32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

1 *
G.R. No. 110478. October 15, 2007.

FERMIN MANAPAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondents.
*
G.R. No. 116176. October 15, 2007.

DOMINGO LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 116491-503. October 15, 2007.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.

MAXIMO LOBERANES, ELADIO QUIMQUE,
CESARIO VEGA, JUANITO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO
ORACION and GONZALO MERCADO, respondents.

Eminent Domain; Non-Impairment Clause; The power

of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power
of the State; By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise
of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is
clearly superior to the final and executory judgment
rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution merely imposes a limit on the
government’s exercise of the power and provides a measure
of protection to the individual’s right to property.—The
power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable
power of the State. Also called the power of expropriation, it
is described as “the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government” that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method “in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State.” By virtue of its sovereign
charac-

_______________

1 Initially, this case was given additional 11 docket numbers, 110482-

93, due to the fact that the decision of the CA indicated that it involved 12
consolidated expropriation cases. After perusing the records, however, the
Court in the September 20, 1993 Resolution ordered the deletion of the
additional docket numbers for it found that petitioner Manapat filed his
appeal only in his behalf and not of the other parties in the CA
consolidated cases (see Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, pp. 109-111).

* THIRD DIVISION.

33

VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 33

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

ter, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-

impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and
executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment
case. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically
conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, which mandates that
“private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation,” merely imposes a limit on the
government’s exercise of the power and provides a measure
of protection to the individual’s right to property.
Same; The power of eminent domain may be delegated
by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local
government units and even to private enterprises performing
public services.—Just like its two companion fundamental
powers of the State, the power of eminent domain is
exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated
by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local
government units, and even to private enterprises
performing public services.

Same; Requisites.—Over the years and in a plethora of

cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for
the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the
property taken must be private property; (2) there must be
genuine necessity to take the private property; (3) the
taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of
just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due
process of law.

Same; As a rule, genuine necessity for the exercise of

eminent domain is a justiciable question but when the power
is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is
essentially a political question.—It is well to recall that in
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, 440 SCRA 279 (2004), we declared
that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. As a rule, the determination of whether there is
genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question.
However, when the power is exercised by the Legislature,
the question of necessity is essentially a political question.
Thus, in City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349
(1919), we held: The legislature, in providing for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property
for a particular improvement for public use, and it

34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a

case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all
questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and
the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of the people.

Same; Socialized Housing; Words and Phrases;

Socialized housing is the construction of dwelling units for
the middle and lower class members of our society; Zonal
Improvement Program is an integral part of the
government’s socialized housing—as such, the Supreme
Court has deemed it compliant with the public purpose
requirement, it being clearly devoted to public purpose.—
The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented
for government by NHA, draws breath from policy
mandates found in the 1987 Constitution. It is an integral
part of the government’s “socialized housing” program
which, in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, we deemed
compliant with the “public use” requirement, it being a
program clearly devoted to a “public purpose.” Justice Irene
R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said:
“Socialized housing” is defined as, “the construction of
dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of
our society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities” (Pres. Decree No. 1224,
par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include
among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of
dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of
the society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities; b) Slum clearance,
relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers
as well as the provision of related facilities and services; c)
Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating
homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved,
rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and
other dwelling structures and the construction and
provision of basic community facilities and services, where
there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage,
sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay
centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks,
playgrounds and other recreational facilities; d) The
provision of economic opportunities, including the
development of commercial and industrial estates and such
other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and,
e) Such other activities

35

VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 35

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and

maintain housing for the greatest number of people under
Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)
xxxx

Same; Same; Same; The “public use” requisite for the

exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.—It
need only be added, at this juncture, that the “public use”
requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. At present, it may not be amiss to
state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Same; Same; The propriety of exercising the power of

eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely
quantitative or area basis, given that the Constitution
speaks of lands, not of landed estates.—J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration , 31 SCRA 413 (1970),
is instructive. In that case, this Court adopted the
dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v.
Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461 (1955), that the propriety of
exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be
determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given
that the Constitution speaks of lands, not of landed estates.
Speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M.
Fernando, the Court said: This is not to say of course that
property rights are disregarded. This is merely to
emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution
embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its
“nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a
sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions” although not
extending as far as the “destruction or annihilation” of the
rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time
reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their
well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our
Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with
its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy
supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire,
as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not
take too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our
Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it
for laissez faire.

Same; Same; Urban Development and Housing Act of

1992 (R.A. No. 7279); Statutory Construction; A new statute
should affect the future, not the past—the law looks forward
and not backward; The language of R.A. No. 7279 does not
suggest that the Legislature

36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

has intended its provisions to have any retroactive

application.—The Court is not unaware of the condition
now imposed by R.A. No. 7279 that, for purposes of urban
development and housing under the Act, where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted. “Small property
owners” are owners of residential lands with an area not
exceeding 300 sq. m. in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq.
m. in other urban areas and who do not own any other real
property. Invoking this limitation under the said law, the
appellate court in the questioned rulings exempted from
expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes, Quimque,
Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted the lot
of Oracion. The CA’s ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A.
No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the
expropriation cases against the property owners herein
were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio
futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new
statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks
forward, not backward. Article 4 of the Civil Code even
explicitly declares, “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.” In these consolidated
cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279
does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its
provisions to have any retroactive application. On the
contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it “shall
take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.” The law’s prospective
application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree
with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject
lots not exceeding 300 sq. m. are exempt from
expropriation.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision

and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Severo C. Oebanda, Jr. for Domingo Lim.
     Manuel T. Ubarra for Fermin Manapat.
          Antonio A. Cablitos for petitioner in G.R. No.
110478 and G.R. Nos. 110482-93.
     Jose A. Dizon for Rosemarie Guanzon, et al.
     Abundio Villar for Loberanes and Quimpe.
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VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 37

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

     Rafael Viola for respondents Vega and Santos.

          Americo Acosta for respondents Oracion and
Mercado.
          The Government Corporate Counsel for
National Housing Authority.

NACHURA, J.:

For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated

petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.2
G.R. No. 110478 assails the May 27,
1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212. G.R. 3
No. 116176
questions the June 28, 1994 Decision of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159. G.R. Nos. 116491503
assails the 4 March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994
Resolutions of the CA also in CA-G.R. CV Nos.
10200-10212.
The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for
its subject parcels of land forming part of what was
originally known as the Grace Park Subdivision in
Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The Facts
Sometime in the 1960s, RCAM allowed a number of
individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on
condition that

_______________

2 Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, with

Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (who later became Associate
Justice of this Court) and Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, concurring;
Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, pp. 48-69.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with
Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.,
concurring; Rollo, G.R. No. 116176, pp. 20-31.
4 Both penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro,
with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (who later became
Associate Justice of this Court) and Cezar D. Francisco, concurring;
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 66-74 and 76-81.

38

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

they would vacate the premises should the former

push through with the plan to construct a school in
the area. The plan, however, did not materialize,
thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions
they occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAM’s
proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves
as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr.
Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government
for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision
into home lots, and the
5
resale of the subdivided lots to
them at a low price.
Acting on the association’s petition, the
Government, in 1963, through the Land Tenure
Administration (LTA), later succeeded by the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC),
negotiated for the acquisition of the property from
RCAM/PRC. But because of the high asking price of
RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the
Government, the latter’s effort to purchase and/or to
expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM
then decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of
the property and the
6
sale of the individual subdivided
lots to the public. Petitioners Manapat and Lim and
respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos,
Oracion and Mercado in these consolidated cases
were among those who purchased individual
subdivided lots
7
of Grace Park directly from RCAM
and/or PRC.
A significant turn of events however happened in
1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos8
issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072,
appropriating P1.2M out of the

_______________

5 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 27-28.

6 Id., at pp. 28-29.
7 Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, p. 14; Rollo, G.R. No. 116176, p. 11;
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 13-14.
8 PD No. 1072 substantially states as follows:

xxxx
APPROPRIATING THE AMOUNT OF ONE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS TO COVER THE ADDITIONAL
AMOUNT NEEDED FOR THE EXPROPRIATION

39

VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 39

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

President’s Special Operations Funds to cover the

additional amount needed for the expropriation of
Grace Park. The National Housing Authority (NHA),
PHHC’s successor, then filed several expropriation
proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into
small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to
the resi-

_______________

OF 51 LOTS OF THE GRACE PARK SUBDIVISION IN CALOOCAN

CITY
WHEREAS, upon petition of the occupants, the defunct People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation authorized on November 27, 1964, the
expropriation of 51 lots of Block 157, 158 and 159 of the Grace Park
Subdivision situated in Caloocan City, totaling 18,427.5 sq. m., and
requested the Office of the President the sum of Six Hundred Forty Five
Thousand (P645,000.00) Pesos needed to acquire that said lots at P35.00
per square meter.
WHEREAS, the Treasurer of the Philippines was able to release the
requested sum of P645,000.00 to the National Housing Authority only on
February 12, 1976, at which time the market value of the said lots had
increased from P35.00 per square meter to an average of P100 per square
meter, or a total of P1.85 million, thereby making the amount released to
the National Housing Authority inadequate by One Million Two Hundred
Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution do
hereby order and decree:
SECTION 1. The sum of One Million Two Hundred Thousand
(P1,200,000.00) Pesos is hereby appropriated out of the President’s Special
Operations Funds, to cover the additional amount needed to expropriate
the 51 lots of Block 157, 158 and 159 of the Grace Park Subdivision in
Caloocan City, for resale to the bona fide occupants therein.
SECTION 2. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of January, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.

40

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

9
dents of the area. The following cases were filed by
the NHA with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City: C-6225, C-6226, C-6227, C-6228, C-
6229, C-6230, C-6231, C-6232, C6233, C-6234,10 C-
6235, C-6236, C-6237, C-6238, C-6255 and C6435.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered
separate decisions dismissing the expropriation cases,
with the exceptions of Cases Nos. C-6233 and C-6236
in which
11
it ordered the condemnation of the involved
lots. On motion for reconsideration by the NHA in
Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C6234, C-6235,
C-6238 and C-6255, the trial court later amended its
decision, set aside its dismissal of the said cases,
ordered the condemnation of the involved lots and
fixed the amount of just compensation at P180.00 per
square meter. In Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231,
C-6232, C-6237 and C6435, the RTC 12
however denied
NHA’s motion for reconsideration.
NHA eventually appealed to the CA the decisions
in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-
6237 and C-6435 on the issue of the necessity of the
taking, and the amended ruling in Cases Nos. C-
6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 13
and C-
6255 on the issue of just compensation. The CA
consolidated the appeals and docketed them as CA-
G.R. CV No. 10200-10212. NHA likewise filed with
the CA an appeal from the decision in C-6226, which
was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 27159.
On May14
27, 1993, the appellate court rendered its
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 disposing
of the appealed cases as follows:

_______________

9 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 29-33.

10 Id., at pp. 57-60.
11 Id., at p. 16.
12 Id., at pp. 17-19.
13 Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, p. 54.
14 Id., at pp. 48-69.

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VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 41

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1) Reversing and setting aside the decisions of

dismissal in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-
6232, C-6237 and C-6435; and in lieu thereof an
order of condemnation is entered declaring that
plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take
the lots involved for the public use described in the
complaints;
2) Affirming the decisions in Case Nos. C-6227, C-
6228, C6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as
said decision granted the expropriation; declaring
that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to
take the lots involved for the public use stated in
the complaint; but annulling and setting aside the
just compensation fixed by the trial court at P180.00
per square meter in the said cases;
3) Ordering the remand of all the appealed cases,
except for Case No. C-6230, to the trial court for
determination of the just compensation to which
defendants are entitled in accordance with Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court;
4) Finding the compromise agreement in Case No. C-
6230, entitled, “NHA v. Aurora Dy dela Costa, et al.”
in accordance with law, and not contrary to morals
or public policy, and rendering judgment in
accordance therewith;
5) Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as
defendant with Julia C. Diaz in Case No. C-6227.

No pronouncement
15
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”

Rosemarie and Dolores Guanzon, two of the owners of

the lots in C-6225, filed before this Court a petition
for review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the
appellate court [Their petition was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 110462-74]. On September 5, 1994, we dismissed
their petition for failure to sufficiently show that the
CA had committed16 any reversible error in the
challenged decision. An 17Entry of Judgment was
issued on February 2, 1995.

_______________

15 Id., at p. 68.
16 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 110462-74, pp. 99-100.
17 Id., at pp. 263-264.

42

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

Likewise, Julia Diez and Remedios Macato, the

owners of the lots in C-6227, assailed before us the
afore-quoted CA decision through a petition under
Rule 45. On July 28, 1993, however, in G.R. No.
110770, we denied their Motion for Extension of Time
to file a petition for review on certiorari for their
failure to submit an affidavit of service
18
of the motion
as required by Circular No. 19-91.19
After denying
their motion for reconsideration, 20 we issued an Entry
of Judgment on August 27, 1993.
Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner in
C-6229, also elevated the case before us via a petition
21
21
for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 110478.
We initially dismissed
22
this petition for having been
filed out of time,23 but we reinstated it on motion for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, the other defendants-landowners
in the expropriation cases—RCAM/PRC in C-6225,
Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque in C-6231,
Alejandro Oracion, Gonzalo Mercado, Cesario Vega
and Juanito Santos in C6435, and Remedios Macato
in C-6227—moved for the reconsideration
24
of the said
May 27, 1993 Decision
25
of the CA. In the March 2,
1994 Resolution, the appellate court resolved the
motions in this wise:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for

reconsideration of movants Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila and Philippine Realty Corporation (in Special Civil
Action No. 6225) and movant-intervenor Remedios Macato
(in Special Civil Action No. 6227) are DENIED.

_______________

18 Rollo, G.R. No. 110770, p. 3.

19 Id., at p. 18.
20 Id., at p. 207.
21 Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, pp. 10-46.
22 Id., at p. 101.
23 Id., at pp. 109-111.
24 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, p. 67.
25 Id., at pp. 66-74; supra note 5.

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VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 43

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

The motions for reconsideration of movants Gonzalo

Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil
Action No. 6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and
Eladio Quimque (in Special Civil Action No. 6231) are
GRANTED. The motion for reconsideration of movant
Alejandro Oracion (in Special Civil Action No. 6435) is
partially granted to the extent of Three Hundred (300)
square meters of Lot 22, Block 157. The decision of this
Court promulgated May 27, 1993 is accordingly
MODIFIED. Lot No. 26, Block No. 157 owned by Cesario
Vega and Juanito Santos, and Lot No. 4, Block No. 157
owned by Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque are
declared exempt from expropriation and the corresponding
complaints for expropriation (sic) DISMISSED insofar as
said lots are concerned. Lot No. 22, Block No. 157 owned by
movant Alejandro Oracion is declared exempt from
expropriation to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square
meters. Only the remaining Ninety (90) square meters shall
be the subject of expropriation, the portion to be determined
by the lower court in the manner most beneficial to the
owner and consistent26
with the objective of PD 1072.
SO ORDERED.”

Aggrieved by the said March 2, 1994 CA Resolution

specifically with regard to the exemption from
expropriation of the lots of Loberanes, Quimque,
Mercado, Vega and Santos, and the partial exemption
of the lot of Oracion, NHA moved for the
reconsideration of the27same. In the subsequent July
25, 1994 Resolution, the appellate court denied
NHA’s motion, together with the belated motion of
Vivencio S. de Guzman, the defendant-landowner in
C-6255. The dispositive portion of the July 25, 1994
Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration of

defendantappellant Vivencio S. de Guzman of the decision
promulgated May 27, 1993 and of plaintiff-appellant
National Housing Authority of the resolution promulgated
March 2, 1994 are DENIED.
28
SO ORDERED.”

_______________
26 Id., at p. 74.
27 Id., at pp. 76-81; supra note 5.
28 Id., at p. 81.

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44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,

NHA filed29
with this Court a Consolidated Petition for
Review under Rule 45, as aforesaid, assailing the
March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions of
the appellate court. NHA’s petition was docketed as
G.R. Nos. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes
and Quimque (in C-6231), Vega, Santos, Oracion and
Mercado (in C-6435).
In a separate development, 30
the CA, on June 28,
1994, rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
27159, reversing the RTC’s ruling in C-6226. The
fallo of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED,

the appealed decision dated October 29, 1986 is hereby
REVERSED for want of merit. Let the record of this case be
remanded to the court of 31origin for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”

Discontented with the appellate court’s ruling,

petitioner Domingo Lim, one of the owners of the lots
subject of C-6226, elevated the case to us via a
petition32for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
116176.

The Issues

Thus, for resolution by this Court are the following

consolidated cases: (1) G.R. No. 110478 of Manapat;
(2) G.R. Nos. 116491-503 of the NHA; and (3) G.R.
No. 116176 of Lim.
In G.R. No. 110487, petitioner Manapat argues in
the main that, as he is also a member of the tenant
association, the beneficiary of the expropriation, it
would be incongruous to take the land away from him
only to give it back to him as an intended beneficiary.
Accordingly, the CA, in its May 27, 1993 Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212, should not have

_______________

29 Id., at pp. 11-55.

30 Supra note 4.
31 Rollo, G.R. No. 116176, p. 12.
32 Id., at pp. 7-18.

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VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 45

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

allowed the expropriation of his lot. To further

support his stance, Manapat raises the following
grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER, SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO BE
EXPROPRIATED AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THEY ARE INTENDED, REMOVES FROM THE
JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE
NECESSITY OF THE TAKING, THERE 33
BEING NO
SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II
SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR AN
ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT NHA
HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO TAKE THE LOT OF FERMIN
MANAPAT FOR SUPPOSED PUBLIC USE AND FOR
REMAND OF HIS CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT34
FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE

CONSIDERED THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT ONLY
A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK
SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF P.D. 1072 BUT
LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 42370 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE
CITY OF CALOOCAN OVER THE SAME LOT SOUGHT
TO BE EXPROPRIATED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL35
ATTACK AS DISPOSED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE

CONSIDERED THAT THE EVENTUAL BENEFICIARIES
OF ITS BENEVOLENT
36
EXPROPRIATION ARE
SQUATTERS.

_______________

33 Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, p. 28.

34 Id., at p. 40.
35 Id., at p. 41.
36 Id., at p. 42.

46

46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals
NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503,
primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued
its March 2, 1994 Resolution and modified the May
27, 1993 Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 10200-10212 to
the extent that it applied retroactively Article VI,
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus
exempting from expropriation the 300-sq. m. lots of
respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos,
Oracion and Mercado. NHA summarized its
arguments as follows:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying

retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7279
to the subject expropriation 37cases instituted back in 1977
by petitioner-appellant NHA.

A. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should operate

prospectively and,38 therefore, should not be given
retroactive effect.
  Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal law with a
penalty clause which cannot apply
39
retroactively
especially to pending actions.
B. Republic40Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in pari
materia.
  The retroactive application of Article VI, Section 10 of
RA 7279 will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant
NHA arising
41
from its exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the

impractical consequences
42
resulting from a selective
expropriation of lots.

_______________

37 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, p. 33.

38 Id., at p. 35.
39 Id., at p. 41.
40 Id., at p. 43.
41 Id., at p. 45.
42 Id., at p. 47.

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VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 47

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

In G.R. No. 116176, petitioner Lim, a non-member of

the tenant association who bought from RCAM/PRC 43
four lots of the subdivided Grace Park Subdivision,
argues as follows:

Respondent NHA may not, as it would herein, legally re-

group several smaller lots into which a much bigger lot had
previously been subdivided, and consider and treat them as
one again for the purpose of subdividing it once more into
still smaller lots
44
for distribution to its supposed or intended
beneficiaries.

There really was no genuine necessity for the

expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy
45
the purpose
thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor.

Respondent Court did not sustain the clear finding of the

trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its claim that
the expropriation of said lots and subdividing them again
into much smaller lots for resale to their present occupants
would provide the latter with more healthful, decent and
peaceful surroundings and thus improve the quality
46
of their
lives was ever presented by respondent NHA.
Stripped of non-essentials, the petitions raise only
one fundamental issue, and that is, whether the NHA
may validly expropriate the parcels of land subject of
these cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The power of eminent domain is an inherent and

indispensable power of the State. Also called the
power of expropriation, it is described as “the highest
and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government” that may be acquired

_______________

43 Rollo, G.R. No. 116176, p. 88.

44 Id., at p. 13.
45 Id., at p. 14.
46 Id., at pp. 14-15.

48

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

for some public purpose through a method 47

“in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State.” By virtue
of its sovereign character, the exercise of the48
power
prevails over the nonimpairment clause, and is
clearly superior to the final and executory
49
judgment
rendered by a court in an ejectment case.
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically
conferred on the government by the Constitution.
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which
mandates that “private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation,” merely
imposes a limit on the government’s exercise of the
power and provides a measure 50
of protection to the
individual’s right to property.
Just like
51
its two companion fundamental powers of
the State, the power of eminent domain is exercised
by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by
Congress to the President, administrative bodies,
local government units, and even 52
to private
enterprises performing public services.
Albeit the power partakes of a sovereign character,
it is by no means absolute. Its exercise is subject to
limitations, one of which is, precisely, Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution.
Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this
Court has recognized the following requisites for the
valid exercise of the

_______________

47 Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 61, quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 616.
48 Kabiling v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-57424,
December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 623.
49 Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
125218 and 128077, January 23, 1998, 284 SCRA 716.
50 Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2, 1998, 299
SCRA 549.
51 The two other fundamental powers of the State are the police
power and the power of taxation.
52 Under existing laws, quasi-public corporations such as the
Philippine National Railways, the PLDT and Meralco have been
granted the power of expropriation.

49

VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 49

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken

must be private property; (2) there must be genuine
necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking
must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of
just compensation; and (5) 53
the taking must comply
with due process of law. Accordingly, the question
that this Court must resolve is whether these
requisites have been adequately addressed.
It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land
subject of these consolidated petitions are private
property. Thus, the first requisite is satisfied.
With respect to the second,54
it is well to recall that
in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, we declared that the
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. As a rule, the determination of
whether there is genuine
55
necessity for the exercise is
a justiciable question. However, when the power is
exercised by the Legislature, the question
56
of necessity
is essentially a political question.
57
Thus, in City of
Manila v. Chinese Community, we held:

“The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power

of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity
for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact
location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-
settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the
extent of the public necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the
land selected for its site, are all

_______________

53 Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. Nos. L-5516667,

May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89, 99-100.
54 G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004, 440 SCRA 279.
55 Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No.
146886, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 440; Republic v. La Orden de Po
Benedictinos, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 646.
56 Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72126, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA
640.
57 40 Phil. 349 (1919).

50

50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and

the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of the people.”

In the instant cases, the authority to expropriate

came from Presidential Decree No. 1072, issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that
time, and as explicitly recognized under the 1973
Constitution, President Marcos had legislative
powers. Perforce, the expropriation of the subject
properties—identified with specificity in the P.D.—
was directed by legislation. The issue of necessity
then assumed the nature of a political question.
As to the third requisite of “public use,” we
examine the purpose for which the expropriation was
undertaken by NHA. As set forth in its petition, NHA
justifies the taking of the subject property for the
purpose of improving and upgrading the area by
constructing roads and installing facilities thereon
under the Government’s zonal improvement program
and subdividing them into much smaller lots for
distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified
beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time
occupants of Grace Park. Around 510 families with
approximately58
5 members each will be benefited by
the project. The only remaining obstacle in the
completion

_______________
58 NHA, in its Petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, explains that:
xxxx
39. Having been placed in possession of the subject properties,
plaintiff prepared the development plans and detailed engineering
for the area (T.S.N. of Engr. Ramon Ronquillo, pp. 14-15, March 9,
1981). The development plans as approved by the petitioner and
the City Government of Caloocan City called for the construction of
footpaths, roads, drainage system, water supply system and
electrical system (Id., pp. 17-18).

39.1. Such development plan was consistent with the 3rd Improvement
Program of the National Government to be implemented by its various
agencies and instrumentalities. In various presidential issuances, the
National Government had clearly espoused an extensive national housing
policy directed

51

VOL. 536, OCTOBER 15, 2007 51

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

of this project is the lots subject of these consolidated

peti-

_______________

towards the improvement and rehabilitation of congested urban areas.

39. 2. The whole area of Grace Park Subdivision was one of the projects
to be supervised by the plaintiff NHA under a zonal improvement
program. As distinguished from other housing programs of the
government, the zonal improvement project was into development or
upgrading of the project area (T.S.N. of Engr. Ramon Ronquillo, 9 March
1981, pp. 53-55). This entailed the construction of footpaths, roads,
drainage system, water supply system and electrical system (Ibid., pp. 17-
18) which would require a considerable aggregate need for open space in
the congested area. Upon query of the trial court, Engr. Ramon Ronquillo
testified that in totality a reasonable estimate of thirty per cent (30%) of
the land area would be required for open spaces (Ibid., p. 130).
39.3. To implement the project, it was necessary to effect the re-blocking
of some structures to conform to the physical development plan of the
project. This meant the dismantling of some structures, or portions thereof
for the purpose of aligning the rest of the structures (Ibid., p. 98).
39.4. The zonal improvement program was differentiated from the
resettlement projects ventured into by the government in other areas.
Whilst the resettlement involved movement of people from one location to
another effecting thereby a dislocation of these families and their sources
of livelihood (Ibid., pp. 138-139), the zonal improvement program sought to
remedy the social malady by merely focusing its scarce available financial
and technical resources on the site to accommodate the residents in the
same area where they have lived, worked, and been schooled (Ibid., pp.
139-140). Moreover, concomitant to this objective was the plan of
establishing a livelihood component. It basically offers financial loans to be
used for construction materials to improve this lot (Ibid., p. 147).

40. There were approximately 510 families/households

beneficiaries of the intended expropriation, some of whom were
renters, who took second priority in the award and for whom some
vacant lots are intended (Ibid., p. 106). Each household or family
had an

52

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

tions as the other59 lots in Grace Park have already

been expropriated.
The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being
implemented for government by NHA, draws breath
from policy60 mandates found in the 1987
Constitution. It is an integral part of the
government’s “socialized 61
housing” program which, in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, we deemed compliant with
the “public use” requirement, it being a program
clearly devoted to a “public purpose.” Justice Irene R.
Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said:
“Socialized housing” is defined as, “the construction of
dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of
our society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities” (Pres. Decree No. 1224,
par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include
among others:

_______________

average of five (5) members (Id., p. 134). Hence, the entire

project would provide shelter to approximately 2,550 individuals.
The average site of individual homelots to be awarded to each
family is 60 square meters (Id., p. 137). The biggest area could be
one hundred seventy (170) square meters (Ibid., p. 138). In very
exceptional cases an area of forty (40) square meters could be sold.
The variance was explained by the fact that small structures
occupied small lots (Ibid., p. 139).
41. Petitioner-appellant advertised for public bidding the
construction of infrastructure (Id., p. 15). The winning
bidder/contractor commenced work including three (3) streets
which had already been cemented. By January 20, 1982, already
40% of the entire work had already been accomplished.
Specifically, the three (3) streets included in the project had
already been cemented (Id., p. 16).
xxxx
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 30-33.
59 See Appendix “B” of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503; Id.,
at pp. 61-64.
60 Section 9, Article II, and Section 9, Article XIII of the
Philippine Constitution.
61 No. L-48685, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 461.

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Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling

units for the middle and lower income groups of the
society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities;
b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of
squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision
of related facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of
allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or
property involved, rearrangement and re-alignment
of existing houses and other dwelling structures and
the construction and provision of basic community
facilities and services, where there are none, such as
roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and
power system, schools, barangay centers,
community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks,
playgrounds and other recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities, including
the development of commercial and industrial
estates and such other facilities to enhance the total
community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of
the objective to provide and maintain housing for
the greatest number of people under Presidential
Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)

xxxx
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent
upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate
social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. The 1987
Constitution goes even further by providing that:

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and
an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing pro

54

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

gram of urban land reform and housing which will make available
at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
(Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphasis supplied)

Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a

matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum,
the general welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in housing projects
cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it
is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at
once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the
mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a
worldwide development particularly in developing
countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that
the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as
the “International Year of Shelter for the Homeless” “to
focus the attention of the international community on those
problems.” The General Assembly is “[s]eriously concerned
that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and
local levels and of international organizations, the living
conditions of the majority of the people in slums and
squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in
developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both
relative and absolute terms.” [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of
the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that
“socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use.”
It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph
(d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which should be construed in
relation with the preceding three paragraphs. Provisions on
economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost
housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or
slum improvement
62
emphasize the public purpose of the
project.”

_______________

62 Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra note 61, at pp. 466-469; see

Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125,
May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 173.

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Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

It need only be added, at this juncture, that the

“public use” requisite for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. At
present, it may not be amiss to state that whatever is
beneficially employed for the general
63
welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.
Still, petitioner Manapat insists that, being
himself a beneficiary of the expropriation (because he
has been a long-time resident of Grace Park), it would
be incongruous for government to take his land away
from him only to give it back to him. This contention
sadly fails to comprehend the public purpose for the
taking under the “socialized housing” program. The
parcels of land subject of the expropriation are,
precisely, being taken so that they can be subdivided
into much smaller 64
lots—at an average of 66.5 square
meters per lot —for distribution to deserving
dwellers in the area. Upon the completion of the
project, Manapat, and those similarly situated as he,
cannot assert any right to be awarded the very same
lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same
area of the land they now have.
Then, we have petitioner Lim and respondents
Vega, Santos, Oracion, and Mercado, who argue that
the lots they own should not be expropriated are
already titled in their names and are very small in
area, being already the subdivided portions of the
original Grace Park Subdivision.
We are not persuaded.
J.M. Tuason65 & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration is instructive. In that case, this
Court adopted the dissenting opinion
66
of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis, that the propriety of
exercising the power of eminent domain can-

_______________

63 Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone,

G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 240.
64 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, p. 79.
65 No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
66 96 Phil. 461 (1955).

56

56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

not be determined on a purely quantitative or area

basis, given that the Constitution speaks of lands, not
of landed estates. Speaking through Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique M. Fernando, the Court said:
“This is not to say of course that property rights are
disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the
philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what
Justice Laurel referred to as its “nationalistic and socialist
traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of
[its] provisions” although not extending as far as the
“destruction or annihilation” of the rights to property,
negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in
American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable
character. This is not so under our Constitution, which
rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for
the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be
enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice
Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too
firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is
much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire.
So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the above opinion but
in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at
least two of our subsequent decisions. We had occasion to
reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided barely
two months ago.
This particular grant of authority to Congress
authorizing the expropriation of land is a clear
manifestation of such a policy that finds expression in our
fundamental law. So is the social justice principle
enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an expression,
as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting
opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in
the Baylosis case. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set
forth in the ACCFA decision, the opinion being penned by
Justice Makalintal. We quote: “The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be
left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
‘because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,’ continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else

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Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization

of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning
the promotion of social justice.”
67
In a more recent decision, we had occasion to declare
that the fact that the property is less than 1/2-hectare
and that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation does not diminish its public use
character, inasmuch as “public use” now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage,
including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
The Court’s departure from the land size or area
test finds further affirmation in its rulings in Mataas
68
na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. 69Dimayuga and
the aforecited Sumulong v. Guerrero.
Given this discussion, it is clear that “public use,”
as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in
the instant cases, has been adequately fulfilled.
To satisfy the fourth requisite, we affirm the
appellate court’s disposition that the subject cases be
remanded to the trial court for the determination of
the amount of just compensation. Under case law,70
the
said determination is a judicial prerogative. As to
the observance of the fifth requisite, the due process
clause, in the expropriation proceedings, all the
parties have been given their day in court. That they
are now before this Court is attestation enough that
they were not denied due process of law.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is
unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid
exercise of the power of

_______________

67 Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note

49.
68 No. L-32049, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 30.
69 Supra note 61.
70 Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305
(1986).

58

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

eminent domain have been complied with. Thus, our

answer to the singular and fundamental issue in
these consolidated cases is: YES, the NHA may
validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
One final matter: the propriety of the application
by the CA of R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.
The Court is not unaware 71
of the condition now
imposed by R.A. No. 7279 that, for purposes of
urban development and housing under the Act, where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned
72
by
small property owners shall be exempted. “Small
property owners” are owners of residential lands with
an area not exceeding 300 sq. m. in highly urban-

_______________

71 The law is entitled “An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive

and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program,
Establishing Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other
Purposes,” and approved on March 24, 1992.
72 Section 10 of R.A. No. 7279 which reads:

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.—The modes of acquiring land for

purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted
only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided,
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land
owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of
this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined,
shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to
the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed
properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the
National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase:
Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land
shall be given the right of first refusal. [Italics ours.]

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Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

ized cities and 800 sq. m. in other urban73areas and

who do not own any other real property. Invoking
this limitation under the said law, the appellate court
in the questioned rulings exempted from
expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes, Quimque,
Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted
the lot of Oracion.
The CA’s ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A. No.
7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after
the expropriation cases against the property owners
herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non
praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not
74
74
the past. The law looks forward, not backward.
Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares,
“(l)aws shall have no75 retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.” In these consolidated cases,
the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279
does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its
provisions to have any retroactive application. On the
contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it
“shall take effect upon its publication in at least
76
two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.” The
law’s prospective application being clearly stated, the
Court cannot agree with the disposition of the
appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300
sq. m. are exempt from expropriation.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 and the June 28, 1994
Decision in CA-G.R. CV

_______________

73 See Section 3 of R.A. No. 7279; City of Mandaluyong v.

Aguilar, 403 Phil. 404; 350 SCRA 487 (2001).
74 Coloso v. Garilao, G.R. No. 129165, October 30, 2006, 506
SCRA 25, 47.
75 Gallardo v. Borromeo, No. L-36007, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA
500, 502; Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28,
1993, 227 SCRA 444, 448.
76 See Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Opeña, G.R. No.
129807, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 58, 83.

60

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manapat vs. Court of Appeals

No. 27159 are AFFIRMED; and the March 2, 1994

and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions in CA-G.R. CV
Nos. 10200-10212 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

          Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-

Martinez, ChicoNazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Judgments affirmed, resolutions reversed and set

aside.

Notes.—One of the basic principles in our

Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his
private property without due process of law, and in
expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation
whenever private property is taken for public use.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment
cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. (Republic vs.
Lim, 462 SCRA 265 [2005])
It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public
use is no longer limited to traditional purposes—the
idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases
of “use by the public” has been abandoned and the
term has not been held to be synonymous with “public
interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and
“public convenience.” (Reyes vs. National Housing
Authority, 395 SCRA 494 [2003])

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