Frivaldo Vs COMELEC
Frivaldo Vs COMELEC
ISSUE: WON Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. NO
RULING:
Article XI, Sec. 9, of the Constitution states that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution “allegiance at all times” and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the LGC that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Here, evidence shows that Frivaldo was naturalized as US citizen in 1983 which was not denied by him.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was ‘forced” on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason
not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot
agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it
necessary—nor do they claim to have been coerced—to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
Moreover, The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable. That case is not relevant to this petition because it dealt with a
conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in
the case at bar; in fact, even the US is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national.
Thus, petitioner was DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of Sorsogon and was ordered to vacate
his office.
On Repatriation:
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD No.725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as
his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo’s contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open
the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their
abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply
filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions—surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that
meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or
judicial proceedings.