FATA: THE STRATEGIC DEPTH OF PAKISTAN

Dr A. Z. Hilali

Abstract

Since the eve of 9/11, Pakistan’s Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA) have become strategically vital region in the
world and also for the security and defence of Pakistan. The area is
landlocked and an important junction of South, Southwest and
Central Asia and chessboard of great power politics. The war on
terror and the US and NATO actions against the Taliban militants
and al-Qaeda network have changed the fabric of FATA region. This
situation has created challenging circumstances for the security and
stability of Pakistan. Moreover, the US has given free hand to India
in Afghanistan which is a serious matter to Pakistan’s security
concerns. However, the war seems to be “bleeding wound” for
Pakistan because it is hurting more as compared to gains. So, the
best strategy for Islamabad is disengagement from the war because it
will protect FATA which is real strategic depth for the country’s
defence rather than Kabul and it will also strengthen internal
stability and guarantee territorial integrity.

Introduction

In counter-insurgency, the population is not only the field of

battle but also the prize.
– David C
1
Gompert

Since 2001, the global War on Terror has dominated

Pakistan’s foreign policy and the country’s elites have adopted zero
tolerance national security strategy to eliminate the culture of
Talibanization and Al-Qaeda network. The policy makers perceive
that to fight against extremism is an important task because the
situation not only invoked fears of an uncertain future of Pakistan
but also injects urgency for Pakistan’s state and society. For all these
reasons, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

situated in Pakistan’s north western part (now called Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and previously known as North West Frontier
Province –NWFP), and border region between Afghanistan and
Pakistan has become the spotlight of global politics. With the end of
the Cold War and after the incident of 9/11 (2001), FATA has
changed the US strategic dimensions. The violence in the region
becomes contentious issue because the US declared “FATA, the
most dangerous place in the battle against terrorism” 2 and has been
of a paramount importance in the contemporary international
politics. The US administration assumes that Pakistan’s tribal areas
had become a safe haven for al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and the
area is a sanctuary for several insurgent groups operating both inside
Pakistan and Afghanistan.3

After the 9/11, US and Pakistan entered into opportunistic

partnership with disparate objectives. The US made Pakistan one of
its lesser allies in order to have access to its air, land and naval bases
so as to expand the scope of its policy to contain terrorism in the
border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand,
Pakistan shake hand with the US in order to achieve three
fundamental objectives: first to receive US military assistance to
enhance position vis-à-vis India; second, to obtain diplomatic
support for the protection of nuclear assets; and third, to receive
massive US economic assistance to accelerate the growth of
economic development. One beliefs that the US takes advantages of
Pakistan’s strategic and economic weaknesses and uses its sensitive
facilities in the war on terror, and Pakistan as a weak country
sacrifices its national interests because the elites have failed to
protect the country’s territorial integrity and FATA region, which is
a natural border or barrier for the defence and security of Pakistan,
has become the victim of great power politics. It seems that the tribal
belt which is the buffer zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan has
become the bleeding wound to Pakistan and challenges the national
solidarity of the country. The situation further turns into worst
position when the US escalates joint war with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan and FATA region across the
Pakistani border and expands its military operations with modern
military instruments, throughout the tribal areas, including robotic
drones which continue killing innocent civilians and local insurgent

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

leaders at very high rates and undermine the security of Pakistan in

multiple ways.4 It is also perceived that as long as Pakistan’s
alignment with the US continues, it will damage one of the
impoverished countries in the region and will amidst a flood of bad
news rather than relief and potential gains.

The Geopolitics of FATA

FATA has its specific tribal, geographical, socio-economic

and religious characteristics but the region is a small landlocked
tribal belt in the heart of South Asia and is sandwiched between
northwest to southwest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of
Pakistan and located around shred area of Oxus and Jumna which
endowed its potential geographical importance and equally has
historic value for the region.5 It is entirely surrounded by boundaries
created as a result of British and Russian imperial policies. The
Durand Line established in 1893 under the British empire border
policy of “masterly inactivity” which essentially used the tribesmen
as a buffer between British India’s northern frontier and the Russian
empire southward from Central Asia and were concerned that
Afghanistan, the only geographic buffer between British India and
Russia, did not have a defined boundary.6

After the partition of British India (1947), Pakistan also used

Durand Line to prevent Soviet expansion and were no way
successful to control the Afghan government from political
exploitation. The region emerged as a kind of “tribal no man’s land”
over generations and areas were controlled through the loose
political autonomy. The demarcation of boundary line has caused
much dissatisfaction among some of the Afghan elites which
eventually gave rise to political tensions between the two countries.
In fact, the line was created as a result of formal agreement between
Amir Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893 and called
the “Durand Line Agreement”, which is one of the well defined
boundaries in the world and also one of the longest borders
stretching to 2430 km between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There was
a consensus among the successive Afghan governments and Afghan
elders who approved and recognized the demarcation of boundary

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

and gained political and economic benefits from the British Indian
government.7 However, after the creation of Pakistan, the Afghan
ruling elites with the inducement of Indian National Congress
leadership were not prepared to accept the Durand Line and
transmitted a fabricated interpretation about internationally
legitimate boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan for their
paramount concern and vested interests. 8 Interestingly, the people of
FATA and their tribal elders (Khans, Malik, Sardars and Chiefs)
never reacted against the demarcation of Durand Line because
successive governments in Pakistan accommodated the feelings and
wishes of tribal people and ultimately has shown satisfaction with
the settlement. Moreover, from the historical discourse, it can be
clearly observed that during the demarcation of Durand Line, the
British empire pretended to take into considerations the historical
background, natural topography and local considerations. So, the
decision of the parties concerned was not arbitrary because no
authority or group objected to the boundary settlement.

Strategically, FATA is located at the crossroads of global

power interests as described by the renowned historian Arnold J.
Toynbee that the region is the “cross-roads” of civilizations. 9 The
area has also attracted a succession of invaders ranging from
Alexander the Great, to the former Soviet Union in the twentieth
century because of its strategic location and it is a reality that the
area is also one of the most sensitive zones in Pakistan and indeed in
South Asia.10 The area spreads around 27220 square kilometers 11
which is approximately three percent of the total area of Pakistan
and more than one-third of the area is covered by barreled Hindu
Kush Mountains. So, FATA population is over 3.5 million and some
1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan have been settled in the
region and the area continues to be the focal point of global attention
in the event of the US invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the
British empire established administrative structure of tribal areas and
divided tribal area from north to south into seven different
administrative zones such as Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai,
Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan which lie in a
north-to-south strip that is adjacent to the west side of the six
Frontier Regions in order from north to south i.e Peshawar, Kohat,
Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Dera Ismael Khan (D.I.Khan). All

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

agencies except Orakzai share border with Afghanistan and each has
a dominant tribe and economic base and physical characteristics that
distinguishes it from the other regions.

The location of the region is becoming more volatile because

of a number of border passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its
seven routes are well-known which run through its territory, i.e.,
Malakand, Khyber, Gandab route through Mohmand territory,
Khyber and Kohat route through Parachinar, Bangash or Paiwar
route through Kurram, Gomal, Tochi routes through Waziristan and
in the south there is the famous Bolan route to Quetta in Balochistan
province. These passes are corridors of invasion and commerce
between the Indus plains and Central Asia. Moreover, there are
many key passages through the mountainous Pakistan border, which
include two from Paktika Province into Pakistan’s Waziristan
region: one at Angoor Ada, a village that straddles both sides of the
border east of Shkin, and further south, the Gumal River crossing
valley, which cuts through the Sulaiman Range and the Charkai
River passage south of Khowst, Afghanistan, at Pakistan’s Ghulam
Khan village into North Waziristan. One of the busiest Pakistan
border crossing is at Wesh, just northwest of Chaman, Pakistan,
connecting Kandahar and Spin Boldak in Afghanistan to Quetta in
Pakistan, is a flat, dry area, though this route involves Pakistan’s
Khojal Pass at 2,707 m (8,881 ft) just 14 km from the border.

Salient Features of Tribal Society

The Pakhtuns are the most highly segmentary ethnic group in

Pakistan and always avoid subjugation and integration with the other
communities of the country. Each tribe has a large number of clans
or khels, descending from the others. So, Pakhtuns engage in social,
political and economic activities within their own concentric rings
and this engagement normally prevents each government or
authority to gain control over the tribes.12 This is one of the
fundamental reasons that no foreign entity including Alexander, the
British and the Soviets have been able to reconcile the Pakhtuns to
external rule.13 Historically, during the nineteenth century the British
Indian empire failed to subject the Pakhtuns to state authority.14 Even

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) also failed to subjugate

the Pakhtuns, although they used brutal genocidal tactics and killed
1.5 million people and drove approximately 7.4 million into exile
which include 4.2 million in Pakistan and 3.2 million in Iran.15

FATA area is dominated by Pakhtoon tribes and basically

has tribal or feudal structure. The region is still in the midst of the
most critical transformation in the modern history but autonomous
structures of local authority have long been existed parallel to the
federal government. The federal structure continues to deal with
local tribal chiefs through the Political Agents instead of establishing
contacts with the people at grass-root levels. The region is inhabited
by diverse tribes and its traditional institutions and social culture are
based on the freedom (autonomy) of tribes which block the federal
government access to the local authority. In fact, the tribal region has
its own distinction and never strictly follows modern law and liberty
but they permit the federal government to organize its political
power and exercise its restricted authority.16 Moreover, the tribal belt
is highly complicated and ethnically divided into tribal cleavages
and linguistic and religious differences. The society is a mosaic of
different Pakhtun tribes and all are traditional, primitive and
religious. So, the tribal society is highly fragmented and
factionalized and described as a living museum of martial races.
There is a clear distinction between those who inhabit plains and
those who live in mountains. In general, an inhabitant of highland
lives in the rural area east of the plateau of Afghanistan and west of
the plains of Pakistan. There are a countless number of tribes in the
region but the more popular are Yusafzais in Malakand and Bajaur
Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand Agency; Afridis and Shinwaris in
Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Orakzais in Orakzai Agency;
Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Khattaks in east and
southeast of Kohat; Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; and
Mahsuds in South Waziristan Agency.17 These tribes are the
backbone of the tribal belt and their culture is deeply associated with
Arabs and Afghan societies and expressed in its social institutions.
In general, they have common socio-cultural values but by nature
they are hard, rigid and undisciplined.18

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

The Pakhtun prefer to be guided by a tribal code of behavior

(Pakhtunwali) rather than by laws made by modern states for
running their domestic affairs. According to Shahid Javed Burki, the
traditional code existed even before Islam entered the area; they
have added some aspects of the Islamic laws (Sharia), which are not
contradictory to their social values. Pakhtuns practiced social code
for centuries and many of its features are in abhorrence to accept
outside interference in their internal affairs, an equal amount of
reluctance to be governed by a central authority that operates from a
distant place and confidence in the ability of local leaders to provide
protection to their communities and to provide an environment in
which they can live according to their own laws and customs. 19 In
general, the tribes operate through their maliks or some are
determined by the individual tribes themselves and other channels
i.e., official maliks who are normally selected by the concerned
Political Agent of agency and they are responsible for governance in
their respective areas. The number of maliks varies on agency to
agency bases inside FATA and the total strength is around 3616, in
which only 1,600 maliks belong to North Waziristan and the rest are
associated to other tribal agencies in which more than 630 tribal
maliks have been killed in FATA by the Taliban militants.20

Paradoxically, FATA Pakhtoons have enormous

sociocultural values and Pakhtoonwali or Nang-i-Pakhtoon (way or
code of the Pakhtoons) still guides the “lives” of the tribal people.
Each tribe has its own customs and traditions and remarkably rich
with hospitality which is based on finest virtues and a sacred duty to
honour the person. They have supreme values consisted of bravery
for honourable life, freedom, courage and revenge. They also have
several unwritten laws and traditions whose prime objectives are
mediation or protection (Nanawati), retaliation (Badal) and
hospitality (Mailmastia). So, Nanawati is like asylum and it must be
given to all fugitives and even to the worst enemies if they come as
supplicants. According to mailmastia, the host is responsible for
hospitality and protection of the guest or guests. The badal is
basically the responsibility of wiping out insult with insult: i.e. “an
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”. 21 In the same way, honour is
the main cause of feuds and vendettas which may last for
generations. It is interesting to note that Pakhtoons are religiously

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

conservative although Pukhtoonwali and religion have no

commonality. There is a loose definition of Islamic traditions mixed
with tribal customs normally dominated by interpretations by local
mullahs (religious leaders) who belong to different sects or fictions
of Islam. Sunni sect is predominant in the region but the inhabitants
are further divided between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of
jurisprudence. However, there is also a small and well-organized
Shia minority in different parts of the province, particularly in
Parachinar (Kurram Agency) which is the victim of worst
sectarianism in the region. Moreover, tribal love with religion is
undisputed because it serves as the central binding force of
integration among the diverse tribes.22 This emotional attachment is
also one of the core reasons to prevent the growth of a strong state
system or sense of unified national identity. So, there is no central
authority in the tribal area capable to achieve predominance over the
traditional values. In the same way, the socio-cultural power in the
autonomous periphery of tribal areas is in the hands of khans,
maliks, mullahs and tribal chiefs because they have deeper influence
than the state authority. Furthermore, the state has only a limited
capability to compete for influence in the tribal belt. In general, the
local traditional institutions have more power and they exercise
complete authority over the individuals in their respective
jurisdictions. In addition, the tribal social order is not strictly
hierarchical like the modern state system. Social influence based on
blood relationship and interpersonal interactions are more effective
force to control the tribes than coercion and threat of power. Thus,
tribes always oppose foreign domination and have shown their anger
in the recent past and it seems that an external threat is the only
source of integration among the diverse and disunited tribes.23

The Role of Religious Clerics (Mullahs)

In general, religious oligarchy have no political authority in

Pakhtun society and only maliks are perceived to be dominant in
policy making or decision making and mullahs are out of the circle
of tribal gathering or Jirga. They are economically dependent on the
maliks who are responsible for looking-after their house hold and
security of the mosques. But after the Afghan war compared
(19791988), the social influence of mullah has increased as compare

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

to maliks, khans or tribal elders. In this context, the incident of

Iranian Revolution (1979) fueled in more and ultimately mullahs of
the rural areas with some political weight received tremendous
importance. On the other hand, the social upheaval undermined the
existing tribal structures and Pakistan’s security establishment feared
that the Soviets would exploit the Pakhtunistan issue (separate
homeland for the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan) for the
territorial control and access to the hot waters of Persian Gulf and
provid unlimited privileges and access to the settled areas.

After the emergence of militant’s culture, the influence of

mullahs has increased and the mullah is perceived to be no more an
isolated character in tribal society because his power has changed
the socio-cultural fabric of FATA. The officially sponsored maliks
and jirga both have lost their power and confidence. Initially, the
mosque was prohibited to be used for political purpose but after the
event of 9/11, the status of maliks has declined and mullah emerged
as a supreme commander who has the leading position in the
political and social activities. So, in the present circumstances, the
status of maliks has collapsed and the personality of mullahs has
dominated the Pakhtun society and maliks seen to be subordinate to
the religious clergy. The tribal leaders who used to conduct political
meetings in the hujra as a counterweight to the mosque are no more
in existence. Mullah has received prestigious position and the
traditional role of the mosque has changed and now it has dual
function, working as hujra and religious ceremony. Before the
Afghan war, jirga was normally held in the open place but after the
culture of jihad, jirga meeting were used to be held inside madrassas
and addressed by mullahs. In the traditional system, mullahs have no
option to sustain because of lack of financial means but gradually
they become financially sound and got access to financial sources.

In fact, the state policy is responsible to legitimize religious

clergy in the society because ruling elites used religion as a tool for
“survival of the fittest” and ultimately mullahs emerged as
arbitrators between the tribes and the state and became an alternative
leadership. So, Pakhtun society socially has been reshaped around
the culture of religion and they have replaced all the traditional
values and have been able to change the power structure of society. 24

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

According to Shuja Nawaz, mullahs capitalized on the local anger

and used general lawlessness to challenge the writ of the government
and state legitimacy and became an alternative moral authority. 25
Thus, the Taliban of Pakistan have taken advantage of the judicial
gap and prevailing injustice in different parts (Bajaur, Malakand,
Swat and Waziristan) of the society and have established substitute
centers for administrative and judicial justice to settle the disputes,
displacing the tribal jirgas and the elders. Moreover, the Taliban
leadership have successfully built power bases within the society,
particularly among the new young tribals and also have established
link with criminals and subversive segments of the society. As a
result, a huge amount has been used to establish “official”
mujahideen groups and after the end of the Afghan war these groups
mutated out of state control.26 Moreover, the same mujahideens were
also used jointly by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) when the Taliban phenomena was
created in 1994 for the safe passage and access to energy rich
Central Asia through Afghanistan. Pakistan trained madrassa
(religious school) students in the second term of Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto’s government (1993-1996). However, after the
incident of 9/11 (2001), these radical militants are playing in the
hands of Al-Qaeda and working as a “proxy army” against the
United States and the state of Pakistan and have created lawlessness
across the FATA and in the settled areas of the country. They have
killed more than 600 maliks27 since 2007 and are regularly targeting
military, police stations and educational institutions.

Pakhtun Identity as a Race and Religion

It is a historical fact that Pakhtuns had never shown religious

aggression in their history but after the Afghan war, they have
become hostage to the strict Taliban religious interpretation. In
general, Pakhtuns are secular or nationalist having deep affiliation
with their language and culture but the Afghan jihad has changed the
socio-cultural fabric of the Pakhtun society. This situation has also
influenced the political culture of the province where leaders of the
main parties have been Pakhtuns and ultimately their centre of
gravity has shifted to the Pakhtun areas. All major religious parties
with the exception of Jamat-i Islami are dominated by Pashtuns, and

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

has some form of Sunni (Wahabist) orientation. Moreover, the

resistance based its legitimacy on various forms of politicized Islam
and ethnicity is low on the overall political agenda. The fact is that
Taliban militants’ leadership is overwhelmingly Pakhtun and are
religiously rigid and inflexible from the perspective of common
people. Furthermore, Pakhtun nationalist leadership has failed to
comprehend the changing environment of politics and has also failed
to marginalize the situation.

In fact, the Afghan war radicalized Pakhtun society and its

social fabric is further shredded by the returning commanders and
militants who set themselves up in many cases as warlords outside
the authority of the tribal elders. The immediate outcome is anarchy
as militant groups, warlords and social criminals fight over the
carcass of Afghanistan.28 Furthermore, the religious dimension of
this situation brings to the limelight as the militants seem to be a
dominant factor in the contemporary war on terror and the ethnic
factor is no more valid to build support and help from common
people. In this regard, hundreds of foreign volunteers are harbored as
“guests” in different areas of FATA the refusal of the local people
has made the situation critical because the people claim that Pakhtun
traditions and customs are the main hurdle to handover guests to
others. According to the philosophy of Pakhtunwali, Pakhtun can die
but never consider to handover guest to their enemy. For the
protection of Pakhtun traditions, tribal people have fought against
the federal security forces in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA)
but have not compromised on their traditions.29 In fact, A Pakhtun
perceives that once hospitality is granted, to give it up under any
pressure would present a wrong picture about Pakhtuns and that they
have no respect for their own values and have lost their freedom of
action as well. On the other hand, Taliban imagines that to fight with
Pakistani forces makes them better Muslims and to justify their jihad
against the American proxy forces who are killing their brothers and
colleagues. In this regard, a small numbers of common people seems
to be sympathizers with the militants just because of US military
actions in FATA. However, majority of the people believe that the
security establishment of Pakistan is involved in the war on terror to
gain economic and military assistance from the United States.
History of Insurgency in FATA

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

Tribal Pakhtuns are warlike, brave and stoic people and

revolt or retaliation is a common phenomenon in tribal society.
Many jihadi organizations and religious leaders similar to the
Taliban have arisen in that area who challenge the ruling authorities
either they are residing in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Historically,
Taliban leaders such as Mullah of Hadda provoked the Pakhtuns in
1897 against the British empire with the help of mysticism, and
parlor tricks and believed to have turned the British bullets into
water.30 Fakir of Ipi known as “Haji Sahib”, also struggled against
the British (1930-1940) and the Pakistani forces (1949-1960) on a
frustrating chase around the north western region for the liberation
of Pakhtuns. In the contemporary era, Mullah Mohammad Omar,
Mirza Ali Khan and many other are fighting against the NATO
troops and US forces in FATA and Afghanistan because they
perceived that foreign forces are against the enforcement of Islamic
Shari’a in Afghanistan and should pull out as soon as possible.

The radical state policy of militancy in Pakistan initiated in

the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (1979)
and the US used FATA region as a “cat’s paw” and established
largest sanctuaries for Afghan rebels (mujahideen) and trained
thousands of volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union. The US
and Saudi Arabia also supported to establish religious madrassas in
the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, poured $7.2 billion
against the Soviets to stop the flood of communism, and among
them million dollars were funded and paid by Osama bin Laden. 31
Thus, ultimately socio-cultural structure of the society changed and
the conservative politico-religious leadership including local mullahs
known as “ulemas” has taken strict control over the common
population. So, the Afghan compared jihad and Taliban regime in
Afghanistan got free hand as compare to previous jihadi movements
in the region and relatively they have got a lasting impact on the
tribal structure and existing system. Although the jihad against
communism was not the only factor which severely influenced the
tribal culture but equally other factors such as chronic poverty,
illiteracy and unemployment also become cause to fuel in tribal
society. Another bankrupt western elites approach played an
important role to provoke tribal people i.e., misunderstanding about
tribal culture and values. So, socio-economic factors developed the

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

culture of violence and Taliban used these weaknesses as a trump

card against the west and today insurgency in FATA and
Afghanistan has grown steadily in intensity and lethality.32
Moreover, the western analyst has facile observation that FATA is
“ungovernned” territory and there is an absence of western state
structure of governance. Even in the presence of modern state
system the people of the region are living under the local codes and
domestic form of mechanism. Thus, the area is popular as a lawless
land of endless feuds and bloodshed where human poverty,
socioeconomic backwardness, maternal and infant-mortality
percentage are worst in the world.33 Furthermore, the political and
strategic developments in Afghanistan have grave impact on the
other parts of the world including Pakistan.

According to National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Al-Qaida

with uninterrupted funding from Saudi Arabia has not only rebuilt its
command and control structure in FATA but has also continued
involvement to recruit and train operatives to infiltrate the national
security of the United States and the free world. 34 The US security
establishment perceived that since the US invasion in Afghanistan
from October 200,1 thousands of Taliban militants and their senior
leaders have found safe sanctuary in FATA at the centre of the
border and also along the province of Baluchistan to the west and
Khyber Pakhtunkhaw to the east and south.35 During 2002,
unaccountable Afghan Taliban arrived in Pakistan and radicalized
the border area of Pakistan-Afghanistan and ultimately all seven
agencies of FATA came under the strict grip of “Talibanization” and
they consolidated their control in Waziristan. It was also reported
that different Taliban groups such as Mullah Nazir (Ahmadzai
Wazirs leader) and Mullah Omar (Uzbek religious leader) were
fighting in FATA for their control in the region because
approximately 90 to 95 percent of the 1,000 to 2,000 Uzbek
militants are living in the area.36 The New York Times has mentioned
that the Taliban militants have taken sanctuary in FATA with an
almost impregnable strength for command and control, fundraising,
recruiting, training and courage for launching military operations
against foreign forces.”37 Thus, the tribal areas (de facto zone) have
become the centre of extremist activities and the land is used for
murder, arson, and intimidation to avert the situation. In this regard,

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

the dangerous situation emerged during 2006, when the ideology of

Taliban expanded to the main urban areas of Pakistan and the
common people assumed that Taliban are uncheckable and have got
free-hand from the government to expand Talibanization to the other
parts of the country.38 In the same way, during the year of 2007, the
culture of Talibanization spread outward from the FATA across
northern parts of Pakistan which is normally Pakhtun dominated
areas and they have targeted video stores, girls’ schools/colleges,
police stations, and people from civil-society and have also
destroyed the public sector infrastructure because these were
perceived as immoral.39

However, the growing militancy and violence in the border

region of FATA is under the grip of extremists, Sunni militants from
central and southern Punjab and al-Qaeda is getting benefit from
these insurgents.40 The US administration perceive that FATA is the
heart of the crisis and it is critical to the strategic victory of the
NATO operation in Afghanistan and the political integrity of
Pakistan and the success of US in Afghanistan is prerequisite or
dependable on Pakistan. Ironically, the FATA’s current misery is the
product of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1979) and the tragic
incident of the 9/11 subsequently left the region in severe mauled
and in a disastrous position. So, in the contemporary time, the region
is one of the flashpoints in the world and is also one of the most war-
torn, frayed and dangerous areas. After serving as a chessboard for
superpower politics, the area remains a battlefield because of the
conflicting interests of different interests of regional and global
powers. Since the 19th century, the region of FATA is under the grip
of new “Great Game”41 because the imperial empire of the time has
made it more contentious area than ever and presently, the region
reflects chronic instability because of unleashed activities of
nonstate actors who penetrate state and society of the country.

Pak-Afghan Syndrome

The Durand line which was created between British India

and Afghanistan with consensus in 1893 by the British team led by
Sir Mortimer Durand and the Afghan rulers helped to define the

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

geographical features of the area rather than tribal identity. The

demarcation did not divide the homeland of the Pukhtun tribes as
exploited by some of the separatists or nationalist elements. This
was not an imaginary boundary and never looked upon with
contempt and resentment by majority of Pakhtuns or tribal elders of
the both sides (Afghanistan and Pakistan) of the line. Afghan
government since 1947 backed by New Delhi and Moscow called
“unenforced and unenforceable”42 border for their vested interests.
As a practical matter, the line has given identity to the Afghan state
or nation rather than places the position of dispute with the Persian,
Russian and British Indian empires. There are chances to deprive of
legitimacy if someone believes to be an arbitrary and capricious
boundary. During the colonial period, Kabul treated the Durand Line
or border areas with India as a kind of Afghan Appalachia (measures
of the region’s status), while the British empire on the other side
controled the tribal areas.43

Afghanistan was not always a unitary state within its present

boundaries like many other nation-states. The country is located over
the Iranian plateau but Tehran gave up its claims to Herat in the
1857 Treaty of Paris,44 under which the British empire agreed to
arbitrate all conflicts between Iran and Afghanistan. Its southern and
eastern borders are also demarcated with the consensus between
Afghan rulers and Russia (1885 and 1895), British India (1893), and
Persia (1905). The expert on Afghan history claimed that “the
borders of Afghanistan have been drawn according to the desire of
global order of the time and it certainly affects many other
nationstates including Afghanistan but has given opportunity to
strengthen the statehood.”45 The identity of the divided communities
did not suffer and most of the tribal people use better opportunities
as compare to united aspirations. However, the division of
communities was exploited after the partition of British India (1947)
by Afghan ruling elites and the “boundary line became a political
football”46 and a major source of tension between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.

Ironically, Afghanistan opposed Pakistan’s entry into the

United Nations in 1947 and Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly)
declared Durand Line invalid in 1949 without legal understanding

32 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

and logical acumen that the treaty obligation of British India with
respect to international law remained binding upon its successor
states. Thus, the issue of Durand Line and “Pakhtunistan was more
exploited by President Mohammad Daoud Khan (1973-1978) with
the backing of Moscow and New Delhi but failed to threaten the
solidarity of Pakistan.47 Moreover, Pakhtuns side, Pakistan refused to
cooperate with the “policy of suicidal” because they perceived that
fragmentation of the country will contribute to nothing but
destruction of the two states i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Furthermore, any other border policy position would be a political
suicide for Kabul because the country will suffer in its political and
diplomatic support from the west because they almost accepted it as
a valid international boundary in the world. 48 On the other hand,
Islamabad is prone to see the sinister hand of India behind all
Pakistani misfortunes and is convinced that it has funded and backed
some political groups as a countermeasure to Pakistan’s diplomatic
and moral support to some groups for the freedom of Kashmir. It is
also perceived that the Indians have no humanitarian objectives in
Afghanistan and they may boast about their putative pumping of
funds into Baluchistan.49 Both India and Pakistan are in competition
to take lead in Afghanistan and New Delhi has taken vigorous
attempts to limit Pakistan’s influence in the country and wants to
bleed Pakistan in FATA and Baluchistan with the design to relieve
pressure in Kashmir.50 So, it is well acknowledged that the Indians
have mucked around in FATA and Baluchistan with the diplomatic
support and backing of US to deal firmly with cross-border
militancy in Kashmir. However, Pakistan security establishment’s
paranoia has legitimate concerns about Afghanistan and has feared
that US might choose India over Pakistan to deal with the activities
of Taliban and Al-Qaida in the region.51

Washington-Kabul-New Delhi Axis and Pakistan’s Reservations

Afghanistan has a long and tumultuous history of outside

powers using its rugged terrain as a chessboard for the “Great
Game” which has been revisited in Afghanistan but this time US
backed New Delhi-Kabul are the most active players in the region.
In the contemporary time, US-led “War on Terror” has created a
challenging situation for Pakistan because external involvement in

Margalla Papers 2010 33

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

the domestic affairs of the country has created an alarming situation

particularly in the border areas of Pakistan. On the other side, the
United States post Cold War priorities have created difficult
situation for Pakistan and “the country is no longer a regional equal
of India” because US perceives India an emerging regional great
power and “Pakistan’s insistence on a bilateral calculus vis-à-vis
India makes no sense anymore and is a patent obstacle to
progress.”52

According to Ashley Tellis, Pakistan has to recognize that it

simply cannot match India through whatever strategies it chooses.
The sensible thing, then, is for Pakistan to reach the best possible
accommodation with India.53 Moreover, the US in the wake of
September 11 (2010) has marginalized Pakistan’s role in
Afghanistan and has conveniently legalized Indian presence in
Afghanistan. In the prevailing circumstances, India’s relief
organizations and private security contractors patronized by Indian
government would have a strong role in all economic and strategic
projects. India has invested around $1.2 billion in Afghanistan’s
developmental projects and works in collaboration with the
notorious Blackwater’s subsidiary United States Training Centre
(USTC).54 India has increased diplomatic presence and opened four
consulates (Herat, Jalalabad, Kandhar, and Mazar-e-Sharif) close to
Pakistan border regions and has a role in fomenting trouble in
Pakistan’s tribal areas. India’s intelligence network is fully
operational in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s security establishment
perceives that it has an agenda of subverting Pakistan’s stability to
provoke insurgency in FATA and Balochistan and somehow laying
its hands on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. 55 Michele Flournoy (US
Under Secretary of Defence) “appreciated India’s contributions for
Afghanistan”56 without even recalling Pakistan’s endless suffering in
the war on terror. The news has also appeared that the US official
has asserted for strong Indian military presence and has shown
willingness to provide modern weapons to India to be used in
maritime operations.57 The US has accepted the special role of India
in the strife-torn country as Richard Holbrooke (Special Envoy for
Afghanistan) has clearly stated that the “US support for India is
undiminished which has a central role in Afghanistan. The US
believes that India can play a very positive role in the search of

34 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

stability in the region.”58 He further argued that “Afghanistan is not a

zero sum game between New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan is not
going to take over Afghanistan, nor is the Taliban.”59

Apart from the changing nature of US decision makers and

law-makers, the political observers recognized Islamabad’s worries
about India’s growing activities in Afghanistan which can jeopardize
Pakistan’s legitimate vital interests. Shah Mahmood Qureshi
(Pakistan’s Foreign Minister) when publicly questioned during a
visit to the United States said that India “have to justify its interest”
in Kabul. He argued that India’s “level of engagement [in Kabul] has
to be commensurate with [the fact that] they do not share a border
with Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan has the longest border...If there
is no massive reconstruction [in Afghanistan], if there are not long
queues in Delhi waiting for visa to travel to Kabul, why do you have
such a large [Indian] presence in
Afghanistan? At times, it concerns to Pakistan.”60 In the same way,
General Stanley McChrystal (former US commander in
Afghanistan), also mentioned in his report to US President Barack
Obama that India is “exacerbating regional tensions” via its activities
in Afghanistan. He anticipated that Pakistan would take “counter-
measures.”61 The western media has also emphasized that the US
must care about Pakistan’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan
because there will be no solution of Afghanistan if the West will not
address the concerns, then no option will be left for the paranoia of
Pakistan military and the intelligence services to continue to be fed
for the protection of country’s interest.62 According to Christine Fair,
there is a need not to dismiss the importance of Pakistani perceptions
with regards to Afghanistan just because of exaggeration of
Pakistani elite but there is a truth of real nature of the threat which
Pakistan is facing from both India and Afghanistan.63 During the
Cold War, Islamabad sought to bring Afghanistan into their sphere
of influence to extend Pakistan’s “strategic depth” and to protect her
security interest vis-à-vis India. It also became evident that anarchy
in Afghanistan was antithetical to a policy of strategic depth as well
as potentially destabilizing to Pakistan. According to M. K.
Bhadrakumar, “India is playing its decisive role in crushing the
Taliban insurgency, without military deployment in Afghanistan,
which is extremely concerning for Pakistani military

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

establishment.”64 No wonder, Indian presence in Afghanistan is

perceived in Islamabad as a great anxiety because India is co-opting
the Northern Alliance “warlords” to fight against Taliban and
Pakistan is sensitive to its concerns and is supporting southern
Pakhtuns to counter Indian presence in Afghanistan. In this regard,
Pakistan expects the US administration to be serious to its concerns
vis-a-vis India but Washington does not want to annoy New Delhi
and regard India as a friendly power in Afghanistan.65
Nevertheless, in the prevailing situation, there are dim chances of
Kabul-Islamabad equilibrium and in the same way, Islamabad-New
Delhi accommodation is a sine-qua-non for controlling transnational
terrorism which, without the solution of Kashmir dispute and peace
of the region, will be jeopardized and the region will never find real
peace as the people have desired.

Myth of Strategic Depth about Kabul:

In the literature of security studies the term “strategic depth”

is basically considered “non-military strategy” and is associated with
small and weak states which are situated around the hostile
environment and have narrow geographical shape to counter the
adversaries, attack. The term is normally used by security
establishment of the concerned countries to achieve the military
objectives through diplomatic means and this is one of the political
purposes of the war. So, its objectives are for buying time for strong
defence against rival and over a period of time, attacker should not
disturb or halt the country’s industrial and logistic lines.

Historically, Pakistan’s security has come under grave threat

because the country is flanked by India in the east and Afghanistan
in the west and ultimately the legacy of imperial policy makes its
relations with her neighbours far from friendly. In fact, it was the
fault of security planners who harshly formulated the defence policy
to protect north western border on the foot-steps of the British and
that policy strategically has proven vulnerable. British Indian empire
was acting as the guardian of the Khyber Pass against Russian
expansion through the buffer zone of Afghanistan but after the
emergence of Pakistan, the country’s elites seemed to be locked in a

36 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

perennial conflict with Kabul and the result was nothing more than
the loses. In reality, Pakistan’s security elites ignored the ground
realities that the country was no more under the colonial structure
and “its strategic importance towards Southwest Asia was
commanding”66 and cordial relations with Afghanistan were the need
of the hour. According to C. L. Sulzberger, the “geographically
absurdity” has given immense strategic and geopolitical value to
Pakistan and it is a potential asset for the defence of free world. 67
Thus, in the changing scenario the security establishment of the
country paid no attention to the new geopolitical realities and
imprecisely developed inappropriate defence policy for Pakistan
which served the purposes of great powers rather than the country.
On the other hand, the friction intensified between Afghanistan and
Pakistan after the partition of British India and later Cold War
politics, military alliances, propaganda wars and complex political,
economic and ideological factors created more distinct differences
between the two countries and prevented them from reaching a
mutual understanding. During the Cold War era, Afghanistan came
under the severe influence of former Soviet Union. India and
consequently, New Delhi-Moscow nexus became one of the main
irritants in establishing cordial relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. As a result of Afghan-Pakistan antagonisms
(19471990), the Kabul government clearly sided with New Delhi
and Moscow and their close political and military associations were
concerned for Islamabad. At that time, Pakistan faced two front
threats to its territorial security and became a sandwich between
hostile India and unfriendly Afghanistan and this critical security
situation was never faced by any country of the world. In fact, India
found Afghanistan as a strategic asset against Pakistan and perceived
that in future war with Pakistan, Kabul would be able to open the
second front against Pakistan and the country would not be able to
use tribesmen against India. In that situation, New Delhi
successfully used anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan, most
notably in the Dari (Persian) speaking belt (western and northern
provinces of Afghanistan) to destabilize Pakistan. In this context,
Dari speaking Afghan community and their elites have deep shared
close socio-cultural relations with Iran and Central Asia and have
cordial ties with India who has ethno-religious differences with the

Margalla Papers 2010 37

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

majority of Sunni Pakhtuns who are dominant in Afghanistan’s

eastern and southern provinces and are closer to Pakistan.

Thus, the country’s security establishment is determined to

protect borders through the British colonial strategy and less
engaged with Afghanistan in a defensive capacity in order to resolve
disputes. So, the defence planners followed the British concept of
“strategic depth” which they prepared to contain Russian
advancement to India and Islamabad elites adopted to counter India
in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan’s policy makers
perceived that geographically the country is relatively small between
east to west distance, especially in the middle and the British
strategic policy will be productive to secure the country. According
to Michael Scheuer (former chief of CIA), policy makers of Pakistan
believe that India’s expensive, extensive and growing Afghan
presence is a direct and even existential strategic threat to Pakistan
and after the incident of 9/11 (2001), this area of limitless strategic
depth has been transformed into a second military frontier with
India.68 Moreover, the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan is
making the Pakistan army more worried because its policy of
“strategic depth” is becoming shallower by each passing day. 69
Moreover, Pakistan’s anxiety has been recognized by Washington
when General David Petraeus, (Commander of Central Command in
Afghanistan), in an interview expressed his understanding of
“strategic depth” and mentioned that “Pakistan’s strategic depth in
Afghanistan is legitimate because the country is very narrow”. 70 The
defence experts and strategists also agreed that “for Pakistan
“strategic depth” in Afghanistan is a dead-end street.” 71 The
sensitivity of the issue can also be realized when General Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani (Chief of the Army Staff) acknowledged to the
Western quarters that “Pakistan wants strategic depth in Afghanistan
but does not wish to control it” 72 and this distress reflects
Islamabad’s rising concerns over Indian influence in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, India is pursuing long-term policy of

“strategic encirclement” of Pakistan but in response to that
Islamabad does not have effective counter diplomatic and security
policy for its western border. By all means, Pakistan wants its
influence in Afghanistan which seems to be strategic liability

38 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

because no other options are available to protect the vital interests of

the country and the existing policy will remain an asset. However,
the real motives behind Pakistan’s commitment to Afghanistan are
moral and ethical because majority of Southern Pakhtuns of
Afghanistan share virtually all of the same values as the Pakistani
side of Pakhtuns and Islamabad steadily strengthened the scale of its
commitment through moral and diplomatic support to preserve the
Pakhtuns superiority over others minorities. In addition, Pakistan
cannot afford the destabilization of Pakhtun majority in Afghanistan
which is actually working as security shield for Islamabad and is
considered extended human deterrence against other regional actors.
Moreover, Pakistan’s policy makers must realize that the security of
the country is much more important as compare to pursuing the old
fashion policy which has entirely failed to achieve results. It will be
in the interest of the country that security elites must review their
policy towards Afghanistan and only pursue the level actually
required and limit the political and strategic actions which should
not increase high-risk for the security of Pakistan.

FATA as a Strategic Depth of Pakistan

FATA is an inseparable part of Pakistan and is a legitimate

area of the country’s territories. The region is neither a “no-fly zone
nor a no man land” and belongs to Pakistan since the partition of
British India. But the region begins to appear as a sandwich when
the great power politics begins in Afghanistan, and then after the
incident of 9/11 the situation was further complicated and the region
has become a bone of contention in the world. It is for the first time
in NATO’s history (1949-1990) that its forces are used out of
Atlantic periphery (Afghanistan) and the US justifies the military
involvement in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The war on terror has converted FATA into a never ended

war area as part of the worldwide anti-terrorism struggle and
Islamabad seems to be more active to contain India’s growing
activities in Afghanistan and is helpless in safeguarding the
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is a pity that neither
Washington nor most American political observers have really tried

Margalla Papers 2010 39

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

to fathom the depth of Pakistani feelings about drones attacks and

violation of its territorial integrity. In fact, protecting each and every
part of Pakistan’s land and securing borders has been the major
preoccupation of the country’s foreign policy but Islamabad’s
economic dependence and military vulnerability often compels to
compromise on its national objectives. It is significant in this regard
that the security of the entire country significantly depends on the
protection of FATA which is the gateway of country’s territorial
integrity and governance. It is also clear that stability of Pakistan
depends on peace in the tribal areas and continued disturbance will
corrupt the rest of country. All this has happened because of the
inappropriate policies of the security vanguard and never assessed
ground realities. In reality, the strategic policy of Pakistan is an
extension of the centuries old fortress mentality or fighting from
fixed positions, which resulted in unprecedented outcomes in the
Western borders. Thus, the defence policy with regards to
Afghanistan had neither been consistent nor part of any
comprehensive strategic plan. The planners did not refresh the
colonial policies to secure the country and rarely used diplomatic
and economic means to settle the matters. As a result the country
suffered more as compare to gains. In this regard, the country’s
history has witnessed that “offensive-defence policy” erroneously
has not given any advantage to the country rather enemies have
taken more benefits from the weak corridors of the policy.

It is an undeniable truth that the tribal Pakhtuns have always

supported Pakistan and have played an important role in the
protection of Pakistan and have proved to be the backbone or iron
shield to its security. During 1948 when Pakistan army was unable
to send their troops to Kashmir because General Douglas Gracey
(Army Chief of Pakistan) refused to send troops to the Kashmir front
and also rejected to obey the order of Muhammad Ali Jinnah
(Quaid-i-Azam), as a Governor General and justified his position by
arguing that the Indian forces had occupying Kashmir represented
the British Crown and he could not order the military to encounter
with the Indian forces.73 This situation ultimately helped India and
Pakistan faced grave trouble because Indian forces had taken control
of approximately two thirds of Kashmir area. At that critical time,
the tribal “volunteers” (around 5000) came forward at the call of Pir

40 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

of Wana, South Waziristan Pir Ghulam Dastigir and Malik Akhya

Jan and waged jihad under the organized Lashkar (Afridi, Mahsud
and Waziri tribes) and launched operation against the Indian forces
and despite all the drawbacks the Lashkars brushed aside the Dogra
forces and captured thousand miles area which in the present day is
called Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir.74 Furthermore, during
the Indo-Pakistan wars (1965, 1971 and 1999), the tribal people
backed Pakistan rather than India and Afghanistan. In the same way,
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), FATA attained a
paramount geo-strategic importance and the United States declared
Pakistan a “frontline state” against Soviet aggression and the
USused tribal areas as a training camp and a channel to provide
military assistance to the Afghan mujahideen to prevent the flood of
communism.75 At that time, US promoted the culture of
Talibanisation in the tribal areas to teach a lesson to the Soviet
Union and ultimately, the decade-long war brought a culture of guns
and drugs and the economy of the tribal areas, which was already
underdeveloped, suffered enormously.

In the current, there is a need that the country’s planners must

review the security policy which basically did not help to protect
every square inch of the country’s territory. According to Edward
Luttwak, “effective defence policy will be free from external
pressure and should be based on country’s security priorities.” 76 John
Garnett also describes that “war is not only a military activity
conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire
nations.”77 In this regard, the passions of people are necessary to
endure the sacrifices inherent in war because people supply the
blood and treasure required to prosecute war and without that no war
can be won. Machiavelli once wrote to the prince that “if it is
necessary to resort to certain brutalities, that must be carried out in
the most energetic fashion and in the briefest possible time because
the masses will not tolerate the prolonged application of brutality.” 78
As the war of terror begins its tenth year (2001-2010) and FATA is
severely under the fires of US and NATO attacks, it is perceived that
the war in FATA is worth fighting for only if it can be justified in
terms of national interests. The present security establishment has
failed to articulate any such justification and “the use of force on a
large scale over a protracted period of time did not reduce the level

Margalla Papers 2010 41

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

of threat.” 79 If anything, the past decade shows the continued

attacks on FATA areas by the international forces, in fact, serves to
exacerbate antagonism towards the West. On the other hand, by
waging war against terrorism means playing into the hands of
enemies. Expending scarce resources at a prodigious rate and
sacrificing irreparable human and material sources gradually
weakens the country’s position.

Moreover, the contemporary war on terror has been imposed

on the tribal people and the FATA becomes a “buffer” between
Pakistan and Afghanistan and the debate is closely related to the
controversy over whether the problem is primarily political and
economic or military. In fact, the US adopted the incorrect strategy
to precede the matter and assumed that the problem in FATA can
only be resolved through military means. In reality, the United States
military efforts basically provoke local people and create serious
affects on the tribal region. Thus, the war in FATA is between an
insurrection by indigenous trained man-power, and an invasion by
the regular army such as NATO and the US forces. It is a war of
snipers and ambushes, booby traps and pitched battles. The location
of the fighting ranged from FATA to Afghanistan inhabited “gun
basket” in the remote mountain areas. Thus, it is in the greatest
interest of the US that they should not prolong war in FATA regions
and as soon as they leave the area, they will be safe from their
human cost and material losses.

Disengagement is the best solution:

Given the historical and conventional facts about the FATA,

the best strategy for Pakistan to manage the ongoing war on terror is
the disengagement because the war has created unbearable anarchy,
provoked fiercer and more widespread resistance and disengagement
will strengthen peace and stability. The crisis is not simple and
required to be handled with careful and skillful planning because the
country’s economic and military dependence is miserable and on the
other hand, India and Afghanistan are playing un-healthy role to
destabilize Pakistan. In the present scenario, experts have an opinion
that complete withdrawal of forces from the war torn areas will be

42 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

suicidal because this attempt can create more harassment and

insecurity for people.80 It would primarily require an intense political
and diplomatic effort to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations
with all the concerned quarters or stake-holders for stable peace in
the area. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how
the security establishment of Pakistan will cash the country’s
geopolitical situation and this would give Islamabad a great deal of
leverage that could be used to advance Pakistan’s national interest.

Pakistan cannot afford anarchy in the country in order to

provide unprecedented facilities to the United States and NATO
forces at the cost of country’s vital interests. The elites of the
country must chalk-out the strategy to manage the US pressure
because the strategy of disengagement certainly requires bold,
risktaking statecraft of a high order, and much political competence
in its execution. It would be soundly based on the most fundamental
of realities that the war has expanded violence and it has also
reduced the popularity of the civil government. The plain fact is that
Pakistan cannot afford the US partnership which is undoubtedly
dangerous and the stability of the country has already been
threatened and each passing day experiences new cycles of
resistance, repression and violence. According to Luttwak, a retreat
is notoriously the most difficult of military operations to pull off
successfully. It will be worst without well-calculated retreat because
it will not only extricate a force from a difficult situation but also
can turn the tide of battle by luring the enemy beyond the limits of
its strength until it is over-stretched, unbalanced and ripe for defeat.81
So, Pakistan is badly engaged in the war and is paying irreversible
cost and could be the cause of exhaust, political instability and only
distance from war can protect the country’s security and it will also
reduce the level of hatred and regional nationalism.

Conclusion

The horrific incident of September 11 (2001), radically

changed the pattern of international politics and as a consequence,
the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) has also changed
the dynamics of global politics and almost overnight, the remote and

Margalla Papers 2010 43

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

fiercely independent tribal societies have fallen into the world’s

spotlight because the US perceived that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
are using tribal region as a safe-haven for training fighters to launch
attacks against American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. So, the
United States, which as an invincible and immortal state felt
ominous fear and perceived that its national security has become
under severe threat and has described FATA one of the dangerous
zones in the world.

The US administration has introduced a new war strategy

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan bordering region to handle Taliban
militants and has stepped up its unmanned aerial (Drones) bombing
campaign in the tribal areas of Pakistan to thwart Taliban insurgents.
The US special operations commanders have also been updating
plans for cross-border raids and have prepared to launch ground
operations in FATA, in case if Islamabad hesitates to dismantle
militant network. In fact, the US administration desires that Pakistan
should confront Taliban, not with rhetoric and empty promises but
with action and not by vacillating, half-hearted measures but through
strong and consistent Pakistani military action wherever required
and at whatever cost. The US media has propagated that Pakhtuns
never negotiate from a position of strength, as such negotiations and
“peace deals” are simply seen as a sign of weakness by the militants.

However, it has been observed by majority of Pakistanis that

war has not only threatened the country’s stability but also its
territorial integrity. There is no doubt that the people detest the
extremists, do not want the name of their country and its illustrious
founder associated with terrorists and suicide bombers and need
more assertive military action if it is done with cautious regard for
innocent people because they are not in favor of militant’s brutality
as they feel that war has damaged the state and society. It has also
been observed that war is not profitable for the country and the cost
is irreparable.

In the realm of action, however, it has been perceived by the

majority of Pakistani people that there is no end to war and as long
as it continues, it will create more fear rather than opportunities. The

44 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

common people have opined that FATA is the integral part of

Pakistan and it is the natural border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The strategists and experts argue that US strategy will
be the worst for the country and it will back-fire to our natural
strength (FATA), which is the real “strategic depth” of Pakistan.

The country’s elites must remember that the fate of Pakistan

will be decided on the chess-board of FATA and not in Kabul. Thus,
there is a sound reason of disengagement from the war on terror as
Machiavelli clearly advised to prince that never to be involved in the
great power politics because the weaker always be the looser. More
and more, the war has marginalized the influence of Islamabad visà-
vis India and it seems to be that New Delhi and Washington are
benefiting more as compared to Pakistan. It is also important to
remember that anarchical Pakistan would be dangerous for the
longterm state’s interests and only peace and stability can
encourage/open up the possibilities for significant improvement.

Nevertheless, in the light of past experiences, engagement is

associated with heavy cost and disengagement will strengthen the
country’s position and it will also enhance the credibility of
leadership and forces. According to Luttwak, “in engagement, the
chances of survival will be much higher and it will evoke continuing
hostility both for local and foreign troops and end will be remote
desert rather ensure bright future.”82 So, there is no doubt that the
strategy of disengagement would require much skill than the
indefinite military operation. An anarchical Pakistan is a far greater
danger and it will be better to move towards the logical end with the
choice to avoid dangerous losses because development and
prosperity will be the good option. The country elites must
remember that the policies of the stronger ally will most likely
prevail at expense of the weaker ally’s vital interests.

Author

Dr. A. Z. Hilali is a Professor of International Relations in

the Department of Political Science at the University of Peshawar.

Margalla Papers 2010 45

FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

Peshawar- Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. Dr. Hilali can be approached to

[email protected]
Notes

1
David C. Gompert has been Senior Advisor for National Security and
Defense in the CPA-Iraq, Vice President for RAND’s National Security
Research Division, a senior official at the US National Security Council
and State Department, and a corporate executive in the information
industry.
2
Molly Kinder, “Effective Aid in the Most Dangerous Place in the World
for Americas,” (Washington: Centre for Global Development, 2010), p. 1.
3
Lisa Curtis, “Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan,” (Washington:
The Heritage Foundation, 2006), pp. 2-10.
4
Kevin Zeese, “The Longest Afghan War,” Daily Times (October 10,
2010); see more details in Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The
Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan (
5
Arnold J. Toynbee, Between Oxus and Jumna (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), p. 47.
6
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 52.
7
Lutfur Rehman, “Durand Line: A Pakistani Perspective,” Perviaz Iqbal
Cheema (ed.), Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Research Islamabad (IPRI), 2008), pp.
132141. 8 Ibid., p. 132.
9
Akbar S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas
197276 ( Karachi: Oxford University Press), 1977, p. 1.
10
Dr. Noor-ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri,
“Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” IPRI - PAPER 10
( March 2005), pp. 5-23.
11
, Daniel S. Markey, Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (Washington:
Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), p. 5.
12 nd
Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (2 ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980), p. 415.
13

46 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 52.
14
See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central
Asia ( New York: Kodansha America, 1992), pp. 16-43.
15
See A. Z. Hilali, “The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the
Marxist Coup,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005,
pp. 674-682; and see also David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

of the Afghan Jihad (Berkely: University of California Press, 2002), pp.

18-43.
16
Syed.Iftikhar Hussain, Some Major Pakhtoon Tribes Along The
PakAfghan Border (Islamabad: Area Study Centre, University of
Peshawar, 2000) , p. 163.
17
Major R.T.I. Ridgway, Pathans (Calcutta: Superintendent Government
Printing, 1910), p.1.
18
J. Spain, The Way of the Pathan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1962), pp. 13-46; Olaf Caroe, The Pathan 550 B.C-AD1957 (London:
Macmillan 1958)and see also Khalid B. Sayeed, “Pathan Regionalism,”
The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 478-506.
19
Shahid Javed Burki, “How to Develop the Afghan-Pak tribal Belts?,”
Unpublished paper, p. 8.
20
See Daily Times (April 18, 2008); and also see Dawn (August 13, 2009).
21
Syed Bahadur Shah Zafar Kakakhel, Pukhtana, translation from
Pashto by Syed Anwarul Haq Jeelani (Peshawar: University Book
Agency, 1964), pp. 13-76; and see Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550
B.C.A.D. 1957 ( London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1958 ).
22
Richard Tapper, “Ethnic Identities and Social Categories in Iran and
Afghanistan,” in Elizabet Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcom
Chapman (ed.)., History and Ethnicity (London: Rutledge, 1989), pp.
232246.
23 A. Z. Hilali, “The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist
Coup,” p. 681.
24
Shuja Nawaz, FATA- A Most Dangerous Place (Washington, DC:
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 27.
25
Ibid. 26
Shuja Nawaz, FATA- A Most Dangerous Place, p. 15.
27
Dawn (March 9, 2009); and see New York Times (September 6, 2009).
28
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Buirst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 71.
29
Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Tribal Elders Call for Raising FATA Force,” The
News ( Rawalpindi), September 14, 2006.

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Dr A. Z. Hilali

30
David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan
Frontier (Berkeley: Berkeley University of California Press, 1996), pp.
169-170.
31 See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,
2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), and see also Thomas H. Johnson,
“Financing Afghan Terrorism: Thugs, Drugs and Creative Movements of
Money,” in Jeanne Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (ed.,), Terrorism
Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 93-114.
32 William S. McCallister, “Strategic Design Considerations for
Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Small Wars Journal (January
2008), p. 14-23.
33
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Buirst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 55.
34
See Tom A. Peter, “National Intelligence Estimate: Al-Qaeda and a
Threat to US Home land,” Christian Science Monitor (July 19, 2007).
35
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Buirst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” p. 42.
36
Thomas H. Johnson, “No Sign Until the Buirst of Fire: Understanding
the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, p. 57.
37
The New York Times (July 7, 2010).
38
See Dawn (September 28, 2008), and also
see
Abbas
Memkari,”Extremism and All Types of ups and Down”, Daily Urdu Jang
(April 1, 2007).
39
The Frontier Post (August 3, 2009); and see also The News (February 5,
2009).
40
Shuja Nawaz and Arnaud de Borchgrave, FATA-A Most Dangerous
Place (Washington, NW: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
2006) , p. –
41
The term “The Great Game” is usually attributed to Arthur Conolly
(1807–1842), an officer of the Secret Service of British East India
Company’s Sixth Bengal Light Cavalry. But the word was introduced into
mainstream consciousness by British novelist Rudyard Kipling in his novel

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

Kim (1901). The author first published his ideas serially in McClure’s
Magazine (1900-1901) as well as in Cassell's Magazine (1901) and book
published by Macmillan & Co. Ltd ( London) in October 1901.
42 Ibid.
43
Ibid., p. 68; and see also Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan
(Karachi: Pakistan Council of World Affairs, 1968),
44
Heart was the city of Iran and birthplace of Shah Abbas of Safavi
dynasty. Iran claimed Heart from Afghan rulers under Qajar dynasty in
1838 and 1852 and reclaimed on October, 25, 1956. However, under the
French mediation Iran signed a peace treaty in Paris (March 4, 1857)
waiving Iran's rights to Herat.
45
Barnett R. Rubin, “Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of
Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp.
3038.
46
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” pp. 43-48.
47
Hafeez Malik, Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), pp. 43-87.
48
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Buirst of
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” p. 69.
49
Sumit Ganguly, “What’s The Problem With Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. III, No. 2 (March 2009), pp. 9-24.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. 52
Shaun Gregory, “What’s The Problem With Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs,
(March 2009), pp. 9-24.
53
Ashley Tellis, “What’s The Problem With Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs,
( March 2009), pp. 9-24.
54
The Nation (8 July 2010), and also see Los Angeles Times ( July 6, 2010).
55
M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan warns India to ‘back off’,” Asia Times
( October 10, 2009).
56
See The Times of India (July 7, 2010), and also see The Nation (July 8,
2010).

50 Margalla Papers 2010

Dr A. Z. Hilali

57 Ibid.
58
See The Hindu (July 23, 2010).
59 Ibid.
60
See Los Angeles Times (6 March 2009).
61
See M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan warns India to ‘back off’,” (October
10, 2009). 62
David Miliband, “How to end the war in Afghanistan”, Daily Telegraph
(June 25, 2010).
63
Christine Fair, “What’s The Problem With Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs,
(March 2009), pp. 9-24.
64
See M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan warns India to back off',” Asia Times
( October 10, 2009).
65 Ibid.
66
Lord Bordwood, Reflections on Pakistan in International Relations,”
Pakistan Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1955), p. 6.
67
See C. L. Sulzberger, “Pakistan: A Geographical Absurdity,” The New
York Times (February 5, 1955).
68
Ibid. See Michael Scheuer, “Will India, Pakistan come to blows over
Afghanistan?,” The Diplomat ( August 31, 2010).
69
Ibid. See also Michael Scheuer, “Will India, Pakistan come to blows
over Afghanistan?,”.
70
The Nation ( March 7, 2010).
71
Dawn ( March 14, 2010).
72
Dawn (February 2, 2010.
73
Ishtiaq Ahmad, “Did Jinnah Know about the Kashmir War,” Daily
Times (March 24, 2010).
74
Maj Gen Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi: Pak Publishers Ltd,
1970), pp. 23-56.
75
See A. Z. Hilali, “The Cost and Benefits of the Afghan War for
Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. II, No. 3 (2003) , Pp. 329-310.
76
Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard:
Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 18-89.
77

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FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan

John Garnett, Problems of Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1970),

pp. 15-55.
78
Machiavelli, The Art of War ( London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 7-18.
79
Andrew J. Bacevich, “Is Afghan War Still Worth Fighting?,” CS
Monitor, October 18, 2010.
80 th
Shah Mehmood Qureshi (Foreign Minister of Pakistan) Speech at 45
Munich Security Conference 2009, See Dawn (February 10, 2009).
81
Edward N. Luttwak, “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement,” Foreign
Affairs (January/February 2005), p. 31.
82
Edward N. Luttwak, “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement,” Foreign
Affairs ( January/February 2005), p. 36.

52 Margalla Papers 2010