1 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., et al. vs. COMELEC G.R. No.

203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

ISSUES:
We rule upon two issues: 
First, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying the groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and 
Second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

RULING:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying groups and organizations from participating in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning
the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying groups and organizations, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot
win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives . The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and
another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." 
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute
a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Thus, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly
rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they
clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system
will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional
parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties
from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to
be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent
any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party
must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.” The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2
on Declaration of Policy.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on
the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5
that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall
in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives. Thus, to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing,
that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political
party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that
"component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the
party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. xxx
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. xxx
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate
the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's
allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the
Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we
acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would
not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in  Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or
orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. As discussed above, the disqualification of
parties and their organizations, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

2 BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s
national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC
en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the
Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of
RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec
11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the-broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” 

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
4 ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013

Facts:

LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and
energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was
approved by the COMELEC.

Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the cancellation of LPGMA’s
registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of
the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented
citizens.

In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that
party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the
society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6
of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition
for registration.

The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the
petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is
actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with
finality. Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were denied.

Issues:
1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators,
officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.

HELD:
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of
COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed.

1) An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for
cancellation.

Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation, viz:

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious

purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.

For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the
law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group
concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.

2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 36 the Court explained that the "laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections" referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, 37 which
declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens
become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not
comply with this policy must be disqualified.

The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their
alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that "those
who are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified."

All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for cancellation of
LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein complaint should be
remanded to the COMELEC. However, on August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which
subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list groups, including LPGMA,
to assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set in
Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the registration of all non-compliant
groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC
and was deemed to have complied with all requirements for registration.
5 Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529

Facts:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted
PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon
verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to
participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the
votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.

PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list
organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 –
MINERO (Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant
controversy.

One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally,
the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT
(Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point,
as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Issue:
Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.

Held:
According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and
therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to
treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is
an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-list
vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.

The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to
mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of
the Supreme Court to state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of
stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).

The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was
clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability
of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the
intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.

Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as
a party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.
6 ALAUYA vs JUDGE LIMBONA

FACTS:

Alauya reported that numerous verbal complaints had been received against Judge Casan Ali Limbona
(Judge Limbona) for: (a) not reporting to his station at the SCC in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur; (b) having
filed a certificate of candidacy as a party-list candidate of the Development Foundation of the
Philippines (DFP) while serving in the Judiciary and while receiving his salary as a judge; and (c) obtaining
from the post office, without sufficient authority, checks representing benefits for court employees.

In a letter dated December 28, 1998 addressed to the OCA, Judge Limbona denied that he consented to
be a nominee of DFP in the May 1998 elections. To prove his point, he submitted the affidavit 7 of Datu
Solaiman A. Malambut, DFP’s National President, admitting sole responsibility for his "honest mistake"
and "malicious negligence and act of desperation" in including the name of Judge Limbona among the
party’s list of nominees.

The OCA disbelieved Judge Limbona’s assertion that he did not consent to the inclusion of his name in
the certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC and that his inclusion was purely due to the
carelessness of the person who prepared the certificate. The OCA nevertheless took the view that a
positive identification of the judge’s participation in the filing of the certificate of candidacy was needed
to fully resolve the matter.

ISSUE: WON Judge Limbona committed gross misconduct for being a party-list candidate

RULING: Yes. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law,
yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative without giving up his judicial post, he
violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that “no officer or employee in the civil service
shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”

The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbona’s signatures on the certificate of candidacy
unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy, thus negating his claim that
his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the
candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post.

For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post, Judge
Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbona’s political
aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the bench. We cannot
likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. In light of the gravity of Judge Limbona’s infractions, we find
OCA’s recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and
gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal.
7 DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES,Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES
A. ROBLES,Respondents.
G.R. No. 178678           April 16, 2009
FACTS:
n 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of Buhay, a party-list group duly
registered with COMELEC.3 The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers,
without re-election.4 BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. All the
required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises, including the Certificates of
Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. 5 On January 26, 2007, in
connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation. 6 As in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the
signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007
elections containing the following names: (i) Rene M. Velarde, (ii) Ma. Carissa Coscolluela, (iii) William Irwin C.
Tieng, (iv) Melchor R. Monsod, and (v) Teresita B. Villarama. Earlier, however, or on March 27, 2007, petitioner
Hans Christian Señeres, holding himself up as acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed a
Certificate of Nomination with the COMELEC, nominating: (i) himself, (ii) Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, (iii) Antonio
R. Bautista, (iv) Victor Pablo C. Trinidad, and (v) Eduardo C. Solangon, Jr.7

SENERES ROBLES
filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course filed a petition praying for the recognition of Jose D.
to Certificates of Nomination.8 In it, petitioner Señeres Villanueva as the new representative of BUHAY in the
alleged that he was the acting president and House of Representatives for the remaining term until
secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that June 30, 2007.12
position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated filed on the same day an “Urgent Motion to Declare
the position. Pushing the point, Señeres would claim Null and Void the Certificate of Nomination and
that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of Certificates of Acceptance filed by Hans Christian M.
authority, null and void owing to the expiration of the Señeres, Hermenegildo Dumlao, Antonio R. Bautista,
latter’s term as party president. Victor Pablo Trinidad and Eduardo Solangon, Jr.”13
COMELEC
Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the
Constitution,9disqualified from being an officer of any COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as
political party, the latter being the Acting a winning party-list organization for the May 2007
Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority elections entitled to three (3) House seats and it also
(LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Robles, declared Robles as the duly authorized representative
so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political of BUHAY.
activity which civil service members, like the former, Followed by an issuance on July 19, 2007 recognizing
were enjoined from engaging in. and declaring Robles as the president of BUHAY and,
as such, was the one “duly authorized to sign
documents in behalf of the party particularly the
Manifestation to participate in the party-list system of
representation and the Certification of Nomination of its
nominees.”15

ISSUE HELD RATIO

Whether or No, Robles is not His being the chairman of LRTA and the president of BUHAY, a party-
not Robles should disqualified as list group, is not compatible. There is no law prohibiting that the LRTA
be disqualified as the president of chair cannot be a president of a party-list group. Further, Robles is not
president of BUHAY.  guilty of electioneering. Robles’ act of nominating BUHAY
BUHAY. representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The crime
electioneering is clearly defined under Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus
Election Code but Robles did not commit any act defined thereunder.
Anent the issue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY already
expired when he made the nominations hence the nominations are
void, the Supreme Court ruled that the nominations are valid. This is
because of the “Hold-Over” doctrine under corporation law. As a
general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected
or appointed. The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which
is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would
otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity
to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.
8 Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC and Didagen Dilangalen, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.

Creation of ARMM’s Shariff Kabunsuan province is invalid. The Supreme Court Justices, according to Chief Justice
Reynato Puno (thru PDI), “are aware of of how their decision on a deal expanding the Bangsamoro
territory would impact on the volatile situation in Mindanao.” This may be particularly true considering
that just last month, the SC also declared that the creation of a new province in the ARMM – Shariff
Kabunsuan – is unconstitutional. Here’s the digest of that case — Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC and
Didagen Dilangalen, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.

Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created underRepublic Act (“R.A.”) No.
6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato
City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.

There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of
Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above,
Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a
plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first
legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress.

Issue: There are a number of issues resolved, but the main issue is this — Whether Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

Ruling: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to
the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the
Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section
19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.

Discussion: The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed bySection 10, Article X of
the Constitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local
government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – to wit:

1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code.
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.

When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution
that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the
power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter.

The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is
clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of theConstitution (“Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution (“ “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”) In
other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.

However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives.  Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts.  The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress
itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable
membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress
can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.

The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law.  It
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for
a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a
Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.  It would be incongruous for a regional
legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory.  The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds
and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds.  It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a
national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional
Assembly’s legislative powers “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x
9 ALDABA vs COMELEC (GR 188078 January 25, 2010)
TOPIC: ): population should not be based on projection and certification must be issued by head of the
Philippine Statistics Authority, formerly, National Statistics Office (NSO)

FACTS:

1. The province of Bulacan was represented through 4 legislative districts (prior to May 2009)
2. It was composed of Malolos, Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong.
3. RA 9591 lapsed to law on May 1, 2009. It amended the Malolos chapter by creating a separate
legislative district for the city.
4. The population of Malolos on May 1 is a contested fact, HB 3693 ( aka RA9591) relied on an
undated certification issued by a regional director of the NSO that the projected population of the
municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010
5. This is in conflict over the certification stating that Malolos will only have 241,550 by 2010 based
on the growth rate of 3.78%

ISSUE(S): WON the creation of the legislative district of Malolos, Bulacan violates the minimum
population requirement of 250,000?

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

RATIO:

1. Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent
Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, the population of the Municipality of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-
2000. This projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized
under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of
Population Sizes), which states:

xxx

(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the

range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will
correspond to the official low and high population projections.

(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall

be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers.
Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the
NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. 1 (Emphasis supplied)

2. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at
least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately
following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of
1
Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.

3. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time
for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the
City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

4. The constitutional check against “gerrymandering,” which means the creation of

representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate, is
found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution. It states that “each legislative district
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.” It
should be noted, however, that this rule is qualified by the phrase “as far as practicable.”
Hence, the fact that the creation of a legislative district for Malolos would separate the
town of Bulacan from the rest of the towns comprising the first district, would not
militate against the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. This is so because there is no showing
that Congress enacted R.A. 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city can aspire
to have one representative who will represent its interest in Congress.
10 ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SUMMARY: Cagayan de Oro City used to have a single legislative district. In 2006 a law was passed to
divide it into two legislative districts. Bagabuyo opposed the move before the SC, claiming that the split
must be approved by a plebiscite and that the split violates the constitutional standard of equal
representation. The implementing agency, COMELEC countered that the petition should have been filed
with the RTC; and that a plebiscite is not needed. SC junked Bagabuyo’s petition, holding that the law was
a legislative apportionment measure, which does not require a plebiscite. Legislative apportionment is
not division of an LGU. It is simply a delineation of an area whose inhabitants will have one representative
in the lawmaking body. It does not involve the creation, alteration, or abolition of an LGU, which is a
special corporate body under the Constitution and the law. The special and corporate nature of LGUs is
the precise reason why its creation, alteration, or abolition has to be approved by plebiscite. This
rationale does not apply to legislative districts.

DOCTRINE
 Apportionment of legislative district is a different concept from division of LGUs. The two are
governed by different Constitutional provisions.
 Definition of apportionment and reapportionment [please see ratio#2, 1st bullet]
 The Constitution and the LGC expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit.
In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
 A legislative district can be considered a political unit but it is not a political subdivision. It is a
political unit but not a corporate unit, being a device for purposes of representation. It is a mere
delineation of areas occupied by the group of people who are to choose a common representative
to the lawmaking body. It cannot act for and in behalf of its constituents (unlike LGUs).
 LGUs are territorial and political subdivisions of the State. An LGU is a political unit and a
corporate unit, created by the Constitution and the legislature and vested with legal personality
distinct and separate from the State. LGUs are defined by the Constitution as entities which may
be created, divided, abolished, or merged by law in accordance with Constitutional and legislative
standards.

NATURE: Original action in the Supreme Court. Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

FACTS
 Oct. 10, 2006 – Then Rep. Constantino Jaraula of the Lone District of Cagayan de Oro City filed and
sponsored House Bill 5859, providing for the apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of
Cagayan de Oro.
 HB 5859 was passed into law as Republic Act 9371.
 RA 9371 split the Lone District of Cagayan de Oro into two districts, the First District covering the
rural areas of the city, and the Second District covering the urban areas.
o The law further provided that the voters of the city would be classified as belonging to
either the 1st or the 2nd district, depending on their place of residence.
o The constituents of each district would elect a Representative and 8 members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod.
 Mar. 13, 2007 – COMELEC promulgated en banc Resolution No. 7837 implementing RA 9371.
 Mar. 27, 2007 – Rogelio BAGABUYO filed the present petition against the COMELEC, on the ground
that RA 9371 cannot be implemented without the conduct of a plebiscite, which he says is
indispensable for the division or conversion of a LGU.
o He asked that the COMELEC be stopped from implementing RA 9371 and Resolution No.
7837 and for Cagayan de Oro to be reverted to a single district.
 Apr. 10, 2008 – Bagabuyo amended his petition to implead the Executive Secretary, the Budget
and Management Secretary, the Chair of the Commission on Audit, the Mayor and Members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro, and the Cagayan de Oro Board of Canvassers.
 May 14, 2007 – The National and Local Elections pushed through in accordance with RA 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837, the SC not having issued a TRO.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N Bagabuyo violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine when he filed the petition directly with the SC
(NO)
2) Does RA 9371 involve the division or conversion of a LGU, or does it only provide for legislative
reapportionment? (LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT)
3) W/N RA 9371 violates the equality of representation doctrine (NO)

RATIO
1) CASE AT BAR IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE
 The hierarchy of courts doctrine serves to declog court dockets and focus the SC’s time on matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction.
 Therefore, when SC has concurrent jurisdiction with a lower court over a proceeding, recourse
must first be made to the lower court; unless there are “special and important” reasons for the
direct invocation of the SC’s jurisdiction, clearly and especially set out in the petition.
 Among these special and important circumstances include petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus against lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed.
o CASE AT BAR: Bagabuyo’s petition assails a legislative enactment. The nature of the issues
raised also suffices as reason for considering it an exception to the rule.
o Additionally, the petition also assails a resolution of the COMELEC en banc, which requires
a Rule 65 petition before the SC per ROC 64.

2) RA 9371 IS A LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT MEASURE

 CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS DISTINGUISHED
o Bagabuyo: The implementation of RA 9371 requires a plebiscite since it involves the
division of an LGU.
o OSG: RA 9371 merely increases the representation of Cagayan de Oro in the House of
Representatives pursuant to Art. VI, § 5 of the 1987 Constitution. It does not involve a
creation of a LGU or substantial alteration of boundaries, hence the criteria under Art. X,
§10 of the Constitution is inapplicable. Finally, RA 9371 did not change Cagayan de Oro’s
territory, population or income classification, hence no plebiscite is required.
o SC: Bagabuyo confuses the concept of apportionment of legislative districts with the
concept of division of local government units.
o Apportionment:determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or o
ther subdivision may send to a legislative body; allocation of seats in proportion to
population; drawing of voting district lines to equalize population and voting power among
districts (Black’s)
o Reapportionment: Realignment or change in legislative districts to reflect population
changes; mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation
(Black’s)
o APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES. Art. VI (entitled The Legislative Department), §5
refers to legislative districts and their creation and composition. Art. X (entitled Local
Government) refers to LGUs, or more generally, municipal corporations. §10 requires a
plebiscite before a LGU is created, divided, merged, or abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered, in accordance with criteria set in a Local Government Code.
o The only common element between the two provisions is that the Legislature has been
given the authority to act [in one case by apportioning or reapportioning legislative
districts and in the other by setting the criteria for the
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by
actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and
altering their boundaries through legislation].
o Art. VI, §5 concerns the optimization of political representation in the legislature and
provides for rules toward optimal apportionment [250,000 population requirement for
cities, 1 representative per province, uniform and progressive ratio, contiguity of territory,
regular reapportionment, etc.]. Art. X, §10 concerns
“the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local
government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks
of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern”
[compliance with LGC criteria and approval by plebiscite].
 LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A PLEBISCITE
o In contrast with Art. X, §10, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
o In Tobias v. Abalos the splitting of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate legislative
districts without a plebiscite being held in San Juan was upheld, because the plebiscite in
Mandaluyong was on the issue of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, as required by
Art. X, §10 and the LGC. The apportionment was only a consequence of the conversion, so
a plebiscite need not be held in San Juan, where only a reapportionment tool place.
o HISTORY OF THE APPORTIONMENT PROVISION
 It was rooted in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution and certain US state
constitutions.
 Philippine Bill of 1902 - mandated the apportionment of seats in the popularly
elected Philippine Assembly.
 Jones Law of 1916 – Philippine Islands were divided into 12 senatorial districts and
90 representative districts, with the Philippine Legislature being given the authority
to redistrict.
 1935 Constitution – Art. VI, §5 retained the concept of legislative apportionment
and the district as the basic unit of apportionment. The aim of equality of
representation was enshrined “as an essential feature of republican institutions”.
(Macias v. COMELEC)
 Macias v. COMELEC (1961) and Montejo v. COMELEC (1995) – Held that inequality
of representation is a justiciable issue. No plebiscite issues were raised in both
cases.
 1973 Constitution – Art. VIII, §2 retained equal representation and introduced the
“uniform and progressive ratio” and the contiguity criterion.
 1987 Constitution – Retained the 1973 formulation, with the addition of party-list
representatives. No plebiscite was required under both constitutions.
 Plebiscites were never required.
o HISTORY OF DIVISION PROVISION
 1959 – RA 2264 required a petition by majority of affected voters in the creation of
barrios
 1961 – Caloocan City Charter required a plebiscite for its effectivity
 Subsequent enactments up to 1972 also required a plebiscite as a condition for the
creation and conversion of LGUs.
 1973 – Plebiscite requirement was enshrined in the Constitution.
 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
o A legislative district can be considered a political unit but it is not a political subdivision. It
is a political unit but not a corporate unit, being a device for purposes of representation. It
is a mere delineation of areas occupied by the group of people who are to choose a
common representative to the lawmaking body. It cannot act for and in behalf of its
constituents.
o LGUs are territorial and political subdivisions of the State. A LGU is a political unit and a
corporate unit, created by the Constitution and the legislature and vested with legal
personality distinct and separate from the State. LGUs are defined by the Constitution as
entities which may be created, divided, abolished, or merged by law in accordance with
Constitutional and legislative standards.
o A LGU begins its corporate existence upon election and qualification of its chief executive
and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian. It is an instrumentality of the state in
carrying out government functions. It is an agency of the state and exercises special
functions for the sole benefit of local affairs. It is the medium through which the people act
in their corporate capacity on local concerns. Its special status and role merited that its
creation, alteration, or abolition be regulated by the affected residents through approval
by plebiscite.
o By their history and nature, legislative apportionment and division of LGU are different and
the former does not mean [or even imply] the latter. Thus, the plebiscite requirement
should not be applicable to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.
 CASE AT BAR
o The wording of RA 9371 does not imply any division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political
and corporate entity.
o No new territorial administrative divisions are created nor are there any areas removed
from the City.
o RA 9371 simply creates a new legislative district out of the former lone district for
purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. No plebiscite is therefore
necessary.
o The creation of additional Sangguniang Panglungsod seats by virtue of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837 as a consequence of the creation of the two new districts is not new
but is based on an earlier law - RA 6636 – which laid down the apportionment of seats in
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of every city. The resolution simply follows the provisions of
said law.
o Furthermore, the resolution does not divide the LGU or create a new one. It merely
enhances voter representation by giving greater weight to each vote, both in Congress and
in the Sangguniang Panglungsod. From 12 councilors and one representative for 500,000
people, CdO now has 2 House representatives, one for each group of 250,000 people, and
8 councilors for each same group.

3) NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION PRINCIPLE

 Bagabuyo: The apportionment of districts is unequal because District 1 has only 93,719 registered
voters while District 2 has 127,071.
 SC: The legal basis for the drawing of districts is the number of inhabitants and not the number of
registered voters (Herrera v. COMELEC).
o Bagabuyo did not provide population figures. SC took judicial notice of the August 2007
census of the NSO which showed that District 1 has 254,644 residents while District 2 has
299,322.
o While there may be a disparity, the Constitution does not require that each district have
exactly the same population. With regard to population, all that it requires is 250,000
residents in a city to constitute one district; and at least 1 district for each province
regardless of population. Even the contiguity requirement is tempered by the phrase “as
far as practicable”.
o “[T]he Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and does not require their division, merger
or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes.  Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact
and adjacent as far as practicable.”
 Bagabuyo: District 1 is composed of predominantly rural barangays while District 2 is composed
mostly of urban barangays.
 SC: (eh ano naman?) Bagabuyo does not substantiate his stance. Also, the Constitution does not
include development indicators in its criteria. As long as they follow the limits of the Constitution
and law, the lawmakers of Cagayan de Oro are free to determine the component barangays of the
legislative districts.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

11 AMORES vs HRET
FACTS:

Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the
legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative
of the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of
the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance,
he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior
to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA
No. 7941.

ISSUE: WON Villanueva is eligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the party-list organization CIBAC.

RULING: NO.

The Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No.
7941 reading:

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election,  so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-
list representative seats.
12 Liban v. Gordon

FACTS
Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as
“having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors.

During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of
the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners
alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as
provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution:

Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat….

Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC
is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the
Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to
which is neither an office nor an employment.

ISSUE
By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat?

HELD
No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not
have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but
must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in
accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary
service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordon’s case, in
accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit.
13 Belgica vs Executive Secretary Ochoa (PDAF Case)

FACTS:

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act
(GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their
pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost”
projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure
projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
14 Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
15. Reyes vs. Comelec, 708 SCRA 197 (2013)

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Facts:

The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque.

On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground
that it contained material representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of
candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied
her MR.

However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took
her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner,
the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of
Marinduque.

Held:

Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet.
Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.  Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.

Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved
to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross. 
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists.