
the Court of Appeals?
3. Has this case been rendered moot and academic?

RULING:
1. No.

There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on
respondent De Lima’s assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that
petitioner murdered the victim. The convergence of the circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and
reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and cruelty.

2. No.

563
A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

In this case, petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited trial. Thus,
petitioner claims that it is necessary “to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to whether . . . respondent
[De Lima] committed grave abuse of discretion . . . in issuing the [a]ssailed [r]esolutions.” In his view, a direct
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is necessary. Petitioner argues that without this Court’s intervention,
a situation may result where “the trial has already concluded[,] while the issue on whether there exists probable
cause to charge [petitioner] with the crime of murder . . . has not been settled with finality.”

This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for
review of petitioner’s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner
is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. Once
there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.
Consequently, even assuming that grave abuse of discretion somehow taints an executive finding of probable
cause, such grave abuse of discretion has no effect in a trial. Whether respondent De Lima, indeed, committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant to the trial
itself.

3. Yes.

The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has already
rendered this Petition moot. It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the
judicial determination of probable cause. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her]
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel
or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent.
Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial
court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

This Petition has already been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of probable cause in
the form of the Regional Trial Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because Rules of Criminal Procedure has not been amended by the Revised Rules.

564
Rule 112, Sec. 1

Marantan v. Department of Justice

G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019
Leonen, J.

A petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information based on
the preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in turn, would complete its own determination of
probable cause. After this judicial determination, the question of an accused’s guilt or innocence would rest with
the trial court’s own sound discretion.

FACTS:
The case involves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that the DOJ be prohibited from proceeding
with the preliminary investigation involving petitioner due to its lack to impartiality and independence and because
it violates petitioner’s right to due process and equal protection of laws.

Petitioner was among the police officers involved in the shootout in Atimonan, Quezon between combined forces
of the PNP and AFP. Then President Aquino ordered NBI to investigate what was then called the Atimonan
Encounter. Subsequently, DOJ Secretary De Lima submitted a report stating that the NBI would file criminal
charges against the involved police and armed forces personnel.

A few days later, DOJ issued DOJ Office Order No. 208, convening a Panel of Prosecutors (Panel) to conduct a
preliminary investigation. A day after the issuance of the DOJ Office Order, petitioner filed a Letter-Motion with
DOJ Secretary De Lima and copy furnished the Senior Deputy State Prosecutor, praying that the DOJ inhibit
from conducting the preliminary investigation, and instead forward the its records to the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, said Letter-Motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Two days later, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation that after he had this Petition, the Panel conducted his
preliminary investigation. In their Comment, respondents attached an Omnibus Resolution wherein the Panel
found probable cause to charge petitioner, along with his co-respondent police officers with the crime of multiple
murder. Then Petitioner filed his Reply.

ISSUE:
Is the Preliminary Investigation conducted by the NBI incorrect?

RULING:
No, the preliminary investigation was conducted correctly by the Court.

Petitioner claims that the case is an exception to the rule on judiciary hierarchy because it was the Court’s duty
to decide whether the other branches of government have committed grave abuse of discretion.

The relevant issues in determining whether grave abuse of discretion attended the preliminary investigation are:
(1) whether petitioner had been so fundamentally deprived of an opportunity to be herd in relation to the purposes
of preliminary investigation; (2) whether the infirmities were so fatal that they effectively deprived petitioner of any
opportunity to be heard during the judicial examination, pre-trial and trial; and (3) whether there would be a public
policy interest in suspending the criminal action.

The process of preliminary investigation is essentially one (1)-sided, as it serves to assist the prosecution to
summarily decide whether there was sufficient basis to: (1) charge a person with an person; and (2) prevent a
harassment suit that both prejudices a respondent and wastes government resources. During the preliminary
investigation, the prosecution only needs to determine whether it has prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of
the information.

Here, petitioner failed to show any basis to find that the Omnibus Resolution, which found probable cause to
charge him with murder, as erroneous. He broadly claims that the Panel was not an impartial tribunal and,
because their superior had already prejudged petitioner to be guilty, they had no choice but to arrive at the same
conclusion and tailor their resolution fit to find probable cause against petitioner. However, aside from failing to

565
establish respondent DOJ Secretary De Lima’s bias against him, petitioner also failed to show that the Panel’s
conclusion was wrong, much less tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, a petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information
based on the preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in turn, would complete its own
determination of probable cause. After this judicial determination, the question of an accused’s guilt or innocence
would rest with the trial court’s own sound discretion.

Here, an information against petitioner has already been filed before the RTC. Consequently, whether the case
should be dismissed, or whether petitioner should be acquitted or convicted, is for the trial court to determine.
Resolving whether public respondent DOJ should have inhibited from conducting the preliminary investigation
and forwarded the case records to the Office of the Ombudsman would be of no practical use and value here.

EFFECT OF THE REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

566
Rule 112, Sec. 1

Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas

G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2020
Leonen, J.

A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function and generally lies
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion that can be corrected through the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer that the decision by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas (Respondent Office) be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Maria Tupaz filed a Criminal Complaint with Respondent Office for falsification (penalized under Art.
171 of the RPC) and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against private respondents
Atty. Fernando Abella, the Registrar of Deeds of Catamaran, Nothern Samar, and Macrina Espina. The Criminal
Complaint maintained that Atty. Abella: (1) issued a spurious owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT No. 15609,
representing the land owned by her Mother; tolerated the use of an qually spurious Certificate Authorizing
Registration and Deed of Conveyance; and (3) enable the issuance of specious transfer certificats of titles, with
Genaro (represented by Macrina) as beneficiary. Hence, she filed her Complaint, asserting that Atty. Abella,
along with Macrina, were liable for falsification, graft and corrupt practices, misconduct, dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Respondent Office dismissed petitioner’s complaint for being “premature” and declined to file criminal
information. When Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant Office denied it maintaining that the
complaint was premature and that she has the option to again lodge the same complaint as long as the issue on
ownership of the subject property has been settled by the proper court.

ISSUE:
Did respondent office commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing complaint of petitioner?

RULING:
Yes, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint.

As a general rule, a public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of
filing an Information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale
of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

This case is not unique. In the past, this Court has overturned the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution not
finding probable cause in criminal complaints concerning titles whose issuance was allegedly occasioned by
falsification perpetrated by a registrar of deeds who may have violated Section 3(e).

The charge of falsification cannot prosper. Nonetheless, respondent Office failed in addressing the charges of
graft and corruption. Private respondent Abella’s official acts fell miserably short of the standards apropos to his
office. While he did not act with private respondent Macrina out of a shared malevolent design, he nonetheless
relied on manifestly defective and tellingly suspicious documents that private respondent Macrina presented.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case are not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

567
Rule 112, Sec. 1

Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019
Leonen, J.

Resolutions made by public prosecutors in determining probable cause shall not generally be disturbed by courts.
However, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed against a public prosecutor who is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion in determining probable cause.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 praying that the Resolution of public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

In an affidavit-complaint, petitioner, an owner of a resort, alleged that Barangay Captain Amores collected
increased monthly garbage collection fees amounting to Php 2,000 even without any ordinance or statute, or any
other regulation authorizing its collection, and despite the City of Lapu-Lapu already collecting its own garbage
fees. Petitioner wrote to Barangay Captain Amores questioning her authority to levy garbage collection fees,
considering the same fees were already being paid to the City alongside business taxes and fees for licenses,
and considering that no public hearing was ever conducted. As a result of the letter, the Barangay stopped
collecting the resort’s garbage.

In its assailed Resolution, public respondent dismissed the complaint for Illegal Exactions, penalized under Art.
213(2) of the RPC, and violation of Sec. 48 of RA No. 9003 filed by petitioner against private respondents. In its
assailed Order, public respondent denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

In dismissing the charge of violating Section 48 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act, Atty. Mernado
of respondent Office noted that the allegations against the public officers do not fall under the 16 prohibited acts
of Section 48. In dismissing the charge of illegal exactions penalized under Art. 213(2) of the RPC, Atty. Mernado
explained that complainant failed to present the Ordinance on garbage fees.

Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did respondent office committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint?

RULING:
Yes, respondent office committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.

Jurisprudence has settled that probable cause for the filing of an information is “a matter which rests on likelihood
rather than on certainty. It relies of common sense rather than on clear and convincing evidence. Determining
whether probable cause exists for the filing of an information is an executive function. It is not a power that rests
in courts. Generally, courts do not disturb conclusions made by public prosecutors. This is due to the basic
principle of separation of powers. Nonetheless, “grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor’s resolution
if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.” As such, in keeping with the principle
of checks and balances, a writ of certiorari may issue and undo the prosecutor’s iniquitous determination.

Contrary to Atty. Mernado’s conclusion, the evidence sustains a “reasonable belief” that private respondent
Amores demanded the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules used in this case are not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

568
Rule 112, Sec. 1

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Price Richardson Corp.

G.R. No. 197032, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is an
executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor and the justice
secretary. If the public prosecutor finds probable cause to charge a person with a crime, he or she causes the
filing of an information before the court. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor’s
determination of the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its correctness.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the resolutions of the Department of Justice in denying the Petition for Review filed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner prays for the filing of an Information against Price
Richardson Corporation, Consuelo Velarde-Albert, and Gordon Resnick for violating Sections 26.3 and 28 of the
Securities Regulation Code.

Respondent Price Richardson Corporation is a Philippine corporation whose primary purpose is to provide
administrative services which includes but is not limited to furnishing all necessary and incidental clerical,
bookkeeping, mailing and billing services.” Its former employee, Michelle S. Avelino, executed a sworn affidavit
at the National Bureau of Investigation’s Interpol Division, alleging that Price Richardson was “engaged in boiler
room operations, wherein the company sells non[-] existent stocks to investors using high pressure sales tactics
Upon application of the NBI and the SEC, the RTC issued three search warrants against Price Richardson for
violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The search warrants were served and Price
Richardson’s office equipment and documents were seized.

SEC filed before the DOJ its complaint against defendants for violation of Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC and
Sections 26.3 and 28 of the SRC. The SEC alleged that Price Richardson was neither licensed nor registered “to
engage in the business of buying and selling securities within the Philippines or act as salesman, or an associated
person of any broker or dealer.” However, the State Prosecutor Aristotle M. issued a Resolution, dismissing the
SEC’s complaint “for lack of probable cause.” According to him, is imperative for complainant to prove the
respondent-corporation’s affirmative act of buying and selling securities to constitute the offense charged. It
cannot be established on the expedient reason that a corporation is not license[d] or authorize[d] to trade
securities. Thereafter, the SEC moved for reconsideration which was denied. The SEC subsequently filed before
the DOJ a Petition for Review of State Prosecutor’s resolutions. However, it was also denied. The SEC then filed
a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA affirmed the assailed resolutions ruling that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of DOJ Secretary when he affirmed State Prosecutor resolutions, which found no
probable cause to file an information.

Petitioner herein claims that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause
to indict respondents. On the other side, Respondent Price Richardson argues that the determination of probable
cause is an executive function and is reviewable by courts only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion. The
DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was no probable cause to indict respondents
for violation of the Securities Regulation Code.

ISSUE:
May court pass upon the determination of the prosecutor of probable cause.

RULING:
Yes. Courts may pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion.

Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine the
existence of probable cause. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

569
It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is an
executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor and the justice
secretary. If the public prosecutor finds probable cause to charge a person with a crime, he or she causes the
filing of an information before the court. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor’s
determination of the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its correctness. It does not
review the determination of probable cause made by the prosecutor. It does not function as the prosecutor’s
appellate court. Thus, it is also the public prosecutor who decides “what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause.” Upon filing of the information before the court, judicial determination of probable cause
is initiated. The court shall make a personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence.
Unlike the executive determination of probable cause, the purpose of judicial determination of probable cause is
“to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. Thus, the general rule is that the
determination of probable cause is an executive function which courts cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts
may interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause only when there is grave abuse of discretion.
A prosecutor gravely abuses his or her discretion in not finding probable cause by disregarding or overlooking
evidence that “are sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe that the crime was committed and that the
respondent was its author.” Further, “what is material to a finding of probable cause is the commission of acts
constituting [the offense], the presence of all its elements and the reasonable belief, based on evidence, that the
respondent had committed it.”

In this case, grave abuse of discretion exists, which warrants this Court’s interference in the conduct of the
executive determination of probable cause because petitioner provided sufficient bases to form a belief that a
crime was possibly committed by respondent Price Richardson. Based on the Certification issued by the Market
Regulation Department of the SEC, Price Richardson “has never been issued any secondary license to act as
broker/dealer in securities, investment house and dealer in government securities.” SEC also certified that Price
Richardson “is not, under any circumstances, authorized or licensed to engage and/or solicit investments from
clients.” Moreover, documents seized from respondent Price Richardson’s office show possible sales of
securities. The evidence gathered by petitioner and the statement of respondent Price Richardson are facts
sufficient enough to support a reasonable belief that respondent is probably guilty of the offense charged.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was not amended nor revised.

570
Rule 112, Sec. 3

Binay vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 213957-58, August 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-
respondents.

FACTS:
This involves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify the Office of the Ombudsman’s Resolution
adding then Makati City Mayor Elenita S. Binay among the accused in both the Information for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for malversation.

It was revealed in an audit conducted by COA that the City of Makati, through its General Services Department
Head and former Mayor Binay, entered into a contract with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies (Apollo) for
the purchase from Apollo of hospital beds and bedside cabinets for the Ospital ng Makati. The manufacturer’s
invoice for the transaction showed that the items’ actual total cost was merely P2,447,376.14, which was well
below P36,431,700.00, the amount paid to Apollo. As a result, two (2) Complaints were filed separately before
the Office of the Ombudsman. On May 9, 2011, the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to indict 15 officials. No probable cause was found against Mayor Binay.

Two (2) Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan based on the Ombudsman Resolution. Thereafter,
three (3) MRs were filed by some of the officials who were indicted. They argued that they could not be held
liable for malversation because they were not the funds’ custodians. They averred that it was Mayor Binay who
not only was the custodian, but was also the approving authority in their disbursement. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued a Consolidated Resolution recommending the inclusion of Mayor Binay as an accused in the
two mentioned cases which was later approved by Ombudsman Carpio Morales. Subsequently, the Informations
filed before the Sandiganbayan were amended to include Mayor Binay as accused. Mayor Binay filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but this was denied.

Thus, Mayor Binay comes to this Court through a Petition for Certiorari seeking, among others, to nullify public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s Consolidated Resolution finding probable cause against her.

ISSUES:
1) Did the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against
petitioner?
2) Was petitioner’s right to due process violated when she was not served with a copy of her co-accused’s
Motions for Reconsideration?

RULING:
The Petition lacks merit.

1) This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it determined the existence of probable cause against petitioner. The May 9, 2011 Resolution had not
yet attained finality when the Ombudsman received the initial finding.

“The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.” Only when
all the parties have been given an opportunity to file their respective motions for reconsideration will the
preliminary investigation be completed.

Moreover, settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. In Alvarez v. People, this Court decreed:

The Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke,
repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. And Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez
teaches that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance

571
for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and
the evidence already submitted.

2) Contrary to petitioner’s postulation, her failure to receive a copy of the Motions for Reconsideration does not
result in a violation of her right to due process.

In Reyes v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this Court explained that a preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial. Consequently, it need not be subjected under the same due process requirements mandated during
trial.

A person’s rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law. Rule 112,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following

manner:
....
(b) . . . .
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present
against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and
other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies
thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her
co-respondents.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

572
Rule 112, Sec. 3

Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016
Leonen, J.

At the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of evidence is premature for petitioner
to raise. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during
the trial proper [,] and not in the preliminary investigation.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against Jaime
Dichaves with plunder. The consolidated complaints trace their roots to the contents of the sealed second
envelope, Joseph Estrada’s impeachment trial, and his plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

In 2000, the House of Representatives impeached Estrada for bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public
trust, and culpable violation of the Constitution. After Estrada’s impeachment, Dichaves herein was reported to
have fled the country “and cooled his heels off in China.” After Estrada was considered resigned as president,
he (Estrada) was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan, and Dichaves was identified as one of the
John Does. While preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being conducted, Dichaves
was nowhere to be found in the Philippines.

The Office of the Ombudsman later filed an Amended Information for plunder against Estrada, which then led to
said Office to come out with a resolution, finding probable cause to also indict Dichaves for plunder. A warrant of
arrest was later issued against Dichaves, who at the time could not be located again since he was able to slip
out of the country. No subpoena was served on him.

After then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pardoned Estrada, Dichaves resurfaced and filed a Motion to
Quash and/or Motion for Reinvestigation, seeking for a preliminary investigation of his case since none was
conducted. The Motion for Reinvestigation was given due course and Dichaves’ warrant of arrest was recalled.
However, his Motion to Quash was denied as the court found that material facts in the amended information was
sufficient to establish the elements of plunder against him. The Ombudsman later, after having conducted a
preliminary investigation and receiving Dichaves’ counter-affidavits, found probable cause to charge Dichaves
with plunder. Dichaves filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE:
Did the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause against Dichaves?
Consequently, did the Ombudsman correctly consider pieces of evidence allegedly not presented during
preliminary investigation?

RULING:
No. We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion. According to him: (a) he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, (b)
the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the preliminary investigation, and (c) there
is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.

Petitioner’s assertions are erroneous. First, there is nothing capricious or whimsical about petitioner’s lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Petitioner has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a
preliminary investigation. At this early stage, the Ombudsman has yet to file an information that would trigger into
operation the rights of the accused (found under Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution). Only when a
person stands trial may he or she demand “the right to confront and cross-examine his [or her] accusers[.]” This
right cannot apply to petitioner, who has yet to be arraigned and face trial as he left the country at the time he
was initially charged with plunder.

Second, the public prosecutor is not bound by the technical rules on evidence. The executive finding of probable
cause requires only substantial evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt. The Ombudsman merely depends on

573
evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a “more likely-than-not” belief that a crime has been
committed, thus, technical rules on evidence cannot be made to apply to it.

Hence, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of evidence is premature for
petitioner to raise. Section 3, Rule 112 [Preliminary Investigation] of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.... The
admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial
proper[,] and not in the preliminary investigation.

Petitioner erroneously claims that the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may rely on the facts as stated in People v. Estrada. In the
determination of probable cause, nothing bars the Ombudsman from considering evidence already established
in a related and decided case. Notably, the present case is an offshoot of the proceedings in Estrada’s
impeachment and plunder trials. Petitioner was identified as one of the John Does in Estrada’s plunder case.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncements in People v. Estrada may be taken judicial notice of.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this case considers matters related to criminal procedure.

574
Rule 112, Sec. 5

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or
rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation. Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information
and supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause
prompting him to issue the warrant of arrest.

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assails Order and Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular) of RTC in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The assailed
Order granted the prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito
Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime charged.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto
and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him.

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla (wife of the deceased) also
filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Bonifacio (Asst. Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with
the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the
case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties.
Subsequently, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the Bling of an
amended information before the Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where
he reinstated the RTC October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against
Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular granted the motion to amend the information and to admit
the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against Corpus.

Priscilla claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no
basis since petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim. The OSG also adds that
the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended information will not affect
Samonte’s substantial rights.

ISSUE:
1. Was the non-filing of motion for reconsideration to RTC fatal to this case?
2. May the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period
suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
3. Did respondent err when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and
jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused?
4. Did respondent has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr.?

RULING:
1. The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order
or decision. Certiorari, therefore, “is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration.”

575
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari.” This enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a “concrete,
compelling, and valid reason.”

Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court.
Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by respondent
Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or
Memorandum.

It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere
procedural technicality. These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly
complied with.” Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before filing this Petition is fatal.

2. Yes. Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an
arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the DOJ. It does not suspend the execution of a
warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of
arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending
petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”

Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.1Thus,
the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with
the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

3. Yes, but it is only a formal amendment which prejudiced the other accused. Petitioners question the inclusion
of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended
information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her
arraignment.

After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it does
not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if
it is beneficial to the accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot
invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is
only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the
essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original
information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
“conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the
prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the amendment is merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for murder against Samonte was dated
June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano’s affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, Corpus was implicated as the one who
instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This prompted the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, which
resulted in the filing of the amended information.

576
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the
amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not
be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment
after plea is not allowed.

4. Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is required for the judge to “personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.” In case the evidence on record fails
to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a discussion showing both the
factual and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original information until the filing of the
Motion to Amend Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the incidents of this
case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant,
a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case.

Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended information that
constrained him to find probable cause in issuing the warrant.

The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information and supporting documents,
the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the
warrant of arrest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rules on criminal procedure was not amended.

577
Rule 112, Sec. 5

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority to
determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. The court is “the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it.” The dismissal of a criminal case due to lack of probable cause protects the
accused from having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Personal Collection Direct
Selling Inc. (Personal Collection), assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
its Petition for Certiorari against the RTC.

Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence against
Terestita Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for her failure to account or liquidate
for the cash advances entrusted to her. After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor filed an
Information against Carandang before the RTC and the RTC thereafter ordered that an arrest warrant be issued
against Carandang. Carandang filed her Counter Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that
her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was due to the sudden termination of her employment by
Personal Collection. She also claimed that she did not receive any demand letter or any offer from Personal
Collection to settle the case.

The Office of the City Prosecutor, then filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC stating that there was
lack of probable cause to hold Carandang liable for estafa. RTC issued an Order granting the Motion. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Personal Collection against the RTC which alleged that
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
1. Was Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy for Petitioners instead of filing an appeal?
2. Did the RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information upon finding that there was a lack of probable
cause?
3. Was petitioner deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard on
respondent’s Motion to Release Cash Bond?

RULING:
1. No. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy. Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. An
order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy to
question this final order is an appeal.

Despite petitioner’s claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal of an order dismissing
the criminal case against respondent, it is evident that the grant of the Motion to Withdraw Information
dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the Regional Trial Court’s
findings of lack of probable cause due to the alleged insufficiency of evidence presented by respondent and
because all the elements of estafa were present. Thus, petitioner questions the trial court’s allegedly
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected by an
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

2. Yes. When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority
to determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. The court is “the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it.” The dismissal of a criminal case due to lack of probable cause
protects the accused from having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence.

Judges must proceed with caution in dismissing cases for lack of probable cause since the evidence before
them are preliminary in nature. When probable cause exists, the court must proceed with arraignment and
trial. But should the evidence presented absolutely fail to support this finding of probable cause, the case

578
should be dismissed. Whether it is to dismiss the case or to proceed with trial, a judge’s action must not impair
“the substantial rights of the accused [or] the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law.”

The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it reversed its earlier finding of probable cause. The
earlier finding was about the issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court evaluated the prosecutor’s
Resolution and its attached documents. Following this, respondent prayed for the reinvestigation of the case
as she was unable to attend the initial preliminary investigation. It was during the reinvestigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor that respondent was able to present her defense against the allegations in the
complaint. Clearly, the additional evidence adduced prompted the prosecutor’s reversal of its initial finding of
probable cause and the filing of the motion to withdraw information. It was also this additional evidence that
formed the basis of the trial court’s evaluation that there was now a lack of probable cause sufficient to
withdraw the information. There being insufficient evidence showing that the trial court erred in finding a lack
of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must be upheld.

3. No. Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the cancellation of bail. Among the
instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is dismissed. Since cancellation of
bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation
takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place.

The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made to answer for
any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.
In this case, the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the information resulted in the automatic
cancellation of respondent’s bail.

Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard
on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was automatically
cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. Petitioner’s hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash
Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to respondent was
already warranted under the Rules of Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes in these rules.

579
Rule 112, Sec. 5

Maza v. Turla
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
Leonen, J.

Judge cannot remand the case for another conduct of preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier
preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, seeking to have the Orders of the RTC, Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and
1880-P nullified and set aside and the criminal cases against them dismissed.

Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and
Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three cases of murder
against petitioners and 15 other persons. Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. That the named individuals
conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List.

Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla issued an Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that the proper
procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases and remanded
the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Did the trial court judge err in returning the case to the prosecutor in order to conduct a complete preliminary
investigation?

RULING:
Yes, the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor.

Rule 112 SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. –

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the following
options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court
judges must determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of
the prosecutor’s report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or
require the submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of
preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.

Here, regardless of Judge Turla’s assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was incumbent
upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of the
prosecutors’ report and the supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it
unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to
remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted
without any legal basis.

Hence, the trial court judge erred in remanding the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary
investigation.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because said rule is not amended.

580
Rule 112, Sec. 5

Napoles v. De Lima
G.R. No. 213529, July 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

A decision convicting an accused moots any proceeding that questions the determination of probable cause,
either in the filing of the information in court or in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Guilt beyond reasonable
doubt had then been established, and questioning whether a lower quantum of proof exists, i.e., probable cause,
would be pointless. The prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation (an executive function) whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the
determination of probable cause is a judicial function.

FACTS:
This case involves the Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for a TRO/PI filed by Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles), assailing the CA Decision which affirmed the filing of an information for serious illegal detention against
her and the subsequent issuance of an arrest warrant.

A Joint Sworn Statement was made as to the detention of Benhur Luy (Luy) against his will since December 19,
2012 to cover up the JLN Group of Companies’ anomalous transactions involving the Priority Development
Assistance Fund. Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies, and her brother, Reynald Lim (Lim), allegedly
masterminded the “pork barrel scam” and the detention of Benhur Luy. Acting on such, Secretary De Lima
directed the NBI to investigate and conducted a rescue operation, upon which Lim was arrested for being at the
condominium unit where Luy was found. NBI requested for their prosecution for serious illegal detention. In their
counter-affidavits, they claim that Luy unauthorizedly loaned 5 million pesos from Air Material Wing Savings and
Loan Assoc., Inc. under Napoles’ name, and that to obtain the latter’s forgiveness, Luy voluntarily went on a
three-month spiritual retreat with them. Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Navera recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of probable cause which was approved. However, in the Review Resolution, Senior Deputy
State Prosecutor Theodore Villanueva reversed it, saying that the alleged diversion of government funds to the
JLN Group of Company’s dummy foundations was necessary to “establish the alleged motive of [Napoles and
Lim] in detaining . . . Benhur Luy against his will.” Moreover, there was probable cause to believe that Benhur
Luy was deprived of his liberty, given the allegations in his Sinumpaang Salaysay. Hence, an information was
filed against them. Judge Alameda issued an arrest warrant and no bail was allowed. She was tried and convicted
of the charge.

Napoles filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which the latter denied. Hence, this petition. She alleged that
there was grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause even without introduction of additional evidence
and that it was just used to get hold of her because of the PDAF misuse allegations. She also alleged that Judge
Alameda hastily issued the warrant the same day the records were transmitted to her, instead of evaluating the
same for 10 days as allowed under Rule 112, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court. The respondents commented that
Napoles failed to implead the People; that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the
determination of probable cause is an executive function on which the court cannot intervene.

ISSUES:
1. Is this petition moot and academic?
2. Was there probable cause for filing the information and issuing the arrest warrant?

RULING:
1. Yes. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
Furthermore, her conviction was beyond reasonable doubt, a quantum of evidence, higher than probable cause.
Hence the question on the existence of probable cause is of no more value.

2. Yes. The prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation (an executive function) whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is

581
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In the present case, all the elements of serious illegal detention
were determined to be present.

Furthermore, reception of new evidence is not within the office of a Motion for Reconsideration. A reversal may
result if a piece of evidence that might have yielded a different resolution was inadvertently overlooked. In initially
dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Benhur Luy’s family, the prosecutor disregarded the purported motive
behind Benhur Luy’s detention.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial function.
No less than the Constitution commands that “no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

Judge Alameda declared that he personally evaluated the records of the case, including the Review Resolution
and the Sworn Statements of the witnesses; and that based on the records, he found probable cause to issue
an arrest warrant against Napoles. “Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may
be another’s undue haste.”

Hence, the petition was denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

582
Rule 112, Sec. 5

Mendoza v. People
G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014
Leonen, J.

The trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of
lack of probable cause, despite the earlier finding of probable cause of the prosecutor. Once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal
of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the issued a Resolution of the Office of the prosecutor, finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. Juno Cars alleged that it
hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. A partial audit was conducted of the used cars and discovered
that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were
accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex
and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition
cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.

Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial court. After conducting an independent
assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution, the court holds that the evidence
adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Upon appeal
by the prosecution, the Resolution was reversed and the case was reinstated. Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition
for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that
there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record.

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the Court of the information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent
finding of lack of probable cause?

RULING:
YES. In People v. Hon. Yadao, the Court held that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial
court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option
under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents. It is also settled that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion
of the court.”

In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded
that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa.” Specifically, she found that Juno Cars “failed to prove by competent evidence” that the vehicles alleged
to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received
by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint “[did] not
state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused,” which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court.

583
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure

Lee v. Sales
G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay the
immediate execution of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon a public office. Since decisions of the Ombudsman
are immediately executory even pending appeal, it follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an
injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the right of the person seeking its issuance must be
clear and unmistakable.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In a June 11, 2010 Complaint, the
Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, through Associate Graft Investigation Officer I
Buenaventura, charged the spouses Lee who were both employed at the BIR as Revenue Officer with dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Complaint charged that the
Spouses Lee were members, stockholders, or incorporators of four (4) corporations, but did not disclose their
interest in these corporations in their 2001 to 2006 SALN.

The Complaint alleged that Spouses Lee acquired wealth in the amounts of ₱2,353,785.93 and US$13,414.17,
which were disproportionate to their legitimate incomes. It claimed that in 2002, the Spouses Lee had a total
aggregate income of ₱252,840.00 but had cash in bank amounting to ₱334,929.93 and US$8,414.17, and a
declared vehicle worth ₱640,000.00. In 2004, they had a total aggregate income of ₱259,152.00 but had cash in
bank in the amounts of ₱380,000.00 and US$3,000.00, an ₱800,000.00 vehicle, and personal effects amounting
to ‘Pl 50,000.00. In 2005, they had a total aggregate income of ₱259,152.00 but had cash in bank in the amounts
of ₱290,000.00 and US$2,000.00, a ₱500,000.00 vehicle, and personal effects amounting to ₱30,000.00.

The Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. It found that they separately
filed their SALNs from 2001 to 2006, apart from 2003 for which they filed a joint SALN. It held that they had the
willful intent to violate Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379, when
they failed to declare their true, detailed, and sworn statements of their business and financial interests.

Elmer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision. While the motion was still
pending, he received a letter from Martinez, Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division of the BIR, through Regional
Director Valeroso directing him, among others, to turn over all government assets and documents to the head
office, transfer his accountabilities, and surrender his BIR Identification Card to the Human Resource
Management Unit in the Regional Office.

Elmer filed a Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, with RTC Quezon City praying for the trial court to enjoin herein
respondents from executing his dismissal from service. He claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision
was not yet final and executory due to his pending motion for reconsideration. RTC denied Elmer’s prayer for
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissed the case for injunction
and/or prohibition. Since the Office of the Ombudsman’s July 16, 2012 Decision was immediately executory,
Elmer was not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. Elmer filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court before this Court, assailing the Order of the RTC

ISSUE:
Does a pending motion for reconsideration stay the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman dismissing a
public officer from service?

RULING:
A pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay its
immediate execution. This is clear under the rules of the Office of the Ombudsman and our jurisprudence.

The Office of the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17,
Rule III, Section 7, which states an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty
is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under

584
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal.

Moreover, Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, provides:

Section 7 Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the “Ombudsman Rules of Procedure”
provides that: “A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course.”

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not
operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, duly issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate implementation of the said Ombudsman decisions, orders or
resolutions.

Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued by the
Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770. The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public
service and must be beholden to no one. The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a
protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public officers
from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records.

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, relied upon by petitioner, provides:

Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.

In interpreting the above provision, this Court held in Laja, citing Lopez, that “only orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalties of public censure, reprimand or
suspension of not more than one month or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and
unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is
other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
to one-month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive
or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that
execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right
to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise,
the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it is not part of the Rules.

585
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure

Canlas v. Bongolan
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.

The exoneration of public officers by the Ombudsman in a charge alleging grave misconduct and a violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g) is generally unappealable. Furthermore, any appeal to the Supreme Court
from such a case cannot be initiated by one who does not stand to be benefited or injured by the results of the
suit. This absence of a right to appeal affects petitioner Canlas’ legal standing in this case. He is not a party
entitled to the relief prayed for, or one who will benefit or be injured by the results of the suit.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals Decisions and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 119352. The assailed Decision affirmed the Office of the
Ombudsman’s Decision, which dismissed the administrative complaint for grave misconduct and violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 filed by Jerome R. Canlas (Canlas).

National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II) executed a Joint Venture Agreement to implement the
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (the Project). The Project sought to convert the former
Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into habitable housing with commercial and industrial development and to reclaim
the property adjacent to Smokey Mountain as its enabling component.

Home Guaranty is a government-owned and -controlled corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of
Republic Act No. 8763. It is mandated to guarantee payment of “all forms of mortgages, loans and other forms
of credit facilities and receivables arising from financial contracts exclusively for residential purposes and the
necessary support facilities.

Petitioner Canlas filed his Complaint-Affidavit against respondents, who are Home Guaranty’s officers. Canlas
claimed that the Home Guaranty Officers were guilty of grave misconduct and of entering into a contract grossly
disadvantageous to the government under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 by selling lots owned by the
government at a low price.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, which the Court of Appeals upheld. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel approved of the proposal before the Home Guaranty’s Board
of Directors approved the sale. It also ruled that petitioner Canlas was a stranger to the contract and had no right
to dictate the parameters under which the contracting parties may determine price.

ISSUE:
May petitioner Canlas appeal the decision dismissing the administrative complaint against respondents?

RULING:
For administrative cases filed with the Ombudsman, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, states:

Section 7. Finality and Execution of Decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Thus, the Ombudsman’s decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or imposes the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month
salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court of Appeals under the requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman’s October 12, 2010 Decision exonerated respondents. Thus,
Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. He has no other recourse. “The right to appeal is a mere statutory

586
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
There must then be a law expressly granting such right.”

This absence of a right to appeal affects petitioner Canlas’ legal standing in this case. He is not a party entitled
to the relief prayed for, or one who will benefit or be injured by the results of the suit.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provision involved, or jurisdiction is not amended.

587
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure

Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016
Leonen, J.

The executive finding of probable cause requires only substantial evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt. The
Ombudsman merely depends on evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a “more likely-than-
not” belief that a crime has been committed, thus, technical rules on evidence cannot be made to apply to it.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against Jaime
Dichaves with plunder. The consolidated complaints trace their roots to the contents of the sealed second
envelope, Joseph Estrada’s impeachment trial, and his plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

In 2000, the House of Representatives impeached Estrada for bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public
trust, and culpable violation of the Constitution. After Estrada’s impeachment, Dichaves herein was reported to
have fled the country “and cooled his heels off in China.” After Estrada was considered resigned as president,
he (Estrada) was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan, and Dichaves was identified as one of the
John Does. While preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being conducted, Dichaves
was nowhere to be found in the Philippines.

The Office of the Ombudsman later filed an Amended Information for plunder against Estrada, which then led to
said Office to come out with a resolution, finding probable cause to also indict Dichaves for plunder. A warrant of
arrest was later issued against Dichaves, who at the time could not be located again since he was able to slip
out of the country. No subpoena was served on him.

After then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pardoned Estrada, Dichaves resurfaced and filed a Motion to
Quash and/or Motion for Reinvestigation, seeking for a preliminary investigation of his case since none was
conducted. The Motion for Reinvestigation was given due course and Dichaves’ warrant of arrest was recalled.
However, his Motion to Quash was denied as the court found that material facts in the amended information was
sufficient to establish the elements of plunder against him. The Ombudsman later, after having conducted a
preliminary investigation and receiving Dichaves’ counter-affidavits, found probable cause to charge Dichaves
with plunder. Dichaves filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE:
Did the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause against Dichaves?
Consequently, did the Ombudsman correctly consider pieces of evidence allegedly not presented during
preliminary investigation?

RULING:
No. We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion. According to him: (a) he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, (b)
the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the preliminary investigation, and (c) there
is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.

Petitioner’s assertions are erroneous. First, there is nothing capricious or whimsical about petitioner’s lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Petitioner has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a
preliminary investigation. At this early stage, the Ombudsman has yet to file an information that would trigger into
operation the rights of the accused (found under Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution). Only when a
person stands trial may he or she demand “the right to confront and cross-examine his [or her] accusers[.]” This
right cannot apply to petitioner, who has yet to be arraigned and face trial as he left the country at the time he
was initially charged with plunder.

Second, the public prosecutor is not bound by the technical rules on evidence. The executive finding of probable
cause requires only substantial evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt. The Ombudsman merely depends on

588
evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a “more likely-than-not” belief that a crime has been
committed, thus, technical rules on evidence cannot be made to apply to it.

Hence, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of evidence is premature for
petitioner to raise. Section 3, Rule 112 [Preliminary Investigation] of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.... The
admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial
proper[,] and not in the preliminary investigation.

Petitioner erroneously claims that the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may rely on the facts as stated in People v. Estrada. In the
determination of probable cause, nothing bars the Ombudsman from considering evidence already established
in a related and decided case. Notably, the present case is an offshoot of the proceedings in Estrada’s
impeachment and plunder trials. Petitioner was identified as one of the John Does in Estrada’s plunder case.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncements in People v. Estrada may be taken judicial notice of.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this case considers matters related to criminal procedure.

589
Rule 113, Sec 5

Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4,2019
Leonen, J.

There was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at bar primarily because the apprehending officer was still far
away from the petitioner when the alleged crime of selling was being committed. The confidential information
given regarding the sale of prohibited drugs to the police officers was not substantial enough to make the arrest
as in flagrante delicto.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting Joseph Villasana y Cabahug of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

Petitioner is Joseph Villasana y Cabahug was charged with the violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs
act of 2002 for illegal possession of one self-sealing transparent plastic bag containing 0.15 gram of white
crystalline substance Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. Respondent on the other hand is the people
of the Philippines or the prosection as the violation is a crime against the citizes of the Philippines. PO3 Martinez
received information regarding the rampant selling of drugs in Valenzuela against the petitioners. The entrapment
operation was successful and Villasana was apprehended together with the sachet of shabu which was
documented and marked in the barangay. Villasana says that that he was just seized by the police officers after
alighting from the jeepney. He was then brought to the narcotics department wherein when the siblings arrived
they were asked for 50,000 php areglo. He was also then asked to sign a document saying that he will be charged
for a drug related offense.

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was invalid and the drug seized from him was inadmissible in
evidence and that there were irregularities in the handling of the seized shabu such as inconsistent markings and
the marking were not done at the place of arrest including non-compliance with inventory and photograph
requirements. respondent counters that petitioner purely raises questions of fact that are proscribed in a Rule 45
petition. Furthermore that since the petitioner entered his plea without objection he waived his right to question
the illegality of his arrest.

ISSUES:
Is Rule 45 proper even though the supreme court is generally not a trier of facts?
Was the arrest proper as in flagrante delicto arrest?
Was the integrity of the drugs seized compromised?

RULING:
Yes Rule 45 is proper.
No there was no proper in flagrante delicto arrest.
Yes the integrity of the drugs seized was compromised.

According to Rule 45 of the the Rules of Court, as a general rule only questions of law may be brought in a
petition for review on certiorari. This court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts if they are not
supported by substantial evidence. There are of course exceptions to this including the claim of the petitioner
that there were factual findings which were overlooked, disregarded and could change the outcome of the case.

According to Rule 113 Section 5 of the revised criminal procedure, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. The two elements of the person to be arrested has just
committed is committing or attempting to commit a crime and in the presence of the arresting officer.

According to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 the apprehending team must seize, mark and document the
drugs confiscated in the presence of the accused or from whom which drugs were seized. This in effect helps
protect the integrity of the drugs seized.

590
Based on the sound discretion of the Supreme court the allowance of the facts stated by petitioner even in Rule
45 is allowed as one of the exceptions. This led to the reversal of the decision of the case.

There was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at bar primarily because the apprehending officer was still far
away from the petitioner when the alleged crime of selling was being committed. The confidential information
given regarding the sale of prohibited drugs to the police officers was not substantial enough to make the arrest
as in flagrante delicto.

Lastly the proper initial marking and documentation in front of authorized personnel upon apprehension of the
contraband was not followed. This led to the integrity of the drugs to be compromised. As there has been doubt
in the chain of authentication, the possibility of tampering existed.

Therefore, with all the premises being considered the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Case is dismissed against the petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 on appeal by certiorari has not been changed.
No effect because Rule 113, Sec. 5 on warrantless arrest has not been changed
No effect because RA 9165 has not been changed.

591
Rule 113, Sec. 5

Manibog v. People
G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019
Leonen, J.

To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally observed two (2) or
more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity
to compel the arresting officer to investigate further. The combination of the police asset’s tip and the arresting
officers’ observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner’s shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the
arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.

FACTS:
This is a case resolving a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Larry Sabuco Manibog (Manibog) assailing
the CA Descision upholding the judgment of the RTC finding him guilty of violating the Omnibus Election Code
(Gun Ban).

Manibog was charged with violation of the Omnibus Election Code (Gun Ban) after he was found to be willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly carrying in a public place, and outside of his residence a caliber [.]45 pistol.

He claims that he was not arrested in flagrante delicto because he was only standing in front of the Municipal
Tourism Office when the police officers descended upon and searched him. He maintains that the search came
prior to his arrest, rendering any evidence obtained from him tainted and inadmissible. Manibog asserts that at
the time of his arrest, the police officers could not have seen the contour or bulge of his gun, as it was tucked in
his waistband below his navel and could not be seen from a distance. He emphasizes that the police officer who
frisked him first patted his back before finding the gun in his waist. This indicates that the police officer was
unsure if he actually had a gun on him. Petitioner also imputes malice on the police officers, who had earlier
received orders to dismantle Mayor Gamboa’s private army. As part of her security, he claims that he was singled
out and illegally searched and arrested despite merely standing outside a building at that time.

The RTC found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It
also ruled that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest because there was probable cause for the
police to frisk and arrest him. The CA upheld the finding of RTC. Manibog moved for reconsideration but was
denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Was the warrantless search made upon petitioner Larry Sabuco Manibog unlawful, and, consequently, was the
gun confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence?

RULING:
No. The warrantless search was lawful. Hence, the confiscated gun is admissible in evidence.

Under the Constitution, search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, the same
would violate the Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. But this is only the general rule. Exceptions to this were covered by jurisprudence.

For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there was a lawful warrantless
arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

592
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must have personally witnessed the
crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested committed an offense. Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest
generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search.

Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on petitioner, the facts
on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop
and frisk search. Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he knew as a kagawad and
security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun outside the Municipal Tourism Office during an election gun
ban. With a few other police officers, he went there and spotted petitioner right in front of the building with a
suspicious-looking bulge protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police officer deduced this to be a
firearm based on the object’s size and contour.

The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers’ visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object
tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.
However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a)
and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted
on petitioner fell under the established exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset’s tip and the arresting officers’ observation of a gun-shaped
object under petitioner’s shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop
and frisk search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless
search on petitioner:

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because involved provisions were not amended.

593
Rule 113, Sec. 5

Aparante v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) as the rule
also requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show
that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a
warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was
probable cause.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which sustained the conviction of herein
accused for illegal possession of 0.01 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

In the present case, the arresting officers saw a man hand herein petitioner a small plastic sachet, which petitioner
then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley. Upon the officers’ approach, these two
men fled. The police then only managed to arrest herein petitioner, and only thereafter conducted a search upon
the person of the accused. An investigator at the police station where petitioner was immediately brought then
placed the initials of herein petitioner “JBA” on the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu immediately after seizure.

ISSUES:
1. Is the above described warrantless arrest and immediately subsequent search valid?
2. Is the chain of custody broken in the present case?

RULING:
1. Yes, reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) as
the rule also requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was being, or was about
to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as
these two acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause.

In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what must be evaluated
is whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for petitioner’s arrest when they made the search.
Here, the overt acts of the accused and the circumstances were observed personally by the arresting officers
and, taken together, constitute reasonable suspicion that the men who fled violated R.A. 9165.

Hence, the arrest and the immediately subsequent search made on the person of the accused in the present
case are valid.

2. Yes, the Court emphasized that where the amount of narcotics seized is miniscule, a stricter adherence to
the requirements of R.A. 9165, Sec. 21 is required to preserve the evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the police officers immediately went to the police station to
turn over petitioner and the evidence seized from him. The police investigator at the station then marked the
confiscated plastic sachet with appellant’s initials. It is then clear that the seized drugs were not marked by
the apprehending team but by an investigating officer at the police station, an act which is not in accordance
with the chain of custody rule under Republic Act No. 9165, Sec. 21.

Hence, this misstep is a clear indication that the chain of custody is broken in the present case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this case involves discussions on jurisprudence and principles in warrantless arrests and
searches and the rules on chain of custody under R.A. 9165 which is a separate, special law.

594
Rule 113 Sec. 5

Veridiano v. People
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017
Leonen, J.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident
to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

FACTS:
Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Veridiano was arraigned. He
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, at about 7:20
a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho,” who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way
to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana.” POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.
Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty. Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that
“he was illegally arrested.” He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is “inadmissible in evidence for being
the ‘fruit of a poisonous tree. “Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on
chain of custody.

ISSUES:
(1) Was there a valid arrest?
(2) Was there a valid warrantless search?
(3) Is there enough evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

RULING:
1) No. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest was unlawful. The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences
among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of
law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the
evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible. Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a
result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea.
Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is “estopped from questioning the legality of his
or her arrest.

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. 59 The reason for this rule is
that “the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.”
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when
an accused fails to question the court’s jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely manner. Jurisdiction
over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually
exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

2) No. A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; “the process cannot be reversed.”

For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest
may also be effected without a warrant. In this case, petitioner’s arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied
solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent

595
any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is
what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in “stop and frisk”
searches.

A “stop and frisk” search is defined in People v. Chua as “the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.” Thus, the allowable scope of a “stop and
frisk” search is limited to a “protective search of outer clothing for weapons.”

Although a “stop and frisk” search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards
crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting “stop and frisk” searches. While probable cause
is not required, a “stop and frisk” search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law
enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances
of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at
all, cannot produce a reasonable search.

3) No. The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

EFFECT OF THE REVISED RULES ON THE RULING:

None.

596
Entrapment

People v. Casio
G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014
Leonen, J.

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of
which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However, the police carry out its
entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts
will not pass on the wisdom thereof.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused Casio to reverse the ruling of the court of appeals in finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

In 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order
to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. By reason thereof, the team of police operatives
pretended as tourist guides looking for girls to entertain their guest. When they proceeded to Cebu City’s red light
district, accused Casio called their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?). The police,
together with Accused Casio, AAA and BBB proceeded to the Queensland Motel after agreeing to engage the
special services offered by AAA and BBB. When Casio accepted the marked money, she was immediately
arrested. Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found Accused Casio guilty of violating Republic
Act No. 9208, otherwise known as “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003” Section 4(a), qualified by Section
6(a).
On appeal, Casio argued that the entrapment was not valid because the police should have conducted a prior
surveillance before the entrapment operation.

ISSUE:
Is the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid even without conducting prior surveillance?

RULING:
Yes, the entrapment is valid even without prior surveillance conducted by the police operatives.

Prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. In People v. Padua this court
underscored the value of flexibility in police operations: A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of
an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait
of good police work. However, the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the
accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers
may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. This flexibility is even
more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require
immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.

Thus, the entrapment made to arrest Casio was rendered valid.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect on the ruling since the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court still stands because no amendments
were mare regarding this specific topic.

597
Rule 114, Sec. 5

Reyes v. People
G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.

The grant of bail after a judgement of conviction is discretionary upon the courts. Bail may be denied if the courts
find any of the circumstances present in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Cancellation of bail may also
be done depending on the circumstances.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review by the Supreme Court against the decision of the Sandiganbayan which rendered
Joel Tolentino Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt on willfully, knowingly and criminally, with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith granting and issuing Small Scale Mining Permit to Olympic Mines and Development
Corporation despite the fact that the current mining permit is valid and subsisting.

Petitioner is Governor Joel Tolentino Reyes. Respondent is the People of the Philippines under the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the case at bar, Governor Reyes and Head of Provincial Mining Regulatory Board Baguyo
granted a small-scale mining permit to Olympic Mines and Development Corporation. This said permit was
unnecessary because there was still a valid and subsisting permit.

Petitioner Reyes avers that there was no criminal intent or negligence on his part since he signed the permit
based on the favorable recommendation of the Provincial mining regulatory board. Also, that there was grave
abuse of discretion when the petitioner’s bail was cancelled.

ISSUE:
Is the Sandiganbayan incorrect in revoking Reyes’ bail based on the violations of certain conditions and for
possibility of flight?

RULING:
No. Violation of conditions and being a flight risk are grounds to cancel bail.

According to the rule 114 Section 5 of the Rules of Court, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of notice of appeal provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. Furthermore, cancellation of bail may be done when there is probability of flight and violation
of the conditions set.

Petition Reyes was granted bail by the Sandiganbayan. Bail after conviction is not a matter of right. Its grant or
cancellation is within the sound discretion of the court. However, he did not show up in court at scheduled
hearings that he was ordered. From this alone his bail can already be cancelled. Furthermore, he escaped to
Thailand. He was only returned to the Philippines due to the help of Thai authorities. As such the Sandiganbayan
cancelled the bail of Petitioner Reyes.

Therefore, since Reyes has been determined to be a flight risk and does not follow the conditions including
appearing in court his bail has been rightfully denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rule 114 section 5 has not been changed.

598
Rule 114, Sec. 17

Tejano v. Marigomen
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is
pending has no authority to grant bail. The last sentence of Rule 114, Sec. 17(a) is clear that for purposes of
determining whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary
surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application.

FACTS:
This case stems from an affidavit-complaint filed by herein petitioner against respondent Judge.

A certain Adrino filed a civil case for declaration of absolute nullity of deed of absolute sale which is pending
before the court of herein respondent Judge. A certain Tejano then filed a criminal case against this Adrino for
violation of the Anti-Violence against Women and Children Act, which is lodged with a different court and a
different judge.

Notwithstanding this fact and without a standing warrant of arrest against him, Adrino posted bail with herein
respondent Judge, which the latter granted.

ISSUE:
Is the bail granted by herein respondent Judge valid?

RULING:
No, the Court held that without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the province, city, or
municipality where the case is pending has no authority to grant bail.

The last sentence of Rule 114, Sec. 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether or not the accused
is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province,
city, or municipality may grant a bail application. In the same vein, t is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants
an application for bail in a criminal case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or
unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending.

In the present case, respondent Judge granted Adrino’s bail even when there is not standing warrant against him
and without ascertaining if the judge with whom the criminal case is originally pending is actually absent.

Hence, the bail granted by herein respondent Judge is invalid.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this portion has not been amended.

599
Rule 114, Sec. 22

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

Among the instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is dismissed. Since
cancellation of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the
cancellation takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place. Petitioner’s right to due
process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release
Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was automatically cancelled upon the dismissal
of the case. The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made to
answer for any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not succeeded by the immediate release of the cash
bond.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Personal Collection Direct
Selling Inc. (Personal Collection), assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
its Petition for Certiorari against the RTC.

Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence against
Terestita Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for her failure to account or liquidate
for the cash advances entrusted to her. After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor filed an
Information against Carandang before the RTC and the RTC thereafter ordered that an arrest warrant be issued
against Carandang. Carandang filed her Counter Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that
her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was due to the sudden termination of her employment by
Personal Collection. She also claimed that she did not receive any demand letter or any offer from Personal
Collection to settle the case.

The Office of the City Prosecutor, then filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC stating that there was
lack of probable cause to hold Carandang liable for estafa. RTC issued an Order granting the Motion. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Personal Collection against the RTC which alleged that
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
1. Was Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy for Petitioners instead of filing an appeal?
2. Did the RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information upon finding that there was a lack of probable
cause?
3. Was petitioner deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard on
respondent’s Motion to Release Cash Bond?

RULING:
1. No. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy. Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. An
order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy
to question this final order is an appeal.

Despite petitioner’s claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal of an order
dismissing the criminal case against respondent, it is evident that the grant of the Motion to Withdraw
Information dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the Regional
Trial Court’s findings of lack of probable cause due to the alleged insufficiency of evidence presented by
respondent and because all the elements of estafa were present. Thus, petitioner questions the trial court’s
allegedly erroneous conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected by
an extraordinary writ of certiorari.

2. Yes. When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority
to determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. The court is “the best and sole

600
judge of what to do with the case before it.” The dismissal of a criminal case due to lack of probable cause
protects the accused from having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence.

Judges must proceed with caution in dismissing cases for lack of probable cause since the evidence before
them are preliminary in nature. When probable cause exists, the court must proceed with arraignment and
trial. But should the evidence presented absolutely fail to support this finding of probable cause, the case
should be dismissed. Whether it is to dismiss the case or to proceed with trial, a judge’s action must not
impair “the substantial rights of the accused [or] the right of the State and the offended party to due process
of law.”

The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it reversed its earlier finding of probable cause. The
earlier finding was about the issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court evaluated the prosecutor’s
Resolution and its attached documents. Following this, respondent prayed for the reinvestigation of the case
as she was unable to attend the initial preliminary investigation. It was during the reinvestigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor that respondent was able to present her defense against the allegations in the
complaint. Clearly, the additional evidence adduced prompted the prosecutor’s reversal of its initial finding
of probable cause and the filing of the motion to withdraw information. It was also this additional evidence
that formed the basis of the trial court’s evaluation that there was now a lack of probable cause sufficient to
withdraw the information. There being insufficient evidence showing that the trial court erred in finding a lack
of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must be upheld.

3. No. Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the cancellation of bail. Among
the instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is dismissed. Since cancellation
of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation
takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place.

The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made to answer for
any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.
In this case, the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the information resulted in the automatic
cancellation of respondent’s bail.

Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard
on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was automatically
cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. Petitioner’s hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash
Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to respondent was
already warranted under the Rules of Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes in these rules.

601
Rule 115, Sec. 1

Kim Liong v. People

G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

The right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness is a basic fundamental constitutional right. However,
this is personal to the accused, who can waive the right. When the accused abuses its option to choose his
counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The
pattern of postponements and changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent.

FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 113152. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
Orders of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court, Manila declaring Kim Liong (Liong) to have waived his right to cross-
examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela Rama (Dela Rama).

On January 28, 2002, Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite
demand, a total of US$50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar account The first prosecution
witness, Antonio Dela Rama (Dela Rama), was finally presented as scheduled on June 8, 2006. His direct
examination was terminated on January 25, 2007, and the initial date for his cross-examination was set on March
15, 2007. However, the cross examination was reset several times upon motion of the accused who engaged
the services of the new counsel. Witness Antonio dela Rama was hospitalized. Thus, private prosecutor Atty.
Ma. Julpha Maningas moved that Liong be declared to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama. It
averred that the cross examination of witness Antonio dela Rama had been reset a number of times due to the
fault of the accused who kept on changing his counsel; that accused was given more than sufficient opportunities
to cross examine the said witness but simply delayed the proceedings of this case until it lapsed two (2) years.
The Motion was granted by the trial court.

Liong filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was denied. Liong tiled his Petition for Review
on Certiorari32 before this Court. Respondent People of the Philippines counters that petitioner raises a question
of fact, specifically on which of the resettings are not attributable to him. It contends that questions of facts are
not allowed in a Rule 45 Petition, and therefore, this Court is “not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the [trial court and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
(1) Does Petition for Review on Certiorari should be denied for raising factual issues?
(2) Was there a proper waiver of petitioner Kim Liong’s right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela
Rama?

RULING:
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and rightfully so. Supreme Court, as the court of last resort, should focus
more on performing “the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.”52 The
rule, therefore, is that petitions for review on certiorari may only raise questions of law. Rule 45, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency.

It is true that this rule is subject to exceptions. This Court may review factual issues if any of the following is
present:

(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the

602
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Nevertheless, this Court finds that none of the exceptions applies in this case. Even if this Court considers the
facts as alleged by petitioner, it will still arrive at the conclusion that the trial court judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion in deeming petitioner’s right to cross-examination as waived. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not
err in denying petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari.

Rule 115, Section 1(f) on the right to cross-examine provides:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:
xxx

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part
of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found
in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity
to cross-examine him.

However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It “is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.” When an
accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed
to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony given during direct examination will remain on record. If this
testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of the right of confrontation.

In People v. Narca, the trial court deferred to another date the cross examination of the prosecution witness on
the instance of the accused. However, in the interim, the prosecution witness was murdered. Thus, the accused
moved that the testimony of the prosecution witness be stricken off the record for lack of cross-examination. This
Court rejected the argument, finding that the accused waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution witness
when they moved for postponement. It said that “mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the
essence of the right to cross-examine.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the provisions involved were not amended.

603
Rule 116, Sec. 1

People v. Palema
G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

An arraignment not only satisfies the due process clause of the Constitution, but also affords an accused an
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him or her. Through arraignment, the accused is placed in
a position to enter his or her plea with full knowledge of the consequences. It is a vital aspect of any criminal
prosecution, demanded by no less than the Constitution itself.

FACTS:
For this Court’s resolution is a Notice of Appeal challenging the Decision of the CA in affirming the RTC’s Decision
convicting Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia, accused-appellants herein of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Grengia, along with Lester Ladra y Palema (Ladra), Edwin Manzanero y Bautista
(Manzanero), and Marvin Marqueses (Marqueses), were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in an
Information. On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Marvin, meanwhile, remained at large. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued before the RTC.
During the course of the proceedings, Ladra was discharged from the case in accordance with the provisions of
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. RTC then rendered a decision, finding Palema, Palmea, Saldua,
and Grengia guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, while acquitting Marqueses for the prosecution’s failure
to present evidence that he participated in committing the crime.

ISSUE:
Was the acquittal of accused Marqueses proper?

RULING:
Yes, the acquittal was proper.

Arraignment is defined as “the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”69 Its purpose is to notify the accused of
“the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could
be possibly meted against him.”70 It is not an idle ceremony that can be brushed aside peremptorily, but an
indispensable requirement of due process, the absence of which renders the proceedings against the accused
void. Through arraignment, the accused is placed in a position to enter his or her plea with full knowledge of the
consequences.

A perusal of the records shows that Marqueses was never arraigned. While the Regional Trial Court, in its
January 8, 2008 Order,64 noted that all the accused were present on arraignment and that they all pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged, only the names of accused-appellants Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia, as
with Ladra and Manzanero, were shown in the Certificate of Arraignment. Marqueses’ name is nowhere to be
found.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

604
Rule 116, Sec. 1

Lapi v. People
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
Leonen, J.

The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object to
its validity before arraignment.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the RTC
ruling that Lapi (petitioner) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated RA No. 9165, also known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

An Information was filed against petitioner and two others who were charged with violation of Art. II, Sec. 15 of
RA No. 9165. On arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, the two
others changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentence to rehabilitation for six months at a government-
recognized center. Only petitioner was subjected to trial on the merits.

The RTC found petitioner guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was caught in
flagrante delicto. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, he filed this Petition.

Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his warrantless
arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used against him.

ISSUE:
Can an accused question the validity of his arrest after he enters his plea?

RULING:
No, the accused cannot question the validity of his arrest after he enters his plea.

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objective is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment.
And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.

In this case, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively
participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this
Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of
this court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not
raising the objection before his arraignment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments.

605
Rule 116, Sec. 11

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
Leonen, J.

This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assails Order and Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular) of RTC in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The assailed
Order granted the prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito
Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime charged.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto
and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him.

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla (wife of the deceased) also
filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Bonifacio (Asst. Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with
the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the
case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties.
Subsequently, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the Bling of an
amended information before the Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where
he reinstated the RTC October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against
Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular granted the motion to amend the information and to admit
the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against Corpus.

Priscilla claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no
basis since petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim. The OSG also adds that
the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended information will not affect
Samonte’s substantial rights.

ISSUES:
1. Was the non-filing of motion for reconsideration to RTC fatal to this case?
2. May the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period
suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
3. Did respondent err when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and
jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused?
4. Did respondent has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr.?

RULING:
1. The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order
or decision. Certiorari, therefore, “is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration.”

It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari.” This enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error” through a “re-examination of the

606
legal and factual circumstances of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a “concrete,
compelling, and valid reason.”

Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court.
Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by respondent
Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or
Memorandum.

It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere
procedural technicality. These are “jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly
complied with.” Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before filing this Petition is fatal.

2. Yes. Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an
arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the DOJ. It does not suspend the execution of a
warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of
arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending
petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

This Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”

Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.1Thus,
the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with
the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

3. Yes, but it is only a formal amendment which prejudiced the other accused. Petitioners question the inclusion
of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended
information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her
arraignment.

After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it does
not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if
it is beneficial to the accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot
invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is
only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the
essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original
information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
“conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the
prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the amendment is merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for murder against Samonte was dated
June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano’s affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, Corpus was implicated as the one who
instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This prompted the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, which
resulted in the filing of the amended information.

607
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the
amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not
be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment
after plea is not allowed.

4. Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is required for the judge to “personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.” In case the evidence on record fails
to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a discussion showing both the
factual and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original information until the filing of the
Motion to Amend Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the incidents of this
case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant,
a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case.

Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended information that
constrained him to find probable cause in issuing the warrant.

The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the amended information and supporting documents,
the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the
warrant of arrest.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because rules on criminal procedure was not amended.

608
Rule 116, Sec. 11

ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon

G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
Leonen, J.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari to assail the CA Decision reinstating the DOJ Resolution that ordered
the withdrawal of the Information filed for respondents’ violation of the Intellectual Property Code.

The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas worker and
hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival
of dela Cruz at NAIA. ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken
earlier under a special embargo agreement. Under the agreement, any of the footages it took would be for the
use of Reuter’s international subscribers only and no other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to
use ABSCBN footage without the latter’s consent. GMA-7 subscribes to Reuters and it received a live video feed
of the coverage of dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters. GMA carried the live news feed in its program “Flash Report,”
together with its live broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was
airing footages of ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement under the IPC. Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo
Venturanza issued the Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas as the Head of the News Operation and the Program Manager of Flash Report, respectively.
Consequently, the Information for violation of the IPC was filed. Respondents filed a Petition for Review before
the DOJ. Trial court granted respondents’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred respondents’
arraignment for 60 days in view of the Petition. In 2005, Secretary Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents,
reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordering that the case be Dismissed and that
the information be withdrawn. In 2010, DOJ Acting Secretary Agra issued the Resolution that reversed the 2005
Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas for violation of IPC.

ISSUE:
Did the trial court commit error when it deferred respondents’ arraignment after the expiration of the 60 days from
the time the Petition for Review was before the DOJ?

RULING:
Yes. Trial court committed error when it continued to defer respondents’ arraignment after the expiration of the
60 days from the time the Petition for Review was filed before the DOJ.

Rule 116, Sec. 11(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused’s arraignment
when a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or
the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of
said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after
the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the TRO was issued by the CA. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal
case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. Failure to proceed with the arraignment
disregards the requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect herein because the Revised Rules did not provide any amendment for this Rule.

609
Rule 117, Sec. 1

Lapi v. People
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
Leonen, J.

An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the
information against him before his arraignment.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the RTC
ruling that Lapi (petitioner) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated RA No. 9165, also known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

An Information was filed against petitioner and two others who were charged with violation of Art. II, Sec. 15 of
RA No. 9165. On arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, the two
others changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentence to rehabilitation for six months at a government-
recognized center. Only petitioner was subjected to trial on the merits.

The RTC found petitioner guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was caught in
flagrante delicto. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, he filed this Petition.

Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his warrantless
arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used against him.

ISSUE:
Can an accused question the validity of his arrest after he enters his plea?

RULING:
No, the accused cannot question the validity of his arrest after he enters his plea.

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objective is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment.
And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.

In this case, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively
participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this
Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of
this court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not
raising the objection before his arraignment.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule used in this case is not among those covered by the 2019 amendments

610
Rule 117, Sec. 4

Dio v. People
G.R. No. 208146, June 8, 2016
Leonen, J.

When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect, such as when the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, that may be cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend
the information.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision which reviewed RTC’s decision that quashed
the informations charging Dio with libel.

Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, of which Virginia Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors. Desmond filed a
complaint against Dio for libel. Dio moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the “facts charged do not
constitute an offense.” Initially, the trial court denied Dio’s motion. RTC granted Dio’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, for failure to allege the element of publication in the information, which prompted Desmond to
file a Notice of Appeal with CA. CA ruled that although the informations did not constitute a crime, RTC erred in
not giving the prosecution a chance to amend them. Hence, this petition.

Dio argues that the informations were void as the prosecutor had no authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the offenses charged since they did not allege the place where the emails were first printed.

ISSUE:
Was the quashal of the information valid on the ground of failure to constitute the offense?

RULING:
No. When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect, such as when the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, that may be cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity
to amend the information. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. Also, the grounds for quashal
of information are: a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; b) That the court trying the case has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; c) That the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so; d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; e) That more than one
offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses; f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; g) That it contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. The enumeration does not include a case of
defect in the information.

In this case, since Dio had not been arraigned yet, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies and the
prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision on the Rules for Criminal Procedure.

611
Rule 119, Sec. 23

BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa

G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

When a demurrer is granted in a criminal case, the private complainant can file a Rule 65 petition on the civil
aspect of the case, as long as he or she can show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the demurrer.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA, affirming
the orders of the RTC, granting respondent Antonio Choa (Choa)’s Demurrer to Evidence.

An information was filed before the RTC against Choa, then president and general manager of Camden
Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was charged with violating the Trust Receipts Law, to the prejudice of BDO
Unibank, Inc. (BDO), the private complainant. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented Gerard K. Santiago
(Santiago) and Froilan Carada (Carada) as its witnesses. On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the trial court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. On September
25, 2014, Choa filed his Comment. Later, on October 13, 2014, Choa filed a Motion for Leave (To file Demurrer
to Evidence), attached to which was his Demurrer to Evidence. In its October 20, 2014 Order, the trial court
directed the prosecution to comment on Choa’s pleading, and Choa’s counsel to reply on the comment if needed.
On October 30, 2014, the prosecution filed its Opposition. Arguing that the Motion for Leave should be expunged
from the records, it claimed that the pleading was pro-forma for being filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary
period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner insists that the Motion for Leave was not timely filed. It avers that under Rule 119, Section 23 of the
Rules of Court, respondent should have filed his Motion for Leave within five (5) days from September 12, 2014,
when the prosecution supposedly rested its case after its documentary evidence had been admitted by the trial
court judge. Respondent counters that his Motion for Leave was not belatedly filed. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,
the period of his Motion’s filing did not start on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the
prosecution’s exhibits. Respondent asserts that since the trial court directed him to comment on the evidence in
the same Order, the trial court did not yet rule on the evidence’s admissibility.

ISSUES:
(1) Did petitioner BDO Unibank, Inc. possess legal personality to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA?
(2) Did the RTC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Order granting respondent
Choa’s Demurrer to Evidence?

RULING:
(1) Yes, petitioner had legal personality to file said petition.

Jurisprudence provides that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Furthermore, in a special
civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the
State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the
case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.

Here, although petitioner discussed respondent’s criminal liability in its Petition for Certiorari, the totality of its
arguments concerns the civil aspect of the case.

(2) Yes, the RTC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued said order.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section 23 of Rule 119 provides that the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after

612
the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from its receipt. If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period often (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a
similar period from its receipt.

A review of the case records reveals that when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
on August 20, 2014, it included a reservation in its Prayer, which states that “With the admission of the foregoing
exhibits and the testimonies of Messrs. Gerard Santiago and Froilan Carada, for the purposes for (sic) which
they are offered, plaintiff People of the Philippines hereby rests its case.” Hence, the prosecution is deemed to
have rested its case on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted its documentary evidence. However,
the counting of the five (5)-day period did not commence on August 20, 2014, when the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; or on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the evidence.
Instead, it started upon respondent’s receipt of the September 12, 2014 Order, for only then was he notified that
the prosecution had rested its case.

Nonetheless, respondent filed his Motion for Leave and Demurrer to Evidence on October 13, 2014. To recall,
the September 12, 2014 Order had also directed respondent to submit his comment/opposition, which he then
submitted on September 25, 2014. Even if there is no record of when respondent received a copy of the Order,
it can be surmised that he received it before September 25, 2014. It follows that the Motion for Leave and the
Demurrer to Evidence were filed beyond the five (5)-day period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, then, should have denied these pleadings outright.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

613
Rule 120, Sec. 4

Aquino v. People
G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or
information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA September 4, 2013 Decision and March 19, 2015 Resolution
which dismissed 3 out of the 7 cases against Maria Fe Cruz Aquino y Velasquez (Aquino) for lack of jurisdiction.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed her guilt under Section 19, paragraph c(2) of Republic Act No. 8239 for
Criminal Case Nos. 97-161314 to 97-161317.7 separate Informations were filed against Aquino before the RTC
of Manila charging her with 3 counts of violation of Section 19, paragraph (b)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 and 4
counts of violation of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239

On November 3, 1997, Vice Consul Ted Archibal (Archibal) of the Anti-Fraud Unit of the United States Embassy
received a call from the non-immigrant visa section through a consular officer, who suspected that the documents
submitted by a female applicant with two (2) minor children were fraudulent. Aquino was later identified as the
female applicant. The RTC found Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all offenses charged.

On appeal, the CA modified the RTC’s decision According to the CA, the Informations for Criminal Case Nos.
97-161311 to 97-161313 should have been filed before the RTC of Pasay City, and not of Manila. The violations
of Section 19, paragraph (b)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 were committed in Pasay City since the passport
applications were filed with the Department of Foreign Affairs Office in Pasay City. Hence, the CA dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 97-161311 to 97-161313 for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, the CA noted that there was an
error in the designation of the offense charged. Aquino should have been charged under paragraph (c)2, instead
of paragraph (c)1, of Republic Act No. 8239. The latter pertains to the act of forging and using the forged
documents while the former concerns “willfully or knowingly uses or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for
use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document

ISSUES:
1. Did the constitutional right of the accused to due process and the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation violated?
2. Does RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
1. No, petitioner’s claim is erroneous. Petitioner argues that her due process rights were violated because the
Information charged her under paragraph (c)1, which provides:

“1. Falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates or alters any passport or travel document or any
supporting document for a passport application, with the intent of using the same … “

She claims that the Information only alleges forgery and does not directly allege that she “willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously used” the forged documents. On the contrary, the Information reads:

Herein accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously FORGE . . . and used the same
as a supporting document in the accused’s application for a U.S. Visa in flagrant violation of the aforesaid
law. (Emphasis supplied.)

A basic reading of the Information shows that “use” of the forged documents was also alleged. The Information
was couched in parallel structure. In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, this court reiterated the variance doctrine,
axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or
information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given by the

614
fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in
the body of the information.
The RTC correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 4 counts of violation of Section 19,
paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 and not paragraph (c)2 as found by the Court of Appeals.

The elements of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 are:

3. The accused forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered any passport or travel document or any passport
validly issued, which has become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed by law; and

4. The accused used, uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document or any passport validly issued which has
become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed by law.

All the elements are present.

2. Yes, while the Petitioner argues that all the essential elements of the crime took place in the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Pasay City, and therefore, is under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.
Clearly, however, the second element of the offense, the intent to use, was committed in the premises of the
United States Embassy in Manila. Criminal acts are regarded to have been committed within the province or
city where the appellant was found and arrested.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because jurisdiction and criminal procedure were not part of the amendments of the rules.

615
Rule 120, Sec. 4

Osorio v. People
G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018
Leonen, J.

If there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the
offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged
if it is necessarily included in the offense proved. In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. In an Information, Osorio was charged with Estafa, punished
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, that the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, prior to and even simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, to the effect that her money, if invested with Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20%
interest per annum, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Josefina
O. Gabriel to give and deliver, as in fact, she gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of
Php200,000.00, on the strength of the manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the
said manifestation and representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount of Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession,
with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same
to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Josefina O. Gabriel in the aforesaid
amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Osorio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented
as witnesses private complainant, Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in
December 2000, Osorio visited Gabriel’s store and introduced herself as an agent of the Philam Life. As proof,
Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance coverage to
Gabriel. Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management. The proposed
investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme and would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel
that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed by the offer,
Gabriel tendered ₱200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn issued Philam Life receipts. A few months later, Gabriel
discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted
Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility.

Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released to her
on May 14, 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life office to see
Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to a certain Atty. Cabugoy who sent a
demand letter to Osorio. Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she was allowed to
engage in other lines of work. He stated that Osorio should not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel’s
₱200,000.00 investment. Although the receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should only be issued
for insurance premium payments.

RTC rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa. It ruled that Gabriel was
induced to part with her money through Osorio’s misrepresentation that it would be invested in Philam Life, a
company with an established reputation. It rejected Osorio’s defense that Gabriel later on consented to the
placement. When she was informed of the placement with PMIAM, Gabriel had no other choice but to agree.
Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming Osorio’s conviction. Osorio moved for reconsideration but her
motion was denied.

ISSUE:
May accused who was charged of Estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC instead be
convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the RPC?

RULING:
YES. As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule proceeds
from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the

616
accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which simply means that if there is a variance between the offense charged
and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense charged.
An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.

In Sales v. Court of Appeals, the accused was charged with Estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)( d)
of the Revised Penal Code. She was convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. In
holding that there was no violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against
her, this Court held that the elements of the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
also constitute one (1) of the elements of Estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code:

In the information filed against her, the petitioner with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
“(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall
be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Rep. Act No.
4885, approved June 17, 1967.)”

Under the aforequoted provision, the elements of Estafa as defined therein are as follows: (1) postdating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof. . . Basically, the two essential
requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in
order that the crime of Estafa may be established.

On the other hand, Article 318 of the same Code partly provides that:
“Other deceits. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and
not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by
any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.”

Clearly, the principal elements of deceit and damage are likewise present in the preceding article cited. The
petitioner’s conviction under the latter provision instead of that with which she was charged was merely an
application of the rule on variance between allegation and proof defined under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court which states that:
“Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.”

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily
included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 120, Section 4 is not affected by the amendments.

617
Rule 121, Sec. 2

Abubakar v. People
G.R. No. 202409, June 27, 2018
Leonen, J.

Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality
of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial.

FACTS:
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the DPWH-ARMM when the offenses were allegedly
committed. Abubakar held the position of Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir
was the Director of the Bureau of Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-Qualification
Bids and Awards Committee, while Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary.

After the creation of ARMM, the national government earmarked P615,000,000.00 for the implementation of
regional and provincial infrastructure projects. In 1991, the funds were transferred to the Office of the ARMM
Regional Governor. Later, a portion of the funds was then transferred to DPWH-ARMM.

During the incumbency of then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), the Office of the President received
reports of irregularities attending the implementation of the DPWH-ARMM infrastructure projects. The
Commission on Audit was directed to conduct an investigation.

The audit team made the following findings:

First, an overpayment amounting to P17,684,000.00 was incurred on nine (9) road sections. The audit team
discovered the existence of bloated accomplishment reports that allowed contractors to prematurely claim on
their progress billings. Second, advance payments totaling P14,400,000.00 were given to nine (9) contractors for
the procurement of aggregate sub-base course in violation of Section 88(l) of Presidential Decree No. 1445.

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July 31, 1998, 21
separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and other officials of DPWH-ARMM.

All the Informations charged the accused with conspiracy except for Criminal Case No. 24971.
Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-accused entered a plea of not guilty. De
Leon testified on the alleged irregularities attending the bidding procedure. She explained that some contractors
were allowed to mobilize their equipment even before the conduct of the bidding and the perfection of the
contracts for six (6) road sections of the Cotabato-Lanao Road and the Awang-Nuro Road Projects.

Mendoza testified on the alleged irregular payment scheme for the procurement of sub-base aggregates. She
stated that the concerned DPWH-ARMM officials made it appear that they were requesting for the pre-payment
of cement. However, the disbursement vouchers indicate that the payment was made for the procurement of
sub-base aggregates. The words “sub-base aggregates” were superimposed on the disbursement vouchers
Sandiganbayan rendered judgmentfinding Guiani, Baraguir, and Masandag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
seven (7) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969.

Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective motions for new trial and reconsideration on separate dates. They
anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged incompetence of their former counsel. Guiani, Suasin, and
Mamogkat also moved for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the motions for
new trial and reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Are petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir entitled to a new trial for the alleged incompetence
of their former counsel?

RULING:
No.

618
Lawyers act on behalf of their clients with binding effect. This is the necessary consequence of the fiduciary
relationship created between a lawyer and a client. Once engaged, a counsel holds “the implied authority to do
all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit. The acts of
counsel are deemed acts of the client. Thus, as a rule, parties are bound by the acts, omissions, and mistakes
of their counsel. An exception to this is when the gross and inexcusable negligence of counsel deprives the
latter’s client of his or her day in court. The allegation of gross and inexcusable negligence, however, must be
substantiated. In determining whether the case falls under the exception, courts should always be guided by the
principle that parties must be “given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their action or defense.”

In criminal as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have
been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or
incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new trial.

So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy,
materiality, or immateriality of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds
for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and
cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded
differently.

This Court holds that petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled to a new trial.

First, they failed to convince this Court that they have a meritorious defense and that the evidence they seek to
introduce would probably lead to their acquittal. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir, through counsel, presented
their evidence and made out their case before the Sandiganbayan. Based on Jurisprudence it is incumbent upon
them to present a meritorious defense and to convince this Court that the evidence omitted by their former
counsel would probably alter the results of the case. They cannot simply allege that they were deprived of due
process or that their defense was not fully threshed out during trial. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir failed to
discharge this burden. Petitioners seek to introduce as evidence their personnel data files, contracts of service,
and appointment papers to prove that they were engaged in a temporary capacity. These documents would
certainly not alter the results of the case.

Second, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir’s former counsel was not grossly negligent. Their former counsel
may have failed to present other pieces of evidence in addition to what their co-accused had presented. He may
have also failed to incorporate other arguments in the record of the case. However, these cannot be considered
as grossly negligent acts.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 121, Sec. 2 has not been amended nor repealed.

619
Rule 122, Sec. 1

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy to
question this final order is an appeal.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Personal Collection Direct
Selling Inc. (Personal Collection), assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
its Petition for Certiorari against the RTC.

Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence against
Terestita Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for her failure to account or liquidate
for the cash advances entrusted to her. After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor filed an
Information against Carandang before the RTC and the RTC thereafter ordered that an arrest warrant be issued
against Carandang. Carandang filed her Counter Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that
her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was due to the sudden termination of her employment by
Personal Collection. She also claimed that she did not receive any demand letter or any offer from Personal
Collection to settle the case.

The Office of the City Prosecutor, then filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC stating that there was
lack of probable cause to hold Carandang liable for estafa. RTC issued an Order granting the Motion. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Personal Collection against the RTC which alleged that
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
1. Was Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy for Petitioners instead of filing an appeal?
2. Did the RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information upon finding that there was a lack of probable
cause?
3. Was petitioner deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard on
respondent’s Motion to Release Cash Bond?

RULING:
1. No. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy. Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. An
order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the remedy to
question this final order is an appeal.

Despite petitioner’s claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal of an order dismissing
the criminal case against respondent, it is evident that the grant of the Motion to Withdraw Information
dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the Regional Trial Court’s
findings of lack of probable cause due to the alleged insufficiency of evidence presented by respondent and
because all the elements of estafa were present. Thus, petitioner questions the trial court’s allegedly
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected by an
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

2. Yes. When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority
to determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. The court is “the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it.” The dismissal of a criminal case due to lack of probable cause
protects the accused from having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence.

Judges must proceed with caution in dismissing cases for lack of probable cause since the evidence before
them are preliminary in nature. When probable cause exists, the court must proceed with arraignment and
trial. But should the evidence presented absolutely fail to support this finding of probable cause, the case
should be dismissed. Whether it is to dismiss the case or to proceed with trial, a judge’s action must not impair
“the substantial rights of the accused [or] the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law.”

620
The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it reversed its earlier finding of probable cause. The
earlier finding was about the issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court evaluated the prosecutor’s
Resolution and its attached documents. Following this, respondent prayed for the reinvestigation of the case
as she was unable to attend the initial preliminary investigation. It was during the reinvestigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor that respondent was able to present her defense against the allegations in the
complaint. Clearly, the additional evidence adduced prompted the prosecutor’s reversal of its initial finding of
probable cause and the filing of the motion to withdraw information. It was also this additional evidence that
formed the basis of the trial court’s evaluation that there was now a lack of probable cause sufficient to
withdraw the information. There being insufficient evidence showing that the trial court erred in finding a lack
of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must be upheld.

3. No. Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the cancellation of bail. Among the
instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is dismissed. Since cancellation of
bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation
takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place.

The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash bond is made to answer for
any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.
In this case, the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the information resulted in the automatic
cancellation of respondent’s bail.

Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard
on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail was automatically
cancelled upon the dismissal of the case. Petitioner’s hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash
Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to respondent was
already warranted under the Rules of Court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes in these rules.

621
Rule 122, Sec. 11

People v. Yanson
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
Leonen, J.

Accused-appellant’s acquittal arising from a lack of proof of corpus delicti favors the other accused, even if they
did not appeal before this Court. This Decision applies to them as much as it does to accused-appellant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA decision affirming the RTC’s Judgment convicting accused-appellant Leonardo
Yanson and his co accused, Jaime Sison and Rosalie Bautista, for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

An Information was filed against accused Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the RTC for transporting dried
marijuana leaves. During trial, police officers testified that in May 1996, they had set up a checkpoint on the basis
of a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number 61911 and carrying three (3) people—
that was transporting marijuana. When the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint, the team leader asked Sison,
who is driving, about inspecting the vehicle. Sison alighted and, at an officer’s prodding, opened the pickup’s
hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine. The RTC, in a Joint Judgment, convicted
the three accused. Only Yanson appealed before the CA.

Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are
inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle.

ISSUES:
1) Was the warrantless search conducted on the pickup boarded by accused-appellant and his co-accused
valid?
2) Can Sison (the driver) be deemed to have consented to the warrantless search?
3) Must Sison and Bautista be also acquitted given that only Yanson appealed?

RULING:
1) No. For a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains imperative. Law
enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution’s mere
allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there were
other odd circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive search.
Evidently, the police officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to
inspect the vehicle.

Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause.
A single hint hardly amounts to “the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.” To maintain otherwise would be
to sanction frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be
initiated by sly informants.

2) No. It cannot be said that Sison consented to the search made by the arresting officers. Jurisprudence
has settled that “[m]ere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all.” The validity of a supposedly consented warrantless
search is contingent on the totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail an inquiry into the
environment in which the consent was ostensibly given, such as “the presence of coercive police
procedures.”

Here, Sison, who was then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officers to open the pickup’s hood.
His beguiling conformity is easily accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who had
specifically flagged him and his companions down. He was under the coercive force of armed law
enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated.

622
3) Yes. In drugs cases where the allegedly confiscated drug is excluded from admissible evidence-as when
it was acquired through an invalid warrantless search-the prosecution is left without proof of corpus
delicti. Any discussion on whether a crime has been committed becomes an exercise in futility. Acquittal
is then inexorable.

Thus, here, the arresting officers’ search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2) sacks
of marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence.

His co-accused, Sison and Bautista, must also be acquitted.

Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns situations where there
are several accused but not all of them appeal their conviction:

SECTION 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

a. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

As a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the accused who appealed his or her conviction.
However, when an appellate court renders a favorable judgment, the effects of such favorable judgment
extends even to those who did not appeal, to the extent that such effects apply to their specific contexts.

Here, accused-appellant’s acquittal arising from a lack of proof of corpus delicti favors the other accused,
Sison and Bautista, even if they did not appeal before this Court. This Decision applies to them as much
as it does to accused-appellant.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 amendments only covers rules on civil procedure and evidence.

623
Rule 122, Sec. 11

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
Leonen, J.

While the SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it cannot disturb the penalties imposed
by the CA on those who did not appeal, when its ruling is unfavorable to those who did not appeal.

FACTS:
This case involves separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the accused-appellants Christopher Soliva,
Warren Zipangan, and Robert Alvir, seeking the reversal of the SC’s decision in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and attempted murder of Fortes, Natalicio, Lachica (Lachica),
Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston resulting from fraternity-related violence. SC previously reversed the decision of
the CA which ruled that the other accused are only guilty of slight physical injuries, thereby reverting to RTC’s
decision.

Soliva contends that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio’s sole testimony, which
he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. He points out that prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was
able to witness the attack on Natalicio but was unable to identify him as the attacker. Also, Alvir argues that
Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his forearms, which created doubt that
he was able to see his attackers. He argues that Lachica’s statement that he was still able to raise his head while
parrying blows was impossible, and that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime,
Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and Zingapan.

Zipangan argues that the information filed against him was insufficient as to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The aggravating circumstance of “masks and/or
other forms of disguise” was alleged in the Information to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers
intended to conceal their identities.

Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police Officers Romeo Cabrera
(Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the
Philippines Infirmary should have been given credibility by this Court, and that the victims’ delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries
of Cabrera and Salvador since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers.

Alvir argues that the decision of the SC in the review did not apply to his co-accused who did not appeal to this
Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla.

ISSUE:
Does the SC Decision affect those accused who did not appeal the case?

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that while SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it cannot disturb the
penalties imposed by CA on those who did not appeal, namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with
Rule 122, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

CA reviewed the case with regard to all the accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of
appeal since the sentence imposed is death penalty pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. However,
CA lowered some of the imposable penalties of accused-appellants, which was then brought back to
the higher offense of attempted murder by the SC. Since such ruling is unfavorable to the accused-appellants, it
shall therefore not apply to those who did not join the appeal.

Furthermore, as the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the appeal before the CA, the highest
penalty the CA could impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of a CA Decision by the SC will never be
mandatory or automatic because as previously applied under the rules, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment

624
cases were brought before the SC via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed on automatic
review. Hence, Feliciano and Medalla cannot be bound by the appeal of the accused-appellants since a notice
of appeal is required.

Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision on the Rules for Criminal Procedure.

625
Rule 126, Sec. 13

Veridiano v. People
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017
Leonen, J.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made.
Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; “the process cannot be reversed.” For there to be a
lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected
without a warrant.

FACTS:
Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Veridiano was arraigned. He
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, at about 7:20
a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho,” who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way
to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana.” POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.
Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty. Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that
“he was illegally arrested.” He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is “inadmissible in evidence for being
the ‘fruit of a poisonous tree. “Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on
chain of custody.

ISSUES:
Was there a valid warrantless search?

RULING:
No. A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made.
Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; “the process cannot be reversed.”

For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may
also be effected without a warrant. In this case, petitioner’s arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto
arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what
gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in “stop and frisk”
searches.

A “stop and frisk” search is defined in People v. Chua as “the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.” Thus, the allowable scope of a “stop and frisk” search
is limited to a “protective search of outer clothing for weapons.”

626
Although a “stop and frisk” search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime
prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting “stop and frisk” searches. While probable cause is
not required, a “stop and frisk” search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers
must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case,
that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce
a reasonable search.

EFFECT OF THE REVISED RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Amended Rules do not include changes in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

627
Warrantless Searches

Acosta v. Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019
Leonen, J.

The government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for firearm licenses unless
armed with a search warrant.

FACTS:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10591, or the
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Among the assailed provisions are Sec. 9 of both the law and the IRR. Said provisions respectively provide:

Republic Act No. 10591 2013 IRR

SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. — SECTION 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. —
Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and
payment of required fees to be determined by the xxx xxx xxx
Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be issued
the appropriate license under the following 9.6 For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the licensed citizen
categories: must comply with the inspection requirements of the
PNP. Failure on their part to comply with any of the
Type 1 license — allows a citizen to own and possess requirements herein mentioned is a ground for the
a maximum of two (2) registered firearms; cancellation of license and/or registration.

Type 2 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;

Type 3 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of ten (10) registered firearms;

Type 4 license — allows a citizen to own and possess

a maximum of fifteen (15) registered firearms; and

Type 5 license — allows a citizen, who is a certified

gun collector, to own and possess more than fifteen
(15) registered firearms.

For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container

secured by lock and key or other security measures
for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.

For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply

with the inspection and bond requirements.

The PNP, in the pro forma Individual Application for New Firearm Registration, included a paragraph indicating
the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection, to be signed by the applicant. It provides that the applicant
agrees to voluntarily consent to the inspection of the firearm at the residence indicated in the application.

In petitioners’ view, this inspection is an unreasonable search prohibited in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
and a violation of their right to privacy. Further, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection
would allegedly be an invalid waiver, as it is not given “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly” by the applicant who
would just sign it, lest the application not be approved.

The Petitions herein — certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — are filed directly with the SC.

ISSUES:

628
1. Is petitioners’ direct recourse to the SC in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
2. Does the inspection requirement in the law and in the IRR amount to an unreasonable warrantless search?

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioners’ direct recourse to the SC in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Under this doctrine, recourse must first be sought from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. This is “to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner.”

Here, to assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591 and their
corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations, petitioners filed actions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — actions that could have been brought before a regional trial court.

Thus, petitioner should have brought the action before the RTC instead. In any case, the SC shall proceed
to resolve the merits of the case.

2. Yes, the inspection requirement in the law and in the IRR amount to an unreasonable warrantless search.

A reasonable search is different from a warrantless search. While a reasonable search arises from a reduced
expectation of privacy, a warrantless search, which is presumed unreasonable, dispenses with a search
warrant for practical reasons. This is why a search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain
view, consented search, and extensive search of moving private vehicle do not require a search warrant.
This Court holds that the inspection requirement under Republic Act No. 10591, as interpreted by the
Philippine National Police in the Implementing Rules, cannot be considered a reasonable search. There is a
legitimate, almost absolute, expectation of privacy in one’s residence. Signing the Consent of Voluntary
Presentation for Inspection does not result in a true and valid consented search. Section 9 authorizes
warrantless inspections of houses which, as has been extensively discussed, are unreasonable and,
therefore, require a search warrant.

Thus, Sec. 9 of the law and Sec. 9.3 of the 2013 IRR are unconstitutional, and the PNP is prohibited from
requiring individual applicants — either for a license to own and possess firearm or for a new firearm
registration — to sign the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection, or otherwise requiring inspection
of their houses as a requirement for a license to own and possess firearm unless, armed with a search
warrant.

It must be noted that the 2018 IRR now provides the scope and extent of the inspection, the same, however,
may still only be done with a search warrant.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the principles on warrantless searches have not been
amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules.

629
Warrantless Searches

People v. Yanson
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
Leonen, J.

Warrantless searches based on a solitary tip, without other suspicious circumstances which would have
prompted the police officers to do an extensive search, is invalid. In addition, the validity of a supposedly
consented warrantless search is contingent on the totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail an
inquiry into the environment in which the consent was ostensibly given, such as “the presence of coercive police
procedures.”

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA decision affirming the RTC’s Judgment convicting accused-appellant Leonardo
Yanson and his co accused, Jaime Sison and Rosalie Bautista, for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

An Information was filed against accused Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the RTC for transporting dried
marijuana leaves. During trial, police officers testified that in May 1996, they had set up a checkpoint on the basis
of a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number 61911 and carrying three (3) people—
that was transporting marijuana. When the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint, the team leader asked Sison,
who is driving, about inspecting the vehicle. Sison alighted and, at an officer’s prodding, opened the pickup’s
hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine. The RTC, in a Joint Judgment, convicted
the three accused. Only Yanson appealed before the CA.

Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are
inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle.

ISSUE:
Was the warrantless search conducted on the pickup boarded by accused-appellant and his co-accused valid?

RULING:
No. For a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains imperative. Law enforcers
do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution’s mere
allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there were other odd
circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive search. Evidently, the police
officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to inspect the vehicle.

Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single
hint hardly amounts to “the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place to be searched.” To maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the
floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 amendments only covers rules on civil procedure and evidence.

630
Warrantless Searches

Dela Cruz v. People

G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood
so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

FACTS:
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court’s Judgment finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764.

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz
was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the
terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine
saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. The bag was then inspected and the following items were found inside:
three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed
inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in
the negative. Dela Cruz was then arrested.

According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a porter to buy a
ticket. A considerable time of fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the ticket while his luggage was left
sitting on the floor with only the porter standing beside it. He claims that someone must have placed the
unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he was away from it. He was surprised when his attention
was called by the x-ray machine operator after the firearms were detected. Considering the circumstances, Dela
Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search:

Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure. Dela
Cruz was caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went
through the x-ray machine. The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a
common seaport security procedure. According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches
and seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures.

ISSUE:
Was there a valid search and seizure of petitioner’s belongings?

RULING:
Yes, there was a valid search and seizure of petitioner’s belongings. The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with
authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction
between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily
law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions
of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. Searches
pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and
inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection
of passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port
authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules on criminal procedure were not amended.

631
Warrantless Searches

People v. Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
Leonen, J.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person.
The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the
person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon
one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

FACTS:
This is to appeal (pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) the decision of the CA finding the accused-appellant
Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) guilty for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
(CDDA).

As presented by the prosecution, the police in San Gabriel, La Union received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana. As a result, checkpoints
were placed in order to intercept the suspect. Then, a passenger jeepney arrived at the checkpoint and the driver
disembarked and gave a signal to the police that 2 of his passengers were carrying marijuana. The police
approached the 2 passengers who were later identified as accused Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. When the
police inquired on the contents of the bags they were carrying, the 2 replied that they had no idea of the contents
of the bags in their possession since they were only asked by their barriomate named Marvin to transport the
bags. As the bags were opened, the contents were found to be the 3 bricks of what looked like marijuana.
Thereafter, they were both arrested. The RTC found Cogaed guilty, but the case against Dayao was dismissed
because he was a minor. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and found that Cogaed waived his right
against warrantless searches when without any prompting from the police officer, he voluntarily opened his bag.
Hence, this appeal was filed.

ISSUE:
Was there a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the accused-appellant?

RULING:
No. The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. A basic criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. In this case,
Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the
police officer but by the jeepney driver. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything
less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules
of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a
warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. Further, There can be no
valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if assumed that he did not object when the police asked him
to open his bags. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere

632
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Hence, there is no enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case pertain to the rules on criminal procedure and as of to date, no
amendments have been made as to such.

633
Rule 128, Sec. 3

Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp.

G.R. No. 181683, October 7, 2015
Leonen, J.

When evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be competent. The weight accorded to
evidence is properly considered only after evidence has been admitted.

FACTS:
In these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (Lorenzo Shipping)
challenges the CA decision finding it liable for damages caused to the Power Barge 104, a non-propelled power
plant barge, owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). On the other hand, the latter seeks to recover actual
damages.

Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed in General Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon, owned and
operated by Lorenzo Shipping, hit and rammed into it. At the time of the incident, Captain Villarias served as the
Master of the MV. However, it was then under Captain Yape’s pilotage as it was mandatory to yield navigational
control to the Harbor Pilot while docking. The former recalled that during the pilotage of Captain Yape, he always
remained his side and affirmed that he heard and knew of Captain Yape’s orders, because he had to repeat the
order. As the MV Lorcon Luzon moved precariously close to the wharf, Captain Yape ordered the vessel to move
backward. Despite his orders, the engine failed to timely respond. Thus, even when Captain Yape ordered the
dropping of the anchor, MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into Power Barge 104.

Marine protests where filed by the Plant Manager and Captain Villarias. NPC filed before the Quezon City RTC
a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping. The RTC absolved Lorenzo Shipping of liability, but the CA
reversed the said decision. Lorenzo Shipping argues that no liability could be attributed to it as the MV Lorcon
Luzon was under compulsory pilotage and that NPC assumed risk when it berthed a non-propelled vessel in the
Makar Wharf. NPC, on the other hand, maintains otherwise. It further argued that it was able to show by
“competent testimonial and documentary evidence” that it must be compensated for actual damages in the
amount of P876,826.00. Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE:
Is a bill of expenses considered as a private document such that its due execution and authenticity must be
established to be admitted as evidence?

RULING:
Yes, because a bill of expenses does not fall under the definition of public documents. Any material presented
as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic
is that a private document offered as authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution
and authenticity are established in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Such due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any
other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. Admissibility of evidence and
weight accorded to evidence are two distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
governs admissibility and provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law of these rules. When evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be competent. The
weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after evidence has been admitted. To this end, courts
evaluate evidence in accordance with the rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, consistent with basic precepts of rationality and guided by judicially established standards.

A bill of expenses, such as Exhibit “F” in this case, is considered a private document as it does not fall under
what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public documents. For it to have been admitted by the RTC
as authentic, Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been complied with. Exhibit
“F” was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the
standard of competency. Reliance on NPC’s Exhibit “F” and its contents, so as to establish the extent of
National Power Corporation’s pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit “F” does not form
part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration. The pieces of evidence fall short of the standard
required for proving pecuniary loss, which shall be the basis for awarding actual damages.

634
Hence, the due execution and authenticity of the bill of expenses must be established to be admitted as evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because the new rules provide for
another mode of authenticating a private documents: (c) By other evidence showing its due execution and
authenticity. The amendment pertains to third means to prove the due execution and authenticity of a private
document, aside from by anyone who saw it being executed or proving the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Further, Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence now provides that
evidence may be inadmissible if excluded also by the Constitution.

635
Exclusionary Rule

People v. Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
Leonen, J.

Dangerous drugs obtained from accused through an invalid warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence.

FACTS:
This is to appeal (pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) the decision of the CA finding the accused-appellant
Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) guilty for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
(CDDA).

As presented by the prosecution, the police in San Gabriel, La Union received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana. As a result, checkpoints
were placed in order to intercept the suspect. Then, a passenger jeepney arrived at the checkpoint and the driver
disembarked and gave a signal to the police that 2 of his passengers were carrying marijuana. The police
approached the 2 passengers who were later identified as accused Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. When the
police inquired on the contents of the bags they were carrying, the 2 replied that they had no idea of the contents
of the bags in their possession since they were only asked by their barriomate named Marvin to transport the
bags. As the bags were opened, the contents were found to be the 3 bricks of what looked like marijuana.
Thereafter, they were both arrested. The RTC found Cogaed guilty, but the case against Dayao was dismissed
because he was a minor. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and found that Cogaed waived his right
against warrantless searches when without any prompting from the police officer, he voluntarily opened his bag.
Hence, this appeal was filed.

ISSUES:
Can the evidence obtained through the search be admitted?

RULING:
No. The Constitution provides: Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule
or the fruit of the.poisonous tree doctrine. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage
law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are
not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were
founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no
evidence left to convict Cogaed. Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.
However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.

Hence, there is no enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules in this case pertain to the rules on criminal procedure and as of to date, no
amendments have been made as to such.

636
Rule 130, Sec. 1

People v. Divinagracia, Sr.

G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

It is well-established that “physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses.” The physical evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA’s vagina strongly corroborates AAA
and BBB’s testimonies that AAA was raped by their father.

FACTS:
In a Notice for Appeal filed before the Court of Appeals, respondent Julito Divinagracia, Sr. challenges the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC’s decision convicting the respondent for one (1) count
of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.

The RTC found that BBB suddenly woke up to her father’s tight embrace from behind and felt him roughly running
his hand ove her leg and breasts and felt her father poking his hard penis against her buttocks. On the same
night, Divinagracia pulled down AAA’s shorts and put his finger inside her vagina and got on top of AAA and
inserted his penis inside her vagina. AA.A’s father then continued to molest her. An information for acts of
lasciviousness and rape was filed against respondent Divinagracia, Sr. The prosecution presented Dr. Naomi
Poca who testified the lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions could have only been caused by penetration into
the vagina and opined that the healed laceration at 8 :00 position suggested sexual abuse.

As respondent pleaded not guilty to the alleged acts imputed against him, Divinagracia denied abusing his
daughters and claimed that they had a happy family life. Divinagracia then accused his wife’s family of plotting
against him.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt Divinagracia’s guilt for the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness against his minor daughters?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

It is well-established that “physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses.” The physical evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA’s vagina strongly corroborates AAA
and BBB’s testimonies that AAA was raped by their father.

The medical findings of Dr. Biag, as interpreted and testified to by Dr. Poca, also corroborate AAA’s allegations
of her father’s abuse. Dr. Poca testified that while some of the healed lacerations could still be considered as
normal variant finding rather than acquired, the lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions could have only been
caused by the insertion of a penis, object, or finger into the vagina.

On the charge of acts of lasciviousness, Divinagracia’s defense of denial must fail. Jmbo v. People emphasized
that the self-serving defense of denial falters against the “positive identification by, and straightforward narration
of the victim.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of the offended party
is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

Such finding of lasciviousness is solely attributable to the testimony of the private complainant BBB whom the
court considers credible and competent. BBB categorically stated that the accused lay down beside her,
embraced her and poked his penis to her buttocks. This candid description of the molestation is a direct statement
that undoubtedly proves the crime committed by the accused with his daughter.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the said principle was not affected by 2019 Rules of Court.

637
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Asaytuno
G.R. No. 245972, December 2, 2019
Leonen, J.

In dangerous drugs cases, the seized contrabands must be properly authenticated and documented in front of
authorized individuals. Not being able to do such may tarnish the integrity of the contrabands.

FACTS:
Case is with thhe Supreme Court from an appeal from the Court of appeals.The lower court resolved in favor of
conviction on illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Petitioner is the People of the Philippines while the respondents
are Martin and Renato Asaytuno.

Respondets were apprehended in a buy bust operation. Police officiers marked a 1000Php bill and bought shabu
from respondents. After the signal the police grabbed both respondents. Based on the chemistry report, the three
sachets obtained tested positive for shabu.

Respondents contended that the police infiltrated their homes and woke up with a gun pointed at their face and
that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the failure in the chain of custody. Petitioners on
the other hand stick to the buy bust operation that occurred and that proper adherence to the chain of custody
was properly observed.

ISSUE:
Was the chain of custody properly observed?

RULING:
No. The chain of custody was not observed.

In handling dangerous drugs the police officers must follow a process for the authentication of the drugs seized.
It must be properly marked upon apprehension and documented in front of other authorized personnel. Said drug
must also be sent to the laboratory for verification. Then it may be presented in court and must be destroyed
afterwards.

In the case at bar the process was not strictly followed. The court relaxes the rules sometimes in authentication
of the drugs but it must still remain with integrity and must be justified. However this is not apparent in the buy
bust operation. This thereby tarnishes the object evidence to result in a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

As the reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established based on the improper following of the chain of custody,
the respondents were released. Appeal has been granted and the decision of the court of appeals along with the
regional trial court are hereby reversed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rule on evidence regarding chain of custody of sezied prohibited drugs has not been
repealed.

638
RA 9165, Sec. 21

Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
Leonen, J.

The arresting officers’ unjustified noncompliance with the legal safeguards under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 compromises integrity of the confiscated drug.

FACTS:
This is a petition to for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting Joseph Villasana y Cabahug of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

Petitioner is Joseph Villasana y Cabahug was charged with the violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs
act of 2002 for illegal possession of one self-sealing transparent plastic bag containing 0.15 gram of white
crystalline substance Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. Respondent on the other hand is the people
of the Philippines or the prosection as the violation is a crime against the citizes of the Philippines. PO3 Martinez
received information regarding the rampant selling of drugs in Valenzuela against the petitioners. The entrapment
operation was successful and Villasana was apprehended together with the sachet of shabu which was
documented and marked in the barangay. Villasana says that that he was just seized by the police officers after
alighting from the jeepney. He was then brought to the narcotics department wherein when the siblings arrived
they were asked for 50,000 php areglo. He was also then asked to sign a document saying that he will be charged
for a drug related offense.

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was invalid and the drug seized from him was inadmissible in
evidence and that there were irregularities in the handling of the seized shabu such as inconsistent markings and
the marking were not done at the place of arrest including non-compliance with inventory and photograph
requirements. respondent counters that petitioner purely raises questions of fact that are proscribed in a Rule 45
petition. Furthermore that since the petitioner entered his plea without objection he waived his right to question
the illegality of his arrest.

ISSUE:
Is Rule 45 proper even though the supreme court is generally not a trier of facts?
Was the arrest proper as in flagrante delicto arrest?
Was the integrity of the drugs seized compromised?

RULING:
Yes Rule 45 is proper.
No there was no proper in flagrante delicto arrest.
Yes the integrity of the drugs seized was compromised.

According to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as a general rule only questions of law may be brought in a petition
for review on certiorari. This court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts if they are not supported
by substantial evidence. There are of course exceptions to this including the claim of the petitioner that there
were factual findings which were overlooked, disregarded and could change the outcome of the case.

According to Rule 113 Section 5 of the revised criminal procedure, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. The two elements of the person to be arrested has just
committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit a crime and in the presence of the arresting officer.

Also According to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 the apprehending team must seize, mark and document
the drugs confiscated in the presence of the accused or from whom which drugs were seized. This in effect helps
protect the integrity of the drugs seized.

Based on the sound discretion of the Supreme court the allowance of the facts stated by petitioner even in Rule
45 is allowed as one of the exceptions. This led to the reversal of the decision of the case.

639
There was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at bar primarily because the apprehending officer was still far
away from the petitioner when the alleged crime of selling was being committed. The confidential information
given regareding the sale of prohibited drugs to the police officers was not substantial enough to make the arrest
as in flagrante delicto.

Lastly the proper initial marking and documentation in front of authorized personnel upon apprehension of the
contraband was not followed. This led to the integrity of the drugs to be compromised. As there has been doubt
in the chain of authentication, the possibility of tampering existed.

Therefore with all the premises being considered the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Case is dismissed against the petitioner.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 on appeal by certiorari has not been changed.
No effect because Rule 113, Sec. 5 on warrantless arrest has not been changed
No effect because RA 9165 has not been changed.

640
R.A. 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Ramos
G.R. No. 225325, August 28, 2019
Leonen, J.

Police officers are given time to prepare for a buy-bust operation and make necessary arrangements beforehand,
fully aware of the strict procedure to follow under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act. Assuming that the apprehending team in this case really could not have immediately marked the seized
drugs because they had no marker or because the required witnesses were absent, both circumstances were
entirely of their own making. If these rendered the immediate marking impracticable, such impracticability was
‘their fault and cannot be used as an excuse to not immediately mark the items. If anything, the lack of foresight
that led to these circumstance shows that the team did not exert genuine effort to comply with the chain of custody
rule.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision upholding the conviction of appellant Isidro Ramos for violating Article II,
Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Two (2) separate Informations were filed before the RTC against appellant for illegal possession and sale of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. During trial, four police officers testified for the prosecution providing that they
had planned a buy-bust operation after a confidential informant reported to them that a known drug pusher named
“Billy” was selling shabu. After the poseur-buyer had given the signal that the transaction had already been
consummated, they arrested the appellant where they confiscated 17 heat-sealed sachets containing white
crystalline substance, as well as the marked money. PO2 Navarro explained that the items were not immediately
marked after seizure as none of the required witnesses under the law were then present. PO3 Yco, meanwhile,
testified that the markings were not placed at the time of arrest because he and PO2 Navarro did not bring pens.

In a Joint Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crimes charged. The trial court accepted as a justifiable
ground for not immediately marking the seized items the officers’ failure to bring a marking pen. It also accepted
as justifiable ground for marking the items at the police station the officers’ explanation that the required witnesses
were available by then.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of the required witnesses and the belated marking of the seized items warrant the acquittal
of the accused.

RULING:
Yes. Before a court may convict someone for the crimes of illegal possession and sale of drugs, it must be certain
that dangerous drugs were seized, and that the “drugs examined and presented in court were the very ones
seized.” To convince the court of this, the prosecution must show that the apprehending team followed the
stringent requirements on the custody of the seized drugs, as provided under Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. It states, in part:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - ...

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Police officers are given time to prepare for a buy-bust operation and make necessary arrangements beforehand,
fully aware of the strict procedure to follow under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act. Assuming that the apprehending team in this case really could not have immediately marked the seized
drugs because they had no marker or because the required witnesses were absent, both circumstances were
entirely of their own making. If these rendered the immediate marking impracticable, such impracticability was

641
‘their fault and cannot be used as an excuse to not immediately mark the items. If anything, the lack of foresight
that led to these circumstances shows that the team did not exert genuine effort to comply with the chain of
custody rule.

Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crimes charged.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revision only included the exclusionary rule under the Constitution, but even before the
amendment, the term “law” was understood to also embraces the Constitution.

642
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Banding
G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019
Leonen, J.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be
made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an
existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face,
the presumption cannot arise.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision upholding the RTC Judgment convicting accused-appellant Alan Banding
of violating Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

Accused-appellant was charged for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. He was arrested during a buy-bust operation
where the apprehending police officers were able to confiscate Methamphetamine Hydorchloride from him. On
trial, the prosecution witnesses testified:
1. That the physical inventory and the taking of photographs were conducted in their office in Camp
Karingal. They opted to go there for two (2) reasons: (1) because accused-appellant “is a notorious drug
pusher”; and (2) because a commotion was brewing at the place of the arrest;
2. That only a media representative was present during the physical inventory and the taking of
photographs. Although they requested the presence of a barangay official, their invitation was allegedly
unheeded; and
3. That accused-appellant did not sign the inventory receipt.
4. That the discrepancy between the inventory receipt, which indicated that the officers seized dried
marijuana fruiting tops, and the chemistry reports, which refer to white crystalline substance, was a
mere clerical error.

The RTC convicted accused-appellant. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision holding that “[t]he integrity
of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that
the evidence has been tampered with.”

On appeal before the SC, accused-appellant argues that the police officers should have conducted the inventory
and photographing at the place of the arrest, that out that only a media representative was present with him to
witness the inventorying and photographing and that the glaring discrepancies between the inventory receipt and
the chemistry reports impair the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.

ISSUE:
Whether the procedural lapses committed by the police officers warrant the acquittal of the accused.

RULING:
Yes. From the language of Section 21, the mandate to conduct inventory and take photographs “immediately
after seizure and confiscation” necessarily means that these shall be accomplished at the place of arrest. When
this is impracticable, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 allows for two (2) other
options:

Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.

However, there was no showing that Camp Karingal was the nearest police station or office from the Mercury
Drug Store branch in Barangay Lagro, where the prohibited drug was allegedly confiscated—much less that it
was practical. This Court takes judicial notice that Camp Karingal is more than a 17-kilometer car ride away from
the place of arrest and seizure.

643
Further, the Court underscores that this was not a spontaneous arrest, but rather, a pre-planned and organized
buy-bust operation. Yet, even the arresting team’s supposed attempt to secure the presence of a barangay official
remained unsubstantiated at this stage. Self-serving guarantees that they exerted effort shall not be sanctioned.
There was also no such effort to secure a Department of Justice representative at all.

Lastly, the prosecution’s contention that all of these are mere clerical errors, along with its insistence on the
presumption of regularity, is patently unmeritorious and deserves scant consideration. The discrepancies are
blatant irregularities that cast serious doubts on the seized items’ identity. They completely defeat the police
officers’ self-serving assertions that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug were preserved.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be
made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an
existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face,
the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong
when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revision only included the exclusionary rule under the Constitution, but even before the
amendment, the term “law” was understood to also embraces the Constitution.

644
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Sultan
G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

Unless an unbroken chain of custody over items allegedly seized during drug operations is established, the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent prevails. Ultimately, doubt in the corpus delicti—the drugs and drug
paraphernalia that were the alleged objects of a drug offense—impels the acquittal of an accused.

FACTS:
This is an appeal challenging the CA Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Larry Sultan for
illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Sultan was arrested in a buy-bust operation where the apprehending officers confiscated several sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride from him. During trial, the prosecution established that:
1. PO2 Hechanova, the designated poseur-buyer, put the seized items inside his pocket from the place of
confiscation to the barangay hall where the marking, inventorying, and photographing of the seized items
was done;
2. Two (2) barangay officials witnessed the marking, inventorying, and photographing; and
3. PO2 Albarico received the seized items from PO2 Hechanova for safekeeping before he turned it over
for laboratory examination.
The prosecution failed to present as witness PO2 Albarico. The RTC convicted Sultan and was later affirmed by
the CA.

Before the SC, the accused-appellant assails the police officer’s unjustified marking of the seized items at the
barangay hall instead of at the place of confiscation. He argues that the non-presentation of PO2 Albarico, the
police officer who allegedly received the specimen for examination, casts doubt on the identity and integrity of
the seized items.

ISSUE:
Whether the unjustified marking of the seized items at the barangay hall instead of the place of confiscation and
the non-presentation of PO2 Albarico warrants the acquittal of Sultan.

RULING:
Yes. Noncompliance with Section 21 engenders doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. When the corpus
delicti is cast in doubt, an accused’s guilt is also cast in doubt—warranting acquittal.

First, the required witnesses must not only be present during the inventorying and photographing, but as early
as the seizure of items.Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs
“immediately after seizure and confiscation,” which means that these must be done at the place of the arrest.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items may be done “at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.” Evidently, the barangay hall, as in this case, is
not an alternative.

While deviations may be condoned under justifiable grounds, the prosecution must plead and prove that
justifiable ground.
Here, the prosecution has never bothered to prove, let alone plead, any situation akin to those contemplated in
Lim to excuse the police enforcers deviation from the law’s simple requirements. This casts doubt on the integrity
of the items supposedly seized and, ultimately, on the commission of the crimes.

Second, the chain of custody rule removes unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs presented
in court. Officers who come into possession of seized drugs must show how they handled and preserved the
integrity of the seized drugs while in their custody.

Here, the prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2 Hechanova had sole
custody of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone cannot be taken as a guarantee of the items’ integrity.

645
On the contrary, an officer’s act of personally and bodily keeping allegedly seized items, without any clear
indication of safeguards other than his or her mere possession, has been viewed as prejudicial to the integrity of
the items.

Lastly, without PO2 Albarico’s testimony, this Court finds a fatal gap in the juncture involving PO2 Hechanova,
the designated poseur-buyer, and Chief Inspector Puentespina, the forensic chemical officer. This—together with
the absence of the required third-party witnesses, the police officers’ lack of a sense of immediacy to mark,
inventory, and photograph the items at the place of the arrest, and the unsound manner of transporting whatever
items were supposedly seized from accused-appellant—reveals a seriously compromised chain of custody.
These put in serious suspicion the identity of the objects of the offenses attributed to accused-appellant, leaving
reasonable doubt on his guilt.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revision only included the exclusionary rule under the Constitution, but even before the
amendment, the term “law” was understood to also embraces the Constitution.

646
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Castillo
G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the
time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as
it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity,
and integrity of the seized drug.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the conviction finding accused-appellant Jomar Castillo y
Maranan of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. Two (2) separate Informations were filed against Castillo for illegal possession and illegal sale
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. According to the prosecution, after the police officers arrested accused-
appellant and confiscated sachets of shabu from him, the buy-bust team went inside their vehicle parked near
the place of arrest, and there did the marking. It was also only at the police station that Limbo (DOJ
representative) and Brgy. Chair Latayan were called in to witness the inventory and photographing. After trial,
the RTC convicted Castillo of the offenses charged which was later affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of the required witnesses during the seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs is
fatal to the admissibility of the seized items.

RULING:
Yes. In People v. Tomawis, this Court declared that the third-party witnesses required by Section 21 must be
present as early as the time of apprehension:

Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. In addition, the inventory must
be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the
media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of
the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if
this is not practicable, the IRR allows that the inventory and photographing could be done as soon as the buy-
bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. By the same
token, however, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension—a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the
buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team has enough time and
opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.
....
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the
time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as
it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity,
and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating
witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the
buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21
of RA 9165.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revision only included the exclusionary rule under the Constitution, but even before the
amendment, the term “law” was understood to also embraces the Constitution.

647
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Merando
G.R. No. 232620, August 5, 2019
Leonen, J.

Section 21 requires the presence of the accused, representatives from the Department of Justice and the media,
and an elected public official during the actual seizure of the evidence and their subsequent inventory and
photographing.

FACTS:
This is an appeal form the CA decision which affirmed the RTC’s judgment convicting accused-appellant Jayson
Merando of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Merando was charged with violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 for selling marijuana after
he has been arrested in a buy-bust operation. During trial, it was established that the police officers received the
report on Merando’s allegedly rampant selling of drugs at around 7:00 p.m. on April 8, 2013. Only at around 2:00
p.m. the next day were they again informed that Merando was spotted at a market. The police officers testified
that after having marked, photographed, and inventoried the suspected marijuana seized at the place of arrest,
PO1 Reyes and his team brought accused-appellant to the barangay hall. There, PO1 Reyes presented accused-
appellant, the buy-bust money, the sachet of suspected marijuana, and the inventory of seized evidence to
barangay officials, Magudadayao and Novero, who then signed the inventory. Merando was convicted by the
RTC finding that the identity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved even though none of the
required third-party witnesses were present in inventorying and photographing the seized items. CA affirmed.

In his appeal, Merando argued that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the police officers’ noncompliance
with Section 21, particularly in their failure to secure the third-party representatives required by law. He also
claimed that the saving clause in Section 21 did not apply because the prosecution failed to provide a justifiable
ground for their noncompliance.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of the required witnesses during the actual seizure and the subsequent inventory and
photographing warrants the acquittal of the accused.

RULING:
Yes. Section 21 requires the presence of the accused, representatives from the Department of Justice and the
media, and an elected public official during the actual seizure of the evidence and their subsequent inventory
and photographing. Here, the arresting officers had about 19 hours to secure the presence of the third-party
witnesses. Despite that leeway, they failed to secure the presence of a representative from the media, a
representative from the Department of Justice, and an elected official. Nevertheless, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that noncompliance with the law’s requirements may be allowed as
long as the arresting officers offer a justifiable ground and prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, despite noncompliance, have been properly preserved.

This clause, however, will not work to help the prosecution’s case. A perusal of the records reveals that the
prosecution offered no justifiable reason for their failure to strictly comply with the mandate of Section 21. They
merely relied on the presumption that unless there was contrary evidence indicating ill motive on their part, they
were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. However, this presumption arises only when
no facts exist suggesting that the arresting officers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty. It will not
be applied when their official act is irregular on its face.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revision only included the exclusionary rule under the Constitution, but even before the
amendment, the term “law” was understood to also embraces the Constitution.

648
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 229053, July 17, 2019
Leonen, J.

Whenever there is an unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements, the prosecution cannot
invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to conveniently disregard such lapse.
Noncompliance obliterates proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, warranting an accused’s acquittal. Thus, the
constitutional right to presumption of innocence prevails.

FACTS:
This resolves an Appeal assailing the CA’s decision in upholding the RTC’s decision, finding Jordan Casaclang
Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A buy-bust operation was planned to entrap Dela Cruz, a 20-year-old high school student of Pangasinan National
High School (PNHS), suspected of selling marijuana. On the day of the operation, PO1 Santillan saw Dela Cruz
come out of PNHS and walk toward him. He recognized him from the week-long surveillance he had earlier
conducted. After identifying himself that he was the buyer, PO1 Santillan handed the marked bills to Dela Cruz.
In exchange, Dela Cruz took out and gave him two (2) plastic sachets of suspected marijuana. After the sale,
with PO1 Santillan’s signal, two other policemen rushed to the scene. PO1 Santillan then grabbed Dela Cruz,
introduced himself as a police officer, and arrested him. Two more sachets of marijuana was found in the latter’s
pocket. After marking the plastic sachets obtained from Dela Cruz, he eventually turned them over to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing. After conducting a laboratory examination, it was
confirmed that the confiscated items were indeed marijuana. The said items were then turned over to the
evidence custodian, who corroborated such on trial.

In his defense, Dela Cruz argued that the RTC and CA gravely erred in finding him guilty for failure to comply
with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for no elected official, Department of Justice representative, or media
representative was present during the inventory. He further claims that no valid justification was offered to explain
their absence. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the prosecution has
substantially complied with Sec. 21, providing that (1) the buy-bust team photographed and marked the corpus
delicti at the crime scene after accused-appellant’s apprehension; and (2) the chain of custody of the confiscated
items was established through the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies. It adds that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of the police officer’s duties, absent contrary proof.

ISSUE:
Was the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a representative from the
Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation warrant Dela Cruz’s acquittal?

RULING:
Yes, Dela Cruz is acquitted of the charges against him for the absence of an elective official, a representative
from the media, and a representative from the Department of Justice as provided under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
during the buy-bust operation.

Jurisprudence dictates that the mere marking of seized items, unsupported by a proper physical inventory and
taking of photographs, and in the absence of the persons whose presence is required by Section 21 will not
justify a conviction. The presence of third-party witnesses is imperative, not only during the physical inventory
and taking of pictures, but also during the actual seizure of items. However, R.A. No. 10640 did introduce
amendments that permit deviations from the law’s express requirements when there are justifiable grounds – as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. To invoke this proviso,
two requirements must be met: first, the prosecution must specifically allege, identify, and prove “justifiable
grounds”; second, it must establish that despite non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite demands a showing
of positive steps taken to ensure such preservation. Broad justifications and sweeping guarantees will not suffice.
Furthermore, justification for the absence of third-party witnesses must be alleged, identified, and proved.
Moreover, there must be an earnest effort to secure their presence during the inventory.

649
Prosecution witness PO1 Santillan attempted to justify the absence of the third-party witnesses, testifying that
time constraints and the uncertainty of accused-appellant’s appearance at the meeting place had prevented the
team from securing their presence. However, his own testimony belies this claim. He narrated that he recognized
accused-appellant from the week-long surveillance he had conducted prior to the buy-bust operation.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case is under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165

650
RA 9165, Sec. 21

Veriño v. People
G.R. No. 225710, June 19, 2019
Leonen, J.

State agents are expected to strictly comply with the legal safeguards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
as amended. Should there be noncompliance, the prosecution must prove that a justifiable cause existed and
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved for the saving clause in Section 21 to
be appreciated in favor of State agents.

FACTS:
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Decision Resolution of the CA in affirming the
conviction of petitioner Ricardo Veriño y Pingol (Veriño) for violating Section 11 of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Together with PO1 Verde and SPO3 Sanchez, a buy-bust operation was planned in order to entrap Veriño, a
suspected drugs dealer in Marulas Public Market, Valenzuela City. After conducting the same and seizing 3
plastic sachets from Verino, PO1 Verde placed the same in two small brown envelope bags, marked with his
initials before sealing and signing the envelopes in the other officers’ presence. The whole team then went to
Barangay Marulas and inventoried the seized items in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Viray. PO1 Verde
then turned the seized items over to SPO3 Sanchez, who then prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination
and Request for Drug Test. PO3 Macaraeg received the requests, and forwarded them to Chief Inspector Cejes
for laboratory examination. In the Initial Laboratory Report, Cejes found that the urine sample taken from Veriño
tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and that the items turned over to him contain
also the same drug. Hence, Veriño was charged with violating Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act.

The RTC found Veriño guilty of the crime charged against him, noting the police officers’ compliance with the
Section 21 of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act when they prepared an inventory of the seized items in the
presence of a Barangay Kagawad Viray, an elected public official. It stressed that minor deviations from the
legally mandated procedure were not fatal to the prosecution’s case, when the lapses could be explained by
justifiable grounds. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

Petitioner claims that the police officers failed to comply with Article II, Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. He pointed out that he did not sign the inventory, and no representative from the
Department of Justice or the media was present when the inventory was conducted. Furthermore, the prosecution
allegedly failed to present as evidence the photographs that were allegedly taken when the seized sachets were
being inventoried.

ISSUE:
Was petitioner Veriño liable for the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to show strict compliance with
the required procedure under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

RULING:
No, the petitioner is not liable.

When it comes to Section 21, this Court has repeatedly stated that the handling officers must observe strict
compliance to guarantee the integrity and identity of seized drug. Nonetheless, while strict compliance is the
expected standard, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act recognized that it may not always be possible in
every situation. Hence, the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations introduced a saving clause, which may
be appreciated in the prosecution’s favor if noncompliance with Section 21 was justified and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug were preserved. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of
explaining why Section 21 was not strictly complied with and proving its proffered justifiable ground during trial.

Here, an inventory of the items seized from petitioner was prepared by SPO3 Sanchez, the investigating officer.
However, despite the clear requirements under Section 21, the inventory was only witnessed by an elected public
official. The prosecution failed to explain why the inventory was not signed by petitioner or his representative and
a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, as mandated by law. When the RTC asked

651
why only the elected public official signed the inventory, PO1 Verde explained that he did not prepare the
inventory and was in no position to know the protocol behind the inventory of items seized from operations. He
added that SPO3 Sanchez should know the protocol for inventory-taking since he prepared the inventory.
However, the prosecution never presented SPO3 Sanchez as its witness. Another lapse was the prosecution’s
failure to present a photograph of the inventory, despite PO1 Verde’s testimony that at least two (2) people took
photos during the inventory. Again, the prosecution failed to explain this blatant noncompliance with Section 21.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

652
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Ternida
G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

Before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance with the legal requirements,
justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. It has the positive duty to establish its
reasons for the procedural lapses.

FACTS:
This is a a case for appeal after the CA affirmed the conviction of Rolando Ternida y Munar (Ternida) for violating
Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant, concerning an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida, the San
Fernando City Police formed a buy-bust team. The officers spotted accused Ternida along Quezon Avenue.
Ternida asked how much one of the officers would buy, and the latter said P1,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave
said officer one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of crystalline substance in exchange for a P1,000.00 bill. After
securing the sachet, the officer gave the pre-arranged signal to the other officers, who immediately approached
and arrested Ternida. A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. The seized plastic sachet was then
sent to the crime laboratory for forensic examination, where it tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

In his defense, Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed that on November 17, 2009,
he was about to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to a Restaurant when three (3) officers who held his neck and
handcuffed him. After frisking him, the officers took his cell phone and coin purse containing P150.00. They then
brought him under a tree, where they took photos of him beside the plastic sachet. Afterwards, they brought him
to the police station, where he was detained. An Information was filed charging Ternida with selling 0.0402 gram
of shabu, in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Ternida pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Pre-trial was conducted, and trial on the merits then ensued.

The RTC found Ternida guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. On appeal, Ternida argued that
the prosecution failed to preserve the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. He pointed out that the seized
item was not marked with the date of seizure, which meant that it could not be distinguished from other evidence
that may have been in the police officer’s possession. Moreover, he claimed that the drugs allegedly seized were
not photographed. He asserted that the prosecution did not give justifiable grounds for the apprehending officers’
failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements under the law. The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings in
toto. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution properly establish that the apprehending officers complied with the chain of custody
requirements under the law, which in turn preserve the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti?

RULING:
No. Accused-appellant should be acquitted since the prosecution did not prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was seized from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation.

To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not only prove that the sale
took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In doing this, the prosecution must establish the chain
of custody of the seized items To prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drug seized.

That the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs must be done immediately where seizure had
taken place minimizes the possibility that evidence may be planted. Noncompliance with this legally mandated
procedure, upon seizure, raises doubt that what was submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in
court was seized from an accused.

653
Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs were photographed upon
seizure, in the presence of the accused. No photograph of the seized drugs was offered in evidence raises
questions as to whether the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was seized from accused-appellant
in the buy-bust operation. Worse, the prosecution did not even address the apprehending team’s failure to
photograph the seized items.

Before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance with the legal requirements,
justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. It has the positive duty to establish its
reasons for the procedural lapses.

In this case, the prosecution has failed to perform such duty. The arresting officers’ failure to photograph the
seized drugs, to explain this failure, and to establish that the integrity of the seized drugs was preserved despite
the failure, are sufficient to reverse accused- appellant’s conviction based on reasonable doubt.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because law involved is R.A. 9165 and not the Rules of Court.

654
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Comoso
G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting evidence of
the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged under Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. Failing to do so will result in the acquittal of the accused if it is found that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti is preserved. In buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-
buyer which must prove that : “(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.” Evidence proving that a transaction took place “must be
credible and complete.”

FACTS:
This is a case for appeal of the Decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC Decision convicting accused-appellant
Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa (Comoso) for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A buy-bust operation was conducted after receiving information that Comoso was allegedly selling illegal drugs
in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. The team assigned were told by the asset to wait
since their target was still playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front
of Comoso’s house. Upon his arrival, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana in exchange
for the asset’s buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, gave the signal that the transaction had been consummated
which resulted in the rest of the team rushing to the scene and arresting Comoso and the asset. The plastic
sachet was recovered from the asset, while the buy-bust money was recovered after frisking. Both the plastic
sachet and the buy-bust money were then marked with his initials “FJA.” As they reached the police station, one
of the officers also marked the used marijuana stick and lighter and prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

Comoso on the other hand testified in his defense that he was on his way home from delivering his catch, he
was grabbed and frisked by two (2) armed men, whom he figured were police officers. They first brought Comoso
to the airport, then to the police station, where he was detained. The police officers recovered from Comoso
P420.00, the money he had earned from selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs.

The RTC found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, Comoso contended that the chain of custody was not established. He
contended that the arresting officer did not testify that the seized items were marked or inventoried in front of
him. He also points out that there were no photographs of the seized items taken, and that he did not sign the
inventory of seized items. Moreover, he claims that the prosecution failed to prove that there was no “possibility
of switching, planting, or contamination.” The CA however affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove Comoso’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not strictly complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti?

RULING:
No. The prosecution failed in its duty to establish accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus the
presumption of innocence must prevail.

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To secure conviction, the prosecution must
overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged under Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: “(1) proof that the transaction or sale
took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.” Evidence proving
that a transaction took place “must be credible and complete.” In buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by
the testimony of the poseur-buyer. In People v. Andaya the prosecution failed to present their informant, who
was also their poseur-buyer, to testify on the sale of illegal drugs. Despite the police officers occupying “different

655
positions where they could see and observe the asset[,]” this Court noted that none of them had witnessed the
transaction and only acted upon the informant/poseur-buyer’s pre-arranged signal.

Here, the apprehending officer testified that he had seized the plastic sachet from accused-appellant and marked
it with his own initials, “FJA.” He added that he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought
the seized items to the crime laboratory. However, it remained unclear from his testimony if: (1) he conducted
the inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino
turned the items over to an investigating officer.

Furthermore, the forensic chemist only received the seized items on April 10 working days after the buy-bust
operation. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has
not been able to explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic
chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant. Worse, nothing in the records shows that the
witnesses required to be present and sign the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned entrapment
operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement officers’ noncompliance with the chain
of custody. It merely stated that “the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.”

Hence, because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the amendment made to Rule 133, Sec. 2 was only made to address gender sensitivity.

656
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Sanchez
G.R. No. 216014 (Resolution), March 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

Despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies on where the seized items were marked, these
inconsistencies “[did] not impair the credibility of the police witnesses.” What is important is that, as adequately
established, there was an “unbroken and continuous possession of the . . . shabu, from the moment of seizure
up to the time they were delivered to the laboratory and later presented in court. Although the testimonies differed
on where the seized items were marked, the prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that this discrepancy did
not affect the integrity or evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

FACTS:
PDEA Regional Office IV-B organized a buy-bust operation after receiving a tip that a certain “Dada” from Laguna
was selling “shabu” in Barangay Lumangbayan, Calapan City. Two (2) Informations for violation of RA 9165 were
filed against Sanchez before the RTC of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.

RTC found for the prosecution and convicted accused Sanchez of the crimes charged. With respect to the chain
of custody of the seized item, the trial court found that an unbroken chain was established. Upon confiscation by
IO1 Riñopa, the sachets were turned over to IO1 Diocampo, who marked the sachets with her initials. IO1
Diocampo then personally delivered the items to the crime laboratory for testing. Sanchez appealed, which was
denied by the CA. CA focused on the issue of chain of custody and echoed the trial court’s finding of an unbroken
chain.

Sanchez maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He specifically assails
the inconsistent testimonies of IO1 Diocampo and IO1 Riñopa on where the seized items were marked. IO1
Diocampo testified that the sachets were marked at the barangay hall, while IO1 Riñopa recalled marking the
sachets at the place of the arrest. With this discrepancy, the prosecution allegedly failed to establish the “very
crucial first link in the chain of custody” of the corpus delicti, impairing its integrity and evidentiary value.

The People of the Philippines counters that the discrepancy of testimonies on where the seized items were
marked is a “minor” detail that “does not change the fact that ... accused-appellant [Sanchez] was positively
identified as the seller of prohibited drugs; and ... the chain of custody of the seized drugs was established by
the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Was the unbroken chain of custody established considering the differing testimonies on where the items were
marked?

RULING:
Although the testimonies differed on where the seized items were marked, the prosecution has sufficiently
demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the integrity or evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. IO1
Diocampo testified that she marked the items with “1KCD” and “2KCD” in the presence of accused-appellant
Sanchez. This testimony was corroborated by IO1 Riñopa. The inventory of the items was done in the presence
of Punong Barangay Mendoza and Department of Justice representative Magnaye. IO1 Diocampo then
personally brought the seized items to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory where the items tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The apprehending officers more than substantially complied with
the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, which, before amendment by Republic Act
No. 10640

In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant Sanchez. There
was no error in his conviction for the crime of sale of dangerous drugs with a corresponding penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because RA 9165 in relation to evidence was not amended.

657
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Que
G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

The chain of custody requirements in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are cast in precise, mandatory
language. They are calibrated to preserve the even greater interest of due process and the constitutional rights
of those who stand to suffer from the State’s legitimate use of force, and therefore, stand to be deprived of liberty,
property, and, should capital punishment be imposed, life. This calibration balances the need for effective
prosecution of those involved in illegal drugs and the preservation of the most basic liberties that typify our
democratic order.

FACTS:
This resolves an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals convicting Joshua Que (Que) for violation of
Sections 5[2] and 11[3] of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), for illegal sale
and possession of dangerous drugs.

PO3 Sammy Lim (Lim) of the PNP Zamboanga City Mobile Group recounted that on July 26, 2003, acting on the
report of an informant that Que was selling shabu, they organized a buy-bust operation with Lim as poseur buyer.
After Que’s arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from him. Que was then brought
to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to the investigator SPO4
Eulogia Tubo (Tubo), who then marked these items with his initials. He also prepared the letter request for
laboratory examination of the sachet’s contents. Police Chief Inspector Mercedes Diestro (Diestro) recounted
their office’s receipt of a request for laboratory examination of the contents of two plastic sachets which tested
positive for shabu. Meanwhile, Que was the sole witness for the defense.

The RTC found Que guilty as charged and sentenced him for violation of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11 of R.A. 9165. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Thereafter, Que filed his Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:
Was Que’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence provided by the prosecution?

RULING:
No. Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite quantum of proof. Though it does not demand absolutely impervious
certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty.

Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, spells out the requirements for the custody and disposition
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Thus, the following links should be
established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of
the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People v. Nandi). Compliance with Section
21’s chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items. Non-compliance with them tarnishes
the credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions under R.A. 9165 revolve.

This case is tainted with grave, gratuitous violations of Section 21(1). The prosecution here failed to account for
the intervening period between the supposed handover of the sachet from accused-appellant to PO3 Lim, to the
marking of the sachets by SPO4 Tubo. Likewise, it absolutely failed to identify measures taken during transit
from the target area to the police station to ensure the integrity of the sachets allegedly obtained and to negate
any possibility of adulteration or substitution.

This Court is left with absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the sachets other than the self-serving
assurances of PO3 Lim and SPO1 Jacinto. This is precisely the situation that R.A. 9165 seeks to prevent. The
very process that Section 21 requires is supposed to be a plain, standardized, even run-of-the-mill, guarantee
that the integrity of the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia is preserved. All that law enforcers have to do is
follow Section 21’s instructions. They do not even have to profoundly intellectualize their actions. An admitted

658
deviation from Section 21’s prescribed process is an admission that statutory requirements have not been
observed. This admitted disobedience can only work against the prosecution’s cause.

The buy-bust team’s failures bring into question the integrity of the corpus delicti of the charge of sale of illegal
drugs against accused-appellant. This leaves reasonable doubt on the guilt of Que. Necessarily, he must be
acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the amendment made is only to address gender sensitivity.

659
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Pangan
G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017
Leonen, J.

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
cannot be utilized to frustrate legitimate efforts of law enforcers. Minor deviations from the mandated procedure
in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a guilty defendant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Emma Bofill Pangan (Pangan) from the CA Decision affirming the RTC ruling that she
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of RA 9165, Sec. 11.

On April 10, 2003, around 8AM, PO1 Eleno Carillo conducted a test-buy operation on Pangan at her
merchandising store in Roxas City. Pangan instructed Carillo to return in the afternoon of that day as more shabu
would allegedly be delivered to her via Fastpak. At 4:20PM, they conducted the buy-bust operation and read the
contents of the search warrant to Pangan. While inside the store, the officers inspected the Fastpak package.
Pangan suddenly became unruly, trying to grab the package. The police officers brought Pangan out of the store
and to prevent Pangan from harming herself. They then found 3 sachets of suspected shabu. Members of the
media and barangay officials were present during the entire course of the search and seizure. The confiscated
items were marked and the inventory was signed by third-party witnesses who were present during the search.
PO1 Carillo also took pictures of the premises and seized items. Then the items were then brought to the court.

The RTC convicted Pangan, finding that she had animus possidendi as she appeared to know the contents of
the Fastpak package she received. Pangan appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of
the confiscated drugs, because the police officers failed to observe the guidelines under Sec. 21 of RA 9165.
Neither the marking of the confiscated drugs or the signing of the inventory receipt was made in her presence.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to establish the identity of the corpus delicti despite the absence of the accused during
the marking of the confiscated drugs?

RULING:
Yes. To establish that the illicit drugs scrutinized and presented in court were the very same ones confiscated
from the accused, the prosecution should offer testimonies relating to its chain of custody.

While the chain of custody has been a crucial issue which led to acquittals in drugs cases, this Court has still
ruled that non-conformity with the mandated procedure in handling the seized drugs does not automatically mean
that the seized items’ identity was compromised, which necessarily leads to an acquittal. The Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provide some flexibility with the addition of a proviso. The saving
mechanism included in the implementing rules guarantees that not every case of non-observance will irreversibly
prejudice the prosecution’s cause. However, to merit the application of the saving clause, the prosecution should
acknowledge and explain the deviations they committed. Moreover, the prosecution should also prove that the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the confiscated evidence was maintained.

Pangan’s main point of contention rests on her absence during the inventory and marking of the confiscated
articles. The police officers acknowledged their breach, offering a justifiable reason why they had to dispense
with Pangan’s presence during the search, inventory, and photographing. The police narrated how Pangan
became “uncontrollable.” This is a fact corroborated by the accused herself when she testified that she “struggled
to free herself and she accidentally swiped a bottle in front of her store that fell and broke into pieces.” Therefore,
Pangan’s aggressive actuations urged the police officers to lock her up in the vehicle for the search to smoothly
proceed. The attendance of third-party witnesses during buy-bust operations and during time of seizures is to
prevent the planting of evidence or frame-up. Even though neither Pangan nor any of her representatives was
present during the marking, inventory, and photographing, the police officers substantially complied with the rules
as media representatives and barangay officials were present during the search.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there were no changes on this rule.

660
RA 9165, Sec. 21

Aparante v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
Leonen, J.

Where the amount of narcotics seized is miniscule, a stricter adherence to the requirements of R.A. 9165, Sec.
21 is required to preserve the evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision which sustained the conviction of herein
accused for illegal possession of 0.01 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

In the present case, the arresting officers saw a man hand herein petitioner a small plastic sachet, which petitioner
then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley. Upon the officers’ approach, these two
men fled. The police then only managed to arrest herein petitioner, and only thereafter conducted a search upon
the person of the accused.

An investigator at the police station where petitioner was immediately brought then placed the initials of herein
petitioner “JBA” on the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu
immediately after seizure.

ISSUES:
1. Is the above described warrantless arrest and immediately subsequent search valid?
2. Is the chain of custody broken in the present case?

RULING:
1. YES—Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) as
the rule also requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was being, or was about to
be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two
acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause.

In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what must be evaluated is
whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for petitioner’s arrest when they made the search.

Here, the overt acts of the accused and the circumstances were observed personally by the arresting officers
and, taken together, constitute reasonable suspicion that the men who fled violated R.A. 9165.

Hence, the arrest and the immediately subsequent search made on the person of the accused in the present
case are valid.

2. YES—The Court emphasized that where the amount of narcotics seized is miniscule, a stricter adherence
to the requirements of R.A. 9165, Sec. 21 is required to preserve the evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the police officers immediately went to the police station to turn
over petitioner and the evidence seized from him. The police investigator at the station then marked the
confiscated plastic sachet with appellant’s initials. It is then clear that the seized drugs were not marked by the
apprehending team but by an investigating officer at the police station, an act which is not in accordance with the
chain of custody rule under Republic Act No. 9165, Sec. 21.

Hence, this misstep is a clear indication that the chain of custody is broken in the present case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this case involves discussions on jurisprudence and principles in warrantless arrests and
searches and the rules on chain of custody under R.A. 9165 which is a separate, special law.

661
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Caballon
G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of custody. Absent
this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug
presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the accused.

FACTS:
This is a review of the CA decision sustaining the conviction of herein accused for violation of R.A. 9165, Sec. 5.

In a buy-bust operation, an asset poseur-buyer transacted with the accused in an alley while the police officers
observed them from a distance. Once they saw the poseur-buyer scratch his head, their pre-approved signal,
the police officers descended upon the accused, who then ran away upon noticing the approaching officers.

After finally arrest the accused, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from him. That
same day, a sachet marked with “SCC 04/13/06” was turned over to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for examination. It was unclear who made the marking.

ISSUE:
Is the chain of custody broken in the present case?

RULING:
Yes, the marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of custody
under R.A. 9165, Sec. 21. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in
favor of the accused.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to identify who made the marking on the sachet.

Hence, the chain of custody is clearly broken in this case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because this case involves the rules on chain of custody under R.A. 9165 which is a separate, special
law.

662
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Saragena
G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule, the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, must be strictly complied with. In
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.

FACTS:
For resolution of this Court is the sole issue of whether or not accused-appellant Abundio Mamolo Saragena is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. Subsumed in this issue is the
matter of whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody rule.

SPO1 Roldan Paller (SPO1 Paller) received information that a certain “Tatay” was selling illegal drugs at Sitio
Sindulan, Brgy. Mabolo, Cebu City. “Tatay’s” exact address was unknown. A buy-bust team was formed,
composed of SPO3 Raul Magdadaro (SPO3 Magdadaro) as team leader, PO1 Roy Misa (PO1 Misa) as poseur-
buyer, and SPO1 Paller as back-up. SPO1 Paller called the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for coordination
on the buy-bust operation.

Outside accused-appellant’s house, PO1 Misa convinced the suspect to sell him shabu. PO1 Misa handed the
P100.00 bill as payment, for which he received a “pack of white crystalline substance.” SPO1 Paller and SPO3
Magdadaro then rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. SPO1 Paller conducted a
body search on accused-appellant and recovered the buy-bust money. Accused-appellant was brought to the
police station. PO1 Misa, accompanied by SPO1 Paller, delivered SPO3 Magdadaro’s letter-request and the
seized plastic pack to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Cebu City. A certain PO2 Roma received
the letter-request and the specimen from PO1 Misa and then delivered these items to P/S Insp. Pinky Sayson-
Acog (P/S Insp. Acog), a forensic chemist.

On the other hand, according to the defense, accused-appellant was at home when three (3) armed police officers
kicked the door of his house. He recognized PO1 Misa, SPO1 Palter, and SPO3 Magdadaro as they frequented
illegal cockfights and would take turns asking for the defeated fighting cock.The police officers held accused-
appellant. One (1) of them searched his pockets but found nothing. They also searched his house.
Despite the lack of contraband found, accused-appellant was sent to the Mabolo Police Station. He inquired why
he was being arrested. The buy-bust team told him that they were able to buy shabu from him. Denying this
accusation, accused-appellant asserted that they planted the evidence.

ISSUE:
Did the police officers comply with the chain of custody rule?

RULING:
NO. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant is presumed innocent of the crime charged.
There is great possibility of abuse in drug cases, especially those involving miniscule amounts. This Court has
recognized that buy-bust operations could be initiated based on dubious claims of shady persons, or that small
amounts of illicit drugs could be planted as evidence on innocent individuals, in view of the secrecy surrounding
drug deals in general. Thus:

“By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use
of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be
planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great.” Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses”

663
Therefore, courts must subject “the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing . . . [T]he
presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused.” In deliberating the accused’s guilt, courts must exercise “utmost diligence
and prudence.” More importantly, they must be on their guard in trying drug cases; otherwise, they risk meting
severe penalties to innocent persons.

Each and every link in the custody must be accounted for until the seized item is presented before the court. In
this case, there are gaps in the linkages in the chain of custody. Some key witnesses were absent during trial.
PO1 Misa, the poseur-buyer, was not presented in court. As a result, prosecution has not established how the
purported transaction with accused-appellant occurred. PO1 Misa also delivered the drug specimen to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination. During the post-seizure custody and handling of the
dangerous drug, a certain PO2 Roma received the specimen from PO1 Misa before delivering it to P/S Insp.
Acog. However, the prosecution failed to present the testimony of P02 Roma, who was also part of the chain of
custody

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules of Court did not affect the CDDA as a special law.

664
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Sagana
G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017
Leonen, J.

Unjustified lapses in the chain of custody requirement – (1) photographing not done concurrently with marking
and inventory, (2) presence of the required third-party witnesses only during the belated photographing, and (3)
failure to present as witness persons who had direct contact with the seized drugs – cast doubt on the identity
and integrity of the dangerous drugs

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision affirming the RTC ruling finding accused-appellant Ernesto Sagana y De
Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The police officers in this case conducted a buy-bust operation, which was the basis of Sagana’s arrest. However,
there are certain lapses in the chain of custody requirement under the law, in particular: (1) the photographing of
the seized drugs were done only at the police station, instead of being done concurrently with the marking ang
inventory which were done in Sagana’s house, the place of arrest; (2) none of the required third-party
representatives was present during the seizure and inventory of the dangerous articles; and (3) some of the
persons who had direct contact with the seized drugs – the desk officer who supposedly recorded the incident in
the police blotter, the investigator who prepared the request for examination, and the police officer who received
the articles in the laboratory – were not presented as witnesses.

ISSUE:
Do the unjustified lapses in the chain of custody cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drugs?

RULING:
Yes, the unjustified lapses in the chain of custody cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drugs.

In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise
the corpus delicti of the charges. Aside from proving the elements of the charges, “the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold [was] the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.” The chain of custody carries out this
purpose “as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.” In this
case, a buy-bust operation was conducted to validate the tip given by the confidential informant. While a buy-
bust operation has been known to be useful in “flush[ing] out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted
covertly and in secrecy,’ it has its drawback “that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law.” It is
prone “to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.” Thus, it is essential that the
chain of custody is established in buy-bust operations. This includes:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court.

The prosecution’s narration of events reveals that the police officers did not conform with the chain of custody.
This is in contravention to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, which is mandatory in nature, as reflected in the
presence of the word “shall” in the provision. According to the prosecution, the items were immediately marked
and inventoried in Sagana’s residence after confiscation. However, it failed to offer any reason why the mandated
photographing was not concurrently done with the inventory and was only made when Sagana was already in
the police station. Similarly, none of the required third-party representatives was present during the seizure and
inventory of the dangerous articles. To underscore, the prosecution “has the positive duty to establish that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21 . . . or that there was a
justifiable ground for failing to do so.” In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-party
representatives were present only during the belated photographing of the confiscated articles. Considering the

665
sequence of the people who have dealt with the confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to justify why three
(3) other significant persons were not presented as witnesses. “In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to
the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which
cannot but inure to its own detriment.”

To establish “whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting
the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly
and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence.” More so, as in this case where the
seized quantities of shabu are merely 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams, it is important that all details are clear. Hence,
the miniscule quantities of dangerous drugs allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties with regard their
integrity.

Thus, accused-appellant is acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because RA 9165, Sec. 21 has not been amended nor repealed by the Revised Rules on Evidence.

666
R.A. 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Segunda
G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

In this case, a perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals that the procedure provided for
under Republic Act No. 9165 was not complied with “despite its mandatory nature as indicated by the use of
‘shall’ in the directives of the law.”

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Jaime Segundo y Iglesias (Segundo) from the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the RTC’s ruling that Segundo was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sale of dangerous drugs or of
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

An information was filed charging Jaime Segundo of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF
THE REPUBLIC ACT 9165 and Dominador Gubato y Ibuho of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 12 IN
RELATION TO SECTION 14, ARTICLE II OF THE REPUBLIC ACT 9165. Upon arraignment, both accused
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Gubato posted bail for his provisional liberty, however, he later jumped bail.
Joint trial on the merits commenced. The Regional Trial Court found Segundo guilty of selling dangerous drugs
and ruled that in prosecution of illegal possession or sale of prohibited drugs, great weight is given to prosecution
witnesses, particularly when they are police officers. In the absence of any ill-motive on their part, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty stands except when there is proof to the
contrary. Hence, this presumption prevails over the accused’s unsubstantiated defense of denial and claim of
frame-up.

In his appeal, Segundo assailed the broken chain of custody in handling the alleged confiscated shabu. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling and it held that the prosecution’s failure to prove that the police handled the
seized items based on the guidelines provided for under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and its
implementing rules did not immediately make Segundo’s arrest illegal and the confiscated items inadmissible as
evidence.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody necessary to convict respondent Segundo?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Accordingly, these entail proof “that the sale transaction
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.”

“Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In the case at bar, the prosecution offered testimonies to establish the identity of the buyer and seller, as well as
the consideration that sustained the alleged deal and how the sale had transpired. It failed, however, to comply
with the chain of custody that would supposedly ensure that the miniscule amount of 0.03 grams of shabu offered
as evidence in court was the one retrieved from Segundo at the time of the operation.

In this case, a perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals that the procedure provided for
under Republic Act No. 9165 was not complied with “despite its mandatory nature as indicated by the use

667
of ’shall’ in the directives of the law.” PO2 Occeña testified that PO2 Yumul marked the seized items with “JSI l”
to “JSI 10” inside Segundo’s house and in front of the two (2) accused. PO2 Yumul’s testimony, however, did not
reveal much about the marking he allegedly made. He merely stated that he was the one who “inventoried and
took photographs of the pieces of evidence recovered.” PO3 Occeña added that when the items were marked,
“no representative of the media and the barangay” were present. Furthermore, the prosecution’s initial witness,
SPOl Balsamo, admitted that no pictures of the alleged confiscated items were taken. Contrary to this assertion,
PO2 Yumul testified differently. While he insisted that he took photographs of the seized items, which he also
inventoried, the photos purportedly got lost.

Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the applicable provisions in this case was not amended or affected by the amendments.

668
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Jaafar
G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017
Leonen, J.

While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution’s
case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure
from the general rule. This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

FACTS:
The accused-appellant Jafaar and Gani were charged with violation of Article II Section 5 of RA 9165. They were
alleged to have sold, delivered, given away, transported, or distributed dangerous drugs to PO1 Marlon Look,
who acted as a poseur-buyer, a plastic sachet containing shabu. Both pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and
thus trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II, Section 5 of RA 9165, but acquitted Gani for insufficiency of
evidence. Jaafar filed an appeal before the CA, contending that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and that the arresting team violated the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA 9165. In
particular, he argued that the shabu was not formally offered in evidence during trial, but was instead only
presented during the hearing for the application for bail, and thus, the RTC should not have considered the shabu
as evidence. Moreover, he pointed out that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody of the
shabu, and that the police officers neither photographed nor inventoried the seized shabu sachet, and that there
were no representatives from the media and the DOJ, nor an elected public official to witness the proceedings.

The CA ruled that despite the sachet of shabu not being formally offered in evidence, it was nevertheless
identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist, thus, forming part of the records of the case. Also, the CA
agreed with the RTC that although there was a departure from the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA
9165, this did not automatically render the confiscated drugs inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu
had been kept intact.

ISSUE:
Did the court establish the accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-observance of the
required procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165?

RULING:
NO. This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Jaafar. While it may be true that non-compliance
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution’s case provided that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only
be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule.

This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant non-compliance with
the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team marked and
conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet
had been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was
done in the presence of accused-appellant or his representative, representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice, and an elected public official.

The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buybust operation had been carefully planned by
narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution relied heavily on the
exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution did not even offer any explanation on why they
failed to comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned
the buy-bust operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot
feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Hence, the court was not able to establish the accused-apellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in this case.

669
EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:
No effect because the Old Rules and the Revised Rules of Evidence are the same insofar as general principles
regarding admissibility of evidence under the chain of custody rule respecting dangerous drugs or substances
are concerned.

670
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Caiz
G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

Failure to prove the preservation of the integrity of the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases will lead to the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the resolution of CA which affirmed RTC’s decision in convicting Gloria Caiz in a criminal
case for violation of R,A. 9165, Secs. 5 and 11.

A buy bust ensued where SPO1 Patricio and PO1 Valle are the poseur buyers of a sachet of shabu. Upon his
arrest, they informed Caiz of her constitutional rights and frisked her right after she was arrested, during which
they recovered the marked money and 2 plastic sachets of shabu. The items were marked. PO1 Valle testified
that the marking was done immediately, while SPO1 Patricio told it was marked at the police station. RTC
convicted her of violating Sec. 5 but that of Sec. 11 was already absorbed. In an appeal before the CA, she
contended that the police officers failed to coordinate with the PDEA; that the place of marking the seized sachets
was not proven because of different testimonies; that the confiscation receipts were not signed, nor was he given
a copy; that there was no photograph of the seized sachets; and the booking sheet was prepared on the day
after her arrest. The appeal was dismissed. Hence, this case was elevated to the SC by appeal.

Caiz contends that the rules on chain of custody were not observed, and her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Should the non-compliance with the requirements of chain of custody affect the judgment?

RULING:
Yes. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are preserved.

The IRR of R.A. 9165 requires that in warrantless seizures, the marking of the seized items in the presence of
the violator shall be done immediately at the place where the drugs were seized or at the nearest police station
or nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. The physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted in the same nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, and in the presence of the suspect or his/her representative or counsel,
with elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media, who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory of the seized or confiscated items and be given copy thereof.

Although it may be true that the place of marking is not an essential element, the failure to establish with certainty
where the seized sachets were marked affects the integrity of the chain of custody of the corpus delicti. There
was also no proof as to the photograph of the items, and the entry in the booking sheet was not immediate.
However, non-coordination with PDEA does not invalidate the buy-bust operation.

Hence, the decision of RTC was reversed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the law applied in this case is a special law.

671
RA 9165, Sec. 21

Tuano v. People
G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), June 27, 2016
Leonen, J.

Non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 creates uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
confiscated substance.

FACTS:
This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration of the SC Resolution which affrimed CA’s decision. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision in finding Ruel Tuano y Hernandez (Tuano) of violation of R.A. 9165, Art. II, Sec. 11(3).

Tuano was charged for having in his possession one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams
of shabu. After trial on the merits, RTC convicted the accused. On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, this motion.

Tuano argues that the apprehending officers did not conduct inventory nor take photographs of the evidence, in
violation of R.A. 9165, Sec. 21. He also claims the illegality of his warrantless arrest for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:
Shall Tuano be acquitted because of the non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule?

RULING:
While this Court has ruled that “the failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecution’s cause,” more recent cases highlight the need for strict
compliance with the legal requirements to protect the integrity of the chain of custody, more so when the miniscule
quantity of the confiscated substance—0.064 gram, in this case—underscores the need for exacting compliance
with Section 21. Non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 creates uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the confiscated substance. It casts doubt on the guilt of the accused.

Sweeping statements on lack of significant lapse of time from apprehension of the accused to submission of the
confiscated sachet for testing should not be considered sufficient to secure a conviction. Neither should
prosecution rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Marking of the seized drugs
alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

The action is granted, and the accused is acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case involves a special law.

672
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Dimaano
G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous drugs is proved beyond
reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established with moral certainty.

FACTS:
In a petition under Rule before the SC, herein accused-appellant Dimaano challenged the decision of the Court
of Appeals in affirming the ruling of the RTC in finding her guilty of the crime of attempted transportation of
dangerous drugs punished under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

On November 13, 2002 herein accused arrived at Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1 around 3 in the morning.
Upon entering the airport, NUP Bilugot frisked herein accused and felt a hard object bulging near the accused’s
buttocks. NUP Bilugot asked what the object was, accused replied that it was a sanitary napkin. Not satisfied,
NUP Bilugot informed SPO2 Ragadio of the said hard object. Both officers asked the accused to proceed to the
ladies’ room for an extensive search. NUP Bliugot found on the panties’ crotch a plastic sachet hidden under the
sanitary napkin, she then asked accused what it was and the accused replied that it was shabu. NUP Bilugot
then seized the plastic sachet and turned it over to SPO2 Ragadio. The latter recalled having received 2
transparent plastic sachets to which both officers wrote their respective initials. Thirty minutes later, investigators
from PDEA arrived to collect the specimen and placed their initials on the two plastic sachets, inside of each
smaller sachets were found the total of which is 7 sachets.

Police inspector Tecson then received from Police Chief Inspector Fabian two plastic sachets marked with initials.
He reported that one of the sachets contained 3 heated-sealed plastic sachets, while the other contained 4. And
after subjecting the contents of the sachets to chemical analysis, he confirmed that the sachets contained a total
of 13.96 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. On the other hand, NUP Bilugot testified that she
obtained from accused only 1 plastic sachet.

Accused waived her right to testify in court and filed a memorandum and argued that the prosecution failed to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the conflicting testimonies of NUP Balugot and SPO2
Ragadio as to the number of sachets allegedly obtained from her person. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that
the chain of custody remained unbroken because immediately after NUP Bilugot seized the shabu, she
immediately turned over the same to SPO2 Ragadio who was just outside the door of the ladies’ room. SPO2
Ragadio’s testimony that he received two sachets that were further placed insisde a bigger plastic sachet
explained NUP Bilugot’s testimony that she obtained only one plastic sachet from accused.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution establish the unbroken chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. The testimony of Police Inspector Tecson that he received two sachets marked with “FSB” which is the
initials of NUP Bilugot proved that there is evidence that NUP Bilugot marked two plastic sachets. The marking
of the corpus delicti as a means to preserve its identity should be done only as far as practicable. In this case,
only the two outer sachets could be marked because the two sachets were heat-sealed. If the two outer sachet
would have to be opened for the seven smaller sachets to be marked, this would contaminate the specimen.

Thus, the prosecution successfully established the identity of the corpus delicti. In addition, the chain of custody
was unbroken. Both NUP Bilugot and SPO2 Ragadio testified that after NUP Bilugot seized the specimen, she
immediately endorsed it to SPO2 Ragadio. SPO2 Ragadio then turned over the two plastic sachets to
investigators detailed at the Philippine Center for Aviation and Security. Investigators from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency then collected the specimen and finally turned it over to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for testing.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the chain of custody rule has not been altered by the Revised Rules on Evidence.

673
RA 9165, Sec. 21

Lescano v. People
G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

Compliance with Section 21’s requirements is critical. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of
an accused.

FACTS:
This resolves an appeal of a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. An Information charging petitioner
Howard Lescano with illegal sale of dangerous drugs was filed. According to the prosecution, an informant sought
the assistance of the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Team (CAIDSOT) of Olongapo City. The informant
alleged that drug-pushing activities were taking place at the corner of Tulio and Tabacuhan Streets. Acting on
this tip, the CAIDSOT monitored the area and allegedly found the informant’s claims to be true. CAIDSOT
operatives relayed the results of their surveillance to their Chief, P/Insp. Julius Javier (P/Insp. Javier). P/Insp.
Javier then instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation.

PO3 Javier and the informant arrived at the corner of Tulio and Tabacuhan Streets. By then, the other members
of the team were already within the area. While walking towards Tulio Street, the informant pointed to Lescano
who was standing alone, about three (3) meters away, allegedly waiting for a prospective customer. PO1
Mataverde stayed behind about seven (7) meters from PO3 Javier and the informant. The informant introduced
PO3 Javier to Lescano. Lescano asked PO3 Javier how much marijuana he was willing to buy. PO3 Javier
responded by handing the marked P100 bill to Lescano. Lescano then gave PO3 Javier a medium-sized plastic
sachet supposedly containing marijuana. At this, PO3 Javier gave the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team.
PO1 Mataverde approached them and introduced himself as a police officer. He then frisked Lescano and
recovered the buy-bust money.

The rest of the buy-bust team arrived as Lescano was about to be handcuffed. PO3 Javier marked the medium-
sized plastic sachet with the initials “HJ” and turned it over to SPO1 Delos Reyes. Lescano was then brought to
the CAIDSOT office for investigation. Inside the CAIDSOT office, an inventory was allegedly conducted and
photographs of the marked money and the sachet were taken. The sachet allegedly containing marijuana
weighed 1.4 grams. P/Insp. Javier asked the Hospital Administrator of the James L. Gordon Memorial Hospital
to conduct a physical examination on Lescano. He also asked the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
to examine Lescano’s urine and the contents of the sachet seized during the buy-bust operation. Testifying during
trial, PO3 Javier positively identified the drug specimen.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to establish compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165?

RULING:
No, the prosecution was not able to establish compliance with Sec. 21. The elements that must be established
to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs are settled:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence.

As regards corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates requirements for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Specifically, with respect to custody before the filing of a criminal
case, Section 21, as amended, provides:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a

674
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

Compliance with Section 21’s requirements is critical. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of
an accused.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of
the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation
of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them.
Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence
in any manner.

It is glaring that despite the prosecution’s allegations that a buy-bust operation was carefully planned and carried
out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully complied with.
While an inventory was supposed to have been conducted, this was done neither in the presence of petitioner,
the person from whom the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative.
Likewise, not one of the persons required to be present (an elected public official, and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have been around during the inventory and
photographing.

We are, in effect, left with no other assurance of the integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving claims
of the prosecution and of its witnesses. These claims cannot sustain a conviction. The prosecution’s sweeping
guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction.
Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will suffice.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the case does not revolve around the rules of court, but rather on the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

675
RA 9165, Sec. 21

People v. Holgado
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014
Leonen, J.

Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous
drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused.

FACTS:
This resolves an appeal from a conviction of accused-appellants Roberto Holgado (Holgado) and Antonio
Misarez (Misarez) for illegal sale of dangerous drugs or for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No.9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

As alleged by the prosecution, the Pasig City Police received reports of illegal drug activities of Holgado. After
surveillance operations, a search warrant was issued against Holgado. Acting on the search warrant, the Pasig
City Chief of Police instructed his officers to, if possible, first conduct a buy-bust operation before actually
enforcing the search warrant. By reason of the buy-bust operation conducted, Holgado and Misarez were
apprehended.

On their part, Holgado and Misarez claimed that no buy-bust operation was conducted. Instead, the police
operatives allegedly barged into Holgado’s house and arrested them while they were merely having a few
drinks. While they were handcuffed, the police operatives conducted a supposed search of Holgado’s house.
The RTC found them guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. In their supplemental brief, they assailed the
supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set by the chain of custody of seized drugs and drug
paraphernalia as provided by Sec. 21 of RA 9165.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution comply with the requirements set by the chain of custody?

RULING:
No. By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, noncompliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to establish
an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this noncompliance suffices as a
ground for acquittal. Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances
or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure;
and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of
or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or
tampering of evidence in any manner.

In this case, while the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it is unclear
if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the search warrant or was inclusive
of whatever items seized during the buy-bust operation. The paraphernalia to which PO2 Castulo testified to in
court were different from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant was
enforced.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items. However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly
conducted and the sachet was supposedly seized and marked, there were justifiable grounds for dispensing with
compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized
sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved.

676
Apart from the officers’ glaring noncompliance with Section 21, two (2) circumstances are worth underscoring in
this case. First, the shabu supposedly seized amounted to 0.05 gram. This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to
only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second,
Holgado and Misarez were acquitted by the RTC of all other charges (i.e., for possession of dangerous drugs
and for possession of drug paraphernalia). While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground
for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malillin v.
People, this court said that “the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when
the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because CDDA was not amended.

677
DNA Evidence

People v. Corpuz
G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father. Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case, Allan is
disputably presumed to be the child’s father. This is in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
provides that in evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider if the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court
of Appeals in affirming Regional Trial Court’s ruling that Allan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of Simple Rape.

Allan was charged with four (4) counts of rape of AAA, 14 years old, a mental retardate (intellectually disabled)
with a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months. AAA was already 20 years 8 when she testified. But
before taking the witness stand, AAA underwent a neuropsychiatric examination. Dr. Rachel Acosta, testified
that she had examined AAA’s mental status including her “mental, behavioral and emotional conditions and her
manner of communication.” She found that AAA had a “mild degree of mental retardation” and an Intelligence
Quotient of 70. Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her mental age was that of a
child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. But she concluded that AAA was fit to testify as a witness depending on
her emotional condition when she testifies although she was “not oriented to time, date and place.” Her degree
of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to 7 years old, she does not know what is right or wrong.
When asked, AAA confirmed that XXX was her four (4)-year-old child. She identified Allan as XXX’s father. When
AAA was asked how Allan became XXX’s father, she responded, ”Iniyot nak, sir.” (He had sex with me, sir.) She
attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on four (4) occasions, each of which he gave
her money. Upon motion before the trial court, the defense applied for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) paternity
test, which was granted. Forensic Biologist III Demelen dela Cruz affirmed that the comparison of their DNA
profiles revealed a 100% proof that the accused is the biological father of XXX.

The RTC convicted Allan of four (4) counts of Simple Rape. The trial court ruled that AAAs testimony was
“categorical, straight forward and credible.” Since it was already established that the victim was intellectually
disabled, it would be unlikely for her to fabricate the accusations against Allan. In his appeal, Allan insisted that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the records were bereft of any credible proof
indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times. AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not
oriented with place, date, and time. The CA affirmed Allan’s conviction. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
AAA’s testimony was credible. Her positive identification of the accused and the narration of the sordid acts
committed against her sufficed. Hence, an appeal before this Court was filed.

Allan herein insists that AAA was inconsistent in her testimony because when she was interviewed, she did not
know who raped her. He argues that the DNA paternity test result’s confirmation that he is the father of AAA’s
child is insufficient on its own for his conviction.

ISSUES:
1. Is AAA a qualified witness?
2. Was the DNA paternity test result insufficient to prove that AAA’s the father to conclude conviction of the
crime of rape

RULING:
1. Yes. To qualify as a witness, the basic test under Rule 130 Section 20 of the Rules of Court, is whether
he or she can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his [or her] perception to others. Therefore, an
intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. “He or she
can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows.” If an intellectually
disabled victim’s testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.

678
Notwithstanding AAA’s intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low
Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her perception to
others. Given that AAA’s qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA’s mental state also does not
prevent her from being a credible witness. The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person
is upheld provided that she is capable and consistent in narrating her experience. Therefore, Allan
cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since AAA
was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AAAs failure to offer any testimony as to when and
where she was raped does not matter. The Supreme Court underscores that the date, place, and time
of the incidents need not be accurately established since these are not elements of rape.

2. No. In in Herrera v. Alba, the Supreme Court explained that in a paternity test, the forensic scientist looks
at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the
DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match
the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded
as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.

Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case, Allan is disputably presumed to be the child’s
father. The DNA testing result shows that there is a COMPLETE MATCH in all of the fifteen (15) loci
tested using the Powerflex 16 System between the alleles of Edgar Allan F. Corpuz and XXX.” Based
on the findings, “there is a 99.9999% Probability of Paternity that Edgar Allan F. Corpuz is the biological
father of XXX. This is in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence provides that in
evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider if the value of the Probability of Paternity
is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

To emphasize, it is the defense that moved for a DNA testing. It failed to assail the result and the
dependability of the procedure before the trial court. It is only now that it is questioning the test’s
accuracy given that the results are not favorable to it. For this reason, this Court agrees with the CA that
the defense is already “estopped from questioning, much less, objecting the reliability of the DNA testing
methodology conducted on the specimens submitted.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court merely deleted the phrase “except as provided in the next succeeding
section”.

679
Rule 130, Sec. 9

Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Construction and Development Corp.

G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015
Leonen, J.

Per the Parol Evidence Rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed, “forbids any
addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to
show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.” However,
provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four items enumerated in the second paragraph of
Rule 130, Section 9, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 praying that CA’s decision be reversed and the RTC
ruling in favor of Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras in their action for breach of contract with damages against
respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation (Kimwa) be reinstated.

Lucia Paras was a”concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction
firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa
entered into a contract denominated “Agreement for Supply of Aggregates” (Agreement) where 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates were “allotted” by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates
at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however,
Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. As it failed to do so, it was liable to Spouses Paras for the total sum of
₱720,000.00, the value of the 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates that Kimwa did not haul. Claiming that in so
doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint for breach of
contract with damages that is now subject of this Petition.

RTC favored Spouses Paras but CA reverse the said ruling and faulted the trial court for basing its findings on
evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.

ISSUE:
Is the application of the general rule on Parol Evidence proper?

RULING:
NO. Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties’ true
intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even responded to by
respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be
introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been
the parties’ true intent, may be admitted and considered.

Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless convincingly shown otherwise) that individuals
act as rational human beings, i.e, “[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns[.]” This basic evidentiary
stance, taken with the supporting evidence petitioners Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwa’s awareness
of the conditions under which petitioner Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement’s own text specifying
exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners Spouses Paras’ position that respondent Kimwa
was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. As it admittedly hauled only
10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of the remaining 30,000 cubic
meters.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 130, Sec. 9 is affected by the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence in three ways: (1) change in the numbering
of the section from 9 to 10, (2) addition of “or her” to address gender sensitivity, and (3) necessity that the pleading
be verified.

680
Rule 130, Sec. 9

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
Leonen, J.

The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not
base a claim on it.

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent herein after the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
court of appeal’s resolution and ordered the respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) in order that petitioners may inspect photocopy of the same.

Respondent raised the following points: (1) motion for production was filed out of time; (2) the production of the
LSPA would violate parol evidence rule; and (3) the LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.

Petitioners on the other hand, argued that: (1) motion for production was not filed out of time since there is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the
pre-trial; (2) Parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties to the deed of
assignment, and “they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed
of Assignment.”; (3) that “it has not been shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . . analogous
to [any of the relationships enumerated in Rule 130, Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from disclosing
information as to their transaction.”

ISSUES:
1. Is the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, limited to the pre-trial stage?
2. Will the presentation of the document violate the patrol evidence rule in Rule 130, Section 9?
3. Is the LSPA considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence?

RULING:
1. No, the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial
stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or
inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a
showing of due cause.” In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes. this court declared that depositions, as a
mode of discovery, “may be taken at any time after the institution of any action [as there is] no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.”

Thus, petitioners are allowed to avail of the motion for production.

2. No, the parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and
do not base a claim on it.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules on Evidence provides that “when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second
paragraph is when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.

Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.

3. No. LSPA is not considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence.

Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are communication between
or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between
physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. This court

681
has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: “(a) editors may not be compelled to
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c)
trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits” (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and intelligence information; and (f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless,

The LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute,
and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. Respondent failed to
discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged document. Respondent did not present any
law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as classified information.

Thus, the respondent may be ordered to produce the LSPA since it does not fall under the privileged
documents contemplated by law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 27, Sec. 1 - No effect because Rule 27, Section 1 was not substantially amended.

Rule 130, Sec. 9 - Section 9 of Rule 130 is renumbered to Section 10 of Rule 130. Other than the numbering, no
substantial amendments were made that would run counter the decided case abovementioned.

Rule 130, Sec. 24 - No effect because the amended section does not contradict the decision of the court.

682
Rule 130, Sec. 20

People v. Corpuz
G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. “He or she can be
a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows.” If an intellectually disabled victim’s
testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court
of Appeals in affirming Regional Trial Court’s ruling that Allan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of Simple Rape.

Allan was charged with four (4) counts of rape of AAA, 14 years old, a mental retardate (intellectually disabled)
with a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months. AAA was already 20 years 8 when she testified. But
before taking the witness stand, AAA underwent a neuropsychiatric examination. Dr. Rachel Acosta, testified
that she had examined AAA’s mental status including her “mental, behavioral and emotional conditions and her
manner of communication.” She found that AAA had a “mild degree of mental retardation” and an Intelligence
Quotient of 70. Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her mental age was that of a
child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. But she concluded that AAA was fit to testify as a witness depending on
her emotional condition when she testifies although she was “not oriented to time, date and place.” Her degree
of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to 7 years old, she does not know what is right or wrong.
When asked, AAA confirmed that XXX was her four (4)-year-old child. She identified Allan as XXX’s father. When
AAA was asked how Allan became XXX’s father, she responded, ”Iniyot nak, sir.” (He had sex with me, sir.) She
attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on four (4) occasions, each of which he gave
her money. Upon motion before the trial court, the defense applied for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) paternity
test, which was granted. Forensic Biologist III Demelen dela Cruz affirmed that the comparison of their DNA
profiles revealed a 100% proof that the accused is the biological father of XXX.

The RTC convicted Allan of four (4) counts of Simple Rape. The trial court ruled that AAAs testimony was
“categorical, straight forward and credible.” Since it was already established that the victim was intellectually
disabled, it would be unlikely for her to fabricate the accusations against Allan. In his appeal, Allan insisted that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the records were bereft of any credible proof
indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times. AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not
oriented with place, date, and time. The CA affirmed Allan’s conviction. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
AAA’s testimony was credible. Her positive identification of the accused and the narration of the sordid acts
committed against her sufficed. Hence, an appeal before this Court was filed.

Allan herein insists that AAA was inconsistent in her testimony because when she was interviewed, she did not
know who raped her. He argues that the DNA paternity test result’s confirmation that he is the father of AAA’s
child is insufficient on its own for his conviction.

ISSUES:
1. Is AAA a qualified witness?
2. Was the DNA paternity test result insufficient to prove that AAA’s the father to conclude conviction of the
crime of rape

RULING:
1. Yes. To qualify as a witness, the basic test under Rule 130 Section 20 of the Rules of Court, is whether
he or she can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his [or her] perception to others. Therefore, an
intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. “He or she
can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows.” If an intellectually
disabled victim’s testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.

Notwithstanding AAA’s intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low
Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her perception to
others. Given that AAA’s qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA’s mental state also does not

683
prevent her from being a credible witness. The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person
is upheld provided that she is capable and consistent in narrating her experience. Therefore, Allan
cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since AAA
was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AAAs failure to offer any testimony as to when and
where she was raped does not matter. The Supreme Court underscores that the date, place, and time
of the incidents need not be accurately established since these are not elements of rape.

2. No. In in Herrera v. Alba, the Supreme Court explained that in a paternity test, the forensic scientist looks
at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles
of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined
to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.

Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case, Allan is disputably presumed to be the child’s
father. The DNA testing result shows that there is a COMPLETE MATCH in all of the fifteen (15) loci
tested using the Powerflex 16 System between the alleles of Edgar Allan F. Corpuz and XXX.” Based
on the findings, “there is a 99.9999% Probability of Paternity that Edgar Allan F. Corpuz is the biological
father of XXX. This is in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence provides that in
evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider if the value of the Probability of Paternity
is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

To emphasize, it is the defense that moved for a DNA testing. It failed to assail the result and the
dependability of the procedure before the trial court. It is only now that it is questioning the test’s
accuracy given that the results are not favorable to it. For this reason, this Court agrees with the CA that
the defense is already “estopped from questioning, much less, objecting the reliability of the DNA testing
methodology conducted on the specimens submitted.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the 2019 Rules of Court merely deleted the phrase “except as provided in the next succeeding
section”.

684
Rule 130, Sec. 24

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
Leonen, J.

A Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement does not fall under privileged documents contemplated by law.

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent herein after the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
court of appeal’s resolution and ordered the respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) in order that petitioners may inspect photocopy of the same.

Respondent raised the following points: (1) motion for production was filed out of time; (2) the production of the
LSPA would violate parol evidence rule; and (3) the LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.

Petitioners on the other hand, argued that: (1) motion for production was not filed out of time since there is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the
pre-trial; (2) Parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties to the deed of
assignment, and “they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed
of Assignment.”; (3) that “it has not been shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . . analogous
to [any of the relationships enumerated in Rule 130, Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from disclosing
information as to their transaction.”

ISSUES:
1. Is the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, limited to the pre-trial stage?
2. Will the presentation of the document violate the patrol evidence rule in Rule 130, Section 9?
3. Is the LSPA considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence?

RULING:
1. No, the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial
stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or
inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a
showing of due cause.” In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes. this court declared that depositions, as a
mode of discovery, “may be taken at any time after the institution of any action [as there is] no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.”

Thus, petitioners are allowed to avail of the motion for production.

2. No, the parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and
do not base a claim on it.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules on Evidence provides that “when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second
paragraph is when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.

Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.

3. No. LSPA is not considered privileged and confidential document under Rule 130 and other related
jurisprudence.

Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are communication between
or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between
physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. This court

685
has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: “(a) editors may not be compelled to
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c)
trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits” (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and intelligence information; and (f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless,

The LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute,
and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. Respondent failed to
discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged document. Respondent did not present any
law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as classified information.

Thus, the respondent may be ordered to produce the LSPA since it does not fall under the privileged
documents contemplated by law.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

Rule 27, Sec. 1 - No effect because Rule 27, Section 1 was not substantially amended.

Rule 130, Sec. 9 - Section 9 of Rule 130 is renumbered to Section 10 of Rule 130. Other than the numbering, no
substantial amendments were made that would run counter the decided case abovementioned.

Rule 130, Sec. 24 - No effect because the amended section does not contradict the decision of the court.

686
Rule 130, Sec. 33

People v. Lumayag
G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

Dela Cruz’ extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that Dela
Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into writing. Further, when the police
officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not
constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution states that “these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.”

FACTS:
In a petition for appeal, Diony Opiniano (Opiniano) challenges the decision of the Court of Appeals his conviction
for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

In the Information, Opiniano, Romaldo Lumayag (Lumayag), and Jerry Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) were charged with
the crime of robbery with homicide when they allegedly conspired together with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation against persons as they entered the residence of Eladio Santos y Gutierrez and
Leonor Santos y Reyes. As a result of the incident, Eladio and Leonor died. When the accused were arraigned,
they pleaded not guilty of the offense as charged. After the investigation conducted by the police authorities,
SPO2 Ko did not take the fingerprints of the accused or submit the items for fingerprinting at the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory before submitting them to the National Bureau of Investigation because he
thought it was no longer necessary.

The trial court found Opiniano and Lumayag guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and Dela
Cruz as an accessory to the crime. Only Opiniano appealed the Regional Trial Court’s decision. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision and ruled that the direct testimony of Dela Cruz
admitting their participation in the crime and Opiniano’s possession of the stolen items were clear proofs of his
involvement in the crime.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to establish the sufficiency of evidence to convict the appellant of robbery with
homicide?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Dela Cruz’ extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that Dela
Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into writing. Further, when the police
officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not
constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution states that “these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.” This kind of perfunctory giving of the so-called Miranda rights is what this Court has previously
frowned upon as ineffective and inadequate compliance with the mandates of the Constitution. Any confession
obtained under these circumstances is flawed and cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant
but also against his co-accused.

Nonetheless, even without Dela Cruz’ extra-judicial confession, Opiniano’s conviction still stands. An accused is
always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact that he had been discharged from the
information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight
that should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this connection,
it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the
basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. The eyewitness account of Dela Cruz, corroborated by the
testimony and findings of Dr. Arizala and Forensic Biologist Buan, suffices to convict accused-appellant Opiniano
of the crime charged. “The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a

687
conviction.” Dela Cruz was categorical and coherent in stating appellant Opiniano’s participation in the robbing
and killing of the Spouses Santos. His testimony remained unshaken even on a lengthy and intense cross-
examination from appellant Opiniano’s counsel and the prosecutor.

Therefore, the conviction should be sustained.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect the applicable provision in this case was not amended.

688
Rule 130, Sec. 33

Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
Leonen, J.

Any admission obtained from the “request for appearance” without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in
evidence.

FACTS:
Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of P.D. 533 for stealing one female carabao belonging to Teresita
Perez (Perez).

Apparently, Lopez untied a carabao from a tree and asked his errand boy Felix Alderete (Alderete) to deliver it
to the former’s boss named Boy Platan. Alderete followed the instructions, not knowing whether Lopez was the
owner of the carabao. The next day, Alderete learned about Perez’s missing carabao. Aftraid of being accused,
Alderete went to the barangay police, and Lopez followed afterwards. During a commotion with Perez, Lopez
admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay indemnification. PO3 Leo Lorazito testified as to what
transpired during the confrontation, and that the parties failed to settle. He was found guilty or cattle-rustling.
Lopez filed an appeal with CA, which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Lopez argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao
owned by Perez. Alderete testified that the carabao he and Lopez took was still pregnant while Perez said their
carabao had an offspring. Perez also could not confirm the date the carabao was stolen. Lopez also alleges that
the request for appearance issued by PO3 Lozarito was in violation of his custodial rights.

ISSUES:
1. Should the petition be denied for raising questions of fact?
2. Were all the elements of the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt?
3. Was Lopez’s uncounseled admission at the barangay police admissible in evidence?

RULING:
1. No. The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
However, there are instances when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review. These
instances include the following: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded
on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7)
when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the
facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Here, the question of fact falls under the exceptions, as when the lower courts misapprehended the facts, and
their findings are contradicted by the evidence presented. He had no personal knowledge of the appearance of
the carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez. He himself doubted whether theft was committed.

2. No. To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty.
Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Alderete’s description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any distinguishing mark on the
carabao that petitioner allegedly stole.

3. No. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. SC ruled against CA’s ruling that it was admissible
because the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not

689
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits
having committed the crime.

The record shows that Lopez’s appearance was not voluntary since there was a “request for appearance” from
the barangay police, which is no different from an “invitation” by police officers for custodial investigation. When
he was requested to appear, he was already singled out as the probable culprit, falling within the definition of
custodial investigation. Also, the explanation that the police did not ask questions but merely let Lopez and Perez
confront each other attempts to circumvent the law.

As to PO3 Lozarito’s testimony, it is considered as hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what
the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. He most likely overheard the
conversation between Teresita and petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had
discussed.

Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of CA is reversed. Lopez shall be acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied were not substantially revised.

690
Rule 130, Sec. 36

Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
Leonen, J.

Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is
not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. He
most likely overheard the conversation between Teresita and petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge of
what the parties had discussed.

FACTS:
Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of P.D. 533 for stealing one female carabao belonging to Teresita
Perez (Perez).

Apparently, Lopez untied a carabao from a tree and asked his errand boy Felix Alderete (Alderete) to deliver it
to the former’s boss named Boy Platan. Alderete followed the instructions, not knowing whether Lopez was the
owner of the carabao. The next day, Alderete learned about Perez’s missing carabao. Aftraid of being accused,
Alderete went to the barangay police, and Lopez followed afterwards. During a commotion with Perez, Lopez
admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay indemnification. PO3 Leo Lorazito testified as to what
transpired during the confrontation, and that the parties failed to settle. He was found guilty or cattle-rustling.
Lopez filed an appeal with CA, which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Lopez argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao
owned by Perez. Alderete testified that the carabao he and Lopez took was still pregnant while Perez said their
carabao had an offspring. Perez also could not confirm the date the carabao was stolen. Lopez also alleges that
the request for appearance issued by PO3 Lozarito was in violation of his custodial rights.

ISSUES:
1. Should the petition be denied for raising questions of fact?
2. Were all the elements of the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt?
3. Was Lopez’s uncounseled admission at the barangay police admissible in evidence?

RULING:
1. No. The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
However, there are instances when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review. These
instances include the following: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded
on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7)
when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the
facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Here, the question of fact falls under the exceptions, as when the lower courts misapprehended the facts, and
their findings are contradicted by the evidence presented. He had no personal knowledge of the appearance of
the carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez. He himself doubted whether theft was committed.

2. No. To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty.
Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Alderete’s description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any distinguishing mark on the
carabao that petitioner allegedly stole.

3. No. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s

691
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. SC ruled against CA’s ruling that it was admissible
because the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits
having committed the crime.

The record shows that Lopez’s appearance was not voluntary since there was a “request for appearance” from
the barangay police, which is no different from an “invitation” by police officers for custodial investigation. When
he was requested to appear, he was already singled out as the probable culprit, falling within the definition of
custodial investigation. Also, the explanation that the police did not ask questions but merely let Lopez and Perez
confront each other attempts to circumvent the law.

As to PO3 Lozarito’s testimony, it is considered as hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what
the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. He most likely overheard the
conversation between Teresita and petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had
discussed.

Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of CA is reversed. Lopez shall be acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the rules applied were not substantially revised.

692
Rule 130, Sec. 42

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
Leonen, J.

A sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering
that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization, and one of them died from his injuries.

Four days after the incident, the victims reported the incident to the NBI. Thereafter, an information for murder
was filed. Separate informations for attempted murder were also filed. The informations included the following
statement: “the above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating
with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually
helping one another.” At the trial, among those presented as witness by the prosecution were several bystanders.

ISSUES:
1. Did the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them?
2. Are the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae?
3. Did the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies?

RULING:
1. Yes, the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them.

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise” in the information does not violate their constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in
the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. The
introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their
identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The information charges conspiracy among the
accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had
been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them
might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

693
Thus, the information was not violative of the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

2. Yes, the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae.

As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, . . .” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is
when the evidence is part of res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

Thus, the statements made by the bystanders are admissible in evidence.

Nonetheless, the statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety
of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that
of the victims.

3. No, the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies.

The fact that they went to the NBI four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their credibility since
most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity moves
as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well enough to go to
the NBI headquarters in order to give their statements. The decision to report the incident to the NBI instead
of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the NBI more equipped to
handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely
following the legal advice of their counsel.

Thus, the belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive identification of the appellants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

As for Rule 110, Sec. 1, and our principles on the credibility of witnesses, they have not been amended nor
repealed by the Revised Rules.

As for Rule 130, Sec. 42, the Revised Rules on Evidence renumbered the same to Sec. 44 and now expressly
states that the statements made must be “under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence.”

694
Rule 130, Sec. 44

DST Movers Corp. v. People’s General Insurance Corp.

G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

For the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the following requisites must be present: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that a new one be entered
dismissing respondent People’s General Insurance Corporation’s (PGIC) Complaint for Sum of Money.

In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, PGIC alleged that at about
10:30 p.m. on February 28, 2002, along the South Luzon Expressway and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City,
a Honda Civic sedan was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck. PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop
position when it was hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The
driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002, PGIC
relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas

The truck was supposedly subsequently discovered to be owned by DST Movers. The sedan was covered by
PGIC’s insurance. The sedan’s owner, Fidel Yuboco, filed a total loss claim with PGIC and the latter paid.
Asserting that it was subrogated to Fidel Yuboco’s rights and that the proximate cause of the mishap was the
negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC, through counsel, sent DST Movers demand letters. Its demands not
having been satisfied, PGIC proceeded to file its Complaint. The lower courts ruled in favor of PGIC. Hence, DST
Movers filed the present Petition insisting that its liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence.
Specifically, it faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was
supported by nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was
misplaced as it was supposedly “improperly identified [and] uncorroborated. Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the
non-presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who prepared the report, was fatal to respondent’s cause.

ISSUE:
Was it error for the lower courts to admit and lend evidentiary weight to the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon
by respondent People’s General Insurance Corporation: the Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by
PO2 Tomas?

RULING:
Yes, there was error committed by the lower courts. Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides for the Hearsay Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons
who are not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule proceeds from the
basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable to cross-examine the person
making the statement.

Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with the need for presenting as
witness the public officer or person performing a duty specially enjoined by law who made the entry. This,
however, is only true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

For the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the following requisites must be present: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person

695
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.

Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts
below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein
stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official information. Neither was there any explanation
as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account
of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared
it.

It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that were personally known to PO2
Tomas. The Report is candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely reported to PO2 Tomas by “G.
Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX.” It was this “G. Simbahon,” not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the performance of
his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to the
Hearsay Rule.

To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person who prepared the Report—PO2 Tomas—to
have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the Report would have
been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the
motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the
testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 130, Sec. 37 and 46 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because the relevant provisions
on hearsay have been renumbered but the concept of hearsay and entries in official records remain the same.

696
Rule 130, Sec. 46

Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

A published treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial
notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the
subject. Here, the RTC did not take judicial notice of the translator’s and advisors’ qualifications. Nor was an
expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and advisors’ credentials
is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the RTC was correct in not
considering the English translation as a learned treatise.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
RTC’s resolution be reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court denied Petitioner Genevieve Arreza Toyo’s
(Genevieve) Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City.
After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement in Japan, which was later on
accepted and registered. Genevieve then filed before the RTC a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted the necessary documents
to prove her petition, including an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. RTC denied Genevieve’s petition
for failing to prove the copy of Japan’s law, noting that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English
translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, Genevieve filed in the SC the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an
official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court. That it is an official
publication, she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan’s law under Rule 132, Section 25 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not considering the English translation
of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors’ credentials.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC err in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry filed by petitioner?

RULING:
No, the RTC did not err in denying the same.

A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before
a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In the same line, lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

While the SC ruled that the documents submitted by the petitioner complied with the requirements of Sec. 24
and 25 of Rule 132, the English translation submitted by petitioner was published by a private company in Japan
engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws. These translations are “not advertised as a source
of official translations of Japanese laws;” rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws
and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is
not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.

The rule is that hearsay evidence “is devoid of probative value.” However, a published treatise may be admitted
as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies
that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject. Here, the RTC did not take judicial
notice of the translator’s and advisors’ qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this

697
matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and advisors’ credentials is the inside cover page of the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the RTC was correct in not considering the English translation as
a learned treatise.

Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.
Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan’s law on divorce, are not within this Court’s ambit to resolve.
Nonetheless, while the Petition raised questions of fact, “substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be
referred to the Court of Appeals for further appropriate proceedings”.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the contents Rule 130, Sec. 46 was just transferred to Rule 130, Sec 48. Also, the
amendments in Sec. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules do not affect the ruling because the amendments merely
classified whether the document presented originated from a foreign country which is a contracting party to a
treaty or convention subject to reciprocity or not, without changing the requirements of proving the same when
the document originated from a non-contracting party.

698
Rule 130, Sec. 49

Tortono v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

In the case of an expert witness, he or she must be shown to possess knowledge, skill, experience, or training
on the subject matter of his or her testimony.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC praying that the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision be reversed and set aside. This assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the
RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now petitioners (Teodoro Tortono et. al.), in their
action for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants, now respondents (Julian Gregorio et.
al.).

This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed) allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina Casimiro
(Rufina), the purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of
Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. Petitioners asserted that their mother was illiterate and only
affixed her thumbmark on documents and was always assisted by one of her children which was not the case
here. They also presented several documents bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. The NBI
fingerprint examiner Eriberto Gomez (Gomez) conducted an examination on the thumbmark on the documents
presented by petitioners and the thumbmark on the Deed and reported that the same were different (first report).
In another report, Gomez observed that the while the standard thumbmarks lack the necessary ridge
characteristics to warrant positive identification, all the standard are all in the same finger print pattern.

The RTC concluded that the Deed was a forgery and ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA reversed the RTC
ruling and found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the
presumption of regularity. It held that, ultimately, petitioners failed to prove “by clear and convincing evidence”
that the thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. Respondents here assail the qualification
of the NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee”.

ISSUES:
1. Is it proper to raise factual issues resting on the evidence presented during trial under Rule 45?
2. Did the CA err in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine because it was notarized?
3. Should the Court accept Gomez’s testimony as an expert witness?

RULING:
1. As a general rule, no. The matter of the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on the
evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of
exceptions.

Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.

Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals
conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court.

699
2. Yes. Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to verify the
genuineness of his or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of
the instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is imbued
with public interest. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution. However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Petitioners successfully discharged this burden. With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina’s
apparent thumbmarks on the demonstrated disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks
on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable
presumption, and sought to affirm this presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose
very act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose credibility was shown to be
wanting, and who is himself potentially liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also endeavored to
undermine petitioners’ expert witness by dismissively characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee.”

3. Yes. Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the testimonies
of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing “special knowledge, skill, experience or training”.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a wide
latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case. Respondents here assail the qualification of National Bureau of Investigation
fingerprint examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding him as “just an ordinary employee.”

Contrary to respondents’ dismissiveness towards Gomez, his performance of such tasks as taking fingerprints,
even if, for a time it was his main duty, does not, per se, discount competence. A history of performing this
function does not negate any “special knowledge, skill, experience or training” that Gomez possesses.
Incidentally, this case is not the first instance that this Court sustained Gomez’s competence and credibility. The
credibility of an expert witness does not inhere in his or her person. Rather, he or she must be shown to possess
knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her testimony. The Regional Trial Court’s
recollection indicates, most notably, that Gomez was not handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners’
request, Gomez appeared to have been designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself to conduct the
examination. Thus, any such determination of Gomez’s expertise was not borne by petitioners’ innate preference
for him or of their insistence upon him, but by the National Bureau of Investigation’s own confidence in him.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no changes on Rule 45. There is also no effect on the Ruling under the Amended
Rules on Rule 130, Sec. 49 because the amendment only included “education” as an additional way of proving
the credibility of an expert witness.

700
Judicial Affidavit Rule, Sec. 10

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

Its excuse— “for whatever reason”— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the
Judicial Affidavits.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the RTC in ruling that the MTCC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits of the
prosecution’s witnesses.

Petitioner Ronald Lim (Ronald), filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against
his brother Respondent Edwin Lim (Edwin). Acting favorably on the Complaint, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed an Information against Edwin before the MTCC. On arraignment, Edwin pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. The case was set for pre-trial; however, the same was reset thrice. At the pre-trial, the prosecution,
among others, moved that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses later
that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits earlier, but “for whatever reason,” was not able
to submit them. Despite the defense counsel’s insistent opposition, the MTCC granted the Motion via an Order
and gave the prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the MTCC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits. The prosecution argued that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over them since no summons had been served upon Ronald and the Office of the Solicitor
General. In addition, they contended that a resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy of
appeal was still available to them. RTC ruled in favor of Edwin.

ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines?
2. Was the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition the proper remedy to question the Order the MTCC?
3. Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits?

RULING:
1. Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald and People of the Philippines.

Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, summons need not be issued in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall
issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. Furthermore, when a party participates in
a proceeding despite improper service of summons, he or she is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
court’s jurisdiction. Here, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court a Comment/Opposition to the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a Comment/Opposition to the Petition.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Office of the Solicitor General should have been served with a copy of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. However, under the Rules of Court, when a petition for certiorari is filed
assailing an act of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a private respondent, and is then
mandated to appear and defend both on his or her own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected
by the proceedings. The public respondent shall not be required to comment on the petition unless required by
the court.

2. Yes, the said petition was the proper remedy.

A petition for certiorari is a remedy directed not only to correct errors of jurisdiction, but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

701
Here, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly disregarding the clear wording of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses
not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall
be deemed to have waived their submission.

3. Yes, the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing such.

Section 9 and 10 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule clearly states that the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial
affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the
time prescribed, they shall be deemed to have waived their submission. Nevertheless, if the belated submission
of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay once as long as it “would not unduly
prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine.

Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution’s belated submission of their Judicial Affidavits
despite the repeated postponements of the scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the pre-trial was reset thrice. In spite
of that, the prosecution failed to submit their Judicial Affidavits within the time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse—
“for whatever reason”— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the matters in this case are not covered by the amendments.

702
Rule 131, Sec. 1

David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the action and who
alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-
judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This
burden was petitioner’s to discharge.

FACTS:
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As
an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
and turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar. On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting
the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.

Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth. She was
naturalized and granted American citizenship and was given a United States passport. After her adoptive father’s
death, she decided to return to the Philippines with her family. Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines and filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA9225,
which was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Between 2006 and 2009, Senator Poe made
several trips to USA using her United States Passport, after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship. In 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American Citizenship. In 2013, Senator Poe ran
for the Senatorial Elections and won.

Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari praying for the nullification
of the Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David
which sought to unseat private respondent as a Senator.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate Electoral Tribunal act with grave abuse of discretion?
2. Is circumstantial evidence a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings?
3. Did the burden of evidence shift to Poe upon a mere showing that she is a foundling?

RULING:
1. No, the Court finds no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The viability of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.”
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the
Constitution. Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown,
considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father or mother.
It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was
without judicial precedent. Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established personal circumstances of private
respondent. The Senate Electoral Tribunal arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof
required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt

703
or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

2. Yes, circumstantial evidence may be used as a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings.

A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
substantially proves that either or both of one’s parents is a Filipino citizen. Since proving Poe’s biological
parentage is practically impossible, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence in lieu of direct
evidence. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation
of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice
to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

3. No, the claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent is a serious error.

“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;
that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue.” Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another.
What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her
favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has
ostensibly been established against him or her. In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in
the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner’s to discharge. Once the petitioner makes
a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent’s admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner.
While it does establish that the identities of private respondent’s biological parents are not known, it does not
automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino. The most that petitioner had in his favor
was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and
shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

1. No effect because Rule 65 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.
2. No effect since Rule 133, Section 4 remains the same, but with an added last sentence.
3. No effect since the 2019 Rules of Court has added burden of evidence, the definition of which is the same as
what was applied in this case.

704
Rule 132, Sec. 11

People v. Dimapilit
G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

A witness’ inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there are no material
contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive identification of the
accused as one of the main assailants.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision affirming the RTC ruling finding accused-appellant Rene Boy Dimapilit y
Abellado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

One of the prosecution’s witnesses was Magdalena Apasan, who identified the assailants, which included Rene
Boy, and gave a detailed account of the incident. The trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, found
Magdalena’s testimony to be categorical and consistent. Rene Boy however, hinges on the purported
inconsistencies in Magdalena’s testimony to assail her credibility, to wit: (1) the discrepancy between her court
testimony and her sworn statement, as she failed to disclose that she went with Simeon (victim’s brother) to
follow the victim at Pastor’s (one of the assailants) house; (2) her confusion with the names of the accused
persons, Junnel and Joel; and (3) the fact that she did not ask for help as she witnessed the incident. Additionally,
Rene Boy cites People v. Rodrigo to further assail Magdalena’s credibility.

ISSUE:
Do the alleged inconsistencies in Magdalena’s testimony affect her credibility?

RULING:
No, a witness’ inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there are no material
contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive identification of the
accused as one of the main assailants.

(1) As to the discrepancy between Magdalena’s testimony before the court and her sworn statement, said failure
does not automatically cast doubt on her credibility as a witness. As explained in People v. Nelmida:
“Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as
inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.” Also, any inconsistency, which is not relevant to the
elements of the crime, “is not a ground to reverse a conviction.” (2) Magdalena’s confusion with the names of the
accused also does not affect her credibility as a witness. It is possible that she might have interchanged the name
of “Junnel” to “Joel” due to their vivid similarity. Instead of weakening her credibility, the trivial lapses strengthen
her statements as they indicate that she was not “coached or [her] answers contrived.” (3) The fact that
Magdalena did not ask for help is not contrary to human experience. “Witnesses of startling occurrences react
differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.” Finally, accused-appellant’s
reliance on People v. Rodrigo is misplaced. In said case, this Court ruled that since Rosita’s identification would
be the sole basis for Rodrigo’s conviction, it should be handled with great caution. Thus, the flawed procedure in
the photographic identification made the witness’ recognition undependable. Unlike the witness in Rodrigo,
Magdalena’s testimony can stand on its own. Her identification of Rene Boy was unquestionable since she knew
the accused even before the incident happened. Contrary to Rene Boy’s imputation, the trial court in this case
did not automatically accept Magdalena’s testimony as credible on the ground that the defense failed to show
any proof that Magdalena had reasons to falsely testify against him. Hence, the fact that Magdalena had no
apparent motives against Rene Boy only corroborated the totality of evidence which favored the prosecution’s
case. After considering Magdalena’s well-substantiated testimony and reliable identification of the accused, the
trial court accordingly gave more credence to her as a witness rather than Rene Boy’s baseless denial.

Thus, the inconsistency in Magdalena’s testimony does not affect her credibility.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 11 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, but only insofar as it addressed gender
sensitivity by adding she/her pronouns.

705
Rule 132, Sec. 17

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013
Leonen, J.

When a party produces in court a Deed of Assignment, the adverse party must be given the opportunity to
examine the whole document.

FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin I.
Oben (Oben) are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) through a
Complaint and currently pending proceedings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC’s outstanding loan obligations of P10,232,998.00 to
respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special purpose vehicle. Thereafter,
Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB, which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) referred to in the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent Cameron opposed the motion and argued that petitioners have not shown “good cause”
for the production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. The RTC denied
petitioners’ motion for failure to show the relevance and “good cause” for the production of the LSPA.

ISSUE:
Is the denial of the Motion for Production/Inspection proper?

RULING:
No. The provision on production and inspection of documents under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also
the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.

Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court
judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant
evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due process. The test
to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description
is one of reasonableness and practicability.

The question was whether respondent had acquired a valid title to the credit, i.e., EDC’s outstanding loan
obligation, and whether it had a right to claim from petitioners. As respondent Cameron’s claim against the
petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to
allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express
terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject matter —
the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners’ defense.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached
writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by respondent, petitioner must be given
the opportunity to examine the whole document.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court. One provision in this case was amended but only to address gender
sensitivity.

706
Credibility of Witnesses

People v. Magallano
G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018
Leonen, J.

There is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a frightful experience. Not every
witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind, because
witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-
cut, standard form of behavior can be drawn. Delay in reporting the incident or making a statement before the
police, when adequately explained, neither impairs the credibility of a witness nor destroys the probative value
of his testimony.

FACTS:
This case is an Ordinary Appeal from the decision of the CA, which affirmed the conviction of Nady F. Magallano,
Jr. (Magallano) and Romeo C. Tapar (Tapar) for the crime of murder.

One of the witnesses of the case is Miguel Angelo Pineda, Jr. (Pineda). Pineda testified that on October 1, 2005,
he peeked through his window and saw two (2) men, whom he later identified as Magallano and Tapar, ganging
up on Ronnie Batongbakal (Batongbakal), who was by then lying on the ground. He testified that he saw
Magallano repeatedly strike Batongbakal with a “dos por dos,” while Tapar watched.

Pineda explained that he did not immediately give his statement to the police officers because the day after the
incident, he was informed by a police officer that a woman had already given her statement; thus, his statement
was no longer needed. The RTC convicted Magallano and Tapar. The Regional Trial Court gave much weight to
Pineda’s testimony pointing to Magallano and Tapar as Batongbakal’s killers. It found Pineda’s testimony to be
“straightforward, credible, and consistent.” Accused-appellants assail Pineda’s credibility as a witness because
his actions during and after the incident supposedly went against human nature. Moreover, they assert that his
testimony was riddled with inconsistencies.

ISSUE:
Does Pineda’s delay in giving his statement affect his credibility as witness?

RULING:
No, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a frightful experience. Not
every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind,
because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses, and for which
no clear-cut, standard form of behavior can be drawn.

Likewise, Pineda’s delay in reporting the incident or making a statement before the police, when adequately
explained, neither impairs his credibility as a witness nor destroys the probative value of his testimony. Further,
there is no rule that the suspect in a crime should be hurriedly named by a witness. As to the imputed
inconsistencies in Pineda’s testimony, they refer only to minor if not inconsequential or trivial matters which do
not impair the credibility of Pineda. In fact, it even signifies that he was neither coached nor was lying on the
witness stand. What commands greater importance is that there is no inconsistency in Pineda’s complete and
vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and positive identification of accused-appellants as the victim’s
assailants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is no such amendment on testimonial evidence which applies in this case.

707
Credibility of Witnesses

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016
Leonen, J.

Delay in reporting the crime caused by (1) the gravity of private complainants’ injuries upon which they had to
recuperate first, (2) their desire to report to the proper authorities, and (3) the weekend, is not enough to disprove
their credibility as witnesses.

FACTS:
This case involves separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the accused-appellants Christopher Soliva,
Warren Zipangan, and Robert Alvir, seeking the reversal of the SC’s decision in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and attempted murder of Fortes, Natalicio, Lachica (Lachica),
Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston resulting from fraternity-related violence. SC previously reversed the decision of
the CA which ruled that the other accused are only guilty of slight physical injuries, thereby reverting to RTC’s
decision.

Soliva contends that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio’s sole testimony, which
he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. He points out that prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was
able to witness the attack on Natalicio but was unable to identify him as the attacker. Also, Alvir argues that
Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his forearms, which created doubt that
he was able to see his attackers. He argues that Lachica’s statement that he was still able to raise his head while
parrying blows was impossible, and that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime,
Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and Zingapan.

Zipangan argues that the information filed against him was insufficient as to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The aggravating circumstance of “masks and/or
other forms of disguise” was alleged in the Information to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers
intended to conceal their identities.

Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police Officers Romeo Cabrera
(Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the
Philippines Infirmary should have been given credibility by this Court, and that the victims’ delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries
of Cabrera and Salvador since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers.

Alvir argues that the decision of the SC in the review did not apply to his co-accused who did not appeal to this
Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla.

ISSUES:
1. Are Natalicio’s and Lachica’s testimonies sufficient to prove the appellants’ identity?
2. Was Zingapan’s right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him violated?
3. Are the victims credible witnesses despite delay in the reporting of the incident?
4. Does the SC Decision affect those accused who did not appeal the case?

RULING:
1. Yes. The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Natalicio’s and Tan’s testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio’s position during the attack. Natalicio explained
that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his
attackers. This is consistent with Tan’s testimony that he saw the incident but failed to identify the attackers only
because he did not know their names. As to Alvir’s contention, the Court ruled that it is the most natural reaction
of victims to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner of the commission of
the crime, creating a lasting impression. Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants.
Private complainants’ testimonies were clear and categorical.

708
2. No. An information shall state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The allegation in the information as to the circumstances of wearing masks established the intent to conceal their
identities, which did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi, although he did not present such. Hence,
his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him was not violated.

3. Yes. Even if Natalicio denied knowing his attackers, it did not cast doubt on accused-appellants’ guilt due to
the conditions prevailing within the campus at the time of the incident must also be taken into account, that is, all
students involved in fraternity rumbles are expelled. As to the delay in reporting the crime, the alleged delay in
reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants’ injuries upon which they had to recuperate first, as
well as their desire to report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These circumstances are not enough to
disprove their credibility as witnesses.

4. No. The Court ruled that while SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it cannot disturb
the penalties imposed by CA on those who did not appeal, namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with
Rule 122, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

CA reviewed the case with regard to all the accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of
appeal since the sentence imposed is death penalty pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. However,
CA lowered some of the imposable penalties of accused-appellants, which was then brought back to
the higher offense of attempted murder by the SC. Since such ruling is unfavorable to the accused-appellants, it
shall therefore not apply to those who did not join the appeal.

Furthermore, as the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the appeal before the CA, the highest
penalty the CA could impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of a CA Decision by the SC will never be
mandatory or automatic because as previously applied under the rules, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment
cases were brought before the SC via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed on automatic
review. Hence, Feliciano and Medalla cannot be bound by the appeal of the accused-appellants since a notice
of appeal is required.

Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision on the Rules for Criminal Procedure.

709
Credibility of Witnesses

Cirera v. People
G.R. No.181843, July 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

The alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specially
with respect to the principal occurrence and positive identification of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the
testimony even strengthen credibility as they show that the testimony was not rehearsed. What is important is
that there is consistency as to the occurrence and identity of the perpetrator.

FACTS:
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the CA decision that affirmed the RTC in convicting petitioner Miguel Cirera
of two counts of frustrated murder committed against private complainants, Rome Austria and Geraro Naval.

Two informations for frustrated murder were filed against Cirera. Austria testified that while he was playing a
game in a wake, Cirera arrived, asking money from him so he could buy liquor. He told, Cirera to be quiet. Then,
another person came named Naval and asked Austria to go home. There were exchange of words between
Naval and Cirera. Suddenly, Austria felt that he was stabbed at his back and as he ran home, he saw Cirera
armed with a knife, this time chasing Naval. Austria was hospitalized and was confined for more than a month.
Meanwhile, Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he and Cirera had an
exchange of words, he felt a hard blow on his back.

For the defense, Cirera testified that he saw private complainants at a wake. Naval approached him and asked,
“Anong problema mo?” to which he answered, “Wala naman.” Naval then punched Cirera. As Cirera was about
to stand up, he was hit by a hard object on his head, causing him to lose consciousness. He avers that there are
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ narratives as Austria and Naval failed to testify that they saw him
stab them, insisting that the claim “he was armed with a knife” was not proven since the knife was not recovered.

ISSUE:
Was there patent lack of evidence to convict petitioner?

RULING:
No. Petitioner points to alleged inconsistencies that pertain only to collateral and inconsequential matters. These
alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specially with
respect to the principal occurrence and positive identification of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the testimony
even strengthen credibility as they show that the testimony was not rehearsed. What is important is that there is
consistency as to the occurrence and identity of the perpetrator. Further, the alleged failure to retrieve the knife
supposed to have been used in perpetrating the offense does not destroy the credibility of the testimonies. The
crime is proved not by presenting the object but by establishing the existence of the elements of the crime as
written in law.

Circumstantial evidence was used to identify the perpetrator in this case. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides that a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the requisites are present. It
provides: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the following facts were considered: 1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to
be at the scene of the crime; 2) Private complainants were able to describe how they obtained their injuries; 3)
Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime; 4) Only three persons were involved in the incident
— private complainants and petitioner; 5) Petitioner “was standing very close to the private complainants” 6)
Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private complainants, and petitioner was seen chasing
and about to stab at least one of the private complainants; 7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds; 8)
The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it not been given appropriate
medical attention. The combination of these circumstances constitutes unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the [petitioner], to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, although Rule 133, Sec 4. has been amended, the same was not substantial.

710
Credibility of Witnesses

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
Leonen, J.

The belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive identification of the appellants.

FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization, and one of them died from his injuries.

Four days after the incident, the victims reported the incident to the NBI. Thereafter, an information for murder
was filed. Separate informations for attempted murder were also filed. The informations included the following
statement: “the above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating
with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually
helping one another.” At the trial, among those presented as witness by the prosecution were several bystanders.

ISSUES:
1. Did the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them?
2. Are the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae?
3. Did the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies?

RULING:
1. Yes, the information, containing the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks, despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off, violate their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them.

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise” in the information does not violate their constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in
the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. The
introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their
identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The information charges conspiracy among the
accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had
been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them
might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

Thus, the information was not violative of the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

711
2. Yes, the statements of the bystanders who witnessed the incident admissible as part of res gestae.

As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, . . .” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is
when the evidence is part of res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

Thus, the statements made by the bystanders are admissible in evidence.

Nonetheless, the statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety
of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that
of the victims.

3. No, the fact that the victims reported the incident to the NBI four days after the incident give doubt as to the
credibility of their testimonies.

The fact that they went to the NBI four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their credibility since
most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity moves
as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well enough to go to
the NBI headquarters in order to give their statements. The decision to report the incident to the NBI instead
of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the NBI more equipped to
handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely
following the legal advice of their counsel.

Thus, the belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive identification of the appellants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

As for Rule 110, Sec. 1, and our principles on the credibility of witnesses, they have not been amended nor
repealed by the Revised Rules.

As for Rule 130, Sec. 42, the Revised Rules on Evidence renumbered the same to Sec. 44 and now expressly
states that the statements made must be “under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence.”

712
Probative Weight of In-Court Identifications

Concha v. People
G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018
Leonen, J.

The “probative weight of an in-court identification is largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification.” Thus,
it is necessary to determine if the conduct of the latter is above suspicion.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 praying that Decision and the Resolution of the be reversed
and set aside. The CA affirmed Decision of the RTC, finding Melky Concha (Concha) and Romeo Managuelod
(Managuelod) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping.

A Honda Wave motorcycle owned by Cacho was forcibly taken by the 4 accused from his nephew, Macutay, who
was then driving it. Macutay parked the passenger van owned by one Aileen Cacho at Cacho’s house in Centro,
Tumauini. Cacho thereafter lent the motorcycle with sidecar to Macutay to go home to Liwanag, Tumauini.
Macutay drove the motorcycle, while his uncle, and his cousins, were aboard the sidecar. as Macutay’s group
was traversing the road between Lallauanan and Liwanag, the motorcycle had a flat tire. The group decided to
push the motorcycle. 4 armed persons emerged from it and one of them pointed a gun at Macutay and declared
“holdup.” Macutay and his group then hid as the armed men took his motorcycle and left the sidecar behind.

Macutay reported the incident to the PNP at Tumauini. Macutay and the police went to the location of the incident.
He showed them where the motorcycle was taken, their positions when it was taken, and the place where he
jumped. he Tumauini police asked him to accompany them to Cabagan Police Station to identify the persons
suspected to be responsible for the crime. At the police station, the police presented to Macutay 5 persons that
they had apprehended. Macutay pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who robbed
him. He claimed that Managuelod was the one who declared “holdup” and drove the motorcycle, while Concha
wore the t-shirt they got from him.

ISSUE:
Is the out-of-court identification of Concha and Managuelod admissible?

RULING:
No, the out-of-court identification of petitioners could have been disregarded altogether since it was not shown
that they were assisted by counsel. However, this Court recognizes that the “probative weight of an in-court
identification is largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification.” Thus, it is necessary to determine if the
conduct of the latter is above suspicion. In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the ways of out of court identification of
suspects conducted by police, It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose.

At the outset the CA erred in declaring that the out-of-court identification conducted by the police was a police
lineup. What was conducted was a police show-up, since only 4 persons were shown to the prosecution’s witness
for the purpose of identifying his 4 assailants.

Also the out-of-court identification of petitioners did satisfy the totality of circumstances test. First, Macutay failed
to provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the incident to the police. Macutay did not describe
them as to their height, skin color, clothes, or any distinguishing mark that could have made them stand out.
Second, Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of attention. Third, it was not
shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of petitioners. Finally, the out-of-court identification was
tainted with improper suggestion. To reiterate, the police in Cabagan Police Station showed Macutay only 4
persons to be identified.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect

713
People v. Nuñez
G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification by a witness
during trial due to the frailty of human memory. The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration
of verbal and non-verbal information that might become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a witness.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA decision affirming with modification the RTC decision convicting herein accused
of robbery with homicide.

The prosecution’s case rises and falls on the testimonies of eyewitnesses, Cruz and Perez. They recounted that
they were sitting near the gasoline pumps and noticed the station’s office was being held up. There were allegedly
two persons poking guns at and asking for money from the deceased Diaz and a certain Regencia. Regencia
and Diaz grappled with the robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two men ran to the office.
The first was identified to be a Marciales and the second, according to the eyewitnesses, was Nunez.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in upholding the conviction of the accused predicated on eyewitness accounts?

RULING:
No, the Court held that to convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive
identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified
person matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased
character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.

Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed natural propensity for remembering the faces of assailants,
this Court now emphasizes the need for courts to appreciate the totality of circumstances in the identification of
perpetrators of crimes.

The totality of circumstances test requires a consideration of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
undergone by a witness. Both verbal and non-verbal information might become inappropriate cues or suggestions
to a witness. In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines have not been clearly established to have been
faithfully observed and accounted for.

Hence, the CA was incorrect in upholding the conviction of the accused predicated on eyewitness accounts in
this case.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it merely tackles the probative weight given to eyewitness accounts as evidence of identity of
the accused.

714
Alibi

People v. Borja
G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017
Leonen, J.

The defense of alibi shall not prosper where it was not shown that it was physically impossible for the accused
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, considering that the place where the accused
allegedly is and the scene of the crime are only a few blocks away

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals finding accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom.

At about 10:00 am, while the victim was walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City with her friend, she
was taken by PO3 Borja and his companions into a vehicle, which was driven around Quezon City during the
ordeal. The victim’s mother then received a phone call from the abductors, who then demanded ransom for her
daughter’s liberty. The victim’s brother then received a call from the abductors who gave instructions as to how
the ransom shall be given. At 3:00 pm, Edwin went to the Wildlife Park as planned. As it turned out, the victim’s
family contacted the police and an entrapment operation was in motion, leading to the arrest of PO3 Borja.
Despite the successful entrapment operation, the authorities failed to rescue the victim. While she was inside the
vehicle, she heard one of her abductors say that PO3 Borja was entrapped, and the others cursed her and said,
“Putang ina, iyung kapatid mo. Tumawag ng taga-NAKTAF.” Afterwards, she was taken by her captors to the
PDEA where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

For his defense, PO3 Borja testified that on the day of the alleged incident, he was with PO2 Ding Tan at Branch
79, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City to testify as a witness in a criminal case. However, the hearing was
postponed. After securing a certificate of appearance, PO3 Borja decided to go home at 12:00 noon.

The RTC convicted accused-appellant. On appeal, the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as well.
Hence, this appeal.

On the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi and denial, the OSG argues that the same does not deserve weight,
as it was not physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed since Quezon City
Hall of Justice was just a few blocks away from where the victim was taken.

ISSUE:
Will the defense of alibi prosper where physical impossibility was not shown?

RULING:
No, the defense of alibi shall not prosper, especially in view of the fact that the place where the accused allegedly
was at the time of commission and the place where the crime was committed are just a few blocks away from
each other.

All the elements of kidnapping were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, which cannot be overturned by
accused-appellant’s bare denial and alibi. These two (2) defenses are inherently weak considering that they can
be easily contrived. For the defense of alibi to prosper, there must be a showing that it was physically impossible
for the accused “to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.” In the present case,
accused-appellant failed to overcome this standard. Even if he attended the hearing in Quezon City Hall of
Justice, there is no showing that it was physically impossible for him to be at Agham Road when the victim was
forcibly taken. This Court takes judicial notice that Agham Road and the Quezon City Hall of Justice are just a
few blocks away from each other. Accused-appellant could have easily slipped out of the city hall at any time.

Thus, the defense of alibi shall not prosper.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the defense of alibi and the appreciation thereof have not been changed by the Revised Rules
on Evidence.

715
Child Witness

Ricalde v. People
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

Court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity and leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are
relating past incidents of abuse.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the CA’s Decision affirming the RTC of Calamba Decision convicting
Ricalde of rape through sexual assault under RPC, Art. 266-A, par. 2, and Resolution denying reconsideration.

Ricalde, then 31 years old and a distant relative and textmate of XXX, a 10-year old boy, spent the night at the
latter’s house. Ricalde slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when
XXX awoke as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus”. When Ricalde returned
to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde
played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother, armed with a knife for self-defense, confronted Ricalde about the
incident and asked him to leave. Then, a criminal complaint of rape through sexual assault was filed.

Ricalde denied the accusations. He argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal
testified that he found “no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma in XXX’s anus,” or any trace of
spermatozoa. Secondly, Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt.
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he
saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.

RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It found that XXX’s “straightforward,
unequivocal and convincing testimony” sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice. There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse
petitioner. CA accorded great weight to the trial court’s findings and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution sufficiently establish Ricalde’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape through
sexual assault despite XXX’s inconsistent testimony and the absence of trace of any spermatozoa in his anus?

RULING:
Yes. No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.

In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their “youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.” XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct
lies against petitioner. This court has also held that “leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors,
especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.

In People v. Soria, SC discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal
orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed. Here, SC finds it inconsequential that
the victim could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What
is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her genitals. Second, petitioner’s reliance
on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit.
The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration.
This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.

This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions
for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony. In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative
finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect on this ruling.

716
Rule 132, Sec. 19

Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
Leonen, J.

English translation of a foreign law by a private company not advertised as a source of official translations of said
foreign country’s laws is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.

FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
RTC’s resolution be reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court denied Petitioner Genevieve Arreza Toyo’s
(Genevieve) Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City.
After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement in Japan, which was later on
accepted and registered. Genevieve then filed before the RTC a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted the necessary documents
to prove her petition, including an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. RTC denied Genevieve’s petition
for failing to prove the copy of Japan’s law, noting that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English
translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, Genevieve filed in the SC the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an
official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court. That it is an official
publication, she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan’s law under Rule 132, Section 25 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not considering the English translation
of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors’ credentials.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC err in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry filed by petitioner?

RULING:
No, the RTC did not err in denying the same.

A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before
a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In the same line, lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

While the SC ruled that the documents submitted by the petitioner complied with the requirements of Sec. 24
and 25 of Rule 132, the English translation submitted by petitioner was published by a private company in Japan
engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws. These translations are “not advertised as a source
of official translations of Japanese laws;” rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws
and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is
not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.

The rule is that hearsay evidence “is devoid of probative value.” However, a published treatise may be admitted
as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies
that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject. Here, the RTC did not take judicial
notice of the translator’s and advisors’ qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this
matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and advisors’ credentials is the inside cover page of the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the RTC was correct in not considering the English translation as
a learned treatise.

717
Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.
Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan’s law on divorce, are not within this Court’s ambit to resolve.
Nonetheless, while the Petition raised questions of fact, “substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be
referred to the Court of Appeals for further appropriate proceedings”.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the contents Rule 130, Sec. 46 was just transferred to Rule 130, Sec 48. Also, the
amendments in Sec. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules do not affect the ruling because the amendments merely
classified whether the document presented originated from a foreign country which is a contracting party to a
treaty or convention subject to reciprocity or not, without changing the requirements of proving the same when
the document originated from a non-contracting party.

718
Rule 132, Sec. 19

Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp.

G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018
Leonen, J.

In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to
merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in
a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS:
This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental Mindoro, which Your Own Home Development
Corp. (YOHDC) entered into with its partner, Archangel Corporation. Iris’ husband, Tarcisius was hired as the
project coordinator/manager. He found a property owned by Rosillas who agreed to sell the land for
P1,200,000.00. However, Tarcisius misrepresented to the partner corporations that Rosillas had asked for
P4,000,000.00 instead.

Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2) installments. Despite this, Tarcisius still requested for two (2) more
checks in Rosillas’ name, each for P500,000.00, insisting that the land was acquired for P4,000,000.00. He
requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor of Rosillas’ property, Engineer Delos Reyes, in the amount
of P254,400.00 each. For these, YOHDC issued four (4) Metrobank checks. Tarcisius and his wife, Iris,
(collectively, the Rodriguez Spouses), deposited two (2) checks totaling P754,400.00 in their personal BPI
Account and other two (2) checks were deposited in their other personal BPI bank account.

YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas’ and Delos Reyes’ checks. They found out that while
the checks were for two (2) different people, they were deposited in the same BPI accounts and that during this
time, Iris worked as a bank teller at BPI. YOHDC contacted Rosillas and Delos Reyes regarding the checks who
confirmed that they never received, endorsed, encashed, or deposited any of the four (4) checks.

Hence, YOHDC demanded from Tarcisius the amount of the checks which he failed to return. YOHDC first sought
reimbursement from Metrobank, which advised it to direct its claim against BPI. BPI suggested that YOHDC
course its documents through Metrobank. Pursuant to Metrobank’s instructions, YOHDC submitted Rosillas’ and
Delos Reyes’ Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which, in turn, forwarded them to BPI.

BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so
that it could respond to YOHDC’s complaint to which they complied. However, they requested BPI to suspend its
action on YOHDC’s claim and instructed it not to deduct the amount until they have clarified the matter but BPI
denied this request and sent Metrobank Special Clearing Receipt No. 065273 to reimburse the amounts of the
four (4) checks totaling P1,508,000.00. Thereafter, Metrobank credited the amount to YOHDC.

Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for Damages against YOHDC, BPI, Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos
Reyes, among others. The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas’ Checks were received by Rosillas’ agent,
Godofredo Syquioco. As for Delos Reyes’ Checks, the Rodriguez Spouses asserted that Delos Reyes received
P424,000.00 from the proceeds of Metrobank Check Nos. 181043813 and 181043841. They claimed that all four
(4) checks were encashed through BPI with the assistance of Iris.

The RTC dismissed the case against Rosillas, Delos Reyes, Metrobank, and BPI. The CA modified the RTC’s
decision and ruled that YOHDC is not liable to the Spouses Rodriguez in the amount of PhP 424,000.00 and it
is not also liable to the latter for attorney’s fees. Taricius died during the pendency of the proceeding. Iris filed a
MFR but it was denied.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari where she argues that in Delos Reyes’ Answer filed with the
Regional Trial Court, he admitted the existence of his Acknowledgment and receipt of the amount of
P424,000.00. In its Comment, YOHDC asserts that in arguing that Delos Reyes was paid P424,000.00, Iris
raised a question of fact, which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. YOHDC also contends that
Delos Reyes never appeared in court to confirm or prove the allegations in his Answer. It also points out that in
Delos Reyes’ Affidavit, he categorically stated that he did not receive, deposit, encash, or endorse his Checks,
or receive their proceeds.

719
ISSUES:
1. Is a factual issue proper on a Petition for review on certiorari?
2. Is the affidavit more competent to take into account over the belatedly issued acknowledge?

RULING:
1. No. In the first place, Iris raised a factual issue which is not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
This Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It only entertains questions of law—
those which ask to resolve which law applies on a given set of facts. It does not rule on questions which
determine “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.”

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion.” The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court’s function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts.

The question of whether Delos Reyes has been paid the amount of P424,000.00 is a question of fact. It does
not simply ask to resolve which law properly applies given the set of facts in this case. It requires a review of
the evidence and the determination of the truth or falsity of the parties’ allegations. Clearly, Iris is raising a
question of fact which is not proper in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

2. This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more credence to Delos Reyes’ Affidavit,
which is a public document.

A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary weight with respect to
its due execution. As such, it need not be proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it
is entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and effect. To nullify a notarized document
on account of flaws and defects, there must be a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity.

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, this Court ruled that to contradict statements in a notarial document, there
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence against it. A subsequent notarial
document retracting the previous statement is not even sufficient. In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial
document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial
document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial document is clear and
convincing evidence. The rationale for this rule is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of notarized
documents.

In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they could be admitted in evidence. To
establish their authenticity, the best proof available must be presented. In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp.,
whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.
On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is
genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed
by mistake or under duress. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented.

However, authentication may not be necessary where the document’s genuineness and due execution were
admitted by the adverse party.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals:
The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they can be
received in evidence. On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. There is also no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.

720
In the case at bar, Delos Reyes’ Acknowledgement is a private document. Thus, for Iris to rely on it, she
must have first proven its genuineness and authenticity by presenting the best proof available. As such, she
should have presented Delos Reyes to testify on its genuineness and due execution. However, Iris merely
relied on Delos Reyes’ Answer and Acknowledgement on their faces. Delos Reyes neither appeared in court
to attest to the allegations of his Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as Iris’ witness.

Assuming that the statements in Delos Reyes’ Answer are binding admissions, these admissions only pertain
to the existence of his Acknowledgment. He neither categorically stated its genuineness and authenticity,
nor admitted its allegations. Moreover, while he admitted the receipt of P424,000.00, he excluded from his
admission that it was from the Metrobank checks stated in the Rodriguez Spouses’ Complaint. Thus, the
amount he received cannot be assumed to have been from the proceeds of his Checks or that it was payment
made to him on behalf of YOHDC as these claims must still be proven. Moreover, this Court notes that Delos
Reyes never denied his notarized Affidavit’s allegations even though his Acknowledgement’s allegations are
inconsistent with them. Hence, this Court assumes that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of a retraction.
This Court has consistently held that retractions are looked upon with disfavor because of its unreliable
nature and the likely probability that it may again be repudiated.

Again, in Rufina Patis Factory: For retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction, it is necessary
to examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible motives for reversing the previous declaration, as
these motives may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them hook, line
and sinker would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the doors to fraud.

In the case at bar, assuming Delos Reyes’ Acknowledgement is genuine, he provided no satisfactory
explanation for his contradictory statements in his Affidavit. He did not appear in court to clarify the matter or
elucidate any circumstance that could explain what happened between the executions of these two (2)
documents. The only logical explanation that could reconcile the two (2) documents is if this Court assumes
that the Rodriguez Spouses paid Delos Reyes the amount of P424,000.00 sometime after he executed his
Affidavit. However, if this is the case, that payment on behalf of YOHDC is not authorized since the Rodriguez
Spouses did not represent YOHDC in any manner. Moreover, it can be assumed that Tarcisius’ authority to
represent YOHDC had been impliedly revoked considering the incidents on Delos Reyes’ and Rosillas’
Checks. Thus, if Delos Reyes was paid by the Rodriguez Spouses on behalf of YOHDC, this payment is
unauthorized. Iris’ cause of action is with Delos Reyes, and not with YOHDC.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 45 and Rule 132, Sec 19(b) are still the same.

721
Rule 132, Sec. 19

Tortono v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to verify the genuineness
of his or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the instrument,
without need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is imbued with public interest.
Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their
due execution. However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC praying that the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision be reversed and set aside. This assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the
RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now petitioners (Teodoro Tortono et. al.), in their
action for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants, now respondents (Julian Gregorio et.
al.).

This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed) allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina Casimiro
(Rufina), the purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of
Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. Petitioners asserted that their mother was illiterate and only
affixed her thumbmark on documents and was always assisted by one of her children which was not the case
here. They also presented several documents bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. The NBI
fingerprint examiner Eriberto Gomez (Gomez) conducted an examination on the thumbmark on the documents
presented by petitioners and the thumbmark on the Deed and reported that the same were different (first report).
In another report, Gomez observed that the while the standard thumbmarks lack the necessary ridge
characteristics to warrant positive identification, all the standard are all in the same finger print pattern.

The RTC concluded that the Deed was a forgery and ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA reversed the RTC
ruling and found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the
presumption of regularity. It held that, ultimately, petitioners failed to prove “by clear and convincing evidence”
that the thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. Respondents here assail the qualification
of the NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee”.

ISSUE:
1. Is it proper to raise factual issues resting on the evidence presented during trial under Rule 45?
2. Did the CA err in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine because it was notarized?
3. Should the Court accept Gomez’s testimony as an expert witness?

RULING:
1. As a general rule, no. The matter of the authenticity of Rufina’s thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on the
evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of
exceptions.
Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.

722
Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals
conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court.

2. Yes. Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to verify the
genuineness of his or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of
the instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is imbued
with public interest. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution. However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Petitioners successfully discharged this burden. With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina’s
apparent thumbmarks on the demonstrated disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks
on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable
presumption, and sought to affirm this presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose
very act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose credibility was shown to be
wanting, and who is himself potentially liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also endeavored to
undermine petitioners’ expert witness by dismissively characterizing him as “just an ordinary employee.”

3. Yes. Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the testimonies
of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing “special knowledge, skill, experience or training”.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a wide
latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case. Respondents here assail the qualification of National Bureau of Investigation
fingerprint examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding him as “just an ordinary employee.”

Contrary to respondents’ dismissiveness towards Gomez, his performance of such tasks as taking fingerprints,
even if, for a time it was his main duty, does not, per se, discount competence. A history of performing this
function does not negate any “special knowledge, skill, experience or training” that Gomez possesses.
Incidentally, this case is not the first instance that this Court sustained Gomez’s competence and credibility. The
credibility of an expert witness does not inhere in his or her person. Rather, he or she must be shown to possess
knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her testimony. The Regional Trial Court’s
recollection indicates, most notably, that Gomez was not handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners’
request, Gomez appeared to have been designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself to conduct the
examination. Thus, any such determination of Gomez’s expertise was not borne by petitioners’ innate preference
for him or of their insistence upon him, but by the National Bureau of Investigation’s own confidence in him.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there are no changes on Rule 45. There is also no effect on the Ruling under the Amended
Rules on Rule 130, Sec. 49 because the amendment only included “education” as an additional way of proving
the credibility of an expert witness.

723
Rule 132, Sec. 20

Imperial v. Heirs of Spouses Bayaban

G.R. No. 197626, October 03, 2018
Leonen, J.

Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19.
These official receipts, therefore, are private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as
witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by presenting an evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Raul S. Imperial (Imperial) assailing the CA’s decision finding Imperial
solidarity liable with his employee and driver, William Laraga (Laraga), for the damages suffered by spouses
Bayaban as a result of Laraga’s negligent operation of the van owned by Imperial.

Two vehicles, a van and a tricycle, figured in an accident along Sumulong Highway, Antipolo City. The van was
owned and registered under Imperial’s name, and was driven by Laraga. The tricycle was driven by Gerardo
Mercado (Mercado). On board the tricycle were the Bayaban Spouses, who sustained injuries.

The Bayaban Spouses demanded compensation from Imperial, Laraga, and Mercado for the hospital bills and
loss of income that they sustained and they subsequently filed a complaint for damages in the RTC.

The Regional Trial Court held that the official receipts presented in evidence substantiated the Bayaban Spouses’
claim for reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses. Petitioners maintain that the official receipts of the
medical and hospital bills, though original, were allegedly not authenticated as required under Rule 132, Section
20 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, these receipts are not competent evidence of the actual damages sustained
by Neil and respondent Mary Lou.

ISSUE:
Are the original receipts of the medical and hospital bills presented by respondents competent evidence of the
actual damages that they have sustained considering that the receipts were not authenticated?

RULING:
Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public or private. When public documents are presented in
evidence, they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there, and thus, need not be authenticated.

As for private documents, those not enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19, they must be authenticated, or their
due execution and authenticity proven, per Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19.
These official receipts, therefore, are private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as
witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by presenting an evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. In insisting that respondents should have presented as witnesses the
persons who signed the official receipts, petitioner ignores the first manner of authenticating private documents.
Respondent Mary Lou testified as to the circumstances of the accident and the expenses she and Neil had
incurred as a result of it. Since the official receipts were issued to respondent Mary Lou, her testimony, therefore,
is a competent evidence of the execution of the official receipts.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 132, sec. 20 only adds 3rd instance which does not affect the ruling in this case which
was based on the 1st instance.

724
Rule 132, Sec. 24

Racho v. Tanaka
G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
Leonen, J.

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign
country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
that foreign country.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in
Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not
have any children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was
granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the
Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by an authentication officer of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.

She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed
that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines to report the
documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. She tried to have
the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since
there was no court order recognizing it. She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and
secured a Japanese Law English Version of the Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition.

She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry with the Regional Trial Court,
Las Piñas City. Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City rendered a Decision,finding that Racho failed to prove that
Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka’s national law, the Divorce
Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself. Racho filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification,
whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce
Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City,
Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009” is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by
agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General posits that the Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not properly authenticated under
Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court. However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance with this Court’s January
18, 2012 Resolution.

ISSUE:
Is the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to
his national law?

RULING:
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the
Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law. Mere presentation
of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, this Court established the principle
that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that
purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the
divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before
trial courts. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

725
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce, certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has
been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe,
Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of
the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to
certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the
case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an appeal by
certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to
the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or
not issues of fact are involved shall be final.

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign
country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
that foreign country:

Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul
Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further
certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his
signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revised rules did not amend this portion.

726
Rule 132, Secs. 24 & 25

Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhard

G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
Leonen, J.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be
proven. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption, that the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the law, which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

FACTS:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) filed this Petition praying for the reversion and setting aside
of the CA Decision and Resolution, as well as the trial court’s Decision declaring it in default, in order for PNCC
to be allowed to file its Answer, or, the cause of action having already prescribed under Malaysian laws, the case
be dismissed outright.

PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate
company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to
construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. Various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest
Merchant Bankers were obtained to guarantee the due performance by PNCC of its construction
contracts. These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia. Due to failure to perform
the obligations, the State of Pahang demanded payment of the reduced amount of MYR 3.9M against Asiavest
Merchant Bankers’ performance bonds, pursuant to a compromise agreement. Consequently, the corporation
demanded from PNCC the amount it paid to the State of Pahang. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a
Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the RTC. It based its action on Malaysian Laws.
The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant
Bankers to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of the latter and found that Asiavest complied
with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws. The CA dismissed PNCC’s appeal.

PNCC contends it had consistently raised the propriety of impleading the two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest-
CDCP and Asiavest Holdings, and their participant liability, which are questions of fact. According to PNCC,
Asiavest-CDCP undertook to hold PNCC free and harmless from all its obligations under the agreement while
Asiavest Holdings agreed in the guaranty agreement to share with PNCC the guarantee liability on a 51% - 49%
arrangement. PNCC submits that the trial court could have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and
refused to take cognizance of the case considering the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two Malaysian
corporations and in determining PNCC’s exact liability. Further, considering that the transactions involved
originated from and occurred in a foreign country, PNCC adds that it was deprived of its day in court when its
Motion for extension to file an Answer was denied, and it was subsequently declared in default. Lastly, PNCC
submits that Asiavest Merchant Bankers already winded up, hence, the case is now moot and academic.

ISSUES:
1. May the CA dismiss appeals on the ground that only pure questions of law were raised?
2. May the Court consider questions of fact which while not enumerated in the appellant’s brief were raised in
the motion to lift order of default?
3. May a mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens operate to automatically divest a court of its
jurisdiction?
4. Did the denial of motions for extension to file an Answer, considering that the transactions involved originated
from and occurred in a foreign country, violate due process?
5. May rules on prescription based on Malaysian Laws be raised as defense in this case?

RULING:
1. Yes, because all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved is within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. This section includes the proviso: “except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
includes all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. In this case, the petition originated from a

727
default judgment against petitioner. Petitioner was not able to present evidence before the trial court. Necessarily,
the errors raised from the trial court involved only questions of law.

2. No, because Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that the appellant’s brief must include “clear
and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment.” In this case,
petitioner only assigned the following two errors: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) denial of the
motion for reconsideration as it deprived it of his day in court. The argument on the two Malaysian corporations
was raised by petitioner for the first time in its Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Merit. Further, since
this was already raised in the said Motion to Lift Order of Default and Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam filed before the trial court, these were already considered by the lower court when it ruled on both
Motions. In addition, the bases of its argument to implead the two Malaysian corporations (subcontract agreement
and guaranty agreement) were not submitted with any of its pleadings.

3. No, because the determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. Forum non conveniens, which literally translates to
‘the forum is inconvenient,’ gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. But a mere invocation of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest
a court of its jurisdiction. Here, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction because it would be more convenient
to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible,
witnesses would be readily available and it would entail less expenses in terms of legal services. Most of
petitioner’s officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely
also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this
civil suit before Malaysian courts.

4. No, because the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and there is no denial of the right to
due process if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend their interests in due course. Petitioner had been
able to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court, and later elevated its case before the CA. There is
no denial of due process if a party was given an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
also did not take advantage of the opportunities it was given to file a responsive pleading. It allowed the periods
it was given for the filing of pleadings to lapse. It never attempted to file its Answer, even belatedly. Further, it
argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, yet it did not file a Motion to Dismiss. Lastly,
in its affidavit of merit, it did not state the evidence it plans to present in the event its Motion is granted, or attach
documents in support of its claims.

5. No, because petitioner did not prove the Malaysian laws provisions regarding prescription. The Philippines
does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove
a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption, that the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. Further, prescription did not avail of the remedy of motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. It
was also not raised as an error before the CA. Nevertheless, we have ruled that prescription may be raised for
the first time before this court.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 25 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because a new provision has been
added. The amendment provides that a document already accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent needs
no more proof, since the certificate or its equivalent is prima facie evidence of its due execution and genuineness.
A certificate is no longer required if the treaty or convention between the Philippines and a foreign country has
abolished such requirement or exempted the document itself from such formality.

The other rules used in this case are not affected by the new amendments under the Revised Rules of Court.

728
Rule 132, Sec. 30

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is presumed
regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution, and entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized document, the party questioning
it must present “clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence.”

FACTS:
Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a land in Cebu This property
included two lots. Ciriaco sold the two lots to Victoria Po. Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children
(Mariano Heirs). Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989
renouncing his interest over the two Lots [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto.” In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807. The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By
way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in
which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration
for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.

In 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes.

Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue City Regional Trial Court,
acting as land registration court. The case was raffled to Branch 28. The trial court granted the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions
sold to Ernesto and Jose. The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with
damages.

The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages. The complaint
was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses
Po. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October
31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue
that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po
is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals that has this
jurisdiction. They also contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are
indispensable parties.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po’s complaint
2. Whether the land registration court’s finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the
Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
3. whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should
be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
4. Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties

RULING:
1. Yes. The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint
for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. A complaint for reconveyance is an action which
admits the registration of title of another party but claims that such registration was erroneous or
wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a
superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a
title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-

729
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due
process of law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is
issued. The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land
which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they acquired the property
from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had the property
registered without their knowledge and through fraud. Thus, they sought to recover the property and to
cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an order for the
defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief prayed for may be
granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner
rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction. An action for annulment
of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to lack of
due process of law. The remedy is premised in the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the
title that is issued. Title that is invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the
decision of a Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on the
merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on the
merits is properly alleged and proven.

Considering the Spouses Aboitiz’s fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po’s knowledge and the
latter’s assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz’ s title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of
judgment.

2. This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces two
(2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under
Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based on “the
same claim, demand, or cause of action.” It applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final
judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was “rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties”; and (d) there is “identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action” between the first and second actions. Res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the
same parties involving different causes of action. Its effect is to bar “the relitigation of particular facts or
issues” which have already been adjudicated in the other case.

In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They contend that they
were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove their claim over the property.
Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed
of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco’s favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their
favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria’s name. Additionally, they also submitted their
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz. These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of
Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration
court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po. 168

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po the
remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over
the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in
the land registration case.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property.
Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh these
pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound
simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.

730
An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his
or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of
ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full
opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from
any other claim of the adverse party on the property.

However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

3. Yes. This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the
scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An appeal under Rule 45 must raise
only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence or the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are
accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.

The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial
Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter’s testimony about Mariano’s sale
of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco’s sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoria.

Furthermore, with regard to the allegations of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting
certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution,
and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized
document, the party questioning it must present “clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant
evidence.”

4. It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests
in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling
of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this
Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest
has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES IN RULING:

The amendments in civil procedure and evidence will not affect the ruling in this case since there was merely a
reiteration of the previously amended rules.

731
Rule 132, Sec. 30

Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp.

G.R. No. 181683, October 7, 2015
Leonen, J.

Any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted by the court. A private document
offered as authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are established in
the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

FACTS:
In these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (Lorenzo Shipping)
challenges the CA decision finding it liable for damages caused to the Power Barge 104, a non-propelled power
plant barge, owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). On the other hand, the latter seeks to recover actual
damages.

Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed in General Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon, owned and
operated by Lorenzo Shipping, hit and rammed into it. At the time of the incident, Captain Villarias served as the
Master of the MV. However, it was then under Captain Yape’s pilotage as it was mandatory to yield navigational
control to the Harbor Pilot while docking. The former recalled that during the pilotage of Captain Yape, he always
remained his side and affirmed that he heard and knew of Captain Yape’s orders, because he had to repeat the
order. As the MV Lorcon Luzon moved precariously close to the wharf, Captain Yape ordered the vessel to move
backward. Despite his orders, the engine failed to timely respond. Thus, even when Captain Yape ordered the
dropping of the anchor, MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into Power Barge 104.

Marine protests where filed by the Plant Manager and Captain Villarias. NPC filed before the Quezon City RTC
a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping. The RTC absolved Lorenzo Shipping of liability, but the CA
reversed the said decision. Lorenzo Shipping argues that no liability could be attributed to it as the MV Lorcon
Luzon was under compulsory pilotage and that NPC assumed risk when it berthed a non-propelled vessel in the
Makar Wharf. NPC, on the other hand, maintains otherwise. It further argued that it was able to show by
“competent testimonial and documentary evidence” that it must be compensated for actual damages in the
amount of P876,826.00. Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE:
Is a bill of expenses considered as a private document such that its due execution and authenticity must be
established to be admitted as evidence?

RULING:
Yes, because a bill of expenses does not fall under the definition of public documents. Any material presented
as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic
is that a private document offered as authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution
and authenticity are established in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Such due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any
other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. Admissibility of evidence and
weight accorded to evidence are two distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
governs admissibility and provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law of these rules. When evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be competent. The
weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after evidence has been admitted. To this end, courts
evaluate evidence in accordance with the rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, consistent with basic precepts of rationality and guided by judicially established standards.

A bill of expenses, such as Exhibit “F” in this case, is considered a private document as it does not fall under
what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public documents. For it to have been admitted by the RTC
as authentic, Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been complied with. Exhibit
“F” was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the
standard of competency. Reliance on NPC’s Exhibit “F” and its contents, so as to establish the extent of
National Power Corporation’s pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit “F” does not form

732
part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration. The pieces of evidence fall short of the standard
required for proving pecuniary loss, which shall be the basis for awarding actual damages.

Hence, the due execution and authenticity of the bill of expenses must be established to be admitted as evidence.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 132, Sec. 20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because the new rules provide for
another mode of authenticating a private documents: (c) By other evidence showing its due execution and
authenticity. The amendment pertains to third means to prove the due execution and authenticity of a private
document, aside from by anyone who saw it being executed or proving the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Further, Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence now provides that
evidence may be inadmissible if excluded also by the Constitution.

733
Rule 133, Sec. 2

People v. Balao
G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

Every conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard does not entail absolute certainty but
only moral certainty or that which “ultimately appeals to a person’s very conscience.” The testimony of a single
eyewitness to a crime, even if uncorroborated, produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt as long as it is
credible and positive.

FACTS:
This resolves an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of Cesar Balao
(Balao) for the crime of murder.

Eyewitness Rodel Francisco (Francisco) narrated that at around 11:45AM of April 10, 1991, he saw that while
Wilfredo Villaranda (Wilfredo) was on a bicycle and engaged in a conversation with two people, Balao suddenly
appeared behind Wilfredo’s back and stabbed him on his chest with a fan knife. Wilfredo was declared dead on
arrival at the hospital. Balao interposed the defense of Alibi.

RTC found Balao guilty beyond reasonable doubt and gave more weight to the positive identification of Balao as
the perpetrator of the crime over Balao’s defense of alibi. Balao asserted that the prosecution failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court heavily relied on the testimony of a single eyewitness to
determine whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged. Although he was identified as Wilfredo’s assailant,
the sole eyewitness, Francisco, had ill motives against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed Balao’s conviction.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to prove Balao’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the sole testimony of the
Francisco?

RULING:
Yes. Every conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard does not entail absolute certainty
(RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 4) but only moral certainty or that which “ultimately appeals to a person’s
very conscience.”

Francisco, the sole eyewitness, was familiar with accused-appellant and knew accused-appellant’s identity and
reputation even before the stabbing incident took place. First, although Francisco did not know accused-
appellant’s name, Francisco knew accused-appellant’s identity. The identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime is regarded as more important than ascertaining the name of the accused. Second, when
he testified in court, Francisco affirmed without hesitation that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Wilfredo in
the chest. During his direct examination, Francisco narrated the events that transpired on the day of the alleged
incident and identified the person responsible for Wilfredo’s death. Apart from Francisco’s positive identification
of Balao as the perpetrator of the crime, Francisco narrated in a straightforward manner how Wilfredo was killed.

Francisco’s testimony on how Wilfredo was killed does not appear to be tainted with any irregularity. The
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime gave him a fair opportunity to observe the events that
transpired. First, the killing happened around noon, in broad daylight when he could see clearly. Second,
Francisco was at a distance not far from where the victim and the accused-appellant were standing when the
stabbing occurred. Moreover, Francisco’s testimony is bolstered by the autopsy report. This is consistent with
Francisco’s eyewitness account that Wilfredo was stabbed in the chest with a fan knife.

Although Francisco stated that he disliked accused-appellant for being a notorious troublemaker in their
community, this does not conclusively establish that he was animated by ill-motives in testifying against accused-
appellant. The presumption then is that Francisco testified in good faith. Therefore, his testimony should be
“entitled to full weight and credit.”

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the amendment made is only to address gender sensitivity.

734
Rule 133, Sec. 2

People v. San Jose

G.R. No. 206916 July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

The burden of proving the accused’s guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution’s evidence produces even an iota
of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice but to rule for the accused’s acquittal.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the of the Court of Appeals affirming the RTC’s decision that San Jose brothers were
guilty of the crime of murder.

Joseph San Jose y Gregorio and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio (the San Jose brothers) were charged with
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Jilito O. Espino (Jilito) testified that on June 2, 2002, around
6:30 p.m., his brother Carlito Espino y Oreo (Carlito) and his friends were drinking when Jilito saw the San Jose
brothers enter the house. The San Jose brothers then started punching Carlito, who tried to run to a nearby store.
However, his assailants caught up with him. He saw Jonathan embraced Carlito from behind and while punching
him, stabbed him on the side of his body while Joseph stabbed Carlito in the front. Thereafter, the San Jose
brothers ran away. Carlito’s friends also ran away out of fear. Jilito ran after the San Jose brothers for about 100
meters but failed to catch up to them. When he returned to the vacant lot, he was told that Carli to had already
been brought to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

For their defense, Joseph testified that on June 2, 2002, he and his brother Jonathan were at home eating with
a childhood friend, when a commotion occurred outside the house. People were shouting and when he went
outside, he saw a person running away. He asked that person what was going on and was told that someone
had been stabbed. Joseph returned to his house and continued eating. Sometime in 2005, while he was at work
at a hardware store, police officers arrested him for the killing of a certain Joselito. He denied the charges against
him. Jocelyn Espino (Jocelyn) testified that at the time of the incident, Carlito was outside the house. Their
neighbors later informed them of the commotion outside their house involving Carlito. She claimed that Jilito only
learned of the incident when he went outside of their house. The RTC found the San Jose brothers guilty as
charged. Joseph and Jonathan appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
appeal.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Jilito was consistent in his testimony on how accused-appellants
killed his brother, Carlito. It maintains that he was able to positively identify accused-appellants since all of them
were residents of the same barangay. The autopsy report likewise corroborates Jilito’s testimony that Carlito was
stabbed at the right side of his torso. Accused-appellants, on the other hand, counter that there is no qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength since the presence of one (1) stab wound on the victim indicates that
the victim was not really taken advantage of. They also point out that a substantial portion of Jilito’s testimony is
hearsay since Jocelyn testified that at the time of the incident, Jilito was inside their house.

ISSUE:
Were accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Carlito Espino?

RULING:
It is a basic right of the accused under our Constitution to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven. Thus, the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The burden of proving the
accused’s guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence,
not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution’s evidence produces even an iota of reasonable doubt,
courts would have no choice but to rule for the accused’s acquittal.

In this case, the trial court and CA placed heavy reliance on the testimony of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness,
Jilito Espino, and his positive identification of the accused-appellants as the assailants who murdered his brother.

735
Thus, the review of finding of guilt necessarily involves a re-evaluation of Jilito’s testimony. A review of Jilito’s
testimony, however, when placed against the other pieces of evidence, reveals numerous material
inconsistencies that cannot be ignored. First, it was unclear where the stabbing actually occurred. Jilito stated
that he was able to witness the incident because he was located only “20 arms length” away from the scene of
the crime. Jilito initially testified that he saw his brother stabbed in front of the vacant house. Later, he testified
that his brother was able to run away from the vacant house to a store where he was stabbed. The Court of
Appeals considered the change of location a “clarification” that the victim was able to run away during the
commotion. Rather than clarifying the situation, Jilito’s testimony raises even more questions that the trial court
and the CA ignored. A point of interest, for example, would have been how far the store was from where Jilito
was located that he was still able to witness the stabbing. Another query would have been how the female could
have gone outside the store during the incident without coming near the victim considering that the stabbing
occurred at the store.

There were also material inconsistencies between Jilito’s testimony and the autopsy report submitted by the
prosecution. Jilito repeatedly stated to the trial court that his brother was stabbed twice. However, Dr. Carpio,
testified that the victim sustained “one fatal stab wound on the abdomen or at the right hypochondriac.” Otherwise
stated, Jilito testified that the victim was stabbed twice, but there was only one (1) stab wound found on the body.

The delayed arrests of the accused-appellants likewise cast doubt on their guilt. The crime occurred on June 2,
2002. Accused-appellant Jonathan was arrested on April 1, 2005 and accused-appellant Joseph was arrested
on August 3, 2005, or about three (3) years after the crime was committed. Accused-appellants remained
residents of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal from the occurrence of the crime in 2002 until their arrests
in 2005. In People v. Capili, the Supreme Court was inclined to question the credibility of the supposed
eyewitness who only reported the crime a week after it occurred, leading to the accused’s acquittal. The
prosecution has an eyewitness account in the victim’s brother Jilito. The victim’s family remained in the same
barangay. The accused-appellants did not live anywhere else but were arrested in the same barangay they had
been residing. It is highly unusual for the victim’s family to have taken three (3) years to have the alleged
perpetrators arrested. While delay per se may not impair a witness’s credibility, doubt arises when the delay
remains unexplained. The delay in this case becomes significant when pitted against Jilito’s Kusang-loob na
Salaysay, where he admits that he merely heard about the incident from other people. The unexplained delay
and the Kusang-loob na Salaysay lead this Court to the possibility that Jilito’s supposedly positive identification
of the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime was a mere afterthought.

The prosecution’s lone eyewitness could not even give a clear and categorical narrative of the events. There
were several unusual circumstances during the prosecution of the case that he has not adequately explained.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court
is constrained to acquit accused-appellants.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because Rule 133, Section 2 was not amended nor affected by the amendment.

736
Rule 133, Sec. 2

Daayata v. People
G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

The prosecution has the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence,
and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds
basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be
“presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence
that lays such burden upon the prosecution. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a
matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the assailed May 31, 2012 Decision3
and January 14, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27951 be reversed and set aside,
and that petitioners be acquitted of the offense of which they are charged.

On December 17, 1995, Rolando O. Bahian alleged that Capistano Daataya et al, conspiring mutually, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, assaulted, box, kick and struck Bahian. This incident happen a day after a
commotion incident between the parties in the basketball court. Bahian Farther alleged that a stone was thrown
to his head by petitioners that causes depress frontal fracture, open frontal bone, left, and advice for surgery.
The petitioners pleaded not guilty.

The defense, apart from the three petitioners, offered the testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin), Rodolfo Yafiez
(Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ). Petitioners Salisi and Malacat
claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata (Vicente), in the morning of December 17,
1995. Bahian arrived with Kagawad Abalde, and called for Salisi to come out. When Salisi acceded, Bahian
challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch that started a scuffle. In the course of the melee, Bahian took
a swing for Salisi, who ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on the pavement and hit his
head. Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened to kill him. For his part, petitioner
Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some 50 meters away from Vicente’s house when the incident recalled
by petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired. He rushed to Vicente’s house upon hearing a commotion. Farther
said the Barangay Captain Yafiez arrived after an hour. They added however, that in the evening of December
16, while they were on their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he challenged them
to a fight. Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.

Frustrated murder case was filed against petitioners, the petitioners ordered guilty by Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 37, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners appealed in the court of appeals but affirmed
guilty. However, Bahian Medical Certificates showed no injury other than that on fore head. Bahian during the
questioning admitted that the injury on the forehead was cause by accidentally he hit the edge of the concrete
pavement.

ISSUE:
Should the petitioners be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:
Yes. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of
its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of
an accused to be “presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional

737
presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution. Should the prosecution fail to discharge
its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.

Here, the details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral certainty
and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While not per se
demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense’s entire version of events, they nevertheless
disclose how the prosecution’s case is unable to stand on its own merits. They cast doubt on whether the
complainant and his companion were actually stopped in their tracks to be assaulted, and support the possibility
that they may have instead deliberately intended to bring themselves to Vicente’s house to provoke or challenge
one (1) of the petitioners. They also cast doubt on whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the
specific purpose of ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant by one (1) of the
petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and whether petitioners had actually brandished
implements for maiming and killing.

Hence, Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because it still the same.

738
Rule 133, Sec. 2

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), August 3, 2016
Leonen, J.

The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
This case involves separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the accused-appellants Christopher Soliva,
Warren Zipangan, and Robert Alvir, seeking the reversal of the SC’s decision in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and attempted murder of Fortes, Natalicio, Lachica (Lachica),
Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston resulting from fraternity-related violence. SC previously reversed the decision of
the CA which ruled that the other accused are only guilty of slight physical injuries, thereby reverting to RTC’s
decision.

Soliva contends that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio’s sole testimony, which
he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. He points out that prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was
able to witness the attack on Natalicio but was unable to identify him as the attacker. Also, Alvir argues that
Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his forearms, which created doubt that
he was able to see his attackers. He argues that Lachica’s statement that he was still able to raise his head while
parrying blows was impossible, and that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime,
Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and Zingapan.

Zipangan argues that the information filed against him was insufficient as to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The aggravating circumstance of “masks and/or
other forms of disguise” was alleged in the Information to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers
intended to conceal their identities.

Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police Officers Romeo Cabrera
(Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the
Philippines Infirmary should have been given credibility by this Court, and that the victims’ delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries
of Cabrera and Salvador since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers.

Alvir argues that the decision of the SC in the review did not apply to his co-accused who did not appeal to this
Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla.

ISSUES:
1. Are Natalicio’s and Lachica’s testimonies sufficient to prove the appellants’ identity?
2. Was Zingapan’s right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him violated?
3. Are the victims credible witnesses despite delay in the reporting of the incident?
4. Does the SC Decision affect those accused who did not appeal the case?

RULING:
1. Yes. The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Natalicio’s and Tan’s testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio’s position during the attack. Natalicio explained
that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his
attackers. This is consistent with Tan’s testimony that he saw the incident but failed to identify the attackers only
because he did not know their names. As to Alvir’s contention, the Court ruled that it is the most natural reaction
of victims to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner of the commission of
the crime, creating a lasting impression. Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants.
Private complainants’ testimonies were clear and categorical.

739
2. No. An information shall state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The allegation in the information as to the circumstances of wearing masks established the intent to conceal their
identities, which did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi, although he did not present such. Hence,
his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him was not violated.

3. Yes. Even if Natalicio denied knowing his attackers, it did not cast doubt on accused-appellants’ guilt due to
the conditions prevailing within the campus at the time of the incident must also be taken into account, that is, all
students involved in fraternity rumbles are expelled. As to the delay in reporting the crime, the alleged delay in
reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants’ injuries upon which they had to recuperate first, as
well as their desire to report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These circumstances are not enough to
disprove their credibility as witnesses.

4. No. The Court ruled that while SC can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, it cannot disturb
the penalties imposed by CA on those who did not appeal, namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with
Rule 122, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

CA reviewed the case with regard to all the accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of
appeal since the sentence imposed is death penalty pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. However,
CA lowered some of the imposable penalties of accused-appellants, which was then brought back to
the higher offense of attempted murder by the SC. Since such ruling is unfavorable to the accused-appellants, it
shall therefore not apply to those who did not join the appeal.

Furthermore, as the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the appeal before the CA, the highest
penalty the CA could impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of a CA Decision by the SC will never be
mandatory or automatic because as previously applied under the rules, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment
cases were brought before the SC via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed on automatic
review. Hence, Feliciano and Medalla cannot be bound by the appeal of the accused-appellants since a notice
of appeal is required.

Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because there is yet to be a revision on the Rules for Criminal Procedure.

740
Rule 133, Sec. 2

Macayan, Jr. v. People

G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015
Leonen, J.

Guilt based on proof beyond reasonable doubt places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of
an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an
accused.

FACTS:
This petition prays for the reversal of the CA’s decision of increasing the duration of the penalty of Nilo Macayan,
Jr. (Macayan) who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery before the RTC-Quezon
City.

Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample
cutter and to undertake materials purchasing for her garments business.

However, in 2000, her business was doing poorly and thus, she allowed her employees to accept engagements
elsewhere to augment their income, provided they prioritize their work at Lanero. But it came to her attention that
Macayan and his wife (also an employee at Lanero) accepted work for a rival company.

Confrontations occured and later, Macayan stopped working for Jao and thereafter filed a case for illegal
dismissal. Several conferences were set but immediately after the postponement of the conference on February
12, 2001, Macayan threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him
P200,000.00. Hence, Jao sought the help of the NBI for an entrapment. The operation ensued and bills totalling
P4,000.00 were marked and used in the operation.

Macayan was apprehended, charged and tried for the crime of Robbery and later was convicted by the RTC for
the same.

ISSUE:
Did the evidence presented by the prosecution merits conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of robbery?

RULING:
NO. We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and acquit petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. of the charge of
robbery.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence speci􏰀fes the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal
cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of
its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of
an accused to be “presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. “Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional
presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution.” Should the prosecution fail to discharge
its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, because the Revised Rules merely inserted “or her” to address gender sensitivity.

741
Rule 133, Sec. 4

People v. ZZZ
G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019
Leonen, J.

The absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in proving the
commission of rape. This is because the crime “is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. The commission of the crime of rape may be proven not
only by direct evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA affirming the RTC’s decision finding ZZZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide of AAA.

BBB, uncle of both AAA, an 11-year old girl and ZZZ, a 15-year old boy testified that at around 7:00pm on May
16, 1996, he was on his way to the store to buy cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward
the school. Still, he presumed nothing was off, because they were relatives. He had merely reprimanded them
before he went on to buy his cigarette and returned home. A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a
lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the school. The officials came to know the body’s identity through BBB, who
also claimed that ZZZ was the person behind the crime. At this time, ZZZ’s stepfather brought him to Tarlac to
work and used an alias to be employed. The officials also found YYY, ZZZ’s brother who testified before the
police that on the night of the incident, he was walking home with ZZZ and AAA when his brother told him to go
home alone. According to the autopsy, there were contusions all over her body including the vaginal area. There
was also a tear inside the vaginal area which showed that AAA might have been sexually assaulted and that her
death could have been caused by the traumatic cerebral contusion.

In his defense, ZZZ testified that on the night of the incident, he went to his grandmother’s house, where he
watched television with his brother and around 20 other people including AAA. After watching, he and his brother,
YYY, returned to their sister’s house to sleep. He said that he did not notice if AAA left their grandmother’s house.
Later on, YYY retracted his testimony before the police, affirming ZZZ’s testimony. The RTC ruled against ZZZ
based on circumstantial evidence that he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared, and
he fled and hid his identity when he learned that he was a suspect.

On appeal before the SC, ZZZ argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. First, he claims that contrary
to BBB’s testimony, human experience dictates that BBB, as AAA’s guardian, should have been alarmed when
he allegedly saw him dragging her to a dark place and that BBB implicated him in the crime because BBB was
himself investigated by the police. Second, he reasons that he went to Tarlac because he was brought there by
his stepfather, and as a child, he had no choice but to follow this order. Lastly, he avers that his denial must be
considered since it was corroborated by his brother, who was with him when the crime was committed.

ISSUE:
Was ZZZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide?

RULING:
Yes, ZZZ was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said crime.

In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in proving the
commission of rape. This is because rape “is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify
for [him or] herself. This becomes more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed
because the victim could no longer testify.” Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the
requirements for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

The SC gave credence to the findings of the RTC and CA in considering the following circumstantial evidence in
convicting ZZZ: (1) BBB testified seeing him dragging AAA to the school on the night of the incident; (2) ZZZ’s
brother, YYY, testified going home with him and AAA, but ZZZ asked him to leave them behind; (3) after AAA’s
body had been found, ZZZ fled town and hid his identity using an alias; and (4) the autopsy confirmed that the
cause of AAA’s death was a traumatic cerebral contusion, while the dried blood from her vagina was caused by

742
a tear inside the genital area. Furthermore, BBB explained that he reprimanded ZZZ and AAA when he saw
them, but he was not suspicious since the two were relatives. The prosecution established that BBB was not a
suspect in the crime, and nor was there any proof that BBB had motive to erroneously implicate ZZZ. Moreover,
the SC has held that retractions are generally disfavored as they are unreliable. Even the Court consider YYY’s
more recent testimony, ZZZ’s alibi must still fail. For his defense of alibi to be credible, he must show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed. Yet, ZZZ, who stayed in
the same barangay as AAA and the school, failed to do so. Lastly, it was not shown that the trial court erred and
misapprehended any fact or evidence. The trial court’s findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive on this Court. Thus, its findings must not be disturbed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the Revised Rules on Evidence merely added the sentence “Inferences cannot be based on
other inferences” on the said section. The said addition is not material to the ruling of this case.

743
Rule 113 Sec. 4

Bacerra v. People
G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no
requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of
reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and
beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of P.D. 1613. Bacerra pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the
Decision the Regional Trial Court in Villasis, Pangasinan found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
Bacerra appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. He argued that none of the prosecution’s witnesses
had positively identified him as the person who burned the nipa hut. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court in toto.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No direct
evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to private complainant’s nipa hut.

ISSUES:
Was the petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the circumstantial evidence adduced
during trial?

RULING:
Yes. The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial
evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between “direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred.” The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must
be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. A number of circumstantial evidence may be
so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a
crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct
evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be
proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt. The commission of a
crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.
The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the
conclusion that the accused authored the crime

In this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has established
multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson. First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner stoned private complainant’s house and threatened to bum him. Second, the evidence was credible
and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a few hours later and made his way to private complainant’s nipa
hut. Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m., he saw petitioner pass by their house and walk towards their
nipa hut. This was corroborated by private complainant’s son who testified that he saw petitioner standing in front
of the nipa hut moments before it was burned. Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant testified that he saw
petitioner walk to and fro in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire. Private complainant’s
son likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut before it was burned.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON THE RULING OF THE CASE:

No effect since there was no substantial change with regard to Rule 133 Section 4. Take note however that under
the revised rules on evidence the phrase, “inferences cannot be based on other inferences.” was added.

744
Rule 133, Sec. 4

David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.
There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and
for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.

FACTS:
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As
an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
and turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar. On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting
the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.

Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth. She was
naturalized and granted American citizenship and was given a United States passport. After her adoptive father’s
death, she decided to return to the Philippines with her family. Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines and filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA9225,
which was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Between 2006 and 2009, Senator Poe made
several trips to USA using her United States Passport, after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship. In 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American Citizenship. In 2013, Senator Poe ran
for the Senatorial Elections and won.

Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari praying for the nullification
of the Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David
which sought to unseat private respondent as a Senator.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate Electoral Tribunal act with grave abuse of discretion?
2. Is circumstantial evidence a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings?
3. Did the burden of evidence shift to Poe upon a mere showing that she is a foundling?

RULING:
1. No, the Court finds no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The viability of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.”
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the
Constitution. Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown,
considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father or mother.
It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was
without judicial precedent. Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established personal circumstances of private
respondent. The Senate Electoral Tribunal arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof
required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt

745
or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

2. Yes, circumstantial evidence may be used as a standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings.

A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
substantially proves that either or both of one’s parents is a Filipino citizen. Since proving Poe’s biological
parentage is practically impossible, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence in lieu of direct
evidence. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation
of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice
to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

3. No, the claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent is a serious error.

“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;
that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue.” Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another.
What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her
favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has
ostensibly been established against him or her. In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in
the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner’s to discharge. Once the petitioner makes
a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent’s admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner.
While it does establish that the identities of private respondent’s biological parents are not known, it does not
automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino. The most that petitioner had in his favor
was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and
shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

1. No effect because Rule 65 was not amended by the 2019 Rules of Court.
2. No effect since Rule 133, Section 4 remains the same, but with an added last sentence.
3. No effect since the 2019 Rules of Court has added burden of evidence, the definition of which is the same as
what was applied in this case.

746
Rule 133, Sec. 4

People v. Baron
G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

Where a multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses, points to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape and killing of the seven-year-old child, there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. Testimonies regarding these details were given by disinterested
witnesses whom the accused himself had not managed to discredit for having any ill-motive against him. Two (2)
of the prosecution witnesses are even children of tender age.

FACTS:
In an Information, accused-appellant Ruben Baron was charged with the rape and killing of a seven-year-old girl
identified as AAA.

AAA’s mother testified that at about 12:30 p.m. on May 4, 1999, AAA sought her permission to play at the day
care center, which was a short distance from their house. At about 1:30 p.m., Baron arrived with AAA, both of
them wet from head to toe. They informed her that they bathed at the seawall. They then asked her permission
to go for a “joy-ride” in Baron’s trisikad. They returned at about 4:00 p.m. At about 5:30 p.m., she noticed that her
daughter was missing. She then went to the Molo Supermarket to look for her common-law partner so that he
may assist her. After a certain Perla Tacorda informed them that AAA might have returned to the seawall, AAA’s
mother sought Baron’s assistance in searching for AAA. Baron initially refused, but with her prodding, reluctantly
relented. They entered the seawall, where they found the lifeless body of AAA.

Baron resorted to a denial. He testified that at about 2:00 p.m. on May 4, 1999, AAA joined him for a joy ride
aboard his trisikad. At about 2:30 p.m., he turned over AAA to her mother in the presence of Gingging Tacorda,
Langging Tacorda, Soledad Palacios, and Romeo Inocencio. At about 6:30 p.m., AAA’s mother approached him
in the vicinity of Molo Supermarket, asking about AAA’s whereabouts. He reminded her that he had returned
AAA to her. Romeo Inocencio asked him to go to the seawall, where they found AAA’s lifeless body. He claimed
to have learned of being implicated in AAA’s rape and killing only after he was apprehended.

RTC convicted Baron of Rape with Homicide. CA affirmed the ruling. Baron filed before the Court of Appeals his
Notice of Appeal. Accused-appellant is of the position that the prosecution has not established his involvement
with certainty. He bewails the prosecution’s reliance on supposedly tenuous circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE:
Was the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to convict Accused Baron?

RULING:
Yes, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convict the accused. The
requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses, points to no other conclusion than
that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape and killing of the seven-year-old child, AAA:
(1) Seven-year-old Gennivive Belarma was playing with AAA when Baron picked up AAA and brought
her to the river/seawall.
(2) Alcid Flores saw accused-appellant clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants with AAA walking
towards the seawall at about 4:15 p.m. on May 4, 1999.
xxx
(4) Arsenio Valguna saw accused-appellant, clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants, nervously
and hurriedly leaving the seawall and, thereafter, boarding his trisikad.

747
xxx
(6) AAA’s body, which bore injuries at the vaginal area, was discovered at the seawall. The seawall is
the same place several witnesses identified as where AAA and accused-appellant went in the afternoon
of May 4, 1999. This is also the same from where accused-appellant nervously and hurriedly left in the
same afternoon.
(7) The lacerations sustained by AAA on her vagina, which, per Dr. Doromal, could very well have been
caused by the insertion of an erect penis.
xxx

Testimonies regarding these details were given by disinterested witnesses whom Baron himself had not
managed to discredit for having any ill-motive against him. Two (2) of the prosecution witnesses are even children
of tender age. As against these details and testimonies, all that accused-appellant had offered in defense were
denial and alibi—defenses that jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

This is affected by Rule 133, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure/Revised Rules on Evidence because
as the revised rules added a provision which states that “inferences cannot be based on other inferences.”

748
Rule 133, Sec. 4

People v. Chavez
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
Leonen, J.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
This case is a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Sec. 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure filed
by defendant Mark Jason Chavez (Chavez) who was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The RTC found Chavez guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution. Prosecution’s witness, Angelo Peñamante (Peñamante), testified that he saw a person leaving the
house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie), the victim. On the next day, SOCO team arrived and found Barbie’s dead
body inside the house. Thereafter, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
He described the physical appearance of the person leaving Barbie’s place. Then, Chavez accompanied by his
mother voluntarily surrendered and were informed of the consequences in executing a written statement without
the assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement and subsequently surrendered 2
cellphones owned by Barbie. When Peñamante was summoned to identify from a line-up the person he earlier
saw and described, he immediately pointed to and identified Chavez.

On his end, Chavez explained that Barbie suspected him having a relationship with Barbie’s boyfriend. When
Barbie no longer replied to Chavez’s messages, he decided to go to Barbie’s place. He likewise raised
presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts of substance
that could have altered its verdict. He argued that since the prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence,
conviction must rest on moral certainty of guilt on his part.

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution is
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez. The circumstantial evidence presented before the trial
court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavez’s acts of killing and
robbing Barbie.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can Chavez be convicted of the crime charged based on circumstantial evidence?

RULING:
Yes but only for the separate and distinct crime of homicide. The Rules of Court expressly provides that
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an
accused. Section 4 of Rule 133 provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is
more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

While there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death,
nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events that
leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt that accused Chavez committed the crime charged: first, it has
been duly established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim; second, the victim’s
2 units of cellular phones without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as part of the missing personal
belongings of the victim, were surrendered by the mother of the accused, when the accused voluntarily
surrendered, accompanied by his mother; third, the testimony of witness Peñamante.

Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its
conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by the court, more
so when these factual findings are affirmed by the CA. Nevertheless, this court has held that what is imperative
and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the

749
offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide. The circumstantial evidence
relied on by the lower courts, do not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit
robbery. An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less than
21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body. This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim.

Lastly, the court laments that object evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not properly handled,
and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the court. The results of this case would
have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court level had all these been done.The quality of every
conviction depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before the courts. The public’s
confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we promulgate against the
accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and take this to heart.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

While there’s an additional provision “Inferences cannot be based on other inferences”, the requisites under Rule
133, Sec. 4 remain the same.

Additional note: Custodial Investigation; Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial
investigation to “include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any
violation of law.”

750
Rule 133, Sec. 4

Cirera v. People
G.R. No.181843, July 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction where the combination of the circumstances constitutes an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.

FACTS:
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the CA decision that affirmed the RTC in convicting petitioner Miguel Cirera
of two counts of frustrated murder committed against private complainants, Rome Austria and Geraro Naval.

Two informations for frustrated murder were filed against Cirera. Austria testified that while he was playing a
game in a wake, Cirera arrived, asking money from him so he could buy liquor. He told, Cirera to be quiet. Then,
another person came named Naval and asked Austria to go home. There were exchange of words between
Naval and Cirera. Suddenly, Austria felt that he was stabbed at his back and as he ran home, he saw Cirera
armed with a knife, this time chasing Naval. Austria was hospitalized and was confined for more than a month.
Meanwhile, Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he and Cirera had an
exchange of words, he felt a hard blow on his back.

For the defense, Cirera testified that he saw private complainants at a wake. Naval approached him and asked,
“Anong problema mo?” to which he answered, “Wala naman.” Naval then punched Cirera. As Cirera was about
to stand up, he was hit by a hard object on his head, causing him to lose consciousness. He avers that there are
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ narratives as Austria and Naval failed to testify that they saw him
stab them, insisting that the claim “he was armed with a knife” was not proven since the knife was not recovered.

ISSUE:
Was there patent lack of evidence to convict petitioner?

RULING:
No. Petitioner points to alleged inconsistencies that pertain only to collateral and inconsequential matters. These
alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specially with
respect to the principal occurrence and positive identification of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the testimony
even strengthen credibility as they show that the testimony was not rehearsed. What is important is that there is
consistency as to the occurrence and identity of the perpetrator. Further, the alleged failure to retrieve the knife
supposed to have been used in perpetrating the offense does not destroy the credibility of the testimonies. The
crime is proved not by presenting the object but by establishing the existence of the elements of the crime as
written in law.

Circumstantial evidence was used to identify the perpetrator in this case. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides that a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the requisites are present. It
provides: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the following facts were considered: 1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to
be at the scene of the crime; 2) Private complainants were able to describe how they obtained their injuries; 3)
Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime; 4) Only three persons were involved in the incident
— private complainants and petitioner; 5) Petitioner “was standing very close to the private complainants” 6)
Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private complainants, and petitioner was seen chasing
and about to stab at least one of the private complainants; 7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds; 8)
The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it not been given appropriate
medical attention. The combination of these circumstances constitutes unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the [petitioner], to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect, although Rule 133, Sec 4. has been amended, the same was not substantial.

751
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 9

Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner

G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.
This is because under Section 9, the parties were required to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the
factual issues as defined in the preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the parties cannot raise a new
factual issue on appeal, otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present
evidence against it.

FACTS:
British national Turner initiated via Chinatrust-Ayala Branch the telegraphic transfer of US$430.00 to the account
of “MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, Citibank, Heliopolis Branch” in Cairo, Egypt. The amount was partial payment
to Turner’s travel agent for his and his wife’s 11-day tour in Egypt. Turner paid a service fee of US$30.00. Both
amounts were debited from his dollar savings account with Chinatrust. Chinatrust remitted the funds through the
Union Bank of California, its paying bank, to Citibank-New York, to credit them to the bank account of Min
Travel/EsmatAzmy in Citibank-Cairo, Egypt. Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo’s telexnotice about the latter’s
inability to credit the funds it received because the “beneficiary name did not match their books. Chinatrust
claimed that it relayed the discrepancy to Turner and requested him to verify from his beneficiary Turner allegedly
informed Chinatrust that he was able to contact Esmat Azmy, who acknowledged receipt of the transferred funds.
Turner, however, had to cancel his travel-tour because his wife got ill and requested from Chinatrust the refund
of his money. According to Chinatrust, it explained to Turner that since the funds were already remitted to his
beneficiary’s account, they could no longer be withdrawn or retrieved without Citibank-Cairo’s consent. Turner
allegedly insisted on withdrawing the funds from Chinatrust.

Turner filed a Complaint against Chinatrust before the MTC. After the parties had submitted their respective
position papers in accordance with the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTC dismissed the case. On appeal,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City rendered a decision the Regional Trial Court ruled that this was not sufficient
basis to absolve Chinatrust of any responsibility. The trial court found insufficient evidence to show that Chinatrust
was not negligent in the performance of its obligation under the telegraphic transfer agreement. It held that no
“discrepancy notice” from Citibank-Cairo was even presented in evidence. The CA upheld the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s decision granting the refund of respondent’s US$430.00 telegraphic funds
transfer despite its successful remittance and credit to respondent’s beneficiary Min Travel’s account with
Citibank-Cairo?

RULING:
Yes. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner was negligent in failing to
immediately address respondent’s queries and return his money and was consequently liable for the anguish
suffered by respondent. They ruled on an issue that was not raised by respondent in the lower court, thereby
violating petitioner’s right to due process.

It is an established principle that “courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party.” The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Teston, where this Court held that it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of the relief sought
by the pleadings.

The bank’s supposed negligence in the handling of respondent’s concerns was not among respondent’s causes
of action and was never raised in the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent’s cause of action was based on the
theory that the telexed funds transfer did not materialize, and the relief sought was limited to the refund of his
money and damages as a result of the purported non-remittance of the funds to the correct beneficiary account.

Furthermore, the case was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Accordingly, no trial was conducted as, after the conduct of a preliminary conference, the parties
were made to submit their position papers. There was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual

752
trial. However, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure calls for the submission of witnesses’
affidavits together with a party’s position paper after the conduct of a preliminary conference. The determination
of issues at the preliminary conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal. This is because
under Section 9 above, the parties were required to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual
issues as defined in the preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the parties cannot raise a new factual issue
on appeal, otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence against
it.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect since what was discussed here is a principle of law not specifically mentioned under the Rules of Court.

753
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 11

Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Sr.

G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
Leonen, J.

The filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor does not toll the prescription period of the
commission of the crime charged under a city ordinance. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance. There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell) is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under such Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.

Jadewell, thru its General Manager and personnel alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the
respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure. The car was then illegally parked and unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The fines for illegal parking and the declamping fee were also not paid by the
respondents herein. In another incident, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 7, 2003, herein respondents Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly
removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car which was then considered illegally parked for failure to
pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp. After forcibly removing
the clamp, respondents took and carried it away. According to complainants, the fine and the declamping fee
were not paid by the respondents.

On the other hand, Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia
likewise filed a case charging Jadewell President and 4 of Jadewell’s employees with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations for violation of Sec. 21 of the abovementioned City Ordinance
were filed with the MTC. Respondent Balajadia and the other accused filed a Motion to Quash. Contending that
the crime has already prescribed, as the crime was committed on May 7, and the Information was only filed on
October 2. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe in two months, and in this case the
Information was filed 5 months after. Respondent Judge Lidua, Sr., granted the accused’s Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases on the ground that the criminal liability of the accused has already prescribed. Petitioner
now contends that the crime has not prescribed, arguing that the filing of a complaint tolls the prescription of the
crime.

ISSUE:
Was the prescription period of the commission of the offense tolled by the filing of a Complaint?

RULING:
No, the prescription period was not tolled. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

The case is governed by Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Sec. 1 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure provides that it shall cover criminal cases on violations of municipal ordinances. Sec. 11 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, provides that The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.

754
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance, that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

It is now without question that prescription is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. There is no distinction between the filing of the
Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the
representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor, the prescription period was
running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the
preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the
ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that
the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was
discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running
of the prescription period. Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations, the period had
already prescribed.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect. The issue in the case is not affected by the amendments because the rule involved is not covered by
the 2019 amendments on the Rules of Court, as it deals with prescriptive period of a violation of an ordinance.

755
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 7

Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources

G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others’ behalf, carry the burden
of substantiating the writ’s elements. Before private parties or public interest groups may proceed with the case,
they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the determination of the writ’s issuance.

FACTS:
Petitioner IBP, Abogado, et al. filed a Petition seeking the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, over
Panatag Shoal, Panganiban Reef, and Ayungin Shoal, located within the Philippines’ EEZ. They alleged that
their “constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology” was being threatened and was being violated due
to the “omissions, failure, and/or refusal of Respondents to enforce Philippine laws in Panatag Shoal, Ayungin
Shoal, and Panganiban Reef. Respondents in this case include the DENR, DA, BFAR, Phil. Navy, Phil. Coast
Guard, PNP, PNP-Maritime Group, and DOJ.

During the pendency of the case, however, almost all of the fisherfolk-petitioners executed affidavits before
respondent BFAR requesting that their signatures be withdrawn from the Petition, which they claimed they did
not read and was not explained to them before signing. They stated that they had been misinformed about the
nature of the Petition filed before this Court. Thinking that the respondents would be the foreign nationals who
caused the environmental damage, they said that they were surprised to hear that the case was instead filed
against the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the Philippine Navy, whom they considered allies.
Thus, petitioners’ counsels requested for Petition’s withdrawal.

The SC granted the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Petition dismissing the case without passing upon any of the
substantive issues raised. However, the SC took the opportunity to discuss about writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

ISSUE:
What is the nature of the writ of kalikasan and the writ of continuing mandamus?

RULING:
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
The nature of a writ of kalikasan is stated in Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases:

SECTION 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.

A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy that “covers environmental damages the magnitude of which
transcends both political and territorial boundaries.” The damage must be caused by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official, public employee, or private individual or entity. It must affect the inhabitants of at least two (2)
cities or provinces.

In civil, criminal, and administrative cases, parties are clear as to the quantum of evidence necessary to prove
their case. In petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, however, the quantum of evidence is not specifically
stated.

Other special civil actions such as certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be filed by a party that is directly
injured or will be injured by the act and omission complained of. However, a petition for the writ of kalikasan may
be filed on behalf of those whose right is violated. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases only requires
that the public interest group is duly accredited.

756
This Court explained that “the Rules [of Procedure for Environmental Cases] do[es] not define the exact nature
or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of
such damage[.]” Every petition, therefore, must be examined on a case-to-case basis. It is imperative, however,
that even before a petition for its issuance can be filed, the petition must be verified and must contain:

a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and personal circumstances
are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission
complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence,
scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence;

e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
its present status; (3) if petitioner should learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and

f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.

Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others’ behalf, carry the burden
of substantiating the writ’s elements. Before private parties or public interest groups may proceed with the case,
they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the determination of the writ’s issuance.

WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

A writ of continuing mandamus, on the other hand, “is a special civil action that may be availed of ‘to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.’“ Rule 8, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. — When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect
to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

While Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides a civil procedure for the enforcement
or violation of environmental laws, Rule 8 provides a distinct remedy and procedure for allegations of unlawful
neglect in the enforcement of environmental laws or the unlawful exclusion in the use or enjoyment of an
environmental right. As with the procedure in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, this
procedure also requires that the petition should be sufficient in form and substance before a court can take further
action. Failure to comply may be basis for the petition’s outright dismissal.

The writ is essentially a continuing order of the court, as it:

... “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of

757
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.”

However, requiring the periodic submission of compliance reports does not mean that the court acquires
supervisory powers over administrative agencies. This interpretation would violate the principle of the separation
of powers since courts do not have the power to enforce laws, create laws, or revise legislative actions. The writ
should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies
required are clearly political or administrative in nature.

For this reason, every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be clear on the guidelines
sought for its implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot merely request the writ’s issuance
without specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented and the period when the submission of
compliance reports may cease.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

758
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 8

Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources

G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

Every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be clear on the guidelines sought for its
implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot merely request the writ’s issuance without specifically
outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented and the period when the submission of compliance reports may
cease.

FACTS:
Petitioner IBP, Abogado, et al. filed a Petition seeking the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, over
Panatag Shoal, Panganiban Reef, and Ayungin Shoal, located within the Philippines’ EEZ. They alleged that
their “constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology” was being threatened and was being violated due
to the “omissions, failure, and/or refusal of Respondents to enforce Philippine laws in Panatag Shoal, Ayungin
Shoal, and Panganiban Reef. Respondents in this case include the DENR, DA, BFAR, Phil. Navy, Phil. Coast
Guard, PNP, PNP-Maritime Group, and DOJ.

During the pendency of the case, however, almost all of the fisherfolk-petitioners executed affidavits before
respondent BFAR requesting that their signatures be withdrawn from the Petition, which they claimed they did
not read and was not explained to them before signing. They stated that they had been misinformed about the
nature of the Petition filed before this Court. Thinking that the respondents would be the foreign nationals who
caused the environmental damage, they said that they were surprised to hear that the case was instead filed
against the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the Philippine Navy, whom they considered allies.
Thus, petitioners’ counsels requested for Petition’s withdrawal.

The SC granted the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Petition dismissing the case without passing upon any of the
substantive issues raised. However, the SC took the opportunity to discuss about writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

ISSUE:
What is the nature of the writ of kalikasan and the writ of continuing mandamus?

RULING:
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
The nature of a writ of kalikasan is stated in Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases:

SECTION 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.

A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy that “covers environmental damages the magnitude of which
transcends both political and territorial boundaries.” The damage must be caused by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official, public employee, or private individual or entity. It must affect the inhabitants of at least two (2)
cities or provinces.

In civil, criminal, and administrative cases, parties are clear as to the quantum of evidence necessary to prove
their case. In petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, however, the quantum of evidence is not specifically
stated.

Other special civil actions such as certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be filed by a party that is directly
injured or will be injured by the act and omission complained of. However, a petition for the writ of kalikasan may

759
be filed on behalf of those whose right is violated. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases only requires
that the public interest group is duly accredited.

This Court explained that “the Rules [of Procedure for Environmental Cases] do[es] not define the exact nature
or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of
such damage[.]” Every petition, therefore, must be examined on a case-to-case basis. It is imperative, however,
that even before a petition for its issuance can be filed, the petition must be verified and must contain:

a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and personal circumstances
are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission
complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence,
scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence;

e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
its present status; (3) if petitioner should learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and

f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.

Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others’ behalf, carry the burden
of substantiating the writ’s elements. Before private parties or public interest groups may proceed with the case,
they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the determination of the writ’s issuance.

WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

A writ of continuing mandamus, on the other hand, “is a special civil action that may be availed of ‘to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.’“ Rule 8, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. — When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect
to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

While Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides a civil procedure for the enforcement
or violation of environmental laws, Rule 8 provides a distinct remedy and procedure for allegations of unlawful
neglect in the enforcement of environmental laws or the unlawful exclusion in the use or enjoyment of an
environmental right. As with the procedure in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, this
procedure also requires that the petition should be sufficient in form and substance before a court can take further
action. Failure to comply may be basis for the petition’s outright dismissal.

The writ is essentially a continuing order of the court, as it:

760
... “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.”

However, requiring the periodic submission of compliance reports does not mean that the court acquires
supervisory powers over administrative agencies. This interpretation would violate the principle of the separation
of powers since courts do not have the power to enforce laws, create laws, or revise legislative actions. The writ
should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies
required are clearly political or administrative in nature.

For this reason, every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be clear on the guidelines
sought for its implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot merely request the writ’s issuance
without specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented and the period when the submission of
compliance reports may cease.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

761
Arbitration Clause

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. DMCI Project Developers, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 173137 & 173170, January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

An arbitration clause in a document of contract may extend to subsequent documents of contract executed for
the same purpose. Nominees of a party to and beneficiaries of a contract containing an arbitration clause may
become parties to a proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause.

FACTS:
This is a petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC.

On June 10, 1995, Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement1
with Philippine National Railways (PNR) and other foreign corporations. Under the Joint Venture Agreement, the
parties agreed to construct a railroad system from Manila to Clark. BCDA shall establish North Luzon Railways
Corporation (Northrail) for purposes of constructing, operating, and managing the railroad system.The Joint
Venture Agreement contained the following provision:

ARTICLE XVI
ARBITRATION
If any dispute arise hereunder which cannot be settled by mutual accord between the parties to such
dispute, then that dispute shall be referred to arbitration.

BCDA invited investors to participate in the railroad project’s financing and implementation. Among those invited
were D.M. Consunji, Inc. and Metro Pacific Corporation. The Joint Venture Agreement was amended to include
D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee as party. BCDA and the other parties to the Joint Venture Agreement,
including D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee, then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. Under this
agreement, the parties agreed that the initial seed capital of P600 million shall be infused to Northrail.

D.M. Consunji, Inc. informed PNR and the other parties that DMCI-PDI shall be its designated nominee for all
the agreements it entered and would enter with them in connection with the railroad project.

Upon BCDA and Northrail’s request, DMCI-PDI deposited P300 million into Northrail’s account for its future
subscription of the Northrail shares of stocks. On September 27, 2000, DMCI-PDI started demanding from BCDA
and Northrail the return of its P300 million deposit for Northrail’s failure to increase its authorized capital stock.
BCDA and Northrail refused to return the deposit. DMCI-PDI served a demand for arbitration to BCDA and
Northrail, citing the arbitration clause in the June 10, 1995 Joint Venture Agreement. DMCI-PDI filed before the
RTC of Makati a Petition to Compel Arbitration against BCDA and Northrail.

BCDA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was no arbitration clause that DMCI-PDI could enforce
since DMCI-PDI was not a party to the Joint Venture Agreement containing the arbitration clause. RTC denied
the motion and granted DMCI-PDI’s Petition to Compel Arbitration.

ISSUE:
May DMCI-PDI compel BCDA and Northrail to submit to arbitration?

RULING:
Yes, DMCI-PDI may compel BCDA and Northrail to submit to arbitration. The state adopts a policy in favor of
arbitration. Arbitration is a mode of settling disputes between parties. Like many alternative dispute resolution
processes, it is a product of the meeting of minds of parties submitting a pre-defined set of disputes. They agree
among themselves to a process of dispute resolution that avoids extended litigation.

Three documents — (a) Joint Venture Agreement, (b) amended Joint Venture Agreement, and (c) Memorandum
of Agreement — represent the agreement between BCDA, Northrail, and D.M. Consunji, Inc. Among the three
documents, only the Joint Venture Agreement contains the arbitration clause. DMCI-PDI was allegedly not a
party to the Joint Venture Agreement.

762
A reading of all the documents of agreement shows that they were executed by the same parties. Initially, the
Joint Venture Agreement was executed only by BCD A, PNR, and the foreign corporations. When the Joint
Venture Agreement was amended to include D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee, D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or
its nominee were deemed to have been also a party to the original Joint Venture Agreement executed by BCDA,
PNR, and the foreign corporations. D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee became bound to the terms of both
the Joint Venture Agreement and its amendment.

Moreover, each document was executed to achieve the single purpose of implementing the railroad project, such
that documents of agreement succeeding the original Joint Venture Agreement merely amended or
supplemented the provisions of the original Joint Venture Agreement.

Hence, the arbitration clause in the Joint Venture Agreement should not be interpreted as applicable only to the
Joint Venture Agreement’s original parties. The succeeding agreements are deemed part of or a continuation of
the Joint Venture Agreement. The arbitration clause should extend to all the agreements and its parties since it
is still consistent with all the terms and conditions of the amendments and supplements.

DMCI-PDI, being a nominee of D.M. Consunji, Inc, is a party to all the agreements, including the arbitration
agreement. It may, thus, invoke the arbitration clause against all the parties.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect because the revised rules have not changed the concept of arbitration as used in this case.

763
Arbitration Clause

Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corp.

G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.

A consequence of a corporation’s separate personality is that consent by corporation through its representatives
is not consent of the representative, personally. Its obligations, incurred through official acts of its representatives,
are its own. A stockholder, director, or representative does not become a party to a contract. Thus, members of
the board of directors cannot be made parties to arbitration proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause in the
contract to which the corporation is a party.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition assailing the decision and resolution of CA affirming the trial court’s decision
holding that petitioners, as directors, should submit themselves as parties to arbitration proceedings.

BF Corporation (BF) alleged that it entered into an agreement with Shangri-La undertaking to construct a mall
and a multilevel parking structure along EDSA. Shangri-La had been consistent in paying BF in accordance with
its progress billings until it defaulted in its payment. BF alleged that Shangri-La induced it to continue with the
construction of the buildings by assuring BF that it had funds and the delay was simply a matter of delayed
processing of the billing statement. Construction was eventually completed but despite demands, Shangri-La
refused to pay the balance. BF also alleged that Shangri-La’s directors were in bad faith so they should be jointly
and severally liable with Shangri-La.

BF filed a collection complaint with RTC against Shangri-La and its directors. The latter then filed a motion to
suspend proceedings in view of BF’s failure to submit its dispute to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
clause provided in its contract. BF opposed the motion but the motion was denied. After their MR being dismissed,
the directors filed a petition for certiorari with CA which granted it and ordered the submission of the dispute to
arbitration. The directors sought to be excluded from the proceedings between BF and Shangri-La. Pending the
decision of CA, RTC had promulgated a decision absolving the directors from liability. CA dismissed the petition
alleging they were necessary parties to the arbitration.

ISSUE:
Should the members of the board of directors of Shangri-La be made parties to the arbitration proceedings
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract?

RULING:
No the directors should not be made parties to the arbitration. The petitioners point out, their personalities as
directors are separate and distinct from Shangri-La. Because a corporation’s existence is only by fiction of law,
it can only exercise its rights and powers through its directors, officers, or agents who are all natural persons. A
corporation cannot sue or enter into contracts without them. A consequence of a corporation’s separate
personality is that consent by corporation through its representatives is not consent of the representative,
personally. Its obligations, incurred through official acts of its representatives, are its own. A stockholder, director,
or representative does not become a party to a contract.

A corporation’s representatives are generally not bound by the terms of the contract executed by the corporation.
They are not personally liable for obligations and liabilities incurred on or in behalf of the corporation.

Hence, when the directors, as in this case, are impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice or bad
faith on their part in directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that the directors
and the corporation are not acting as separate entities. They are alleging that the acts or omissions by the
corporation that violated their rights are also the directors’ acts or omissions. They are alleging that contracts
executed by the corporation are contracts executed by the directors. Complainants effectively pray that the
corporate veil be pierced because the cause of action between the corporation and the directors is the same. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. As such, the Agreement, containing the stipulation on arbitration, binds
the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and heirs.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect as the rules on ADR is not affected by the revised rules.

764
Jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission

Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp.
G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019
Leonen, J.

For the construction industry arbitration commission to acquire jurisdiction, the law merely requires that the
parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration any dispute arising from construction contracts. The arbitration
clause in the construction contract ipso facto vested the CIAC with jurisdiction. This rule applies, regardless of
whether the parties specifically choose another forum or make reference to another arbitral body. Since the
jurisdiction of CIAC is conferred by law, it cannot be subjected to any condition; nor can it be waived or diminished
by the stipulation, act or omission of the parties, as long as the parties agreed to submit their construction contract
dispute to arbitration, or if there is an arbitration clause in the construction contract. The parties will not be
precluded from electing to submit their dispute to CIAC, because this right has been vested in each party by law.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision which affirmed the Final Award in
CIAC Case No. 19-2008 issued by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), which found that
respondent Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (Charter Chemical) is entitled to the payment of the
monetary equivalent of two (2) units in Camp John Hay Suites.

Camp John Hay Development entered into a Contractor’s Agreement with Charter Chemical to complete the
painting works of Camp John Hay Manor. The contract price was P13,239,734.16, for which Camp John Hay
Development paid P7,339,734.16. The balance of P5,900,000.00 was ought to be settled by offsetting the price
of the two (2) studio units. After the completion of its painting works, Charter Chemical demanded the execution
of the deed of sale and delivery of the titles of the two (2) units. Camp John Hay Development and Charter
Chemical executed contracts to sell which provide that all actions involving this Contract shall be instituted only
in the proper courts of Pasig City, Metro Manila to the exclusion of all other courts.

Due to the delay in the delivery of the units, Charter Chemical wrote Camp John Hay Development, demanding
that it transfer the units or pay the value of these units. When it felt that further demands would be futile, Charter
Chemical filed before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Request for Arbitration under
the arbitration clause in the Contractor’s Agreement. The CIAC ordered Camp John Hay Development to pay the
monetary value of the two (2) units in Camp John Hay Suites. CA affirmed the arbitral tribunal’s award.

Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner points out that disputes must be adjudicated by the proper courts of
Pasig City, to the exclusion of all other courts.

ISSUE:
Does the CIAC have jurisdiction over the dispute despite the existence of a dispute resolution clause?

RULING:
Section 4 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law lays down the jurisdiction of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission:

SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. - The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from,
or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the
dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof.
These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties
to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and
delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.

Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall
continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines.
For the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission to acquire jurisdiction, the law merely requires that the
parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration any dispute arising from construction contracts.

765
In HUTAMA-RSEA Joint Operations, Inc. v. Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation:

Under Section I, Article III of the CIAC Rules, an arbitration clause in a construction contract shall
be deemed as an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction,
“notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract.
. . .”

. . . The arbitration clause in the construction contract ipso facto vested the CIAC with jurisdiction.
This rule applies, regardless of whether the parties specifically choose another forum or make
reference to another arbitral body. Since the jurisdiction of CIAC is conferred by law, it cannot be
subjected to any condition; nor can it be waived or diminished by the stipulation, act or omission of
the parties, as long as the parties agreed to submit their construction contract dispute to arbitration,
or if there is an arbitration clause in the construction contract. The parties will not be precluded from
electing to submit their dispute to CIAC, because this right has been vested in each party by law.

It bears to emphasize that the mere existence of an arbitration clause in the construction contract
is considered by law as an agreement by the parties to submit existing or future controversies
between them to CIAC jurisdiction, without any qualification or condition precedent. To affirm a
condition precedent in the construction contract, which would effectively suspend the jurisdiction of
the CIAC until compliance therewith, would be in conflict with the recognized intention of the law
and rules to automatically vest CIAC with jurisdiction over a dispute should the construction contract
contain an arbitration clause.

Arbitration, “[b]eing an inexpensive, speedy[,] and amicable method of settling disputes . . . is encouraged by the
Supreme Court.” If any doubt will arise, it “should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”

Here, petitioner and respondent agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute arising from the construction contract,
as clearly stipulated in their Contractor’s Agreement. The arbitration clause should, thus, be given primacy in
accordance with the State’s policy to favor arbitration. It follows that if there is any doubt as to what provision
should be given effect, this Court will rule in favor of the arbitration clause.

Moreover, the contracts to sell, containing a contrary dispute resolution clause, did not supersede the arbitration
clause. The case records show that the contracts to sell are not inconsistent with the Contractor’s Agreement.
They are merely devices to facilitate the transfer of ownership of the two (2) units to respondent-an offshoot of
the offsetting scheme provision in the Contractor’s Agreement.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULES ON RULING:

No effect.

766
Jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission

Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Spouses Rune

G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

When a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original jurisdiction. However,
when not being a party to the construction agreement, petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause and, thus,
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Where a surety in a construction contract actively participates in a
collection suit, it is estopped from raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that petitioner is privy to the construction
agreement, we cannot allow petitioner to invoke arbitration at this late stage of the proceedings since to do so
would go against the law’s goal of prompt resolution of cases in the construction industry.

FACTS:
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of CA affirming RTC Makati for
collection of a sum of money. This case involves the proper invocation of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Committee’s (CIAC) jurisdiction through an arbitration clause in a construction contract

Spouses Stroem entered into an Owners-Contractor Agreement with Asis-Leif Company for the construction of
a two-storey house on the lot owned by Spouses Stroem. Asis-Leif secured Performance Bond from Stronghold.
Stronghold and Asis-Leif, through Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif, bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the
Spouses Stroem the agreed amount in the event that the construction project is not completed. Asis-Leif failed
to finish the project on time despite repeated demands of the Spouses. Spouses subsequently rescinded the
agreement. They then hired an independent appraiser to evaluate the progress of the construction project.
Stronghold sent a letter to Asis-Leif requesting that the company settle its obligations with the Spouses Stroem.
No response was received from Asis-Leif.

Spouses Stroem filed a Complaint for breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for damages against
Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold. RTC rendered a judgment in favour of the Spouses and ordered
Stronghold to pay the Spouses. CA affirmed.

Stronghold argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, CA committed
reversible error when it upheld the Decision of the RTC. The lower courts should have dismissed the case in
view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and should have referred the case to CIAC. Moreover, the
stipulations in said Agreement are part and parcel of the conditions in the bond. Were it not for such stipulations
in said agreement, Stronghold would not have agreed to issue a bond in favor of the Spouses Stroem

Respondents argue that Stronghold is not a party to the arbitration agreement. Petitioner did not consent to
arbitration. It is only respondent and Asis-Leif that may invoke the arbitration clause in the contract. The Owners-
Contractor Agreement is separate and distinct from the Bond. The parties to the Agreement are Asis-Leif and
Spouses Stroem, while the parties to the Bond are Spouses Stroem and Stronghold.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the dispute — liability of a surety under a performance bond — connected to a construction contract and,
therefore, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIAC?
(2) Can Stronghold invoke the arbitration clause and consequently invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC?

RULING:
(1) Yes. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1008 defines the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIAC:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction – The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or
connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute
arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes
may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and
delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.

767
Similarly, Section 35 of Republic Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 states:
SEC. 35. Coverage of the Law. - Construction disputes which fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (the “Commission”) shall include those between or among
parties to, or who are otherwise bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether such parties
are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy in a
construction project. The Commission shall continue to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over
construction disputes although the arbitration is “commercial” pursuant to Section 21 of this Act.

When a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original jurisdiction. Construction
has been defined as referring to “all on-site works on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through
completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation of components and equipment.” In this
case, there is no dispute that the Owners-Contractor Agreement between Asis-Leif and respondents is a
construction contract. Petitioner and respondents recognize that CIAC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from
the agreement.

(2) No. Stronghold cannot invoke the arbitration clause for not being a party to the construction agreement.
Petitioner, thus, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC.

In the present case, Article 7 of the Owners-Contractor Agreement merely stated that a performance bond shall
be issued in favor of respondents, in which case petitioner and Asis-Leif and/or Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif shall
pay ₱4,500,000.00 in the event that Asis-Leif fails to perform its duty under the Agreement. Consequently, the
performance bond merely referenced the contract entered into by respondents and Asis-Leif, which pertained to
Asis-Leif’s duty to construct a two-storey residence building with attic, pool, and landscaping over respondents’
property.

To be clear, it is in the Owners-Contractor Agreement that the arbitration clause is found. The construction
agreement was signed only by respondents and the contractor, Asis-Leif, as represented by Ms. Ma. Cynthia
Asis- Leif. It is basic that “[c]ontracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs[.]” Not being a
party to the construction agreement, petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause. Petitioner, thus, cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC.

Moreover, petitioner’s invocation of the arbitration clause defeats the purpose of arbitration in relation to the
construction business. The state has continuously encouraged the use of dispute resolution mechanisms to
promote party autonomy.

The CIAC was created through Executive Order No. 1008 (E. 0. 1008), in recognition of the need to establish an
arbitral machinery that would expeditiously settle construction industry disputes. The prompt resolution of
problems arising from or connected with the construction industry was considered of necessary and vital for the
fulfillment of national development goals, as the construction industry provides employment to a large segment
of the national labor force and is a leading contributor to the gross national product.

However, where a surety in a construction contract actively participates in a collection suit, it is estopped from
raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that petitioner is privy to the construction agreement, we cannot allow
petitioner to invoke arbitration at this late stage of the proceedings since to do so would go against the law’s goal
of prompt resolution of cases in the construction industry.

EFFECT OF REVISED RULED ON THE RULING:

No effect on the issues and ruling presented in this case.

768