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COMPILATION IN COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM

2011

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COMPARATIVE POLICE SYSTEM
_______________________________________
The study of comparative police system, criminal justice and law is a fairly new
field and has correspond with rising interest in a more established field, comparative
criminology. However, in this chapter, we will present some issues which will bring you
to discover ideas useful in the conceptualization of successful crime controls.

Rationale

With Globalization goes transnational crimes like terrorism, drug trafficking,

money laundering and human smuggling. Transnational crimes cross across
borders and the need for bilateral and international cooperation becomes
imperative. It is also essential to study trends in policing because the speed by which
changes affect the lives of people disturbs traditional values and social arrangements
which used to unite people in pursuing common goals in the past. This state of anomie
(as Merton termed it) or “normlessness” brings about a new breed of crimes which the
police normally is not prepared to face. As we compare our own police system with other
models we would be able to gain insights into how to deal with transnational or
borderless crimes. Besides, best practices maybe adopted from other police models in
order to make policing in this country more current and effective.

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Course outline:
_____________________________________________
Part I. Effects of Globalization
-The Changing   Role and Nature of the Police
-The Effects of Globalization
Part II. Transnational Crime
         -Terrorism
         -Drug Trafficking
         -Money Laundering
         -Human Trafficking
         -Cyber Crimes
         -Others
Part III. Selected Police Models
         -Japan Police System
         -Singapore Police System
         -Police System of Other ASEAN Countries
         -Australian Federal Police
         -US and other European Models
         -Programs of Select Police Models
         -Application to the Philippine Setting
Part IV. Role of INTERPOL
         -Organizational Setup
         -Functions and Programs
         -Role in Anti-Transnational Crime
         -Criminal Intelligence Analysis
Part V. Bilateral and International Cooperation of Transnational Crime
         -UN Convention against Transnational Crime
         -Role of ASEANAPOL
         -PNP Agreements with ASEAN Police Organizations
Part VI. Participation of PNP Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Missions
         -Selection and Qualifications
         -Terms of Deployment

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Course Goal:

To identify contemporary transnational crime problems and their origins, as well as

international criminal justice responses.

Course Objectives:

At the end of this course the student will be able to:

1. Analyze the process that leads to the identification of certain social problems as
transnational crime issues.
2. Understand the types of information available regarding transnational crimes and how
to critically evaluate these sources.
3. Develop an awareness of the difficulties involved in both defining what constitutes
transnational crime and designing global strategies to combat it.
4. Discuss the role of policy in developing strategies to combat transnational crime.
5. Analyzed different law enforcement practices and be able to identify its usefulness in
our own setting.
6. Compare different selected police models in the world, their similarities and differences;
7. See the need for Bilateral and international cooperation in addressing transnational
crimes like terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc;
8. Understanding that globalization brings about changes which disturb traditional values
and social arrangements;
9. Adopt best practices from different police models of the world.

THE HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE METHOD

    The study of comparative justice and law is a fairly new field less than fifty years
old, and it has corresponded with rising interest in a more established field, comparative
criminology, which can be traced back to Durkheim's famous 1895 statement that
"comparative sociology is ... sociology itself."  Whether the purpose is to discover more
successful crime control policies or to test hypotheses in diverse cultures, the goal of
comparative justice and comparative criminology is to remedy American ethnocentrism
(the view that American ideas apply naturally to other parts of the world). 

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Comparative research is usually carried out by the so-called "safari" method (a

researcher visits another country) or "collaborative" method (the researcher
communicates with a foreign researcher).  Published works tend to fall into one of three
categories: single-culture studies (the crime problem of a single foreign country is
discussed), two-culture studies (the most common type), and comprehensive studies
(which cover three or more countries).  Examinations of crime and its control in the
comparative context often require an historical perspective since the phenomena under
study have frequently developed under unique social, economic, and political structures. 
Hence, the method most often employed by researchers is the historical-comparative
method. To summarize the historical-comparative method in a few words, it is basically
an alternative to both quantitative and qualitative research methods that is sometimes
called historiography or holism. 

In historiography, there are at least eight (8) ways to do history:

 The Great Man approach,

 The historical forces approach,

 The crisis of civilization approach,

 The dialectic approach,

 The evolutionary approach,

 The geographic factors approach,

 The conflict or "who won" approach, and

 The serendipity or accidental discovery approach. 

In holism (which is a term that describes when a whole gives meaning to parts), there is
an emphasis upon inductive inference from description, which is similar to Max Weber's
notion of "ideal types" that are general to many cases.  The idea of "wholes as
configurations of parts" is also part of the idea behind Boolean algebra, which is a
comparative method advocated by Ragin (1987).  Max Weber's main method was case-
based and covered only a handful of cultures at a time.   

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Durkheim's method was variable-based and would consider hundreds of cultures at a

time.  It should be noted that Durkheim's method is the one that caught on in historical-
comparative sociology and sociology in general.  One might say it is this Durkheimian
bias toward large sample sizes which has made sociology and criminology so
quantitative.  In conclusion, patterns, trends, and syndromes are mostly synonymous
words used in comparative criminal justice with essentially the same meaning as ideal-
types.  One should not be afraid of using their intuition and announcing their "discovery"
of a pattern, trend, or syndrome.

INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

"When a classification does not exhaust, a haphazard classification is preferable"
(Kierkegaard)

There are four kinds of societies in the world:

(1) folk-communal, which are also called primitive societies;

(2) urban-commercial, which rely on trade as the essence of their market system;
(3) urban-industrial, which produce most of the goods and services they need without
government interference; and
(4) bureaucratic, or modern post-industrial societies where the emphasis is upon
technique or the "technologizing" of everything, with the government taking the lead. 

Some people also talk about a fifth type, the post-modern society, where the emphasis is
upon the meaning of words, coded narratives, and the deconstruction of institutions. 
Developing countries tend to be lumped into the first two types (1 & 2) where the study
of culture becomes more important than the study of structure.  Developed countries tend
to be lumped into the last two types (3 & 4) where the study of structure becomes more
important.  The study of culture involves the study of customs and folkways of the
people, culture referring to things which come and go, which are mainly produced by
people each generation. 

The study of social structure involves the study of enduring institutions, like economic
and political systems, which remain in place generation after generation.  It should also
be noted that some comparativists are "splitters" instead of "lumpers" which means that
instead of lumping closely similar societies together, they may make some fine
comparisons, thereby splitting types into subtypes.  The lumping-splitting problem is a
problem in any social science, and unfortunately, there is no good way to resolve it. 
Most people are lumpers, and the four types of societies presented here are examples of
lumping similar things together (knowing full well that finer subtypes exist).

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 folk-communal -- little codification of law, little specialization among police, and

a system of punishment that just lets things go for awhile without attention until
things become too much, and then harsh, barbaric punishment is resorted to.
Classic examples include the early Roman gentiles, African and Middle Eastern
tribes, and Puritan settlements in North America (with the Salem "witch trials").
 urban-commercial -- presence of civil law (some standards and customs are
written down), specialized police forces (some for religious offenses, others for
enforcing the King's law), and punishment is inconsistent, sometimes harsh,
sometimes lenient, but mostly harsh. Most of Continental Europe developed along
this path.
 urban-industrial -- presence of codified law (statutes that proscribe as well as
prescribe) with an attempt to create more law in a direction that prescribes good
behavior; police become specialized in how to handle property crimes, and the
system of punishment attempts to run on market principles of creating incentives
and disincentives. England and the U.S. followed this positive legal path.
 bureaucratic -- a coherent system of laws (along with armies of lawyers), police
who tend to keep busy handling rare events, terrorism, and newly emerging forms
of crime; a system of punishment often characterized by moral panics, over-
criminalization and overcrowding. The U.S. and perhaps only eight other nations
fit the bureaucratic pattern. Juvenile delinquency is a phenomenon that usually
only occurs in a bureaucratic society because of the way such societies extend the
adolescent age period. 

    Many comparativists romanticize the folk-communal society for its low crime rates as
well as the way most quarrels and conflicts are settled privately.  However, folk societies
are also known for "lumping it" which is a process of letting things go on too long until
it's too much to tolerate anymore.  Basically, the more primitive the society, the more
likely it is to let things build up until it reaches a "boiling point" or the "straw that broke
the camel's back."  By contrast, the more modern a society is, the more likely it is to over-
react to the slightest, little thing.  Folk societies work very hard to avoid the over
criminalization common to modern bureaucratic societies. 

Theorists have worked hard to attempt understanding exactly when and where societies
became so crime-fixated.  In this regard, the most frequently pointed-to variable in
comparative criminal justice is urbanization, or the process of internal migration from the
countryside to the cities.  It is suspected that urbanization dissolves family ties, creates
cultures of poverty, and produces a stabilized criminal underworld consisting of well-
defined criminal career pathways. 

Also of importance are the variables of colonization and underdevelopment, as these

processes of globalization shape underdog ideologies among exploited poor people which

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come back in the form of terrorism against the more developed countries.  However, an
event (like urbanization or colonization) cannot be the cause of crime if it occurs when
crime rates are falling, as anomalies don't occur that often against "master trends." 
However, there are so many examples of fluctuating crime rates in so many countries
under so many conditions that any search for a "master variable" is likely futile.

FOUR LEGAL TRADITIONS

    It is the consensus of experts is that there are four types of legal traditions in the
world: 

(1) Common;
(2) Civil;
(3) Socialist; and
(4) Islamic. 

This pretty much classifies about 185 different nations.  It is important to compare
nations that have similar legal traditions because crimes may not be defined the same.  In
fact, legal systems may not even be the same.  According to Reichel (2005), a legal
tradition refers to a culture's attitudes, values, and norms (the conceptual components),
whereas a legal system refers to the operational components that function day in and day
out. 

Interpol and the U.N. have dealt with this problem for years -- that even something as
simple as murder is defined differently by different nations, and even within the same
nation, there may be a dozen or more different kinds of murder.  There's also a reporting
problem.  In some countries, crime data are based on offenses known to police, and in
other countries, statistical data is based on convictions. 

Certain countries (such as those in Central Africa) do not even collect crime statistics.  In
other countries (mostly socialist ones), crime statistics are collected, but the data are
classified.  It is also difficult to compare punishments, since in some countries, the family
members of the offender are punished, and the range of punishments includes such things
as stoning and mutilation. 

The four legal traditions are:

 Common law systems -- also known as Anglo-American justice. They exist in

most English-speaking countries of the world, such as the U.S., England,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and former British colonies in Africa.

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They are distinguished by a strong adversarial system where lawyers interpret and
judges are bound by precedent (or stare decisis). Common law systems are
distinctive in the significance they attach to precedent (the importance of
previously decided cases). They rely primarily upon oral systems of evidence in
which the public trial is a main focal point. Conceptually, all common law
countries believe that law originates in custom, that a fair and open competition
will sort out the truth, and that if everybody just plays by the rules, everything will
work out.

 Civil law systems -- also known as Continental justice, Romano-Germanic justice,

or Roman law. It is the largest and most prevalent system of justice in the world.
About 48% of the world is on the Roman system according to Reichel (2005). It is
practiced throughout most of the European Union, in places such as Sweden,
Germany, France, and Japan, and throughout much of Latin America. It is
distinguished by a strong inquisitorial process where less rights are granted to the
accused, and the written law is taken as gospel and subject to little interpretation.
For example, a French maxim goes like this: "If a judge knows the answer, he
must not be prohibited from achieving it by undue attention to regulations of
procedure and evidence." By contrast, the common law method is for a judge to at
least suspend belief until the sporting event of a trial is over. Legal scholarship is
much more sophisticated in civil law systems, as opposed to the more democratic
common law countries where just about anybody can get into law school or write
legal scholarshp. Romano-Germanic systems are founded on the basis of natural
law, which has a deep respect for tradition. The sovereigns, or leaders, of a civil
law system are considered above the law, as opposed to the common law notion
that nobody is above the law. Despite this elitism, everyone who works in a civil
law system, from police to prosecutor to judge, sees themselves as equals who
pool their efforts to determine what happened. Historically, civil law systems go
back to the Corpus Juris Romanis of 450 B.C., and this is mentioned because over
the years, there have been various other important codes, or landmark pieces of
legislation, which are taken as gospel within this tradition, an example being the
famous Napoleonic Code of 1804.

 Socialist systems -- also known as Marxist-Leninist or Communist justice.  It

exists in many places, such as Africa and Asia, and parts of Latin America,
anywhere where there has been a Communist revolution or the remnants of one. It
is distinguished by procedures designed to forcibly rehabilitate or retrain people
into fulfilling their responsibilities to the state. It is the ultimate expression of
positive law, designed to move the state forward toward the perfectibility of state
and mankind. It is also primarily characterized by administrative law, where non-
legal officials make most of the decisions. For example, in a socialist state, neither
judges nor lawyers are allowed to make law. Law is the same as policy, and an

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orthodox Marxist view is that eventually, the law will not be necessary. In
practice, however, most societies which claim to have a socialist system of justice
either have a dictatorship (no law at all) or some variant of a Roman legal
tradition.

 Islamic systems -- also known as Muslim or Arabic justice.  It derives all of its
procedures and practices from interpretation of the Koran. It is the only legal
tradition in the world which considers all law to be of divine origin. Most Islamic
law is in the form of commands, orders, or directives which govern the whole
lifestyle of a person. For example, a citizen in a common law or Roman law
society might be able to find some place, some time, where a little bit of unlawful
behavior would be tolerated. Not so with Islamic law. There are few exceptions,
and few situations where the Shari'a (the path to follow - another word for Islamic
law) does not apply. Exceptions include places where Islamic law is not uniformly
applied, but Islamic systems in general are characterized by the absence of positive
law (the use of law to move society forward toward some progressive future).  It is
based on a concept of natural justice (crimes are considered acts of injustice that
offend a religious or moral tradition). Religion plays an important role in Islamic
systems, so much so that most nations of this type are theocracies, where legal rule
and religious rule go together. In point of fact, religion must play an important role
in Islamic law because only a few verses of the Koran can be used for law.
Additional guidance can be had from books which point out statements and deeds
by the Prophet, and although Islamic jurisprudence varies on this, one can also
rely upon analogical reasoning (qiyas) to resolve controversies, and following that,
the consensus of legal scholars (ijma).   

    Each society also has its own customary law or tribal traditions.  Many parts of Africa,
for example, have reverted back to a tribal system because they could not accommodate
their heritage of colonialism, or could not choose among Common, Civil, Socialist and
Islamic systems.  Tribal justice systems tend to be characterized by arrest without trial
and other summary procedures.  In other parts of the world, such as Latin America, the
problem has involved the profit of drug crime outpacing the capability of justice systems,
and where a normal trend toward decriminalization should have occurred, an opposite
trend of haphazard legal practice and harsh punishment has occurred.  Traditionalism,
colonialism, modernization, and the increasing tendency for crime to become
transnational in an international marketplace form the components of the
globalization problem in comparative criminal justice.  It is important now, more than
ever, to understand how we got to this point.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

    If one had to summarize the whole time span of human history into what have been the
three "master trends," what would one say?  The renowned sociologist, Max Weber
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(1947) said they were demystification, rationalization, and bureaucratization.  The history
of mankind has been the history of movement from myth to reason, and bureaucracy has
been what we simultaneously depend on and deplore (Jacoby 1973).  The first large-scale
project that mankind probably faced was irrigation to grow crops.  That's why most of the
earliest societies -- the "cradles of civilization" -- were river valley societies.  Someone
(perhaps the first government) had to organize the irrigation of water so that there was
not too much or too little, and Wittfogel (1957) argues that such "hydraulic societies"
took on a form of government he calls "Oriental despotism" because total power was
required over the land and property relations.  Marxists called it the "Asiatic mode of
production" and it pulled the world out of a tribal system into a class or status-based
system.  

    Next came the world's great empires (the Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu, Persian, Inca,
Aztec, Roman, and Ottoman) which Eisenstadt (1963) has documented as movement
toward a centralized bureaucratic structure.  Bureaucracies were crucial to the rulers of
such empires if only for the reason that unquestionable loyalty was required of their
staff.  A tendency for empires to have some kind of in-house magic or primitive religious
belief as an adjunct to their rule probably led to the first cases of specialization and
professionalization in the form of shamans or viziers (the world's first bureaucrats). 
Secular specialization and professionalism came about with the advent of the Chinese
civil service. 

The American civilizations (Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs) followed a different route, relying
instead upon blood-based clan or interclan councils.  The city-state system also emerged
independently, or by colonization, in the Mediterranean basin (Heady 2001).  Athens,
Sparta, Carthage, and Rome started out as perfect examples of the urban-commercial
pattern, but only Imperial Rome and its Byzantine Empire became influential enough to
impact Western civilization as we know it. 

The movement from strict, civil-military hierarchies of the Byzantine Empire to the strict,
royal court hierarchies of European feudalism was relatively seamless.  Feudalism, by
definition, required every person to know their place, and although customs varied, it was
common for a peasant to have a small plot, or share a communal plot, on which to grow
food for subsistence as long as they paid a portion to their lord who protected them and
dispensed justice when the need arose.

     Feudalism was eventually replaced by powerful monarchies with central

bureaucracies.  The key historical development was a money economy which replaced a
barter economy.  The ability to accumulate "coin of the realm" produced freemen,
burgesses (municipal officials/bankers), and a middle-class.  To manage these new
groups of people, rulers fell back upon Roman Law traditions which saw the "right" of
sovereignty (owning the state) vested in one person. 

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The king (or queen) shared their power with the aristocracy, but also created the
countervailing institution of "privy councils" (advisors) which consisted of non-
aristocrats given royal duties (the most famous of which was the French Conseil d'Etat
which still exists today).  Bureaucracies grew because a growing manufacturing sector
required subsidies and controls, colonies required administrators, and the huge treasuries
required the attention of clerks and accountants.  Kings also had little time for dispensing
justice as was done in the old feudalism days, so they appointed justice officials
(intendants or commissioners) to act as their representatives.  Old-fashioned competition,
however, took place among people who wanted appointment to the royal service, and
various training/education services sprang up along with other screening devices such as
entrance exams.  Thus, the royal service was converted into the public service.  Only the
"best and the brightest" obtained government work.  All that followed was development
of the nation-state and manufacturing (industrialization).

POLICE, COURT, AND CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS

    Every type of system -- Common, Civil, Socialist, Islamic -- has local variation.  Even
in English-speaking countries, for example, there is variation.  Canadian justice places
more emphasis upon the right to a fair trial, free from prejudicial publicity.  In Canada,
the public and the media are usually banned from the courtroom, and there is little
interest in crime news.  In England, there is more emphasis upon fairness in sentencing,
and making sure the guilty don't go free.  English police dossiers along with two types of
lawyers (solicitors and barristers) and two types of courts (Magistrate and Crown) help
ensure this.

    Police systems are quite different around the world.  With the exceptions of Japan
and the Common Law nations, few countries hold their police officers strictly
accountable for violations of civil rights.  In Socialist and Islamic countries, the police
hold enormous political and religious powers.  In fact, in such places, crime is always
seen as political crime and a co-occurring religious problem.  Police everywhere are the
most visible (and accountable) symbols of criminal justice, so one universal finding is
that when police fail to control crime, informal methods of law (vigilante policing and
community courts) tend to arise.  Other universal findings include the fact that minorities
everywhere seem to distrust police, and that the American innovation of community
policing doesn't transfer well to other countries because it comes off as too omnipresent
(Braga et al. 2007). 

    Court systems of the world are of two types: adversarial, where the accused is
innocent until proven guilty; and inquisitorial, where the accused is guilty until proven
innocent or mitigated.  The U.S. adversarial system is unique in the world.  No other
nation, not even the U.K., places as much emphasis upon determination of factual guilt in
the courtroom as the U.S. does.  Outside the U.S., most trials are concerned with legal
guilt where everyone knows the offender did it, and the purpose is to get the offender to

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apologize, own up to their responsibility, argue for mercy, or suggest an appropriate

sentence for themselves.  Inquisitorial systems have more secret procedures.  Outside of
the United States, one is likely to encounter community (or neighborhood-focused) courts
which offer an array of non-conventional, alternative sanctions.   

    Correctional systems worldwide can be fairly easily distinguished by whether they
support corporal punishment (beatings) or not.  Some so-called "civilized" countries that
claim they are better than the U.S. because they don't have the death penalty regularly
practice such corporal punishments as beatings and whippings.  Nations that practice
corporal punishment do tend, however, to have less of a correctional overcrowding
problem.  Probation and parole, where they exist cross-culturally, tend to be available
only for native citizens, and not for foreigners nor immigrants.  Outside of the United
States, prisons tend to be less sanitary and unhealthy.   

    Juvenile Justice Systems vary widely.  Scotland has the toughest system, regularly
sentencing juveniles to harsh boot camps with a strict military regimen and forced labor. 
Germany has a juvenile justice system similar to the U.S., but there is more emphasis
upon education.  Not every country in the world believes in special handling of juveniles,
nor the concept of adolescence. 

SEVEN THEORIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

       Schneider (2001) does a good job summarizing the various theories that exist with at
least some empirical support.  They are listed here with little comment since, as theories,
they are always under development:

 Alertness to crime theory -- holds that as a nation develops, people's alertness to

crime is heightened, so they report more crime to police and also demand the
police become more effective at solving crime problems.
 Economic or migration theory -- holds that crime everywhere is the result of
unrestrained migration and overpopulation in urban areas such as ghettos and
slums.
 Opportunity theory -- holds that along with higher standards of living, victims
become more careless of their belongings, and opportunities for committing crime
multiply.
 Demographic theory -- holds that when the event occurs when a great number of
children are born, as the baby boom grows up, delinquent subcultures develop out
of the adolescent identity crisis.
 Deprivation theory -- holds that progress comes along with rising expectations,
and people at the bottom develop unrealistic expectations while people at the top
don't see themselves rising fast enough.

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 Modernization theory -- holds that (and this is an oversimplification) that the

basic problem is society becoming too complex.
 Anomie and synomie theory -- suggests that progressive lifestyles and norms
result in the disintegration of older norms that once held people together (anomie),
but in other cases, people can come together and achieve social consensus or
social cohesion over values (synomie).

PART I

EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

A. THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE POLICING

Theories and practices in law enforcement have been compared in several studies under
diverse circumstances, the goal is to test whether the theory and practice in policing
needs innovations to meet the demands in the present trends in crime fighting.

Comparative research is usually came out by the “safari” method (a researcher visits
another country) or “collaborative” method (the researcher communicate with a foreign
researcher).

Published works tend to fall into three categories:

1. Single-culture (the police and the crime problem of a single foreign country is
discussed),
2. Two culture studies (the most common type, and
3. Comprehensive textbooks (which cover three or more countries).

The examination of crime and its control in the comparative context often requires
historical perspective since the phenomena under study are seen as having developed
under unique social, economic, and political structures. Hence, the method most
often employed by researchers is the historical-comparative method. On the other
hand, whatever method used in comparative research in this subject matter, one thing
is evident-police systems are now moving towards innovative law enforcement.

A-1. GLOBALIZATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

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Every nation has its own law enforcement agency called the Police. One thing is
common. The police symbolize the presence of a civil body politics in everyday life; they
symbolized the capacity of the state to intervene and the concern of the state for the
affairs of the citizenry. It is therefore timely to discuss the connection of globalization to
policing.

What is globalization?

Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production and

investment, information, ideas, and authority.

Alison Brysk in a digest paper stated that Globalization is the growing interpretation of
states, markets, communications, and ideas. It is one of the leading characteristics of the
contemporary world. International norms and institutions for the protection of policing
human rights are more developed than any previous point in history. While global civil
society fosters growing avenues of appeal for citizens repressed by their own states.

But assaults in human dignity continue, and very blurring of borders and rise of
transnational actors that facilitated the development of a global human rights abuse.

With Brysk new globalization and human rights, a more broadly articulated and
accepted way of protecting these rights is within the hands of the Law Enforcement
Agencies in the world. The rights of individual have come to depend ever more on a
broad array of global system of policing and forces, from the local police to the
INTERPOL.

Effects of Globalization on Law Enforcement

Every law enforcement agency in the world is expected to be the protector of the
people’s rights. Globalization has great impact on every human right.

The emergence of “international regime” for state security and protection of

human rights, growing transnational social movement networks, increasing consciousness
and information politics have the potential to address both traditional and emerging forms
of law violations. Open international system should free individuals to pursue their rights,
but large numbers of people seem to be suffering from both long standing state repression
and new denials of rights linked to transnational forces like international forces like
international terrorism and other acts against humanity.

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The challenge of globalization is that unaccountable flows of migration and open

markets present new threats, which are not amenable to state-based human rights
regimes, while the new opportunities of global information and institutions are
insufficiently accessible and distorted by persistent state intervention.
(RK MANWONG; LAW ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION CHAPTER 10)

Threats on law enforcement: Some threats brought about by globalization are:

1. Increasing volume of human rights violations evident by genocide or mass killing

2. The underprivileged gain unfair access to global mechanisms on law enforcement
and security
3. Conflict between nations
4. Transnational criminal networks for drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism,
etc.

Opportunities for law enforcement: While globalization brings the threats and many other
threats to law enforcement, opportunities like the following are carried:

1. Creation of International Tribunals to deal with human rights problems

2. Humanitarian interventions that can promote universal norms and link them to the
enforcement power of the states
3. Transnational professional network and cooperation against transnational crimes
4. Global groups for conflict monitoring and coalitions across transnational issues

A-2. Globalization and Human Rights

Transnational Threats and Opportunities

Alison Brysk

Globalization—the growing interpenetration of states, markets, communications, and

ideas across borders—is one of the leading characteristics of the contemporary world.
International norms and institutions for the protection of human rights are more
developed than at any previous point in history, while global civil society fosters growing
avenues of appeal for citizens repressed by their own states. But assaults on fundamental
human dignity continue, and the very blurring of borders and rise of transnational actors
that facilitated the development of a global human rights regime may also be generating
new sources of human rights abuse. Even as they are more broadly articulated and
accepted, the rights of individuals have come to depend ever more on a broad array of
global actors and forces, from ministries to multinationals to missionaries.

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What are the patterns of the human rights impact of globalization? Are new problems
replacing, intensifying, or mitigating state-sponsored repression? Are some dynamics of
globalization generating both problems and opportunities? How can new opportunities be
used to offset new problems? And how has the idea and practice of human rights
influenced the process of globalization?

How does globalization—which liberals claim will promote development, democracy,

personal empowerment, and global governance—instead present new challenges for
human rights?

Globalization is a package of transnational flows of people, production, investment,

information, ideas, and authority (not new, but stronger and faster).1 Human rights are a
set of claims and entitlements to human dignity, which the existing international regime
assumes will be provided (or threatened) by the state. A more cosmopolitan and open
international system should free individuals to pursue their rights, but large numbers of
people seem to be suffering from both long-standing state repression and new denials of
rights linked to transnational forces.

The essays in this volume show that the challenge of globalization is that unaccountable
flows of migration and open markets present new threats, which are not amenable to
state-based human rights regimes, while the new opportunities of global information and
institutions are insufficiently accessible and distorted by persistent state intervention.

The emergence of an "international regime" for human rights (Donnelly 1986),

growing transnational social movement networks, increasing consciousness (Willetts
1996), and information politics have the potential to address both traditional and
emerging forms of human rights violations. The United Nations has supervised human
rights reform in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, while creating a new high
commissioner for human rights. The first international tribunals since Nuremberg are
prosecuting genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Transnational legal
accountability (Stephens and Ratner 1996) and humanitarian intervention promote
universal norms and link them to the enforcement power of states. Thousands of
nongovernmental organizations monitor and lobby for human rights from Tibet to East
Timor (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Alongside principled proponents such as Amnesty International, globalization has

generated new forms of advocacy such as transnational professional networks (Doctors
without Borders), global groups for conflict monitoring, and coalitions across
transnational issues (Sierra Club-Amnesty International).

New forms of communication allow victims to videotape their plight, advocates to flood
governments with faxes, Web sites to mobilize urgent action alerts. But the effectiveness
of global consciousness and pressure on the states, paramilitaries, and insurgents

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responsible for long-standing human rights violations varies tremendously. And access to
the new global mechanisms is distributed unevenly, so that some of the neediest victims
—such as the illiterate rural poor and refugee women—are the least likely to receive
either global or domestic redress.

Beyond this interaction of new solutions with old problems, new human rights problems
may result from the integration of markets, the shrinking of states, increased transnational
flows such as migration, the spread of cultures of intolerance, and the decision-making
processes of new or growing global institutions (Kofman and Youngs 1996; Mittelman
1996; Held 2000). The increasing presence of multinational corporations has challenged
labor rights throughout Southeast Asia, along the Mexican border, and beyond.
Increasing levels of migration worldwide make growing numbers of refugees and
undocumented laborers vulnerable to abuse by sending and receiving states, as well as
transnational criminal networks.

Hundreds of Mexican nationals die each year crossing the U.S. border; in contrast, 450
German migrants were killed during forty years of Europeans crossing the Berlin Wall.
International economic adjustment and the growth of tourism are linked to a rise in
prostitution and trafficking in women and children, affecting millions in the Caribbean,
Southeast Asia, the post-Soviet states and even the United States. The U.S. State
Department estimates that one to two million persons each year are trafficked for various
forms of forced labor and "modern-day slavery"—including almost 50,000 annually to
the United States (Richard 1999).

The same Internet that empowers human rights activists increases government
monitoring, instructs neo-Nazis, and carries transnational death threats against dissenters.
Unelected global institutions like the World Bank, international peacekeepers, and
environmental NGOs administering protected areas increasingly control the lives of the
most powerless citizens of weak states.

In this volume, we attempt to map new territory, bring together diverse perspectives,
challenge conventional wisdom, and begin to cumulate research to address these
questions and contradictions. Our aim is not to introduce a new theory of globalization,
but rather to identify generalizable patterns from diverse developments. In order to make
sense of these developments, we must first consider the general trends of human rights
and globalization. Then we can map patterns in the globalized development of human
rights threats and opportunities.

Human Rights in a Global Arena

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Human rights are a set of universal claims to safeguard human dignity from illegitimate
coercion, typically enacted by state agents. These norms are codified in a widely
endorsed set of international undertakings:

The "International Bill of Human Rights" (Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant
on Social and Economic Rights); phenomenon-specific treaties on war crimes (Geneva
Conventions), genocide, and torture; and protections for vulnerable groups such as the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women. International dialogue on human rights has produced a
distinction between three "generations" of human rights, labeled for their historical
emergence. Security rights encompass life, bodily integrity, liberty, and sometimes
associated rights of political participation and democratic governance.

Social and economic rights, highlighted in the eponymous International Covenant,

comprise both negative and positive freedoms, enacted by states and others: prominently,
rights to food, health care, education, and free labor. More recently discussed collective
rights may include rights such as membership in a cultural community and access to a
healthy environment (Chris Brown 1997). These "generations" of rights often involve
different sets of actors and different levels of state accountability.

While the origins of the international human rights regime, U.S. foreign policy, NGO
monitoring, and much previous scholarship have focused on security rights, this project
will entertain a broader conception of linked political, social, and cultural rights grounded
in the Universal Declaration. A focus on security rights may be desirable for clarity and
manageability, as well as because security rights of life and freedom are "basic" or
enabling rights that make the pursuit of other rights possible (Shue 1980). However,
human rights claims have an inherently expanding character, which requires the
consideration of every type of threat to human dignity under a range of changing social
conditions. Thus, both liberty and survival may involve social issues, such as the right to
free labor and to organize for better labor conditions. Some vulnerable groups, notably
women and indigenous peoples, may face linked threats that emanate from public and
private actors, and seek cultural freedoms to meaningfully participate in civic life.

Furthermore, the very process of globalization blurs distinctions among categories of

rights: humanitarian intervention seeks to rescue ethnic groups, women working as
prostitutes are beaten by police for "bothering tourists" to feed their children, and rights
to privacy and expression collide on the Internet (also see McCorquodale and Fairbrother
1999). In this volume, these linked rights can be delineated by granting priority to those
rights that enable others and those violations that present the greatest harm to victims.

Human rights values derive from and are justified by reference to philosophical
constructions of human nature, cultural and religious traditions, demands from civil

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society, and international influence. In practical importance, the latter two political
factors are the most important source of human rights in the contemporary world (Perry
1998; Montgomery 1998). Accordingly, despite frequent violations in practice,
international consensus has implanted human rights as a nearly universal vocabulary of
debate, aspiration, and civic challenges to state legitimacy.

Analysts of human rights have identified a variety of psychological, social, economic,

and political patterns that put societies "at risk" of human rights violations. These
generally include authoritarian government, civil war, strong ethnic cleavages, weak civil
society, power vacuums, critical junctures in economic development, and military
dominance (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Haas 1994; Donnelly 1998b). Above all, the
study of human rights teaches us that human rights violations usually reflect a calculated
(or manipulated) pursuit of political power, not inherent evil or ungovernable passions
(Gurr 1984; Human Rights Watch 1995b). One of our first tasks is to analyze the effect
of globalization on these risk factors.

The effect of globalization on state-based human rights violations will depend on the
type of state and its history. In newly democratizing countries with weak institutions
and elite-controlled economies (Russia, Latin America, Southeast Asia), the growth of
global markets and economic flows tends to destabilize coercive forces but increase
crime, police abuse, and corruption.

Global mobility and information flows generally stimulate ethnic mobilization, which
may promote self-determination in responsive states but more often produces collective
abuses in defense of dominant-group hegemony. On the other hand, the same forces have
produced slow institutional openings by less fragmented single-party states (like China
and Mexico).

In much of Africa, globalization has ironically increased power vacuums, by both

empowering substate challengers and providing sporadic intervention, which displaces
old regimes without consolidating new ones. Some of the most horrifying abuses of all
have occurred in the transnationalized, Hobbesian civil wars of Sierra Leone, Angola,
and the Congo.

But the literature on human rights has also moved beyond the conventional wisdom that
situated human rights violations and remediation predominantly within the state, to
suggest ways in which globalization creates new opportunities to challenge the state
"from above and below" (Brysk 1993; Risse et al. 1999). Human rights research has
produced both evidence of new capabilities for monitoring, pressure, and sanctions
(Alston and Steiner 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998), along with reports of new types and
venues of abuse (Human Rights Watch 1996; Fields 1998; Rickard 1998; Peters and
Wolper 1995). In general, analysts of globalization find that states' international
integration improves security rights, but increases inequality and threatens the social

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rights of citizens (Crossette 2000; Milner 1998). However, neither economic

development nor economic growth in and of themselves improve human rights
performance (Montgomery 1998: 325; Amartya Sen 1999; Tan 1999). In addition to
globalization and growth, findings on the effectiveness of international pressure on state
human rights policy suggest that target states must be structurally accessible,
internationally sensitive, and contain local human rights activists for linkage (Burgerman
1998; Sikkink 1993).

There is little systematic evidence available on the overall human rights impact of global
flows and actors, and that which does exist is often contradictory. For example,
quantitative studies that demonstrate improved security rights where MNCs
(multinational corporations) are present (Meyer 1998) contrast with case studies
documenting multinational reinforcement of state coercion and labor suppression
(Arregui 1996; Ho et al. 1996).

Other scholars suggest that the impact of multinationals depends more on their type of
production, customer base, or sending country than their globalizing nature (Spar 1998).
Similarly, some studies indicate that even within "economic globalization," different
types of global economic flows at different times will have different impacts on
democracy and human rights (for example, for Li and Reuveny 2000, trade is negative
but foreign direct investment is positive).

There is some basis for believing that new global human rights mechanisms, such as
transnational NGO campaigns, may be particularly effective against transnational actors
like multinationals. Analysts argue that transnational human rights threats can be most
easily met by transnational human rights campaigns, since it is easier to access
transnational actors than repressive states, transnational’s cannot cloak their abuses in
sovereignty rationales, global elites are increasingly amenable to "rights talk," and global
civil society can provide local linkages for transnational networks (Rodman 1998; Brysk
2000a). The research in this volume suggests that the human rights impact of
globalization depends on three types of factors: the type of globalization involved, the
level of analysis addressed, and the type of state that is filtering globalizing flows.

A-3. Globalization: Rights and Wrongs

What do we mean by globalization?

While some analysts treat globalization as a predominantly economic process or even a

synonym for global capitalism (Greider 1997; Korten 1995), others focus on the growth
of international institutions and organizations (Ruggie 1998). Some scholars emphasize
the impact of transnational demographic, environmental, and cultural flows (Kearney

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1995; Sassen 1998, 1996), while others plot the emergence of cross-border networks that
may constitute a "global civil society" (Kaldor 1999; Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996).

In this project, these developments are seen as facets of a linked, albeit uneven, process.
In an extension of Jan Aart Scholte's definition, globalization is an ensemble of
developments that make the world a single place, changing the meaning and importance
of distance and national identity in world affairs (Scholte 1996b: 44). 2 Nevertheless,
aspects of globalization that occur simultaneously may have very different logics and
impact for human rights—as the sections of this book reflect.3

In order to analyze globalization as a comprehensive process, it must be recognized as a

dynamic process, that is, a change over time. One of the biggest challenges to analyzing
the current era of globalization is the observation of historical periods with similar
elements and very different political results (Hirst and Thompson 1996). However,
globalization need not be entirely new to be significant, and significant in new ways.
Some suggest that globalization has occurred in waves, with the current wave linked to
U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a "democratic peace" in the core of the world
economy.4

The current wave of globalization does surpass previous eras in the breadth, scope, and
intensity of the combination of connection, cosmopolitanism, commodification, and
communication. It is this combination of norms, flows, institutions, and markets that has
particular political consequences for human rights.

A more globalized world is simultaneously more connected, cosmopolitan, commodified,

and influenced by communication. Connection is a functional parameter of globalization,
involving increasing numbers, volumes, and salience of transnational flows of bodies,
business, information, and norms. The sections of this volume are organized around these
flows: transnational migration and citizenship, global markets and commodification,
international uses of information and communication, and transnational norms embodied
in attempts at governance.

The cosmopolitan dimension is structural; the evolution of multiple, linked, and

overlapping centers of power above and below the state. This is closely related to James
N. Rosenau's analysis of a "multicentric" turbulent world. Commodification highlights
distinctive characteristics of expanding world markets and their relationship to other
flows, institutions, and states. As Richard Falk's contribution details, globalization as
commodification means that increasing spheres of social relationship are based on
exchange value, including citizenship.

The underlying causal dynamic that has catalyzed and intensified each of these
dimensions of globalization is communication, which combines an increase in technical
capacity and volume, a shift in the distribution of capabilities, a diversification of

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channels, and an expansion of content (Deibert 1997). As Shayne Weyker and Clifford
Bob discuss, communication carries both information and norms, affective images and
transnational identities. Both terrorism and the international response also reflect these
characteristics.

What are the effects of globalization?

Optimists suggest that transnational integration will empower citizen challenges to state
power (Falk 1995; Rosenau 1997), while revisionists assert that globalization reiterates
national and/or market exploitation (Bhabha 1998a; Burbach et al. 1997; Brecher and
Costello 1994; Mander and Goldsmith 1996).

One attempt to resolve this debate delineates good and bad forms of globalization;
"globalization from above" versus "globalization from below." (Hunter 1995; Falk 1994)
Another set of scholars contend that a deeper process of globalization has transformed the
fundamental forms of world politics through changing identities, evolving social forms
such as networks, and the diffusion of an increasingly influential world institutional
culture that includes support for human rights or at least democracy (Robertson 1992;
Castells 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). This project suggests, instead, that different elements
and levels of globalization may produce distinct effects of empowerment, exploitation,
and evolution; also Friedman 1999).

But these diverse effects are not random or wholly ambiguous. Previous research
suggests that world politics is clustered in three streams, with distinctive logics: the
interstate realm, global markets, and transnational civil society. These domains are
differentially accessible and responsive to human rights appeals, with civic actors most
amenable and states most resistant to a reconstruction of existing relationships.

Furthermore, the appeals of target groups are facilitated when markets, states, and
transnational social forces are separable rather than working in tandem (Brysk 2000a).
Globalization is most positive for human rights when it enables the exchange of
information and the formation of new identities, and most negative when it reinscribes
borders and props up repressive states. Global markets, on the other hand, generate
systematically contradictory effects that depend heavily on the type of state and sector
involved. Meanwhile, global civil society introduces new norms, which sometimes
become institutionalized as evolving human rights standards, and, ultimately, objects of
interstate enforcement. Recent events suggest that a fourth realm of transnational
violence may have its own patterns and effects.

We can thus begin to map the effects of different forms of globalization on different
kinds of rights (see table 1). Increased mobility provides refuge to some but also
opportunities for abusive policing and economic exploitation. Global markets also
increase economic exploitation, but may provide increased monitoring of social and

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security conditions. Information facilitates campaigns for all types of rights, as well as
the formation of transnational networks and reporting to the emergent "international
human rights regime." And governance provides a new array of enforcement tools, from
intervention to law to economic sanctions. <Place table 1 about here>

Meanwhile, these streams of globalization are unfolding at different levels of analysis—

the second key factor suggested by our approach. Rosenau's contribution examines the
human rights impact of globalization across states and concludes that transnational flows
and institutions are constructing evolving responses to "the most obstreperous actor" (still
usually a state). By contrast, Richard Falk distinguishes globalization above and below
the state, attributing threats mainly to unaccountable transnational market forces and
institutions, partly combated by the struggles of grassroots global civil society. Donnelly
introduces the missing element of globalization through the state, which he finds highly
problematic for social rights, in ways that also reiterate the distinction between different
streams of globalization and their differential effect on rights.

These levels of analysis overlap with the streams of globalization. Global mobility
operates across and through the state, and the rights impact is generally more positive
across and more negative through—both Kristen Maher and Amalia Lucia Cabezas
suggest that policing creates more violations than migration itself. Global markets may be
across (financial flows), above (multilateral trade and financial institutions), through
(economic adjustment), or below (grassroots protests, shifts in local production or
consumption).

This is part of the problem in assessing the contradictory effects of markets on rights
(Wesley Milner's analysis is across and above, while Raul Pangalangan's is through and
below). Global information is predominantly across and below the state, hence it tends to
facilitate rights unless bottlenecks develop through (Weyker) or above (Bob) the state.

Finally, global governance appears as the paradigm of globalization from above. But Fox
explores a trilateral struggle between a multilateral institution above, a transnational
campaign below, and recalcitrant states in the middle, while Wayne Sandholtz shows that
globalization from above can partially supersede the state level—when states have lost
legitimacy across the international system. The latter has wider implications for the study
of global governance, as it suggests that the development of global norms and institutions
is actually a three- or four-level game, not just an interstate coordination problem (Evans
et al. 1993; Smith et al. 1997).

Finally, our analysis shows that the human rights impact of globalization is filtered
through the type of receiving state (Holm and Sorensen 1995). Much of the literature on
globalization has overlooked the effect of globalization on the state; globalization has
produced a new "globalized state"—changing rather than eroding sovereignty (Ian Clark
1999).

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As some scholars have argued, power is moving from weak states to strong states, from
all states to markets, and away from state authority entirely in certain domains and
functions (Strange 1998; Schmidt 2000). At the same time, the state is the main
administrator of globalization. As one partisan of globalization puts it, globalization
means that the quality of the state matters more, since the state is "the operating system
for global capitalism" (Friedman 1999: 134). Thus, the struggle for human rights in a
global era is now from above, from below—and still through the middle.

The Globalized State as Threat

In the security sphere, states respond with increased repression to fragmentation,

transnationalized civil war, and uncontrolled global flows such as migrants and drug
trafficking. Transborder ethnic diasporas help inspire civil conflict, while the global arms
trade provides its tools. Even extreme civil conflicts where states deteriorate into
warlordism are often financed if not abetted by foreign trade: diamonds in the Congo and
Sierra Leone, cocaine in Colombia.

While nonstate actors like insurgents and paramilitaries pose increasing threats to
human rights, state response is a crucial multiplier for the effect on citizens. Since all but
the most beleaguered states possess more resources and authority than rebels, they can
generally cause more damage—and human rights monitoring in a wide variety of settings
from Rwanda to Haiti attributes the bulk of abuses to state (or state-supported) forces.
States also differ in their ability and will to provide protection from insurgent terror
campaigns (like that in Algeria).

Global economic relationships can produce state policies that directly violate social and
labor rights and indirectly produce social conflict that leads to state violations of civil and
security rights. While globally induced economic adjustment may cut state services and
intensify poverty and protest, global windfalls of wealth may also underwrite repressive
and predatory states, as in Angola, where oil revenues have fueled repression and civil
war (Harden 2000). It is states that largely determine labor rights and security response to
labor dissidence; states also regulate multinationals, certify unions, and form joint
ventures with global investors.

A-4. Globalization and the Citizenship Gap

Just as globalized states may present new threats alongside long-standing patterns of
repression, globalization offers states declining opportunities to serve as a source of

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human rights protection. Increasing numbers of residents of increasing numbers of states

are less than full citizens.

Over 25 million people are international refugees, while an estimated similar number are
economic migrants—mostly undocumented and generally lacking civil rights (Mills
1998: 97-124). Refugee camps can also become sites or sources of human rights
violations, as in Rwanda, Lebanon, Guatemala, and Indonesia. Within many countries,
internally displaced persons, rural-urban migrants, and isolated peasants (often illiterate)
are also undocumented and lack rights and civil status. In China alone, an estimated 100
million people are unregistered domestic migrant workers (Solinger 1995).

Many millions around the world live in occupied territories or emergency zones where
citizenship was never granted or has been suspended. A number of the states hosting the
world's 300 million indigenous people assign them special juridical status—often tutelary
—which may fall short of conventional citizenship. Similarly, a significant number of
states (especially in the Middle East) circumscribe the rights of the female half of their
populations—and personal status codes contravene international human rights standards
and sometimes directly deny citizenship or nationality (Chinkin 1999).

Analysts of globalization speak of variable levels and configurations of citizenship within

the same state, depending on the triangulation between a given sector, state power, and
transnational forces, and even regional zones of limited citizenship (such as limitations
on movement, speech, and assembly in export-processing zones) (Ong 1999).

Meanwhile, alongside people who are not citizens, states have diminished capacity to
control the conditions of citizenship—even for those securely inscribed within the
juridical and social status. Observers of states undergoing both political and economic
liberalization decry the emergence of "delegative democracy," which is characterized by
"low-intensity citizenship" (O'Donnell 1994; Stahler-Sholk 1994).

More and more legal citizens lack effective accountability for power relationships; their
lives depend on distant investment decisions, organizational resolutions, religious edicts,
and information campaigns. "Economic liberalization is exacerbating the gap between
rich and poor within virtually all developing regions. At the same time, other elements of
globalization are increasing the inequalities of political power and influence, as well as
highlighting new dimensions of inequality.

For one group of countries globalization is eroding the cohesion and viability of the state"
(Hurrell and Woods 1999: 1). These global forces are often translated into local
conditions in opaque ways, which deepens the gap of information, knowledge, and
control further. Since migration is the transnational flow with the strongest claim to state
control, it is interesting that Maher and Cabezas each note a "citizenship gap" both for
aliens to developed countries and citizens of developing countries (vis-à-vis tourists). 5

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Types of States and the Impact of Globalization

Beyond these general trends of accelerating threats and declining opportunities, the
impact of globalization on human rights conditions differs in different types of states.
Many analyses of transnationalism suggest that the impact of global forces on various
issue-areas is filtered by domestic characteristics (Risse-Kappen 1995; Keohane and
Milner 1996)—even straightforward economic effects depend on a state's factor
endowments, economic institutions, and policies (Stewart and Berry 1999).6

One scholar outlines a general pattern of types of states with different patterns of
international interaction: premodern, Westphalian modern nation-states, and postmodern,
with the former and latter departing significantly from standard scholarly assumptions of
sovereignty, anarchy, and self-help (Sorenson 2000).

We can further develop these distinctions, and the tendencies of different types of
globalizing states for human rights performance and the citizenship gap.

First, in collapsing and "failed" states such as large sectors of Africa, foreign aid and
international organizations often simultaneously prop up power vacuums and assist
victims (Ignatieff 1998). Globalization brings increased market flows and weak
intervention, but little accountability and no definitive governance. Here, the citizenship
gap is most severe, as victims lack control at the community, state, and international
level.

In second place, aspiring theocracies like Afghanistan—which make war on women—are

less a return to tradition than a reaction against foreign penetration sustained by
international identity politics. Victims lack both state citizenship and voice in the
religious/ethnic community, which engenders "private" violations. Similarly,
ethnocracies are both inspired by and reactive to international forces. Sometimes
international organizations intervene, as in Kosovo. However, interveners, ethnocratic
and emerging states, and ethnic communities all violate rights (the way ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo are now persecuting Serbs), and none are subject to citizen accountability.

Next, the few remaining "hard states"—such as China—seem to be evolving toward what
has been labeled "market Leninism," in which centralized political control coexists with
(and indeed may depend upon) opening to global markets. But in such states, growing
international influence does seem to foster some partial increase in transparency, the rule
of law, and international cooperation—although it has not yet produced systematic
improvement in human rights. The citizenship gap here is predominantly democratizing
the state, and secondarily accessing market pressures.

Most of Latin America, parts of Southeast Asia, and many post-Soviet states are now
"low-intensity democracies," with globalizing electoral regimes systematically skewed by

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social inequalities and weak states. Residents of these areas have low-quality citizenship
and no access to the market forces that dominate their states. Even postmodern, liberal
capitalist democracies experience human rights impacts from globalization, becoming
more connected and aware but simultaneously overloaded in state capacity to process
diverse and complex issues.

We too lack full control over global markets, although we are more insulated from their
effects than citizens of weak or authoritarian states. We are also more dependent on the
opportunity of the globalization of information, but thus more vulnerable in those
situations where information is a threat: as surveillance, ideology, or terror.

A-5. Globalization, Human Rights, and the New World Order

These essays were written during 2000, before the September 11th terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington ushered in a new world order framed by renewed security
threats, directly targeting globalization, along with an international military response.
While in some ways these events go beyond the scope of issues considered in this
volume, in others they strengthen the relevance and urgency of this analysis.

The nature of the threat, its targets and impact, and the response all indicate the growing
power of globalization as a parameter of political action. The emergence of transnational
civil networks capable of state-level crimes against humanity depends upon the
globalizing patterns of connection, communication, and even commodification (via
financial networks). It is inspired by a transnational ideology of a radical, extremist
version of Islamic fundamentalism that is largely reactive to economic and cultural
globalization, and thus targets sites and symbols of both cosmopolitanism and hegemony.

The shattering impact of threats to globalizing flows such as air travel on the world
economy and daily life demonstrate how deeply dependent we have become on these
connections. And even the U.S.-sponsored response has gone beyond the historical
standard reaction of a great power under direct attack; it is more internationalist,
multisectoral in its treatment of areas like migration and finance, and much more
conscious of human rights issues such as laws of war, refugees, and humanitarian
assistance.

While the crisis of 2001-2002 has diminished global levels of migration and economic
exchange, it has increased flows of communication and governance. And the new world
order has not diminished the salience or fundamentally altered the pattern of the human
rights impact of any of the forms of globalization. Indeed, the impact on human rights of
the new global threat of terrorism itself largely follows the logic suggested by this
volume, with the most deleterious spillovers linked to state-regulated migration and
governance (intervention), mixed results of markets, and enduring avenues of appeal via

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global communications. Our second factor, the type of state, is also relevant, as liberal
democracies are most vulnerable to the new threat, while failed states suffer
disproportionately from the response.

The final element—level of analysis—matters in a new way that will require further
study, as international authorities above and through the state struggle to respond to
unaccountable forces across and below state boundaries.

The first global conflict of the new millennium marks a new phase in the development of
human rights, which should heighten our attention to the issues examined in this volume.
The persistence of human rights as a focus of legislative and public debates on security
measures in the United States and Germany, as well as the widespread efforts to foster
tolerance and support for Muslim minorities, show that liberal human rights standards
have shifted the agenda beyond those of previous conflicts. Although such standards are
not always achieved, and new security policies sometimes do violate civil liberties,
human rights norms and networks remain legitimate and incorporated in international
policymaking and the politics of the dominant international powers.

Yet the background and supporters of the terrorists demonstrate the limitations of liberal
conceptions, and the connections between chronic denials of economic, social, and
political rights and a climate of dysfunctional political violence. Without excusing or
justifying the moral responsibility of terrorists, we must understand the conditions that
make perpetrators more likely to arise and gain credence.

The emergence of new human rights threats from the ashes of Cold War struggles, at the
haunting edges of the globalizing world economy, should remind us to broaden our
attention beyond the core conflict of each era—to consider those at the peripheries,
whose pain or pathology may well become the theme of the next epoch. In this new
world order, it is ever more urgent to deepen our understanding of the new global threats
to human rights, even beyond the normative and cosmopolitan connections charted below
—for our own survival.

Effects of globalization to human rights

The effect of globalization on state-based human rights violations will depend on

the type of state and its history. In newly democratizing countries with weak institutions
and elite-controlled economies (Russia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia), the growth
of global markets and economic flows tends to destabilized coercive forces but increases
crime, police abuse, and corruption.

Global mobility and information flows generally stimulate ethnic mobilization,

which may promote self-determination in responsive states but more often produces
collective abuses in defense of dominant-group hegemony. On the other hand, the same

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forces have produced slow institutional openings by less fragmented single-party states
(like China and Mexico). In much Africa, globalization has ironically increase power
vacuums, by both empowering sub-state challengers and providing sporadic intervention,
which displaces old regimes without consolidating new ones. Some of the most
horrifying abuses of all have occurred in the transnationalized Hobbesian civil wars of
Sierra Leone, Angola, and Congo.

In general, analyst of globalization find that states international integration

improves security rights, but increases inequality and threatens the social rights of
citizens. However, neither economic development nor economic growth in and of
themselves improves law enforcement capabilities and human rights performance. In
addition to globalization and growth, findings on the effectiveness of international
pressure on state human rights policy suggest that target states must be structurally
accessible, internationally sensitive, and contain human rights activist for linkage.

Map of the Volume

In this volume, we try to assess the impact of globalization on human rights and the
impact of human rights on globalization. The chapters cannot possibly encompass the full
range of either globalization or human rights, but they do sample across the spectrum of
threats and opportunities. Although most of the chapters are global in focus, those that
concentrate on a place or region include the United States (Maher), Latin America
(Cabezas), Asia (Pangalangan), and Africa (Bob). Similarly, the contributors bring a
variety of methodologies to bear on common questions: theoretical deduction (Falk,
Rosenau, Donnelly), cross-national quantitative study (Milner), policy analysis (Maher,
Fox, Sandholtz), and case studies (Cabezas, Bob).

The first section, "Citizenship," analyzes the effect on rights as people cross borders
and states shift capabilities and goals. This essay has identified a broader "citizenship
gap," as globalized states introduce new threats and provide declining opportunities to
citizens, while increasing numbers of residents lack citizenship claims. Illustrating the
latter dynamic, Kristen Maher deconstructs the immigration policy of the largest
receiving nation, the United States, in relation to labor flows from Latin America and the
rights ideology of liberalism. In a complementary geography and analysis, Amalia Lucia
Cabezas shows how prostitution in the Dominican Republic is constituted by global
economic adjustment and northern tourism. However, her contribution also emphasizes
both the role of the state as an intervening actor in economic development and policing
and sex workers' transnational mobilization for labor and security rights.

In "Commodification," the book turns to the globalization of markets. Richard Falk

highlights the political impact of economic globalization, and the contradictions between
economic and political liberalism for social rights. Wesley Milner's comprehensive study
of economic liberalization establishes the differential impact of structural integration on

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different types of rights. By contrast, Raul Pangalangan documents and analyzes

mobilization against the deleterious effects of multinational labor exploitation in Asia.

"Communication" examines the influence of information flows and global civil society
on human rights. Shane Weyker provides an overview of the inherent potential and
pitfalls of the new information technologies for human rights activists. Clifford Bob
documents the power and distortions of transnational communications and network
appeals, through a comparative case study of Nigeria's Ogoni. Both authors emphasize
the social context of information and the organizational politics of NGOs. James Rosenau
applies his pioneering analysis of global turbulence to the cosmopolitan governance of
"most obstreperous actors."(Refusing to be controlled)

The next section, "Cooperation," explores the emerging exercise of institutional

authority across borders on behalf of human rights. Jonathan Fox explores an increasing
mechanism of international accountability: transnational mobilization against a global
institution. Then, his chapter outlines the limitations of institutional reform, seeking
largely social and collective rights. Wayne Sandholtz chronicles the emergence and
limitations of a norm and practice of humanitarian intervention—when global human
rights standards trump state sovereignty. Finally, Jack Donnelly analyzes the evolving
role of state power in filtering the impact of globalization on human rights.

Challenges of Globalization in the field of law Enforcement

In the law enforcement and security sphere, states respond with increased
repression to fragmentation, transnationalized civil war, and uncontrolled global flows
such as migrants and drug trafficking. Transborder ethnic differences help inspire civil
conflicts, while the global arms trade provides its tools. Even extreme civil conflicts
where states deteriorate into warlordism are often financed if not abetted by foreign trade
diamonds in the Congo and Sierra Leone, cocaine in Columbia. While non-state actors
like insurgents and paramilitaries pose increasing threats to human rights, state response
is a crucial multiplier for the effect on citizens.

Since all but the most beleaguered states posses more resources and authority than rebels,
they can generally cause more damage and human rights monitoring in a wide variety of
settings from Rwanda to Haiti attributes the bulk of abuses to state (or state-supported )
forces. States also differ in their ability and will to provide protection from insurgent
terror campaigns (like that in Algeria).

Global economic relationships can produce state policies that directly violate
social and labor rights and indirectly produce social conflict that leads to state violations
of civil and security rights. While globally induced economic adjustment may cut state
services and intensify poverty and protest, global windfalls of wealth may also
underwrite repressive and predatory states, as in Angola, where oil revenues have fueled

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repression and civil war (Harden 2000). It is states that largely determine labor rights and
security response to labor dissidence; states also regulate multinationals, certify unions,
and form joint ventures with global investors.

The challenge now is on how every state pursues a strong relationship in the area
of policing these global wrongs.

A-6. Globalization and Terrorism

The nature of the threat, its target and impact, and the response all indicate the
growing power of globalization as a parameter of political action. The emergence of
transnational civil networks capable of state-level crimes against humanity depends upon
the globalizing patterns of connection, communication, and even commodification (via
financial networks). It is inspired by a transnational ideology of radical, extremist version
of Islamic fundamentalism that is largely reactive to economic and cultural globalization,
and thus target sites and symbols of cosmopolitanism. The shattering impact of threats to
globalizing flows such as air travel on the world economy and daily life demonstrate how
deeply dependent we have become on these connections.

And even the U.S.-sponsored response against terrorism and all its form has gone
beyond the historical standard reaction of a great power under direct attack; it is more
internationalists, multi-sectoral in its treatment of areas like migration and finance, and
much more conscious of human rights issues such as laws of war, refugees, and
humanitarian assistance.

B. GLOBAL THREATS AND THE POLICE

John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz (Global Metropolitan Policing)

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Police, like the rest of society, face a changing political, technical, and economic setting.
Traditionally, urban police forces confined their activities to their immediate local area
for the simple reason that criminal activity was primarily a local phenomenon –
jurisdictions generally matched patterns of criminal activity. As globalization and
technology stimulated greater linkages among cities, widespread connections between
criminal and terrorist activity began to surface, culminating in a new range of threats that
local police had to address. One component of this threat stream is the global Islamist
jihad.

Islamist movements form a loose confederation of independent groups with varying roles
and reach. They often work in a cooperative manner among “theaters of operation.”
Local groups gather intelligence and targeting data and share it across the global jihadi
network. David Kilcullen believes that this movement is best viewed as a global
insurgency. Countering it, according to Kilcullen, “demands extremely close coordination
and integration between and within police, intelligence, military, development, aid,
information, and administrative agencies” – a difficult task when undertaken at the global
level.

Other observers believe that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda is a malignant and
mutated version of the market-state – an emerging state form. Al Qaeda and its kin are

The emergence of transnational criminal actors challenges national

law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Global criminals are involved
in traditional organized crime activities, e.g., theft, smuggling, and
dealing in all types of contraband. These criminal networks, however,
also engage in activities that can fuel domestic and international
conflicts, potentially creating threats that can undermine state actors
and existing security regimes. The tensions created by what amounts to
the “darker side” of globalization challenge existing mechanisms of
cooperation among various national police organizations.

John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz

more than state-less gangs. These networked adversaries possess standing armies,
treasury and revenue sources derived from criminal enterprises, a bureaucracy or “civil”
service, intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, welfare systems, and the ability
to make alliances with state and other non-state actors.

They also promulgate law and policy for their adherents and declare war. From
this perspective, the al Qaeda network constitutes a sort of virtual state that can control
territory. Through insurgency and terrorism it seeks to influence events and policies
across the globe.
Criminal and terrorist networks thus constitute a departure from traditional criminal
activity because they are not concentrated in any one local jurisdiction.

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They create a problem for everyone, but they belong to no one. Actions taken by a
few local jurisdictions or even states can deliver a setback to the criminal network, but
they cannot destroy the network because it exists outside of their jurisdictions.

To contain and eventually destroy these international criminal and terrorist enterprises,
local and national jurisdictions have to work together in real time. The traditional
distinction between domestic and foreign threats that is common in both the law
enforcement and security studies literature seems especially inappropriate because the
external threat posed by terrorists to one state actually represents an ongoing domestic
threat to another government.

In effect, the nature of this threat creates a good deal of pressure to increase the pace,
scope, and intensity of global law enforcement activity. Without global engagement,
terrorists can always retreat to safe havens provided by unchallenged portions of their
networks.
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 2 (MAY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG

PART II
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES
       
1.  Terrorism
2.  Drug Trafficking
3.  Money Laundering
4.  Human Trafficking
5.   Cyber Crimes
6.  Others
Transnational crimes are crimes that have actual or potential effect across
national borders and crimes which are intra-State but which offend fundamental values
of the international community.[1] The term is commonly used in the law
enforcement and academic communities.

The word "transnational" describes crimes that are not only international (that is, crimes
that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature involve border
crossings as an essential part of the criminal activity. Transnational crimes also include
crimes that take place in one country, but their consequences significantly affect another
country. Examples of transnational crimes include: human trafficking, people smuggling,
smuggling/trafficking of goods (such as arms trafficking and drug trafficking), sex

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slavery, terrorism offences,torture and apartheid. Transnational organized crime (TOC)

refers specifically to transnational crime carried out by organized crime organizations.
Transnational Crimes may also be crimes of customary international law or international
crimes when committed in certain cricumstances. For example they may in certain
situations constitute Crimes against humanity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnational_crime

C. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Introduction

The international system that was conceived with the conclusion of the Treaty of
Westphalia has undergone significant and sweeping changes. The classical actors in
international relations consisting purely of sovereign and independent states have been
expanded to accommodate non-state actors to include intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations and multinational corporations. Countries are no longer
polarized by ideological conflicts but economic status. The paramount objectives in their
dealings with one another are no longer confined to the advancement of national interest
but include the attainment of regional and international peace and security.

It is, however, the degree of interdependence, which is popularly referred to as the era of
globalization, characterized by rapid increase of transactions across national borders that
underwent the most notable but controversial changes. This pattern of interconnectedness
encompasses information revolution and breaking down of national barriers to allow the
free flow of all factors of production. It is also characterized by the general tendency for
many domestic problems to affect other countries and renders inutile unilateral national
solutions.

These developments in international relations are indications that the world is gradually
being transformed into what Marshall McLuhan termed as "global village" or even a
"shrinking world" by Peter Grabosky. Whether the interdependence has reached this level
or not, the fact remains that humanity stands to savor globalization's benefits as well as
adverse effects.

Transnational Crime Defined

The transnational character of many crimes, although not new, has not been fully
recognized until recently. Crime was traditionally viewed as a purely domestic law
enforcement issue and, therefore, treated and addressed as an exclusive concern of

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individual states. As such transnational crime, being a new threat to domestic and
international interest and security, has yet to be baptized with an official definition.
However, there is an emerging consensus to accept the definition of transnational crime
as proposed by Bossard. He defined transnational crime as an offense that has an
international dimension and implies crossing at least one national border before,
during or after the fact.

With this working definition, we can now enumerate many crimes that satisfy the
elements of transnational crime. This includes the six major concerns of the Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) namely; illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, money laundering, terrorism, arms smuggling, trafficking in
persons and piracy.

The kidnapping of local and foreign nationals by members of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) in Sipadan, an island resort of Malaysia and a cyber crime involving the
spread of a love bug virus that crippled computer softwares worldwide are clear examples
of recent crimes falling under this category. The trafficking of Filipino nationals to Italy
using Hungary and other countries as transit points and the smuggling of illegal drugs
from Mainland China to our shores are some of the frequent transnational crime
incidence encountered by Philippine authorities.

PCTC PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Mission and Function of Interpol NCB-Manila
NCB-INTERPOL Manila serves as the office and main coordinating body for
international police cooperation against transnational crimes representing all law
enforcement agencies in the Philippines. In the accomplishment of its mission, NCB-
INTERPOL Manila has the following functions.
1. Monitor and coordinate all activities of all law enforcement agencies relative to
transnational crime committed against or affecting the Philippines;
2. Maintain records and minutes of all meetings of NCB-INTERPOL Manila.
3. Operate and maintain the operation center of NCB-INTERPOL Manila as the focal
point for international cooperation against transnational crimes for all law
enforcement agencies in the Philippines; and
4. The NCB-INTERPOL Manila also functions as a sub-committee of the NALECC
for the monitoring of the sensitive activities of the latter.
Roles and Function of NCB Sub-Bureaus
1. Receives request for information and record checks of local and foreign nationals
and reply to such request.

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2. Conduct investigation of cases brought to their attention involving Filipino's and

foreign nationals as requested by other Interpol member countries.
3. Monitor result of investigation for cases referred by Interpol for compliance and
feedback.
4. Ensures that cases referred for action are acted upon and reports are rendered
promptly.
5. Informs Interpol Manila on any case being handled by their agency involving
foreign nationals or seek assistance for verification or any coordination needed
with other Interpol member countries based on the Standard Message Format.
6. Maintain a list of wanted persons (local/foreign) circulated by Interpol and inform
Interpol Manila of any arrest.
7. Gives summaries of the most important international cases in which their agency
was involved; and
8. Submits periodic activity report of accomplishments to Interpol Manila based on
the Standard Message Format.

Information exchange between the Interpol General Secretariat and NCBs.

In its progress towards the goals and objectives set for the organization renewal of
INTERPOL, the organization has undergone enormous changes in recent years notably in
the stregthening of international police cooperation and in the modernization of
telecommunications.  

In order for Interpol to facilitate the rapid and reliable exchange of criminal investigative
information among the police of member countries, the NCBs used the Interpol Global
Communication System (I-24/7). In technical terms, I-24/7 is a security technology
network which operates using Internet protocols and state of the art security technology.
It delivers fast, reliable and secure information in a highly user-friendly manner
permitting immediate analysis and identification. NCBs now have easy and immediate
access to criminal information (drugs, counterfeit credit cards and fraudulently identity
documents,stolen vehicles, international notices, weapons and explosives tracking
systerm, finger prints and DNA, Stolen works of art...)
Telecommunication Network (X-400 Communication System)
One of INTERPOL's prime objective is to ensure that it's Member States have rapid,
reliable, secure and permanently available system for transmitting to each other to the
General Secretariat.
The telecommunication as network, security by encryption system. The information to be
transmitted maybe anything from typed text to images, fingerprints to database
consolations, photographs to facts files.

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Benefits that the Philippines Derive as Member of the INTERPOL

1. As member of the ICPO-INTERPOL we can have access to police information on
international Criminal Cases.
2. Access to International Summaries of Criminal Cases.
3. Attend meetings and symposiums on case of special topics.
4. Request information about criminal intelligence in an international perspective
through the criminal intelligence subdivision.
5. Access to information dealing with economic and financial crime in an
international level.
6. Access to information dealing with illicit drug trafficking in an international level.
7. Recipient of reference materials on criminology, crime prevention, criminal law
and procedures, techniques used by the police etc.
8. Participate in I.C.P.O - Interpol organized trainings.
9. Receives technical assistance and support on telecommunication and
computerization.
10. Use of the IPSG to circulate information intended for International
Circulation:

a. Individual notices
b. Stolen property notices
c. Modus operandi sheets
d. Facilitating identification
e. Criminal information on intelligence

11. Receives cooperation from other NCB's in Combating International Crimes

such as:

a. Crimes against person

b. Crime against property
c. Organized crime and terrorism
d. Firearms and explosives used for criminal purposes
e. Human trafficking, exploitation of prostitution, child abuse
f. Unlawful interference with international civil aviation
g. Trafficking of precious substance (gold, diamond, etc.)
h. Currency counterfeiting and forgery
i. Identification, tracing, seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from criminal
activities

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j. Illicit drug trafficking

k. Drug related activities

12. Receives cooperation on matters involving extradition from other NCB's.

13. Receives technical assistance granted by the more advanced countries to less
advanced countries especially in connection with training and specialization of
police personnel.

C-1. Beyond Transnational Crime

Sharon Pickering and Jude McCulloch

During the last two decades, neoliberal globalization has resulted in significant growth in
transnational crimes such as global terrorism, trafficking in antiquities, people and drugs,
immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. Beyond being pressing social problems,
they are the consequences of a significant extension and reconfiguration of state power
on various fronts, resulting from the progressive intersection of the internal and external
coercive functions of the political state in ways that have implicated crime control in
foreign policy and merged law enforcement with issues of national security. The dramatic
political-economic, social, and cultural transformations shaping the contemporary global
environment call for a new approach to transnational crime, one that transcends the
verities of orthodox criminology by examining the role of criminal organizations and
individuals, and that of political states and their economic partners in the generation of
transnational crime. The goal of this volume is to offer such a new approach.

Although globalization has rendered the borders between nation-states less significant in
terms of capital and financial flows, the border has simultaneously become an important
symbol of state power, fortified against unregulated flows of goods, money, and people.
Countermeasures against transnational crime have increasingly treated the boundaries
between military and police action, domestic and international law, and criminal justice
and international relations as ever more indistinct.

In addition, the development and deployment of preemptive countermeasures and the

application of retrospective legislation increasingly undermine the distinction between
past and present as states "colonize the future" and "rewrite the past." Border politics,
border reconstruction, geographically and temporally mobile borders, and a trend toward
"a-national" sites of enforcement are the hallmarks of state responses to transnational
crime and the conditions leading to transnational crime. Globalization's challenge to
geographic and temporal borders has been matched and reflected by challenges to the
boundaries that historically marked the limits of sovereignty, citizenship, and nation-
state. In important and as yet relatively unexamined ways, these shifts are evident in the

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nature of transnational crime, and are animated through state responses to it. These issues
are addressed here.

The articles published here arise from the 2006 meeting of the Prato Group, comprised of
criminologists from New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Group and these articles seek to lay a foundation for a transnational or global
criminology that begins with critical understandings of the state, borders, and crime. We
hope this edition will contribute to creating a new space for the development of useful
theories, empirical investigations, and the formulation of constructive social policy
regarding the phenomena labeled transnational crime and those frameworks, laws,
policies, and actions that are produced in response.

The ways in which transnational crime and its countermeasures confront the traditional
borders of crime control, national security, politics, and international relations challenge
the disciplinary boundaries of orthodox criminology, which has traditionally focused on
matters internal to nation-states. Critical criminologists, in contrast, have always
understood that sociologically grounded analyses of crimes, social harms, and wrongful
acts require an engagement with and understanding of the broadest political, economic,
and social terrain. Thus, as the authors here demonstrate, analyzing crimes and harms that
occur in the transnational context--and increasingly all contexts are transnationalized--
requires close attention to the processes of globalization and the dynamics between states,
and between states and nonstate actors, particularly the relationship between the states
and corporations.

The contributors to Beyond Transnational Crime also recognize that while state coercive
powers have been increasingly globalized under the auspice of transnational crime
frameworks, rights frameworks are still often territorially bounded, requiring
enforcement from a particular place. International frameworks related to state power and
rights have developed asymmetrically, with the result that discourses, laws, and measures
related to transnational crime have significantly eroded, undermined, and eclipsed the
international human rights frameworks that potentially limit state power and associated
social harms. Orthodox, state-centered ways of labeling and responding to troublesome
transnational activities also obscure the social, political, and economic conditions that
give rise to them, relieving states of the responsibility for creating and ameliorating these
conditions, and thus creating a fertile context for blaming, stigmatizing, and punishing
victims instead.

Although transnational crime enforcement strategies are purportedly aimed at organized

criminals, these countermeasures typically miss their targets altogether. Instead, they are
responsible for generating a range of serious transnational social harms borne
disproportionately by the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, especially refugees
and "illegalized" migrants. Although neoliberal countermeasures to transnational crime
have been frequently spectacularly unsuccessful, they have succeeded in reproducing

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established social divisions based on race, class, and gender by maintaining and
extending social, political, and economic hierarchies between and within states.

Beyond Transnational Crime offers an alternative theoretical approach to understanding

both the phenomena that are currently labeled transnational crime and state responses to
them. This collection differentiates itself from orthodox, state-centered and
administrative criminologist by paying careful attention to the conditions that produce
transnational crimes and the harms that arise from state responses, as well as, in some
cases, the failure of the state to respond. By critically analyzing the role of the state and
the dynamics of power between state and nonstate actors, the authors here foreground the
ways in which crime and social injuries in the transnational context are intimately linked
to the intersection of neoliberal globalization and renewed forms of empire and
imperialism.

C-2. Specific Types of Transnational Crime

http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/week7.htm

We began thinking about ways to categorize international and transnational crime, with
one such division being motivation. Most of the items on the transnational crime list
appear to have financial motivation. The international crimes appear to have political,
ideological, or other non-financial motivations. Obviously, this distinction breaks down,
as terrorist acts might be carried out for monetary gain or political reasons. Certain forms
of computer hacking don't seem to fit in either category, as some are done just to see if
it’s possible to break through digital security systems. 

For this course, we've used financial motivation as a key, and spent weeks looking at
transnational crimes that appear to be primarily monetary in nature. This summer we'll
cover international crimes and those whose motivation are other than financial. Included
on this list are terrorism, trafficking in people, and computer crime. Each of these could
have financial elements and frequently do, but political, social, and cultural
underpinnings often motivate crimes on the above list.

1. Global Terrorism

The Terrorism Research Center provides this definition of terrorism:

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Terrorism is a crime, consisting of an intentional act of political violence

to create an atmosphere of fear. Terrorists use violence to make a political
statement about a government or policy with which they disagree. The
victim may be symbolic or random, but the act itself is always political.
Acts of terrorism are premeditated by their perpetrators and are
conspiratorial in nature. It is by generating fear the terrorist hopes to
motivate the public, group or government to make changes whereby the
goals of the terrorist might be realized.

2. Trafficking in People

This is a very broad category, encompassing everything from illegal immigration

to international prostitution, slavery, and child pornography. The greatest
motivations for the first three appear to be global economic conditions and
political unrest. People attempt to escape from politically repressive and
economically depressed societies (push factors) and head towards ones that
promise economic opportunity and political freedom (pull factors). 

The President’s Interagency Council on Women has formulated a definition on

trafficking in women and children:

Trafficking is all acts involved in the recruitment, abduction, transport,

harboring, transfer, sale or receipt of persons; within national or across
international borders; through force, coercion, fraud or deception; to place persons
in situations of slavery or slavery-like conditions, forced labor or services, such
as forced prostitution or sexual services, domestic servitude, bonded
sweatshop labor or other debt bondage. 

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In essence, trafficking in women is the use of force and deception to transfer women into
situations of extreme exploitation. Examples of this may include Latvian women
threatened and forced
to dance nude in
Chicago; Thai
women brought to the
US for the sex industry,
but then forced to be
virtual sex
slaves; ethnically
Korean-Chinese
women held as
indentured servants in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; and hearing-
impaired and mute Mexicans brought to the US, enslaved, beaten, and forced to peddle
trinkets in New York City.

Human trafficking is the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or
deception, with the aim of exploiting them.
Smuggling migrants involves the procurement for financial or other material benefit of
illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident.
Virtually every country in the world is affected by these crimes. The challenge for all
countries, rich and poor, is to target the criminals who exploit desperate people and to
protect and assist victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants, many of whom endure
unimaginable hardships in their bid for a better life.

3. The Internet and International Crime

Obviously, the Internet (I-way) and international crime are fundamentally related,
as the Internet backbone connects all online computer networks worldwide to each
other.  

Digital crime in all forms is likely to increase dramatically in the 21 st Century, as

globalization of computer networks continues, accompanied by dramatically
increased access to these networks. Criminologists, criminal justice officials, and
computer security personnel need to prepare now to be able to meet this threat.
However, until recently it has been difficult to even categorize digital crime
adequately so that analysts and practitioners can discuss this phenomenon
intelligently. Phrases such as computer crime, network crime, Internet crime, and
information crime have all been employed, often times without specificity, to
describe digital crime. Terms such as hacking, cracking, freaking, spoofing, and
computer terrorism have been applied to certain types of digital crimes; again
without consistent usage.
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The Webopedia offers the following definitions:

Hacker 
A slang term for a computer enthusiast, i.e., a person who enjoys learning
programming languages and computer systems and can often be considered an
expert on the subject(s). Among professional programmers, depending on how it
used, the term can be either complimentary or derogatory, although it is developing
an increasingly derogatory connotation. The pejorative sense of hacker is becoming
more prominent largely because the popular press has co-opted the term to refer to
individuals who gain unauthorized access to computer systems for the purpose of
stealing and corrupting data. Hackers, themselves, maintain that the proper term for
such individuals is cracker.
 

Crack
(1) To break into a computer system. The term was coined in the mid-80s
by hackers who wanted to differentiate themselves from individuals whose sole
purpose is to sneak through security systems. Whereas crackers sole aim is to break
into secure systems, hackers are more interested in gaining knowledge about
computer systems and possibly using this knowledge for playful pranks. Although
hackers still argue that there's a big difference between what they do and what
crackers do, the mass media has failed to understand the distinction, so the two
terms -- hack and crack -- are often used interchangeably.

(2) To copy commercial software illegally by breaking (cracking) the various

copy-protection and registration techniques being used.

IP spoofing 
A technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the intruder
sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message is
coming from a trusted host. To engage in IP spoofing, a hacker must first use a
variety of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted host and then modify
the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming from that host.

Crime in the Digital Age by Grabosky and Smith provides much needed assistance to our
thinking about digital crime. Their categorization of electronic crimes recognizes that
there are differences between existing types of crime now being committed by digital
means, and newly emerging forms of crime impossible before the advent of networked
computer systems. Overall, the authors categorize digital crimes as follows, devoting a
chapter to fleshing out examples of each:

Illegal interception of telecommunications

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Electronic vandalism and terrorism

Stealing telecommunications services
Telecommunications piracy
Pornography and other offensive content
Telemarketing fraud
Electronic funds transfer crime
Electronic money laundering
Telecommunications in furtherance of criminal conspiracies

It is within this framework that we can define and apply terms such
as hacking and spoofing, so that all professionals who need to refer to these practices can
use a common frame of reference. Just to give one example, under the heading of
pornography and other offensive content fall such new forms of harassment
as flaming, mail-bombing, and spoofing the identity of another to send libelous or
defamatory information. The categories developed by Garbosky and Smith can be
modified or added to as new digital crimes emerge. 

Boni and Kovacich in I-Way Robbery: Crime on the Internet focus on specific crimes,
frequently chosen targets, and methods of attack. Their book is aimed at law enforcement
professionals and computer security personnel, both currently overwhelmed by the
current amount of I-way crime.

Equally important, is discussions of the laws (or the lack thereof) that apply to each type
of digital crime. Grabosky and Smith provide summaries of the laws of Australia, the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  A number of conclusions emerge from
such comparative analysis.

(1) Many types of digital crime are prosecutable under several legal statutes
simultaneously. For example, since the Internet ultimately use phone lines to transmit
data, criminal violators can be charged with telecommunications crimes as well as
specific computer crimes.

(2) Despite the plethora of laws, most are in no way universally applicable, and thus
extremely difficult to enforce. Internet criminals are likely to use servers in countries with
the least restrictions on their activities.  For example, in 1999, American network TV
signals were being digitized and “rebroadcast” using streaming technology from a
Canadian server, because copyright laws are more difficult to enforce there.

 (3) Given the difficulty of enforcing laws across jurisdictions and countries, prevention
strategies hold much greater promise in reducing digital crimes. These include personal
and organizational security policies and practices, featuring such things as filtering
software, anti-virus software, firewalls, password and encryption tools, and biometric

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access technologies.  Paradoxically, government officials are equally worried about the

use of these technologies by digital criminals to hide evidence, make interception of
messages impossible, and thwart law enforcement efforts. The result has been requests
for back door entry to all computer files (clipper chips) and weaker available encryption
standards. This in turn has inspired privacy advocates to seek greater protections from
government intrusions. 

(4) Another avenue to stopping digital crime in the future will be the use of international
treaties to govern cyberspace.  Recent efforts such as the Geneva conference on copyright
protection may help.

Other efforts the can be recommend as part of comprehensive planning in this area
include: better detection and higher reporting rates by victimized users; expanded data
collection and analysis, coordination of efforts, and specialized units within law
enforcement; harmonization of laws and expanded extradition to aid prosecution, and
stiffer penalties as deterrents.

4. Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking refers to

illegal drugs being sold and
distributed. This happens in
the United States as well as in
other countries. The main
concern with transnational
drug trafficking for the United
States is illegal drugs being
transported in from other
countries and sold. Not only
do these illegal drugs cause
crime in the States, the sale of
them also draws large
amounts of money into other
countries. Because illegal drugs, such as marijuana, methamphetamines and cocaine, are
in demand in the United States, trafficking in drugs is a very common and lucrative
transnational crime. This causes drug trafficking to be extremely hard to combat and stop.
With drug trafficking comes other types of crime, such as money laundering, illegal
procession of arms or even murder.

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Global heroin flows from Asian points of origin

Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2010

5. Money Laundering

Money laundering refers to the process of criminals disguising the illegal origins of their
money. Money
laundering occurs
all over the world.
Criminals who get
their money from
illegal actions, such
as prostitution,
smuggling
or computer fraud
typically launder
their money in
order not to attract
the attention of
authorities. By not
attracting attention
from authorities,
criminals are able to fly under the radar and continue their criminal activities, making
even more money without getting in trouble. Money laundering is done in three main
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ways: disguising the source of the money -- such as disguising a prostitution ring as a
massage parlor, changing the form -- such as changing cash into a money order, or
moving the funds -- such as taking money from one large bank account and putting
it in several smaller accounts under different names. 
Money-laundering is the process that disguises illegal profits without compromising the
criminals who wish to benefit from the proceeds. There are two reasons why criminals -
whether drug traffickers, corporate embezzlers or corrupt public officials - have to
launder money: the money trail is evidence of their crime and the money itself is
vulnerable to seizure and has to be protected. Regardless of who uses the apparatus of
money-laundering, the operational principles are essentially the same. Money-laundering
is a dynamic three-stage process that requires:
 placement, moving the funds from direct association with the crime;
 layering, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and,
 integration, making the money available to the criminal, once again, with its
occupational and geographic origins hidden from view.
These three stages are usually referred to as placement, layering and integration.

Questions, Answers and Facts about Money Laundering

Q: What is money laundering and why do people do it? 

A: Today, enterprise criminals of every sort, from drug traffickers to stock fraudsters to
corporate embezzlers and commodity smugglers, must 
launder money for two reasons. The first is that the money trail itself can become
evidence; the second is that the money can be the target of investigation and seizure. The
operational principles of money laundering are as follows: first, moving the funds from
direct association with the crime; second, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, third,
making the money available to the criminal once again with its origins hidden from view.

Q: How much money is laundered every year and how much is recovered by law
enforcement? 
A: Estimates have ranged as high as $300 billion to $500 billion a year. Law enforcement
authorities recover about $500 million in a good year, roughly a quarter of 1 per cent.

Q: What are the consequences of money laundering activities for national

economies? 
A: Money laundering undermines international efforts towards free and competitive
markets, and the development of national economies:

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 It distorts the functioning of markets: money

laundering transactions can increase the
demand for cash, create exchange rate
volatility and generate unfair competition.
 It damages credibility and therefore the
stability of financial markets: bank collapses
related to organized crime activities can have
a domino effect on the financial system of
individual countries or regions. 
Small States are particularly vulnerable to
money laundering. The economic power
generated by outlaw activities provides
criminal organizations with leverage on small
economies. The absence of appropriate
controls, or of the capacity to enforce them,
provides de facto impunity to criminals.

Q: How effective are the international instruments governing money laundering? 

A: The international community is not using all the tools at its disposal. The 1988 UN
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances obliges
States to make money laundering illegal and assist investigations. Of the 148 signatories
to the Convention, fewer than 30 are fully implementing its measures.

Q: Is there an acceptable right to banking privacy? 

A: Yes, but acceptable levels of confidentiality must be clearly defined. There are
legitimate commercial, legal or even human rights reasons for confidentiality. However,
the abuse of bank secrecy must be countered.

Q: What role does the Internet have in money laundering? 

A: Internet banking is a growing source of worry. It has already been proven that
fraudulent banking business can be conducted via the Internet. For example, in one case
an Internet bank was domiciled in an offshore centre, the server was in another country
and the operational management was located in a third. When the owners of the bank
stole the depositors' funds, it was impossible to pursue them through the three
jurisdictions. Their actions were not even considered illegal in the jurisdiction where the
bank was physically located.

Q: What should the international community do? 

A: The members of the international community have agreed to comply with the existing
international instruments currently governing money laundering by the year 2003. Of

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particular importance is adherence to the provisions of the 1988 United Nations

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. But the
international community needs to continue to question the way banks are defined. Should
they be chartered by Governments in order to tighten controls? How should they be
regulated? Should we allow companies to be formed in places where they have no
apparent purpose connected with normal commercial activities, or whose owners may
conceal their identity? An emphasis must be placed on systemic reforms, rather than
specific tinkering with the odd regulation. The harmonization of regulatory regimes
covering financial havens, trusts, shell companies and banks should be a main goal.

Q: What can the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML) do to

help? 
A: Developing countries, and those with economies in transition, are in particular need of
technical assistance and training. Local law enforcement cannot crack down on complex
financial crimes unless they know the tricks of the money launderer. The UN Global
Programme against Money Laundering is ready to provide expert training, assistance,
public awareness and research tools on the art of financial investigations, 
prosecutions, best banking practices and financial regulations for government, business,
law enforcement and judicial professionals.

To request assistance and additional information from the 

UN Global Programme against Money Laundering, please contact 
the United Nations directly at the following address:

UN Office on Drugs and Crime 

Global Programme against Money Laundering 
P.O. Box 500, A-1400 Vienna, Austria 
Tel.: (43-1) 260 60 5762 
Fax: (43-1) 260 60 6878 
E-mail: [email protected] 
Web site: http://www.imolin.org

The G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in 1989 established the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) the purpose of which is the promotion and development of policies to
combat money-laundering. In April 1998, FATF member-states confirmed their
intention to build a strong global alliance and urged all concerned to foster the
establishment of a world-wide anti-money laundering network through expansion of its
membership, development of regional bodies and close coordination with all relevant
international organizations. It also expressed its concerned on jurisdictions which allow
excessive banking secrecy and the use of “screen companies” for illegal purposes. It then
issued the FATF 40 Recommendations on money-laundering which was revised in 1996
and referred to as the FATF Recommendations.
THE G7: Group of Seven: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA

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6. Arms Trafficking

Arms’ trafficking refers to the smuggling of guns, ammunition and other weapons.
When weapons are smuggled into a country and sold illegally, buyers don't have to have
any type of license or waiting period in order to buy one. This makes it easier for
criminals who can't purchase a weapon legally to obtain one. Smuggled weapons
typically end up in the hands of criminals or people with criminal intentions. This causes
more crime to occur that could potentially be reduced if illegal arms trafficking is
reduced or eliminated. Stopping arms trafficking is difficult because weapons have
military, law enforcement and sport uses. This makes it harder to determine if a weapon
is in the country and possessed legally.

Read more: Types of Transnational Crime | eHow.com http://www.ehow.com/info

7. The Market for Human Body Parts

The first successful human transplant - a kidney - occurred in France in 1906. More
transplant attempts followed in other parts of Europe and later in the Soviet Union. But
the modern era of human transplants only began in the 1950s, and even then transplants
remained largely experimental until the mid-1970s (Patrick et al., 1991).
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, the number of transplants began to increase, an
increase that continued to accelerate throughout the decades. For example, of 6000 heart
transplants performed worldwide by 1988, 80% had occurred during the period 1984-
1988 (Patrick et al., 1991). Graph 1 shows the increased occurrence of human organ
transplants internationally between 1978 and 1994.(4)

The most rapid increase in transplant procedures occurred in the wealthy and
technologically advanced Western countries. Nonetheless, organ transplants came into
practice in many parts of the world, rich and poor alike. By 1994, nearly 300,000
transplants (of all types) had been conducted throughout the world (see Table 1).

Moreover, the variety of different types of transplants also "took off," especially
following the approval for general use in 1983 of the immunosuppressive drug,
cyclosporine. Kidneys, hearts, and lungs remained the organ transplants "of choice," but
other types, including multiple transplants, became more common (see, for example,
CORR, 1996).

C-3. How Do We Know Anything About the Reality of Transnational Crime?

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Deductive or Inductive?

As this course focuses on the transnational crime problem as an aspect of comparative

criminology, it will be critical to reflect on what we currently know about this
phenomenon and how we know it.  Only then can we discuss and compare contemporary
responses to transnational crime, and suggest new crime control policies.

There are two ways we could approach these issues, corresponding closely to inductive
and deductive reasoning as investigative techniques. In a deductively constructed course,
the instructor would give out a list of definitions, describe the problems to be
investigated, what is currently known about each problem, etc.

In this course, we will adopt an inductive approach instead. Rather than presuming that
transnational crime can be easily defined and its extent statistically validated, we will
begin by analyzing the ways in which "knowledge" about this phenomenon is produced
and becomes "taken for granted" as part of reality. Only then, will we attempt to define
transnational crime and it global extent.

In this regard, this course will adopt a starting position variously known as social
constructionism, symbolic interactionism, labeling, or phenomenological existentialism. 
Since the 1960s, a number of social scientists have focused upon the "social construction
of reality." This phrase, coined by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman in their book with
the same title, presumes that ultimately reality may be unknowable except as a mediated
phenomenon. Similarly, in A Sociology of the Absurd, Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott
asserted that reality is "absurd" in the sense that it is unfathomable. However, Lyman and
Scott also recognized that to accept reality as absurd ran counter to most people's
common sense understanding of the world in which they live. Most people (except for the
insane and some existential philosophers) assume that "reality" is indeed knowable. But,
how do we know it? How do we come to the conclusion that we have grasped the essence
of reality?

Components of Reality

Reality as a mediated experience is different for each individual. This was pointed out by
Aaron Cicourel in his book Cognitive Sociology. Yet, we remain able to converse
intelligently with others because of shared understandings. Durkheim identified these
features of collective life as "social facts." Reality is in turn mediated to each individual,
and these images are internalized and accepted as fact. Components of an individual's
interpretation of reality include a combination of the following:

Experience
Socialization
Mass Media
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Academic Studies
Experience

Obviously, some of the knowledge of reality we possess is based on experience. Some

even go so far as to claim that experience is the only basis for understanding reality
clearly. I have witnessed this in classes when students who work in the criminal justice
system caution others about presuming they know something about policing, the courts,
or corrections when they have never been a police or corrections officer. Unfortunately,
most people will never have the opportunity to be police officers or even to take part in
ride-along programs or jail tours. However, every citizen in this society has an opinion
about police and prisons; and their thoughts form part of their understanding of reality.
People in everyday life claim to know about many things they have never experienced
themselves. While few have ever been to Antarctica, most could describe it.

What types of personal experiences do citizens have with the criminal justice system? For
most people the only personal experiences they have with police are in situations such as
traffic stops or crowd control at sports contests. If citizens have had "negative
experiences" during these interactions, they may harbor an overall negative image of
police. The major benefit of community-oriented policing, school resource officers, and
programs such as DARE may be that these programs offer people positive experiences
with police officers. This may in turn change attitudes toward law enforcement.

Most citizens have no experience at all with transnational crime, though some may have
been willing consumers of illegal products such as drugs or imported bootlegged CDs.
So, if experience has so little to do with what we know about crime and justice, how do
people come to their understandings of the nature of such things?

Socialization

The traditional answer given by sociologists is that reality is produced as a by product of

the socialization process. Individuals interact with others and internalize their experiences
and conversations.  As children, we come to understand the world around us because it is
mediated for us by parents, teachers, siblings and peers. As we grow older we continue to
rely on personal experiences and the experiences of others.

The experiences of others and their retelling can be important in shaping a person's view
of reality, and in some cases the reality shared by any entire community. For example,
while not all black males have had a "bad experience" during a police stop, enough have
that the accounts of such experiences are ubiquitous in the black community and a
pervasive fear/dislike of the police may exist as a result. When black celebrities like Joe
Morgan, ex-baseball player, or Blair Underwood, actor on L.A. Law, discussed for the
national media how they were stopped while driving expensive cars in upper middle class

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neighborhoods, a logical conclusion was that minorities continue to harassed by the

police needlessly. The Mark Furman tapes introduced during the O. J. Simpson trial only
added to what minorities "already know" is true. While a number of police department
spokespersons appeared in the media to claim that Furman was an aberration among
police officers, most minority members continued to think otherwise.

However, as with personal experience, the accounts of others and their internalization as
part of socialization may provide little data about topics relevant to this course. Most
have not directly been victimized by transnational crimes, though those with networked
computers are more and more frequently under direct attack by global computer viruses
and worms. In a recent HBO docudrama, The Corner, victims of drug addiction in urban
Baltimore appeared to have no conception that they were caught up in international drug
trafficking patterns.

Mass Media

Certainly the media plays a very important part in constructing reality for us within our
technological society because of its ability to provide images of experiences most people
are unlikely to have (like going to Antarctica; or being arrested, going to jail, being a
criminal defendant, or being sentenced to prison). When considering things few of us
experience directly, media images must of necessity play a very important part. Graber's
study of news sources found that mass media was credited with providing 95% of the
information the public receives about crime.

Almost all of us have watched movies and documentaries about transnational crime. 
From James Bond type efforts to stop global terrorism to drug trafficking films like The
French Connection to the latest escapades of The Sopranos, international crime and
efforts to stop it are frequently depicted. Are these depictions in any way based in reality?
Or do they mostly just reference other media images, like earlier movies?

News stories about transnational crime appear almost every night on network TV news.
A quick search of the Vanderbilt TV News Archive reveals a multitude of related stories.
As the number of television news sources has increased, so has the number of stories
about international crime. 

How citizens are affected by this steady dose of global crime stories?

One model, cultivation theory, was put forward by George Gerbner at the Annenberg
School of Communications. He believes that the typical heavy viewer of such
programming is likely also to be isolated and atomized, thus highly influenceable by the
media. The result of a heavy diet of media violence is that people perceive our society as
a mean, scary, and dangerous place when it is not.

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The unintended consequence of media violence is that citizens respond by overly

supporting conservative crime control agendas (e.g. electing legislators who run on
platforms that they will be tough on crime, supporting laws that toughen criminal
penalties, etc.) The ultimate result has been the massive buildup of our jails and prisons.
Gerbner compared heavy viewers to light viewers, saying heavy viewers showed greater
fear responses. Senior citizens trap themselves in their own homes and watch a steady
diet of murder and mayhem on the evening news. Other researchers disagree with
Gerbner's hypothesis that the media creates the fear response in viewers and have
criticized his methodology. (see Chandler below)

The Internet has emerged over the last 10 years as a major sources of information on all
topics, including transnational crime. However, a new problem emerges as to how to sort
out the importance of the materials found there. Everything from online editions of
newspapers to government and United Nations reports to the private postings of crime
victims is available.  We'll look at ways to analyze the value of Internet materials as
sources of information about transnational crime and criminal justice. 

Academic Study

The academic study of transnational crime is still in its infancy, particularly when
compared to other criminological concerns. For example, there are no textbooks in this
area that give an overview of all types of transnational crime and how various countries
are attempting to deal with it. This course should contribute to a better overall
understanding of this topic.

However, there are a number of important issues that need to be discussed in relation to
the academic study of transnational crimes. These include:

1. Why have certain negative behaviors been focused upon (e.g. drug trafficking)
while others (global pollution) not been treated as serious crime issues?

2. Can crime statistics compiled by different countries even be compared?

3. What are we to make of the fact that not all countries have laws criminalizing the
negative behaviors we are discussing? For example, money laundering is not
universally a crime.

4. How do we account for the major differences in policy in regards to preventing

and deterring these type crimes? The United States has been employing
imprisonment of both dealers and users as the solution to drug trafficking; in
Holland you can purchase marijuana in cafes.

PART III

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Selected Police Models

D- I. Japan Police System

D-2. Singapore Police System
D-3. Police System of Other ASEAN Countries
D-4. Australian Federal Police
D-5. US and other European Models
D-6. Programs of Select Police Models
D-7. Application to the Philippine Setting

D -1. JAPAN POLICE SYSTEM

Description of the Japanese Police Organization

1. Responsibilities

Police responsibilities under the Police Act include “protecting life, person and
property; preventing, suppressing and investigating crimes; apprehending
suspects; traffic enforcement; and, maintaining public safety and order."

The Code of Criminal Procedure states that “when a judicial police official deems an
offense has been committed, he shall investigate the offender and evidence thereof.”
Accordingly, the police are empowered to investigate not only penal code offenses but

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also all illegal acts punishable under Japan’s judicial system. Most cases are investigated
by the police and referred to the public prosecutor’s office for prosecution. While public
prosecutors are also empowered to conduct investigations, their investigations are
generally supplementary. The primary duty of the public prosecutor is to determine case
dispositions and prosecute defendants.

Several other authorities such as the Japan Coast Guard and the Narcotics Control
Department retain investigative powers. Their investigations are generally limited in
scope, as authorized by act, and the number of cases is small.

Besides criminal investigations, the police perform many administrative activities to

maintain public safety and order applying various acts such as the Road Traffic Act and
the Anti-Boryokudan Act.

The police also conduct a wide variety of activities and maintain close contact with
local communities to:

・Prevent crimes;
・Handle lost and found articles;
・Give guidance to juveniles;
・Help people in times of disaster;
・Take care of lost children and runaways; and,
・Provide counseling services to help citizens solve their problems.

2. History

In 1872, the government sent the first Superintendent General Toshiyoshi KAWAJI to
Europe to research the police system. He returned the following year and in 1874
established the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in the Ministry of the Interior.
This was the first modern police agency in Japan. The police system was based on a
National Police system.

In the process of the democratization of Japan after World War 􁶘the old Police Act,
enforced in 1948, had incorporated the system of public safety Commission into the
police and had created a structure consisting of national and municipal police with the
aim of ensuring democratic management and decentralization of police power.

The old Police Act had an epochal significance in that it had aimed at democratizing the
police. However, it had institutional shortcomings such as the existence of a multitude of
municipal police forces in parallel with the National Rural Police. This caused several
problems.

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With a view to retaining the good features of the old act and remedying its institutional
shortcomings, the old Police Act was amended in its entirety into the present act in 1954.
Under the present Police Act, the National Police Agency was established and the present
police system started.

3. Organization

The Police Act empowers the national government to establish a central police
organization to control and supervise prefectural police organizations on matters of
national concern. The act also gives each prefecture the authority to carry out police
duties to “protect life, person and property” and “maintain public safety and order” within
its prefectural jurisdiction. At both the national and prefectural levels, public safety
commissions have administrative supervision over the police.

A. National Police Organization

The National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency constitute
Japan’s national police organization.

(1) National Public Safety Commission

After the World War 􁶘, the

public safety commission
system was introduced
under the process of police
reform. The main object of
introduction of this system
is to ensure the democratic
administration and political
neutrality of police under
the administrative
supervision by the
commission which consists
of people with good sense.

The National Public

Safety Commission exercises administrative supervision over the National Police
Agency. While the Commission is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, the Prime
Minister is not empowered to exercise direct command or control. This ensures the
Commission’s independence and its political neutrality.

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The Commission formulates basic policies and regulations, coordinates police

administration on matters of national concern and authorizes general standards for
training, communication, criminal identification, criminal statistics and equipment.

The Commission appoints the National Police Agency’s Commissioner General and
senior officials of prefectural police organizations. The Commission indirectly supervises
prefectural police organizations through the National Police Agency.

The Commission consists of a chairman and five members. To make the cabinet’s
responsibility for the public safety clear, the chairman is a state minister who presides
over Commission meetings. Members, who serve five-year term, are appointed by the
Prime Minister with the consent of both houses of the Diet. They must be persons who
have not served as police or prosecutorial officials for the last five years. To ensure
political neutrality, no more than two members may belong to the same political party.

To fulfill its duty, the commission holds a regular meeting once a week, and if necessary,
holds additional meetings.

(2) National Police Agency

(a) Organization and Authority

The NPA is headed by a Commissioner General who is appointed or dismissed by the

Commission with the approval of the Prime Minister. The Commissioner General, under
the administrative supervision of the Commission, administers the agency’s operations,
appoints and dismisses agency employees and supervises and controls prefectural police
organizations within the agency’s defined duties.

The NPA duties include:

・Planning and research on police systems;

・National police budget;
・Review of national policies on police;
・Police operations in time of large scale disasters and disturbances;
・Formulation and implementation of plans for emergency situations;
・Measures against trans-prefectural organized crime;
・Traffic regulation on national highways;
・International criminal investigation assistance;
・Operation of the Imperial Guard;
・International emergency relief activities;
・Police training;
・Police communications;
・Criminal identification
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・Criminal statistics;
・Police equipment;
・Standards of recruitment, duties and activities of police personnel;
・Coordination of police administration; and,
・Inspection.

(b) Organizations Attached to the National Police Agency

NPA-
attached

organizations include the National Police Academy, the

National Research Institute of Police Science and the Imperial Guard
Headquarters.

The National Police Academy provides training to senior police officers and carries out
academic research. I t has nine t raining departments, including Community Safety,
Criminal Investigation, Traffic and Security Training Departments. Experts in each
department serve as instructors or researchers.
Academy sub-units that provide advanced and expert training and conduct research are:
the Highest Training Institute for Investigation Leaders, the Research and Training
Center for International Criminal Investigation and Police Cooperation, the Police Policy
Research Center, the Police Info-Communications
Research Center, the Police Info-Communication Academy, and the Research and
Training Center for Financial Crime Investigation.

The National Research Institute of Police Science conducts research in forensic science
and applies the results of such research in the examination and identification of evidence
collected during police investigations. It also conducts juvenile crime prevention and
traffic accident research. The Institute’s seven departments are: General Affairs; First,
Second, Third and Fourth Forensic Science; Criminology and Behavioral Sciences; and,
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Traffic. The Imperial Guard Headquarters provides escorts for the Emperor, Empress,
Crown Prince and other Imperial Family members. It is also responsible for the security
of the Imperial Palace and other Imperial facilities. It consists of the Imperial Police
Administration, the Imperial Security and the Imperial Escort departments.

(c) Regional Police Bureaus

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Regional Police Bureaus (RPB) are subordinate to the NPA.

There are seven RPBs nationwide. They are located in major cities of each geographic
region. Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and Hokkaido
Prefectural Police Headquarters are excluded from the jurisdiction of RPBs.

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Headed by a Director General, each RPB exercises necessary control and supervision
over and provides support services to prefectural police within its jurisdiction, under the
authority and orders of NPA’s Commissioner General. Attached to each RPB is a
Regional Police School that provides police personnel with education and training
required of staff officers as well as other necessary education and training.

B. Prefectural Police Organization

The Police Act requires that each prefectural government has its own police organization
to carry out police duties within its jurisdiction. The prefectural public safety commission
and prefectural police headquarters constitute the police organization.

(1) Prefectural Public Safety Commissions

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Prefectural Public Safety Commissions (PPSC) are under the jurisdiction of elected
prefectural governors.
PPSC exercise administrative supervision over the prefectural police by formulating basic
policies and regulations for police operations. They are also authorized to issue
administrative licenses for amusement businesses, firearm possession and driving
permits; however, neither PPSC nor prefectural governors nor elected assemblies may
supervise individual cases or specific law enforcement activities of the prefectural police.

Large PPSC have five members, while others have three. Members are appointed from
those who have not served as a police or prosecutorial official within five years of
appointment by the prefectural governor with prefectural assembly’s consent and serve a
three-year term. The members then elect their chairman among them. A majority of the
PPSC members may not belong to the same political party.
(b) Police Stations, Police Boxes and Residential Police Boxes

The MPD and the PPH divide their territory into districts, each under the jurisdiction of a
police station headed by a station chief. As operational units at the front lines, police
stations perform their duties in close contact with the local community. Police boxes
(Koban) and residential police boxes (Chuzaisho) are subordinate units of police
stations and are located in sub-districts of the station. They are the focal points of
community police activities and serve as the “Community Safety Center” for local
residents.

They play the leading role in the maintenance of the safety of local communities through
links with the people and local government bodies. To permit them to successfully fulfill
this role, Japanese police strive to provide them with the infrastructure they require.

(c) Relations among Prefectural Police Organizations

Although each PPH (including MPD) is independent, when large scale incidents occur
within a single prefecture or crimes cross prefectural borders, other prefectural police
forces and the NPA render assistance when requested. In addition, PPH can extend their
authority (generally up to 15 km beyond its border) to cope with incidents occurring on
or near prefectural boundaries. A PPH can also exercise its authority in other prefectures
to such an extent as necessary for protecting the life, persons and property of the
prefecture’s residents and maintaining the public safety of the prefecture.

4. Human Resources

A. Authorized Strength

The National Police Agency (NPA) and prefectural police are staffed with police officers
and Imperial guards, clerical and technical officials, and other necessary personnel. As of
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2009, the total strength reached approximately 290,600 personnel. The NPA total is about
7,700: 1,900 police officers, 900 Imperial guards and 4,900 civilians. Prefectural police
total is about 283,000: 254,300 police officers and 28,700 civilians. Nationwide, there are
about 14,200 female police officers and about 11,800 female civilians.

Female police officers are expected to play a greater role in

various fields of police activities. Their characteristics and
competence are indispensable for the improvement and
promotion of assistance to the victims of crime, especially to the
victims of sex crimes, and to cope with newly emerging
threats, such as stalking, domestic violence and child abuse.
The police, therefore, are making every effort to promote
measures to improve the working environment for female police
officers, including the introduction of a babysitter system in
contract with private enterprises, etc.
B. Rank

Police officers are divided into nine ranks:

1. Superintendent General,
2. Superintendent supervisor,
3. Chief Superintendent,
4. Senior superintendent,
5. Superintendent,
6. Police inspector,
7. Assistant police inspector,
8. Police sergeant and
9. Police Officer.

The NPA Commissioner General holds the highest position of

the Japanese police. His title is not a rank but rather denotes
his position as head of the NPA. On the other hand, the MPD
Superintendent General represents not only the highest rank in
the system but also assignment as head of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department. In order to integrate and
coordinate the prefectural police, prefectural police officers who
hold the rank of senior superintendent or above are national
government employees. At present, 623 senior superintendents
and above are assigned to prefectural police.

C. Promotion

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The police promotion process differs according to rank. Promotion up to police inspector
is based on written examination and professional accomplishment. In each case, however,
knowledge, skill and experience are taken into consideration. Promotion to
superintendent or above is based on an evaluation of ability, experience and work record.

D. Pay and Welfare

Because police work is inherently dangerous, police officers are paid under a special pay
scale. Their initial salary in the case of high school graduates, who engage in dangerous
or difficult duties, such as criminal investigation, traffic control and vehicle patrols, is, on
average, approximately 15% higher than that of administrative service personnel. Police
officers are also paid special allowances.

E. Recruitment

Recruitment procedures of NPA police officers

differ from those of the Prefectural Police
Headquarters.
The NPA recruits from those who have passed the
National Public Service Examinations conducted
by the National Personnel Authority. These officers
are assigned either to the NPA or the PPH as key
members.

PPH applicants are administered an exhaustive

written examination by prefectural personnel
authorities in cooperation with the PPH. In 2008,
nationwide, about 110,300 persons took the
examination; about 14,500 passed. Different
examinations are given in accordance with the
applicant’s educational background, high school or
university graduates, and each is recruited
separately.

PPH interviews those who pass the written

examination and final selections are made based on
an assessment of an applicant’s ability and
adaptability to the rigor of police duties. University
graduates account for about 65% of the successful
applicants.

F. Educational Training

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(1) Educational Training for New Recruits

Newly recruited prefectural police officers undergo an initial training program consisting
of pre-service training course, on-the-job training, pre-service progress course, and the
actual exercise course.

Educated training for high school graduates is 21 months (15 months for university
graduates).

High school graduates first attend a ten-month pre-service training course at the
prefectural police school (6 months for university graduates). During the course, they
acquire basic community policing knowledge and skills.

After graduation, they are assigned to a police station for 3 months of on-the-job training
under instruction of a senior officer.

Then, they return to the police school for a three-month progress educational training
program to cultivate character, improve professional legal knowledge and hone their
understanding and skills in community policing (2 months for university graduates).

Thereafter, they are assigned to a police station, where they perform their actual duties
for 5 months in the police box, receiving instruction by a senior officer (4 months for
university graduates).

(2) Educational Training upon Promotion and

Higher Level Training

When promoted, police officers receive educational training suited for their new rank.

Newly promoted police sergeants and assistant police inspectors receive educational
training to acquire the knowledge and skills to perform their new duties at a regional
police school. (6 week course for police sergeants, 8 week course for assistant police
inspectors)

Additionally those who promoted to police inspectors enter the National Police Academy
in Tokyo for a four-month educational training program to develop management skills,
leadership, and practical abilities to serve as the section chief of a police station.

The National Police Academy also provides educational training for superintendents
designated for assignments as the chief of a police station. This is the highest-level
educational training course available for police officers.

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As the affiliated organizations of the National Police Academy, the Highest Training
Institute for Investigation Leaders trains police inspectors and above in leadership,
management skills, advanced techniques and technologies concerning criminal
investigation, and the Research and Training Center for International Criminal
Investigation and Police Cooperation provides both foreign language training for
Japanese police officers and training course for police officers from other countries.

(3) Martial Arts

When police officers are attacked or resisted by suspects, they must be able to control the
situation and apprehend the suspects with minimum force. For that reason, police officers
are required to attain a high level of skill in judo, kendo, arrest techniques and shooting.
Due to their proficiency in martial arts and shooting, Japanese police officers often
achieve outstanding records in domestic and international competitions.

Current State of “Dial 110"

The number of “Dial 110” calls has increased annually. In 2008 the police received about
９ million calls nationwide, almost 1.3times more calls than a decade ago. This means that
on any given day the CCC receives a call about every 3.5 seconds.

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(Refer to Police Info Communications on page 35 about Communications Command

System.)

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

1. Technical Assistance

A. Policy Initiatives for Promoting

International Cooperation

Police Administration, the traffic control system, Koban

system, method of criminal investigation,
criminal identification techniques etc.,
as developed by the Japanese police are of great interest to nations throughout the world.
We frequently have requests for technical cooperation, primarily from developing
countries.

The aim of international police cooperation is to contribute to the development and

progress of relevant countries, especially to improve their ability to counter crime and
terrorism.

Promoting international cooperation by using the experience and knowledge of Japanese

police is expected to contribute not only to the international community, but also to the
security of Japan. To accomplish this, we have established “Policy Initiatives for
Promoting International Cooperation” in September 2005 to clarify the principles of
international police cooperation as well as the directions and measures to be
implemented.

International cooperation by the Japanese police, contributing to the achievement of good

governance and to the improvement of the capability of a country to counter organized
criminal activity (capacity building), has been of great value to relevant countries. The
Japanese police, as an arm of the government, are expected to make the most of their
achievements and experience and to actively promote further international cooperation.

B. International Seminar on Police Activity

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Japanese Police promotes police technical cooperation by convening international

seminars and inviting police officers from developing countries. These cooperation are
done by joint hosting Japanese police and JICA, Japan International Cooperation Agency,
or independently by Japanese police.

C. Dispatches of Experts

Technical cooperation to developing countries is operated by invitation of police officers

from counterpart countries and dispatch of experts to the countries. In 2009, a total of 16
long-term experts and 27 short-term experts were dispatched to transfer technology and
skill on criminal identification, drug enforcement, Koban system, information
communication and etc. to Indonesia, Philippines, Brazil, Thailand and others.

D-2. Singapore Police Force

SPF Organization Structure (With effect from 1 April 2011)

Staff Departments

Administration & Finance Police National Service

Department Department
International Cooperation Police Technology
Department Department
Manpower Department Public Affairs Department
Operations Department Security Industry Regulatory
Department
Planning and Volunteer Special
Organisation Department Constabulary

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Police Logistics Service Development &

Department Inspectorate Department
Specialist Staff Departments
Commercial Affairs Police Intelligence
Department Department
Criminal Investigation    
Department
Specialist and Line Units
Airport Police Division Police Coast Guard
Gurkha Contingent Public Transport Security
Command
Six Land Divisions Security Command
  Ang Mo Kio Police Special Operations
Division Command
  Bedok Police Division Traffic Police
  Central Police Division Training Command
  Clementi Police    
Division
  Jurong Police Division    
  Tanglin Police Division

The Singapore Police Force (Abbreviation: SPF; Chinese: 新 加 坡 警 察 部

队; Malay:Pasukan Polis Singapura; Tamil: சிங்கப்பூர் காவல் துறை) is the main
agency tasked with maintaining law and order in the city-state.[1] Formerly known as the
Republic of Singapore Police (Abbreviation: RSP; Malay: Polis Republik Singapura),
it has grown from an 11-man organization to a 38,587 strong force. It enjoys a relatively
positive public image, and is credited for helping to arrest Singapore's civic unrests and
lawlessness in its early years, and maintaining the low crime rate today despite having a
smaller police-citizen ratio compared to other major cities. Singapore has been ranked
consistently in the top five positions in the Global Competitiveness Report in terms of its
reliability of police services.
The organization structure of the SPF is split between the staff and line functions,
roughly modeled after the military.[6] There are currently 15 staff departments and 13 line
units. The headquarters is located in a block at New Phoenix Park in Novena, adjacent to
a twin block occupied by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

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Early years
The Singapore Police Force has a heritage almost as old as that of modern Singapore,
having been formed in 1819 with a skeleton force of 11 men under the command
of Francis James Bernard, son-in-law of William Farquhar, and kept in operation with a
monthly budget of $300. Manpower constraints meant that the men had to perform a
wide range of roles, and required the help of headmen amongst the various ethnic
communities to maintain orderliness on the streets, all the more possible as the
communities lived in segregated areas around the city.
This partnership with the community was in line with Sir Stamford Raffles' vision of a
thriving colony largely self-regulated by local social structures, with the British masters
administrating it via indirect rule. The large influx of migrants from China, however,
began to test this system when the hands-off approach by the British allowed secret
societies in Singapore to thrive. Although originally formed with legal intentions of
community bonding and the provision of assistance to fellow migrants, these societies
gradually became influential, competitive, and increasingly engaged in illegal activity
including monetary extortion from the masses, the operation of gamblingdens, and
the smuggling of illegal goods on top of more legal commercial operations to meet their
financial needs.
Competition gradually heated up between large rival factions, such as that between the
largerGhee Hin Kongsi, the Ghee Hock Kongsi and the Hai San Kongsi. Murders, mass
riots, kidnappings, arson and other serious crimes became commonplace in the next four
decades since the colony's founding. Faced with violent acts of crime which may involve
thousands, such as the funeral riots of 1846 involving 9,000 members from the Ghee Hin
and Ghee Hock secret societies, the police force was woefully incapable of bringing the
situation under control, and often had to call in the army for assistance. The escalating
number of serious crimes prompted the need for stronger legislation to deter would-be
criminals. Singapore's first executions were thus held in the wake of the first criminal
session in June 1828, when a Chinese and Indian were found guilty and convicted
for murder.
Headed by Europeans and predominantly staffed by Malay and Indian officers, the force
had little Chinese representation as the military and policing professionals were
traditionally shunned by the Chinese community, which therefore impaired policing
efforts amongst the large Chinese populace. In 1843, the force comprised a
sitting magistrate doubling up as a superintendent, three European constables and an
assistant native constable, 14 officers and 110 policemen. With a total strength of no

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more than 150 men, the police was compelled to avoid direct intervention in these mass
acts of violence, else risking almost total annihilation.
A repeat of this scenario occurred in 1851, when lingering displeasure against Roman
Catholic ethnic Chinese erupted into major rioting leaving over 500 Chinese dead. The
army was called in again, although it involved having to induct Indian convicts into
military service almost overnight. In 1854, twelve consecutive days of violence sparked
by a dispute between the Hokkiens and Teochews disrupted trade. This particular
incident led to the formation of the military's Singapore Rifle Corps on 8 July 1854, the
earliest predecessor of the Singapore Armed Forces' People's Defence Force today.
Criminal violence was not merely in the domain of the ethnic Chinese, however.
Rivalries between Malay princes and communities also often result in acts of violence,
which prompted the passing of Singapore's first arms law in March 1823 restricting the
right to bear arms to 24 of the Malay Sultan's followers. Nearly two centuries later, these
anti-arms laws continue to be strictly enforced, resulting in a society relatively free from
firearms-related criminal offences.
Regulars
Regulars, or uniformed, full-time officers, constitute about 20% of the police's total
workforce and number approximately 8,000 in strength. Basic entry requirements for
police officers include normal fitness levels, good eyesight, and at least five passes in the
GCE Ordinary level or a NITEC from the Institute of Technical Education, although
those with lower qualifications may still be considered. [13] Those joining the senior police
officers require a basic degree from a recognized university. [14] Alternatively, police
officers from the junior ranks may also be considered for promotion into the senior ranks.
[15]
 Officers serving in the force as national servicemen are also regularly considered for
absorption into the regular scheme. Basic training for all officers are conducted at
the Home Team Academy, under the purview of the Police Training Command. It takes
about six months[16] and nine months[17] to train a new police officer and senior police
officer respectively.
As is the case with many other civil service positions in Singapore, the salaries of police
officers are reviewed in accordance to market rates. Salaries are kept competitive as
part of anti-corruption measures. Gross starting salaries for police officers may range
from S$1,559.43 to $2,186.90,[18] and that of senior police officers from S$2,650.00 to
S$3,889.00,[19] depending on entry qualifications and National Service.

Police officers commence their careers as Sergeants (Full GCE 'A' level or Diploma
holders) or Corporals (other qualifications), [18] while senior police officers start as either

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Assistant Superintendent of Police (2nd Upper Honors Degree and above) or Inspectors
(2nd Lower Honors degree and lower).[19] Reviews of an officer's performance for
promotion consideration are conducted annually. Interviews conducted for promotion to
certain ranks were phased out since 1995. It takes approximately five years for a police
officer to be promoted to the next rank, although the system allows for accelerated
promotion for outstanding officers.

While joining the force as a career is generally considered a respectable decision in

contemporary Singapore,[20] support from the ethnic Malay community has been
traditionally stronger due to less social stigma attached to the profession. Traditionally,
Chinese culture has eschewed careers in uniformed positions, resulting in a force
dominated by non-Chinese officers for most of the force's early history. National
servicemen also contribute a higher proportion of ethnic Malays in the force. The current
ethnic profile of the force continues to have a significantly higher proportion of ethnic
minorities compared to the national ethnic profile, although such an outcome is related to
operational demands: police resources are typically deployed with a diverse ethnic mix to
decrease communication problems while attending to incidents in ethnically-diverse
Singapore.
Competition in the employment market, usually heating up during economic boom times,
occasionally depressed the number of police recruits as well as its existing ranks. A series
of major incidents in 2008 affecting agencies of the Home Affairs Ministry has led to the
ministry conducting a study which concluded that there is a shortage of officers, resulting
in officers being "overstretched, strained and overstressed".[12] 
In the police force, it was admitted that the recruitment and retention of non-graduate
police officers has been "adversely affected by the tighter labor market", with resignation
rates increasing by 50% between 2004 and 2007. Recruitment figures, while remaining
relatively stable, has been unable to "address the higher demands placed on the Force".
[21]
 Various measures were thus taken in response, including an increase in starting
salaries, sign-on bonuses for senior police officers, and retention bonuses of up to
S$30,000 for non-graduate police officers in a bid to encourage them to stay for at least
eight years,[22] over the five years where many leave at the end of their service bonds.
Police national servicemen
While national service was introduced in 1967 in Singapore, it was solely geared towards
the building up of the Singapore Armed Forces. There was little urgency in the police
force to increase its manpower strength until the Laju incident in 1974 demonstrated the
need for additional trained reserve officers who can be called up at short notice in the

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event of an emergency. National service was thus extended to the Singapore Police Force
in 1975, with the primary aim of guarding key installations and to act as a reserve unit.
Subsequent expansion of the scheme, changing security needs, and the trend
in outsourcing installation protection (such as to the Auxiliary Police Forces) has
expanded their role to more functions, which may range from administration,
investigation to front-line policing alongside their regular counterparts.
Volunteers
Main article: Volunteer Special Constabulary
Formed in 1946, The Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) is an important component
of the Singapore Police Force, contributing more than fifty years of volunteer service to
the nation.
The VSC is composed of volunteers from all walks of life in Singapore, from
businessmen to blue-collar executives to even bus captains, bonded with the same
aspiration to serve the nation by complementing the Singapore Police Force. They are
vested with equal powers of a police officer to enforce law and order in Singapore. VSC
Officers don the same police uniform and patrol the streets, participate in anti-drug
operations and sometimes even high-speed sea chases.
Previously headquartered at the Eu Tong Sen Street Police Station and Toa Payoh Police
Station, it relocated to the new Police Cantonment Complex in year 2000.

Civilian staff
Civilian staff in the Police Force are deployed in areas such as technology, logistics,
human resource and administrative and finance services as well as planning and
intelligence. The civilian staff schemes falls under the general civil service schemes
managed by the Public Service Division. These schemes include:

Management Executive Scheme(MX) for degree holders

Home Affairs Senior Executive (HASE)
Corporate Support Scheme (CS) for diploma and below
Technical Support Officer
Corporate Support Officer

The civilization of non-core police functions have accelerated over the years in order to
free up additional manpower for redeployment into Police Divisions. Other changes
include the deployment of contract staff through organizations such as Ministry of
Finance's VITAL.org for administrative staff and partners such as Singapore
Technologies, CSA Singapore for technical support.
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International Cooperation Department

Background

The International Cooperation Department (ICD) was established on 1 Oct 2009 as the
staff authority on all international engagement efforts of the Singapore Police Force
( SPF ). ICD has three divisions: the International Policy Division, International
Operations Division and the Protocol and Administrative Services Division.

Mission

ICD’s mission is to:

1. serve as the central gateway for communication and cooperation between local
law enforcement agencies and their counterparts in INTERPOL’s member
countries;
2. craft coherent foreign engagement policies to enhance SPF's standing in the
international policing community;
3. contribute towards SPF’s efforts in building and strengthening relationships with
partners through practising established diplomatic formalities and protocol; and
4. provide guidance on foreign engagement to SPF units.

Vision

ICD strives to be a world-class agency spearheading SPF's international engagement

efforts to inspire the world.

Our Divisions

International Policy Division (IPD)

The IPD is the staff authority on international policy matters; tasked with the
responsibility to co-ordinate all foreign relations related issues in SPF and collate
information pertaining to all foreign bilateral affairs and engagements.

International Operations Division (IOD)

The IOD assumes the role of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in
Singapore . NCB Singapore is the designated contact point with the INTERPOL
General Secretariat, regional offices and all the other 187 member countries on

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transnational police cooperation, including investigations and operations. It also serves

as a gateway for exchange of information, as well as facilitation of cooperation,
between SPF and local enforcement agencies with our foreign counterparts.

As the staff authority on international operations, the IOD provides guidance to SPF
units on matters relating to cooperation with fellow foreign counterparts on operations
and investigation, and ensures alignment of SPF's international operations with that of
our international policies.

Protocol & Administrative Services Division (PASD)

PASD is the staff authority on all Protocol matters pertaining to major SPF ceremonies,
events and visits to ensure that the due order of precedence and procedures are observed
in accordance to established international diplomatic formalities and protocol. The
Division also ensures that the due hospitality provisions are accorded to all visiting
dignitaries. Through relationship-building, the Division provides steadfast support in
SPF's efforts to strengthen relationships with our foreign and local partners, both Police
and non-Police, through the various platforms of diplomatic engagements
Organization Structure

D- 3. Australian Federal
Police

This section details the nature and organisational structure of the AFP. It includes
the AFP’s history, relevant legislation, recognition and ceremonial initiatives and more.
Responding to change
The nature of the AFP and what is required of it, has changed significantly in recent
years. The AFP has responded to a rapidly changing environment and this has required a
greater focus on national and international operations.

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The new challenges the AFP faces include counter terrorism, human

trafficking and sexual servitude, cyber-crime, peace operations, protection and other
transnational crimes.
To help meet these challenges, the AFP has implemented a new organisational structure.
The structure focuses on AFP's main operational areas and provides a higher level of
national coordination and support to these areas.
The objectives of the new structure are to achieve better results by:

 improving the management structure and methodologies to better reflect the AFP's
national and international focus
 providing an improved management framework which is better able to meet the
national expectations of government, client and partner agencies
 providing a stronger accountability framework to the government
 ensuring the organisation is acting in a corporately consistent manner and that
resources are being aligned to meet corporate priorities
 providing a stronger management framework to develop and implement corporate
strategy and policy
 improving our strategic position and management capabilities to proactively
identify and manage new demands and emerging crime and security threats, and
 providing opportunities for staff development in managerial roles.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the federal police agency of the Commonwealth
of Australia. Although the AFP was created by the amalgamation (Combining) in 1979
of three Commonwealth law enforcement agencies, it traces its history from
Commonwealth law enforcement agencies dating back to the federation of Australia's six
precursor British self-governing colonies in 1901.

The role of the AFP is to enforce Commonwealth of Australia criminal law and to protect
Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The AFP is
Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative, and the
Government's chief source of advice on policing issues.[2]

Since 7 September 2009, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police has been Mr
Tony Negus who was sworn in following the retirement of the previous commissioner,
Mick Keelty.[3]

History

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The AFP was formed on 19 October 1979 under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979[2]
after the merging of the former Commonwealth Police and the Australian Capital
Territory Police. In November 1979, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics of the Australian
Customs Service was transferred to the new agency. [4] In 1984 the Protective Service
component of the AFP was separated forming the Australian Protective Service under the
Administrative Service and later governed by Attorney Generals Department,
subsequently that government agency was transferred back to the AFP in 2004 and is
now known as Australian Federal Police Uniform Protection.

Roles and functions

The AFP falls within the portfolio of the Home Affairs Ministry, a ministerial position
outside of the Cabinet and subordinate to the Attorney-General. The Minister responsible
for the AFP is the Minister for Home Affairs, Brendan O'Connor MP .[2] Prior to the
creation of this ministerial portfolio with the commencement of Rudd Government in
November 2007, the Minister responsible for the AFP was the Minister for Justice and
Customs.

Key priorities of the AFP are set by the Australian Minister for Home Affairs, through a
'ministerial direction' issued under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979. The current
'ministerial direction' was issued by the former Minister for Home Affairs, Hon Bob
Debus MP, on 12 October 2007. [5]

The AFP enforces Commonwealth law, protects Commonwealth and national interests
from crime in Australia, and overseas. The AFP provides community policing to the
ACT, the Jervis Bay Territory, Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling)
Islands. The AFP provides protective security for (and on behalf of) the Australian
Government.

The AFP is Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative, and is
the chief advisor on policing issues to the Australian Government. The AFP maintains an
extensive international liaison network; officers are posted to 33 international posts. The
AFP works closely and collaboratively with all Australian police forces and criminal
investigative agencies and Crime Commissions.

The AFP consists of a workforce of over 6500. The Australian Federal Police Act 1979 is
the legislative base for the employment of all AFP staff. Each employee is described in
the legislation as an AFP Employee, who are then declared as either a Member (Police
Officer, Federal agent), (Uniform Protection Officer)-Protective Service Division ,
Special Member.

Industrial representation of AFP staff solely rests with the Australian Federal Police
Association branch of the Police Federation of Australia.

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National

Federal Agents are based in each Australian state and Territory capital city,
internationally and form the largest component of the AFP staff; Federal Agents chiefly
perform criminal investigative duties.

Current areas of focus for the AFP:

 Illicit drug trafficking

 Organized people smuggling, including sexual servitude and human exploitation
 Serious major fraud against the Government
 High Tech Crime involving information technology and communications
 Preventing, countering and investigating terrorism
 Transnational and multi-jurisdictional crime
 Money laundering
 Organized crime

The AFP hosts the National Missing Persons Coordination Unit, the Australian Interpol
National Central Bureau and the Australian Bomb Data Centre.

Community policing role

A Traffic Operations vehicle, with Traffic Operations and other officers in ceremonial
dress at the 2008 National Anzac Day Service at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

The AFP provides community policing services to the Australian Capital Territory, under
a contractual agreement between the Australian Government and the ACT Government.
This AFP portfolio, ACT Policing, is the successor of the ACT Police, one of the
agencies that was merged to form the AFP in 1979. The mission of ACT Policing is to
keep the peace and preserve public safety for the citizens of the ACT. Key sections of
ACT Policing include general duties, crime and safety management, criminal
investigations, crime prevention, traffic operations and criminal intelligence. The head of
ACT Policing is known as the Chief Police Officer of the Australian Capital Territory.

A 2005 review of aviation security in Australia led to the streamlining of security at all
major Australian airports, the Aviation portfolio was established as a result of the
review. Members of State, and the Northern Territory, police agencies are seconded to
the AFP to provide policing services at each of the 11 major Australian airports.

The AFP provides community policing within the mainland Jervis Bay Territory, and the
three populated external territories of Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and the Cocos
(Keeling) Islands.

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The AFP provides a mix of United Nations peacekeeping, community policing and
advisory roles and services in a number of nations.

Uniform protection role

AFP providing Uniform Protection outside an Embassy

in Canberra, Australia

AFP Uniform Protection provides physical protection

for the Australian Government at key locations
throughout Australia and internationally. Uniform
Protection officers are firearms and defensive tactics
trained, performing duties which include armed escorts,
bomb appraisals, bomb detection canines, visitor
control, static guarding, alarm monitoring and response, mobile, foot and bicycle patrols,
maintain civil disorder, security consultancy services, counter terrorism first response at
many Commonwealth establishments. Uniform Protection Officers have powers under
Section 14 of the AFP Act 1979 to arrest, stop, search, and request identification in their
jurisdiction. Uniform Protection officers undertake a critical role in protecting Australia's
critical infrastructure and assist in providing protection for Australian High Office
Holders, diplomatic, consular personnel and other foreign nationals.

Uniform Protection Officers providing an armed uniform capability are located at

Commonwealth establishments including Parliament House in Canberra; the residences
of the Prime Minister and Governor-General; foreign Embassies and Consulates in
Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth; the Australian Nuclear Scientific Technology
Organization installation, Joint Defense Facilities (such as the Australian Defence Force
Headquarters in Canberra) and sensitive covert locations.

International deployment group

Since its inception, the AFP has had a long tradition of involvement in international
peacekeeping, policing and capacity development. This portfolio of the AFP, the
International Deployment Group (IDG), has increased rapidly in a short time since its
inception in 2004. Since 1964, Australia has contributed police officers to the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. AFP officers also presently serve with the United
Nations in East Timor and Sudan. Previous peacekeeping missions have included Haiti,
Mozambique, Thailand, Namibia, South Africa and Somalia.

In recent years, Australian Government efforts to assist neighboring and remote countries
with institutional capacity building has led to AFP deployments to Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands (Under the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands),

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Timor-Leste (Under the Timor-Leste Police Development Program TLPDP, Nauru,

Tonga, Vanuatu and Afghanistan.

Liaison Office of the AFP for Europe is located in Belgrade, Serbia. It was opened in
2003, following the closure of the office in Rome, Italy that operated from 1990 to 2002.
[6]

Ceremonial and protocol duties

To recognize, celebrate and respectfully honor the achievements and commitments made
by members of the AFP, the AFP Ceremonial Team conducts and participates in a variety
of police and community functions and ceremonies.

Ceremonial events include: Annual National Police Remembrance Day Service at the
National Police Memorial in Canberra on 29 September ], medal presentations, parades,
police funerals, memorial services, official opening of Police Stations and Policing
Facilities, AFP Pipes and Drums concerts, inauguration events and Public relations
events

The Ceremonial Team coordinates the AFP Ceremonial and Protocol Officer (CAPO)
Network, the AFP Ceremonial Mounted Cadre and the AFP Pipes and Drums to perform
ceremonial duties at these functions and ceremonies.

The AFP Ceremonial Mounted Cadre was raised on the 29th September, 2006 at the
dedication of the National Police Memorial. The ceremonial uniform comprises linkages
to former mounted policing units of the AFP's predecessor organisations, namely the
Commonwealth Police and the Peace Officer guard, as well as mounted policing units
from the NSW Police Force which patrolled the geographic area of the Australian Capital
Territory.

The AFP Ceremonial and Protocol team currently provide Drill Instructor Accreditations
for both the AFP and the NSW Police Force, and also provide Ceremonial and Protocol
Officer accredition for all of Australia's policing jurisdictions.

Titles and ranks

AFP Commissioner's Order 1 (Administration) states that all Members (Police Officers)
are titled Federal Agent, unless undertaking duties in ACT Policing, External Territories,
Aviation, International Deployment Group (mission component only), where uniforms
are worn.

AFP Commissioner's Order 1 (Administration) states that every AFP Member holds a
rank (as detailed below), with the corresponding title and role adopted.

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Policing ranks

Original
Original AFP Ranks Initial Title & Role Current Title & Role
Broadband Ranks
Constable / 1st
Federal Agent, Federal Agent, Team
Constable / Senior Constable
Team Member Member
Constable
Sergeant / Senior
Federal Agent, Federal Agent, Team
Sergeant / Station Sergeant
Team Leader Leader
Sergeant
Inspector / Federal Agent, Federal Agent,
Superintendent
Superintendent Coordinator Coordinator
Federal Agent,
Commander Commander Commander, Manager
Manager
Assistant
Assistant Federal Agent,
Assistant Commissioner Commissioner, National
Commissioner National Manager
Manager
Deputy Deputy
Deputy Commissioner Deputy Commissioner
Commissioner Commissioner
Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner

(AFP Uniform Protection) protective service officer ranks

Protective Service Officer Rank Internal Title and Role

Team Member Probationary & Under 4 years
Protective Service Officer( PSO )
service
Protective Service Officer( PSO 1) > Team Member Over 4 years service
Protective Service Officer (PSO 2) >> Team Member Supervisor
Senior Protective Service Officer (SPSO)
Team Leader / Duty Manager
>>>
Assistant Inspector ** Operation Supervisor
Inspector *** OIC-Station Manager
Superintendant **+ Regional Co-ordinator
Commander *++ Divisional Portfolio Manager

Additional ranks have been adopted throughout the country in the Aviation Portfolio,
reflecting the rank held by the seconded State or Territory Police Force Members, such as
different levels within the Constable and Sergeant Rank, Inspectors and so on.

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ACT Policing has a title for Members within the Constable level, Senior Constable,
which is a reflection of six years of service as a Member, it does not equate with the
Senior Constable terminology used within Section 23WA of the Crimes Act 1914, which
refers to Members who are Sergeants. [7]

Constable and Non-commissioned ranks

Senior
Constable Sergeant
Constable

 Australian Protective Service (Obsolete)

 CrimTrac
 Federal police
 National police (disambiguation)
 List of Australian Federal Police killed in the line of duty
 Specialist Response and Security, the Police Tactical Group of the AFP
 Commonwealth Police
 Australian Capital Territory Police
 Australian Federal Police Association

D-4. United States of America

Types of police

Policing in the United States is conducted by numerous types of agency at many different
levels. Every state has their own nomenclature for agencies, and their powers,
responsibilities and funding varies from state to state.

Federal

Main article: Federal law enforcement in the United States

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Federal police possess full federal authority as given to them under United States Code
(U.S.C.). Federal Law Enforcement Officers are
authorized to enforce various laws not only at the
federal level, but also state, county, and local in
many circumstances.

U.S. Park Police officers standing by during the

2005 Inauguration Day

Both types operate at the highest level and are endowed with police roles, both may
maintain a small component of the other (for example, the FBI Police). The agencies
have nationwide jurisdiction for enforcement of federal law. All federal agencies are
limited by the U.S. Code to investigating only matters that are explicitly within the power
of the federal government. However, federal investigative powers have become very
broad in practice, especially since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for most law enforcement duties at the
federal level.[8] It includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), the United States Marshals Service, and others.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is another branch with numerous federal
law enforcement agencies reporting to it. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), United States Secret Service (USSS),
United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) are some of the agencies that report to DHS.

At a crime or disaster scene affecting large numbers of people, multiple jurisdictions, or

broad geographic areas, many police agencies may be involved by mutual aid
agreements, for example the United States Federal Protective Service responded to the
Hurricane Katrina natural disaster. Command in such situations remains a complex and
flexible issue.

The federal government is prohibited from exercising general police powers due to
restrictions in the constitution, because the United States is organized as a union of
sovereign states, which each retain their police, military and domestic law-making
powers. For example, the State's National Guard is the state's military. The constitution
gives the federal government the power to deal with foreign affairs and interstate affairs
(affairs between the states). For policing, this means that if a non-federal crime is
committed in a state and the fugitive does not flee the state, the federal government has
no jurisdiction. However, once the fugitive crosses a state line he or she violates the
federal law of interstate flight and is subject to federal jurisdiction, at which time federal
law enforcement agencies may become involved.

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State

Main article: State police

Most all states operate statewide government agencies that provide law enforcement
duties, including investigations and state patrols. They may be called State Police, State
Patrol or Highway Patrol, and are normally part of the state Department of Public
Safety. In addition, the Attorney General's office of each state has their own state bureaus
of investigation.

Various departments of State Governments may have their own enforcement division
such as capitol police, State Hospitals, Departments of Correction, Water police,
environmental (fish and game/wildlife) Game Wardens or Conservation Officers (who
have full police powers and statewide jurisdiction). In Colorado, for instance, the
Department of Revenue has its own investigative branch, as do many of the state funded
universities.

County

Also known as parishes and boroughs, county law enforcement is provided by Sheriffs'
Departments or Offices and County police.

County police

Main article: County police

County police tend to exist only in metropolitan counties and have countywide
jurisdiction. In some areas, there is a sheriff's department which only handles minor
issues such as service of papers such as a constable in other areas, along with security for
the local courthouse. In other areas, there are no county police and the local sheriff is the
exclusive law enforcement agency and acts as both sheriff and county police, which is
much more common than there being a separate county police force. County police tend
to fall into three broad categories:

 Full-service - provide the full spectrum of police services to the entire county,
irrespective of local communities, and may provide contractual security police
services to special districts within the county.
o Hawaii - Hawaii has only county police, there are no local police.
 Limited service - provide services to unincorporated areas of the county (and may
provide services to some incorporated areas by contract), and usually provide
contractual security police services to special districts within the county.
 Restricted service - provide security police to county owned and operated
facilities and parks. Some may also perform some road patrol duties on county

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built and maintained roads, and provide support to municipal police departments
in the county. Some northeastern states maintain county detectives in their county
attorneys' offices.

Sheriffs' departments

Main article: Sheriffs in the United States

 Full service - The most common type, provide all traditional law-enforcement
functions, including countywide patrol and investigations irrespective of
municipal boundaries.
 Limited service - along with the above, perform some type of traditional law-
enforcement function such as investigations and patrol. This may be limited to
security police duties on county properties (and others by contract) to the
performance of these duties in unincorporated areas of the county, and some
incorporated areas by contract.
 Restricted service - provide basic court related services such as keeping the
county jail, transporting prisoners, providing courthouse security and other duties
with regard to service of process and summonses that are issued by county and
state courts. The sheriff also often conducts auction sales of real property in
foreclosure in many jurisdictions, and is often also empowered to conduct seizures
of chattel property to satisfy a judgment. In other jurisdictions, these civil process
duties are performed by other officers, such as a marshal or constable.

Municipal

See Municipal police departments of the United States for a list

Municipal police range from one-officer agencies (sometimes still called the town
marshal) to the 40,000 men and women of the New York City Police Department. Most
municipal agencies take the form (Municipality Name) Police Department. Many
individual cities and towns will have their own police department, with larger
communities typically having larger departments with greater budgets, resources, and
responsibilities.

Metropolitan departments, such as the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, have
jurisdiction covering multiple communities and municipalities, often over a wide area
typically coterminous with one or more cities or counties. Metropolitan departments have
usually have been formed by a merger between local agencies, typically several local

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police departments and often the local sheriff's department or office, in efforts to provide
greater efficiency by centralizing command and resources and to resolve jurisdictional
problems, often in communities experiencing rapid population growth and urban sprawl,
or in neighboring communities too small to afford individual police departments. Some
county sheriff's departments, such as the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, are
contracted to provide full police services to local cities within their counties.

Other

See Specialist police departments of the United States for a list

There are other types of specialist police department with varying jurisdictions. Most of
these serve special-purpose districts and are Special district police. In some states, they
serve as little more than security police, but in states such as California, special district
forces are composed of fully-sworn peace officers with statewide authority.

These agencies can be transit police, campus police, airport police, park police or police
departments responsible for protecting government property such as the Los Angeles
General Services Police. Some agencies, such as the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey Police Department, have multi-state powers. There are also some private
(non-governmental) agencies, such as the Co-op City Department of Public Safety.

Police functions

A Florida Highway Patrol state trooper at the

scene of a motor vehicle accident

Textbooks and scholars have identified three

primary police agency functions. The following
is cited from The American System of Criminal
Justice, by George F. Cole and Christopher E.
Smith, 2004, 10th edition,
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning:

 Order maintenance. This is the broad mandate to keep the peace or otherwise
prevent behaviors which might disturb others. This can deal with things ranging
from a barking dog to a fist-fight. By way of description, Cole and Smith note that
police are usually called-on to "handle" these situations with discretion, rather than
deal with them as strict violations of law, though of course their authority to deal
with these situations are based in violations of law.

 Law enforcement. Those powers are typically used only in cases where the law
has been violated and a suspect must be identified and apprehended. Most obvious

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instances include robbery, murder, or burglary. This is the popular notion of the
main police function, but the frequency of such activity is dependent on geography
and season.

 Service. Services may include rendering first aid, providing tourist information,
guiding the disoriented, or acting as educators (on topics such as preventing drug
use). Cole and Smith cited one study which showed 80% of all calls for police
assistance did not involve crimes, but this may not be the case in all parts of the
country. Because police agencies are traditionally available year-round, 24 hours a
day, citizens call upon police departments not only in times of trouble, but also
when just inconvenienced. As a result, police services may include roadside auto
assistance, providing referrals to other agencies, finding lost pets or property, or
checking locks on vacationers' homes.

Styles of Policing

Given the broad mandates of police work, and yet having limited resources, police
administrators must develop policies to prioritize and focus their activities. Some of the
more controversial policies restrict, or even forbid, high-speed vehicular pursuits.

Three styles of policing develop from a jurisdiction’s socioeconomic characteristics,

government organization, and choice of police administrators. According to a study by
James Q. Wilson (”Varieties of Police Behavior”, 1968, 1978, Harvard University Press),
there were three distinct types of policing developed in his study of eight communities.
Each style emphasized different police functions, and were linked to specific
characteristics of the community the department served. (Wilson’s field of study was in
the United States, and it is not clear if similar studies have been done for other countries
with different governmental organization and laws.)

 Watchman. Emphasizes maintaining order, usually found in communities with a

declining industrial base, and a blue-collar, mixed ethnic/racial population. This
form of policing is implicitly less pro-active than other styles, and certain offenses
may be “overlooked” on a variety of social, legal, and cultural grounds, as long as
the public order is maintained. Smith and Cole comment the broad discretion
exercised in this style of policing can result in charges of discrimination, when it
appears police treatment of different groups results in the perception that some
groups get better treatment than others;

 Legalistic. Emphasizes law enforcement and professionalism. This is usually

found in reform-minded cities, with mixed socioeconomic composition. Officers
are expected to generate a large number of arrests and citations, and act as if there
were a single community standard for conduct, rather than different standards for
different groups. However, the fact that certain groups are more likely to have law

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enforcement contact means this strict enforcement of laws may seem overly harsh
on certain groups;

 Service. Emphasizes the service functions of police work, usually found in

suburban, middle-class communities where residents demand individual treatment.
Police in homogeneous communities can view their work as protecting their
citizens against “outsiders”, with frequent but often-informal interventions against
community members. The uniform make-up of the community means crimes are
usually more obvious, and therefore less frequent, leaving police free to deal with
service functions, and traffic control.

Wilson’s study applies to police behavior for the entire department, over time. At any
given time, police officers may be acting in a watchman, service, or legalistic function by
nature of what they’re doing at the time, or temperament, or mood. Individual officers
may also be inclined to one style or another, regardless of supervisor or citizen demands.

Entry qualifications

Nearly all U.S. states and the federal government have by law adopted minimum-
standard standardized training requirements for all officers with powers of arrest within
the state. Many standards apply to in-service training as well as entry-level training,
particularly in the use of firearms, with periodic re-certification required. These standards
often comply with standards promoted by the US Department of Justice. These standards
typically require a thorough background check that potential police recruits:

 Be a United States citizen.

 Must have a high school diploma or a G.E.D. and if necessary a college degree or
served in the United States military without a dishonorable discharge;
 Be in good physical and psychological condition;
 Maintain a clean criminal record without either serious or repeated misdemeanor
or any felony convictions;
 Must have a valid driver's license with a clean driving record and that is not
currently or has a history of being suspended or revoked;
 Be of high moral character;
 Not have a history of prior narcotic or repeated marijuana use or alcoholism;
 Not have a history of ethical, professional, prior employment, motor vehicle, or
financial improprieties;
 Not have a history of domestic violence or mental illness;
 Not to pose a safety and security risk;
 Be legally eligible to own and carry a firearm.

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Repeated interviews, written tests, medical examinations, physical fitness tests,

comprehensive background investigations, fingerprinting, drug testing, a polygraph
examination and consultation with a psychologist are common practices used to review
the suitability of candidates. Recruiting in most departments is competitive, with more
suitable and desirable candidates accepted over lesser ones, and failure to meet some
minimum standards disqualifying a candidate entirely. Departments maintain records of
past applicants under review, and refer to them in the case of either reapplication or
requests from other agencies.

Despite these safeguards, some departments have at times relaxed hiring and staffing
policies, sometimes in violation of the law, most often in the cases of local departments
and federally-funded drug task forces facing staffing shortages, attrition, and needs to
quickly fill positions. This has included at times the fielding (and sometimes the arming)
of uncertified officers (who may be working temporarily in what is supposed to be a
provisional limited-duty status prior to certification) and the hiring of itinerant "gypsy
cops", who may have histories of poor performance or misconduct in other departments.
Several serious cases of police misconduct such as the LAPD beating of Rodney King,
the late-1990s LAPD Rampart Scandal, the 1999 Tulia, Texas mass drug arrests, the late
1990s shooting of Amadou Diallo, the 2004 torture of Lester Eugene Siler, and the Sean
Bell shooting incident all raised questions surrounding the screening of potential recruits.

Salary

Salary varies widely for police officers, with most being among the top third of wage-
earners, age 25 or older, nationwide.[9] In May 2008, the overall median was $51,410. The
median salary for those at the federal level was $46,620, compared to $57,270 for those
at the state level and $51,020 for those employed by local law enforcement agencies. The
top 10% earned more than $79,680 and bottom 10% less than $30,070.[10]

Rank Minimum Salary Maximum Salary

Police Chief $90,570 $113,930
Deputy Chief $74,834 $96,209
Police Captain $72,761 $91,178
Police Lieutenant $65,688 $79,268
Police Sergeant $58,739 $70,349
Police Corporal $49,421 $61,173
Reserve Officer $0.00 $0.00

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, 2010

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D-5. Law enforcement in France

Law enforcement in France is conducted at the national and municipal level, and is the
responsibility of a variety of law enforcement agencies. Three agencies operate at the
national level, and at the local level each commune is able to maintain their
own municipal police. Paris does not have its own police municipale and that the Police
Nationale provides these services directly as a subdivision of France's Ministry of the
Interior. Only certain, designated police officers have the power to conduct criminal
investigations, and such investigations are supervised by investigative magistrates.

Organizations
Agencies
France has three national law enforcement agencies:
 Police Nationale, formerly called the Sûreté, a civilian force; it has primary
responsibility for major cities and large urban areas; run under the Ministry of the
Interior); its strength is roughly 150,000 agents.
 Gendarmerie Nationale, a gendarmerie; it has primary responsibility for smaller
towns and rural areas, as well as all military installations; run by the Ministry of
Defence but under operational control, for most purposes, of the Ministry of the
Interior); its strength is roughly 100,000 agents.
 Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects , a civilian customs service
more commonly known as the Douane, under the Minister of Budget, Public
Accounting and Civil Servants; its strength is roughly 20,000 agents.
Those three agencies are the only ones legally capable of making full arrests or serving
search warrants. A similar diffusion exists, or has existed, in several other countries
following the French system.

Other agencies
French municipalities may also have a local police called the police municipale, garde
municipale or garde champetre, with restricted powers: they can only enforce the
municipal by-laws (amongst which those related to the road circulation) and participate in
prevention actions (survey, evacuation of buildings, protection against accidents, etc.).
These personnel may or may not be allowed to bear firearms.

Local governments (communes) may maintain a Police municipale (Municipal

police) forces, which have very limited law enforcement powers outside of traffic
issues and local ordinance enforcement

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Rural communes may also form a garde champetre or Police Rurale (Rural

police), which is responsible for limited local patrol and protecting the
environment
The Department of Corrections (Administration pénitentiaire) operates Équipes
régionales d’intervention et de sécurité (SWAT teams)
In Wallis and Futuna, there is a territorial guard as well as royal police.

Police vs Gendarmerie
The existence of two national police forces with similar goals and attributions, but
somewhat different zones of activity, has at times created friction or competition between
the two. Their merging has sometimes been suggested.
Since 1941, the division of the zones of activity between the Police and the Gendarmerie
was that cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants were handled by the Police, and the
remaining ones by the Gendarmerie; however, with the development
of suburban dwellings, this had increasingly proved inadequate. Furthermore, the shifting
of a town from a Police to a Gendarmerie zone was often controversial, because,
typically, a gendarmerie unit serves a wide area. A redistribution of authority was thus
decided and implemented between 2003 and 2005. Large conurbations will be handled
entirely by the Police. Rural and suburban areas, and some smaller cities with populations
ranging from 5,000 to 16,000, will be handled by the Gendarmerie.

In addition, the Police and the Gendarmerie have specific zones of authority:

the Police handle questions about the admittance and continuing stay of foreigners
(border police);
the Gendarmerie handles all matters regarding the military, the police at sea, the
security of airports, and the security of certain public buildings (Republican
Guard).
In French, the term "police" not only refers to the forces, but also to the general concept
of "maintenance of law and order" (policing). There are two types of police in this
general sense:

 Administrative police (police administrative): uniformed preventative patrols,

traffic duties etc., with limited powers of arrest.
 Judicial police (police judiciaire): law enforcement and investigation of crime,
with full powers of arrest.

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Thus, the mayor has administrative police power in a town (i.e. they can order the police
to enforce the municipal by-laws), and a judge has police power in their court (i.e. they
can have people who disrupt the proceedings expelled from the court room).
Until 1984, the National Police was involved in the prehospital care and casualty
transport (Police secours). The prehospital care is now performed by firefighters;
however, mountain rescue is performed by the Gendarmerie PGHM (Peloton de
gendarmerie de haute montagne) and the National Police CRS (Compagnies
républicaines de sécurité; Republican Security Companies).
Some other countries follow this model and have separate police agencies with the same
role but different jurisdictions.
Local Police or Gendarmerie precincts may not be capable of conducting complex
investigations. For this reason, both the Police and the Gendarmerie maintain regional
services dedicated to criminal investigations (police judiciaire); these are known as
"regional services of judiciary police" in the Police, "research sections" in the
Gendarmerie. In addition, both the Police and the Gendarmerie maintain laboratories
dedicated to forensics. Most criminal enquiries are conducted by the Police. Justice may
choose either service; sometimes, if the judiciary is disappointed by the results or the
methods of one service, it may give the enquiry to the other service.
The National Police also features some central offices with national jurisdiction, charged
with specific missions, such as the national anti-terrorist division.
Both the Police and the Gendarmerie have SWAT teams. The Gendarmerie has the
foremost and best-known, the GIGN; the Police has the RAID and the GIPN groups. The
Gendarmerie also has armored and paratroops squadrons.
Both the Police and the Gendarmerie have riot control forces: the CRS for the Police,
the Gendarmerie Mobile for the Gendarmerie (which are often mistaken for the former).
They intervene throughout the country.
One justification for the maintenance of a military force handling matters of civilian
police is that the military cannot unionize, contrary to civilian civil servants such as the
Police, which may make management easier. The gendarmes found a workaround by
forming associations of spouses of gendarmes.
The gendarmes each have a free housing inside their respective gendarmerie stations,
which is not the case for the police.
Procedures

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Administrative policing
The police administrative comprises a variety of actions undertaken under the direction
and supervision of the executive branch, notably theprefect, police and gendarmerie
forces conduct a variety of actions ensuring public order. They include:

directing road traffic
channelling street demonstrations
positioning riot control forces (CRS or Mobile Gendarmerie)

Judicial policing
The police judiciaire comprises a variety of actions undertaken under the direction and
supervision of the judiciary. They include:

pursuing and arresting suspects
interrogating suspects in some phases of judicial enquiries
gathering evidence
serving search warrants
These actions must follow the rules given in the Code of Penal Procedure (Code de
procédure pénale), articles 12 to 29.
In order to better fulfill these missions, some sections of the French National Police
(police judiciaire) are specialized in criminal enquiries; the Gendarmerie counterpart are
the sections de recherche (research sections).

Rights and limitations

The powers of French Police and Gendarmerie forces are constrained by statute law
and jurisprudence. The rules of procedure depend on the stage of enquiry:

Crimes committed in flagrante delicto, in which a suspect was found committing

the crime, or pursued by witnesses, or found in possession of objects from the
crime or other probable cause.

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Preliminary enquiries — it is unclear whether a crime, or which crime, has been

committed, but there exist good reasons to believe this might be the case.
Judicial information — an investigative magistrate (a judge, external to the police)
supervises an enquiry on a case where it is certain, or at least very probable, that a
crime has been committed.

In particular, outside of crimes in flagrante delicto, law enforcement forces may not
conduct searches or arrests without a specific commission from the investigative
magistrate.
Not all law-enforcement officers are capable of making full arrests or conducting
searches; these powers are, by law, restricted to those have special legal qualifications
(see next section).
Officers and agents of judiciary police
The procedures that police and gendarmerie officers follow when conducting criminal
enquiries are set by the Code of Criminal procedure(Code de procédure pénale) and
applicable jurisprudence. Criminal enquiries are conducted under the supervision of the
judiciary (depending on the phase, under the supervision of the public prosecutor or of an
investigative judge).
Two important notions are those of "officer of judiciary police" (officier de police
judiciaire or OPJ), "agent of judiciary police" (agent de police judiciaire or APJ) and
"agent of judiciary police assistant" (APJ adjoint).

 Mayors and deputy mayors. This disposition is rarely used.

 In the National Police, these are OPJs:
 the commissioners and above ranks;
 the titular members of the corps de commandement nominally listed in a
joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior;
 Members of the Corps d'encadrement et d'application who have completed
3 years of service, are affected in some specific services, and are nominally listed
in a joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior.
 In the National Gendarmerie, these are OPJs:
 commissioned officers
 non-commissioned officers having completed 3 years of service, nominally
designated by a joint decision by the Ministers of Justice and of Defense.

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These ministerial nomination decisions may only be taken after the approval of a specific
commission. The current rules also warrant the completion of an examination pertaining
to legal matters.
Most other members of the National Police and Gendarmerie are APJs. The remaining
members of the National Police, as well as members of municipal police forces, are APJ
assistants.
Only OPJs may perform full arrests or serve search warrants; APJs may only assist them
in these talks. In case a suspect has been apprehended by an APJ, he/she must be brought
before an OPJ for a full arrest. According to the law, any citizen can apprehend the author
of a crime or of an offence that can be punished by a prison sentence (citizen's arrest),
and lead him/her to an OPJ (this includes APJ, APJ assistants). However, this is
problematic in case of a "simple" citizen due to the estimation of what can be punished
by a prison sentence or not, and due to possible abuse (abuses are a restriction of the
individual freedom and can be sued for illegal confinement).
In all cases, the prerogatives of an OPJ may only be exercised if they are affected to a
position where these are needed, and by nominal decision of the general prosecutor of
their area. These prerogatives are temporarily suspended when they engage, in an
organized force, in an operation of public order (i.e. riot control).
The quality of officer of judiciary police may be withdrawn by the Judiciary if the officer
has behaved in an inappropriate fashion. The general prosecutor grades OPJs, and these
grades are taken into account for possible promotions.
D-6. Law enforcement in the United Kingdom
Jurisdictions and territories
In the United Kingdom, every person has limited powers of arrest if they see
an indictable crime being committed[1] – these are called "every person powers",
commonly referred to as a "citizen's arrest". In England and Wales, the vast majority
of attested constables enjoy full powers of arrest and search as granted by the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. All police officers are "constables" in law, irrespective
of rank. Although police officers have wide ranging powers, they are still civilians and
subject to the same laws as members of the public. However there are certain legal
restrictions on police officers such as the illegality of taking industrial action and the ban
on taking part in active politics.

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Types of law enforcement agency

There are four general types of agency, the first mostly concerned with policing the
general public and their activities and the rest concerned with policing of other, usually
localised, matters:

 Territorial police forces, who carry out the majority of policing. These are police
forces that cover a 'police area' (a particular region) and have an independent Police
Authority. The Police Act 1996, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and the Police
(Northern Ireland) Act 2000, prescribe a number of issues such as appointment of
a Chief Constable, jurisdiction and responsibilities, for police forces in England and
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively.
 Special police forces, which are national police forces that have a specific, non-
regional jurisdiction, such as the British Transport Police. The Serious Organised
Crime and Police Act 2005 refers to these as 'special police forces'.
 Non-police law enforcement agencies, whose officers are not police constables,
but still enforce laws.
 Miscellaneous police forces, mostly having their foundations in older legislation
or Common Law. These have a responsibility to police specific local areas or
activities, such as ports and parks and before the passing of recent legislation such as
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 were often referred to as 'special
police forces'; care must therefore be taken in interpreting historical use of that phrase.
These constabularies are not within the scope of the legislation applicable to the
previously mentioned organisations but can still be the subject of statutes applicable
to e.g. docks, harbours or railways. Until the passing of Railways and Transport
Safety Act 2003, the British Transport Police was such a force.
Cross-border powers
Territorial police constables have certain powers of arrest in countries other than the one
they were attested in. There are four main provisions for them to do so – arrest with a
warrant, arrest without a warrant for an offence committed in their country, arrest without
a warrant for an offence committed in another country and mutual aid. Note: this section
applies to territorial police constables only, and not to others – except the British
Transport Police, whose also have certain cross-border powers in addition to their natural
powers.
Arrest with warrant
Certain warrants can be executed by constables even though they are outside their
jurisdiction: arrest warrants, warrants of commitment and a warrant to arrest a witness

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(England, Wales or Northern Ireland) a warrant for committal, a warrant to imprison (or
to apprehend and imprison) and a warrant to arrest a witness (Scotland). [2] A warrant
issued in one country may be executed in either of the other two countries by a constable
from either the country where it was issued, or the country where it is executed.:
When executing a warrant issued in Scotland, the constable executing it shall have the
same powers and duties, and the person arrested the same rights, as they would have had
if execution had been in Scotland by a constable of a police force in Scotland. When
executing a warrant issued in England & Wales or Northern Ireland, a constable may use
reasonable force and has specified search powers provided by section 139 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994
Arrest without warrant:
Offences committed in home country
If a constable suspects that a person has committed or attempted to commit an offence in
his country, and that person is now in another country, he may arrest (and in the case of a
constable from Scotland, detain) them in that other country.
A constable from England & Wales is subject to the same necessity tests for arrest (as
under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984) as he would be in
England & Wales, a constable from Scotland may arrest/detain if it would have been
lawful to do so in Scotland and a constable from Northern Ireland is subject to the same
necessity tests for arrest (as under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989) as he would be in Northern Ireland.

A person arrested under the above powers:

 in Scotland, shall be taken to the nearest convenient designated police station or to

a designated police station in a police area in which the offence is being investigated
(England & Wales or Northern Ireland),
 in England or Wales, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station
(Scotland) or to a police station within a sheriffdom in which the offence is being
investigated (Scotland), to the nearest convenient designated police station (Northern
Ireland) or to a designated police station in which the offence is being investigated
(Northern Ireland), or

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 in Northern Ireland, shall be taken either to the nearest convenient designated

police station (England & Wales) or to a designated police station in a police area in
which the offence is being investigated (England & Wales) or to the nearest
convenient police station (Scotland) or to a police station within a sheriffdom in
which the offence is being investigated (Scotland).
A person detained under the above powers:

 in England or Wales, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station

(Scotland) or to a police station within a sheriffdom in which the offence is being
investigated (Scotland), or to the nearest convenient designated police station
(England or Wales), or
 in Northern Ireland, shall be taken to the nearest convenient police station
(Scotland) or to a police station within a sheriffdom in which the offence is being
investigated (Scotland), or to the nearest convenient designated police station
(Northern Ireland), as soon as reasonably practicable.
Detention under these powers, which in Scotland normally lasts for six hours, is limited
to four hours.

Arrest without warrant:

Offences committed in other countries
A constable from one country has, in the other countries, the same powers of arrest as a
constable of that country would have.
A constable from England & Wales has:

 in Scotland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Scotland

 in Northern Ireland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Northern Ireland
would have under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)
Order 1989 (necessity test).
A constable from Scotland has:

 in England and Wales, the same power of arrest as a constable from England &
Wales would have under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(necessity test).

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 in Northern Ireland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Northern Ireland
would have under Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)
Order 1989 (necessity test).
A constable from Northern Ireland has:

 in Scotland, the same power of arrest as a constable from Scotland

 in England and Wales, the same power of arrest as a constable from England &
Wales would have under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(necessity test).
When a constable arrests a person in England & Wales, the constable is subject to the
requirements of section 28 (informing of arrest),section 30 (taking to a designated police
station) and section 32 (search on arrest).[5] When a constable arrests a person in Scotland,
the arrested person shall have the same rights and the constable the same powers and
duties as they would have were the constable a constable of a police force in Scotland.
[5]
 When a constable arrests a person in Northern Ireland, the constable is subject to the
requirements of Article 30 (informing of arrest), Article 32 (taking to a designated police
station) and Article 34 (search on arrest).[5]
Other situations
Police forces often support each other with large-scale operations, such as those that
require specialist skills or expertise and those that require policing levels that the host
forces cannot provide. Referred to as mutual aid, constables 'on loan' from one force have
all the powers and privileges of a constable of the host force. [6] Constables from
the Metropolitan Police who are on protection duties in Scotland or Northern Ireland
have all the powers and privileges of a constable of the local territorial police force. [7] A
constable who is taking a person to or from aprison retains all the powers, authority,
protection and privileges of his office regardless of his location. [8] Regardless of where
they are in the United Kingdom, a constable may arrest under section 41 [9] and may stop
and search under section 43[10] of the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of terrorism
(defined by section 40).
Powers of officers
Territorial police constables
Police Constables and an Inspector
of Greater Manchester Police on the beat
in Manchester city centre after the 2008
UEFA Cup Final Riots

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Most police officers are members of territorial police forces. Upon taking an oath for one
of these forces, they have all the powers and privileges, duties and responsibilities of a
constable in one of the three distinct legal systems - eitherEngland and
Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, and the territorial waters of that country. The
limited circumstances where their powers extend across the border are described below.
Other constables
There are many constables who are not members of territorial police forces. The most
notable are members of the three forces referred to as 'special police forces': the British
Transport Police, Ministry of Defence Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary. These
officers have the 'powers and privileges of a constable' on land relating to their work and
in matters relating to their work. [11][12][13] BTP and MDP officers have additional
jurisdiction where requested by a constable of another force, in which case they take on
that constables jurisdiction.[14][15] Upon request from the chief police officer of a police
force, members of one of the above three forces can be give the full powers of constables
in the police area of the requesting force. [14][16] This was used to supplement police
numbers in the areas surrounding the 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles.
Many acts allow companies or councils to employ constables for a specific purpose.
Firstly, there are 10[17] companies whose employees are sworn in as constables under
section 79 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847. As a result, they have the
full powers of a constable on any land owned by the harbour, dock, or port and at any
place within one mile of any owned land. Secondly, there are also some forces created by
specific legislation such as the Port of Tilbury Police (Port of London Act 1968), Mersey
Tunnels Police (County of Merseyside Act 1989) and the Epping Forest Keepers (Epping
Forest Act 1878).
Thirdly, under Article 18 of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional
Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967, London
Borough Councils are allowed to swear in council officers as constables for "securing the
observance of the provisions of all enactments relating to open spaces under their control
or management and of bye-laws and regulations made thereunder". These constables are
not legally police constables and have no powers to enforce criminal law other than those
afforded to every citizen.[18]
Police civilians
In England & Wales, the chief police officer of a territorial police force may designate
any person who is employed by the police authority maintaining that force, and is under
the direction and control of that chief police officer, as one or more of the following:

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 community support officer (commonly referred to as a Police Community Support

Officer),
 investigating officer,
 detention officer, or
 escort officer.[19]
They have a range of powers given by the Police Reform Act 2002,[20] and their chief
police officer decides which of these powers they may use. Unlike a police constable, a
PCSO only has powers when on duty and in uniform, and within the area policed by their
respective force.
Until 1991, most parking enforcement was carried out by police-employed traffic
wardens. Since the passage of the Road Traffic Act 1991,decriminalised parking
enforcement has meant that most local authorities have taken on this role and now only
the Metropolitan Police employs Traffic Wardens, combining the role with PCSOs as
"Traffic Police Community Support Officers".
In Scotland, Police Custody and Security Officers have powers similar to those of
detention officers and escort officers in England and Wales. [21] Similar powers are
available in Northern Ireland.[22]
Accredited Persons
Chief police officers of territorial police forces[23] (and the British Transport Police[24]) can
also give limited powers[25] to people not employed by the police authority,
under Community Safety Accreditation Schemes. A notable example are officers of
the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency, who have been given powers to stop vehicles.
[26]
 However, this practice has been criticised by the Police Federation who described it as
'half-baked'.[27]
Members of the armed forces
In Northern Ireland only, members of Her Majesty's Armed Forces have powers to stop
people[28] or vehicles,[29] arrest and detain people for three hours [30] and enter buildings to
keep the peace[31] or search for people who have been kidnapped.
[32]
 Additionally, commissioned officers may close roads.[33] They may use reasonable
force when exercising these powers.[34]
Under the Customs Management Act 1979, members of Her Majesty's Armed Forces
may detain people if they believe they have committed an offence under the Customs &
Excise acts, and may seize goods if they believe they are liable to forfeiture under the
same acts.[35]

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Other civilians
Many employees of local authorities have powers of entry relating to inspection of
businesses, such as under the Sunday Trading Act 1994[36] and powers to give Fixed
Penalty Notices for offences such as littering, graffiti or one of the wide ranging offences
in the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. Further such powers may be
given under local bylaws or local acts of parliament.
When carrying out an investigation, staff of the Independent Police Complaints
Commission have all the powers and privileges of constables throughout England and
Wales and the territorial waters.[37] Similarly, staff of the Police Ombudsman for Northern
Ireland have certain powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Application to the
Police Ombudsman) Order (Northern Ireland) 2009[38]
Employees of the Serious Organised Crime Agency can be designated[39] with the powers
of a constable,[40] Revenue and Customs officer[41] and immigration officer.[42] These
designations can be unconditional or conditional: time limited or limited to a specific
operation.
Employees of the UK Border Agency may be Immigration Officers and/or customs
officers. They hold certain powers of arrest, detention and search.
In England & Wales, water bailiffs employed by the Environment Agency have certain
powers in relation to enforcement of fishing regulations. Scottish water bailiffs have
similar powers. There are also seven types of court officer - two in Scotland and five in
England & Wales, commonly referred to as 'bailiffs', who can enforce court orders and in
some cases arrest people.
Traffic officers are employed by the Highways Agency and maintain traffic flows
on trunk roads and some bridges and tunnels. There are different types of traffic officer,
and they are appointed under separate Acts. They have limited powers to direct traffic
and place road signs.
Wildlife inspector have certain powers of entry and inspection in relation to wildlife and
licenses relating to wildlife.
Employees of public fire and rescue services have extensive powers in the event of an
emergency, and more limited ones in certain other circumstances, such as investigations
into fires.
Prison officers have all the powers, authority, protection and privileges of a constable
when acting as prison officers.[43]
History

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Accountability
In England and Wales a Police Authority, normally consisting of three magistrates, nine
local councillors and five independent members, is responsible for overseeing each local
force. They also have a duty under law to ensure that their community gets best
value from their police force.

In Northern Ireland the Police Service of Northern Ireland is supervised by the Northern

Ireland Policing Board.
In Scotland each police force is overseen either by the local authority (for Fife
Constabulary and Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary) or by a joint board of the
relevant authority for all other forces.
Two of the three special police forces in Great Britain, (the British Transport Police and
the Civil Nuclear Constabulary) had their own police authorities set up in 2004. These
forces operate across national jurisdictions but their normal responsibility is to the
activities they police, i.e. the railways and the civil nuclear industry.

Police harbor patrol boat in Poole Harbor, Dorset

Her Majesty's Inspectorates of Constabulary
Her Majesty's Inspectorates of Constabulary (HMIC)
are the official bodies responsible for the examination
and assessment of police forces to ensure their
requirements are met as intended.

There are two similarly named organizations:

 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) - this organization is

responsible to the Home Office for police forces in England and Wales. It also
inspects, by invitation, various UK special police forces. Since 2004, HMIC has also
had responsibility for examining HM Revenue and Customs and the Serious
Organized Crime Agency. Inspection services have been provided on a non-statutory
basis for the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (commonly known as

HMIC) - this organisation is responsible to the Scottish Government and examines

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Scotland's territorial police forces, the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency,
the Scottish Criminal Record Office, the Scottish Police College and the Scottish
Police Information Strategy.
Crown dependencies and overseas territories
The Crown dependencies and British overseas territories have their own police forces, the
majority of which use the British model. Because they are not part of the United
Kingdom, they are not answerable to the British Government; instead they are organised
by and are responsible to their own governments (an exception to this is the Sovereign
Base Areas Police - because the SBAs existence is purely for the benefit of the British
armed forces and do not have full overseas territory status, the SBA Police are
responsible to the Ministry of Defence). However, because they are based on the British
model of policing, these police forces conform to the standards set out by the British
government, which includes voluntarily submitting themselves to inspection by the
HMIC.
Ranks
Police ranks of the United Kingdom
Throughout the United Kingdom, the rank structure of police forces is identical up to the
rank of Chief Superintendent. At higher ranks, structures are distinct
within London where the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London
Police have a series of Commander and Commissioner ranks as their top ranks whereas
other UK police forces have assistants, deputies and a Chief Constable as their top ranks.
All Commissioners and Chief Constables are equal in rank to each other.
Uniform and equipment

A Bedfordshire Police Vauxhall Astra patrol car

Main articles: Uniforms and equipment of the

British police and Police use of firearms in the
United Kingdom

Uniforms, the issuing of firearms, type of patrol

cars and other equipment varies by force. Unlike
police in other developed countries, the vast majority of British police officers do not
carry firearms on standard patrol; they do however carry Extendable "Asp" or fixed
Monadnock PR-24 batons and CS/PAVA spray.

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There are, however, exceptions. Every territorial force has a specialist Firearms Unit,
[44]
which maintains Armed Response Vehicles to respond to firearms related emergency
calls, while one territorial force (the Police Service of Northern Ireland) and two of
the special police forces, (the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence
Police) are routinely armed. The British Transport Police is the only police force in the
country without firearms officers, relying on the local territorial force should an armed
incident occur on the railways.
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) firearms unit is called CO19 (formerly SO19),
but every force in the United Kingdom apart from the British Transport Police has
firearms trained officers available should the need arise. Metropolitan and City of
London Police operate with three officers per Armed Response Vehicle (ARV). Each unit
comprises a driver, a navigator, and an observer who gathers information about the
incident and liaises with other units. Other police forces carry two Authorised Firearms
Officers instead of three. Armed Police carry a combination of weapons, ranging
from German Heckler & Koch MP5 carbines, Heckler & Koch MSG901 Sniper rifles,
Heckler & Koch Baton Guns (which fire baton rounds) and Heckler & Koch G36Cs to a
number of specialist weapons such as the Remington pump-action shotgun.
Former Home Secretary Jacqui Smith recently unveiled new plans, for England and
Wales, to train and arm response officers with Tasers, rather than just specialist firearms
teams.[45][46][47] Several forces underwent a trial period with Tasers issued to members of
response teams, and it was subsequently unveiled across the country.
Height
In the 19th and early 20th centuries most forces required that recruits be at least 5 feet
10 inches (178 cm) in height. By 1960 many forces had reduced this to 5 feet 8 inches
(173 cm), and 5 feet 4 inches (163 cm) for women. Many senior officers deplored this,
believing that height was a vital requirement for a uniformed constable. [48] Some forces
retained the height standard at 5 feet 10 inches (178 cm) or 5 feet 9 inches (175 cm) until
the early 1990s, when the height standard was gradually removed. This is due to the
MacPherson report of 1999, as the height restriction was seen to possibly discriminate
against those of ethnic backgrounds who may be genetically predisposed to be shorter.
No British force now requires its recruits to be of any minimum height. The shortest
officer in the UK, PC Sue Day of Swindon Police, is 4 feet 10 inches tall.[49]
Organization of police forces

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As all police forces are autonomous organizations there is much variation in organization
and nomenclature, however outlined below are the main strands of policing that makes up
police forces:

 All police forces have teams of officers who are responsible for general beat duties
and response to emergency and non emergency calls from the public. These officers
are generally the most visible and will invariably be the first interface a member of the
public has with police. In general terms these officers will normally patrol by vehicle
(though also on foot or bicycle in urban areas). They will generally patrol a sub-
division or whole division of a police force area or in the case of the Metropolitan
Police Service, a borough. Nearly all police officers begin their careers in this area of
policing, with some moving on to more specialist roles. The Metropolitan Police
Service calls this area of policing 'Response Teams', whilst other forces use terms
such as 'patrol', 'section' and other variations.

 Most local areas or wards in the country have at least one police officer who is
involved in trying to build links with the local community and resolve long term
problems. In London, the Metropolitan Police Service addresses this area of policing
with Safer Neighbourhood Teams. This entails each political ward in London having
a Police Sergeant, two police constables and a few PCSOs who are ring fenced to
address problems and build community links in their respective wards. Other police
forces have similar systems but can be named 'Area officers', 'Neighbourhood
officers', 'Beat Constables' and a number of other variations.

 Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) can be found in all police forces.

Generally these officers deal with investigations of a more complex, serious nature,
however this again can differ from force to force. Most officers within this area are
detectives. Depending on the force in question this area of policing can be further
divided into a myriad of other specialist areas such as fraud. Smaller forces tend to
have detectives who deal with a wide range of varied investigations whereas
detectives in larger forces can have a very specialist remit.

 All police forces have specialist departments that deal with certain aspects of
policing. Larger forces such as Greater Manchester Police, Strathclyde Police and
West Midlands Police have many and varied departments and units such as traffic,
firearms, marine, horse, tactical support all named differently depending on the force.
Smaller forces such Dyfed Powys Police and Warwickshire Police will have fewer
specialists and will rely on cross training, such as firearms officers also being traffic

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trained officers. The Metropolitan Police, the largest force in the country, has a large
number of specialist departments, some of which are unique to the Metropolitan
Police due to policing the capital and its national responsibilities. For example,
the Diplomatic Protection Group and Counter Terrorism Command.
Issues
Deaths after contact with the police
The police service in the UK is sometimes criticised for incidents that result in deaths due
to police firearms usage or in police custody, as well as the lack of competence and
impartiality in investigations by the Independent Police Complaints Commission after
these events. The Economist stated in 2009:

“ Bad apples ... are seldom brought to justice: no policeman has ever been
convicted of murder or manslaughter for a death following police contact, though
there have been more than 400 such deaths in the past ten years alone. The IPCC
is at best overworked and at worst does not deserve the “I” in its name. ”

—The Economist[50]
Controversial shootings
Main article: Police use of firearms in the United Kingdom#Controversial shootings

The policy under which police officers in England and Wales use firearms has resulted in
controversy. Notorious recent examples include theStephen Waldorf shooting in 1983,
the shooting of James Ashley in 1998, Harry Stanley in 1999, Jean Charles de
Menezes in 2005 andAbdul Kahar in 2006.
Deaths in police custody
In 1997/98, 69 people died in police custody or following contact with the police across
England and Wales; 26 resulted from deliberate self harm.[51]
There are two defined categories of death in custody issued by the Home Office:
Category A: This category also encompasses deaths of those under arrest who are held in
temporary police accommodation or have been taken to hospital following arrest. It also
includes those who die, following arrest, whilst in a police vehicle.

 s/he has been taken to a police station after being arrested for an offence, or
 s/he is arrested at a police station after attending voluntarily at the station or
accompanying a Constable to it, and is detained there or is detained elsewhere in the

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charge of a constable, except that a person who is at a court after being charged is not
in police detention for those purposes.
Category B: Where the deceased was otherwise in the hands of the police or death
resulted from the actions of a police officer in the purported execution of his duty.

 when suspects are being interviewed by the police but have not been detained;
 when persons are actively attempting to evade arrest;
 when persons are stopped and searched or questioned by the police; and
 when persons are in police vehicles (other than whilst in police detention).

Recent issues
Evidence of corruption in the 1970s, serious urban riots and the police role in controlling
industrial disorder in the 1980s, and the changing nature of police procedure made police
accountability and control a major political football from the 1990s onwards.

 The coal miners' strike (1984–1985) saw thousands of police from various forces

deployed against miners, frequently resulting in violent confrontation.
 The presence of Freemasons in the police caused disquiet in the early 1990s.
 The Fettesgate scandal in the early 1990s concerned the theft (and allegedly the
subsequent recovery) of sensitive documents from theEdinburgh headquarters
of Lothian and Borders Police. Nobody has ever been charged, and, at least publicly,
no officer was disciplined.
 The perceived absence of a visible police presence on the streets also frequently
causes concern. This is partially being addressed by the introduction of
uniformed Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), following the passing of
the Police Reform Act 2002, although some have criticised these as for being a cheap
alternative to fully trained police officers.[53]
 Recent undercover TV programmes BBC's The Secret Policeman[54] and
the Channel 4 Dispatches programme Undercover Copper[55]raised questions of
standards within UK police forces.

Racism
Despite attempts to end racism and what the Macpherson Report described as
"institutionalized racism" in the police since the 1993 murder of Stephen Lawrence, there
have been ongoing problems. At the same time, some commentators and academics have
claimed that political correctness and excessive sensitivity to issues of race and class have

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reduced the effectiveness of the police force, not least for people living in deprived areas
or members of minority groups themselves.
In 2003, ten police officers from Greater Manchester Police, North Wales
Police and Cheshire Constabulary were forced to resign after a BBC documentary, The
Secret Policeman, shown on 21 October, revealed racism among recruits at Bruche Police
National Training Centre at Warrington. On 4 March 2005 the BBC noted that minor
disciplinary action would be taken against twelve other officers (eleven from Greater
Manchester Police and one from Lancashire Constabulary) in connection with the
programme, but that they would not lose their jobs. In November 2003, allegations were
made that some police officers were members of the far-right British National Party.
Privacy
At the beginning of 2005 it was announced that the Police Information Technology
Organisation (PITO) had signed an eight-year £122 m contract to
introduce biometric identification technology.[56] PITO are also planning to
use CCTV facial recognition systems to identify known suspects; a future link to the
proposed National Identity Register has been suggested by some.[57]
Freedom of speech
A number of recent cases where police intervened in matters of free speech have also
given rise to allegations[who?] that the police are in danger of becoming thought police. In
December 2005, author Lynette Burrows was interviewed by police after expressing her
opinion on BBC Radio 5 Live that homosexuals should not be allowed to adopt children.
[58]
 The following month, Sir Iqbal Sacranie was investigated by police for stating
the Islamic view that homosexuality is a sin.[59]
Photography of police
Main article: Counter-Terrorism Act 2008#Photographs of police officers in public
places
Section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 came into force on 15 February
2009[60] making it an offence to elicit, attempt to elicit, or publish information "...of a kind
likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism" about: [61] a
member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces; a constable, the Security Service, the Secret
Intelligence Service, or Government Communications Headquarters. Any person found
guilty faces 10 years imprisonment and an unlimited fine. [61] It is a defense for a person
charged with this offence to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for their action.
[61]
 Outside of such circumstances, however, it is perfectly legal to photograph or video a
police officer in a public place.

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Policing of protests
In April 2009, a total of 145 complaints were made following clashes between police and
protesters at the G20 summit.[62] Incidents including the death of 47 year old Ian
Tomlinson,[63] minutes after an alleged assault by a police officer, [64] and a separate
alleged assault on a woman by a police officer, [65] has led to criticism of police tactics
during protests.[66] In response, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson
asked Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) to review policing tactics,
[67]
 including the practice of kettling.[68]
Fixated Threat Assessment Centre
Main article: Fixated Threat Assessment Centre
In the United Kingdom, the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre is a joint police/mental
health unit set up in October 2006 by the Home Office, the Department of
Health and Metropolitan Police Service to identify and address those individuals
considered to pose a threat to VIPs or the Royal Family. [69][70] They may then referred to
local health services for further assessment and potential involuntary commitment. In
some cases, they may be detained by police under the section 136 powers of the Mental
Health Act 1983 prior to referral.
Proposed mergers for England and Wales
In 1981, James Anderton, the then Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police called
for 10 regional police forces for England and Wales, one for each region that would be
adopted as Government Office Regions in England, plus Wales.[71]
A 2004 proposal by the Police Superintendents' Association for the creation of a single
national police force, similar to Garda Síochána na hÉireann was rejected by
the Association of Chief Police Officers, and the government has thus far agreed.[72]
In September 2005, in a report[73] delivered to the then Home Secretary, Charles
Clarke, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary suggested that the forty-three force structure in
England and Wales was "no longer fit for purpose" and smaller forces should be forcibly
merged. As of 2005, nineteen forces had fewer than 2,000 regular officers, and the report
suggested that forces with 4,000 or more officers performed better and could deliver cost
savings.[74] Forces were asked to produce proposals for mergers, within Wales and the
English Government Office Regions. Nearly all the existing forces were under the 4,000
limit, with only the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police, Merseyside
Police, Northumbria Police, Thames Valley Police, West Midlands Police and West
Yorkshire Police over the limit - see Table of police forces in the United Kingdom for a
full list.

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Draft options were announced in November 2005. [75] The Home Office offered money to
police authorities that decided to voluntarily merge ahead of schedule, and was
consequently accused of attempting to "bribe" unwilling Chief Constables into
compliance.[76] The proposals were debated in the House of Commons on 19 December
2005.[77] Most Chief Constables and police authorities did not back the measure, [78] and
some suggested that cross-regional mergers would make more sense (for
example, Hampshire Constabulary in the South East suggested it could merge
with Dorset Police in the South West, whilst there was also a suggestion of North Wales
Police increasing co-operation with Cheshire Police)[79]
On 6 February 2006, preferred options for several regions were announced by the Home
Secretary in a written ministerial statement,[80][81]and set a deadline of 24 February for
forces to agree to the mergers. By this dead-line the only merger to have the agreement of
all forces involved was the Cumbria/Lancashire merger. Cheshire was opposed to a
merger with Merseyside, and West Mercia and Cleveland were holdouts in their regions,
whilst all the Welsh forces opposed the creation of a single Welsh force. [82] The Home
Secretary had the power to order the Cumbria/Lancashire merger to proceed by statutory
instrument under the Police Act 1996, and also to force through the contested mergers,
given a four-month consultation period. In a Written Statement made on 3 March 2006,
[83]
 he announced that the Lancashire/Cumbria merger could be ordered in May, and that
the consultation period on the others was starting, and would end on 2 July 2006. The
new forces would come into being on 1 April 2007.[84][85]
A second batch of merger proposals were made on 20 March 2006, with the Eastern, East
Midlands and South East regions covered. A deadline of 7 April 2006 was set for
responses, after which it was expected that the process above would be followed. [86][87]
[88]
 The following day, the Home Secretary proposed a merger of all four forces in
the Yorkshire and the Humber region.[89] The consultation period on this second batch of
mergers started on 11 April 2006, and would have finished on 11 August, with a target of
1 April 2008 for the mergers coming into effect.[90]

Greater London
Metropolitan Police officers on the beat
inLondon's Trafalgar Square
Upon the publication of the proposals, the Greater
London area was not included. This was due to two
separate reviews of policing in the capital - the first was

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a review by the Department of Transport into the future role and function of the British
Transport Police. The second was a review by the Attorney-General into national
measures for combating fraud (the City of London Police is one of the major
organisations for combating economic crime).[91] Both the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, and the Mayor, Ken Livingstone, stated that they would like
to see a single police force in London, with the Metropolitan Police absorbing the City of
London Police and the functions of the British Transport Police in London.[92] 
However, this met with criticism from several areas; the House of Commons Transport
Select Committee severely criticised the idea of the Metropolitan Police taking over
policing of the rail network in a report published on 16 May 2006, [93] while the City of
London Corporation and several major financial institutions in The Citymade public their
opposition to the City Police merging with the Met. [94] In a statement on 20 July 2006, the
Transport Secretary announced that there would be no structural or operational changes
to the British Transport Police, effectively ruling out any merger[95] 
The interim report by the Attorney General's fraud review recognised the role taken by
the City Police as the lead force in London and the South-East for tackling fraud, and
made a recommendation that, should a national lead force be required, the City Police,
with its expertise, would be an ideal candidate to take this role. [96] This view was
confirmed on the publication of the final report, which recommended that the City of
London Police's Fraud Squad should be the national lead force in combatting fraud, to
"act as a centre of excellence, disseminate best practice, give advice on complex inquiries
in other regions, and assist with or direct the most complex of such investigations"[97]
Merger abandonment
On 20 June 2006 the new Home Secretary, John Reid, announced that the contested
mergers would be delayed for further discussion, [98]and no mergers would be ordered
before Parliament's summer recess on 25 July other than the agreed Lancashire/Cumbria
one.
On 11 July 2006, it then emerged that the entire proposal for police mergers might be
ended, following the decision by the only two forces to have agreed to amalgamation,
Cumbria and Lancashire, not to proceed.[99] The announcement of this was followed by
the head of the ACPOstating that "The necessary financial support has not materialised
and mergers, including voluntary ones, will not take place". [100] On 12 July 2006, the
Home Office confirmed that the mergers were to be abandoned, with the entire proposal
taken back for consultation.[101]

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Other police forces

Policing in Scotland and Northern Ireland does not come under the purview of the Home
Office, and so would have remained unaffected by these proposals. Likewise, the major
non-territorial forces (British Transport Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary, Ministry of
Defence Police) are responsible to other government departments, and so would not have
been affected by this review.
List of proposed mergers
Note: these mergers have all been suspended in the long term while a further review and
consultation into policing in England and Wales takes place

Region Proposed force

Merge Bedfordshire Police, Essex Police and Hertfordshire

Constabulary
Eastern
Merge Cambridgeshire Constabulary, Norfolk
Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary

Merge Derbyshire Constabulary, Leicestershire
East Midlands Constabulary, Lincolnshire Police, Northamptonshire
Police andNottinghamshire Police

London not included in the review of policing, so City of London

London
Police and Metropolitan Police unaffected.

Merge Cleveland Police, Durham Constabulary and Northumbria

North-East
Police

North-West Merge Cumbria Constabulary and Lancashire Constabulary

Merge Cheshire Constabulary and Merseyside Police

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Greater Manchester Police unchanged

Kent Police unchanged

Merge Surrey Police and Sussex Police

South-East
Hampshire Constabulary unchanged

Thames Valley Police unchanged

Option 1: Merge Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Devon and

Cornwall Constabulary, Gloucestershire Constabulary,Dorset
Police and Wiltshire Constabulary
South-West[102]
Option 2: Merge Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Gloucestershire
Constabulary, Wiltshire Constabulary and Dorset Police
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary unchanged

Merge Dyfed-Powys Police, Gwent Police, North Wales

Wales
Police and South Wales Police

Merge Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire Police, West Mercia

West Midlands
Constabulary, West Midlands Police

Yorkshire and Merge Humberside Police, North Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire

Humberside Police, West Yorkshire Police

Border and Immigration Agency/UK Border Agency

As part of the wide ranging review of the Home Office, the then Home Secretary, John
Reid, announced in July 2006 that all British immigration officers would be uniformed.
On April 1, 2007, the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) was created and

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commenced operation. However, there were no police officers in the Agency, a matter
that attracted considerable criticism when the Agency was established - agency officers
have limited powers of arrest. Further powers for designated officers within the Agency,
including powers of detention pending the arrival of a police officer, were introduced by
the UK Borders Act 2007.[103]
The Government has effectively admitted the shortcomings of the Agency by making a
number fundamental changes within a year of its commencement. On 1 April 2008 the
BIA became the UK Border Agency following a merger with UKvisas, the port of
entry functions of HM Revenue and Customs. The Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith,
announced that the UK Border Agency (UKBA) "...will bring together the work of the
Border and Immigration Agency, UK Visas and parts of HM Revenue and Customs at
the border, [and] will work closely with the police and other law enforcement agencies to
improve border controls and security."[104]
Within months of this, the Home Secretary revealed (in a 16-page response to a report
by Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of UK terrorism legislation) that the Home
Office will issue a Green Paper proposing to take forward proposals by the Association of
Chief Police Officers (England & Wales) for the establishment of a new 3,000-strong
national border police force to work alongside the Agency.[105][106]
National Crime Force (England and Wales)
In April 2007, the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron announced the Conservative
Party's proposals for reform of policing. These included:

 Replacing police authorities with directly elected police commissioners. These

individuals would have control over budgets and target setting, with the Chief
Constable retaining operational control of policing.
 Giving the public the right to discuss local policing issues with their local police
officers at regular meetings.
In addition, the proposals made clear that on the issue of serious crime the 43 police
forces in England and Wales would either have to have greater cooperation, or that the
serious crime elements of their function would be invested in a National Serious Crime
Force.[107]
Police pay
The decision by the Home Secretary to refuse to implement, in England and Wales, the
recommendation of the Police Arbitration Tribunal of a 2.5% increase in pay has caused
widespread anger, especially as this decision stood in sharp contrast to the decision of

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the Scottish Government to fully implement the award for police officers in Scotland by
backdating it to 1 September 2007.[108] By instead implementing the award with effect
from 1 December 2007, the Home Secretary effectively reduced it to 1.9%, claiming that
this was necessary to control inflation, despite the fact that police authorities had already
made provision for the full 2.5% increase from their revenue budgets. There were
marches on Westminster by off-duty officers as a result.
Proposed mergers for Scotland
In 2010, the Justice Secretary in Scotland, Kenny MacAskill, outlined plans for reform of
policing in Scotland. Under a consultation, three proposals would be discussed in light of
the financial situation and the need for some level of budget cuts:

1. The eight existing police forces are retained, but with "increased collaboration"
2. Policing in Scotland moves towards a more regional structure, with the number of
individual forces reduced
3. All eight Scottish police forces are merged to form a single Scottish police service
According to the Scottish Government, approximately 25% of the total police budget in
Scotland is spent on Headquarters costs. TheScottish National Party has made a
commitment to increasing numbers of police officers by up to 1,000. Both Labour and
the Conservativeshave come out in favour of a single force, while the Liberal
Democrats are against this proposal.

Overseas police forces in the UK

There are certain instances where police forces of other nations operate in a limited
degree in the United Kingdom:

 The Police aux Frontières or PAF (French Border Police), a division of the Police

Nationale, is permitted to operate in regard to Eurostarrail services through
the Channel Tunnel. This includes on Eurostar trains to London, within the
international terminal at St Pancras Station, at Ebbsfleet and Ashford International
railway stations, and at the Cheriton Parc Le Shuttle terminal (alongside French
Customsofficials). The PAF also operate at Dover Ferry terminals. This arrangement
is reciprocated to the British Transport Police, UK Border Agency, and UK Customs
Officers on Paris bound trains and within the terminal at Paris Gare du Nord,
Coquelles (Le Shuttle), Gare de Lille-Europe, Bruxelles-Midi/Brussel-Zuid and the
Calais, Dunkerque, and Boulogne ferry terminals. [110] The French police officers are

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not permitted to carry their firearms in the London Terminal; the firearms must be left
on the train.
 An Garda Síochána na hÉireann (Irish Police), under a recent agreement between
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, have the right, alongside
the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, to carry out inspections of
the Sellafield nuclear facility in Cumbria.[111]
 In 2006 a small number of officers from the Policja (Polish Police) were seconded
to the North Wales Police to assist with the supervision of foreign (largely eastern
European) truck traffic largely on European route E22 (the A55 road).[112] The Chief
Constable of North Wales has publicly stated (November 2006) that he is considering
directly recruiting a small number of officers from Poland to assist with policing the
substantial population of Polish people that have migrated to his area since Poland's
accession to the EU in 2004.[113]
 Military Police of forces present in the UK within the terms of the Visiting Forces
Act 1952 are permitted to travel to/from relevant premises in uniform and their
(usually distinctive) vehicles will occasionally be seen. Their powers (including the
carrying of firearms) are generally limited by that and other legislation to those
necessary for the performance of duties related to their own forces and to those
possessed by the General Public.

D.7 “Programs of Selected Police Models and its application to Philippine Setting”
(Student Work Assignment)
Possible Role Models: Police Structures in Established Democracies
By: Christopher Paun

Describing the police structures and police reform in established democracies serves two
purposes. On the one hand, those states are likely to serve as role models for states in
transition to democracy. On the other hand, it serves as a frame of reference to asses
whether the police structures in the case studies are rather centralized or decentralized by
international comparison. States that have been chosen as possible examples, are the USA
and France as the oldest democracies of modern times, the UK as a very influential state
that also served as the basis for the US police system, and Germany and Japan as
examples of states that have been successfully led to democracy by external intervention,
which included an externally supervised police reform. After the short description of the
police structures in these selected countries, the chapter is concluded with a brief
categorization of the police structures of the states of the G7, the EU15 and Switzerland.
 

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1.  Policing in the United Kingdom

The police structures in the United Kingdom and in the United States both have
their roots in the so called frankpledge system of the 12th and 13th century in
England. In this system the king appointed for every shire (or county) one shire-
reeve (or Sheriff), who was the local judge and chief of police. The sheriff was the only
paid professional in the policing system. Two unpaid constables have been drafted
per every about 100 citizens, to assist the sheriff and patrol in their
neighborhood3 (Mawby 1999: 29, Roberg et. al. 2000: 33). When the judiciary became
independent, the sheriff was not anymore the local judge, but he remained the local chief
of police and prison warden. In the late 18th century increasing crime rates, especially in
cities, led to demands to create a professional police force. The attempt to create a
London city police in 1785 was rejected, as citizens feared a repressive police after
the example of the authoritarian states in continental Europe. But there have been
fewer concerns about civil liberties in the English colony of Ireland. And therefore a
Dublin city police has been established with a police act of 1786. The Dublin police
was designed to be a centralized, militarized and repressive colonial police
(Waddington 1999: 24-26, Mawby 1999: 32).
 
In England it took until 1829, until the home secretary Sir Robert Peel managed to get
approval for a police act establishing the London Metropolitan Police. His plan was to
establish a professional police that was not repressive and respected the civil liberties of
the citizens. Therefore the London police was unarmed and was wearing a uniform that
clearly differed from military uniforms. For the democratic control of the police, local
watch committees have been established since 1835 comprised of local council members
and representatives of the judiciary (Mawby 1999: 33, Roberg et. al. 2000: 35,
Waddington 1999: 21-24).
 
The London Metropolitan Police served as a role model for the introduction of
many local police forces in England and Wales. Since 1856 all counties and boroughs
have been obliged by law to run a professional police force. In exchange the
national government covered 25% of the costs. In 1874 the national financing has
been increased to 50% in exchange for a centralized setting of standards for the police.
So by the late 19th century the unpaid self-policing system has been completely
replaced by more than 200 professional local police forces each under the control of local
committees, but meeting national standards due to shared local-national financing of the
police. With several reforms increasing the minimum size of a police force, the number

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of police forces in England, Wales and Scotland has been reduced to 51 until the 1960s
and has remained stable since then (Mawby 1999: 42. Tupman 1999: 5).
 
Most scholars describe the English police system as a decentralized system, as only the
standards are set nationally, but policing is mainly a local task. However, some scholars
disagree and argue that it is rather centralized, because they consider the national control
more important than the local control (e.g. Loveday 1999). Contrary to common belief,
there is no centralized criminal investigation police in England. Every local English
police has its own criminal investigation department (CID). Only the CID of the London
Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) has such a good reputation that it is often called for
help by other local police forces (Mawby 1999: 41). To summarize, the characteristic of
the English police system is its mixed national and local democratic control with the
50/50 financing that ensures national standards but defines policing as a mainly a local
task.
 ______________________________
The police structures in England and Wales are identical. In Scotland the local control
is exercised mainly through representatives of the judiciary and less through local
council members. In Northern
Ireland the centralized colonial policing model has been kept until today. But a police
reform is part of the peace agreement of 2006. On some Channel Islands unpaid
constables are still part of the policing system (Mawby 1999: 33, 41-45, BBC 2006).

2. Policing in the United States of America

At first the English colonies in North America adapted the English policing system with
its unpaid constables. But some counties decided to have paid police forces instead. With
the independence of the USA, the office of sheriff was turned into an electoral office and
a network of sheriff departments5 and other local police forces emerged throughout the
states. Especially cities increasingly developed professional police forces after the
example of the London metropolitan police between since the 1830s (Roberg et. al. 2000:
38-40, Mawby 1999: 31, 38). Until the 1920s the local police was almost the only form
of police structure in the USA.

But this form of policing has been heavily criticized due to high levels of corruption and
political influence. In a patronage system people have been rewarded for political support
with employment by the police. For example, after the elections of 1880 in
Cincinnati 219 of 295 police officers have been replaced (Roberg et. al. 2000: 44).

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In such a police system the police officers have been loyal rather to their patron than to
the law. Decisions about police actions against labor rallies, for example, have been made
according to political considerations instead of the legal situation of labor unions (Roberg
et. al. 2000: 45, Mawby 1999: 39). And also the treatment of Afro- Americans was
largely influenced by “local customs” instead of laws, especially in the Southern states.
Even though federal law (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871) regulated the equal treatment of
Afro-Americans by the police throughout the states, it had little effect in the South. It
took until 1936 until the law was first successfully applied by the US Supreme Court
(Skolnick 2001: 223).
 
In the early 20th century there were increasing demands for a police reform in order to
professionalize the police, reduce corruption and political influence, and increase the
accountability of the police to the law. As a structural method to achieve these goals the
so-called progressive movement demanded police centralization. Further arguments for
police centralization have been economies of scale arguments and the examples of
continental European police forces that have been considered to be much more
professional.

They have been able to employ criminologists with university degrees, which was
impossible for small local police forces in the US. Especially influential was the
development of criminal investigation records by the French criminologist Alphonse
Bertillion. He established a system to take pictures and body measurements of criminals
on file that was later complemented with fingerprints. The storing of such files by more
than 3000 local police offices in the USA would have been much more inefficient than a
centralized system. (Roberg et. al. 2000: 45-47) In 1908 the FBI was created within the
national department of justice, with very little competences, as it was based on an
executive order by President Roosevelt and had no approval from Congress.

The bureau took over the national clearinghouse for criminal investigation records from
the Association of Chiefs of Police. Since the 1920s, the FBI got more competencies and
funding, and developed into a federal criminal investigation police. Parallel to the FBI
and local police forces, also state police agencies have been created. Before 1900 only
Texas and Massachusetts had state police agencies, but until 1960, all states created
a state police service (Mawby 1999: 38-40, Roberg 2000: 51-59).

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The division of competencies between different police agencies is not totally clear until
today. For a given policing task, there are often more than one police agency that could
claim responsibility. Therefore the distribution of police competencies between local,
state and federal level has often been an issue of political debate. Especially
economic difficulties during the recession of the 1930s led counties to downsize their
local police and accept increasing competences by the state police.
 
This is also true for the FBI, which got a good reputation in the fight against organized
crime during the prohibition era and afterwards. Therefore the FBI became a general
criminal investigation police, which can claim jurisdiction over any “federal crime”,
which is given, for example, if the crime involves crossing a state border or has effects
in more than one state (Roberg et. al. 2000: 58-90, Mawby 1999: 47).

However, since the 1960s there is a movement against police centralization, as arguments

for centralized police have been counterbalance with the idea of “community policing”,
which is about better relations between police and the local community. (see p. 34) To
summarize, the characteristic of the US policing system are police agencies on all state
levels: the municipality, the county, the state, and the federal level. The system is clearly
decentralized, when it comes to preventive policing and emergency response. But the
federal level has increasing competencies when it comes to the investigation of trans-state
crimes and especially organized crime.

3. Policing in France

Police researchers often use the term “Napoleonic” to categorize a certain police
structure, which can be found for example in today’s France, Italy, and Spain (Tupman
1999: 13). In the 19th and early 20th century it was the most common police structure
throughout continental Europe. It was used by countries as diverse as Portugal, the
Netherlands, Poland, Austria-Hungary and many German states. These countries either
developed a Napoleonic police structure when they had been conquered by Napoleon, or,
if they had not been conquered, they modeled their police structure after the Napoleonic
model. This Napoleonic police structure is to be described here at the example of the
motherland France. The hallmark of the structure are different national police forces,
which are accountable to different national ministries. In France, the Gendarmerie is
responsible for policing throughout the country and especially in rural areas. It is
accountable to the ministry of defense. The Police Nationale is responsible for policing
in cities and is accountable to the ministry of the interior. The Police Judiciaire is the
criminal investigation police and is accountable to the ministry of justice. However, the
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share buildings and employees can transfer from one organization to the other, while the
Gendarmerie is a completely separate organization. (Horton 1995: 26)

The Gendarmerie is the oldest police agency in France, named as such since its
reconstitution in 1791. The predecessor-organization was the Maréchaussée, a military
police in existence since the 14th century, whose functions had been expanded towards
general policing since the 16th century. However, the main function of the Maréchaussée
was not to protect the citizens, it was to protect the state, by preventing revolutions, civil
disorder, and policing the military (Horton 1995:18). With increasing urbanization,
special city guards have been created with the responsibility to police a particular city.

The first of such city guards has been created in 1667 in Paris. Joseph Fouché, who was
Napoleons Minister of Police from 1799 to 1810, has established a centralized
management of the different city polices. But this centralized control of the police was
limited to the protection of the state, which remained a central function of the French
police due to the many insurgencies and coup d’états.7

The protection of the citizens from criminals in cities remained at first under the
decentralized control of the local mayors, while the centralized Gendarmerie was policing
the rural areas. But with the integration of the Paris police and the Lyon police into one
national police, the centralization of city polices started and more of them have been
integrated until the 1920s. However, the complete centralization of the city polices into
one national police is a result of the occupation by Nazi-Germany. (Horton 1995: 10)

Since the 1980s, the centralized character of the French police is being challenged by the
community policing idea, which is called “police de proximité” in France. In several
cities small municipal police agencies have been created to establish good relations to the
community and work parallel to the national police. However, the bulk of the police work
is still done by the national police. The municipal police agencies together have only
about 5% of the employees of all French police agencies (Brogden / Nijhar 2005: 111).
So despite of some community policing, the main characteristic of the French police
structure remained the different centralized police forces, which are accountable to
different national ministries.

4. Policing in Germany

The police in Germany has been radically restructured after World War II. The main
influencing factors have been the police reform plans of the occupying powers and the
history of the German police system. German politicians have been advocating for the
“status quo ante”, meaning the structure of the police in the Weimar Republic before the
Nazis seized power. But the Weimar Republic did not actually have a well structured
police. In the situation of fragile statehood8 after World War I different guards have been

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created parallel to the police agencies, and some of those guards have been integrated
into the official police agencies. And when statehood has been regained, existing
agencies have been kept with very little reform. A “democratization of the police” was
not on the agenda, as stability and security had priority before democratization.

However, one constant in the German policing system was the responsibility of the
German states for policing. Already at the unification of the German Reich in 1871, all
25 German states kept the sovereignty in the area of policing. Some city-states had police
after the English model, while most states, including Prussia, had Napoleonic policing
systems. Prussia, as the largest German state and with its special role, dominated the
German policing system, but the police was not centralized until the Nazis seized power.
After the occupation of Germany the allied powers have redrawn the borders of the
German states and abolished Prussia as a state. As a consequence, there was not anymore
one single state that could dominate the others. (Funk 2000, Leßmann-Faus 2000,
Reinke / Fürmetz 2000)

The allied occupation powers have agreed on a police reform program, which is usually
described with the so-called four “D”s: denazification, demilitarization,
decentralization and democratization. The implementation of this program varied in the
different occupation zones. There was more concern about denazification in the Soviet
and the American zone, while the British and the French tolerated more police officers
with a Nazi history. When it comes to democratization, the longest lasting influence of
the Western allies was the limitation of police powers.

Traditionally the German police had very far-reaching powers that included even some
lawmaking and some judicial competencies. These powers have been abolished. Local
watch committees had been created for the democratic control of the police after the
English model. But these committees have been abolished with the foundation of the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.

As a matter of police decentralization, municipal police agencies have been created, but
with the exception of the British, the occupying powers allowed the creation of state
police agencies parallel to the local police agencies. The West German politicians did not
like the idea of municipal police agencies and advocated for police centralization. They
were finally allowed to centralize the police in each of the German states with the
founding of West Germany, but the occupying powers required them to keep this
decentralized character of the police (Reinke / Fürmetz 2000).

In East Germany the police has been completely centralized on the national level in 1952,
like all other administrative structures in the socialist authoritarian state. With the
reunification of Germany in 1990 the East German states have adopted the West German
policing system and received assistance from the West German police. Thereby the

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decentralized system of state police agencies has been established for Germany as a
whole. Since Germany regained full sovereignty with its reunification, there are some
contended tendencies to expand the competencies of the Federal Criminal Investigation
Office (BKA) and the Federal Border Guard (BGS). The border guard has been renamed
to Federal Police in 2005, to reflect the diminishing importance of borders in a unified
European Union. (Lindenberger 2000, Haselow et. al. 2000, Lisken / Lange 2000) In
spite of these recent developments, the German police system is still characterized by its
decentralized structure on the state-level. There are no municipal police agencies and
only limited competencies for federal police agencies, such as in the area of transnational
organized crime.

5. Policing in Japan

After World War II the US administration had similar plans for police reform in Japan as
in Germany: demilitarization, decentralization and democratization. But depoliticization
was not on the agenda, as the Japanese government has been kept, and even the Japanese
emperor was not forced to resign. Unlike in Germany, there was no democratic tradition
that could have been build upon. The empire existed since 1868, and before, there was a
feudal system called Shogunat Tokugawa (1603-1868).

In the Shogunate, the policing system was very decentral. The samurais, as the lowest
ranking noble men, have been responsible for policing in their area. For that purpose,
they combined five to ten families to a group (gonon-gumi) that was punished as a whole,
if one of their members committed a crime. Therefore policing was based on a high level
of social control. At the end of the Shogunat the new emperor secured his power with a
new centralized police after the examples of France and Prussia.

The Japanese police had similar far reaching powers as in Prussia, and it still employed
the gonin-gumi system of social control. (Aldous 1997: 19-40, Leishman 1999) After
World War II, the national police has been kept until 1947, when a police reform plan has
been implemented together with the entry into force of the new constitution. According to
this plan, every city with more than 50 000 inhabitants had to create a municipal police.
For the policing of smaller towns and rural areas, the US advisors proposed state police
agencies on the level of the Japanese prefectures (todōfuken).

But as a compromise with the Japanese cabinet, the national police has been kept to
police the rural areas instead. However, the cities did not have enough financial resources
to create adequate municipal police agencies. The low salaries of police officers led to a
further increase of the high level of corruption. And as the municipal police agencies
have been overstrained, the national police continued to be active in cities. So the plan for
the police reform was based on the US model, but the result was a somehow Napoleonic
system with competing police agencies (Aldous 1997: 148-207, Leishmann 1999).

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In 1951, the Japanese parliament has passed a law that allowed the cities to hold a
referendum weather to keep or abolish their municipal police agencies. And within only
six months, 1028 cities have held referenda of which 1024 resulted in the abolition of the
local police and the integration of their police stations and officers into the national
police. In response to continuing demands of US officials for police decentralization and
democratization, Japan has reformed its police again in 1954. In this reform the national
police has been restructured into sub-divisions along the lines of the prefectures.
The control of these sub-divisions is mixed: by the national minister of the interior and by
the local prefect, as well as by a national and a prefectural civil watch committee.
However, the democratic control on the subnational level is rather consultative. The
advice needs to be passed to the national level, where the control of the police actually
lies (Aldous 1997: 218f, Leishman 1999). This police structure is in existence in Japan
until today. In essence, it can be described as centralized system, with minor
decentralized consultation mechanisms.

Overview of Police Structures in Established Democracies

The police structures in five very important democracies have been briefly described
above. Japan is an example of a centralized police structure. France is an example of the
Napoleonic structure, with different centralized police agencies. And the USA, the UK,
and Germany are examples of different decentralized police structures. The USA has
police agencies on all state levels, Germany has its police mainly on the state-level, and
the UK has a system of combine central and decentralized democratic control of the
police. An overview of the police structures in the states of the G7, the EU15 and
Switzerland can be seen in Figure 1.

The G7 and the EU15 have been chosen as the can be described as “clubs of
democracies”, and Switzerland has been added as it is also a very old democracy with a
distinct political system. The figure also illustrates some changes to police structures. For
example the Police in the Netherlands used to be Napoleonic, but was reformed in 1990
after the example of the decentralized English police, but the result is not an exact copy.
On the contrary, Austria and Luxemburg have chosen to merge their Napoleonic police
agencies into centralized national police agencies. Centralizations of previously
decentralized police structures happened in Sweden and in Finland.

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PART IV

The Role of INTERPOL

        - Organizational Setup

        - Functions and Programs

        - Role in Anti-Transnational Crime

        - Criminal Intelligence Analysis

E-1. INTERPOL – A Global Organization

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• Created in 1923, INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police

organization, with 188 member countries

• General Secretariat in Lyon, France,

six Sub-Regional Bureaus, one Liaison
Office, and one Office of the Special
Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations.

• Four official languages: Arabic, English, French and Spanish

• A National Central Bureau (NCB) in each member country

Milestones in INTERPOL’s history

1914 –First International Criminal Police Congress held in Monaco (23 countries in
attendance)
1923 –Creation of International Criminal Police Commission, based in Vienna
1946 –Organization rebuilt after WWII and based in Paris; notice system created and first
Red Notices issued
1956 –Renamed International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL
1971 –Recognised as intergovernmental organization by the UN
1989 –General Secretariat moves from Paris to Lyon
2004 –INTERPOL representative office opened at the UN in New York
Governance and management

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THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE (INTERPOL)

The role of the International Police in the control of the impact of

globalization in policing and human rights violations is tremendous being uniquely
positioned to contribute substantially to the success of all law enforcement efforts armed
at combating global crimes, human rights violation, and terrorism.

GLOBAL ISSUES FACE BY THE INTERPOL

- Crime that is increasing Internationally

- Terrorist plot and train
- Traffickers smuggle drugs across boarders
- Hackers steal personal data
- Counterfeit Medicine that kills people
- Children are sexually abused
- Fugitives makes their escape

In a Globalized and interconnected world, crime is increasingly international. As

criminals cross boarders, police needs to stay one step ahead. Interpol brings the world
police forces together to solve international crimes at the heart of every member country,
an Interpol Bureau links national police with their global networks and general secretariat
in France 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, watch the world together, analyzed and share
information on crime.

Searching for data, sharing analysis, making connections to track down criminals, our red
notices alert worldwide to wanted persons, bridging a member country over our secure
communications network.

Interpol warned police of different criminal activities and threats using the latest
technology to reach out officers on the frontline to support our member countries
specialized police provided operational assistance and crisis response and build skills
training courses helping national police to use our data bases up dated day and night. The
data base is provided real time criminal information. This countries helping out together
makes Interpol unique.

Definition

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Interpol is the acronym of the International Criminal Police Organization, an international

non-governmental police organization that presently counts member agencies from 186
nations. Interpol primarily facilitates international co-operation among criminal law
enforcement agencies from different parts of the world, and also co-operates with other
organizations involved with combating international crime.

To achieve its mission, Interpol operates a central headquarters, the General Secretariat
located in Lyon, France, that is linked for information exchange with its member
agencies via so-called National Central Bureaus. Since its formation in 1923, Interpol has
continually expanded its membership, even in periods of international instability.

Formally, Interpol has four core functions.

INTERPOL’s 4 core functions

Core function #1: Secure global police communications

services

INTERPOL’s global police communications system, known as

I-24/7, enables police in all member countries to request,
submit and access vital data instantly in a secure environment.

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Originally conducted by regular mail, since 2003 these communications have been
electronically secured through an encrypted internet-based system called I-24/7
connecting the General Secretariat in Lyon with the National Central Bureaus.

I-24/7 - Connecting police, securing the world

• High-security global police network

• Gateway to INTERPOL databases

• Access to crucial data in seconds, any minute of any day

• Platform for sharing criminal information between law enforcement entities

• Controlled access

• Trained personnel

• Adapted to police needs

Core function #2: Operational data services and databases for police

Member countries have direct and immediate access to a wide range of databases
including information on known criminals, fingerprints, DNA profiles and stolen or lost
travel documents. INTERPOL also disseminates critical crime-related data through a
system of international notices.

Interpol provides its member agencies with operational data and databases
containing information, such as names, fingerprints and DNA profiles, on international
fugitives from justice as well as information on stolen property such as passports and
works of art.

Operational databases and data services for police

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INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions

MIND / FIND

Integrated solutions to access INTERPOL’s databases

• MIND – Mobile INTERPOL Network Database

• FIND – Fixed INTERPOL Network Database

Benefits of FIND and MIND:

• Brings the INTERPOL databases to the front line.

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• Offers real-time information for front-line officers.

• Allows external users to access INTERPOL’s databases.

No language barriers in technical integration

Core function #3: Operational police support services

INTERPOL provides law enforcement officials in the field with emergency support and
operational activities, especially in its priority crime areas. A Command and Co-
ordination Centre operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week and can deploy an Incident
Response Team to the scene of a serious crime or disaster.

Interpol offers operational assistance, particularly in Interpol’s priority areas,

which presently include public safety and terrorism, international fugitives from
justice, drugs and organized crime, human trafficking, and financial and high-tech
crime. In support of these operational services, Interpol organizes a Command and
Coordination Centre that operates as the primary point of contact for any member agency
that seeks immediate support. Other operational support can, at the request of a member
agency, be provided by a Crisis Support Group, a Criminal Analysis Unit, and Incident
Response Teams or Disaster Victim Identification Teams.

INTERPOL’s priority crime areas

INTERPOL’s initiatives in public safety and terrorism

• INTERPOL’s anti-terrorism program is designed to:

– increase the exchange of information on terrorist groups

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– assist member countries in the event of terrorist incidents or investigations

through analytical, investigative and database support

– support member countries in building early detection and counter-terrorism

capacity through training and analytical products

• Environmental crimes - projects focusing on oil pollution, illegal discharge of

hazardous wastes, and illegal trafficking of endangered flora and fauna.

• INTERPOL’s initiatives in public safety and terrorism

• Global initiatives on terrorism

– Fusion Task Force (FTF) - created to initiate a proactive, multi-

disciplinary approach to assist member countries in terrorism-related
investigations.
– Fusion Task Force projects in specific regions:
• Amazon ð Central and South America
• Baobab ð Africa
• Europe ð Europe
• Kalkan ð Central Asia
• Middle East ð Middle East
• Pacific ð Southeast Asia
• Global initiatives on terrorism
– Terrorists Arrest Report - collects information from member countries on
individuals arrested for terrorist activities, along with identifying data.
– Bioterrorism Prevention – aims to raise awareness of the threats posed by
bio-terrorism, counter bio-weapons proliferation, develop police training
programmes and strengthen enforcement of existing legislation.
– INTERPOL Weapons electronic Tracking System (IWeTS) - provides
member countries with a communication and information-sharing tool
which helps to enhance criminal and terrorism investigations related to
firearms.
– Orange Notice - warns police, public entities and other international
organizations about dangerous materials, criminal acts or events that posed
a potential threat to public safety.
– Project Geiger - collects and analyses data on the theft of radiological
materials.

• INTERPOL initiatives in trafficking in human beings

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• Trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation

– Manual of Best Practice for Law Enforcement Investigators on
Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation – used as the key
instruction manual for training police in human trafficking matters.
– Project Red Routes – targets the trafficking of women from Africa for
sexual exploitation.
– People smuggling - the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the
illegal entry of an individual into a country of which he/she is neither a
citizen nor a permanent residence.
– Active co-operation with other international organizations
– Project Bridge – targets smuggling of people from Asia
– Human Smuggling and Trafficking Message - provides a standardized
format for the easy exchange of information. It is accessible to all
authorized users via I-24/7
• Child sexual exploitation on the Internet - ranging from sexual images of
children to visual recordings of brutal sexual crimes that are uploaded and
downloaded on the Internet.
– INTERPOL Child Abuse Image Database (ICAID) - Operational since
2001 and endorsed by the G8. Contains more than 519,203 child abuse
images. Since its creation, 614 victims from 33 countries have been
identified and rescued.

• INTERPOL initiatives in drugs and criminal organizations

• Operational databases
• Support police operations against organized crime
• Identify new drug trafficking trends and criminal organizations worldwide
• Publication of Drug Intelligence Reports and Alerts
• Assist all national and international law enforcement agencies regarding the illicit
production and trafficking of narcotics
• Organized crime projects
– Bada – targets maritime piracy and armed robberies of ships
– FormaTrain – standardised investigative training programme to fight
international vehicle theft and trafficking
– Millennium – targets transnational Eurasian organized crime
– AOC – targets Asian organized crime
• Illegal trafficking of drugs projects

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– NOMAK – aims to enhance operational knowledge of trafficking of drugs

and precursor chemicals in Central Asia
– COCAF – targets cocaine trafficking from Western Africa to Western
Europe via commercial airlines
– DRUM – targets the diversion of precursor chemicals in Africa
– Drug.net – focuses on Internet-related drug trafficking
• Other serious crimes
– SCREAM - aims to enhance co-operation in the identification and
apprehension of suspects in serious criminal cases (serial crime cases)

INTERPOL initiatives in financial and high-tech crime

• Information technology (IT) crime
– GoldPhish: Phishing Project
– BOTNET Task Force: joint INTERPOL-Microsoft initiative which
includes 35 countries and 50 high-tech industry participants
– TOPSI: Training and Operational Standards Initiative on IT Crime
• Money laundering
– IMLASS: INTERPOL Money Laundering Automated Search System
• Payment card fraud
– Counterfeit payment card database – helps connect isolated
investigations based on technical examination of counterfeit payment cards
and their components.
– INTERPOL Counterfeit and Security Documents Branch (CSDB) –
provides forensic support and operational assistance regarding counterfeit
currency.
• Intellectual property (IP) crime
– INTERPOL Intellectual Property Crime Action Group (IIPCAG)
– Operation Jupiter – target crimes involving intellectual property rights in
South America
– Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP) – funded by the
US Chamber of Commerce and the Office of Patent and Trademarks
• Fugitive Investigative Support (FIS)

• Provide fugitive investigative support and training to member countries

• Capacity-building for member countries on war crime investigations
– Liaison with the International Criminal Court and other international
tribunals
– War crime investigators’ manual on INTERPOL website
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– Online information advice for specialist war crime units – networking

• Issuance of Notices
• INTERPOL’s initiatives in Corruption

• The INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA)

– Will be the most innovative provider of anti-corruption education, training,
operational assistance and research in the world
– Serves as a Centre of Excellence for Anti-Corruption Professionals
– To be located in Vienna, Austria
– The INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Office
– Global focal point for anti-corruption activities in support to all anti-
corruption agencies worldwide
– Supports the work of the IACA
• INTERPOL’s Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC)

• Operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in INTERPOL’s four official languages

• Key activities
– Monitoring message traffic and media sources
– Co-ordinating exchange of information among INTERPOL member
countries
– Providing crisis support, Incident Response Teams (IRTs) or Disaster
Victim Identification (DVI) teams
– INTERPOL Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs)
• INTERPOL’s Criminal Analysis Service

• Main analytical services provided to member countries

– Operational analysis
– Strategic analysis/crime threat assessments
– Training and consulting to member countries
• 14 analysts
– INTERPOL has 11 criminal intelligence analysts from 8 different countries
at IPSG
– 3 additional analysts are based in regional offices in El Salvador, Argentina
and Thailand
• INTERPOL’s support services to NCBs

• Assist in the expansion of the I-24/7 system beyond the NCB

• 24/7 assistance to NCBs
• Provide support in the implementation of MIND/FIND integrated solutions

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• Facilitate exchange of NCB Good Practices

• Establish NCB Contact Officers’ network
• Provide trainings to NCB staff officers

Core function #4: Police training and development

INTERPOL provides focused police training initiatives with the aim of enhancing the
capacity of member countries to effectively combat transnational crime and terrorism.
This includes sharing knowledge, skills and best practices in policing and establishing
global standards.

Police training and development, INTERPOL provides focused police training

initiatives with the aim of enhancing the capacity of member countries to effectively
combat transnational crime and terrorism. This includes sharing knowledge, skills and
best practices in policing and establishing global standards.

159 INTERPOL training sessions involving 4,404 participants across four regions

(Jan 2005 – December 2007)

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The INTERPOL International Police Training Program (IIPTP)

• To assist the international police community to achieve excellence in international
coordination in combating international crime
• Seven participants for each 10-week session.
• In 2007, a total of 21 students, covering 20 nationalities and 1 person from
UNMIK, participated

INTERPOL’s co-operation with other organizations

• Global organizations
– UN, WIPO, WCO, etc.
• Regional organizations
– ASEANAPOL, ACCP, SARPCCO, etc.
• International criminal tribunals
– ICC, ICTFY, ITCTR, etc.

INTERPOL-UN Co-operation

INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice created in 2005 in response to

UN Security Council resolution 1617
The resolution called on the UN Secretary General to work with INTERPOL to provide
better tools to help the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee carry out its mandate
regarding the freezing of assets, travel bans and arms embargos aimed at groups and
individuals associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
 300 notices published as of December 2007

INTERPOL’s added value

• Support and assist all organizations, authorities and services in preventing or
combating international crime
• Enhance the global exchange of police information
• Develop and maintain global operational criminal information databases
• Provide capacity-building measures and expert assistance against major crimes

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The way forward

• Active use of the INTERPOL system

• Utilise NCBs in regional and international police operations
• Bring INTERPOL tools and services to the frontline

International Police Cooperation:

The roles of Interpol and Europol

When it comes to transnational crime, prevention entails making the activity a risky
endeavor by reducing safe havens and viewing borders as the criminals do – relatively
invisible. So, police from states that provide safe havens, those that provide the demand
for the services that transnational criminal organizations supply, and those that serve as
transit and/or provide operational permissibility, must all collaborate to tighten the net.
The demand for international cooperation between national police services has become
very clear in an environment ridden with anxiety about security challenges such as
terrorism, arms, drugs and human trafficking, cyber crime or corruption. But demand
hasn’t necessarily translated into supply, and international police cooperation rates
remain relatively low. In light of the demand for cooperation to address the threats posed
by transnational crime, what prevents national police agencies from sharing information
with foreign colleagues, engaging in joint investigations and surveillance? And how are
those obstacles to police cooperation being addressed?

Distinctive Features

Interpol was established at an international meeting of police in Vienna in 1923 in order

to facilitate international police co-operation in response to rising international crime
following the end of the First World War. Then known as the International Criminal
Police Commission, the organization was from the start not set up as a supranational
police force sanctioned by an international governing body, but as a non-governmental
collaborative network among the criminal law enforcement authorities of various nations,
as remains the case today. To facilitate inter-agency collaboration, a central headquarters
was established in Vienna, Austria, and various institutions of co-operation, such as a
radio network, regular meetings, and printed publications, were organized to facilitate
international police communications. By the late 1930s, police of the German Nazi
regime gradually took control of the organization, and the headquarters were
subsequently moved to Berlin where they were institutionally linked to the SS police
structure. Absent any meaningful form of international co-operation during the Second
World War, the organization was revived in 1946 at an international police meeting in
Brussels, Belgium. The headquarters were then moved to France, where they have since

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been located, first in Paris and, since 1989, in Lyon. The formal name change to the
International Criminal Police Organization, abbreviated as ICPO-Interpol or just Interpol,
came about in 1956.

The formal goals of Interpol, as specified in its constitution, are ‘to ensure and promote
mutual assistance [among] criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws’ of
their respective nations and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Interpol, undated). The functions of Interpol are restricted to the prevention and
suppression of ordinary law crimes or violations of criminal law, at the exclusion of
‘activities of a political, military, religious or racial character’ (ibid.). Membership of the
organization is assigned by Interpol’s Secretary General to national police agencies
selected by the governmental authorities of their respective nations as their
representatives. Presently, the four official languages of the organization are English,
French, Spanish and Arabic.

The structure of Interpol consists of a General Assembly, an Executive Committee, a

General Secretariat, and the National Central Bureaus. The General Assembly is
Interpol’s main governing organ, which meets annually and comprises delegates
appointed by each member agency. The Assembly takes all important decisions related to
Interpol’s policies, resources, methods, finances, and activities. The Assembly also elects
the 13-member Executive Committee, which comprises a President, three Vice-
Presidents, and nine delegates covering the regions of Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe
and the Middle-East and Northern Africa. Interpol’s President is elected by the General
Assembly for a period of four years. The General Assembly and the Executive
Committee together comprise Interpol’s governance bodies.

The General Secretariat is located in the Lyon headquarters and has six regional offices,
in Argentina, the Ivory Coast, El Salvador, Kenya, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, in addition
to a liaison office at the United Nations in New York. Since 1996, Interpol has had a
formal agreement with the United Nations, granting each organization observer status in
sessions of their respective general assemblies and enabling co-operation in various
matters of the fight against international crime. Interpol has reached similar co-operation
agreements with Europol (the European Police Office), the International Criminal Court,
and other police and legal organizations.

The National Central Bureaus are maintained in the individual nations of the member
agencies. The Bureaus function as the designated contact points for the General
Secretariat, the regional offices, as well as the other member agencies for all official
Interpol police communications concerning international investigations and the location
and apprehension of fugitives. These communications are conducted on the basis of a
specialized color-coded notification system whereby each one of six possible colors
represents a specific type of request.

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For example, a red notice is a request for the arrest of a wanted person in view of
extradition, and a blue notice is a request to collect information about a person in relation
to a crime. In 2005, an Interpol-United Nations Special Notice was added for requests
concerning groups or individuals that are subject to actions formally sanctioned by the
United Nations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 

There are two categories of obstacles to international police cooperation:

(1) The traditional nationalistic approach to policing, and

(2) National institutions’ lack of structures to facilitate the sharing of intelligence inside
and outside the state. The traditional, age old, obstacles to international cooperation run
parallel to those at the national level.

Turf wars between police officers and/or federal/national agencies and local/regional
agencies have always impeded the sharing of information and the collaboration between
colleagues. These stem from mistrust between colleagues, even at the national level. At
the international level, a lack of trust stems from fear that information, if shared, will be
mishandled (i.e not well encrypted or not handled in a way that makes the evidence
admissible in court) or even “lost” to transnational crime. The problem is compounded
by the fact that cooperation by national police services requires national systems that
enable the flow of information.

Hence, implementation of a policy to cooperate in law enforcement matters requires the

development of national information flow systems, whereby intelligence gathered by
police services will have established channels to travel to a centralized national police
office, which in turn will be in a position to share information with foreign offices or
international police cooperation organizations. Mindsets also have to shift from a
nationalistic culture guided by a code of secrecy, to one that is open to sharing sensitive
information with colleagues across borders. Finally, policy must reflect the state’s
commitment to cooperation by reflecting a trend toward harmonization to ensure
compatibility of information and of evidence gathering techniques. This is all is in the
interest of making evidence gathered in one state admissible in another state’s courts, to
reduce the permissive environment for transnational crime.

To address these obstacles, international police cooperation organizations have been

created.
The recognition that international cooperation may be the answer to international crime
was sparked by the theft of the imperial jewels in Vienna, Austria in 1913. After several
weeks, the jewels were located in another European capital. When the Austrian
government requested the restitution of the jewels and the extradition of the perpetrator,
no one knew how to proceed; no procedure existed.
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A Dr. Schroder and Prince Albert of Monaco called the first International Criminal
Congress in Monaco in 1914. This event, which was organized as a meeting of police
chiefs and essential members of the international community, led to the creation of
INTERPOL, the International Police Office. INTERPOL was established to facilitate the
collaboration of national police services all around the world. EUROPOL began full
operations in 1998 to compensate for the erosion of borders that resulted from the
Schengen and other European Union agreements.

These international police cooperation facilitators are intended to serve member states as
clearing houses. They are intergovernmental organizations whose membership are states,
and put in force by the ratification of member states and their financial support. Both
INTERPOL and EUROPOL have staff, Secretariats and national liaison offices whose
roles are to collect and analyze national police information gathered from investigations,
and voluntarily shared by states.

The crime analysis performed by these International Organizations is coined “finished

intelligence”, and offers a big picture perspective to national police services that tap this
valuable resource. A big picture perspective comes from the compilation of information
on criminal activity in a variety of countries which is analyzed and provides an ‘above
the state’ perspective, depicting the modus operandi, trends and threat assessments based
on where criminal activity takes place, where perpetrators find the resources to engage in
such activity, and where they find safe havens to seek impunity. All these activities take
place in different parts of the world.

International Police Cooperation Organizations (IPCOs) play three roles that enhance
their respective memberships’ ability to fight transnational crime. First, they raise the
levels of concern of states vis-à-vis the threats posed by transnational crime and the
benefits of cooperation. Secondly, they assist states to cooperate internationally more
readily on a systematic basis, by building their capacity. Thirdly, IPCOs aim to
circumvent, or even remove, the traditional obstacles to international police cooperation
by promoting trust, communication and professional partnerships between foreign
colleagues.

IPCOs raise levels of concern by informing both policy and operational national
authorities about transnational crime and the multilateral approach to combating it. To
address low participation rates, Interpol and Europol have introduced initiatives to
promote states’ understanding of the threats they face, the policies they need to adopt vis-
à-vis their national security, and that of their fellow members, and the procedures and
structures and/or institutions that they need to put in place in order to implement policies
that are formulated around international cooperation.

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Both Europol and Interpol organize meetings, symposia, working groups and ad hoc case
meetings. Beyond providing valuable opportunities to network, establish personal
relationships and face-to-face interaction, these conferences also provide a medium for
states to find guidelines for policy formulation. Attendees, who at some of the
conferences are decision-makers themselves, have the opportunity to debate and
compromise on policy directions and set standards for police cooperation. Operational
meetings give field officers a chance to acquire expertise from others and establish
approaches for joint investigations.

IPCOs also have programs that aim to assist states in the development of national
information flow systems, and training seminars that teach national police authorities
how to collect intelligence that is admissible in their judicial systems as well as those of
other states.
Simply, they provide assistance to states to build the capacity of national police services
to participate in an international system of cooperation – sharing and receiving
intelligence.

INTERPOL impacts the capacity of states and the likelihood that foreign police
colleagues will share information through several programs. “Finished intelligence” that
is incomplete, because of the failure of some states to share information, is inaccurate and
its value to national police authorities limited.

The Regional Modernization Program and the Model Cooperation Agreement are
initiatives that were implemented by Interpol in recognition that insufficient national
capacity affected cooperation, and in turn, the quality of the output of the IPCO. These
programs provide guidance, training, and even resources to states that are willing to
establish channels for cooperation, but which do not have the competence and/or the
necessary resources. The Regional Modernization Program offers assistance in setting up
National Central Bureaus (Liaison offices that facilitate communication between national
authorities and Interpol), and the Model Cooperation Agreement serves as a guide for
bilateral cooperation agreement for states willing to initiate a working relationship with
another state.

EUROPOL also engages in field training to enhance the success of operations against
transnational criminal activity. The drugs expert department, for example, has established
a demonstration on how to identify, raid, gather evidence and dismantle a drug
production lab.

A team from Europol goes to the various police stations and provides this type of training
to police officers. The Euro Counterfeit department also launched workshops to educate
and train police and border officers about the modus operandi, the trends and operational
approaches to Euro counterfeiting activities. These programs give national police
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opportunities to learn about new forms of crime and how to address them. Europol is in a
unique position to provide this training, taking the lessons learned by individual states
and communicating them to the entire membership.

Besides this operational approach to capacity building, Europol is also engaged in

expanding existing international police cooperation. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
on Criminal Matters of 2000 is an attempt to reconcile two distinct channels for police
cooperation: the direct channel at the police level, and the judicial channels that make up
the law enforcement apparatus. These two interconnected channels enable Europol to
communicate quickly with member states by harmonizing investigative reports, and
making them easier to understand and use over time. Consequently, analysis tools are
improved. These two channels were established to extent mutual legal assistance and
make sure that evidence is admissible in any court within the membership. The Treaty
provides for enhanced cooperation through coordination of joint teams, joint satellite
tracking in order to facilitate the transfer of evidence and prosecution activities from one
member state to another, a scoreboard mechanism whereby Europol performs an audit of
national information-sharing systems, and the right to request member states to initiate an
investigation.

Finally, IPCOs tackle the obstacles to cooperation which include mistrust, lack of
training and information, turf issues and incompatible investigative methods (ie.
the Anglo- Saxon surveillance approach to gathering intelligence vs. the
infiltration/spy approach widely used elsewhere). They provide a mechanism for
police officers to access information from foreign colleagues that can significantly
enhance their investigations, inform them in order to devise strategy and increase
the chances of prosecution. The institution serves as a clearinghouse for police
information through a variety of services provided by international experts, whose
output is designed to enhance law enforcement successes on an international scale,
making full use of communication and information exchange.

EUROPOL and INTERPOL diffuse "finished intelligence" derived from

compilation and analysis of voluntarily shared intelligence gathered by national
law enforcement authorities. Through this analysis, their staffs identify current and
future trends of criminality and areas of concern both in geographic terms and in
types of crime. The diffusion of information takes place through a sophisticated
computerized information exchange system via a protected database system to
which competent authorities have access in a centralized national office. Besides
serving as a means to send information about criminal activity, investigations or
other operations to member states, the information exchange system is available
for member states to communicate directly in the event that one would request
information from another, e.g. about the criminal record of a perpetrator from one
state conducting criminal activity in another.

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International police cooperation organizations enjoy a unique ability to facilitate

cooperation between national police services, however, the ‘above the state’ perspective
will be limited and of less value to all members if some members withhold information.
Participation rates have been relatively low. In 2001, EUROPOL enjoyed systematic
cooperation by only 6 out of the 15 member states. Some states have been working to
improve their ability to participate. The case of France, which has been slow to
participate, illustrates that when concern about transnational crime and instruments to
combat it is combined with concern that IPCOs are gaining too much executive power
over the state, policies and attitudes can gradually change. A recent parliamentary report
(Rapport du Sénat du Parlement Français, session ordinaire de 2003-2004) has further
defined the relationship between France and Europol and other cooperation conventions,
and has resulted in a significant increase in requests for information by France for
information and in intelligence shared via Europol and other cooperation mechanisms.
There have been significant recent improvements in the participation rates of states as
they strive to integrate their national systems into the larger international network of
cooperation. And much remains to be done.
(Nadia Gerspacher, Ph.D.)

Interpol’s Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Concept: Criminal Intelligence Analysis (sometimes called Crime Analysis) has been
recognized by law enforcement as a useful support tool for over twenty-five years and is
successfully used within the international community. Within the last decade, the role and
position of Criminal Intelligence Analysis in the global law enforcement community has
fundamentally changed. Whereas, previously there were a few key countries acting as
forerunners and promoters of the discipline, more and more countries have implemented
analytical techniques within their police forces. International organizations, such as
Interpol, Europol and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), all have Criminal Intelligence Analyst among their personnel. The techniques
are also widely used within private sector organizations.

Definition: There are many definitions of Criminal Intelligence Analysis in use

throughout the world. The one definition agreed on June 1992 by an International
group of twelve European Interpol member countries and subsequently adopted by
other countries as follows: The identification of and provision of insight into the
relationship between crime data and other potentially relevant data with a view to
police and judicial practice.

Purpose: The central task of analysis is to help officials-law enforcers, policy makers,
and decisions makers – deal more effectively with uncertainty, to provide timely
warning of threats, and to support operational activity by analyzing crime.

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Divisions: Criminal Intelligence Analysis is divided into operational (or tactical) and
strategic analysis. The basic skills required are similar’, and the difference lies in the
level of detail and the type of client to whom the products are aimed.

1. Operational Analysis aims to achieve a specific law enforcement outcome. This

might be arrests, seizure of forfeiture of assets or money gained from criminal
activities, or the disruption of criminal group. Operational Analysis usually has a
more immediate benefit.
2. Strategic Analysis is intended to inform higher level decision making and the
benefits are realized over the long term. It is usually aimed at managers and policy-
makers rather than individual investigators. The intention is to provide early warning
of threats and to support senior decision-makers in setting priorities to prepare their
organizations to be able to deal with emerging criminal issues. This might mean
allocating resources to different areas of crime, increased training in a crime fighting
technique, or taking steps to close a loophole in a process.

Both disciplines make use of a range of analytical techniques and analyst need to
have a range of skills and attributes.

PART V.

Establishing Bilateral and International Cooperation in Addressing Transnational

Crimes

Globalization and, more specifically, the emergence and expansion of

transnational crime confront all justice systems with some new difficulties. Criminal
offenders are mobile and often seek to evade detection, arrest, and punishment by
operating across international borders. They avoid being caught by taking advantage of
those borders and playing on the frequent reluctance of law enforcement authorities to
engage in complicated and expensive transnational investigations and prosecutions. The
weak capacity of any one country to address effectively some of these new threats
translates itself into an overall weakness in the international regime of criminal justice
cooperation. For countries with a relatively weak criminal justice capacity, these
challenges can sometimes appear insurmountable.

The international community now recognizes international cooperation in criminal

matters as an urgent necessity. This demands national efforts to comply with new
international standards, to encourage convergence and compatibility of national
legislation, to introduce complex procedural reforms, and generally to develop a much

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greater investigation and prosecution capacity at the national level as well as strengthen
the capacity to cooperate at the international level. For some countries, building a
capacity for international cooperation within their own criminal justice system is, to say
the least, a struggle.

The main mechanisms supporting international cooperation are mutual legal

assistance, extradition, transfer of prisoners, transfer of proceedings in criminal matters,
international cooperation for the purposes of confiscation of criminal proceeds and asset
recovery as provided for in the United Nations Convention against Corruption, as well as
a number of less formal measures, including measures in the area of international law
enforcement cooperation. These mechanisms are based on bilateral or multilateral
agreements or arrangements or, in some instances, on national law. All of them are
evolving rapidly to keep pace with new technologies and their evolution over the last
decade or so reflects the new determination of Member States to work more closely with
each other to face the growing threats of organized crime, corruption and terrorism.

Noticeably, some of the most innovative strategies are coming out of cooperation
efforts between countries that have either a crime problem or a geographical border in
common. Some of the most significant lessons learned in recent years come from the
experience of countries working at the bilateral, sub-regional or regional level to address
practical issues on a regular basis. Regional cooperation is evolving rapidly in all parts of
the globe.

A consensus is emerging around some of the most promising means of enhancing

international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. Some of
them are now included in the international cooperation framework established by the
United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime; against Corruption;
and against the Financing of Terrorism, and several other multilateral instruments at the
global and regional levels, which provide a strong basis for internal cooperation. Having
national legislation in place to implement fully these instruments is therefore of
paramount importance, as are the development of a capacity to cooperate and the
adoption of the administrative measures necessary to support the various modalities of
international cooperation.

This assessment tool identifies some practical issues that are typically encountered
by a country trying to actively engage in international cooperation. It refers also to some
of the practical issues that have recently emerged during the implementation of new
international conventions, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, whose main purpose is precisely to facilitate international cooperation. Questions
are suggested for assessing the capacity and willingness of a particular jurisdiction to
cooperate at the international level, as well as the obstacles it is facing with respect to
building that capacity.

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For the purpose of this tool, international cooperation is defined broadly because it
can and should occur at various levels of the criminal justice system. The assessor,
however, will frequently need to narrow the scope of the assessment. In doing so, one
may consider the nature of the country’s existing or anticipated future obligations under
various treaties (multi-lateral, regional or bi-lateral).

In spite of the considerable progress accomplished at the bilateral, regional, trans-

regional, and international levels, international cooperation in the investigation and
prosecution of serious crimes still needs considerable strengthening. Practitioners are
well aware of the many obstacles that still exist to international cooperation in criminal
matters. They include sovereignty issues, the diversity of law enforcement structures, the
absence of enabling legislation, the absence of channels of communication for the
exchange of information, and divergences in approaches and priorities. These problems
are often compounded by difficulties in dealing with the varied procedural requirements
of each jurisdiction, the competitive attitude that often exists between the agencies
involved, language, and human rights and privacy issues.

There are also rule of law issues that require attention in relation to international
cooperation. Measures to reinforce the rule of law need not be characterized as
impediments to international cooperation. A country’s commitment to the rule of law and
the protection of human rights should not be negotiable or bartered against some
international cooperation concessions in fighting transnational crime or terrorism. In fact,
a commitment to the rule of law can enhance international cooperation in criminal
matters. Measures to enforce the rule of law and adherence to international human rights
standards are also directly relevant to enhancing mutual assistance and international
cooperation. In matters of extradition, mutual legal assistance, or joint investigations, the
agencies and institutions involved retain an obligation to ensure the lawfulness of all
actions taken in the name of cooperation.

Integrated approaches are also important in the provision of technical assistance.

Smaller countries often experience difficulties implementing the numerous international
conventions and bilateral treaties they are expected to comply with. The basic capacity of
their criminal justice and law enforcement institutions is often limited. They can benefit
from integrated technical assistance activities that focus on building their overall
investigation and prosecution capacity as well as their ability to cooperate effectively.

Technical assistance in the area of international cooperation in the context of a

broader strategic framework may include work that will support the following:

 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that support and
strengthen mutual assistance;

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 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that enable
mutual legal assistance as required by instruments to which the country is a party;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to enable extradition as required by
any treaty to which the country is a party;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that authorize law
enforcement\ cooperation as required by any bilateral or multilateral agreements;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the legal framework to include measures that authorize law
enforcement cooperation as required by any bilateral or multilateral agreements;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the criminal and criminal procedure code to ensure that the
predicate proscribed acts described in the instruments above are criminalized
under the legislative framework, that legal jurisdiction for them is established;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the criminal and criminal procedure code to ensure that the
appropriate criminal acts are extraditable;
 􀂃 Review and enhance the criminal and criminal procedure code to ensure that
sensitive information received via international cooperation is kept confidential;
 􀂃 Develop national policies and implement procedures to facilitate exchange of
information as well as its analysis and to prevent the disclosure of sensitive
information received via such exchanges;
 􀂃 Develop national policies for and implement mechanisms such as central
authorities, liaisons, secondments and exchanges of prosecutors and law
enforcement officials, and networks to facilitate mutual cooperation;
 􀂃 Develop national policies and implement procedures for mutual legal assistance
in the absence of treaties and to the extent possible where dual criminality is
absent;
 􀂃 Develop the capacity of existing institutions and agencies to develop, use, and
respond to requests for mutual legal assistance and information;
 􀂃 Train law enforcement personnel, prosecutors and judicial officials regarding
legal requirements for mutual legal assistance and extradition;

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 􀂃 Develop the capacity of authorities to cooperate internationally in the protection

of victims, their compensation for the harm they suffer, and their safe repatriation
when necessary.

STIMULANT QUESTIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES:

A. How frequently, in what circumstances and with what results have agencies have been
involved in seeking cooperation from another country?

B. From which countries was international assistance most frequently requested?

C. What difficulties have agencies typically encountered in trying to seek the assistance
of other countries?

D. How frequently, in what circumstances, for what type of offences are agencies most
frequently asked for assistance from other countries? What is the volume of request? Are
agencies typically able to reply positively for request for assistance? What are the delays
typically involved in responding to a request for assistance?

E. What are the countries that most frequently request assistance from agencies? For what
kind of assistance? What are offences usually involved?

F. What difficulties have agencies typically encountered in trying to offer technical

assistance to other countries? Are some kinds of assistance more problematic than others?

The assessor may wish to enquire about the experience of the country and its various criminal justice
agencies with various transnational forms of crime, including prevalence, patterns, routes, trends,
modus operandi, victims, etc. The assessor should also be curious about the countries experience
with international cooperation, both as a provider of assistance and as a requesting State.
Furthermore, it is clear that inter-agency cooperation at the national level is not only crucial to effective
local action against transnational organized crime, corruption and terrorism, but is also an important
precondition for effective cross-border cooperation against these major threats.

Designating a single central authority for all incoming and outgoing legal assistance and extradition
requests and strengthening its effectiveness remain crucial to the success of international cooperation
in criminal matters. This is how a country, among other things, can coordinate its own requests for
assistance and stand ready to respond expeditiously to requests for cooperation it receives from other
countries. Increasingly, mutual legal assistance treaties require that States Parties designate a central
authority (generally the Ministry of Justice) to which requests can be sent, thus providing an
alternative to diplomatic channels. The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Convention against Corruption makes it mandatory for States Parties in order to ensure the
expeditious transmission or execution of the requests. Nevertheless, the role of the central authorities
need not necessarily be an exclusive one. Direct exchanges of information and cooperation, to the
extent permitted by domestic law, should also be encouraged.

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G. Does the country have a Central Authority for International Cooperation or

equivalent? Has another agency been delegated this responsibility?

H. Does the Central Authority have sufficient resources to achieve its mandate (skilled
and trained staff, communication equipment, ongoing training, etc.)? Is it able to
collaborate and exchange with other central authorities?
I. Are law enforcement agencies able to share criminal record and other law enforcement
information with each other, directly, in real time, while providing all the required
security and human rights safeguards?

J. Do agencies have access to advanced data communication and storage technologies for
the sharing of criminal record information and the exchange of other criminal justice data
between agencies?

K. Are there clear guidelines, rules, and accountability mechanisms to prevent and detect
improper or corrupt practices in data sharing?

L. Does national legislation allow or support lawful and effective exchanges of data on an
international basis? Does national legislation authorize or provide mechanisms for the
exchange of such information among domestic law enforcement agencies?

M. Where the country is not a party to mutual legal assistance or extradition treaties does
the national legislation authorize such activities? Under what circumstances? Are these
circumstances defined by law?

Evaluation

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In terms of membership, Interpol is one of the world’s largest international

organizations. The ability to attract a wide and in many ways diverse membership clearly
counts among the organization’s most notable achievements. Yet, while Interpol has
secured a measure of co-operation despite the political and other differences that exist
among the nations of the world, the wide scope of the organization’s membership has
ironically also hindered effective co-operation due to frequent mistrust between the
police of different nations. As a result, police from the member countries often prefer to
conduct international police work in a bilateral or otherwise limited form rather than rely
on the multilateral structure of Interpol.

Interpol has been able to institute various means of communication among police
that are driven by professional concerns of efficiency in police work, relatively
unhindered by periods of international instability. Following the terrorist incidents of
September 11, Interpol has technologically upgraded and expanded its facilities.
Problematic is the fact that Interpol’sits  ways of working may operate at the cost of
considerations of accountability and formal legality. A constant concern for Interpol is
finding a way to balance a quest for efficiency in police performance with due concern
for democratic accountability – a dilemma shared by police organizations worldwide.
Associated Concepts:

Accountability, Europol, multi-agency policing, security networks, transnational policing.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Whether a country is attempting to prevent organized crime activities, financial and economic crime, computer crime, corruption or
terrorism, the establishment of better legal bases for international cooperation is a prerequisite. Strengthening the convergence of
criminal law and criminal law procedure is part of any long-term strategy to build more effective international cooperation.
Developing stronger bilateral and multilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance is also part of the solution. The universal
conventions against terrorism, as well as the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and
against Corruption provide a strong basis for legal cooperation and often suggest some of the elements that must be developed
as part of a national capacity for effective investigation and prosecution of these crimes. Having national legislation in place to fully
implement these instruments is therefore of paramount importance.

In matters of international cooperation, criminal justice agencies must rely, to a large extent, on the treaty network developed by
their country. The various conventions mentioned above call upon their States Parties to widen their treaty network by entering into
new bilateral and multilateral treaties to facilitate international cooperation in criminal matters. Making this network work for them in
a practical manner is often still a challenge for prosecution services.

It is important to note, however, that mutual legal assistance can be provided without the existence of a specific treaty if national
laws are flexible enough.

Existing treaties and laws should be reviewed periodically and amended as necessary to keep pace with rapidly evolving practices
and challenges in international cooperation. They should provide maximum flexibility to enable broad and expeditious assistance.
To facilitate these efforts, the General Assembly adopted a Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

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 Deflem, Mathieu. 2009. "Interpol." Pp. 179-181 in The Sage Dictionary of Policing,
edited by Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming. London: Sage Publications. 

http://www.mathieudeflem.net/

Key Readings 

 Anderson, M. (1989) Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International
Police Cooperation. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
 Barnett, M. & L. Coleman. 2005. ‘Designing police: Interpol and the study of
change in international organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 49, 593-619. 
 Bresler, F. (1992) Interpol. London: Sinclair-Stevenson. 
 Deflem, M. (2002) Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of
International Police Cooperation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Deflem, M. (2006) ‘Global rule of law or global rule of law enforcement?
International police cooperation and counter-terrorism’, The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 603, 240-251. 
 Interpol (undated) ICPO-INTERPOL Constitution and General Regulations,
Interpol: Lyon, available at www.interpol.int. 

UN Convention against Transnational Crime

With the signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000, the international community demonstrated
the political will to answer a global challenge with a global response. If crime crosses
borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is undermined not only in one
country, but in many, then those who defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national
means. If the enemies of progress and human rights seek to exploit the openness and
opportunities of globalization for their purposes, then we must exploit those very same
factors to defend human rights and defeat the forces of crime, corruption and trafficking
in human beings.

One of the starkest contrasts in our world today is the gulf that exists between the civil
and the uncivil. By “civil” I mean civilization: the accumulated centuries of learning that
form our foundation for progress. By “civil” I also mean tolerance: the pluralism and
respect with which we accept and draw strength from the world’s diverse peoples. And
finally, I mean civil society: the citizens’ groups, businesses, unions, professors,
journalists, political parties and others who have an essential role to play in the running of
any society.

Arrayed against these constructive forces, however, in ever greater numbers and with
ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call “uncivil society”. They are terrorists,

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criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people and others who undo the good works of civil
society. They take advantage of the open borders, free markets and technological
advances that bring so many benefits to the world’s people. They thrive in countries with
weak institutions, and they show no scruple about resorting to intimidation or violence.
Their ruthlessness is the very antithesis of all we regard as civil. They are powerful,
representing entrenched interests and the clout of a global enterprise worth billions of
dollars, but they are not invincible.

The Millennium Declaration adopted by the Heads of State meeting at the United Nations
in September 2000 reaffirmed the principles underlying our efforts and should serve to
encourage all who struggle for the rule of law. The Declaration states that “men and
women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from
hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice”.

At the Millennium Summit, world leaders proclaimed freedom—from fear and from want
—as one of the essential values in the twenty-first century. Yet the right to live in dignity,
free from fear and want, is still denied to millions of people around the world. It is denied
to the child who is working as an indentured laborer in a sweatshop; to the father who
must pay a bribe to get medical care for his son or daughter; to the woman who is
condemned to a life of forced prostitution.

I believe the trafficking of persons, particularly women and children, for forced and
exploitative labor, including for sexual exploitation, is one of the most egregious
violations of human rights that the United Nations now confronts.

It is widespread and growing. It is rooted in social and economic conditions in the

countries from which the victims come, facilitated by practices that discriminate against
women and driven by cruel indifference to human suffering on the part of those who
exploit the services that the victims are forced to provide. The fate of these most
vulnerable people in our world is an affront to human dignity and a challenge to every
State, every people and every community.

I therefore urge the Member States to ratify not only the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, but also the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which can make a real
difference in the struggle to eliminate this reprehensible trade in human beings.

Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today’s globalized economy and the
sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat them have remained
up to now very fragmented and our weapons almost obsolete.

The Convention gives us a new tool to address the scourge of crime as a global problem.
With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real impact on the ability of
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international criminals to operate successfully and can help citizens everywhere in their
often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and communities.

The signing of the Convention in Palermo in December 2000 was a watershed event in
the reinforcement of our fight against organized crime. I urge all States to ratify the
Convention and the Protocols thereto at the earliest possible date and to bring these
instruments into force as a matter of urgency.

Sample contents of UN CONVENTIONS

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime
 Working groups established by the
Conference of the Parties
 Full text of the Convention and its
Protocols
 Review of the implementation of the
United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and
the Protocols thereto
 Status of ratification
 Travaux Préparatoires
 Legislative guides and glossaries of
terms
 Legal tools

The United Nations Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 2000, is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational
organized crime. It opened for signature by Member States at a High-level Political
Conference convened for that purpose in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 and

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entered into force on 29 September 2003. The Convention is further supplemented by

three Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition. Countries must become parties to the Convention itself
before they can become parties to any of the Protocols.

The Convention represents a major step forward in the fight against transnational
organized crime and signifies the recognition by Member States of the seriousness of the
problems posed by it, as well as the need to foster and enhance close international
cooperation in order to tackle those problems. States that ratify this instrument commit
themselves to taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime, including
the creation of domestic criminal offences (participation in an organized criminal group,
money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice); the adoption of new and
sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement
cooperation; and the promotion of  training and technical assistance for building or
upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women
and Children, was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25. It entered into force
on 25 December 2003. It is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed
definition on trafficking in persons. The intention behind this definition is to facilitate
convergence in national approaches with regard to the establishment of domestic criminal
offences that would support efficient international cooperation in investigating and
prosecuting trafficking in persons cases. An additional objective of the Protocol is to
protect and assist the victims of trafficking in persons with full respect for their human
rights.

The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25, entered into force on 28 January 2004. It deals with
the growing problem of organized criminal groups who smuggle migrants, often at high
risk to the migrants and at great profit for the offenders. A major achievement of the
Protocol was that, for the first time in a global international instrument, a definition of
smuggling of migrants was developed and agreed upon. The Protocol aims at preventing
and combating the smuggling of migrants, as well as promoting cooperation among
States parties, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants and preventing the worst
forms of their exploitation which often characterize the smuggling process.

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The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts
and Components and Ammunition was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/255
of 31 May 2001. It entered into force on 3 July 2005. The objective of the Protocol,
which is the first legally binding instrument on small arms that has been adopted at the
global level, is to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in
order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. By ratifying the Protocol, States
make a commitment to adopt a series of crime-control measures and implement in their
domestic legal order three sets of normative provisions: the first one relates to the
establishment of criminal offences related to illegal manufacturing of, and trafficking in,
firearms on the basis of the Protocol requirements and definitions; the second to a system
of government authorizations or licensing intending to ensure legitimate manufacturing
of, and trafficking in, firearms; and the third one to the marking and tracing of firearms.

Role of ASEANAPOL

The Challenge of International Cooperation

The crime of trafficking in persons is often transnational in both commission and effect.
In contrast, criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons (criminal laws, law
enforcement agencies, prosecution services and the courts) are typically structured and
generally only operate within the confines of national borders.

The disjuncture between the reality of transnational crime and the limits of national
systems presents a significant challenge to the ability of countries to effectively respond
to trafficking in persons.
There are numerous practical and political factors that can impede cooperation across
borders in criminal investigations and prosecutions. These include the difficulties in
communicating with counterparts who speak a different language; differences in legal,
political and cultural traditions; political considerations; and even apprehension about
cooperating with colleagues in another country.
However, while there are many challenges, there are also important opportunities.
Through national laws and international agreements, most countries have developed a
range of tools that can be used by criminal justice agencies to facilitate cooperation
across borders in criminal matters. These include the tools of mutual legal assistance
(which incorporates a sub-set of tools that can assist with recovery of proceeds of crime)
and extradition. An understanding of these tools and of how they work is an important
first step in encouraging States to take a more proactive approach to international
cooperation in trafficking in persons cases.

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ASEAN Commitment to International Cooperation

Over the past several years, ASEAN and its Member States1 have affirmed the
importance of stronger and more effective regional and international cooperation in the
area of trafficking in persons – recognizing that such cooperation is vital to successful
domestic prosecutions as well as to eliminating safe havens for traffickers and their
accomplices.2 A number of instruments have been developed that support such
cooperation. A treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, completed in 2006,
is directly relevant to this issue. A set of guidelines on trafficking in persons, endorsed by
the (ASEAN) Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in 2007,
provide detailed guidance to criminal justice practitioners on international cooperation as
it relates to trafficking in persons cases. Instruments developed by other multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime3(UNTOC), the United Nations Convention against Corruption4 (UNCAC) and
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International

 Introduction

Preface

The first formal meeting of the Chiefs of ASEAN

Police was held in Manila, Philippines on the 21
to 23 October 1981.

 To discuss matters of law enforcement

and crime control.
 This annual meeting was called
ASEANAPOL Conference.  
 The members of ASEAN were originally
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines.
 The basic requirement to become a member of ASEANAPOL is that the country
of the applicant needs to be already a member of ASEAN and needs to apply to
the conference.
 1984, Royal Brunei Police join the conference for the 1st time.
 1996, The Republic of Vietnam National Police join the conference
 1998, Laos General Department of Police and Myanmar police force join the
conference
 2000, Cambodia National Police join the conference

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 The current members of ASEANAPOL are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao

People Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Vietnam.

ASEANAPOL PERMANENT SECRETARIAT

History

 The Secretariat of ASEANAPOL was on a rotational basis with member countries

taking turn to host the ASEANAPOL Conference and automatically assume
the role of the secretariat for the current year. 
 The 25th Joint Communique signed by the ASEAN Chiefs of Police during the
25th ASEANAPOL Conference held in Bali, Indonesia, expressly stated the need
to  establish a Permanent ASEANAPOL Secretariat.

Objectives of the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat

 To harmonise and standardize coordination and communication mechanisms

amongst ASEAN police institutions;
 To conduct a comprehensive and integrative study concerning the resolutions
agreed in the ASEANAPOL Joint Communiqués
 To establish a mechanism with responsibility to monitor and follow up the
implementation of resolutions in the Joint Communiqués; and
 To transform the resolutions adopted in the Joint Communiqués into
ASEANAPOL Plan of Action and its work program

The working group which was set up to consider the viability of the permanent
ASEANAPOL Secretariat finalized that:   

(1) The Secretariat shall be administrated based on the Terms of Reference;

(2) The Head of the Secretariat is to be an Executive Director and he is to  be assisted by
2 Directors. 

The tenure of services are:        

Executive Director - 2 years

Directors - 3 years                                                       

 During the 29th ASEANAPOL Conference in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2009, the Terms
of Reference on the establishment of ASEANAPOL Secretariat was finally
endorsed.  Kuala Lumpur was made the permanent seat.
 The Aseanapol Secretariat started its operation fully from the 1st January 2010.

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 ASEANAPOL's Objective and Function

Objective

 Ensure the effective implementation of all resolutions adopted at the ASENAPOL

Conferences;
 Serve as a coordination and communication mechanism to allow members to
establish and to maintain all channels of interaction amongst members;
 Foster mutual assistance and cooperation amongst members; and
 Endeavour to increase regional cooperation efforts against transnational crimes

Function
 Prepare and implement work plans for effective implement of all the resolutions
adopted in the annual Joint Communiqués signed at the ASEANAPOL
Conference;
 Facilitate and coordinate cross-border cooperation on intelligence and information
sharing and exchange;
 Facilitate and coordinate joint operations and activities involving criminal
investigation, the building and maintenance of the ASEANAPOL database,
training, capacity building, the development of scientific investigative tools,
technical support and forensic science;
 Provide support and necessary assistance in organizing the ASEANAPOL
Conferences;
 Submit on a quarterly basis to the Chiefs of ASEAN Police Forces proposals on all
planned programmed and activities to be carried out;
 Prepare an annual report on its activities and expenditure to be presented to the
ASEANAPOL Executive Committee immediately before the ASEANAPOL
Conference, and distributed to all members and to the ASEANAPOL Conference;
and;
 Act as a custodian of all documents and records of ASEANAPOL

A brief History of ASEANAPOL

Year Details
1981 - Manila  The first formal meeting of The Chiefs of ASEAN
Police
 Attended by 5 original member countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
1983 - Jakarta  Endorsement of the model & design of ASEANAPOL

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logo
1984 - Kuala Lumpur  Royal Brunei Police became a member and joined the
annual conference
1996 - Kuala Lumpur  Vietnam joined as a new member
1998 - Brunei  Laos joined ASEANAPOL
2000 - Myanmar  Myanmar became the 10th country to joined as a new
member
2005 - Bali  The setting up of a working group to consider the
viability of establishing a permanent ASEANAPOL
Secretariat
 Silver Jubilee Commemoration of ASEANAPOL
2008 - Brunei  The Royal Malaysia Police was chosen as a host of
permanent ASEANAPOL Secretariat
2009 - Vietnam  Adoption of Terms of Reference (TOR)
2010  On 1st January 2010 commencement of ASEANAPOL
Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

30th ASEANAPOL Conference Focus on Harmonization in Region

CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH, May 25, 2010-Cambodia on Tuesday hosted the 30th
ASEANAPOL conference with focusing on the combating terrorism, illicit drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, maritime fraud, commercial crime, bank
offense and credit card fraud, cyber crime, fraudulent travel, progression, on electronic-
ASEANPOL data system (E-ADS), mutual assistance on crime matters, exchange of
personnel, and drafting of joint communiqué.

Speaking at the opening forum today, Deputy prime minister and interior minister Sar
Kheng said that the 30th ASEANAPOL meeting is happening during a time when the
world is edging out of the economic and financial crises which have been troubling the
economies of many countries and negatively affected almost every sector, slowing sown
the momentum of the national construction and development in the previous decades.

“Our respond to these challenges have also revealed the creativity of various countries in
setting up economic rehabilitation fund, and within the ASEAN framework, an ASEAN
reserved up fund worth hundreds of millions of dollars was establishing in order to
respond to any unexpected global challenges such as the present economic and financial
crisis and in order to ensure the economic stability of the ASEAN in region, “he said. The

He added that while the whole world is busy solving the economic and financial crisis,
our common enemy –transnational crimes has had the opportunity to broaden by
exploiting targets and vulnerable groups, modern technology and globalization to carry
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out economic crime.

“These activities seriously affected the social stability, resources and lives of people and
law enforcement forces,” he noted,

“The gathering today and discussion within the next tow days signifity the unity of
ASEAN in combating all kinds of threats of transactional crime as well as recognizing
the benefits of the broadening cooperation inside and outside of the ASEAN region so as
to enhance the effectiveness of the fighting against transactional crime through
partnership building with a number of countries whose delegates are also attending this
conference namely China, Japan, republic of Korea, au , news Zealand, representative of
Interpol, “he added.

The cooperation between ASEANAPOL and Interpol has been developing in a positive
direction, “he said, adding that the role and responsibilities of police these days are aslo
regarded as important in the international stage. Many countries including ASEAN
member countries have sent their police force to peace-keeping missions of the UN.” The
initiative of sending police force for UN mission is appropriate and necessary because
countries which have just ended wars or internal conflicts lost infrastructure and social
order, “he emphasized. Our future goal to improve effectiveness and good cooperation,
we need minimized gap of technical law enforcement skills and experienced of the police
agencies, he said. It is a pride that so far ASEANAPOL has had many dialogues partners
who have come to cooperate and share experience and expertise, he added.

National Police chief Net Savoeurn said today meeting will provide the experience and
for each other and strengthen cooperation within effectiveness for regional police
agencies to deal crimes crossing borders, and regional security and issues to live in
harmonization and peace.

Currently, ASEANAPOL has its own headquarter in Kular Lumpur, Malaysia. this office
established in January 2010.

PNP Agreements with ASEAN Police Organizations

ASEAN police chiefs agree on crime data sharing

May 30, 2006, 8:00am

Leaders of the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations Chiefs of Police
(ASEANAPOL) have forged an agreement to further promote cooperation among the

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police forces in the Southeast Asian region to combat criminality and terrorism by
establishing the first international database system on lawless elements.

Director General Arturo C. Lomibao, chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
led a 16-man PNP delegation to the annual meeting of heads of national police agencies
of ASEAN member-states in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, over the weekend.

During the conference, Malaysia sought the commitment of the ASEAN national police
forces to closely monitor and exchange information on newly emerging militant and
radical groups, and take action to prevent them from growing as terrorist groups.

The 26th ASEANAPOL conference was highlighted by the official launching of the
Electronic ASEANAPOL Database System (e-ADS). The eADS system is now ready to
relay data to the 1-24/7 crime database system of the International Police (Interpol).

Lomibao said he presented during the conference the country’s paper on current
transnational crime concerns, including efforts aimed at strengthening international
cooperation with other police forces in the ASEAN against transnational syndicates.

"The PNP is proud to take part in the efforts of the international law enforcement
community in maintaining an atmosphere of peace and stability in the Southeast Asian
Region," Lomibao said.

Aside from the Philippines, other national police forces represented in the conference
were the Royal Brunei Police Force, Cambodian National Police Force, Myanmar Police
Force, Singapore Police Force, Socialist Republic of Vietnam Police, Royal Thai Police,
and the host agency, the Royal Malaysia Police.

Present as observers were representatives from the the ASEAN Secretariat, ICPO-
Interpol, Australian Federal Police, National Police Agency of Japan, New Zealand
Police, Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, and the National
Police Agency of the Republic of Korea.

In September, 2003, the PNP hosted the 23rd ASEANAPOL Conference in Manila. The
Philippines is a founding member of the ASEANAPOL which held its first conference in
Manila in 1981. (Aris R. Ilagan)

1 The Member States of the Association are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.
2 See, for example, Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN
Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons
Particularly Women and Children, Nov. 29, 2004 [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration
Against Trafficking in Persons]; ASEAN, ASEAN Responses to Trafficking in Persons:

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Ending Impunity for Traffickers and Securing Justice for Victims (ASEAN, 2006
(Supplement and Update, 2007)).
3 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 12, 2000, UN
Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Annex I), entered into force Sept. 29, 2003 [hereinafter UNTOC].
4 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, UN Doc. A/RES/58/422
(Annex), entered into force Dec. 14, 2005 [hereinafter UNCAC].
Participation of PNP Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Philippine Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

PRESS RELEASE
NYPM- 20-2009
22 JUNE 2009
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm

The United Nations Stand-by

Arrangements System
(UNSAS) is based on
conditional commitments by
Member States of specified
resources within the agreed
response times for UN
peacekeeping operations.
These resources can be
military formations,
specialized personnel (civilian
and military), services as well
as material and equipment.
The resources agreed-upon
remain on "stand-by" in their
home country, where
necessary preparation,
including training, is
conducted to prepare them to fulfill specified tasks or functions in
accordance with United Nations guidelines. Stand-by resources are
used exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the
Security Council. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources are
requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by participating
Member States, are rapidly deployed to set up new peacekeeping
missions or to reinforce existing ones.

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RP TO DEPLOY PEACEKEEPING BATTALION TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

NEW YORK—In what is going to be its biggest overseas deployment in almost a decade,
the Philippines will be sending more than 300 troops to join United Nations peacekeepers
in the Golan Heights in Syria, the Philippine Mission to the United Nations said today. 

In his report to Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, Ambassador Hilario G.

Davide Jr., Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said a composite
battalion of 336 Filipino peacekeepers will be deployed in September to serve with the
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. 

Ambassador Davide, at the same time, reported that the Philippines will also be sending
military observers to support the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP), which is supervising the ceasefire in the contested state of Jannu and
Kashmir. 

Ambassador Davide said the deployments to the Golan Heights and Kashmir were upon
the invitation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and are being
carried out under the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) that the Philippines
formally entered into during the visit to Manila last year of UN Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon.

The Golan Heights deployment is considered significant since this would be the first time
the Philippines will deploy a sizeable unit since 2001 when it deployed over 600
peacekeepers to support the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. 

“In our own little way, we would help keep the peace in that part of the Middle East,”
Ambassador Davide said, noting the excellent relations the Philippines enjoys with both
Israel and Syria.  

UNDOF was established as part of diplomatic efforts to ease the tensions that followed
the 1973 Yom Kippur War that saw Israel successfully defend territory in the Golan
Heights that it seized from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War. The Agreement on
Disengagement that both sides signed in 1974 called for an area of separation and two
equal zones of limited forces and armaments to be supervised by a UN observer force.  

According to Ambassador Davide, the Philippine contingent will be replacing a battalion

of peacekeepers from Poland and will join more than 1,000 peacekeepers from Austria,
Canada, Croatia, Japan, India and Poland that are presently stationed across the so-called
area of separation. 

Ambassador Davide said three officers will also soon join around 40 military observers
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from Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea, Sweden and Uruguay who are currently
serving in UNMOGIP.

The latest deployments are expected to improve the standing of the Philippines as a troop
contributing country. The Philippines is presently the 30th largest contributor of
peacekeepers with 613 military and police peacekeepers serving in eight UN missions in
Afghanistan, Cote d’ Ivoire, Georgia, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and Timor Leste.

UN Special Action Team exam opens

Police personnel have now better chances of joining the Philippine delegation for United
Nations (UN) for peace-keeping missions with the opening of pre-qualifying
examinations in regional testing centers.

The establishment of more testing centers is geared towards attaining transparency and
“regional balance” in force generation procedures as mandated by PNP Memorandum
Circular 2009-006 which prescribed the “Rules and Procedures on the Selection of PNP
Personnel for Secondment, Detail to International Organizations, Peacekeeping
Missions.”

In past years, pre-qualifying examinations were all held in Camp Crame alone.

The two sets of examination schedules with different venues are: April 12-16, 2010 in
PRO 7, Camp Sergio Osmeña, Cebu City; PRO 9 Camp General Eduardo Batalla,
Zamboanga City, Province of Zamboanga del Sur; PRO 11 Camp Catitipan, Davao City
Province of Davao del Sur and April 26-30, 2010 in PRO CAR (the Cordilleras) Camp
Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad Province of Benguet; and National Headquarters Camp
General  Rafael C Crame Quezon City.

The examinations cover three stages: Stage 1 for Written Examination such as the
reading and listening comprehension, and report writing; Stage 2 for driving proficiency
test; and, Stage 3 for firing proficiency test.

Applicants must not be less than 25 years old and not more than 53 years old upon the
actual deployment and must have at least 5 years of active police service.

Rank requirement for Police Commissioned Officers must be Police Senior Inspector to
Police Superintendent while for Police Non-commissioned Officers must be Police
Officer 3 to Senior Police Officer 4.

Applicants must also pass the physical fitness test as well as medical, dental and the
neuron-psychiatric examinations.

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Computer literacy and driving proficiency are the special skills needed to possess by the
applicants with the recommendation of the unit commander such as the Command Group
and directors of their respective Directorial Staff.

Interested personnel who plan to take the UNSAT exam must submit the electronic copy
of his/her latest PNP Personal Data Sheet, Scanned Valid Driverâs License and Scanned
Recommendation from the Unit Commander not later than March 29, 2010 addressed to
the PNP Directorate for Plans, Attention: Chief, UNPOC with email address
[email protected] with telephone numbers (02) 721-85-49 or 721-04-01 local
3554.

TO BE CONTINUED…………….

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