CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-

BERNABE
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS

A. National territory
B. Declaration of principles and State policies
C. Separation of powers
D. Checks and balances
E. State immunity

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Legislative power
1. Scope and limitations
2. Principle of non-delegability; exceptions

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN M.
ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, - versus - HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT,
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, petitioner, - versus -

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HONORABLE
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board

Member — Province of Marinduque, petitioner, - versus - PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III and SECRETARY FLORENCIO "BUTCH" ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 208566, 208493, & 209251, EN BANC, November 19, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is
lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

In view of the constitutional violations discussed, the Court declares as unconstitutional: (a) the entire
2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws; (c) all

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informal practices of similar import and effect; and (e) the phrases: (1) "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of P.D. No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of P.D. No. 1869, as amended by P.D. No.
1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power.

FACTS:

Petitioner Samson Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition
under Rule 65, seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin Drilon and Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the Pork
Barrel System, in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.

Petitioners Greco Antonious Beda Belgica, et. al. and Jose Villegas, Jr. filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the immediate issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual Pork Barrel System, presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional, considering that they violate the constitutional provisions on separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, and accountability. (YES)

RULING:

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled
in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. Under
the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate how much would go to a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described
in Bengzon and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the
same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.

Further, at its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify
the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under
the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators

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have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the
2013 PDAF Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the regulation and release of funds, in violation of the separation of powers
principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.

With regards to the Presidential Pork Barrel, it was declared unconstitutional. Regarding the
Malampaya Fund, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law. However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund, Section 12 of P.D. 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used to first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The
second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential
Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project
he may so determine as a “priority.” Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline
to construe the same. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional. However, as the provisions are severable, all
other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and
subsisting.

In view of the constitutional violations discussed, the Court declares as unconstitutional: (a) the
entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws; (c) all informal practices of similar import and effect; and (e) the phrases: (1) "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of P.D. No. 910 and (2)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of P.D. No. 1869, as

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amended by P.D. No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power.

B. Houses of Congress; composition and qualification of members

1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a. District representatives and questions of apportionment
b. Party-list system
C. Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications
D. Discipline of members
E. Process of law-making
F. Quorum and voting majorities
G. Appropriation and re-alignment
H. Legislative inquiries and oversight functions
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND MANUEL D.
ANDAL, petitioners, - versus - SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 180308, EN BANC, June 19, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee
of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee
Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the
respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was
submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been
settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

FACTS:

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In February 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect
its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted 11 public hearings on various
dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons.

Respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted
the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC. After
due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in
performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations. In sum,
Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the
shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors
of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners filed the instant petition, questioning the haste with which the respondent Senate
approved the Committee Report No. 312. They also claim that respondent Senator Richard Gordon
acted with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to counsel, and that respondent
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite having voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view
of his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to participate actively in the hearings.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312. (NO)

RULING:

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any
committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted
Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative
inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the
assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these

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legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered
pointless.

Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as suggested by the parties in their
respective pleadings, the issues put forth in the petition have become academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
counsel was violated during the hearings is specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only be
invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were
invited to the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel.

I. Power of impeachment
J. Electoral Tribunals
K. Commission on Appointments
L. Initiative and referendum

III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Qualifications, election, and term of the President and Vice-President
B. Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications
C. Powers of the President
1. Executive and administrative powers in general
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., petitioner, - versus - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA,
in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary
Board, respondents.
G.R. No. 196425. EN BANC, July 24, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In Domingo v. Zamora, the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped
by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition
of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly
within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of
EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. Since both of these

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offices [PAGC and ODESLA] belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way
of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31(1)
of E.O. 292.

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which is
indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President.

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption. President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued E.O. 13,
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD).

Respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit
for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees. Petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
arguing on the ground, among others, that E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the
legislature to create a public office.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. 13 is valid and constitutional. (YES)

RULING:

The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department under E.O.
292. In Domingo v. Zamora, the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority.
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient,
the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the
manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3)
of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper.
Under Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast, under Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely

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transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa.

Since both of these offices [PAGC and ODESLA] belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31(1) of E.O. 292.

There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds. There is no

usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the
existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office. Hence, the express recognition
under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority
to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency. The
aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes
the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which
is, "even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds
for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without
committing any illegal appropriation.

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which is
indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President.
2. Power of appointment
a. Confirmation and by-passed appointments
b. Midnight and ad interim appointments
c. Power of removal
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, - versus - OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in
Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON,
DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, respondents.

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, petitioner, - versus - ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ,
ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., in their capacities as
CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACAÑANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, respondents.
G.R. No. 196231/196232, EN BANC, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

While Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and
a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A.
No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the

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President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, respectively.

Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.
Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was
the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman
to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer
instead to the President's assumption of authority.

FACTS:

These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but
because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to
remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman. The petitions
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of
the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case, G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional grounds the
Decision rendered by the Office of the President dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on
the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of
Public Trust.

The second case, G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul, reverse
and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written
explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation
to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and
(2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, the administrative case initiated against
petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over the petitioners considering the Office of the
Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence. (YES)

RULING:

While Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently
conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended
the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners
as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.

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Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21
- in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of
the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete
out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted
the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs
Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the
administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes
either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's
exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.

The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from
its power to appoint. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's
own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress,
therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for
the military and other law enforcement offices.

3. Power of control and supervision

a. Doctrine of qualified political agency
b. Executive departments and officers

DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, FORMER CHAIRMAN, TARIFF COMMISSION, ET. AL., petitioners, -
versus – COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT
OFFICE I, respondents
G. R. No. 189774, EN BANC, September 18, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

AO 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a uniform set of rules.
In the present case, the Court finds that AO 161 was issued in the valid exercise of presidential control
over the executive departments, which Chairman Velasco was duty bound to observe.

Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive branch. Considering that Special Order 95-02 and
Resolution No 96-01A were issued in direct contravention of the prohibition in AO 161, it follows that
the grant of the incentive awards therein were invalid and lacked legal basis.

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FACTS:

Sometime after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) and in accordance with
Section 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V thereof and its implementing rules, the Tariff
Commission established its own Employee Suggestions and Incentives Awards System (ESIAS),
which was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on December 2, 1993. Subsequently,
however, the CSC ordered the Tariff Commission to revise the ESIAS to comply with certain
requirements. Thereafter, the revised ESIAS was submitted to the CSC for approval.

Without the revised ESIAS having been acted upon by the CSC, the Tariff Commission, through its
then Chairman Emmanuel T. Velasco, issued Special Order No. 95-02 granting the subject Merit
Incentive Award to its officials and employees. The Tariff Commission also issued Resolution No. 96-
01, as amended by Resolution No. 96-01A, granting the subject Birthday Cash Gift to eligible officials
and employees for calendar years 1994, 1995 and 1996.

Upon post-audit conducted by the COA, the grant of the Merit Incentive Award was suspended for
lack of approval of the Office of the President. The Birthday Cash Gift was likewise suspended for lack
of legal basis. Chairman Velasco sought reconsideration with a request that if the disallowances are
not reconsidered, the Merit Incentive Award be converted instead into Hazard Pay. He also informed
the COA that the Tariff Commission adopted Resolution No. 96-01A which converted the Birthday
Cash Gift into “Amelioration Assistance.”

ISSUE:

Whether the grant of the Merit Incentive Award and Birthday Gift to the petitioner has legal basis.
(NO)

RULING:

AO 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a uniform set of
rules. It sought to address the dissatisfaction which came about when some department heads
granted incentive benefits of varying amounts to their officials and employees among those
government employees who received less or no benefits due to lack of funds. It recognized the need
to have a "standard system of incentive pay based on productivity and performance among officials
and employees of the Government.

Conformably with the provisions of AO 161, the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC
73 which prohibited the different government agencies from establishing separate productivity and
performance incentive awards.

The Tariff Commission’s ESIAS cannot be implemented independently and without regard to
subsequent presidential administrative orders such as AO 161. In issuing an administrative order to
regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits, the President was only exercising his power of
control.

In the present case, the Court finds that AO 161 was issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments, which Chairman Velasco was duty bound to observe.
Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive branch.

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Considering that Special Order 95-02 and Resolution No 96-01A were issued in direct contravention
of the prohibition in AO 161, it follows that the grant of the incentive awards were invalid and lacked
legal basis.

c. Local Government Units

4. Military powers
a. Calling out power
b. Declaration of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; requisites and parameters of extension
5. Executive clemency
6. Powers pertinent to foreign relations
D. Rules of succession

IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. Judicial power
B. Judicial review
1. Requisites
2. Political question doctrine
3. Moot questions
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) and PASCUAL M. GARCIA III, as representative of
Philippine Savings Bank and in his personal capacity, petitioners, - versus - SENATE
IMPEACHMENT COURT, consisting of the senators of the Republic of the Philippines acting as
senator judges, namely: JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, VICENTE C.
SOTTO III, ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JOKER P. ARROYO, PIA S.
CAYETANO, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, TEOFISTO GUINGONA III,
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, PANFILO M. LACSON, MANUEL M. LAPID, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, FRANCIS "KIKO" PANGILINAN, AQUILINO
PIMENTEL III, RALPH G. RECTO, RAMON REVILLA, JR., ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, MANNY
VILLAR; and THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE PROSECUTION PANEL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G. R. No. 200238, EN BANC, November 20, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and academic because
there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment will not serve any useful purpose
or have any practical legal effect because it cannot be enforced. The supervening conviction of Chief
Justice Corona as well as his execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts
has rendered the present petition moot and academic.

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FACTS:

The respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an Impeachment Court, issued
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to petitioner Philippines Savings Bank (PSBank) and/or its
representative requiring them to testify and produce before the Impeachment Court documents
relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then Supreme Court Justice
Renato C. Corona. During the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court
to Withdraw the Petition averring that subsequent events have overtaken the petition and that, with
the termination of the impeachment proceedings against former Chief Justice Corona, they are no
longer faced with the dilemma of either violating R.A. No. 6426 or being held in contempt of court for
refusing to disclose the details of the subject foreign currency deposits.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic. (YES)

RULING:

It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and academic
because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment will not serve any
useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because it cannot be enforced.

Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily when it issued the
assailed subpoena to obtain information concerning the subject foreign currency deposits
notwithstanding the confidentiality of such deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by events.
The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona as well as his execution of a waiver against the
confidentiality of all his bank accounts has rendered the present petition moot and academic.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the merits
of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for.

PEÑAFRANCIA SUGAR MILL, INC., Petitioner v. SUGAR REGULATORY

ADMINISTRATION, Respondent
G.R. NO. 208660 March 5, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use.
FACTS:
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (PENSUMIL) is engaged in the business of milling sugar, while the Sugar
Regulatory Administration (SRA) is a government entity taked to uphold the policy of the State “to
promote the growth and development of the sugar industry.”
In 1995, SRA issued Sugar Order No. 2, s. 1995-1996, which provided, inter alia, that a lien of ₱2.00
per LKG-Bag shall be imposed on all raw sugar quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar,
in order to fund the Philippine Sugar Research Institute, Inc. (PHILSURIN). Thereafter, SRA released
two issuances extending the effects of the aforesaid Sugar Order.

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Questioning the validity of the Sugar Orders, PENSUMIL filed a petition for prohibition and injunction
against SRA and PHILSURIN before the Naga City RTC. PENSUMIL alleged that the Sugar Orders are
unconstitutional in that: (a) they were issued beyond the powers and authority granted to the SRA
by EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount levied by virtue of the Assailed Sugar Orders constitutes public
funds and thus, cannot be legally channelled to a private corporation such as PHILSURIN.
In response, the SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of
forum-shopping. The SRA alleged that there is a pending case for declaratory relief in the Quezon
City-RTC and that the main issue raised in both the Naga and QC Cases is the validity of the Assailed
Sugar Orders. For its part, PHILSURIN noted the existence of a pending collection case that it filed
against PENSUMIL before the Makati City-RTC. It contended that the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for in the Naga and Makati Cases are founded on the same facts such that a final judgment in
one will constitute res judicata on the other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum-shopping.
RULING:
At this point, the Court deems it worthy to note that during the pendency of the instant petition, the
SRA has issued Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014, which revoked the assailed Sugar Orders. As a result
thereof, all mill companies were directed to cease from collecting the lien of ₱2.00 per LKG-Bag from
all sugar production, effective immediately.

The case at bar should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the
judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature
of things, it cannot be enforced.

In this case, the supervening issuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the
effectivity of the assailed Sugar Orders has mooted the main issue in the case a quo - that is the
validity of the assailed Sugar Orders. Thus, in view of this circumstance, resolving the procedural
issue on forum-shopping as herein raised would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have
any practical legal effect on the case.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the merits
of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for.

4. Operative fact doctrine

C. Safeguards of judicial independence

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1. Judicial and Bar Council
a. Composition
b. Powers
2. Fiscal autonomy
D. Qualifications of members of the Judiciary
E. Workings of the Supreme Court
1. En banc and division cases
2. Procedural rule-making
3. Administrative supervision over lower courts
4. Original and appellate jurisdiction

V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. Common provisions
B. Powers and functions of the CSC, COMELEC, and COA
C. Composition and qualifications of members
D. Prohibited offices and interests
E. Review of final orders, resolutions, and decisions

VI. BILL OF RIGHTS

A. Fundamental powers of the State
1. Police power
2. Eminent domain
3. Taxation
B. Private acts and the Bill of Rights
C. Rights to life, liberty, and property
1. Procedural and substantive due process
APO CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, - versus - MINGSON MINING INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 206728, FIRST DIVISION, November 12, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent,
a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.

The Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 clearly require that the parties involved in
a mining dispute be given the opportunity to be heard. In this case, it has been established that the POA
proceeded to resolve the present mining dispute without affording either party any fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard, in violation of some of the provisions of DENR DAO 95-23. Hence, Mingson’s
due process rights were violated, thereby rendering the POA’s Decision null and void.

FACTS:

There is a dispute involving mining claims known as “Allied 1 and 2” and “Lapulapu 31 & 32” between
Apo Cement Corporation (Apocemco) and Mingson Mining Industries Corporation (Mingson).

For the supposed failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive use the mineral
properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
proposal to the DENR, essentially seeking to take over their current holder, Luvimin Cebu Mining
Corporation. DENR then declared the subject mining claims abandoned and open for location to other
interested parties, prompting Luvimin to file an appeal. Similarly, Mingson assailed the
aforementioned declarations on the ground that its own mining claims, i.e., “Yellow Eagle I to VII,”
overlapped with the subject mining claims.

The DENR Regional Office ruled that portions of the claims must be awarded to Mingson, considering
its first claims were encroached by the newer ones. However, the DENR Regional Office’s Legal
Division, in a Resolution, recommended that the claims be awarded to Apocemco. The same was
upheld by the Panel of Arbitrators (POA).

Hence, Mingson brought the case to the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MAB) claiming denial
of due process. The DENR MAB reversed the POA’s Decision, declaring that Mingson was not given
an opportunity to be heard, which is repugnant to the due process. The CA sustained the DENR MAB’s
finding that Mingson was not afforded its right to due process, given that none of the procedures
found in the DENR were followed.

ISSUE:

Whether Mingson was not afforded its right to due process. (YES)

RULING:

The Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 clearly require that the parties involved
in a mining dispute be given the opportunity to be heard. In this case, it has been established that the
POA proceeded to resolve the present mining dispute without affording either party any fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard, in violation of some of the provisions of DENR DAO 95-23.
Hence, Mingson’s due process rights were violated, thereby rendering the POA’s Decision null
and void. As explained in PO2 Montoya v. Police Director Varilla:

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the

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denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Although the issue on due process was not assigned as an error in Mingson’s appeal, an apparent lack
of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due process is a jurisdictional requisite that
all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are duty bound to observe. In Salva v. Valle, the Court
pronounced that “a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at
anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any
action or proceeding where it is invoked.”

2. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
3. Hierarchy of rights
D. Equal protection
1. Requisites for valid classification
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, - versus - THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself
and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 179267, EN BANC, June 25, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. The Court further held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) against petitioner-husband, Jesus Garcia pursuant to R.A. No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.

Jaype-Garcia claimed to be a victim of physical abuse, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support. She also added that she suffered emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of her Garcia’s marital infidelity.

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Garcia was said to be dominant, controlling, and always demands absolute obedience from his wife
and children. He later had an affair with a bank manager, who also happens to be the godmother of
one of their sons. Garcia admitted the affair and claimed that he was just using the woman because
of their accounts with the bank. His marital infidelity, however, spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, Garcia grabbed his
wife on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
he hit Jaype-Garcia forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.

Thus, finding reasonable ground to believe that there exists an imminent danger of violence against
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and her children, the RTC issued a TPO. Subsequently, Garcia filed before the CA
a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO, challenging: (1) the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity
of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” The
same was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether R.A. 9262 is violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and is therefore,
unconstitutional. (NO)

RULING:

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, and is therefore, valid.

Garcia bewails the disregard of due process by R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of protection
orders, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. When in reality,
protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The Supreme Court held that the guaranty
of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. The Court further held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

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Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The unequal
power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law.

2. Rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny tests

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN
ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners, -versus- QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY
OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented
by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 225442, EN BANC, August 8, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve
their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the
strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government
has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State
interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations, which were publicly known as part of “Oplan Rody.” Among those local
governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: Navotas City, City of Manila,
and Quezon, City.
Petitioners argued that Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (b)

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fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose. Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents’ prerogative to impose them in the exercise of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest
exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional for violating:

1. Right of the parents to rear their children; and, (NO)

2. Minors’ right to travel (YES, WITH RESPECT TO MANILA AND NAVOTAS ORDINANCES)

RULING:
1. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of
the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances
further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention
of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral
well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during
this time.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are
not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given
unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate
their authority to influence or control their minors' activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or
her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a

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more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US
court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire
to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior
of those children." Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
time on their studies than on the streets." Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right
to rear their children.
2. Right to Travel
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of
liberty. Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion and the right of
citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or
where they can best pursue the ends of life.
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances
of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and
preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible
for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations,
are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some

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provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence of any separability clause.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance
is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to
the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision.

E. Searches and seizures

LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 229380, SECOND DIVISION, June 06, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
In this case, as case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be
considered a criminal act. There being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly
seized from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.
FACTS:
A group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson Monteras
(PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2)
teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her
left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified
to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers.
The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal
kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her

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breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated
the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared
the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain
Manolito Angeles. Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and
turned over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI
Villaraza), who confirmed that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. For her part, Reyes denied the
charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said
date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and
asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was
blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The
latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She
was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of
P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers
took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.
ISSUE:
Is Reyes guilty of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165? (NO)
RULING:
Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. One of the
recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made – the process cannot be reversed. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test,
showing that "the accused exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that
she was in possession of illegal drugs at the time she was apprehended." Absent any overt act
showing the commission of a crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered invalid.
In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything as to
rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime when she was just passing by. As case law demonstrates, the act of
walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act. There being no lawful
warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on account of the search is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.

EDMUND BULAUITAN Y MAUAYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

23 of 117
G.R. No. 218891, FIRST DIVISION, September 19, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional
provision.
Section 8, Rule 126 Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses, provides
that a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the
premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their absence that their presence
may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the policemen involved in the search of
Bulauitan's residence — as shown in their own testimonies - did not conduct the search in accordance
with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Worse, the search team even
instructed Maria to contact her father via telephone, which she could only do by leaving their residence
and going to the house of a certain Dr. Romeo Bago (Dr. Bago) to use the telephone therein. It was only
after her return to their residence that SPO2 Baccay announced that they have allegedly found shabu in
Bulauitan's room.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Bulauitan of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
The prosecution alleged that the Philippine National Police of Solana, Gagayan constituted a team to
implement a search warrant issued by Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig to search Bulauitan's residence.
Before going to the target residence, the search team first went to the house of Barangay Chairman
Jane Busilan, who in turn, assigned Kagawad (Kgd.) Jerry Soliva (Kgd. Soliva) and Kgd. Herald de
Polonia (Kgd. Polonia) as search witnesses. Upon arriving at Bulauitan's residence, the search team
was met by Bulauitan's two (2) children and housekeeper, who informed them that Bulauitan was
not home. This notwithstanding, the search team explained to the children and housekeeper the
reason for their presence, prompting the latter to allow them inside the house and conduct the
search. SPO2 Baccay then proceeded to Bulauitan's room and there, discovered three (3) heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the contents are shabu, the
search team showed the sachets to the children and housekeeper and photographed the same. SPO2
Baccay then gave the sachets to P/Insp. Bulayungan, who in turn, handed them over to PO3 Tagal
who wrapped the confiscated items with a piece of paper for transport to the Solana PNP Station.
When Bulauitan arrived at his residence, the search team effected his arrest and took him to the
police station with the seized sachets. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Tagal prepared the police blotter
and request for laboratory examination, marked the sachets with his initials, and delivered the same
to forensic chemist S/Insp. Myrna Madriaga Tulauan of the PNP Crime Laboratory. A qualitative
examination revealed that the three (3) plastic sachets contained an aggregate of 0.22 gram of shabu.
In his defense, Bulauitan denied owning the sachets allegedly recovered by the search team in his
house. He narrated that in the morning of the fateful day, he went with his wife to Tuguegarao City to
tend to their meat shop. He eventually received a call from his daughter, Maria Bulauitan (Maria),

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informing him that policemen are in their house and conducting a search therein, prompting him to
immediately go home. Upon reaching his house, the policemen informed him that they
recovered shabu from his room, and thus, arrested him. Finally, Bulauitan averred that Joseph Juan -
the person who executed the affidavit in support of the application for search warrant — wanted to
get even with him as his wife testified against Juan in a theft case. Upon arraignment, Bulauitan
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
The RTC found Bulauitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
Bulauitan's conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bulauitan's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. It must,
however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the
same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search.
Section 8, Rule 126 Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses,
provides that a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful
occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their
absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the policemen involved in the search of
Bulauitan's residence — as shown in their own testimonies - did not conduct the search in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Worse, the search
team even instructed Maria to contact her father via telephone, which she could only do by leaving
their residence and going to the house of a certain Dr. Romeo Bago (Dr. Bago) to use the telephone
therein. It was only after her return to their residence that SPO2 Baccay announced that they have
allegedly found shabu in Bulauitan's room.
The testimonies given in the case at bar ultimately prove that: (a) Bulauitan was not in his residence
when the search was conducted; (b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness SPO2 Baccay's
search of Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed her to leave
the house to contact her parents; and (c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia neither witnessed the search
as they remained outside Bulauitan's residence. Accordingly, the search conducted therein by the
search team fell way below the standard mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and thus deemed unreasonable within the purview of the exclusionary rule of

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the 1987 Constitution. As a consequence, the three (3) plastic sachets containing an aggregate
amount of 0.22 gram of shabu recovered therefrom are inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Bulauitan must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- JONAS GERONIMO Y

PINLAC, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 225500, SECOND DIVISION, September 11, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the seized
items were not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media and were not
done at the place of arrest. The law mandates the apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedure
under Section 21 of RA 9165 mainly to ensure the proper chain of custody and avoid the possibility of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. RA 9165 and its IRR explicitly provide that
noncompliance with the required procedure can only be allowed under exceptional circumstances,
provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor by the apprehending officers,
which IA1 Arquero likewise failed to show in this case.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing Geronimo of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The confiscated items were
supposedly marked, photographed, and inventoried by Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Lorilla (Poseur-
buyer) in the presence of Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz. After conducting the
inventory, IO1 Lorilla secured the letter-request for laboratory examination and delivered the
specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Consequently, the specimens were received and
examined by Forensic Chemist who later on revealed that the substance found in the plastic sachet
tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other
wrapped specimen tested of marijuana, all dangerous drugs. Geronimo interposed the defenses of
denial and frame-up
RTC found Geronimo guilty beyond reasonable doubt The CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
Geronimo prayed for his acquittal in light of the police officers’ noncompliance with Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR and their failure to proffer a plausible explanation therefor. In particular, he claims
that the inventory and certification was neither done in the presence of nor signed by a
representative from the DOJ and the media.
ISSUE:

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Whether Geronimo’s conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs should be
upheld. (NO)
RULING:
In this case, Geronimo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs,
the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account
for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media and
were not done at the place of arrest. The law mandates the apprehending team to follow the
prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 mainly to ensure the proper chain of custody and
avoid the possibility of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. RA 9165 and its IRR
explicitly provide that noncompliance with the required procedure can only be allowed under
exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor
by the apprehending officers, which Intelligence Agent 1 (IA1) Arquero likewise failed to show in this
case.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who
are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee -versus- NIÑO CALIBOD y HENOBESO,

Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 230230, SECOND DIVISION, November 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Court declared that while the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the police officers,
strict adherence with the prescribed procedure may not always be possible under varied field conditions.
The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod, thereby putting into serious

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question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod.
Prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165,
Calibod's acquittal is perforce in order.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from Information filed before the RTC, charging Nino Calibod (Calibod) of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drug. Police Officer 2 Gregorio Oruga (PO2), the designated poseur
buyer, arrested Calibod, and retrieved the buy-bust money from him. He marked the seized sachet
with his initials then brought Calibod , the buy-bust money, and confiscated sachet, to the crime
laboratory for examination. Calibod interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
RTC found Calibod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of RTC.
It held that chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs was unbroken and, thus, the integrity and
evidentiary value were adequately preserved.
ISSUE:
Whether Calibod’s conviction for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
To properly secure the conviction of an accused the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to
remove any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drug, the prosecution must show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same, accounting for each link thereof from the moment of
seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Court declared that while the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the police
officers, strict adherence with the prescribed procedure may not always be possible under varied
field conditions. The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod, thereby putting into serious
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod.
Prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165,
Calibod's acquittal is perforce in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- MARICEL PATACSIL Y

MORENO, Accused-Appellant.
G. R. No. 234052, SECOND DIVISION, August 6, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.

Here, a plain examination of PO3 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated September 28,
2012 – which stood as the inventory receipt – shows that while PO3 Meniano claims that representatives
from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such representatives signed the document.
Further, it also appears that no public elected official was present when such inventory was made.

FACTS:
Two (2) Informations were filed before the RTC charging Patacsil with the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Patacsil was apprehended during a buy-bust operation with
PO3 Francisco S. Meniano, Jr. (PO3 Meniano) acting as the poseur-buyer.
In her defense, Patacsil pleaded not guilty to the charges against her and offered her version of the
events. She narrated that on the day she was arrested, she just arrived home after visiting her live-in
partner in jail, when suddenly, six (6) men in civilian clothes appeared in front of her house. After the
men briefly searched her abode, she was then taken to the police station and subsequently charged
with the aforesaid crimes.
The RTC found Patacsil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and held that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. It found that Patacsil's bare
denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy bust
operation. Aggrieved, Patacsil appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Patacsil's conviction should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.
Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and

29 of 117
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. In the
case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the (DOJ), or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law
with the passage of RA 10640 – provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure,
and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under
justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer or team.

In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above saving clause
to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Patacsil.

Here, a plain examination of PO3 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated September 28,
2012 – which stood as the inventory receipt – shows that while PO3 Meniano claims that
representatives from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such representatives signed
the document. Further, it also appears that no public elected official was present when such inventory
was made.

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At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any
genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 must be adduced. Mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact
the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning
from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time
of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set
procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- BENJAMIN FERIOL Y

PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
G. R. No. 23215, SECOND DIVISION, August 20, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. The
apprehending officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule,
thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug allegedly seized
from Feriol.
In this case, while the, inventory and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence of
Feriol and an elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and photography
were done before any representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending officers did not
bother to acknowledge or explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that there was an
attempt to contact or secure these witnesses' presence.
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Feriol with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs. Feriol was apprehended during a buy-bust operation with Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
Operative Delno A. Encarnacion (MADAC Encarnacion) as the designated poseur-buyer and PO1
Mark Angulo as the immediate back-up. Due to security reasons, the buy-bust team brought Feriol
and the seized items to the barangay hall, where the required inventory and photography were
conducted in the presence of Feriol and Barangay Kagawad Roderick P. Bien (Kagawad Bien)
In her defense, Feriol denied the accusations against him, claiming that he was taking a bath inside
his house when he heard a number of individuals shouting his name and averred that upon opening
the door, someone poked a gun at him and asked for his ID. He was handcuffed and brought to the
barangay hall where the pieces of evidence was shown to him.
The RTC found Feriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and observed that the
apprehending officers' failure to secure the representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the media during the conduct of inventory was not fatal – and thus did not render Feriol's arrest void
and the evidence obtained from him inadmissible Aggrieved, Feriol appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE:

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Whether Feriol’s conviction should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the
said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. In the case
of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."
The apprehending officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug
allegedly seized from Feriol.
In this case, while the, inventory and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence
of Feriol and an elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and
photography were done before any representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending
officers did not bother to acknowledge or explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that
there was an attempt to contact or secure these witnesses' presence.
The absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to
secure the required witnesses must be adduced. In view of the prosecution's failure to provide
justifiable grounds which would excuse their transgression in this case, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from Feriol have
been compromised, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
Feriol's acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER BAPTISTA Y VILLA

G. R. No. 225783, SECOND DIVISION, August 20, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The absence of the aforementioned required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
effort to secure the required witnesses must therefore be adduced. In this case, IO1 Regaspi did not
provide a sufficient explanation why no barangay official was present during the requisite inventory
and photography. Worse, the police officers had no qualms in admitting that they did not even bother

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contacting a DOJ representative, who is also a required witness. Verily, as earlier mentioned, there must
be genuine and sufficient efforts to ensure the presence of these witnesses, else non-compliance with the
set procedure would not be excused.
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Baptista with the crimes of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs. Baptista was apprehended during a buy-bust operation. IO1 Regaspi then marked
the plastic sachet with his initials "DDR," but since it was about to rain, the requisite inventory could
not be conducted. Thus, the team went back to the PDEA Office wherein IO1 Regaspi prepared the
inventory of the seized items in the presence only of a media representative, while IO1 Ranel Cañero
took photographs of the same.
In her defense, Baptista denied the charges against him. He claims that he was on his way to the
tiangge to drink with a friend. However, some unknown men grabbed him and was brought to an
office where he was accused by PDEA agents of selling shabu.
The RTC found Baptista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and held that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. It found that Baptista’s bare
denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy bust
operation. Aggrieved, Baptista appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Baptista's conviction should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
The apprehending officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from Baptista. Records disclose that while the inventory and photography of the seized plastic sachet
were conducted in the presence of Baptista and a representative from the media, the same were not
done in the presence of an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ as required by
the rules prevailing at that time (i.e., Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640).
The absence of the aforementioned required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
effort to secure the required witnesses must therefore be adduced. In this case, IO1 Regaspi did not
provide a sufficient explanation why no barangay official was present during the requisite inventory
and photography. Worse, the police officers had no qualms in admitting that they did not even bother
contacting a DOJ representative, who is also a required witness. Verily, as earlier mentioned, there
must be genuine and sufficient efforts to ensure the presence of these witnesses, else non-compliance
with the set procedure would not be excused. The Court thus concludes that there has been an
unjustified breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised. Consequently, Baptista's acquittal is in order.

1. Requisites for a valid warrant

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2. Warrantless searches and seizures
3. Administrative arrests
4. Evidence obtained through purely mechanical acts
F. Privacy of communications and correspondence
1. Private and public communications
2. Intrusion, when allowed; exclusionary rule
G. Freedom of speech and expression
1. Prior restraint and subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine
4. Dangerous tendency, balancing of interests, and clear and present danger
tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Unprotected speech
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment and free-exercise clauses
2. Benevolent neutrality and conscientious objectors
3. Lemon and compelling state interest tests
I. Liberty of abode and right to travel
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN
ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners, -versus- QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY
OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented
by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 225442, EN BANC, August 8, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve
their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the
strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government
has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State

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interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations, which were publicly known as part of “Oplan Rody.” Among those local
governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: Navotas City, City of Manila,
and Quezon, City.
Petitioners argued that Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (b)
fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose. Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents’ prerogative to impose them in the exercise of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest
exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional for violating:
3. Right of the parents to rear their children; and, (NO)
4. Minors’ right to travel (YES, WITH RESPECT TO MANILA AND NAVOTAS ORDINANCES)

RULING:
1. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of
the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."

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The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances
further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention
of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral
well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during
this time.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are
not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given
unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate
their authority to influence or control their minors' activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or
her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a
more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US
court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire
to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior
of those children." Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
time on their studies than on the streets." Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right
to rear their children.
2. Right to Travel
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of
liberty. Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion and the right of
citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or
where they can best pursue the ends of life.
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.

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The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances
of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and
preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible
for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations,
are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence of any separability clause.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance
is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to
the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision.

1. Scope and limitations

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2. Watch-list and hold departure orders
J. Right to information
1. Scope and limitations
2. Publication of laws and regulations
K. Right of association
L. Eminent Domain
1. Concept of public use
2. Just compensation
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus-
EDGARDO L. SANTOS, represented by his assignee, ROMEO L. SANTOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213863, FIRST DIVISION, January 27, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Thus, in expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just
compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance
on the part of the State. Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property such as when title is transferred to
the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment.
Accordingly, the award of twelve percent (12%) annual interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for Land 3 should be computed from the time of taking and not from January 1, 2010 as
ruled by the RTC and the CA, until full payment on October 12, 2011.

FACTS:

Santos owned three (3) parcels of agricultural land devoted to corn situated in the Municipality of
Sagnay, Camarines Sur. the subject lands were placed under the government's Operation Land
Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) fixed the just compensation using the formula provided under Executive Order No. (EO) 228.
Santos was issued Agrarian Reform (AR) Bond No. 0079665, which presents the six percent (6%)
increment pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228 for his Land 3 and withheld the release of the valuation for
Lands 1 and 2 until the submission of the certificates of title thereto, since they were covered by
Decree Nos. N-8237817 and 622575. Finding the valuation unreasonable, Santos filed three (3)
petitions for summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation before
the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur. PARAD rendered separate
decisions fixing the just compensation. PARAD used the recent government support price (GSP),
hence, six percent (6%) annual incremental interest is not applied. Santos unconditionally accepted
and called for the immediate payment of the valuations. Dissatisfied with the PARAD's valuation, the
LBP instituted two (2) separate complaints for the determination of just compensation before the
RTC, averring that the computations were erroneous when they disregarded the formula provided
under EO 228, which Santos moved to dismiss for it were barred by the finality of PARAD’s Decision.

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RTC dismissed both cases and was designated as the new SAC that gave due course to the LBP's
notices of appeal but were later set aside by the CA, which also remanded it to the RTC.

RTC granted the motion and awarded twelve percent (12%) interest computed from June 26, 2000
when the LBP approved the payment of the initial valuation for the property up to the date the
decision was rendered. LBP elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
asserting that the RTC abused its discretion in its decision. CA upheld the RTC's ruling that Santos
was entitled to a twelve percent (12%) interest reckoned from January 1, 2010 until its full payment
since the revaluation by the LBP of Land 3 already included six percent (6%) annual incremental
interest.

ISSUE:

Whether the Respondent is entitled to the interest on the just compensation. (YES)

RULING:

It is doctrinal that the concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment. It
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation cannot be
considered "just," for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.

Thus, in expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just
compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance
on the part of the State. Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property such as when title is transferred to
the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment. To clarify,
unlike the six percent (6%) annual incremental interest allowed under DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994,
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve percent (12%) annual
interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for
damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.

Accordingly, the award of twelve percent (12%) annual interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for Land 3 should be computed from the time of taking and not from January 1, 2010
as ruled by the RTC and the CA, until full payment on October 12, 2011.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- ALFREDO HABABAG, SR.,

SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, CONSOLACION, AND CHILDREN, NAMELY: MANUEL, SALVADOR,
WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO, JR., AND JUDITH, ALL SURNAMED HABABAG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172352, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION, June 08, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP's alternative Motion for Clarification, illumines that the
interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance,
reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit
of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or
emancipation patents are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent
(6%) p.a. until full payment. However, while the LBP averred that the landowner's title was cancelled in
favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic's title/s was/were not attached to the records of these
consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit certified true copies of the
Republic's title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases, and the latter to compute the correct amount
of legal interests due to the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
said titles/s.

FACTS:
Alfredo Hababag, Sr. (Alfredo) was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land. The aforesaid
landholdings were voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the government under Republic Act No. (RA)
6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988".
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) initially valued the subject lands at P1,237,850.00, but
Alfredo rejected the valuation. After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of
the amount of just compensation, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) fixed the value of the subject
lands at P1,292,553.20. Dissatisfied, Alfredo filed a Complaint for the determination of the amount of
just compensation before the RTC. The commissioner designated by Alfredo, Margarito Cuba
(Commissioner Cuba) of Banco Sorsogon, valued the lands at P5,420,600.00.
The RTC rendered a Decision fixing the amount of just compensation of the subject lands at
P5,653,940.00. In reaching the above-stated total amount, the RTC applied the Income Productivity
Approach. Alfredo appealed to the CA averring that the RTC committed a mathematical error in
computing the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, as well as in fixing the remaining
productive life of the coconut trees to only 20 years instead of 40 to 45 years. The CA rendered a
Decision in the aforesaid case, indeed finding a mathematical error in the computation of the
reasonable income from the coconut trees, which if corrected would have been
P23,335,200.00. Accordingly, adding to the same the total land appraised value of P3,465,500.00, the
CA came up with a total of P26,800,700.00. It, however, rejected Alfredo's claim for the adjustment
of the productive life of the coconut trees to anywhere between 40 to 45 years, as it gave credence to
the Inspection and Appraisal Report submitted by Commissioner Cuba which stated that the
remaining productive life of the coconut trees would only be 20 years.
Pursuant to the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Commissioner Cuba to re-compute the accurate
amount of just compensation applying the Income Productivity Approach. Commissioner Cuba,
however, retained the total appraised values for the subject lands and the plants/trees at
P3,465,500.00 and P1,955,100.00, respectively, as similarly indicated in the December 20, 1999 RTC
Decision.
On March 22, 2004, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision, fixing the amount of the just
compensation for the subject lands at P40, 423,400.00

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In the assailed Decision dated November 15, 2005, the CA set aside the RTC's valuation for failure to
give due consideration to the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under
DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94. Based on the foregoing, the average value per hectare
of the 69.3857 hectare lands would therefore be P34, 567.4576.
The CA likewise considered the government's obligation to pay just compensation to be in the nature
of a forbearance of money and, as such, additionally imposed interests on the just compensation
award at 12% p.a., to be reckoned from the time of the taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever
is earlier.
In the Court's September 16, 2015 Decision, it affirmed the November 15, 2005 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86066 and 86167, fixing the just compensation for the subject
69.3857 hectare lands at P2,398,487.24 and imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance, but
modified the imposable interest rate.
The Court upheld the CA's valuation which made use of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
formula as reflective of the factors set forth under Section 17 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, and
rejected the compenseition fixed by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 96-6217, which applied the Income Productivity Approach as contrary to the
jurisprudential definition of just compensation in expropriation cases, i.e., "market value" at the time
of actual taking by the government. Considering that the initial valuation in the amount of
P1,237,850.00 paid to the landowners is lower than the just compensation finally adjudged, the Court
likewise sustained the award of legal interest on the unpaid balance, but modified the imposable
interest rate, in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board
(BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, series of 2013
ISSUE:
Whether the award of just compensation, including interests at the rate is proper. (YES)
RULING:

In Apo Fruits, the Court had illuminated that the substantiality of the payments made by the LBP is
not the determining factor in the imposition of interest as nothing less than full payment of just
compensation is required. The value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the
principal sum of the just compensation due, and that interest is due and should be paid to compensate
for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after the taking has been completed, viz.:

[T]he interest involved in the present case "runs as a matter of law and follows as a
matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as
money can accomplish, as of the date of taking."

If the just compensation for the landholdings is considerable, this

compensation is not undue because the landholdings the owners gave up in
exchange are also similarly considerable x x x. When the petitioners surrendered
these sizeable landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were
likewise sizeable and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The incomes due
from these properties, expressed as interest, are what the government should return

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to the petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of
just compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should
be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due
and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum
after taking has been completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should
prevail if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being "just."

In the present case, the just compensation for the subject lands was finally fixed at
P2,398,487.24,while the payments made by the LBP only amounted to P1,237,850.00. Hence, there
remained an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the
imposition of interest.

That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP's alternative Motion for Clarification, illumines that the
interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance,
reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six
percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. However, while the LBP averred that the landowner's title was
cancelled in favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic's title/s was/were not attached to the
records of these consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit certified
true copies of the Republic's title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases, and the latter to compute
the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date
of the issuance of the said titles/s.

REPUBLIC v. NG+
G.R. No. 229335 | November 29, 2017

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he
loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH; petitioner), led before the RTC a complaint against respondent
Belly H. Ng (respondent), represented by Annabelle G. Wong, seeking to expropriate the lots
registered in the name of respondent under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. V-92188 8 and V-
92191 9 with a total area of 1,671 sq. m. (subject lots), together with the improvements thereon with
an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. (collectively, subject properties), located in Kowloon
Industrial Compound, Tatalon Street, Brgy. Ugong, Valenzuela City, for the construction of the
Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to Caloocan City). Petitioner
manifested that it is able and ready to pay respondent the amounts of P6,684,000.00 (i.e., at
P4,000.00/sq. m.) and P11,138,362.74, representing the combined relevant zonal value of the subject
lots and the replacement cost of the improvements thereon, respectively.

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In her answer, respondent contended that the offer price is unreasonably low, and that she
should be compensated the fair market value of her properties at the time of taking, estimated to be
at P25,000.00/sq. m. Moreover, the fair and just replacement cost of the improvements on the subject
lots should be in the amount of P22,276,724.00, pursuant to Section 10 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 8974. Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of
Possession, after respondent received the amount of P17,822,362.74, representing 100% of the zonal
value of the subject properties.
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the
properties which, thereafter, submitted its Commissioner's Report dated June 10, 2013,
recommending the amounts of P7,000.00/sq. m. and P12,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for
the subject lots and the improvements thereon, respectively, and the payment of six percent (6%)
legal interest therefor, reckoned from the time of taking.

ISSUE
Whether or not the replacement cost for the improvements fixed by the RTC is valid.

RULING
No. The construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City
to Caloocan City) involves the implementation of a national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes
of determining the just compensation, RA 8974 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR),
which were effective at the time of the filing of the complaint, shall govern
The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of substitution, which means that
"all things being equal, a rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the
cost of building an acceptable substitute with like utility."
The case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas) instructs that in using the replacement cost method
to ascertain the value of improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant standards provided
under Section 5 of RA 8974, as well as equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is a
concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount
of the owner's investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by eminent domain, that is
guaranteed to the owner.
While there are various methods of appraising a property using the cost approach, Mupas
declared that the use of the depreciated replacement cost method is consistent with the principle
that the property owner shall be compensated for his actual loss, bearing in mind that the concept
of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone, but must likewise be just
to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to
compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is only the actual value of the
property at the time of the taking. Hence, even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of
the public.
It must be emphasized that in determining just compensation, the courts must consider and
apply the parameters set by the law and its implementing rules and regulations in order to ensure
that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount as just compensation that is contradictory to the
objectives of the law. Be that as it may, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself,
courts are not strictly bound to apply the formula to its minutest detail, particularly when faced
with situations that do not warrant the formula's strict application. Thus, the courts may, in the
exercise of their discretion, relax the formula's application, subject to the jurisprudential limitation
that the factual situation calls for it and the courts clearly explain the reason for such deviation.
In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the recommendation of the court-appointed
commissioners, fixing the just compensation for the improvements on the expropriated properties
at P12,000.00/sq. m., which merely considered their location, classification, value declared by the

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owner, and the zonal valuation of the subject lots. However, there is no competent evidence
showing that it took into account the prevailing construction costs and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures as required by the IRR. Consequently, the Court cannot uphold and must,
perforce, set aside the said valuation as the just compensation for the subject improvements.
In relation thereto, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be
imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, which shall be computed at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of taking, i.e., from April 10, 2013 when the RTC issued a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner, until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013,
until fully paid, the just compensation due respondent shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) p.a., in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

3. Expropriation by local government units

M. Non-impairment of contracts
N. Free access to courts and adequate legal assistance
O. Custodial investigation rights
P. Rights of the accused
JASPER GONZALEZ Y DOLENDO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

G.R No. 225709, SECOND DIVISION, February 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It must be emphasized that "the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can
only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that is, that degree of proof that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Hence, where the court entertains a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is the court's constitutional duty to
acquit them. In this light, the Court is convinced that Gonzalez' conviction must be set aside.
The prosecution failed to establish its allegation that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest,
Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public place - the critical elements of the crime of violation of Section
261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166. The prosecution did not present any other
evidence that would corroborate his version leading to Gonzalez' arrest.
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed against Gonzales for violating: (1) Section 261(p) (q) of the
Omnibus Election Code and 2) Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution alleged that an operative of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID), Special Operation
Task Group (SOTG), Valenzuela City, was informed of the rampant selling of illegal drugs at a wake in
Tamaraw Hills, Valenzuela City, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal drug operation. At
about 3:30 a.m., certain Police Officer (PO) 2 Lim, PO2 Recto, and PO1 Raya, together with PO1 Julius
R. Congson (PO1 Congson), proceeded to surveil the area. While in the area, PO2 Recto and PO1
Congson saw a person coming out of an alley about four (4) meters away, with a fan knife in his right

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hand. Since there was a ban issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the carrying of
deadly weapons at that time, PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson approached the person and introduced
themselves as police officers.
The person, identified as Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the police officers to chase and
eventually, arrest him. The police officer ordered him to bring out the contents of his pocket, which
revealed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing what PO1 Congson believed to be
shabu. PO1 Congson further recovered another heat-sealed transparent plastic pack, labeled
"Calypso", containing several plastic sachets.
On the other hand, Gonzalez denied the charges against him and instead, claimed that he was just at
their house in No. 75 Tamaraw Hills Street. He was about to go to sleep when four (4) male persons
arrived and arrested him. The men then tied his hands with his wife's brassiere, and thereafter,
showed him a sachet of shabu and took the knife that was on top of the table. Later on, and then
proceeded to the Manilas Barangay Hall to wait for the barangay kagawad where he was asked to
sign a paper about the seized evidence. Gonzalez was then brought to Camp Crame for drug testing,
and afterwards to the detention cell at the new city hall.
RTC found Gonzalez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC,. The
CA, then, affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Gonzalez' conviction for violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32
of RA 7166, should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
It must be emphasized that "the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can
only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that is, that degree of proof that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Hence, where the court entertains a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is the court's constitutional
duty to acquit them. In this light, the Court is convinced that Gonzalez' conviction must be set aside.
The prosecution failed to establish its allegation that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest,
Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public place - the critical elements of the crime of violation of Section
261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166. The prosecution did not present any
other evidence that would corroborate his version leading to Gonzalez' arrest. Gonzalez, on the other
hand, presented three (3) witnesses - neighbors who lived below and across his house where he was
arrested and who were there at the time of his arrest. All three (3) witnesses rendered more credible
the defense's claim that Gonzalez was arrested at his home; at the very least, their testimonies
rendered doubtful the prosecution's claim that police officers arrested Gonzalez on the street in the
regular performance of their duties.
Moreover, while the information and the physical evidence presented before the lower court both
revealed a kitchen knife, PO1 Congson categorically testified that he saw a fan knife. Given the
difference in the prosecution and defense's versions of Gonzalez' arrest, including the variance
regarding the physical evidence presented in court, it behooved the lower court to examine and
calibrate more carefully the evidence presented by both sides. As it was, the defense's evidence

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weighed more than the prosecution's evidence. After all, the burden is on the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.

ANGELITO MAGNO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, OF THE REPRESENTED BY THE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondent.
G.R No. 230657, SECOND DIVISION, March 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Thus, the right to speedy trial (as well as the right to speedy disposition of cases) should be understood
as a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would
not be sufficient.
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such right, the following factors
may be considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (d) the prejudice caused by the delay.
First, more than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information in Crim. Case No. DU-10123 was
filed on May 14, 2003, until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November
28, 2014 dismissing the case on the ground of violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial. Second, the
numerous delays and postponements that occurred during the First Period were excusable. However,
the very long delay that occurred during the Second Period largely remains unjustified. Third, petitioner
was not remiss in asserting his right to speedy trial. Fourth, the Court recognizes the prejudice caused
to petitioner by the lengthy and unjustified delay in Crim. Case No. DU-10123.

FACTS:
On May 14, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging, inter alia, petitioner with
Multiple Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. Petitioner objected to the formal
appearance of one Atty. Adelino Sitoy (Atty. Sitoy), who intended to act as a private prosecutor for
and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). RTC ruled that only the Ombudsman
may prosecute the instant case, to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those
authorized under Republic Act No. 6770. CA ruled that the private prosecutor may prosecute the case
and appear for the People of the Philippines in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the
Ombudsman. This court, however, nullified the CA's pronouncements on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the Ombudsman and Atty. Sitoy should have sought recourse from the
SB instead. While the Private Prosecutor Case was still pending before the CA, the latter court issued
a temporary restraining order (TRO), and thereafter, a preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC from
implementing its Order. The prosecution moved to set the case for trial and started presenting one
of its witnesses. In the course of the prosecution's presentation of witnesses, the RTC sustained
petitioner's objection on the admissibility of one of the witness's testimony, prompting the
prosecution to elevate the matter to the SB which dismissed the Objection Case.
After the expiration of the TRO in the Objection Case, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Case for
Continuous Hearing before the RTC, invoking his right to speedy trial. RTC granted so under threat
of being cited in contempt, the prosecution continued its presentation of witnesses on September 1,

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2006. Such presentation continued all the way until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested
to reset the hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the handling prosecutor's illness. However, it appears
that from such postponement until around early 2010, no hearings were conducted in the case. In
view of the foregoing, petitioner moved for the continuation of the trial, the hearing of which was set
on April 22, 2010, which was further reset to September 2, 2010. At the September 2, 2010 hearing,
only petitioner's counsel appeared. Thus, on September 17, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated. (YES)
RULING:
The Court finds that the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. An
accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one
free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its 'salutary objective' being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective
on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, the old legal maxim, 'justice delayed is justice denied'
must be reiterated. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much
more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial."
Thus, the right to speedy trial (as well as the right to speedy disposition of cases) should be
understood as a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient. Pertinently, this right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Hence, in the determination of whether the
defendant has been denied such right, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (a) the
length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (d) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Examining the incidents of this case vis-a-vis the aforesaid jurisprudential parameters in determining
the existence of violation of such right, the Court holds that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been
violated.

First, more than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information in Crim. Case No. DU-10123 was
filed on May 14, 2003, until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November
28, 2014 dismissing the case on the ground of violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial. Second,
the numerous delays and postponements that occurred during the First Period were excusable.
However, the very long delay that occurred during the Second Period largely remains unjustified.
Third, petitioner was not remiss in asserting his right to speedy trial. Fourth, the Court recognizes
the prejudice caused to petitioner by the lengthy and unjustified delay in Crim. Case No. DU-10123.
To stress, the right to speedy trial is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in

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the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the resolution of Crim. Case No. DU-10123 as
well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, the Court concludes that
petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated

Q. Right to the speedy disposition of cases

R. Right against self-incrimination
S. Right against double jeopardy
T. Involuntary servitude
U. Right against excessive fines, and cruel and inhuman punishments
V. Non-imprisonment for debts
W. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
X. Writs of habeas corpus, kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, petitioner, - versus - P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 203254, FIRST DIVISION, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on one hand, and the right
to life, liberty, or security on the other, which must be supported by substantial evidence.

In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to life, liberty or security was
or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he
failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving
the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.

FACTS:

Police Superintendent Neri Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee were former
common law partners. In July 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while
and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was
missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video she discovered
from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and
demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.

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During their confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and
walked away. This prompted Lee to utilize said video as evidence in filing various complaints –
criminal (in violation of the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004”), and
administrative [for misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)] – against
Ilagan.

Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same
to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right
to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ
of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor is warranted. The RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data directing Lee to
appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera as well as the negative/original
copy of the subject video.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Ilagan was proper. (NO)

RULING:

The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.”

In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on one hand, and the
right to life, liberty, or security on the other, which must be supported by substantial evidence.

In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video –
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right
to life, liberty or security. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders
a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end
of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve
unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the
subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases
that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss
the habeas data petition.

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SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN and CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO, Petitioner, -
versus- RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, and ERWIN TULFO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205039, FIRST DIVISION October 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

A petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available only to cases the subject thereof is either
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-
described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation
of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or
indirect government participation.

FACTS:

After arriving at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart)
and Claudine Margaret Santiago (Claudine) waited for their baggage but they were eventually
informed that it was transferred to another flight. While making a formal complaint, the spouses
noticed a man, later identified as Ramon Tulfo, taking pictures of Claudine. A brawl thereafter ensued.
Days after the incident, Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV program
comments against the spouses and threatened to retaliate. Terrified, the spouses filed before the RTC
a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against them. The petition was however dismissed on
the ground that the writ is only for cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the petition was correct. (YES)

RULING:

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC otherwise known as "The Rule on the Writ of Amparo," was intended to address
cases involving extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Section 1 of
the rule states that, “the petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.”

While the first paragraph states that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and
security. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege
any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of
direct or indirect government participation.

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IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O.
LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA, petitioner, - versus - MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU,
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH INFANTRY DIVISION (ID); COL.
LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON
APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN
DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 189689, EN BANC, November 13, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The burden of proof and standard diligence required under Amparo rule is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

A mere conclusion of one’s name in the OB List without more does not suffice to discharge the burden to
establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence. The existence
of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious men or the
violent death of certain personalities. The Court sees no direct relation between the violent deaths of
Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera and the subject OB List because, except for Celso
Pojas, the names of the supposed victims of extrajudicial killings are manifestly absent in the subject OB
List.

FACTS:

Petitioners aver that by the inclusion of their names in the Order of Battle (OB List), which is a list
containing the names of organizations and personalities in Davao City supposedly connected to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), they
become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings which is a real threat to
their life, liberty and security.

Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life, liberty and security by narrating that since
2007, suspicious-looking persons have been visiting her Davao City law office during her absence,
posing either as members of the military or falsely claiming to be clients.

Atty. Librado-Trinidad, on the other hand, averred that sometime in May 2008, two (2) suspicious-
looking men on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went about her day going to different places.
She also recalled that in June 2008, while she was away from home, three (3) unidentified men tried
to barge into their house and later left on board a plate-less, stainless owner type vehicle.

Lastly, Atty. Zarate asserted that the inclusion of his name in the OB List was due to his advocacies as
a public interest or human rights lawyer.

In fine, petitioners were asserting that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by
the fact that there have already been three (3) victims of extrajudicial killing (Celso Pojas, Lodenio
Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera) whose violent death can be linked directly to the OB List. As such,
they separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Application
for a Production Order.

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RTC finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and
security was attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents, hence, this instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule. (NO)

RULING:

The burden of proof and standard diligence required under Amparo rule is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

A mere conclusion of one’s name in the OB List without more does not suffice to discharge the burden
to establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence. The
existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious
men or the violent death of certain personalities. The Court sees no direct relation between the
violent deaths of Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera and the subject OB List
because, except for Celso Pojas, the names of the supposed victims of extrajudicial killings are
manifestly absent in the subject OB List.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, only actual threats, as ay be established from all the facts and
circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed.

Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as that
which brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera without
corroborative evidence. Even if the existence of the OB List or the inclusion of the petitioners’ names
therein can be properly inferred from the totality of evidence, still, no link has been sufficiently
established to relate the subject OB List either to the threatening visits received by petitioners from
unknown men or to the violent death of the three (3) mentioned personalities, which could strongly
suggest that the inclusion of one’s name in an OB List would eventually result to enforced
disappearance and murder of those persons tagged therein as militants.

VII. CITIZENSHIP
A. Who are Filipino citizens
B. Modes of acquiring citizenship
C. Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
D. Dual citizenship and dual allegiance
E. Foundlings

VIII. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

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A. General principles
B. Modes of acquiring title to public office
C. Kinds of appointment
D. Eligibility and qualification requirements
E. Disabilities and inhibitions of public officers
F. Rights and liabilities of public officers

FAUSTINO A. SILANG, et. al., petitioners, - versus - COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 213189, EN BANC, September 08, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits,
and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same in good faith.
Notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected personnel who received the said
benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the disallowed benefits.

However, such finding of good faith cannot be made to apply to Silang, who, as City Mayor, approved
the allowances, as well as the local Sanggunian members, who enacted the ordinances authorizing the
payment of the subject CNA Incentives. As City Mayor and members of the local Sanggunian, they are
presumed to be acquainted with - and, in fact, even duty bound to have full knowledge of - the
requirements under the applicable policies for the valid grant of CNA Incentives.

FACTS:

On three occasions, the LGU of Tayabas, Quezon entered into a Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA) with Unyon ng mga Kawani ng Pamahalaang Lokal ng Tayabas (UNGKAT), the sole
representative of rank-and-file employees of said LGU. The local Sanggunian and the city mayor,
Faustino Silang, passed and approved, respectively, ordinances appropriating money for the
payment of CNA Incentives to the rank-and-file employees of the LGU to be sourced from its
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) savings for the year prior to the execution of a
specific CNA. However, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed such appropriation due to the
non-compliance with DBM Circular No. 2006-01 which requires that the savings shall be reckoned
from the date of signing of the CNA and supplements thereto. In this case, the computation of savings
was reckoned two months before the execution of the first CNA. Despite such disallowance, the
employees were able to receive portions of such CNA Incentives.

ISSUE:

Whether there is good faith on the part of the employees in receiving the CNA Incentives which
precludes their reimbursement. (YES)

RULING:

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Public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as
well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom - in this case, the disallowed CNA
Incentives - shall be solidarily liable for their reimbursement. By way of exception, however, passive
recipients or payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not
refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same in good faith.

Notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected personnel who received the said
benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the disallowed benefits. However, such finding
of good faith cannot be made to apply to Silang, who, as City Mayor, approved the allowances, as well
as the local Sanggunian members, who enacted the ordinances authorizing the payment of the subject
CNA Incentives. As City Mayor and members of the local Sanggunian, they are presumed to be
acquainted with - and, in fact, even duty bound to have full knowledge of - the requirements under
the applicable policies for the valid grant of CNA Incentives.

G. De facto vs. de jure officers

H. Termination of official relation
I. The Civil Service
J. Personnel actions
EVELINA C. BANAAG VS. OLIVIA C. ESPELETA, INTERPRETER III, BRANCH 82, RTC , QUEZON
CITY,
A.M. NO. P-11-3011, NOVEMBER 29, 2011, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Respondent Espeleta is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct as defined in Section 1 of CSC
Resolution No. 100912 (Revised Rules on the Administrative Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct), is “an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and
condemned by the society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.” Respondent's act
of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and
immoral conduct,which is classified as a grave offense punishable with suspension from the service for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
FACTS
Petitioner Evelina claimed that she learned about the affair between respondent Olivia, a court
interpreter, and her husband Avelino, when her husband asked to withdraw P180,000.00 from their
joint bank account to lend to his brother who was in the hospital. She later found out that Avelino
gave him only P80,000.00 and the rest to Olivia. Evelina learned that her husband had gone to Olivia’s
house in Bulacan, accompanied by his friend, Sabigan. Sabigan did not witness any compromising
exchanges, but Avelino had confided to him that he and Olivia were seeing each other, and that he
had been giving Olivia P5,000.00 a week for groceries. The husband admitted his romantic
involvement with Olivia. Worse, Evelina discovered that he had been using their conjugal funds, to
deposit substantial amounts of money to Olivia's Landbank account for years, as well as to the latter's
daughter. He also made deposits to the Landbank accounts of Olivia's co-employees for the benefit of
Olivia.

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Evelina claimed that more than P3 Million had been deposited to Olivia's account but she was able to
retain in her possession deposit slips amounting only to P1.429 Million, having lost the others in a
scuffle with her husband, who tore them to pieces and flushed them in the toilet. The deposit slips
list their relationship as being “cousins.”
Petitioner Evelina Banaag filed a complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging
Respondent Espeleta with Gross Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino C. Banaag.
Oliva failed to comply with the OCA order to comment on the complaint. Another notice was sent and
it was returned stating that respondent had changed addresses.
It was found that Olivia had resigned from the RTC and Presiding Judge informed the OCA that Olivia
had gone to the US, and that it was not known whether she intended to return to the country. The
OCA reported its findings and recommended that Respondent be found GUILTY of Gross Immoral
Conduct, and be ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of P50,000.00, which may be deducted from
whatever sums that are due her, as accrued leave credits, if sufficient.
ISSUE
Whether or not Espeleta is guilty of immoral conduct.
RULING
YES. Respondent Espeleta is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct as defined in Section 1 of CSC
Resolution No. 100912 (Revised Rules on the Administrative Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct), is “an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and
condemned by the society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.”
Respondent's act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the purview
of disgraceful and immoral conduct,which is classified as a grave offense punishable with suspension
from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
for the second offense.
Recently, in Babante-Caples vs. Caples (2010), a utility worker in the MTC, who had resigned, was
nonetheless ordered to pay a fine for maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife.
As in Babante-Caples, respondent herein was given the opportunity to be heard and refute the
charges against her; yet, she chose not to file any comment. Instead, as aptly pointed out by the OCA,
respondent rather hastily tendered her resignation. That respondent fully intended to run away from
accountability for her indiscretions is betrayed by her perfectly-timed departure for the United States
of America shortly after her resignation. Respondent's actuations when confronted with the charges
against her are, thus, strongly indicative of guilt on her part.
The deposit slips indicating various amounts credited both directly and indirectly to respondent's
account indubitably prove the allegation that she had been receiving substantial amounts of money
from complainant's husband, in callous disregard of the heartache and financial dislocation of the
latter's family. There could thus not be any serious doubt that respondent was indeed in an intimate
relationship with Avelino, a married man.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of

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substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant.
This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had been found wanting of such
standards, even if they have precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be
used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an
administrative sanction.

MARIANO T. ONG VS. EVA G. BASIYA-SARATAN, CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 32,
AM NO. P-12-3090, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the imposition
of administrative sanctions.
In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of execution to implement the
judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required
comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of
the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied
admission of the charges.
FACTS
Complainant filed a verified letter-complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
charging Clerk of Court respondent of the RTC of Iloilo City for inefficiency and/or negligence in the
performance of her official duties. Complainant averred that respondent repeatedly failed to issue
Alias Writs of Execution for almost three (3) years from the time she was first directed to do so by
the RTC in its Order.
Complainant is one of the defendants/judgment obligees in a Decision rendered by the RTC. To
implement the judgment, the RTC issued the Order dated April 24, 2006 granting the issuance of the
writ of execution. Since the judgment has remained unsatisfied, complainant moved for the issuance
of an Alias Writ of Execution, which was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 26, 2008,
with a further directive to the Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 72 to proceed against
plaintiff's attachment bond.
On November 26, 2010 or after the lapse of more than two (2) years with no action on the part of
respondent, the RTC again directed the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution and its implementation
by Sheriff. Notwithstanding, respondent did not issue any, prompting complainant to file a "Very
Urgent Motion to Be Furnished Certified True Copy of Alias Writ of Execution," which the RTC
granted.
On February 7, 2011, complainant filed a Manifestation and Motion, seeking to compel respondent to
comply with the court's directive. On August 15, 2011, the RTC issued an Amended Order enjoining
respondent to issue a certified true copy of the Amended Writ of Execution. But up to the filing of the
instant administrative complaint, no action has been taken by respondent.

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The OCA found respondent to have been remiss in the performance of her duties as Clerk of Court in
violation of Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, underscoring her failure
to issue the corresponding Alias Writs of Execution as directed by the RTC as well as her failure to
comment on the allegations of the complainant.
The OCA also noted that this is not the first time respondent had failed to perform her official
functions. In another complaint filed against her by Atty. Raul A. Muyco, she was reprimanded by the
Court for her failure to issue on time a certification requested by the complainant, and sternly warned
that the commission of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent should be imposed the penalty as recommended by the OCA for her
repeated failure to issue the corresponding alias writs of execution despite directives from the RTC.
RULING
YES. The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well-taken. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and
with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court like respondent are primarily responsible for the speedy
and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on
their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court,
issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon
request. As such, they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the
performance of their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias
writs of execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite orders from the RTC.
Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the
judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest
in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the charges.
Consequently, the Court finds her guilty of refusal to perform official duty classified as a grave offense
under Section 52(A)(18) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
punishable with suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and
by dismissal for the second offense.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. PAZ CAPISTRANO, COURT STENOGRAPHER III,
RTC QUEZON CITY, BR. 224.
A.M. NO. P-13-3147, JULY 2, 2014, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify their bundy cards are guilty of dishonesty
Further, under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents, which
includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses. Accordingly, the commission of these acts
carries the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.

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FACTS
The OCA sent a letter to the RTC Presiding Judge Tita Villordon regarding the April and May 2009
bundy card of her staff, one of which was herein respondent. According to the letter, the bundy cards
contained irregularities pertaining to the time of arrival in the morning bearing overbar, thus
indicating that they were punched in the evening. To clarify the matter, respondent was ordered to
file a comment. In compliance, respondent filed her comment admitting to falsifying her bundy cards.
In addition, Capistrano appealed for judicial clemency and pleaded for another opportunity to serve
the judiciary, considering her length of service and dedication to her work.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for dishonesty against respondent Paz P. Capistrano
(Capistrano), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC),
which arose from the questionable entries found in her April and May 2009 bundy cards.
ISSUE
Whether or not Capistrano should be held administratively liable for dishonesty.
RULING
YES. Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify their bundy cards are guilty of
dishonesty Further, under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official
documents, which includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses. Accordingly, the
commission of these acts carries the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service.
These notwithstanding, Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service14 grants the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty.
In this case, respondent readily admitted to the fact that she indeed falsified the entries in her April
and May 2009 bundy cards, and concomitantly, has expressed her remorse and promised not to
commit the same. Thus, considering too that said infraction would be Capistrano's first
administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to adopt the OCA's recommendation to impose
against her the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay, and not the supreme
penalty of dismissal in view of the mitigating factors attendant herein.
The Court made a reminder that every employee of the Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a Court dispensing justice is
mirrored in its very own personnel

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO AND CLERK OF COURT II JOSEFINA C. EMPUESTO, BOTH OF
THE MTC, MAHAPLAG, LEYTE VS. CLERK II BRYAN ANTONIO C. LEONIDO.
A.M. NO. P-14-3222, AUGUST 12, 2014, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. It is a
malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a

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transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be
grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. In order to differentiate gross
misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
FACTS
In their Letter-Complaint, complainants alleged that on February 22, 2011, Leonido intercepted and
withdrew checks representing their second quincena salary as well as their share in the Judiciary
Development Fund and Special Allowance for Judges Fund(subject checks) from the Mail Distribution
Center, Postal Office of Tacloban, Leyte without their authority and knowledge. The fraudulent
transaction was claimed to be done by presenting a forged authorization letter from Empuesto.
Learning about what had transpired, Judge Lagado repeatedly tried contacting Leonido, but to no
avail. Eventually, on February 25, 2011, complainants were able to recover the subject checks
through Leonido’s wife who turned them over to a certain Edgar M. Miralles, a court aide of the MTC.
As complainants averred, this was not the first time that Leonido fraudulently intercepted checks of
other MTC employees.
The OCA found Leonido guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty, and accordingly, imposed the
penalty of dismissal from service against him. However, in view of his having been dropped from the
rolls, it instead recommended: (a) the forfeiture of all the remaining benefits due him, except accrued
leave credits; and (b) his disqualification from reemployment in any branch, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations
The OCA also maintained that even if Leonido had been dropped from the rolls, the Court is not
precluded from imposing upon him the accessory penalties of dismissal from service, i.e., forfeiture
of benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service as well as in
government-owned and controlled corporations.
ISSUE
Whether or not Leonido should be held administratively liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct
RULING
YES. Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary. Misconduct,
on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from
the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.
In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In this case, the OCA correctly found Leonido guilty of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct for
fraudulently intercepting the subject checks through the use of a falsified authorization letter and
keeping such checks in his possession without the complainants’ knowledge and authority. The
subsequent return of the subject checks to their lawful owners is of no moment

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It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it
had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.

FELISICIMO SABIJON AND ZENAIDA SABIJON VS. BENEDICT DE JUAN

A.M. NO. P-14-3281, JANUARY 28, 2015, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
In this case, respondent, as a Sheriff, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay all or part of the judgment debt, is given
the option to choose which among his properties or a part thereof may be levied upon.
FACTS:
Complainants surmised that respondent committed irregularities in executing the judgment in Civil
Case No. 345 and in the disposition of the subject truck, claiming that: (a) they were not furnished a
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale anent the subject truck; (b) assuming an auction sale indeed took place,
respondent never gave them the excess of the proceeds, considering that the value of the subject
truck was significantly higher than their judgment debt which was less than P80,000.00; (c)
respondent and PO2 Aquino connived in not selling the subject truck at public auction and instead,
appropriated the same for their personal benefit, causing damage and prejudice to complainants; and
(d) Zenaida personally saw the subject truck being driven by a person other than PO2 Aquino.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent administratively liable for Grave
Abuse of Authority and Simple Neglect of Duty. The OCA found that by his own admission, respondent
digressed from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments when
he: (a) immediately levied upon the subject truck, rendering nugatory the option given to
complainants, as judgment debtors, to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon;
(b) failed to keep the levied property securely in his custody; and (c) did not prepare a Sheriff’s
Return within the prescribed period and furnish the parties copies of the same. In this light, the OCA
doubted the existence of the auction sale, opining that without the foregoing, all that respondent has
to prove that an actual auction sale occurred is his bare allegation, which is at most self- serving, and
thus, cannot be given any credence. Finally, the OCA did not give credence to respondent’s assertion
that the subject truck was only valued at more or less P80,000.00, considering that the same was
mortgaged on November 28, 2011 in order to secure a loan amounting to P149,272.00.16.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority
(otherwise referred to as Oppression) and Simple Neglect of Duty.
RULING:
YES. De Juan is guilty of Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by
a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. In this
case, respondent, as a Sheriff, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,

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a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay all or part of the judgment debt, is given the
option to choose which among his properties or a part thereof may be levied upon. Moreover,
respondent should have known that under Section 14 of the same Rule, he is required to make a
return on the writ of execution and make periodic reports on the execution proceedings until either
the full satisfaction of the judgment or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, as well as to furnish the
parties copies of such return and periodic reports.

RE: REPORT OF ATTY. CARIDAD A. PABELLO, CHIEF OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OAS-OCA), ON NEGLECT OF DUTY OF
FERDINAND F. ANDRES, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC)-PERSONNEL DIVISION, OAS-OCA, THE PROCESSOR-IN-CHARGE OF
APPOINTMENT AND THE ALLEGED ERRONEOUS RECORDING, ERASURE, AND ALTERATION
OF THE PERFORMANCE RATING ON THE RECORD BOOK,
A.M. NO. 2014-07-SC, JULY 8, 2015, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 1, Canon IV of the “Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that “[c]ourt personnel shall
at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence
FACTS:
Andres is the Processor-in-Charge of RTC personnel in Regions VIII, IX, XI, and XII. In consequence of
the vacancy in the position of Sheriff IV in the RTC-Branch 31, he prepared a Memorandum Report
containing the lineup/matrix of the applicants for the said position, which included Puerto. Puerto,
who was listed as having a performance rating of “Very Satisfactory” for the period January to June
2013, was subsequently promoted to the position of Sheriff IV. However, when Puerto’s promotional
papers were about to be transmitted to the Records Control Division of the OAS-OCA for inclusion in
his 201 file, Andres noticed that Puerto’s performance rating form (PR form) was lacking. Upon
verification with the Clerk of Court who rated Puerto’s performance, Andres learned that Puerto’s
performance rating was only “Satisfactory,” hence, erroneously reported, which meant that Puerto
should have been disqualified for promotion.
Atty. Pabello recommended that an investigation be conducted by the OAS-SC. The OAS- SC
recommended that Andres be found guilty of simple neglect of duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Andres should be held administratively liable for simple neglect of duty and the
alleged tampering of the record book.
RULING:
YES. Section 1, Canon IV of the “Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that “[c]ourt
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. x x x.” Andres, as
processor-in-charge of appointment, occupies a sensitive position which is vital to the human
resource management operations and activities of the RTC- Personnel Division of the OAS-OCA.
Andres was clearly remiss and negligent in performing his assigned tasks as a processor-in-charge,
and is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure of an employee to give proper attention
to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.”

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TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, CLERK OF COURT, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VS. RONELO G.
LABAR, DRIVER, MAILING AND DELIVERY SECTION, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU STATION
A.M. NO. CA-15-33-P, AUGUST 24, 2015, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than the judiciary.
Labar should be held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under Section
52(C)(3) of the Revised URACCS for his unjustified presence at the maintenance section of the CA-Cebu
without official business thereat or without a valid pass slip from the Assistant Clerk of Court, in direct
contravention of the April 14, 2011 Memorandum. Likewise, he should be held liable for the offense of
gambling prohibited by law under Section 52(C)(5) of the same Rules, for having committed gambling
on the same incident.
FACTS:
At around 3:35 in the afternoon of January 25, 2012, Atty. Cad-Enjambre caught Labar, together with
two (2) other coterminous employees of CA-Cebu and an unidentified male person, in the act of
playing cards under the staircase located at the back of the office building, adjoining the working area
of the maintenance section. As there were some twenty-peso bills and coins on top of the table
together with the playing cards, Atty. Cad-Enjambre deduced that Labar and his companions were
gambling. Thus, Atty. Cad-Enjambre issued a to Labar, requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be meted against him for his infractions.
In his defense, Labar explained that he was only taking his afternoon snacks at that time and
thereafter, he and his companions played cards because he was already done with his tasks for the
day. He admitted knowledge of the April 14, 2011 Memorandum but claimed that he simply forgot
about it. Nonetheless, he admitted and apologized for his infractions and vowed never to do such acts
again.
The OCA found that Labar’s actuations constituted insubordination and not merely a violation of the
office rules and regulations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Labar should be held administratively liable for insubordination in violation of the
April 14, 2011 Memorandum.
RULING:
NO. Labar should be held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under Section
52(C)(3) of the Revised URACCS for his unjustified presence at the maintenance section of the CA-
Cebu without official business thereat or without a valid pass slip from the Assistant Clerk of Court,
in direct contravention of the April 14, 2011 Memorandum. Likewise, he should be held liable for the
offense of gambling prohibited by law under Section 52(C)(5) of the same Rules, for having committed
gambling on the same incident.
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected

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with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LEMUEL H. VENDIOLA, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN CITY, LAGUNA (RTC),
A.M. NO. 17-11-272-RTC, JANUARY 31, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE

Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve
with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
FACTS:
The records of the Employees's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), show that Vendiola has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since
May 2012 up to the present.He neither submitted any application for leave. His service record shows
that he was appointed Utility Worker I in the RTC, Branch 24 on November 10, 2004. On April 27,
2009, he was appointed temporarily as Sheriff IV in the OCC, RTC. He was reappointed to the same
position on a permanent capacity on June 3, 2010. Vendiola did not submit the requirements for
initial salary; he did, however, submit his DTR until April 2012.
The OCA recommended that: (a) Vendiola's name be dropped from the rolls effective May 2, 2012 for
having been absent without official leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed
about his separation from the service at his last known address on record at Kasilaga Compound
Silangan St., San Francisco, Biñan, Laguna. The OCA added, however, that Vendiola is still qualified to
receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the
government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
YES. Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it
disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be reiterated and
stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding
public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to report for work
since April 2012 up to the present, Vendiola grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office.
Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in
the government service.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD

A.M. NO. P-17-3705, FEBRUARY 6, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE

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Saguyod must be held administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties. Inefficiency involves specific acts or omission on the part of the employee which results in
the damage to the employer or to the latter's business. It is akin to neglect of duty,which is the failure of
an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard
of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
FACTS:
In the Report, the Audit Team examined 1,194 cases decided by former Judge Liberty O. Castañeda
(Judge Castañeda) of the RTC where BCC Saguyod was also stationed. After the conduct of
investigation, not only did the Audit Team find fault with the way Judge Castañeda proceeded with
the cases she handled, they also discovered that BCC Saguyod had been notarizing a multitude of
documents filed before the RTC in connection with the various cases before it without properly
observing the Court's appropriate guidelines.
BCC Saguyod claimed that he performed said act in good faith and without any monetary
consideration. Citing Section 41, Chapter 10, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
authorizes clerks of courts to administer oaths, he thought that he was doing an important function
which is vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.
The OCA found that BCC Saguyod readily admitted to notarizing various documents filed before the
RTC without complying with Section (f) of the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC, and even when some of these documents were not completely accomplished by the concerned
parties. In this regard, the OCA found that BCC Saguyod's defenses that he did not charge notarization
fees and that there are no available notaries public in Paniqui, Tarlac do not deserve credence,
because: (a) his act of notarizing without compliance with the Court's aforesaid resolution directly
makes him liable thereunder; and (b) there are other petitions filed before the RTC which are
notarized by notaries public based in Paniqui, Tarlac.
The OCA recommended that a suspension from service for one (1) year be meted on him, ursuant to
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.ch
RULING:
YES. The Court adopts the findings and the recommendation of the OCA that BCC Saguyod must be
held administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
Inefficiency involves specific acts or omission on the part of the employee which results in the
damage to the employer or to the latter's business. It is akin to neglect of duty,which is the failure of
an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard
of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Public officers must be accountable to the people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree
of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office,
especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be
countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its
good name and standing as a true temple of justice.

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RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. JANICE C. MILLARE, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY
A.M. NO. 17-11-131-METC, FEBRUARY 07, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series
of 2007, states: Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is continuously
absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence
without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without
prior notice.
FACTS:
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), show that Millare has not submitted her DTRs since July 2017 up to the present.
She neither submitted any application for leave. Thus, she has been on absence without official leave
(AWOL). Millare applied for and was granted authority to travel to Saipan. To date, she has still not
reported for work. Her salaries and benefits were withheld based on Memorandum WSB No.
8a_2017. The OCA informed the Court of the following findings based on the records of its different
offices: (a) Millare is still in the plantilla of court personnel and, thus, considered to be in active
service; (b) she has no application for retirement; (c) no administrative case is pending against her;
and (d) she is not an accountable officer.
The OCA recommended that: (a) Millare's name be dropped from the rolls for having been absent
without official leave for more than thirty working days; (b) her position be declared vacant; and (c)
she be informed about her separation from the service or dropping from the rolls at 1312 Taurus
Street, Carmel IV Subdivision, TandangSora, Quezon City, her last known address on record. The OCA
added, however, that Millare is still qualified to receive the benefits she may be entitled to under
existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Millare should be separated or dropped from the rolls.
RULING:
YES. Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No.
13, Series of 2007, states:
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service
or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x xx.
Based on this provision, Millare should be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls in
view of her continued absence since July 17, 2017. Millare's prolonged unauthorized absences caused
inefficiency in the public service as it disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the
duty of a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency. It should be reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with

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the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the
judiciary.
By failing to report for work since July 17, 2017 up to the present, Millare grossly disregarded and
neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to adhere to the high standards of public
accountability imposed on all those in the government service.

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. MARISSA M. NUDO, CLERK III, BRANCH 6, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANILA
A.M. NO. 17-08-191-RTC, FEBRUARY 07, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
By failing to report for work since March 2017 up to the present, Nudo grossly disregarded and
neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to adhere to the high standards of public
accountability imposed on all those in the government service.
FACTS:
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), show that Nudo has not submitted her Daily Time Record (DTR) since
March 2017 up to the present. She neither submitted any application for leave. Thus, she has been on
AWOL since March 1, 2017. Moreover, Nudo, among others, failed to submit her DTR for the month
of March 2017 because she has been absent since March 14, 2017 up to the present. To date, Nudo
has still not reported for work.
The OCA recommended that: (a) Nudo's name be dropped from the rolls effective March 1, 2017 for
having been absent without official leave for more than thirty working days; (b) her position be
declared vacant; and (c) she be informed about her separation from the service at 738 Magsaysay
Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, her last known address on record. The OCA added, however,
that Nudo is still qualified to receive the benefits she may be entitled to under existing laws and may
still be reemployed in the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nudo should be separated or dropped from the rolls.
RULING:
YES. Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No.
13, Series of 2007, states:
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service
or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. xxx.
Based on this provision, Nudo should be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls in view
of her continued absence. Her prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public
service as it disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant
to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be

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reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy
responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary.
By failing to report for work since March 2017 up to the present, Nudo grossly disregarded and
neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to adhere to the high standards of public
accountability imposed on all those in the government service.

RE: REPORT OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY
(RTC), BRANCH 10, ON THE ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION OF UTILITY WORKER I CATALINA Z.
CAMASO, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, RTC
A.M. NO. 15-02-47-RTC, MARCH 21, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 93 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) authorizes and
provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia, are no longer fit to
perform his or her duties.
In this case, Judge Peras received reports from Camaso's colleagues regarding the latter's strange and
abnormal behavior, thus, prompting the OCA to recommend that Camaso be subjected to a series of tests
to evaluate her neuro-psychiatric well-being. After conducting such tests, the psychologist found that
there are already: (a) deterioration in almost all facets of Camaso's mental functioning; and (b)
distortion in her perception of things, making a limited grasp of reality.
FACTS:
In his complaint, Judge Peras alleged that on September 10, 2014, he issued a Memorandum
temporarily detailing Camaso to Branch 10 to assist in the filing, delivery, and mailing of letters and
correspondences in the said court. As Camaso neither reported to the same branch nor proffered an
explanation therefor, Judge Peras sent her two subsequent memoranda directing her to explain in
writing such non-compliance; however, Camaso ignored such directives. Further, Judge Peras
averred that Camaso has been acting and behaving "strangely and abnormally," as exhibited by the
latter's following acts: (a) claiming that she will not retire upon reaching the age of 65, citing that she
is a "national employee;" and (b) sitting on top of the backrest of a chair and resting her feet on the
seat of the same chair, placing herself in danger of falling. In view of the foregoing, Judge Peras
requested the OCA to conduct a psychiatric evaluation on Camaso to determine her fitness to work.
Further, should the evaluation yield normal results, he requested the conduct of an administrative
investigation against Camaso on the ground of gross insubordination. Based on the Neuro-Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, as well as the Psychological Report of Camaso, it was stated that the examinations
done on her indicate that she is suffering from Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type, and that in the
absence of psychiatric management, she will be unable to maintain good inter-personal relationships
with her co-workers.
The OCA recommended that Camaso be dropped from the rolls without forfeiture of any benefits due
her, for being mentally unfit to perform her duties.
ISSUE:
Whether or Camaso should be dropped from the rolls for being mentally unfit to perform her duties.
RULING:

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YES. Section 93 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) authorizes
and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia, are no longer
fit to perform his or her duties. Portions of this provision pertinent to this case read:
Section 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. — Officers and employees who
are shown to be physically and mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from the
rolls subject to the following procedures:
c. Physically Unfit
3. An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally and manifests continuing mental
disorder and incapacity to work as reported by his/her co-workers or immediate supervisor
and confirmed by a competent physician, may likewise be dropped from the rolls.
In this case, Judge Peras received reports from Camaso's colleagues regarding the latter's strange and
abnormal behavior, thus, prompting the OCA to recommend that Camaso be subjected to a series of
tests to evaluate her neuro-psychiatric well-being. After conducting such tests, the psychologist
found that there are already: (a) deterioration in almost all facets of Camaso's mental functioning;
and (b) distortion in her perception of things, making a limited grasp of reality. These findings are
then corroborated by the psychiatrist, who found Camaso to be suffering from a psychological
impairment, i.e., Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type (Grandiose and Persecutory), which gives her a
distorted view of reality that affects her social judgment, planning, and decision-making. Worse,
when asked to comment on this case, Camaso not only failed to refute such findings against her, but
also exhibited her impaired mental cognition and deteriorating mental health.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to drop Camaso from the rolls. At this point, the
Court deems it worthy to stress that the instant case is non-disciplinary in nature. Thus, Camaso's
separation from the service shall neither result in the forfeiture of any benefits which have accrued
in her favor, nor in her disqualification from re-employment in the government service.

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. ARNO D. DEL ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
BRANCH 41, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC), QUEZON CITY
A.M. NO. 17-12-135-METC, APRIL 16, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 107, Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS)
authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia, are
absent without approved leave for an extended period of time. An official or employee who is
continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) working days may be dropped
from the rolls without prior notice which shall take effect immediately.
FACTS:
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Del Rosario has not submitted either his daily time record
from February 3, 2017 to the present or any application for leave covering such period, thus making
him absent without approved leave since said date. In addition, the records of Employees' Welfare
and Benefits Division, OAS of the OCA reveal that it received an application for retirement from Del
Rosario effective February 3, 2017; however, further verification showed that he has not submitted

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the documents necessary for its approval. In view of the foregoing, Del Rosario's name was excluded
from the payroll starting April 2017. This notwithstanding, the Personnel Division stated that he is
still in the plantilla of personnel and is therefore considered in active service. Thus, in a letter,
Presiding Judge Analie B. Oga-Brual requested to drop Del Rosario from the rolls or declare his
position vacant considering his absences without official leave.
The OCA recommended that Del Rosario be: (a) dropped from the rolls due to his absences without
official leave, and his position be declared vacant; and (b) informed about his separation from the
service. The OCA, however, clarified, that Del Rosario is still qualified to receive the benefits that he
may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be re-employed in the government service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Del Rosario should be dropped from the rolls due to his absences without official
leave.
RULING:
YES. Section 107, Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS)
authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia,
are absent without approved leave for an extended period of time. An official or employee who is
continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) working days may be
dropped from the rolls without prior notice which shall take effect immediately.
This provision is in consonance with Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended
by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007, which states: An official
or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days
shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service
or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.
In this case, it is undisputed that Del Rosario had been absent without official leave since February 3,
2017. Verily, his prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it
disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be reiterated and
stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding
public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to report for work
since February 3, 2017 up to the present, Del Rosario grossly disregarded and neglected the duties
of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed
on all those in the government service.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to drop Del Rosario from the rolls. At this point, the
Court deems it worthy to stress that the instant case is non-disciplinary in nature. Thus, Del Rosario's
separation from the service shall neither result in the forfeiture of any benefits which have accrued
in his favor, nor in his disqualification from re-employment in the government service.

RE: JULIUS E. PADUGA VS. ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171
A.M. NO. P-18-3833, APRIL 16, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE

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As correctly found by the OCA, respondent is guilty of all three (3) of these offenses, considering that: (a)
as a Sheriff in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, he encroached on the authority, duties, and functions of the
Sheriff of RTC--QC Br. 221 when he personally appeared at the property subject of a ruling in said court,
without being deputized to do so; (b) respondent lied when he claimed to have done so during his
personal time, when the truth of the matter is that he acted during official time, as evidenced by his
accomplished Daily Time Record showing his presence in his station in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171 on those
instances; and (c) in attending to such matter extraneous to his duties as Sheriff of RTC-Valenzuela Br.
171, he neglected his own duties and functions in the same court. Clearly, respondent must be held
administratively liable for the aforesaid offenses.
FACTS:
In the letter-complaint, complainant alleged that respondent personally attended to the execution
proceedings in connection with a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 221 despite not having been deputized by said court to do so. He also claimed that respondent
is a sheriff of an entirely different court, i.e., RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171. Complying with the OCA's
directive, respondent explained that as a brother-in-law of one of the counsels in the case ruled upon
by the RTC-QC Br. 221, he only assisted in the implementation of the amicable settlement in order to
prevent physical conflict between the parties. Respondent further averred that he neither interfered
nor participated in any of the processes relative to the execution of the RTC-QC Br. 221 ruling, and
only went there on his brother-in-law's behest, to ensure the prompt delivery of financial assistance
to the defendants. Finally, respondent claimed that he never introduced himself as a sheriff of another
court and that he did all these things in his personal capacity and never during official time
The OCA recommended, inter alia, that respondent be found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Less Serious Dishonesty, and Simple Neglect of Duty, and accordingly, be
meted the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will merit the most severe penalty from the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
RULING:
YES. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service involves the demeanor of a public officer
which tends to tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. On the other hand, Dishonesty
has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a
disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth. Under CSC, Resolution
No. 06-0538, dishonesty may be classified as serious, less serious or simple. Section 4 of said
Resolution states that Less Serious Dishonesty necessarily entails the presence of any one of the
following: circumstances: (a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government
which is not so serious as to qualify under Serious Dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not take
advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other analogous
circumstances. Finally, Simple Neglect of Duty means the failure of an employee or official to give
proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.
As correctly found by the OCA, respondent is guilty of all three (3) of these offenses, considering that:
(a) as a Sheriff in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, he encroached on the authority, duties, and functions of

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the Sheriff of RTC--QC Br. 221 when he personally appeared at the property subject of a ruling in said
court, without being deputized to do so; (b) respondent lied when he claimed to have done so during
his personal time, when the truth of the matter is that he acted during official time, as evidenced by
his accomplished Daily Time Record showing his presence in his station in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171
on those instances; and (c) in attending to such matter extraneous to his duties as Sheriff of RTC-
Valenzuela Br. 171, he neglected his own duties and functions in the same court. Clearly, respondent
must be held administratively liable for the aforesaid offenses.

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. FLORANTE B. SUMANGIL, CLERK III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119
A.M. NO. 18-04-79-RTC, JUNE 20, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 107 (a) (1), Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017
RACCS)12 authorizes the dropping from the rolls of employees who have been continuously absent
without official leave for at least thirty (30) working days, without the need for prior notice.
FACTS:
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), show that Sumangil has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since
December 27, 2017 up to the present or filed any application for leave. Thus, he has been on AWOL
since December 1, 2017. Acting Presiding Judge Bibiano G. Colasito of the RTC forwarded to the OCA
the letter-report of Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Maria Bernadette B. Opeda relative to Sumangil's
prolonged absences without leave. Atty. Opeda reported that she was informed by Sumangil's
housemate that the latter left for Mindanao last December 31, 2017. On the other hand, Sumangil's
daughter, Dyna Sumangil, told her that none of her relatives had seen her father and that the latter
visited his own mother but had not returned. Atty. Opeda also inquired from his friends but no one
knew his whereabouts.
The OCA recommended that: (a) Sumangil's name be dropped from the rolls effective December 1,
2017 for having been absent without official leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be
informed about his separation from the service at his last known address on record at 117 Pasadena,
Barangay 70, Zone 9, Pasay City. The OCA added, however, that Sumangil is still qualified to receive
the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sumangil should be separated or dropped from the rolls.
RULING:
YES. Section 107 (a) (1), Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017
RACCS)12 authorizes the dropping from the rolls of employees who have been continuously absent
without official leave for at least thirty (30) working days, without the need for prior notice.
By failing to report for work since December 2017, Sumangil grossly disregarded and neglected the
duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability

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imposed on all those in the government service. The Court stresses that a court personnel's conduct
is laden with the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's
faith in the Judiciary. Sumangil's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public
service as it disrupted the normal functions of the court, and in this regard, contravened his duty as
a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.

CONCERNED CITIZENS VS. RUTH TANGLAO SUAREZ- HOLGUIN, UTILITY WORKER 1, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA
A.M. NO. P-18-3843, JUNE 25, 2018, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the
allegations in their complaint by substantial evidence.
While complainants attached pictures of respondent posing in a two- piece bikini as posted in social
media, such photographs, by themselves, as aptly stated by the OCA, do not constitute evidence of
immorality absent any sexual innuendo or depiction of a sexual act.
As regards Suarez-Holguin's travels abroad, the Court finds sufficient ground to discipline her for failing
to secure travel authorities for thirteen (13) foreign trips within a span of three (3) years.
FACTS:
In the anonymous complaint, it was alleged that Suarez-Holguin committed the following infractions:
(a) paid someone else to do her job; (b) violated the prescribed dress code; (c) traveled abroad
without securing a travel authority; (d) used official time for personal business, specifically by
engaging in money lending, as well as selling imported items to her co- employees; (e) immorality by
disclosing that she engages in sexual relations with several male foreigners during her travels; and
(f) used Supreme Court stickers on her public utility vehicles to evade being cited for traffic
violations. Respondent denied all the allegations.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the charges for immorality and misconduct against her for
lack of substantial evidence.
However, with respect to her travels without the required travel authority over the course of three
years, the OCA recommended that she be found guilty of violating Paragraph B (4) of OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 and, accordingly, be reprimanded and sternly warned that any repetition of the same or
similar act shall be severely dealt with. The OCA explained that complainants failed to discharge their
burden of proving the allegations in their complaint by substantial evidence, particularly with respect
to Suarez-Holguin's supposed neglect of duty, violation of prescribed dress code, use of official time
for personal business, immorality, and use of Supreme Court stickers to evade traffic citations. It
stressed that pointing out circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions is not sufficient
to prove accusations. Hence, it did not consider the pictures of Suarez-Holguin clothed in a two-piece
bikini as posted in her social media account as evidence of immorality, noting that any interpretation
of such pictures absent any other competent evidence will only amount to conjecture and
supposition.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not Millare Suarez-Holguin should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
YES. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving
the allegations in their complaint by substantial evidence. As found by the OCA in the present case,
the record is bereft of any evidence supporting the charges against Suarez-Holguin for neglect of duty,
violating the prescribed dress code, using official time for personal business, immorality, and using
Supreme Court stickers to evade traffic citations. While complainants attached pictures of
respondent posing in a two- piece bikini as posted in social media, such photographs, by themselves,
as aptly stated by the OCA, do not constitute evidence of immorality absent any sexual innuendo or
depiction of a sexual act. Therefore, the Court dismisses these charges for lack of evidence.
As regards Suarez-Holguin's travels abroad, the Court finds sufficient ground to discipline her for
failing to secure travel authorities for thirteen (13) foreign trips within a span of three (3) years. OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 provides that "[j]udges and court personnel who wish to travel abroad must
secure a travel authority from the [OCA]" and that those who leave the country without the required
travel authority shall be "subject to disciplinary action."

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. STEVERIL J. JABONETE, JR., JUNIOR PROCESS
SERVER, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT PONTEVEDRA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
A.M. NO. 18-08-69-MTC, JANUARY 21, 2019, J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Under Section 93 (a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS),
an officer or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30)
working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. Thus,
Jabonete should be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence
since June 6, 2011.
FACTS:
The records of the Employees' Leave Division (ELD) of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) -
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Steveril J. Jabonete, Jr. (Jabonete) had an approved
vacation and sick leave application until June 3, 2011. However, he has not reported back to work
and has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since June 2011 up to the present. Neither has
he submitted additional applications for leave. Thus, based on the records, Jabonete has been absent
without official leave since June 6, 2011.
The OCA recommended that: (a) Jabonete's name be dropped from the rolls effective June 6, 2011 for
having been absent without official leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed
of his separation from the service at his last known address appearing in his 201 file. The OCA added,
however, that Jabonete is still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing
laws and may still be reemployed in the government.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Jabonete’s name be dropped from the rolls because of absence without leave.

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RULING:
YES. Under Section 93 (a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), an officer or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at
least thirty (30) working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without
prior notice. Thus, Jabonete should be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls in view
of his continued absence since June 6, 2011.
It should be stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility
of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to
report for work since June 2011 up to the present, Jabonete grossly disregarded and neglected the
duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability
imposed on all those in the government service.
Dropping from the rolls is non-disciplinary in nature, and thus, Jabonete's separation from the service
shall neither result in the forfeiture of his benefits nor disqualification from reemployment in the
government pursuant to Section 96, Rule 19 of the RRACCS.

K. Accountability of public officers

1. Discipline
a. Grounds
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, - versus - AVELINO DE ZOSA and BARTOLOME DELA
CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 205433, FIRST DIVISION, January 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In cases
before the Office of the Ombudsman, jurisprudence instructs that “the fundamental rule in
administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in his complaint. Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that there is no substantial
evidence to hold respondents administratively liable for Grave Misconduct.

In this case, records are bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully intended to
transgress some established and definite rule of action which is attended by corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of the rules when they, along with the other
members of the MAB of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, approved MAB-Resolution causing the
re-appraisal and revaluation of the subject lands. The passage of MAB-Resolution was merely done,
so that lands within the municipality which have the same attributes – those which are around “30
meters away from the national road, and classified as agricultural being fishpond or marsh land with
similar desirability, neighborhood and important need for the acquisition of a real property” – will be
assessed uniformly, pursuant to the issued Resolution of the Cavite Provincial Assessment Board.

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit Cavite issued a Resolution authorizing the mayor to sell the
municipal properties and to perform such acts necessary and related to such sales. Pursuant thereto,

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the Municipal Appraisal Board (MAB) of Kawit Cavite issued a MAB Resolution whereby decreasing
the assessed fair market value of the subject lands from P700.00 per sq. m to P500.00 per sq. m.
Thereafter, the Municipality of Kawit Cavite auctioned a parcel of land at a minimum bid price set at
P121,781,000.00 pegged at P500.00 per sq. m. Consequently, the said lot was awarded to FJI Property
Developers, Inc., which gave the highest bid of P123,123,123.00 or P505.51 sq. m.

However, in the Appraisal Review/Evaluation Report of the COA, it was found that the proper fair
market value for said lot should have been P878.26 per sq. m. Hence, the COA Report concluded that
the Municipality suffered undue injury when it was deprived of income in the amount of P378.26 per
sq. m or a total of P92,129,762.12 from the sale of said lot, resulting in unwarranted benefits in favor
of FJI.

Hence, a Complaint was filed against the members of the MAB of Kawit, Cavite criminally charging
them of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and administratively charging them of Grave
Misconduct, for passing and approving MAB-Resolution No. 3-97. The criminal aspect was docketed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, while the administrative aspect subject of the instant case was
docketed before OMB-Luzon. The complaint alleged that respondents’ reappraisal was done sans any
basis or computation.

OMB-Luzon found respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct. However, the CA reversed and set aside
the OMB-Luzon Ruling, and thereby exonerated respondents from administrative liability for Grave
Misconduct and restored their entitlement to their earned benefits.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents are absolved from administrative liability for Grave Misconduct. (YES)

RULING:

There is no substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable for Grave

Misconduct. In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. In cases before the Office of the Ombudsman, jurisprudence instructs that “the
fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving,
by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Thus, the Court must make its own factual
review of the case when the Ombudsman’s findings are contradictory to that of the CA, as in this case,
and after a judicial review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA that there is no substantial
evidence to hold respondents administratively liable for Grave Misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In
order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.

In this case, records are bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully intended to
transgress some established and definite rule of action which is attended by corruption, clear

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intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of the rules when they, along with the other
members of the MAB of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, approved MAB-Resolution causing
the re-appraisal and revaluation of the subject lands. The passage of MAB-Resolution was merely
done, so that lands within the municipality which have the same attributes – those which are around
“30 meters away from the national road, and classified as agricultural being fishpond or marsh land
with similar desirability, neighborhood and important need for the acquisition of a real property” –
will be assessed uniformly, pursuant to the issued Resolution of the Cavite Provincial Assessment
Board.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, -versus- ROGER BORJA, Respondent.

G. R. No. 201830, FIRST DIVISION, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

While there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the offense of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service under the civil service law and rules, it has been jurisprudentially held
to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, even if it not be related or
connected to the public officer’s function.
By causing SPCWD to pay the backwages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja clearly placed
said office in a financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not belong to it,
especially considering that the amount involved and taken from SPCWD's funds, i.e., P1,942,031.82, is
by no means negligible. In doing so, the integrity of Borja's office was put in to question, and SPCWD
was placed in a deleterious financial position.

FACTS:

In August 1991, the Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District (SPCWD) passed separate
resolutions dismissing its division chiefs, Evelyn Eje (Eje) and Racquel Tolentino (Tolentino), on the
basis of the administrative complaint filed by its General Manager, Borja.

Eje and Tolentino appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which affirmed their dismissal from service. The case was, thereafter, elevated to
the CA which, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1995, set aside Eje and Tolentino's dismissal and
awarded them backwages and other employment benefits. The CA, however, ruled that the
backwages could not be charged against SPCWD, in view of the doctrine that where a public officer
removes or dismisses another officer wrongfully, he acts outside the scope of his authority and hence,
shall be held personally liable. The CA decision attained finality on March 27, 1996, and on July 4,
1996, Eje and Tolentino were reinstated and paid their backwages which were, however, taken from
SPCWD's funds upon Borja's approval.

In 1999, members of the San Pablo City Bar Association instituted a civil action on behalf of the water
concessionaires seeking to compel the members of the Board of Directors of SPCWD and Borja to
reimburse SPCWD for the amount paid to Eje and Tolentino. In a Decision dated May 26, 2000, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 32 ordered Borja to refund to SPCWD the
amount of P1,942,031.82 paid to Eje and Tolentino within 60 days from receipt of the decision. The
RTC noted that Borja knew that the same was his personal liability based on the information given
by the Commission on Audit (COA) through Director Felicitas Ona (COA Director Ona). The COA was,

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however, ordered to audit the payments made to Eje and Tolentino to ascertain if they were to be
considered misuse of public funds.

Borja was also criminally charged in Criminal Case Nos. 13758-SP, 13759-SP, and 13760-SP for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," for causing undue injury to SPCWD when he paid Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other
benefits from the water district's funds. In an Order dated October 14, 2008, the RTC of San Pablo
City, Branch 30 dismissed the criminal complaints against Borja on the basis of the Ombudsman's
recommendation when the case was referred back to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
reinvestigation, where it noted that the COA En Banc had ruled that the payment by SPCWD was made
in good faith, and that the subsequent issuances of the COA and CSC negated the initial findings of
bad faith, manifest partiality, and negligence on his part.

Meanwhile, in 2003, Borja and the other officers of SPCWD were charged administratively, docketed
as OMB-L-A-03-1156-L. The complaint alleged that Borja and the other respondents therein used
public funds to settle a private obligation, considering that Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other
benefits were Borja's personal liabilities.

In his defense, Borja maintained that the ruling of the RTC in the civil case for reimbursement could
not be used as basis to hold him administratively liable inasmuch as the condition imposed
thereat, i.e., for the COA to conduct an audit, has not been complied with.

In a Decision dated November 27, 2007, the Ombudsman held Borja guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the service and accordingly, suspended him from service for one (1) year without pay. Aggrieved,
Borja filed a Petition for Prohibition31 before the CA, the CA found that Borja should not be held
administratively liable on the ground that he made the payment in good faith, as found by the COA En
Banc in its ruling in 2004. Undaunted, the Ombudsman filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 201830, where it maintained that the dismissal of the
criminal charges against Borja is not a ground to dismiss the administrative case against him, given
that only substantial evidence is necessary to sustain a finding of administrative liability. It further
added that this quantum of proof had been met as it was established that Borja used the funds of
SPCWD to pay the backwages of Eje and Tolentino, which were his personal liabilities, thereby
tarnishing the image of his office. The Ombudsman also invoked the rule that its findings are deemed
conclusive on courts when supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Borja should be administratively liable. (YES)

RULING:

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the CA's ruling in SP No. 377690 had attained finality on
March 27, 1996. It was held therein that Eje and Tolentino were illegally dismissed but the payment
of their backwages and other benefits could not be taken from SPCWD's funds, being Borja's personal
liability as the public officer who caused their wrongful removal. As such, by causing SPCWD to pay
Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other benefits, Borja therefore contravened the final and
executory decision of the CA. It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable.

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While there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the civil service law and rules, it has been
jurisprudentially held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, even
if it not be related or connected to the public officer's function.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court holds that Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. By causing SPCWD to pay the backwages and other benefits due Eje and
Tolentino, Borja clearly placed said office in a financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability
which did not belong to it, especially considering that the amount involved and taken from SPCWD's
funds, i.e., P1,942,031.82, is by no means negligible. In doing so, the integrity of Borja's office was put
in to question, and SPCWD was placed in a deleterious financial position.

The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 had been
dismissed upon the Ombudsman's manifestation that it lacked basis to prosecute him is of no
moment. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the criminal case is not a
ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule that a criminal case
is separate from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the
law applicable to each case. Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had, while liability in administrative
cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of substantial evidence, defined as that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Petitioner, -versus-

ROLANDO B. FALLER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 215994, FIRST DIVISION, June 06, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, as in this case. Faller,
despite the lack of proof to show that his infractions were tainted with corruption, should have been
more circumspect in complying with the pertinent OGCC and procurement rules, for which he should
remain accountable.
In the same light, Faller's mistakes and/or the irregularities involved in the contested disbursements
which he actually received resulted in an anomaly that tainted the public's perception of his office,
thereby subjecting him to administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Jurisprudence states that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office, as in this case.
FACTS:
On May 25, 2005, the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the OGCC headed by then Government Corporate Counsel (GCC) Agnes VST
Devanadera (Devanadera), whereby the OGCC agreed to handle the extrajudicial foreclosure of
delinquent real estate loan accounts of GSIS (GSIS Foreclosure Project).
Sometime thereafter, Devanadera issued two (2) memoranda authorizing the release of proceeds
from the special assessment fees collected from the GSIS Foreclosure Project, purportedly as their

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partial share therefrom as attorney's fees. Thus, a Memorandum requested the release of the
amounts of P500,000.00 to Devanadera and P200,000.00 to her then Chief of Staff and Head
Executive Assistant, herein respondent Rolando B. Faller (Faller).
Likewise, Devanadera issued a Memorandum requesting the release of the amounts of P100, 000.00
to Devanadera and P30, 000.00 to Faller from the special assessment fees received from the GSIS
Foreclosure Project, purportedly for the purchase of reading materials to aid them in the discharge
of their duties.
On January 23, 2008, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM)
No. 2008-00218 finding irregularities surrounding the alleged purchase of reading materials
amounting to P130, 000.00 charged from the special assessment fees from the GSIS Foreclosure
Project. The COA found that disbursements were made directly to the agency officials, i.e.,
Devanadera and Faller, instead of to bona fide suppliers and without proper documentation, in
violation of the provisions of Section 4 (6) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, otherwise known as
the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines."
The Field Investigation Office filed the instant complaint against Devanadera, Faller, Cruz, and Capili:
(a) criminally charging them with two (2) counts of violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
or Malversation of Public Funds as well as two (2) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019; and (b) administratively charging them with grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, all in connection with the disbursements charged
against the special assessment fees collected from the GSIS Foreclosure Project.
In their defense, Devanadera and Faller claimed that their receipt of the attorney's fees from the GSIS
Foreclosure Project fees was sanctioned under the Administrative Code of 1987 and, more
specifically, under OGCC Office Order No. 006, series of 2004. They claimed that they cannot be held
liable for Malversation, not being "accountable officers" as contemplated under the law. For his part,
Capili argued that he cannot be held liable as a co-conspirator in the absence of any positive evidence
showing that he actively participated in the alleged offenses. Moreover, he claimed that his act of
affixing his signature on the checks issued in favor of Devanadera and Faller was only ministerial.
The Ombudsman finds Devanadera, Faller, Cruz, and Capili guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and accordingly, ordered their dismissal.
The Ombudsman held that there was undue injury to the government when Devanadera and Faller
appropriated for themselves the amount of money charged against the GSIS Foreclosure Project fees
to which they were not entitled. , the CA modified the Ombudsman ruling insofar as Faller is
concerned, finding him guilty only of simple misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
ISSUE:
Whether Faller should be administratively liable for simple misconduct. (YES)
RULING:
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The misconduct is considered as
grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the

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misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. On the other
hand, dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to
one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
While there were violations of established and definite rules of action, there is no substantial
evidence to prove that the foregoing violations were precipitated by Faller with corruption or a
willful intent to violate the law so as to render him administratively liable for Grave Misconduct Apart
from admittedly receiving the checks purportedly as attorney's fees and for the purchase of reading
materials, both charged against the GSIS Foreclosure Project fees, records do not show that Faller
directly or actively participated in the disbursement of the said funds, or authorized the same His
receipt of the sum was based on his assumption that the funds he received were in the nature of
attorney's fees as compensation for his work on the GSIS Foreclosure Project.
Neither were the foregoing infractions indicative of a disposition to deceive or lie so as to hold Faller
administratively liable for dishonesty. While it has been established that Faller received the check for
purportedly as funds for the purchase of reading materials in connection with the discharge of his
duties, it has not been shown, however, that he intended to defraud the government of the said
amount.
Nonetheless, for the above-said violations, Faller should be held liable for simple misconduct.
A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, as in this case.
Faller, despite the lack of proof to show that his infractions were tainted with corruption, should have
been more circumspect in complying with the pertinent OGCC and procurement rules, for which he
should remain accountable.
In the same light, Faller's mistakes and/or the irregularities involved in the contested disbursements
which he actually received resulted in an anomaly that tainted the public's perception of his office,
thereby subjecting him to administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Jurisprudence states that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office, as in this case.

CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS, City Treasurer, Pasay City, and Concurrent OIC, Regional Director
Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) Region VII, Petitioner, -versus-
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by TROY FRANCIS C. PIZARRO, JOSELITO F.
FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO* L. LAZARO, MELCHOR B. PIOL, and ISMAEL S. LEONOR, and THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
GR No. 221153, FIRST DIVISION, April 17,2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee,
and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-
declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense.

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Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a
public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration
results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and
income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of
income and acquisitions.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the
authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's
failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in
the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
FACTS:
Concepcion Daplas entered government service in 1968 as a casual clerk in the Municipal Treasurer
of Kawit Cavite. And she held various posts unti she was appointed as Pasay City Treasurer on May
19,1989. At the time of the filing of the complaints, she was holding the position of OIC Regional
Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance in Cebu City. Department of Finance filed
complaints against Daplas for violating or averred violations6 of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019,7 Section
8 (A) of RA 6713,8 Section 2 of RA 1379, Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Executive
Order No. (EO) 6 dated March 12, 1986, constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and
detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial
connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALNs). In particular, Daplas (1) failed to declare (a) a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan with Plate No.
TBH-238 (Galant sedan) registered under the name of her late husband with an estimated value of
₱250,000.00; (b) her stock subscription in KEI Realty and Development Corp. (KEI) valued at
₱1,500,000.00 with a total paid up amount of ₱800,000.00; 14and (c) several real properties in
Cavite (which had been the subject of a previous administrative complaint against her that had been
dismissed ); and (2) traveled multiple times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast
doubt on her real net worth and actual source of income considering her modest salary. She insisted
that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and maintained that she was not totally
dependent on her salary to finance the said acquisitions. She alleged that: (a) her late husband
purchased the Galant sedan out of his personal money, hence, the same did not form part of their
conjugal properties; (b) she had already divested her interest in KEI in 1998, along with her husband,
but her husband and children reacquired their respective shares sometime in 2003; and (c) her
travels were sponsored by the government or by her relatives abroad.
Ombudsman ruled and found Daplas guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section
8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties, without prejudice
to criminal prosecution. On August 2014, the CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether Daplas is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of the SALN law. (NO)
RULING:

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in order to
promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government

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officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, i.e., RA
6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit a sworn
statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business
interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because
the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.

In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for
the years 1997 to 2003 despite the legal obligation to do so.

Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner's
dismissal from service.

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any

material fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his
examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and straightforwardness.

On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the

performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 41 Without any of these elements,
the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct only. 42 Most
importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the
charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee,
and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-
declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense.
Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a
public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration
results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income,
and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources
of income and acquisitions.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive
the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's
failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty
in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.

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Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her
SALN.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, Petitioner, -versus- EUFROCINA CARLOS
DIONISIO and WINIFREDO SALCEDO MOLINA, Respondents.
GR No. 220700, FIRST DIVISION, July 10,2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former."

In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records would readily reveal that the acts of respondents
fall under the jurisprudential definition of Grave Misconduct, and not just Simple Misconduct.

First, the Ombudsman correctly observed that respondents had no authority to lease out a portion of
the school premises, it being owned by the Provincial Government of Bulacan. Second, respondents
failed to abide by the Constitutionally-prescribed principle of accountability of public
officers.Third, even assuming arguendo that the money received by respondents was used for the
construction of the school canteen and the procurement of educational equipment, they nonetheless
failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9184, otherwise known as the "Government Procurement
Reform Act." One of the most distinguishing features of RA 9184 is the mandate that all government
procurement must be done through competitive bidding. While the law allows for alternative methods
of procurement, it has not been shown that respondents were able to justify the resort thereto in the
construction of the school canteen and in the purchase of the educational equipment.

FACTS:
On July 30,2010 Sps. Editha and Eduardo Ponce filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against
Eufrocina Carlos Dionisio and Winifredo Salcedo Molina for violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Official. Sps. Ponce averred in their complaint that they are the owners of Sariling Atin Drug Store
while Dionisio and Molina were the School Principal of Barasoain Memorial Elementary School and
the President of the Teacher’s Association respectively. And on January 2009, Sps. Dionisio inquired
with Dionisio if they could lease a portion of the school grounds to open a drug store. Dionisio replied
that she would study the matter as it might take a long and complicated procedure if they follow the
rules of the DepEd. Dionisio advised the Sps. Ponce to submit a formal letter offering a rental fee of
Php 10,000.00 or Php 120,000.00 per year. Dionisio purportedly confirmed that she could facilitate
the lease agreement provided that the instead Php 120,000.00 annual rent only Php 36,000.00 would
be recorded and the same should be guise as a donation to the school. Dionisio hid this issue to the
PTA and the Barangay Council to know the exact amount involved but committed that the PTA would
handle the excess money. She also demanded that she wants additional Php 24,000.00 in funds per
year without the Teacher’s Association, PTA, and the Barangay Council knowing about it.
In March 2009, allegedly advanced Php 20,000.00 so that she could go to Manila and confirm the
legality of the lease with DepEd, she also demanded that the 5 year rental which amounted to Php
600,000.00 should be paid in advance, and that complainants should give Php 700,000.00 to the PTA.

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On May 2009, Dionisio demanded Php 200,000.00 for donation to the Teacher’s Association but Sps.
Ponce declined. Sps. Ponce demanded for the copy of the MOA that was signed between them but
Dionisio refused to give them a copy. On the same month, Sps. Ponce went to the house of Dionisio to
sign the MOA and after that Sps. Ponce gave a total of Php 1,280,000.00 to Dionisio and in return
Dionisio gave the Sps. Ponce the notarized copy of the MOA. In June 2009, Sps. Ponce began
constructing their drug store but barely a month later, Dionisio informed them that the area beside
their drug store would be leased to another drug store. Also, Molina (the Teacher’s Association
president) denied receiving the money from the Sps. Ponce. On August 2009, the Sps. Ponce wrote a
demand letter to Molina to acknowledge a receipt where the Teacher’s Association received money
and the latter suddenly issued a certification confirming the receipt of Php 680,000.00 as a donation
to the Association. These actions prompted Sps Ponce to write to the School Superintendent of
Malolos City and inquired to the legality of the lease and the propriety of the donation. Then on
August 2009, DepEd informed the Sps. Ponce that the MOA was illegal and it did not have approval
of the DepEd and they also knew that the Teacher’s Association does not have any legal entity hence
they cannot enter into a MOA.
Sps. Ponce then filed a complaint in the Ombudsman against Dionisio and Molina. Then the
Ombusman ordered them to be preventively suspended. In their answer Dionisio and Molina and
other co-teachers denied the allegation or they did not solicit money and that the donation was at
their own instance. But on October 2012, the Ombudsman found Dionisio and Molina guilty of Simple
Misconduct. But Sps. Morales filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Ombudsman and in an Order
dated August 2013, they found Dionisio and Morales guilty of Grave Misconduct and they were given
a penalty of dismissal from the government service. They found the 2 to have establish corruption
because of the overwhelming evidence that was presented to the Ombudsman. On April 2015, the CA
reinstated the initial ruling of the Ombudsman and found Dionisio and Morales guilty of Simple
Misconduct. CA rationated that the element of corruption was not proved.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondents are guilty of Grave Misconduct. (YES)
RULING:

"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the
duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former."

In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records would readily reveal that the acts of respondents
fall under the jurisprudential definition of Grave Misconduct, and not just Simple Misconduct.

First, the Ombudsman correctly observed that respondents had no authority to lease out a portion
of the school premises, it being owned by the Provincial Government of Bulacan. Under Section 18 of
RA 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," it is the local government unit

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which has the authority to lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal
property held by it in its proprietary capacity. Clearly, respondents violated this provision when they
leased the aforesaid area to complainants.

Second, respondents failed to abide by the Constitutionally-prescribed principle of accountability of

public officers. As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, while respondents claim that the money
received from the complainants in connection with the lease were spent for public purposes, they
failed to submit official receipts and other documents that would support their claim. In Pat-og, Sr. v.
Civil Service Commission, the Court emphasized that public school teachers are first and foremost civil
servants accountable to the people.

Third, even assuming arguendo that the money received by respondents was used for the
construction of the school canteen and the procurement of educational equipment, they nonetheless
failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9184, otherwise known as the "Government
Procurement Reform Act." One of the most distinguishing features of RA 9184 is the mandate that all
government procurement must be done through competitive bidding. While the law allows for
alternative methods of procurement, it has not been shown that respondents were able to justify the
resort thereto in the construction of the school canteen and in the purchase of the educational
equipment.

b. Jurisdiction
c. Dismissal, preventive suspension, reinstatement and back salaries
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner v. SARAH P. AMPONG, Respondent
A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or
after employment in the judiciary.

FACTS:

Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having
impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on
behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir. On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having
committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from service,
imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board
Examination for Teachers rating.

Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed,
she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any
jurisdiction over her. However, it was denied and the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 167916 affirmed her
dismissal from service. The RTC Judge of Saranggani thus inquired about the employment status of
respondent Ampong as Court Interpreter III of the said RTC.

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ISSUE

Whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court Interpreter III of the
RTC.

RULING

YES. Ampong’s dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We
take note that Ampong should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been
made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
Ampong’s present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves.

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control,
supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right
to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine
of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation
of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel;
it undermines the independence of the judiciary.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil
service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial employee
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees who also
impersonated civil service examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges
before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees.

Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service
Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the offense
before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public
school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place
of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-
supervised examination.

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That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or
after employment in the judiciary.

In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the
penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly
suffer the same.

d. Condonation doctrine
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and JEJOMAR ERWIN
BINAY, JR., Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, EN BANC November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective
local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC). Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which
states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified
from running for any elective local position.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of
the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection
with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
(Makati Parking Building).

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-
finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted
(1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel

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filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special
Panel).Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders for each of the OMB
Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation
of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing
Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases. Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to
immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the
same.

On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of
a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be
held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since these transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive
suspension order through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO
III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to
personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At
around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of
office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as
Acting Mayor.

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue
a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering
that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election
meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution dated April 6, 2015, granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI,
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA
found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of
the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine. In view of the CA's supervening
issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination
of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,

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which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that,
at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint
after his re-election in 2013.

ISSUE:

Whether the condonation doctrine applies. (NO)

RULING:

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective
local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC). Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the
LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall
be disqualified from running for any elective local position. In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of
the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the
duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election.

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply
no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to
the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound
to follow its interpretation.

2. Impeachment
3. The Ombudsman
a. Functions
b. Judicial review in administrative proceedings

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c. Judicial review in penal proceedings
4. Office of the Special Prosecutor
5. The Sandiganbayan

IX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. General principles
B. Powers of administrative agencies
1. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) power
a. Kinds of administrative rules and regulations
b. Requisites for validity
2. Quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) power

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TESORO MINING AND

DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC. Petitioner, -versus- REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202877, FIRST DIVISION, December 09, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the administrative agency to

adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or administrative
in nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.

The OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is obviously not an "adjudication" in the
sense above-described. It cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. As one of the contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have
adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party, as in a court case where rights and
duties of parties are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense, the OP’s
cancellation/revocation may be taken as a decision but only to the extent of considering it as its
final administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should employ the
conventional import of the phrase final and executory, as accorded to proper judicial/quasi-
judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a party.

FACTS:
Respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation (Redmont) filed an Application for an
Exploration Permit (EP) over mining areas located in the Municipalities of Rizal, Bataraza, and Narra,
Palawan. After an inquiry with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Redmont learned that said areas were already covered by existing Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA) and an EP, which were initially applied for by petitioners' respective

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predecessors-in-interest with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the
DENR.
In particular, petitioner Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation (Narra Nickel) acquired
the application of MPSA-IV-I-12, covering an area of 3,277 hectares (ha.) in Barangays Calategas and
San Isidro, Narra, Palawan, from Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise
Mining and Development Corporation. On March 30, 2006, or prior to Redmont's EP application,
Narra Nickel had converted its MPSA into an FTAA application, denominated as AFTA-IVB-07.
For its part, petitioner Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro) acquired the application of
MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47), covering an area of 3,402 has. in Barangays Malinao and
Princesa Urduja, Narra, Palawan, from Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI). Similar to Narra Nickel, Tesoro
sought the conversion of its MPSA into an FTAA, but its application therefor, denominated as AFTA-
IVB-08, was filed subsequent to Redmont's EP application, or sometime in May 2007.
In the same vein, petitioner McArthur Mining, Inc. (McArthur) acquired the application of MPSA-
AMA-IVB-153, as well as EPA-IVB-44, covering the areas of 1,782 has. and 3,720 has. in Barangays
Sumbiling and Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan, respectively, from Madridejos Mining Corporation, an
SMMI assignee. McArthur also filed an application for FTAA conversion in May 2007, denominated
as AFTA-IVB-09.
Upon the recommendation of then DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., through a memorandum dated
November 9, 2009, petitioners' FTAA applications were all approved on April 5, 2010. Consequently,
on April 12, 2010, the Republic - represented by then Executive Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, acting
by authority of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo - and petitioners executed an FTAA covering
the subject areas, denominated as FTAA No. 05-2010-IVB (MIMAROPA).
Prior to the grant of petitioners' applications for FTAA conversion, and the execution of the above-
stated FTAA, Redmont filed on January 2, 2007 three (3) separate petitions for the denial of
petitioners' respective MPSA and/or EP applications before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
DENR-MGB, docketed as DENR Case Nos. 2007-01, 2007-02, and 2007-03. Redmont's primary
argument was that petitioners were all controlled by their common majority stockholder, MBMI
Resources, Inc. (MBMI) - a 100% Canadian-owned corporation - and, thus, disqualified from being
grantees of MPSAs and/or EPs. The matter essentially concerning the propriety of denying
petitioners' MPSAs and/or EPs in view of their nationality had made it all the way to this Court, and
was docketed as G.R. No. 195580. In the Court's April 21, 2014 Decision, petitioners were declared
to be foreign corporations under the application of the "Grandfather Rule." Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the said Decision, which was, however, denied in the Court's Resolution dated
January 28, 2015.
Meanwhile, Redmont separately sought the cancellation and/or revocation of the executed FTAA
through a Petition dated May 7, 2010 (May 7, 2010 Petition) filed before the Office of the President
(OP), docketed as O.P. Case No. 10-E-229. Redmont asserted, among others, that the FTAA was highly
anomalous and irregular, considering that petitioners and their mother company, MBMI, have a long
history of violating and circumventing the Constitution and other laws, due to their questionable
activities in the Philippines and abroad. Petitioners opposed Redmont's petition through a motion to
dismiss, contending that: (a) there is no rule or law which grants an appeal from a memorandum of
a department secretary; (b) the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; (c) the appeal was

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not perfected because copies of the appeal were not properly served on them; and (d) Redmont is
not a real party-in-interest.
In a Decision dated April 6, 2011, the OP finding, inter alia, that petitioners misrepresented that they
were Filipino corporations qualified to engage in mining activities, the OP cancelled and/or revoked
the said FTAA, and, in turn, gave due course to Redmont's EP application. Dissatisfied, petitioners
appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated February 23, 2012, the CA affirmed the OP Ruling.
Unperturbed, petitioners filed on March 14, 2012 a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in
a Resolution dated July 27, 2012; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of quasi-judicial authority.
(NO)

RULING:

The Court finds that the CA improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court for the reason that the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one
which could be classified as an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA's
jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken against a
judgment, final order, resolution or award of a "quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions" is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the said Rule.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the administrative agency

to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or administrative
in nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In the legal sense, 'adjudicate'
means: 'to settle in the exercise of judicial authority.

The OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is obviously not an "adjudication" in the
sense above-described. It cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The OP - at the instance of Redmont at that - was exercising an
administrative function pursuant to the President's authority to invoke the Republic's right under
the FTAA. Since an FTAA is entered into by the President on the State's behalf, and it involves a matter
of public concern in that it covers the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources, it is properly classified as a government or public contract, which is, according to
jurisprudence, "generally subject to the same laws and regulations which govern the validity and
sufficiency of contracts between private individuals."

With the legal treatment and parameters of an FTAA in mind, it becomes apparent that the
OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that is
purely administrative in nature , and thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication, again, in the
sense above discussed. As one of the contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have
adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party, as in a court case where rights
and duties of parties are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense, the OP’s
cancellation/revocation may be taken as a decision but only to the extent of considering it as
its final administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should employ

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the conventional import of the phrase final and executory, as accorded to proper judicial/quasi-
judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a party. To reiterate,
being a government or public contract, the FTAA is subject to fundamental contract principles,
one of which is the principle of mutuality of contracts which would definitely be violated if
one were to accept the view that the OP, a contracting party, can adjudicate on the contract’s
own validity.
Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an FTAA’s validity, the Court holds that the OP
has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the
risk of belaboring the point, the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party,
i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement,
a purely administrative action which should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus,
absent the OP’s proper exercise of a quasi-- judicial function, the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is unnecessary
to delve into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
a. Administrative due process
HON. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), ATTY. JOEL L. JACOB, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, LEGAL SERVICE (DPWH), ATTY. OLIVER T.
RODULFO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD, INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, (DPWH), and
HON. JAIME A. PACANAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, (DPWH),
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, Petitioners, -versus- ALVARO Y. APURILLO, ERDA P. GABRIANA,
JOCELYN S. JO, IRAIDA R. LASTIMADO, and FRANCISCO B. VINEGAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 204172, FIRST DIVISION, December 09, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be
heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

Accordingly, respondent filed their first Answer on January 13, 2006, wherein they had presented
their position before the agency, and more significantly, expressly waived their rights to a formal
hearing, as they sought instead, that the case against them be decided based on the records
submitted.

FACTS:

Alama, Assistant Head of the Bids and Awards Committee -Technical Working Group (BAC-TWG),
received an anonymous complaint from an alleged concerned employee of DPWH, Tacloban City,
claiming that R.M. Padillo Builders (RMPB), a local contractor, won the bidding for the construction
of the Lirang Revetment Project, despite its non-inclusion in the list of Registered Construction Firms
(RCF). Alama sent an indorsement letter to Atty. Rodulfo, stating that only contractors fully registered
in the RCF and holding a valid Contractor’s Registration Certificate issued by the BAC-TWG shall be
allowed to participate in any bidding. Atty. Rodulfo issued a Subpoena which directed Engr. Baldos,

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OIC District Engineer of the DPWH Tacloban City, to answer the anonymous complaint and submit
documents related to the award of the subject project to the alleged unregistered contractor. Atty.
Rodulfo forwarded his Investigation Report to Acting Sec. Ebdane, who found that RMPB was not a
duly registered contractor of the bidding and issued Formal Charge against the respondents for Grave
Misconduct. Respondents were directed to file their answer, together with supporting evidence,
given the option to elect or waive the conduct of a formal investigation, and placed under preventive
suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. Respondents’ Answer with Motion to Dismiss and to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension, which argued they were not in any position to answer the Formal
Charge against them due to lack of basis for it was not their duty to determine a registered contractor
with the DPWH Notarial Registry of Civil Works Contractors. Further, respondents expressly waived
their rights to a formal hearing.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC, which held that
respondents' rights to administrative due process were violated when they were deprived of the
opportunity to file their comment prior to, or during the preliminary or fact-finding investigation
conducted. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and failure to state a cause of action, but was denied. In a resolution However, the RTC clarified it was
not intended to prevent the DPWH from pursuing any separate administrative action against
respondents and that they have not been absolved from any administrative liability. Dissatisfied,
petitioners appealed to the CA, which later affirmed the RTC Resolution on the procedural error.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents’ right to due process was violated. (NO)

RULING:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, the Court ruled that any procedural defect
in the proceedings taken against the government employee therein was cured by his filing of a motion
for reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to the administrative agency (in that case,
the Civil Service Commission [CSC]).

In this case, the Court finds that while there were missteps in the proceedings conducted before the
DPWH, namely: (a) respondents were not made to file their initial comment on the anonymous
complaint; and (b) no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Formal Charge
against them, contrary to the sequential procedure under the URACCS, they were, nonetheless,
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard when the Formal Charge directed them to submit their
written detailed answer.

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Accordingly, respondent filed their first Answer on January 13, 2006, wherein they had presented
their position before the agency, and more significantly, expressly waived their rights to a
formal hearing, as they sought instead, that the case against them be decided based on the
records submitted.

b. Administrative appeal and review

c. Administrative res judicata
3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing, and rate-fixing powers
C. Doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE
GUZMAN, Respondents
G.R. NO. 173590 December 9, 2013 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes
fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
FACTS:
De Guzman was suggested to be formally charged in view of an anonymous complaint charging him
of dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of service. However, this was
dropped when the ISLES recommended his exoneration from the charges due to lack of merit. After
the transfer of PSO under DOTC to PPC, De Guzman was formally charged by the PPC for the same
acts imputed to him in the earlier complaint.
De Guzman was found guilty as charged and was dismissed from the service. However, this was not
implemented until 5 years after. Thereafter, De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming
that the decision had been dormant for more than 5 years, it may not be revived without filing
another formal charge.
Undaunted, De Guzman filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved in his favor
and that a formal hearing of the case was ordered to be conducted as soon as possible. After due
hearing, the PPC, found De Guzman guilty of the charged and consequently dismissed him from the
service. It was emphasized therein that when De Guzman was formally charged in 1993, the
complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the
ISLES Memorandum which endorsed the exoneration of De Guzman and the dismissal of the
complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As such, the filing of the formal charge on in
1993 was an obvious rejection of said recommendation.
De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration was denied initially, but at the same time, considered as an
appeal to the PPC Board of Directors. Being the third motion for reconsideration filed by De Guzman,
the same was in gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of the CSC,
which both allowed only 1 such motion to be entertained. It was further held that res judicata was
unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was ― “only a ruling after a fact-finding

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investigation.” Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on the merits but rather, a
dismissal made by an investigative body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial power.

Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution, De Guzman elevated his case to the CA via a special
civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In addition, De Guzman also appealed before the PPC Board.
The Board issued a resolution denying the appeal and affirming with finality the Decision dismissing
De Guzman from service. He then appealed this resolution to the CSC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him.
RULING:
YES. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the
courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. PPC
claims that De Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since
he opted to file a premature certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with the PPC
Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are adequate remedies under the law.

X. ELECTION LAW
A. Suffrage
1. Qualification and disqualification of voters
2. Registration and deactivation
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK TERRY L. RIDON
AND MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD
OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY- GENERAL OF
ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG
AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); and SINING MARIA ROSA L.
MARFORI, Petitioners, -versus- COMMISSION ELECTIONS, ON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318, EN BANC, December 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is
concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially
regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v.

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Abaño, citing Meffert v. Brown, it was stated that "the act of registering is only one step towards voting,
and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote." In said case, this Court definitively characterized registration as a
form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage.
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed
in order "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters." With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that
biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has
the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.

FACTS:

Petitioners Kabataan Party-List assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled
"An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration.” President Benigno S. Aquino III
signed into law RA 10367, which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated
list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. RA 10367 likewise directs that
"registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation”
and "voters who fail to submit for validation shall be deactivated.”

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721, which serves as the implementing rules and regulations of RA
10367 and prescribed the procedure for validation, deactivation, and reactivation of voters'
registration records (VRRs). Resolution provides that: (a) "the registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated
(b) "the following registered voters shall have their biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do
not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter/s Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who
have incomplete BIOMETRICS data appearing in the VRS, and (d) "deactivation shall comply with the
requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated voters."
Petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367 – they contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises
to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation.
Petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367 unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be
commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without biometric information to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto,
are unconstitutional. (NO)

RULING:

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The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by
the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. Therefore, the
state shall regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction. But the
law can step in as far as certain procedural requirements are concerned like requiring registration,
and step in as far as these classifications are concerned. RA 8189 primarily governs the process of
registration, which orders "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of... voters."

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or

capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to perform a
public duty or function."

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is
concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially
regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v.
Abaño, citing Meffert v. Brown, it was stated that "the act of registering is only one step towards
voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may be a
qualified voter without exercising the right to vote." In said case, this Court definitively characterized
registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage.

RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]." As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in
order "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters."

With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA
10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail.
To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a
mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It
was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere
complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.

3. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

4. Local and overseas absentee voting
5. Detainee voting
B. Candidacy
1. Qualifications and disqualifications of candidates
2. Filing of certificates of candidacy
a. Effect of filing
b. Substitution and withdrawal of candidates

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SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, petitioner, - versus - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 202202, EN BANC, March 19, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As said by the Supreme Court, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides that if an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a
person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified.

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as
well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily
follows that if a person's CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly
substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for
a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in this case, Lucy was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for
office, which means that she could not have been elected.

FACTS:

Petitioner Tagolino is assailing the Decision of the House of Representative Tribunal (HRET) which
affirmed the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal
Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth Legislative District
of Leyte. This was in lieu of her husband, Richard Gomez, who previously filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) but was later declared ineligible to run because he failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Subsequently, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled and Richard’s name
remained in the ballot. His garnered winning votes were credited in favor of Lucy, and she was later
proclaimed as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte. However, to oust her
from her seat, Tagolino filed a Petition for quo warranto. claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with
the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that
the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael, Bulacan to the Fourth District of Leyte was only
applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio;
and (3) private respondent's CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial
requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer. After due proceedings, the HRET dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that Lucy
was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative.

ISSUE:

Whether the substitution of Lucy Torres-Gomez is valid. (NO)

RULING:

As said by the Supreme Court, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides that if an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.

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Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.

As defined under Section 79 (a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. The Supreme Court held that the law
requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The
requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In
particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person's public declaration to run for office but evidences as
well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In this regard, the CoC is the
document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other words, absent a
valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation.

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place,
as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it
necessarily follows that if a person's CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in this case, Lucy was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for
office, which means that she could not have been elected.

c. Nuisance candidates
d. Duties of the COMELEC
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, petitioner, - versus - THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE
G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K.
SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C.
ATILANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 205033, EN BANC, June 18, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The Supreme Court held that it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-
judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely
performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of
his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a
purely administrative manner. As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office had already been
settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc

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to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court previously promulgated a Decision that convicted petitioner Romeo Jalosjos by
final judgment of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently,
he was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, which carried
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. President Gloria Arroyo later issued an
order commuting his prison term to 16 years, 3 months and 3 days.

After his discharge from prison, Jalosjos applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga but his
application by the Acting City Election Officer was denied because of his previous conviction. This
prompted him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters. Pending the resolution
of the same, Jalosjos later filed a certificate of candidacy (CoC) seeking to run for mayor of Zamboanga
City in the 2013 Elections, to which he said that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a
registered voter in the place.

The MTC of Zamboanga denied his Petition for Inclusion because of his perpetual absolute
disqualification and the decision was later affirmed by the RTC. Five petitions were later lodged
before the COMELEC First and Second Divisions praying for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of the petitioner’s CoC.

The COMELEC En Banc resolved to cancel and deny due course the CoC filed by Jalosjos due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement. Now, Jalosjos claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’
jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio his CoC and he further asserts that his right to due process
has been violated by the issuance of Resolution No. 9613.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution
No. 9613. (NO)

RULING:

The COMELEC's denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate's
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate
to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.

The Supreme Court held that it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-
judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over
any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it
merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on
the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by
his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative
functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

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The Court noted that while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition
based on either Sections 12 or 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and
executory judgments — as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public office is based on a
final conviction — such exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions, as in this
case.

There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in
a purely administrative manner. As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office had already
been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC
En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner's Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter
in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC's Order dated October 31, 2012.
In this accord, petitioner's non-compliance with the voter registration requirement under Section
39(a) of the LGC is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the
cancellation of his CoC altogether.

BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, DD, PABLO R. MANALASTAS, JR., PhD, MARIA CORAZON
AKOL, CONCEPCION B. REGALADO, HECTOR A. BARRIOS, LEO Y. QUERUBIN, AUGUSTO C.
LAGMAN, FELIX P. MUGA, II, PhD, ATTY. GREGORIO T. FABROS, EVITA L. JIMENEZ, and JAIME
DL CARO, PhD, petitioners, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EN BANC, represented by
Acting Chairperson CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION,
represented by Smartmatic Asia-Pacific President CESAR FLORES, respondents.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

represented by its Acting Chairperson ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATIC-TIM
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 216098 & 216562, EN BANC, April 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed by the principles of transparency,

competitiveness, simplicity and accountability. As a general rule, all government procurement shall be
done through competitive public bidding. However, as an exception, Article XVI of the GPRA sanctions a
resort to alternative methods of procurement, among others, via direct contracting.

Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the COMELEC to “procure any supplies, equipment,
materials or services needed for the holding of the election by public bidding, Provided, That, if it finds
the requirements of public bidding impractical to observe, then by negotiations or sealed bids, and in
both cases, the accredited parties shall be duly notified.” In order to harmonize this provision with GPRA,
the situations stated under the latter law which would justify a resort to alternative methods of
procurement should be deemed as instances that particularize the former’s broad gauge of
"impracticality."

It has already been resolved that the COMELEC failed to comply with any of the conditions by
which its selected mode of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would have been allowed.

FACTS:

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R.A. 8436, as amended, authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).
Pursuant to this, the COMELEC entered into a contract with Smartmatic-TIM which provides that for
the PCOS, the Smartmatic-TIM shall warrant the availability of parts, labor and technical support and
maintenance to the COMELEC for ten years, if purchased. The COMELEC bought the machines.
Eventually, the COMELEC, in its Resolution No. 9922, approved Program 1 of the Extended Warranty
Proposal through direct contracting. The proposal covered labor, preventive maintenance,
diagnostics, repair and/or replacement of PCOS machine parts.

Hence, the present consolidated petitions assail Resolution No. 9922 as it violates the Government
Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) which requires as a general rule, competitive bidding for
government procurement contracts.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the conditions for direct contracting stated under Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA
were complied with. (NO)
2. Whether direct contracting may be resorted to under Section 52(h) of the Omnibus Election
Code. (NO)
3. Whether the Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1), being a part of the 2009 AES Contract,
even required public bidding. (YES)

RULING:
1. Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed by the principles of
transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and accountability. As a general rule, all
government procurement shall be done through competitive public bidding. However, as an
exception, Article XVI of the GPRA sanctions a resort to alternative methods of procurement,
among others, via direct contracting. Under Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA, direct
contracting may be resorted to only in any of the following conditions:

a. Procurement of goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the
proprietary source, i.e. when patents, trade secrets and copyrights prohibit others
from manufacturing the same item;
b. When the procurement of critical components from a specific manufacturer,
supplier or distributor is a condition precedent to hold a contractor to guarantee
its project performance, in accordance with the provisions of this contract; or
c. Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-
dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be
obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government.

In the first scenario, goods are considered to be of "proprietary nature" when they are owned
by a person who has a protectable interest in them or an interest protected by intellectual
property laws. Here, it is not disputed that Smartmatic-TIM has intellectual property rights
over the PCOS machines and the software program used to run the technology. However, the
"goods" subject of these cases pertain to the services for the machines' repair and
refurbishment, which in itself constitutes a distinct contract object that is susceptible
to government procurement through competitive public bidding. Smartmatic-TIM's
existing intellectual property rights do not cover the services subject of these cases.

In the second scenario, it is applicable when there is a contract for an infrastructure project
consisting of the construction/repair/renovation of a plant, and critical components of such

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plant are prescribed by the contractor for it to guarantee its contract performance. The
subject "goods" to be procured, i.e., repair and refurbishment services, are not critical
components of any infrastructure project whose manufacture and/or supply may be
solely availed of from Smartmatic-TIM.

In the last scenario, while Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive manufacturer and
distributor of the PCOS machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence to
show that it is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same.

2. Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the COMELEC to “procure any supplies,
equipment, materials or services needed for the holding of the election by public bidding,
Provided, That, if it finds the requirements of public bidding impractical to observe, then by
negotiations or sealed bids, and in both cases, the accredited parties shall be duly notified.”

In order to harmonize this provision with GPRA, the situations stated under the latter law
which would justify a resort to alternative methods of procurement should be deemed as
instances that particularize the former’s broad gauge of "impracticality."

It has already been resolved that the COMELEC failed to comply with any of the
conditions by which its selected mode of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would
have been allowed.

Under Article 8.8 of the 2009 AES Contract, Smartmatic-TIM warrants that its parts, labor and
technical support and maintenance will be available to the COMELEC, if it so decides to purchase such
parts, labor and technical support and maintenance services, within the warranty period stated, i.e.,
10 years for the PCOS, reckoned from May 10, 2010. Since Article 8.8 is a mere warranty on
availability, it entails a subsequent purchase contract, founded upon a new consideration, to
be effectively invoked. However, by no means does this provision dispense with the need to
bid out the ensuing purchase contract.

C. Remedies and jurisdiction

1. Petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy

WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR., petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANGELINA D.

TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAÑADA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 207199-200, EN BANC, October 22, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members. Case law states
that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET.

In the case at hand, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the
House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in
fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without
jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass

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and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope
of the terms election and return and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Petitioner Wigberto and respondents Angelina and Alvin were contenders for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on the May 13, 2013 National
Elections. Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions: (1) to cancel Alvin’s CoC; and
(2) to declare him as a nuisance candidate.

The COMELEC First Division granted only the petition with regard to the cancellation of Alvin’s CoC.
It cancelled Alvin’s CoC for having committed false material representations concerning his residency
in accordance with Section 7812 of the Omnibus Election Code. In his 2nd Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, Wigberto presented a newly discovered evidence allegedly showing that Alvin’s
candidacy was not bona fide.

Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC due to his material misrepresentations, his name was not
deleted from the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him
instead based on the ruling in the case of Dela Cruz v. COMELEC and COMELEC Resolution No. 9599.
However, this was denied by PBOC.

Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately, and thereafter,
Angelina was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province.

Wigberto filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina, asserting that
had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in
his favor which could have resulted in his victory. While the Petition to Annul was still pending,
Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari case against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution declaring
Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.

ISSUE:

Whether the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina
are matters which fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. (NO)

RULING:

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members. Case law
states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC
of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase election, returns and qualification refers to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term election refers to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes; return refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and qualification refers to matters that could be raised in a quo

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warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his CoC.

In the case at hand, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the
House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has
in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now
without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of
the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall
under the scope of the terms election and return and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole
jurisdiction.

JOSEPH C. DIMAPILIS, Petitioner, -versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

GR NO. 227158 , EN BANC, April 18,2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which be or she intends to run, but must also possess none of
the grounds for disqualification under the law.
In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished
with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from
holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to bold public office is a material fact
involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to run
for any public office at the time he filed the same.
In light of the cancellation of petitioner's CoC due to ineligibility existing at the time of filing, he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013
Barangay Elections, and the votes cast for him are considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate
for the said post who received the highest number of valid votes shall be proclaimed the winner.
FACTS:
Mr. Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in October 2010 and
in 2013 he ran for re-election for the same position and won. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) and declared under oath that he is eligible for the office that he seeks to be elected. Ultimately
he won in the said election and was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul, Angeles City, Pampanga.
On even date, the COMELEC Law Department filed a petition for Disqualification against Mr.
Dimapilis because he was barred from running in an election since he was suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office as a consequence of his dismissal
from service as then Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in an order dated November 10,2009 by the
Ombudsman. Dimapilis in his answer declared that he should not be dismissed because the action
that was filed by the COMELEC are two different actions one is a petition to deny due course to or
cancel COC while the prayer in the petition is about disqualification of COC. The Comelec claimed that
it has the authority to motu propio authority to file cases. The Ombudsman in its comment said that
their decision has already attained finality. The COMELEC Second Division granted the petition to

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cancel the petitioner’s COC and therefore annulled his proclamation. It treated the petition as a
petition for for cancellation despite its caption of Petition for Disqualification. The COMELEC Second
Division ruled that Dimapilis committed material misrepresentation when he claimed that he is
eligible to run. Dimapilis filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner’s COC was validly cancelled. (YES)
RULING:
A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that the
CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run,
and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the
capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been
defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular
position." In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the
required qualifications for the position for which be or she intends to run, but must also
possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.
In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished
with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from
holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to bold public office is a material fact
involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to
run for any public office at the time he filed the same.
As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB
rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC
to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its Constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner's claim57 of denial of due process because even
though the special circumstance extant herein calls for the outright cancellation of his CoC in the
exercise of the COMELEC's administrative function, it even allowed him to submit his Verified
Answer cum Memorandum to explain his side, and to file a motion for reconsideration from its
resolution.
In light of the cancellation of petitioner's CoC due to ineligibility existing at the time of filing, he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013
Barangay Elections, and the votes cast for him are considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified
candidate for the said post who received the highest number of valid votes shall be proclaimed the
winner.

2. Petition for disqualification

3. Failure of election, call of special election
4. Pre-proclamation controversy

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5. Election protest
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, - versus - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES, respondents.

ELMER E. PANOTES, petitioner, - versus - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, respondents.
G. R. No. 199149 & 201350, EN BANC, January 22, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES is utilized, as the "paper ballot, whether
printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by
a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form." The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based
technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names
of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously. As
established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted
format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots
cast.

We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes, that the picture images of the ballots, as
scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the
printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may
be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

FACTS:

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 2010 elections as the representative
of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte but was defeated by Elmer Panotes (Panotes).

Aggrieved, Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in 4 municipalities. Chato designated
40 pilot clustered precincts, in which revision of ballots shall be conducted.

Panotes moved to suspend the proceedings, urging that, should it be shown during such hearing that
the ballots and ballot boxes were not preserved, the HRET should direct the printing of the picture
images of the ballots of the questioned precincts stored in the data storage device for said precincts,
in which the HRET issued a resolution for that effect.

Chato opposed the same, contending that, since the automated election system (AES) used during the
May 10, 2010 elections was paper-based, the "official ballot" is only the paper ballot that was printed
by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas pursuant to Section 15 of R.A.
No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369.

Meanwhile, after the initial revisions of the 25% of the precinct, Chato moved for the revision of
ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts. The motion was initially denied, but a resolution
was eventually issued by the HRET directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the
remaining 75% protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts. Panote opposed the same,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET.

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ISSUE:

Whether the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent
of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out. (YES)

RULING:

Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES is utilized, as the "paper ballot,
whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the
votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form." The May 10, 2010 elections used
a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval
opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his
ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots
simultaneously. As established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of
the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized
representations of the ballots cast.

We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes, that the picture images of the ballots,
as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such,
the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and,
thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications" of its members. By employing the word "sole," the Constitution
is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its
members is intended to be its own full, complete, and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally
asserted its exclusive control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows:

Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions. The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of
election contests involving its members, We cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the HRET
on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially
proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a
determination of the true will of the electorate.

6. Quo warranto

XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. Principles of local autonomy
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON ALCANTARA, petitioners, - versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), respondents.

109 of 117
G.R. No. 195770, EN BANC, July 17, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. The national
government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally
in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA
of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national
government itself but implemented in partnership with the LGUs to achieve the common national goal
development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local
governments.

FACTS:

In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries. It was dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino." In 2008, the DSWD issued A.O. No. 16, s. 2008
setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program"
(4Ps). This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as CCTP, "provides cash
grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human
development goals." Under this program, eligible households that are selected from priority target
areas consisting of the poorest provinces classified are granted health assistance and an educational
assistance to each family.

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by the DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in
detail the obligation of both parties during the intended five-year implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with funding. The
biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011 at around Twenty One Billion (P21B).

Petitioners challenged the validity of said program. They alleged that the disbursement of public
funds and the implementation of the CCTP encroached upon the local autonomy of the LGUs.

ISSUE:

Whether the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP encroached upon the
local autonomy of the LGUs. (NO)

RULING:

The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization x x x

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Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them…Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on
the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the
local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.
Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under
the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by
the national government itself but implemented in partnership with the local government units to
achieve the common national goal development and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, - versus - DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU, respondent.

111 of 117
G.R. No. 189041, EN BANC, July 31, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As defined, “devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.” To ensure the
proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 503,
which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer of personnel: “The
absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the
equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not administratively viable.”

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO
II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word
“shall” both in Section 17(i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a
mandatory order.

FACTS:

In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to R.A. No. 7160,
which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government agencies. Pursuant to
the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the
DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. Respondent Dr. Yu, on the other hand, held the
position of PHO I.

Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin
refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo
at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. She retired in 1996.

Two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr.
Yu to the PHO II position. R.A. No. 8543 was passed into law whereby the hospital positions
previously devolved to the local government unit (LGU) of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted
to the DOH. The position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital II.

While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the Basilan
General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-
classified position of Chief of Hospital II. Subsequently, then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit
appointed Dr. Domingo Remus A. Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital II. Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed
a letter of protest before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the position of Chief of
Hospital II.

ISSUE:

Whether the PHO II position previously occupied by Dr. Yu is a devolved position. (YES)

RULING:

As defined, “devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority
upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.”

To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued E.O. No. 503, which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer
of personnel: “The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case,

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the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not
administratively viable.”

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of
PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the
word “shall” both in Section 17(i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which
connotes a mandatory order. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the
National Government Agencies (NGA) personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable,
meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be
retained by the national government.

However, Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved position in the LGU
for no other reason than that he wanted to accept only the item position of PHO II.

Be that as it may, Governor Salapuddin's refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which,
together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. In order to solve his
dilemma, Governor Salapuddin requested that Dr. Castillo be detailed instead at the DOH, which was
confirmed by then Secretary of Health Juan M. Flavier.

Clearly therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU of Basilan which Governor
Salapuddin claimed to have allowed simply to accommodate her (Dr. Castillo) was, in fact, a necessary
consequence of her devolution to the LGU and subsequent detail to the DOH.

Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without recourse.
The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to question the
justification for her detail. Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.

B. Autonomous regions and their relation to the national government

C. Local government units
1. Powers
a. Police power (general welfare clause)
b. Eminent domain
c. Taxing power
d. Legislative power
i. Requisites for valid ordinance
ii. Local initiative and referendum
e. Ultra vires acts
2. Liability

ROMEO A. GONTANG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF GAINZA, CAMARINES

SUR, petitioner, - versus - ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN, respondent.

113 of 117
G. R. No. 191691, SECOND DIVISION, January 16, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The present case stemmed from a Special Civil Action for mandamus and damages. The damages
sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be deemed to
have been improperly represented by private counsel.

In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the
present case where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may
properly secure the services of private counsel. In Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial
governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint
contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be
satisfied by them in their private capacity. It was therefore an error for the CA to have dismissed
the said petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation.

FACTS:

Engr. Alayan was appointed as a Municipal Government Department Head (Municipal Assesor) on a
temporary status. One year thereafter, she sought for a change of status to permanent, which the Civil
Service Commission-Camarines Sur Field Office denied for lack of relevant experience.

On appeal, the CSC Regional Office approved her application. Thus, she reported for work and sought
recognition of her appointment and the grant of emoluments of the position from Gontang, the
incumbent mayor of Gainza, but the same was denied.

As such, she filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus against Mayor Gontang in his official
capacity, which was eventually dismissed. She elevated the matter to the CA which rendered a
decision in her favor. The respondent then moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by the
RTC for the special civil action for the alleged unsatisfied judgement award which was subsequently
granted.

The order granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution was appealed to the CA, but was
dismissed on the ground of lack of legal authority on the part of Atty. Voltaire Saulon, a private
attorney, to represent the Municipality of Gainza.

ISSUE:

Whether private attorney Saulon is authorized to represent the Municipal Mayor on a petition for
mandamus filed against the latter. (YES)

RULING:

The present case stemmed from a Special Civil Action for mandamus and damages. The
damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be
deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel.

In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the
present case where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may
properly secure the services of private counsel. Moreover, where rigid adherence to the law on
representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also

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said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel
when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from
the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.

It was therefore an error for the CA to have dismissed the said petition for certiorari on the
ground of unauthorized representation.
3. Settlement of boundary disputes
4. Vacancies and succession
5. Recall
6. Term limits

XII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

A. Regalian doctrine
B. Nationalist and citizenship requirement provisions
C. Exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
D. Franchises, authority, and certificates for public utilities
E. Acquisition, ownership and transfer of public and private lands
F. Practice of professions
G. Organization and regulation of corporations, private and public
H. Monopolies, restraint of trade, and unfair competition

XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Concept
B. Economic, social, and cultural rights
C. Commission on Human Rights

XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

A. Academic Freedom

XV. THE FAMILY

A. Rights

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XVI. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. Procedure to amend or revise the Constitution

XVII. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Concepts
1. Obligations erga omnes
2. Jus cogens
3. Ex aequo et bono
B. Relationship between international and national law
C. Sources of obligations in international law
D. Subjects
1. States
2. International organizations
3. Individuals
E. Jurisdiction of states
1. Basis of jurisdiction
a. Territoriality principle
b. Nationality principle and statelessness
c. Protective principle
d. Universality principle
e. Passive personality principle
2. Exemptions from jurisdiction
a. Act of State doctrine b. International organizations and its officers
F. General principles of treaty law
G. Doctrine of state responsibility
I. Refugees
J. Extradition
K. Basic principles of International Human Rights Law

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L. Basic principles of International Humanitarian Law
M. Law of the sea
1. Baselines
2. Archipelagic states
3. Internal waters
4. Territorial sea
5. Contiguous zone
6. Exclusive economic zone
7. Continental shelf and extended continental shelf
8. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
N. Basic principles of International Environmental Law

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