 Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more

favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.

 Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.
 Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORIES

Teleological moral theories locate moral goodness in the consequences of our behavior and not the
behavior itself. According to teleological (or consequentialist) moral theory, all rational human actions
are teleological in the sense that we reason about the means of achieving certain ends. Moral behavior,
therefore, is goal-directed. I have ice in my gutters right now. I am deliberating about when and how to
get that ice out in order to prevent water damage inside the house. There are many strategies (means) that
I might employ to remove that ice (end). Should I send my oldest son, Eli, up on the icy roof today? After
careful deliberation I finally decided not send him on the roof because it is slippery and he might fall.
How did I decide? Well, I took into account the possible consequences. There is nothing inherently wrong
with climbing on the roof. What made roof climbing the morally wrong thing to do at this particular time
and place were the possible consequences. The issue has moral significance in so far as it affects persons.
So from the teleological point of view, human behavior is neither right nor wrong in and of itself. What
matters is what might happen as a consequence of those actions in any given context . Thus, it is the
contextualized consequences that make our behavior, good or bad, right or wrong. In the case of roof
climbing in the winter, I decided to climb up on the roof myself, because it‟s dangerous. Eli might fall off
and get hurt. If that happened, my wife would blame me and so would the community. But if I fell off the
roof, I would be judged to be imprudent, but not necessarily immoral. From a teleological standpoint,
stealing, for example, could not be judged to be inherently right or wrong independent of the context and
the foreseeable consequences. Suppose I am contemplating stealing a loaf of bread from the
neighborhood grocery store. Many moral theorists would argue that morality requires an analysis of my
motives (or intent) that brought about that behavior. However, from a teleological perspective, motives
really have nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the act. What really matters lies in the
potential pains and pleasures associated with the short-term and long-term consequences. If my children
were starving, and if stealing a loaf of bread would immediately prevent them from starving, then I might
seriously consider stealing. But I‟d have to know if the consequences would significantly harm the
grocery store? What would be the odds of getting caught? If I got caught, what would happen to me?
Would I go to jail? Get fined? If I went to jail, who would take care of my children? Therefore, even if
my motive (preventing my children from starving) was praiseworthy, the act of stealing might still be
wrong because other actions might be more cost-effective in bringing about the desired consequences.
Perhaps I‟d be better off signing up for food stamps or asking the storeowner to give me day-old bread .
On the other hand, suppose that there were no other options and that I invented a foolproof system for
stealing bread. Would I be wrong for doing it? If you think about the consequences of your actions when
you make moral decisions, you are applying teleological moral theory.

DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES
There are many philosophers who reject the entire teleological agenda by arguing that moral goodness has
nothing to do with generating pleasure, happiness, and or consequences. Deontological theories are by
definition dutybased. That is to say, that morality, according to deontologists, consists in the fulfillment of
moral obligations, or duties. Duties, in the deontological tradition, are most often associated with obeying
absolute moral rules. Hence, human beings are morally required to do (or not to do) certain acts in order
to uphold a rule or law. The rightness or wrongness of a moral rule is determined independent of its
consequences or how happiness or pleasure is distributed as a result of abiding by that rule, or not abiding
by it. It's not difficult to see why philosophers would be drawn to this position. In ordinary life, we often
encounter situations where doing our duty toward others does not necessarily increase pleasure or
decrease pain. In early nineteenth-century America, many members of the anti-slavery movement argued
that slavery was wrong, even though slaveholders and southern society in general, economically benefited
from it. Suppose, also that the slaveholders were also able to condition the slaves to the point where they
actually enjoyed living under slavery. From a teleological perspective, slavery might appear to be an ideal
economic institution. Everybody is happy! A deontologist, however, would argue that even if the
American government conducted a detailed cost/benefit analysis of slavery and decided that it created
more pleasure in society than pain, it would still be wrong. Therefore, deontologists believe that right and
wrong have nothing to do with pleasure, pain, or consequences. Morality is based on whether acts conflict
with moral rules or not, and the motivation behind those acts. An act is therefore, good if and only if it
was performed out of a desire to do one's duty and obey a rule. In other words, act out of a good will.
Hence, slavery is wrong, not because of its negative consequences, but because it violates an absolute
moral rule. The problem here is: "How does one distinguish absolute moral rules from mere convention,
prudence, or legality, without reference to the distribution of pleasure and pain?" In the Western tradition
there have been two approaches to the establishment of deontological principles: divine command theory
and Kantian theory.

NATURAL LAW THEORY

In the Western deontological tradition moral rules have also been derived, not only from divine
command, but also from the so-called “facts” of human nature. The fundamental assumption here is that
moral goodness can be somehow deduced from a set of descriptive, natural facts. This approach has
always been attractive because, like divine command theory, it claims to provide an objective and
universal foundation. Moral rules based on natural law, like the dictates of science , are portrayed as
objective and existing independent of personal, social, or cultural beliefs. Natural law theory (or
naturalism) is often invoked in support of divine command theory, secular humanism in the Western
Enlightenment tradition, and even evolutionary biology. The key here is to identify natural attributes that
provide the basis for knowledge of moral goodness. We might argue, for example, that human beings are
rational by nature and therefore any act that is performed after sufficient and effective reasoning is good.
The assumption is that all rational persons will arrive at the same moral conclusions if only they reason
properly. Moral disagreements, therefore, turn out to be a conflict between rational and irrational agents.
For example, suppose I was to discuss the issue of slavery with a slaveholder and attempt to convince that
person to liberate his/her slaves. If we are both rational, eventually I should be able to convince that
person that slavery is wrong. Then again, if I fail, I might decide that either: a.) I did not argue effectively.
b.) The slave-holder is simply irrational, and therefore, unable to follow my rational argument. Convinced
of my righteousness, I might decide to forcibly liberate his/her slaves. I might even decide that the
irrational slaveholder is not a person worthy of moral consideration and simply kill him/her in the
process. Other natural law theorists say that all human beings naturally seek to possess private property
and therefore any act that interferes with the pursuit or holding of property is wrong. So if you try to steal
my guitar, you are violating the natural and moral law that states that I have a right to keep property that I
own. The slaveholder might argue that my attempt to liberate his slaves violates his right to own private
property. I might retort that slaves are not property but persons. Finally, evolutionary biologists have
sought to empirically identify the genetic characteristics that comprise human morality. Typically, they
argue that moral behaviors such as kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, feelings of sympathy, and
consolation are evolutionary traits that have contributed to human survival. The basic problem with
naturalism is determining which human behaviors or attributes are empirically consistent with our nature.
Are human beings really naturally rational? Do we really naturally pursue private property? Are we
natural hedonists? Suppose we are, in fact, all three. What happens when those natural impulses conflict?
Is it not possible for me to irrationally pursue property or pleasure? What happens if my lifelong pursuit
of private property interferes with my personal happiness? Even if we could establish an exhaustive list of
natural human attributes, how would one go about deciding which ones can serve as the grounding for
morality? After all, one might argue that human beings are also naturally selfish, xenophobic, erotic,
sexist, and violent. Some philosophers have attempted to contrast natural acts with unnatural acts, arguing
that human beings by reason of rationality, alone are capable of acting unnaturally. This line of argument
is often linked to theological premises that blame our propensity to perform unnatural acts on the fact that
God granted human beings freedom of the will. Unnatural acts, for example, might be attributed to our
failure to subject our free will to other natural constraints such as reason or conscience. However, once
we become engaged in the theological debate over freedom of the will, the prospects for arriving at a
consensus on a specific moral issue becomes much less likely. We might also argue that just because
human beings are naturally prone to perform certain acts, it does not necessarily imply that those acts are
morally good. That is, there may be a difference between a descriptive "is" and a prescriptive "ought."
Philosophers call it the “is/ought gap.” To confuse the two, they argue is to commit the naturalistic
fallacy. For example, if it is true that human beings are, in fact, naturally selfish, does that fact necessarily
imply that selfishness is morally good? If human beings are, in fact, naturally selfish, does that suggest
that prescriptive egoism is true? Again, what happens when natural selfishness conflicts with other natural
human attributes such as: our natural propensity to live in communities, or possess private property?

Despite its inherent vagaries moral philosophy probably cannot altogether avoid naturalism in the sense
that we surely must take into account natural human behavior in deciding what we can reasonably expect
in our treatment of one another. Indeed, the history of human moral codes testifies that it possible to
conceive of absolutely binding moral rules, based on natural law, that ordinary individuals, because of
their biological or social nature, simply cannot live up to. A moral rule is called superogative or idealistic
if it calls for a level of moral turpitude beyond the reach of us ordinary individuals. Many philosophers
argue, for example, that it is simply overly idealist to expect teenagers to refrain from engaging in sexual
activity: its natural behavior. However, many deontologists would argue that, just because teenagers find
sexual activity pleasurable and pre-marital celibacy to be difficult, if not impossible to live up to, that
doesn't mean that the moral rules pertaining to premarital sex are invalid. The rule is right. It's their acts
are simply wrong.

KANTIAN THEORY
In the Western philosophy deontological ethical theory has been dominated by two alternative theories:
divine command theory and Kantian theory. Immanuel Kant‟s major theoretical work, Groundwork for
the Metaphysics of Morals, is probably representative of the most palatable form of secular deontology. It
is also rooted in natural law theory. First of all, Kant argued that morality is only possible in a community
of beings that possess the natural attributes of rationality and free will . Thus, we cannot justly hold
someone responsible for his/her actions unless that person is capable of knowing right from wrong; and
unless that person is capable doing right and avoiding wrong. Knowing what‟s right or wrong is different
from doing what‟s right or wrong. Kant is not sure whether or not human beings do, as a matter of fact,
possess the attributes of rationality and free will, but he is certain that morality is impossible without
those attributes. I think he‟s right. Attempts to reconstruct morality by avoiding rationality and/or free
will are, at least in my view, woefully incoherent. But I digress… Recall that deontological theories avoid
both consequentialist reasoning and hedonism, in favor of a duty-based system of rules. Now Kant
acknowledged that human beings do, as a matter of descriptive fact, pursue pleasurable consequences in
their life. And he also observed the fact that, through personal and collective experience we can discover
general rules that maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Recall my earlier discussion of rules of
prudence: “Look both ways before you cross the street.” It‟s certainly a valid prescription that you ought
to follow. But just because you look both ways doesn‟t mean that you are a good person. Abeyance to the
rules of prudence that govern the distribution of pain and pleasure has nothing to do with morality. Hence,
Kant distinguishes between the rules that govern pleasure, which are relative to the tastes and inclinations
of particular individuals; and the rules that govern morality. Rules of prudence take the form of
hypothetical imperatives. If A then B: “If you like chocolate ice cream, go to Graeters and buy it.” Moral
rules, however, are not contingent upon our individual interests, wants, or taste. They are universal. The
hallmark of Kantian morality is its alleged universality. But how does one go about identifying these
universal rules of morality? Well, Kant argued that we need to apply a rule, which he called the
categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives take the form “Do A.” You do it not because of any
pleasurable consequence, but because it‟s the right thing to do. It is your moral duty to abide by any
particular rule that is consistent with the categorical imperative. In the Groundwork Kant offers us several
different formulations, including: “always act on universal principles” and “always treat persons as ends
and never as means.” Now what does Kant mean when he says that we ought to act on universal
principles, or rules? Well, a good way to start would be to ask the following question. “Could I rationally
prescribe that rule to apply to all persons, in all times, and in all places? ” Take for example the rule:
“Look both ways before crossing the street?” Now clearly, in our automobile-based society the highways
would be very unsafe if no one “looked both ways.” But, note that what makes this a valid rule is the
presence of automobiles and the potential for being struck by them, and the painful consequences that
flow from all that. Therefore, this is really a hypothetical imperative, “If there are cars around, look both
ways.” If you live in a society of pedestrians, the rule makes no sense. Let‟s try another rule. How about
the rule: “Always keep your promises.” First of all, we know that human beings have always made
promises. We also know if everyone makes promises, but they never keep promises, the whole concept of
a promise is derailed. Or suppose you know that human beings only follow the rule: “I keep my promises,
if and only if, keeping that promise increases my own personal pleasure, or the pleasure of most persons.”
If I ask you for a loan, and if you knew that promises are subject to hypothetical conditions, would you
lend me $20 based on my promise to repay you? If you knew that no one ever keeps their promises,
would you still float me that loan? The basic idea here is that the idea of a promise carries with it duty to
fulfill it. But what happens if I simply cannot repay that loan, even though I promised to pay you back
today? Am I a bad person? For Kant, and all deontological theorists, the morality of human action cannot
be separated from intent. Morally good actions arise out of good intentions and morally bad actions arise
out of bad intentions. Deontologists say that morally good actions are brought about by a good will. For
Kant, a good will is a will that molds itself in conformity to these absolute universal moral rules. So if I
make a promise that I intend to keep, but circumstances impede my ability to keep that promise: say I get
hit by a car and cannot afford to pay back the loan. If I intended to pay back that loan, and later regretted
that I could not do it, then I might be morally “off the hook.” Suppose that you I do, in fact, pay back that
loan, but not because it‟s the right thing to do, but because I knew that if I didn‟t pay you back, you
would stop by my house and beat the crap out of me? Morality cannot be based on fear of getting caught!
Hence, this gives rise to another useful Kantian distinction. He argues that there is difference between a
“good person” and a “good citizen.” A good person follows the dictates of the categorical imperative, and
therefore, acts in conformity to universal moral rules that hold true at all times in all places. A good
person does not worry about pain or pleasure, and does not engage in cost/benefit analysis. He/she acts
out of a good will. You do not have to threaten good persons to do the right thing. In contrast, a good
citizen does the right thing purely out of fear of getting caught. I chose to pay you back only because I
wanted to avoid the pain associated with getting beaten up. Note that if I believed that I could effectively
defend myself, or hide from you, I might choose not to pay you back. A society comprised entirely of
good citizens requires clear laws, monitoring for compliance, and the effective enforcement of those
rules. But a society of good persons would not require monitoring and enforcement. No one would break
promises, steal, or murder. We wouldn‟t need a police force, judiciary, or prisons. Sounds great! The
problem here is how does one go about creating a society comprised of good persons? I think at any given
time and place, a certain percentage of human beings are “good persons,” that do what‟s right without
having to be threatened. I will never murder a student. But it‟s not the punishment that deters me from
killing. If it was legal, I still wouldn‟t do it. If the law required me to kill students caught cheating, I sill
wouldn‟t do it. Killing students is just wrong. On the other hand, I am prone to violate local speed limits
when I suspect that there are no policemen around to exact a fine. Interesting, the last five times I‟ve been
caught speeding the policemen gave me warnings and not tickets. Why? Prudence, I try to be
extraordinarily respectful and friendly to policemen, and they usually reciprocate by not ticketing me. Try
it out! Another formulation of the categorical imperative says to “always treat persons as ends and never
as means.” What does that mean? Recall that all teleological theorists distinguish between means and
ends. In general, good ends justify the means by which those ends can be realized. Of course, rationality
of action depends on weighing the quantity of pleasure derived from achieving the end against the cost of
pleasures sacrificed as means. Kant argued that this costbenefit analysis works well enough for the amoral
world of pleasure, but it fails miserably as a foundation for morality. That‟s because all human beings are
rational agents in possession of free will, which bestows upon us infinite value. Therefore, it turns out to
be irrational to sacrifice the happiness of a single individual or a minority group in order to make a
majority happier. In other words, we cannot treat human beings as if they are things or property to be
sacrificed in pursuit of pleasure. The easiest way to understand what Kant has in mind is to focus on the
Kantian imperative stating that we must “always treat persons as ends and never as means.” He suggested
that it‟s best to think of humanity as if it were a “kingdom” composed of “ends;” that is a kingdom of
ends. When we treat persons as means to our own ends we essentially de-humanize them and devalue
them to the level of mere things or property. Actually, I think most libertarians respect Kant, but find his
philosophy to be other-worldly and impractical. It‟s easy to talk about universal moral rules in the
abstract, but it‟s hard to find many of them in the real world. But many libertarians do rely on that
deontological rights-based framework

Bentham believes that it is possible to calculate, compare and measure pleasure and pain
generated by actions according to several criteria (seven, to be precise). He called this the
"felicific calculus".

This means that every action that we intend to do should be measured by the number of
"units of pleasure" it produces, or expects to produce, in each of those seven categories; the
most correct action (the most ethic one) will be the one giving a highest total of points.

Mill is aware of the difficulties of making these quantitative measurements (that are a clear
shortcoming of Bentham's ideas), and changes the emphasis from "quantity" of pleasure to
its "quality".

He distinguishes between "higher" pleasures (associated with the mind, that generate

"happiness") and "lower" pleasures (associated with the body, that generate "contentment").
How do we know which is which? - Well, as he explains it... "those who have experienced
both prefer higher pleasures".

 Bentham said  "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as

poetry”.
 But Mill disagreed, and said: "Better to be a dissatisfied human being than a
satisfied pig. Better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. And if
the fool, or pork, believe otherwise it is because they only know their side of
the problem. "