REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
CALOOCAN CITY
BRANCH 53

BLUE MICA, INC.,

Plaintiff,

- versus - CIVIL CASE NO. 19-31817

FOR: EJECTMENT

TEODORA S. ASTILLA, and any and

all persons claiming rights under her,
Defendants.
x---------------------------------------------------x

MOTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT

(Pursuant to Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)

Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, moves fort the rendition of judgement

against Defendant Teodora S. Astilla, and in support hereof, states as follows.

1. On June 15, 2020, the Honorable Court issued an Omnibus Order setting
the captioned case for preliminary conference on September 24, 2020. A copy of
the Omnibus Order was served upon Defendant’s counsel of record, the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), through Atty. Mark Luwie N. Baluyut (Atty. Baluyut), as
evidenced by the “copy furnished” portion on page 8 of the Order.

2. The preliminary conference was reset to October 22, 2020.

3. Defendant, thorough counsel, did not file the preliminary conference

brief either three (3) calendar days before September 24, 2020 or three (3)
calendar days before October 22, 2020, as directed by the Honorable Court.

4. Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that:

“Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not

later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall
be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with
the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary

conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section
6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be

entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule
shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall
appear at the preliminary conference.

5. Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure provides that:

“Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should defendant fail to

answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for therein; Provided, however, that the court
may, in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s
fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This
is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.”

6. Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 6. The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at
least three (3) calendar days before the date of the pre-trial, their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

xxx xxx xxx

“Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as
failure to appear at the pre-trial.”

7. This exhortation was similarly contained in the last paragraph on page 6

of the above-mentioned Omnibus Order issued by the Honorable Court on June
15, 2020, as follows:

“The Plaintiff and the Defendants are hereby DIRECTED to file

their respective Preliminary Conference Briefs before this Court and
ensure receipt thereof by the adverse party and the Court, at least
three (3) days before the date of the scheduled preliminary
conference. Failure to file the Preliminary Conference Brief shall
have the same effect as failure to appear during the preliminary
conference.”
8. Considering that Defendant’s failure to file her preliminary conference
brief has the same effect as failing to appear during the same, Plaintiff is now
entitled to a judgment in its favor as may be warranted by the facts alleged in its
complaint, and limited to what is prayed for therein.

9. In Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Arturo Loo Po, G.R. No. 217694,
January 27, 2016, the Supreme Court held that:

“Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements

for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:

Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to

the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

“Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the

recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The possession of
the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the
plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. The
defendant’s possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded
that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted
one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it

recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.

10. The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant may be

summarized as follows.
10.1 It is the lawful owner of that parcel of land and
improvement covered by TCT No. 128125 in the name of the
Spouses Erlino G. Raqueno and Natividad R. Raqueno located at 107
E. Benin Street corner Maximo Street, Barangay 86 Caloocan City,
having acquired the same from their heirs by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in its
favor dated June 7, 2019, and that it is in the process of transferring
the title to the property in its name.

10.2 Defendant was a month to month lessee of a portion of

the property, identified as the “General Merchandise,” of the former
owners. As such, Defendant’s continued use and occupation of the
same was upon the mere toleration of the previous owners.

10.3. Plaintiff, as the new owner of the property, is not

interested in continuing with the month to month lease. On July 1,
2019, its representatives, personally served a demand letter upon
Defendant, with the assistance of barangay officials from Barangay
86, Caloocan City informing Defendant that plaintiff was the new
owner of the property, that it had decided not to renew the “month
to month lease,” and demanding that Defendant vacate and
surrender the possession of the premises to plaintiff within five (5)
days from receipt therefrom. Because Defendant refused to receive
the demand letter, plaintiff’s representatives tendered the same to
her. A copy of the demand letter was also sent to defendant by
registered mail with return card on July 1, 2019.

10.4 This notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s representatives again

personally served a demand letter upon Defendant on August 5,
2019 with the assistance of barangay officials from Barangay 86,
Caloocan City informing Defendant that plaintiff was the new owner
of the property, that it had decided not to renew the “month to
month lease,” and demanding that Defendant vacate and surrender
the possession of the premises to plaintiff within fifteen (15) days
from receipt therefrom. Because Defendant refused to receive the
demand letter, plaintiff’s representatives tendered the same to her.
A copy of the demand letter was also sent to defendant by registered
mail with return card on August 6, 2019.

10.5 Defendant refused to comply with Plaintiff’s demands.

10.6 Prior to the filing of the complaint, the dispute had been
referred for barangay conciliation, but the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement.
10.7 The reasonable monthly rental for the premises occupied
by Defendant is Php58,000.00 a month. Because of the refusal of
Defendant to vacate the premises inspite of demand, Plaintiff was
constrained to hire the services of undersigned counsels for
Php20,000.00.

10.8 Plaintiff’s complaint was filed within one (1) year from the
date of last demand.

11. Plaintiff’s complaint has complied with the requirements laid down in
the cited cases.

12. First. Initially, the possession of the property was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff. This requirement has been satisfied with the
allegation that Defendant was a month to month lessee of the previous owner,
and as such her continued use and occupation thereof was by mere tolerance of
the previous owner.

13. That the Plaintiff is the one instituting the Complaint for ejectment is of
no moment, because a vendee may bring such an action once the Defendant’s
occupation of the premises becomes illegal. This is clearly evident from the
ruling of the Supreme Court in the Fairland case, supra. and in the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:

“Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. —

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)”

14. Plaintiff has alleged a superior right of possession over that of the
Defendant when it alleged in its complaint that it is now the new owner of the
property and the premises occupied by Defendant, having purchased it from the
heirs of the previous owners thereof. Thus, as held by the Supreme Court in the
Fairland case, supra.

“Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of

possession over the subject property. These allegations were evidently manifest
in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease the property
to Po. The Court is of the view that these allegations were clear and unequivocal
and did not need supporting attachments to be considered as having sufficiently
established its cause of action. Even the MeTC conceded that the complaint of
Fairland stated a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer. 33 It must be stressed
that inquiry into the attached documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency,
not the veracity, of the material allegations in the complaint.”

15. Second. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession .
This requirement has been satisfied with the allegations that Plaintiff, as the new
owner, was not interested in continuing with the month to month lease and
made demands upon her to vacate and surrender possession of the premises to
the Plaintiff, thereby terminating the Defendant’s right to possession.

16. Insofar as Defendant’s actions with regard to the demands made upon
her as alleged in the complaint are concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of
Manuel Co Keng Kian vs. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
75676, August 29, 1990, held that:

“At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a disturbance of
social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue
reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the
ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long
as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether
handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The
undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing
Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc.
was the new owner of the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a
demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises but
petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12,
1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981
was sent to petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on
the supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by petitioner,
this could only be due to petitioner's blatant attempts at evasion which
compelled the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot
countenance an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers
further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal
of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.”

17. And if that were not enough, the conciliation proceedings had before
the Barangay, culminating in the issuance of a certificate to file action in Plaintiff’s
favor against the Defendant, was also the equivalent of another demand upon her
to vacate the premises.

18. Be the foregoing as it may, be it noted that while demands were made
upon the Defendant several times to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to Plaintiff, such demand was not legally required, nor is it a
jurisidictional requirement in the present case, considering that the present
action is premised on the expiration of Defendant’s month to month lease, and
not her failure to comply with the terms and conditions thereof, including the
condition to pay rent. In Eulogio Lo Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140866,
April 19, 2001, the Supreme Court held:

“On the strength of this provision of Rule 70, respondent Chua as vendor
was without doubt authorized to institute the action for ejectment. Moreover,
inasmuch as the rule recognizes such right of the vendor, respondent Chua also
had the right to send the notices of termination of the lease agreement and to
vacate on 4 December 1995 and 28 March 1996. The right to send the notices is
rooted in the right to file the court action. At any rate, petitioner need not have
harped on the alleged absence of the right of respondent Chua to send the
notices. The notice or demand to vacate is not necessary when the unlawful
detainer is based on expiration of the contract of lease,  as what obtains here.

19. In Velia J. Cruz vs. Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen, G.R. No.
205539, October 4, 2017, the Supreme Court also held that:

“Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's demand to vacate

since the matter was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The
barangay certification issued on August 11, 2005 shows that no compromise
was reached between the parties.

“Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt of the demand

letter is misplaced. Their verbal lease over the property had already expired
sometime in 2002. They were explicitly told to vacate in 2005. They continued to
occupy the property until petitioner sent her final demand letter in 2008. The
demand letter would have been unnecessary since respondents' continued
refusal to vacate despite the expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient
ground to bring the action.

20. And in Nimfa Tubiano vs. Leonardo C. Razo, G.R. No. 132598, July 13,
2000, where the Supreme Court held that:

"xxx The averment that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is

equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of every month. It
is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since
what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. This
being the case, demand to vacate was unnecessary. As this Court explained in
Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 78 Phil. 672 (1946), Rule 70, section 2 requires previous
demand only when the action is ‘for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
conditions for his lease.’ Where the action is to terminate the lease because of
the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case upon
the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord may go into the property
and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for
unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the
expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, section 2.

“Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case, petitioner

became a deforciant unlawfully withholding possession of the property. There
was no need for a demand to be served on him, except to negate any inference
that respondent, as lessor, had agreed to an extension of the term of the lease
under article 1687 of the Civil Code."13
“Verily, demand to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the
ground for ejectment is expiration of term of the lease contract.
Notice/demand to vacate serves no other purpose than to make known the
lessor’s intention to terminate the lease contract. Accordingly, even if petitioner
did not receive the September 7, 1994 notice of private respondent, the
ejectment case filed against petitioner cannot be deemed to be premature
considering that even as early as August 1994, petitioner was already informed
that private respondent will no longer renew the subject lease contract.”

21. Third. The defendant remained in possession of the property, and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof. This requirement has been
satisfied with the allegations that inspite of demand, Defendant has remained in
possession of the premises, to its damage and prejudice, hence the present
complaint. And

22. Fourth. The complaint was clearly filed within one (1) year from the
last demand.

23. That Plaintiff’s complaint has complied with all the foregoing, is
evidenced by the fact that the Honorable Court found no ground to dismiss the
action for unlawful detainer, and ordered that summons be served upon the
Defendant. As held by the Supreme Court in Fairland Knitcraft Corporation,
supra:

“The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served
upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the MeTC found no
ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.”

24. Considering all the foregoing, it is Plaintiff’s humble submission that

judgment may now be rendered by the Honorable Court on its complaint, finding
that it has the right to evict Defendant. For as also held by the Supreme Court in
Fairland Knitcraft Corporation, supra:

“As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can

already be rendered

“In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of

unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower courts is no longer
necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.

“To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be

rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to consider
the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of Fairland had a
valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.

“Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish

the allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession over
the subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer constitutes an admission of
his illegal occupation due to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland’s
rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be rendered finding
that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject property .”
25. And in Tubiano, supra,

“Pertinent provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure, provide:

"Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant

fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the
court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein xxx"

"SEC. 7 Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. –

Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in
ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

“The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary

conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment on his counter-claim in accordance with
Section 6 hereof, all cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If the sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall

be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This
rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued
under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common
defense shall appear at the preliminary conference." (emphasis
supplied)

“Applying the foregoing applicable provisions in point, the Court is of the

opinion, and so holds, that the Court of Appeals erred not in holding that both
the RTC and MTC were correct in declaring the ejectment case submitted for
decision based solely on the complaint of private respondent, upon failure of
petitioner to appear at the preliminary conference on May 25, 1995. It must be
stressed that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. It does not
admit of delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to
remedy the situation.

RELIEF

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff Blue Mica, Inc. most

respectfully prays of the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant and all those claiming rights under her as follows:

1. To vacate the premises occupied by her located at 107 E.

Benin corner Maximo Street and peacefully surrender possession
thereof to Plaintiff;
2. To pay Plaintiff the amount of P58,000.00 as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises from 01
July 2019 up to the time defendant(s) actually vacate the premises;

3. The sum of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and

4. Cost of suit.

Other equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.

Makati City for Caloocan City, October 27, 2020.

VALERIO & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES

Counsel for Plaintiff
17/F Petron Megaplaza Building
358 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue
Makati City

By:

BENEDICTO M. VALERIO, JR.

PTR No. 7335763 / 1.04.19 / Makati City
IBP Lifetime Member No. 01668 / Quezon Province Chapter
Roll of Attorneys No. 34966
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0022385 / 4.04.19

JONATHAN P. ONG
PTR No. 7350770 / 01-20-2019 / Makati City
IBP Lifetime Member No. 01665 / Makati City Chapter
Roll of Attorneys No. 39216
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0023851/ 04-17-2019
Notice of Hearing and
Copies Furnished:

The Branch Clerk of Court

Metropolitan Trial Court
Caloocan City
Branch 53

PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

4TH Floor, Aurelio Building
11th Avenue, Caloocan City
c/o:
Atty. Mark Luwie N. Baluyut
Atty. Alexis Ailex C. Villamor, Jr.

G r e e t i n g s:

Kindly take notice that the foregoing Motion to Render Judgment shall be
submitted by undersigned counsel for the consideration and approval of the
Honorable Court on November 5, 2020, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.

ATTY. JONATHAN P. ONG