G.R. No.

111141 March 6, 1998

MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and
ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation
purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983,
private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land
containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same
under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that
the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.

In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner, asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No.
3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio.

The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what of petitioner's property was
the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in
1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to the lowland at the southern of petitioner' s property, thus converting the old
river into a riceland.

For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied
petitioner's claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed
land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his
hands.

Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this
property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug.

In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner

reacquired the property by way of sale.

However, the property remained in petitioner's hands for only four (4) days because, on
August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa.

Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa's wife, the
late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument
denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale" whereby
the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private
respondent in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration
No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the
area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in
Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner's name.

It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of
the disputed property. The first survey was made for petitioner, while the second was
the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies
between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner's allegation in his
complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789
hectares

On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of
4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him.

However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement petitioner's share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to
private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio's) property and declared
it a part of his inheritance. The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded
on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property
owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong. Private respondent
accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after
he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug because the land
was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter.

The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as
the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect
private respondents' title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, costs and moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has ownership over the land in question?

Ruling:

NO. At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that
the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The
remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the
Civil Code:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that
an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title
over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents
herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered
the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.

Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to
the property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action
for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.

The courts below correctly held that when petitioner "sold, ceded, transferred and
conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and
possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the
same manner, Espinosa's rights of ownership over the land ceased and were
transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter.

In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the
thing sold. In the case at bar, petitioner's claim of ownership must of necessary fail
because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest.

Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession
for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil
Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law
must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that
". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and
with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not
acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of tea years
unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and
good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right.

Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As
aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line
(Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts
constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith."

Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property
upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that "(o)wnership and other real rights
over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up
to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned
twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement
mandated by Art. 1137.

Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared
upon his request, the tax declaration in his name, the commissioner's report on the
relocation survey, and the survey plan. Respondent court correctly held that these
documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and
3606.

A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in

the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in
severalty a part of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership
as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.

Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself,
is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim
of ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's
ownership.