MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, 

Petitioner, v. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-

IN-FACT, ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.

Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her
daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur,
Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael.
She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their
financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel
sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael's
relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to
bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated
as "kasunduan''4 wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates.
. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but
the BarangayCaptain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.

Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion
for Execution of the kasunduan.

Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's alleged
violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

MCTC rendered a decision5 in favor of Annabel,

the RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan City upheld the MCTC decision,
the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject
matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.7
, the RTC granted Michael's Motion for Reconsideration, and ruled that there is merit in the jurisdictional
issue he raised.
. The CA declared that the "appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing
Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael's contention, the
MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount involved.

The Issues
Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved
HELD

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction

to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.
We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the
lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN, Respondents.

On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages4 against
petitioners, respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan,
and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words. Petitioners
also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral
damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees;
₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim
for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of ₱300,000.00, because the claim for
exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court held that the total claim of respondent
amounted to ₱420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.
The trial court also later issued Orders on July 7, 20048 and July 19, 2004,9 respectively reiterating its
denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations
show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00, which amount
was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of
claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case
because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her
claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be
excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.

The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the
amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the original complaint and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of
right under the Rules.

ISSUES

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and

2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint?

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004,
the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to ₱300,000.00.

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by
respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary
relief prayed for in the complaint.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was ₱420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in
affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from ₱300,000.00 to
₱1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it
is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no
jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the
court,23 here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint
was then still a matter of right.24
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely:
JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
G. R. No. 162322               March 14, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent

respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario,
Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value of
₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, more
particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732
square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3

the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7 August 1997, it
issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6

the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan,
because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.7

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in
the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.

I.

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND
TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

II.

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION
FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.17

The Court’s Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in
order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.19 It cannot be acquired through a
waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.20 Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.21
27 
In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead
us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's
jurisdiction.

II

The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear
and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of
which does not exceed ₱100,000.

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporation’s application for registration on 8 January 1998.41

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case
does not exceed ₱100,000.
EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner, v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN, Respondents

Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 625 of the
Limay Cadastre which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-105602, with an aggregate
area of 82,972 square meters. While on board a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a
conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that
Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to
Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under
the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan (Felicisimo).

Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No.
137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.

respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused.
Respondents were then forced to file a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan
for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case No. 438-ML.
Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.

, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence
ex parte.

through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with Motion to Dismiss Case for
Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant.5 Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by means
of substituted service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been residing in Japan
after she married a Japanese national and only comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every
two years.

Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his sister is still in Japan and submitted a copy of
petitioner's passport and an envelope of a letter that was allegedly sent by his sister. Nevertheless, on
April 5, 2001, the RTC issued an Order6 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and declared her in
default. Thereafter, trial ensued.

, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint.

the CA rendered a Decision8 in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the
Decision of the RTC

. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.

On October 23, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution11 denying the motion. The CA concluded that the
rationale for the exception made in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy12 was present in the case.
It reasoned that when the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided by
the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the CA rendered a
decision adverse to her claim.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE CASE.

The petition is meritorious.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof.23Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is
only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in
the RTC are null and void
GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC., CEBU JAYA REALTY INC., and SPOUSES RHODORA and
LAMBERT LIM,Petitioners, 
vs.
HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL

On November 12, 2003, herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint3 for Declaration
of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The Complaint
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu.

herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (the same
being only ₱11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).5

, the RTC granted petitioners' Motion to Dismiss,

qualified the case as one incapable of pecuniary estimation thus, rendering it cognizable supposedly by
the second level courts but considering that Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides to cover "all civil
actions" which phrase understandably is to include those incapable of pecuniary estimation, like the case
at bar, this Court is of the view that said law really finds application here more so that the same case also
"involves title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." For being so, the assessed
value of the real property involved is determinative of which court has jurisdiction over the case. And the
plaintiffs admitting that the assessed value of the litigated area is less than ₱20,000.00, the defendants
are correct in arguing that the case is beyond this Court's jurisdiction.7

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,8 arguing that their complaint consists of several
causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.9

the RTC issued an Order granting respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration and reversing its
earlier Order

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the RTC denied it

, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition via its
assailed Decision dated July 11, 2007, holding that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the
main purpose in filing the action is to declare null and void the documents assailed therein.

It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of
each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.

it is clear from the records that respondents' complaint was for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees." In filing their Complaint with the RTC,
respondents sought to recover ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by
questioning the due execution and validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and herein petitioners.
Aside from praying that the RTC render judgment declaring as null and void the said Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale and Memorandum of Agreement, respondents likewise sought the following: (1)
nullification of the Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc.;
(2) partition of the property in litigation; (3) reconveyance of their respective shares; and (3) payment of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, plus appearance fees.1âwphi1

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition
of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for
declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.15

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance [now Regional
Trial Courts].17
SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARES, Petitioners 
vs.
REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING,

On September 3, 2012, Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) filed a Complaint
denominated as "Breach of Contract and Damages"6 against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares
(petitioners) before the RTC of Cebu City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-39025 and
assigned to Branch 17 of said court. Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet
Contract7 with petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or
materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or laundry
outlet; that petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which
required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when, on April 30, 2012, they
ceased dealer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written demands
upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter
failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of contract.

, the RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of jurisdiction, stating:

In the instant case, the plaintiffs complaint is for the recovery of damages for the alleged breach of
contract. The complaint sought the award of ₱200,000.00 as incidental and consequential damages; the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as legal expenses; the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the
amount of ₱20,000.00 as cost of the suit, or for the total amount of ₱280,000.00 as damages.

Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the amount of
demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction shall exceed ₱300,000.00; otherwise, the action shall fall under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total amount of demand in the complaint is only ₱280,000.00,
which is less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTCs. Hence, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over
the instant case.

Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration,12 arguing that as Civil Case No. CEB-39025 is for
breach of contract, or one whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction thus falls with
the RTC. However, in an April 29, 2013 Order,13 the RTC held its ground.

In our considered view, the complaint, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the
RTC's jurisdiction. x x x

x x xx

A case for breach of contract [sic] is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.17

the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over respondent's Complaint which, although
denominated as one for breach of contract, is essentially one for simple payment of damages.

The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 as an
action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit.
Respondent's complaint denominated
as one for "'Breach of Contract &
Damages" is neither an action for
specific performance nor a complaint
for rescission of contract

An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is nothing therein
which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for specific performance or
rescission of contract. It should be recalled that the principal obligation of petitioners under the
Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act as respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent, however,
neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perfom1 such obligation as contemplated in said contract
nor sought the rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading, and relief are bereft of such allegation.
In fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for purposes of clarity,
respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used any of those
phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's counsels
designated the Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a misnomer and
inaccurate. This erroneous notion was reiterated in respondent's Memorandum30 wherein it was stated
that "the main action of CEB 39025 is one for a breach of contract."31 There is no such thing as an "action
for breach of contract." Rather, "[b]reach of contract is a cause of action,32 but not the action or relief
itself"33 Breach of contract may be the cause of action in a complaint for specific performance or
rescission of contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, cognizable by
the RTC. However, as will be discussed below, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a
complaint for damages.

A complaint primarily seeking to

enforce the accessory obligation
contained in the penal clause is actually
an action for damages capable of
pecuniary estimation.

In an action for damages, the court

which has jurisdiction is determined by
the total amount of damages claimed.

Having thus determined the nature of respondent's principal action, the next question brought to fore is
whether it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-39025.

Paragraph 8, Section 1938 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,39 provides that where the
amount of the demand exceeds ₱100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction
belongs to the Municipal Trial Court

Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed with the RTC on
September 3, 2012 amounted only to ₱280,000.00, said court was correct in refusing to take cognizance
of the case.
THE CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners, v.EJERCITO LIM, DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES,
AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM, Respondent
Petitioners Executive Director and Chairman of the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
(PCSD), Messrs. Winston G. Arzaga and Vicente A. Sandoval, respectively, were the public officials
tasked with the duty of executing and implementing A.O. No. 00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show
Cause Order, while the PCSD was the government agency responsible for the governance,
implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan. On the other
hand, the respondent was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name and style
Bonanza Air Services, with authority to engage in nonscheduled air taxi transportation of passengers and
cargo for the public. His business operation was primarily that of transporting live fish from Palawan to
fish traders.3

The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the transport of live fish from
Palawan would be allowed only through traders and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation
from the PCSD. On September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sent to the PCSD its
communication to the effect that ATO-authorized carriers were considered common carriers, and, as
such, should be exempt from the PCSD accreditation requirement. It attached to the communication a list
of its authorized carriers, which included the respondent's air transport service.4

Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi legislative or rule-making power, and the
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
. The second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs
in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it.16

The challenge being brought by the petitioners rests mainly on the theory that the CA should not have
interpreted the functions of the PCSD, particularly those provided for in Sections 4, 6, 16, and 19 of R.A.
No. 7611, as limitations on the power of the PCSD to promulgate A.O. No. 00-05. Clearly, what was
assailed before the CA was the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as
an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function. The question thus presented
was a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, and exclusively and originally pertained to the proper
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court expressly states that any person "whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation" may bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court "to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise the issue against such validity
should have adhered to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had sufficient
justification to do otherwise. Yet, he utterly failed to show justification to merit the exception of bypassing
the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, by virtue of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,17 the Court's
power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.

To accord with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, therefore, the petition for prohibition should have been
originally brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as a petition for declaratory relief.
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, NAMELY: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA AND ZOEY G.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINA LINDO;
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in
Poblacion, Lupon, Davao, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents,
via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144
was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.1crallawlibrary

Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No.
1798,2anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act  No. (CA) 141, otherwise
known as the “Public Land Act

Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as
defenses.

during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania G. Bautista
(Epifania).

Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty square
meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all
claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC in its Decision

Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 dated February 4, 2013, alleging that the
complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that
the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred pesos (PhP 16,500), and
the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed value.  Since Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to
or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is more than PhP 20,000,
then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks
to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.

Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now seek recourse before this Court
with the following assigned errors

: whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Arguments

Petitioners argue that respondents belatedly filed their Motion to Dismiss and are now estopped from
seeking the dismissal of the case, it having been filed nine (9) years after the filing of the complaint and
after they have actively participated in the proceedings.

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which
reads

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which
provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

It is a well-settled rule that If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would
depend on the amount of the claim.”  But where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.  These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.

He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent.  Ergo, it is
clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to
one of specific performance.  Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interests therein and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the
MTC.  They rely on Sec. 33 of BP 129.

Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property
or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (PhP 20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein which falls
under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP
16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction
will not hold water.  This is because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the
RTC and aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question
the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking for
affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put,
considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped
from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J. TOLENTINO and
RODERICK JULAO, Petitioners, 
vs.
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS

Sometime in the 1960's, Telesforo Julao (Telesforo)6 filed before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA), TSA No. V-2132 and
TSA No. V-6667.7Upon his death on June 1, 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs.8

On April 30, 1979,9 Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights,10 transferring his
hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and
Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on the property they acquired
from Solito.11 In 1986, Solito went missing.12

the DENR issued an Order: Rejection and Transfer of Sales Rights,13 to wit:

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2446,15 covering a 641-square meter property, was issued in
favor of the heirs of Telesforo.16

petitioners Anita Julao vda. De Enriquez, Sonia J. Tolentino and Roderick Julao,17 representing
themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, a
Complaint or Recovery of Possession of Real Property,18 docketed as Civil Case No. 4308-R,19 against
respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter
parcel of land located at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, covered by OCT No. P-2446;20 that the subject
property originated from TSA No. V-2132;21 that respondent spouses' house encroached on 70 square
meters of the subject property;22 that on August 4, 1998, petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent
spouses asking them to return the subject property;23 that respondent spouses refused to accede to the
demand, insisting that they acquired the subject property from petitioners' brother, Solito, by virtue of a
Deed of Transfer of Rights;24 that in the Deed of Transfer of Rights, Solito expressly transferred in favor
of respondent spouses his hereditary share in the parcel of land covered by TSA No. V-6667;25 that TSA
No. V-6667 was rejected by the DENR;26 and that respondent spouses have no valid claim over the
subject property because it is covered by a separate application, TSA No. V-2132.27

Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss28 on the ground of prescription, which the RTC denied for
lack of merit.29 Thus, they filed an Answer30 contending that they are the true and lawful owners and
possessors of the subject property

the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found the Complaint dismissible on two grounds: (1)
failure on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of
jurisdiction. 54 The CA likewise pointed out that the Complaint failed to establish that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case as petitioners failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property

THE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT.57

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action.
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is detennined by the allegations in the complaint,
which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action.60

Section 19(2) and Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
provide:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts:

xxxx

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:

x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the
property sought to be recovered determines the court's jurisdiction.61

In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
₱20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject
property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had
jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be
determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
G.R. No. 199133               September 29, 2014

ESPERANZA TUMPAG, substituted by her son, PABLITO TUMPAG BELNAS, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
SAMUEL TUMPAG, Respondent

On March 13, 1995, Esperanza Tumpag (petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages (docketed as Civil Case No. 666) against Samuel Tumpag (respondent) before the RTC,
Branch 61, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The complaint alleged that:

1) Plaintiff (referring to the petitioner) is of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen and a resident of
Barangay Tuyom, Cauayan, Negros Occidental, while Defendant (referring to the respondent) is
also of legal age, married, Filipino and a residentof Barangay Tuyom, Cauayan, Negros
Occidental, where he maybe served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court;
2) Plaintiff is the absolute owner of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1880-A, Cauayan
Cadastre, containing an area of TWELVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY TWO (12,992)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, situated in Barangay Tuyom, Cauayan, Negros Occidental,
more particularly bounded and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-70184, dated April
27, 1983, issued by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in favor of Plaintiff, xerox copy of
which is hereto attached as ANNEX "A" and made an integral part hereof;

3) Defendant has been occupying a portion of not less than ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE
METERS ofthe above-described parcel of land of the Plaintiff for more than TEN (10) years, at the
tolerance of Plaintiff;

4) Sometime in 1987, Plaintiff wanted to recover the portion occupied by Defendant but Defendant
refused to return to Plaintiff or vacate said portion he has occupied inspite of repeated demands
from Plaintiff. And, to prevent Plaintiff from recovering the portion he has occupied, Defendant
instigated his other relatives to file a case against the herein Plaintiff, and, in1988, herein
Defendant Samuel Tumpag, together with Luz Tagle Vda. De Tumpag and other relatives, filed a
civil case, number 400, before this court against herein Plaintiff, Esperanza Tumpag, for
cancellation of her title with damages;

5) Said Civil Case No. 400 was dismissed by this Honorable Court through its Resolution, dated
October 11, 1989, penned by the Presiding Judge, the late Artemio L. Balinas, prompting the
Plaintiffs in said case to elevate the said resolution of thisHonorable Court to the Court of
Appeals, and their appeal is identified as C.A. G.R. No. CV-25699;

6) On June 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the said appealed case, the
dispositive portion of which read:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Resolution dated October 11, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED."

and, that the same has become final on March 11, 1994 and was entered, on August 26,
1994, in the Book of Entries of Judgment, xerox copy of said Entry of Judgment of the
Court of Appeals is hereto attached as ANNEX "B" and made part hereof;

7) Herein Plaintiff needs the portion occupied by Defendant and she has orally demanded from
Defendant of the return of the same, but Defendant refused and still refuses todo so. Hence,
Plaintiff brought the matter before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tuyom,
Cauayan, Negros Occidental, for conciliation, on March 3, 1995. But, unfortunately, Defendant
refused to vacate or return the portion he occupies to Plaintiff. Attached hereto as ANNEX "C,"
and made part hereof, is the Certification of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tuyom, Cauayan,
Negros Occidental, certifying that this matter was brought to his attention for conciliation;

8) Defendant’s refusal to return the portion he occupies to Plaintiff has caused Plaintiff to suffer
actual damages in the amount of not less than TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00), per
annum;

9) Defendant’s unjustifiable refusal to return the portion he occupies to Plaintiff has caused
Plaintiff to suffer mental anguish, embarrassment, untold worries, sleepless nights, fright and
similar injuries, entitling her to moral damages moderately assessed at not less than FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00);

10) To serve as deterrent (sic) toother persons similarly inclined and by way of example for the
public good, Defendant should be made to pay exemplary damages in the amountof not less than
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱25,000.00);

11) The unjustifiable refusal of Defendant to return the property to the Plaintiff leaves Plaintiff no other
alternative but to file this present action, forcing her to incur litigation expenses amounting to not less
than ONE THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,000.00), attorney’s fees in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱20,000.00) plus ONE THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,000.00) for every court appearance.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or
conduct,14 and is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.15 Under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,16 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,17 the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over civil
actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, orany interest therein, is limited to cases where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings.18

Here, the petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before the RTC but failed
to allege in her complaint the property’s assessed value. Attached, however, to the petitioner’s complaint
was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject property has a market value of
₱51,965.00 and assessed value of ₱20,790.00.

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is
within its jurisdiction.20 

In the present case, we find reason not to strictly apply the abovementioned general rule, and to
consider the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property attachedto the complaint in determining
whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case. A mere reference to the attached document
could faciallyresolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point
unnecessary.

We rule that the respondent is notestopped from assailing the RTC’s jurisdiction over the subject civil
case.1âwphi1Records show that the respondent has consistently brought the issue of the court's lack of
jurisdiction in his motions, pleadings and submissions throughout the proceedings, until the CA dismissed
the petitioner's complaint, not on the basis of a finding of lack of jurisdiction, but due to the insufficiency of
the petitioner's complaint, i.e. failure to allege the assessed value of the subject property. Even in his
comment filed before this Court, the respondent maintains that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can always be raised anytime, even for the first
time on appeal,30 since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged
by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.31 Thus, the respondent is
not prevented from raising the question on the court's jurisdiction in his appeal, if any, to the June 3, 2002
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 666.
JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner, 
vs.
EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA,1 JESUSA2 DE LA PENA, JOHNNY DE LA PENA,
JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE DE LA PENA, JESSICA DE LA PENA, and JAIME ANTONIO DE LA
PENA, Respondents.

Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime), all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located in
Murcia, Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot Nos. 138-D and 138-S, and are
respectively covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-103187 and T-1031895 (subject properties).

Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner)
entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to
respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents discovered such illegal entry, which prompted
them to verbally demand from petitioner to vacate the properties but to no avail.6

Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental but
failed to arrive at any amicable settlement. On September 29, 1997, the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
said Barangay issued a Certificate to File Action;7 and, on March 9, 1998, respondents filed a
Complaint8 for recovery of possession and damages with injunction against petitioner.

In his Answer,9 petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica
executed their separate Waivers of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over
the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime subsequently waived his rights and interests on
the same properties to petitioner.10Petitioner claimed that respondents did not attempt to enter the
properties as they already intentionally relinquished their interests thereon.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the
Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical possession of the properties in dispute; said
Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the parties had a confrontation before
the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial
Court (MTC).

, in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,13 respondents contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case because their demand for petitioner to vacate the properties was made during the crop year 1995-
1996, which was earlier than the refe1Tal of the matter to Barangay Cansilayan.

On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the case
because the area of the subject properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that
the value of the same is more than ₱20,000.00."14

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to turn over the subject properties
to respondents and to pay them ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The RTC ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by Jaime to petitioner was coupled with a
consideration. However, petitioner failed to prove that he paid a consideration for such a waiver; as such,
petitioner was not entitled to possess the subject properties.

Both parties appealed to the CA.

On one hand, petitioner reiterated that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. He also maintained that
respondents already waived their shares and rights over the properties to Jaime, who, in turn, renounced
his rights to petitioner.

On the other hand, respondents assailed the RTC Decision in so far as it failed to award them damages
as a result of petitioner's purported illegal entry and possession of the subject properties.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On May 28, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision

The CA dismissed respondents' appeal because they did not establish entitlement to damages. It
likewise dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner for failing to establish that he gave any
consideration in relation to Jaime's waiver of rights in his (petitioner) favor.

In addition, the CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over this case considering that the parties
stipulated on the jurisdiction of the RTC but also because the assessed value of the subject properties is
presumed to have exceeded ₱20,000.00.

Issues

I. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE?

The Court grants the Petition.

In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment
(either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a
year; 2) accion publiciona or a plenary action for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession
has lasted for more than one year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of
ownership.18

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),19 the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC), MTC, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover,
jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed ₱20,000.00
(or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila),20 On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value
of the property exceeds ₱20,000.00(or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila).21

Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of the
property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property
is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take cognizance of the action.22

As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in
the complaint, and the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts
alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action, and the court that can
take cognizance of the case.23

Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional facts that must be set
forth in the complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer.
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical possession of the
property; the fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth; and the action must be filed within one year from the time the owner or the legal possessor
learned of their dispossession.26 On the other hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must state that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real property after the expiration or termination of
his or her right to possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year from the time such possession
became unlawful.27

In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners of the
subject properties, and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did not assert therein
that they were dispossessed of the subject properties under the circumstances necessary to make a
case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Hence, in the absence of the required jurisdictional
facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment.28

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana, there was no
clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it.1âwphi1

Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and
must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the
parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.29

However, as discussed, jurisdiction cam1ot be presumed. It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the
parties, or on the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.

Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject properties,
it cannot be determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint.
Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even market value of the
land.33 Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are
void,34 which makes it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH LAND,
INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG
RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.

Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 202664
20 November 2015
SUBJECT : Remedial Law
TOPIC : Jurisdiction
FACTS :
Gonzales filed a complaint against GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.)
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of
S.J. Land, Inc.’s shares. Gonzales likewise paid the assessed docket and filing fees
amounting to Php235,825.00.

In the complaint, Gonzales alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., yet these same shares were again
offered for sale.

The case was raffled to RTC Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. GJH
Land, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
since the case involves an intra-corporate controversy, it should be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.

RTC Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss reasoning that it had no jurisdiction over
the case since RTC Branch 256 was the branch specifically designated by the Supreme
Court as the Special Commercial Court.
ISSUE/S :
Whether or not RTC Branch 276 erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter?
HELD :
Yes, the RTC Branch 276 erred in dismissing the case. The case should be referred to
the Executive Judge for re-raffling among the designated Special Commercial Courts of
the same station (i.e. RTC Branch 256 since it is the sole designated Special
Commercial Court in this case).

A court’s acquisition of jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law whereas the exercise of jurisdiction is governed by the
Rules of Court or by the orders issued of the Supreme Court.

In the instant case, from the time of filing of the intra-corporate controversy and payment
of docket and filing fees, the RTC of Muntinlupa City (station) acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. However, RTC Branch 276, not being a Special
Commercial Court, is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the intra-corporate
controversy.
When a commercial case such as an intra-corporate controversy is filed in the official
RTC station but is wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station, the said
regular branch, instead of dismissing the complaint, should first refer the case to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge
should re-raffle the said case among the designated Special Commercial Courts of that
station.
Concorde Condominium, Inc. v. Baculio

G.R. No. 203678, 17 February 2016

FACTS:

Concorde Condominium, Inc., by itself and comprising the Unit Owners of Concorde Condominium Building,

filed with the RTC of Makati a Petition for Injunction against respondents. It seeks (1) to enjoin Baculio and

New PPI Corporation from misrepresenting to the public that they are the owners of the disputed lots and

Concorde Condominium Building, and from pursuing for the demolition of the building which they do not even

own; (2) to prevent Asian Security and Investigation Agency from deploying its security guards within the

perimeter of the said building; and (3) to restrain Engr. Morales, Supt. Perdigon and F/C Supt. Laguna from

responding to and acting upon the letters being sent by Baculio who is a mere impostor and has no legal

personality on matters concerning the revocation of building and occupancy permits and on the fire safety

issues of the same building. The petition was raffled to Branch 149 which was designated as a Special

Commercial Court.

Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss stating that the case is beyond the jurisdiction of Branch 149 as a

Special Commercial Court. The petition seeks to restrain or compel individuals and government officials to

stop doing particular acts and that there is no showing that the case involves a matter embraced in Section 5

of PD No. 902-A which enumerates the cases over which the SEC [now the RTC acting as Special

Commercial Court pursuant to RA No. 8799] exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Petitioner also failed to exhaust

administrative remedies which is a condition precedent.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. By petitioner’s own allegations and admissions, Baculio

and New PPI Corporation are not owners of the subject lots and the building. Due to the absence of intra-

corporate relations between the parties, it ruled that the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy

cognizable by it sitting as a Special Commercial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the allegations in the complaint constitutes an intra-corporate controversy that falls within the

jurisdiction of a special commercial court.

RULING:

No. The petition filed before the RTC is an action for injunction as can be gleaned from the allegations made

and reliefs sought by petitioner. Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test in

determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, as enunciated in Medical Plaza

Makati Condominium Corporation v. Cullen, the Court agrees with Branch 149 that the present case is an

ordinary civil case and not an intra-corporate controversy.

No intra-corporate relations exists between the opposing parties. Moreover, the petition deals with the

conflicting claims of ownership over the lots where Concorde Condominium Building and the parking lot for

unit owners stand as well as the purported violations of the National Building Code. Considering the foregoing,

as the suit between petitioner and respondents neither arises from an intra-corporate relationship nor does it

pertain to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the

internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, Branch 149 correctly found that the subject

matter of the petition is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.

Malayan Insurance v. Alibudbud
Facts:

Diana Alibudbud,employed by Malayan Insurance as the Senior Vice President for its Sales Department was issued
a Honda Civic sedan with the following conditions: (1) she must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least
three full years from the date of the availment of the Car Financing Plan; and (2) that in case of resignation,
retirement or termination before the three-year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the
outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of the motor vehicle.

Alibudbud execute a Promissory Note and a Deed of Chattel Mortgage in the amount of P360,000.00. One of the
stipulations in the Deed state that Alibudbud shall refund Malayan an amount equivalent to its 50% equity share in
the motor vehicle, or P360,000.00 if she leaves Malayan within three years from the availment of the subject
vehicle.

Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. Malayan demanded that she surrender possession of
the car but Alibudbud refused to do so.

Malayan instituted a complaint for Replevin. Afterwards, Alibudbud filed an illegal dismissal case against Malayan.
She also sought for the suspension of the proceedings on the action for Replevin on the grounds that the illegal
dismissal case was a prejudicial question. The complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed.

The RTC granted the replevin and stated that: Alibudbud is under obligation to pay in full the acquisition cost of the
car issued to her by Malayan; Alibudbud's ownership over the car is not yet absolute for it bears the notation
"encumbered", thereby signifying her obligation to pay its value within the period set forth in the Promissory Note
and Deed of Chattel Mortgage; and that the replevin action was converted into a money claim in view of Alibudbud's
vehement refusal to surrender the possession of the car.

The CA dismissed the action for replevin on the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the action for replevin
as there was an “employer-employee” relationship which was, in effect, a pre-condition before one can avail of the
car financing plan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case; Whether or not the parties’ relationship to
each other is that of an “employer-employee”

HELD:

YES, the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case. The relationship of the parties is that of debtor and
creditor. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its
possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel
Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under
Malayan's Car Financing Plan. The issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal
case.