Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Commissioner of 1.

Whether or not the right of respondent BIR

Internal Revenue, 473 SCRA 205, G.R. No. 139736. Commissioner to collect from petitioner BPI the
October 17, 2005 alleged deficiency DST for taxable year 1985 had
prescribed; and
Chico-Nazario, J.
2. Whether or not a request for reconsideration tolls
Facts: the prescriptive period of the CIR to collect on an
assessment;
Petitioner BPI is a commercial banking corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. On two Held:
separate occasions, particularly on 06 June 1985 and 14 June
There is no valid ground for suspending the running of the
1985, it sold United States (US) $500,000.00 to the Central
prescriptive period for collection of the deficiency DST
Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank), for the total sales
assessed against petitioner BPI.
amount of US$1,000,000.00.
Anent the question of prescription, this Court disagrees in the
On 10 October 1989, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Decisions of the CTA and the Court of Appeals, and herein
issued assessment notice finding petitioner BPI liable for
determines the statute of limitations on collection of the
deficiency DST on its afore-mentioned sales of foreign bills of
deficiency DST in Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-002054 had
exchange to the Central Bank. Petitioner BPI received the
already prescribed.
Assessment, together with the attached Assessment Notice,
on 20 October 1989. The statute of limitations on assessment and collection of
taxes is for the protection of the taxpayer and, thus, shall be
Petitioner BPI, through its counsel, protested the Assessment
construed liberally in his favor.
in a letter dated 16 November 1989, and filed with the BIR on
17 November 1989. Petitioner BPI did not receive any Though the statute of limitations on assessment and
immediate reply to its protest letter. However, on 15 October collection of national internal revenue taxes benefits both
1992, the BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy the Government and the taxpayer, it principally intends to
against BPI only on 23 October 1992 afford protection to the taxpayer against unreasonable
investigation. The protest filed by petitioner BPI did not
Then again, petitioner BPI did not hear from the BIR until 11
constitute a request for reinvestigation, granted by the
September 1997, when its counsel received a letter, dated 13
respondent BIR Commissioner, which could have suspended
August 1997, signed by then BIR Commissioner Liwayway
the running of the statute of limitations on collection of the
Vinzons-Chato, denying its “request for reconsideration,”.
assessed deficiency DST under Section 224 of the Tax Code of
Upon receipt of the above-cited letter from the BIR, 1977, as amended.
petitioner BPI proceeded to file a Petition for Review with the
The Tax Code of 1977, as amended, also recognizes instances
CTA on 10 October 1997
when the running of the statute of limitations on the
Petitioner BPI raised in its Petition for Review before the CTA, assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes
in addition to the arguments presented in its protest letter, could be suspended, even in the absence of a waiver,
dated 16 November 1989, the defense of prescription of the
Of particular importance to the present case is one of the
right of respondent BIR Commissioner to enforce collection
circumstances enumerated in Section 224 of the Tax Code of
of the assessed amount. It alleged that respondent BIR
1977, as amended, wherein the running of the statute of
Commissioner only had three years to collect on Assessment
limitations on assessment and collection of taxes is
No. FAS-5-85-89-002054, but she waited for seven years and
considered suspended “when the taxpayer requests for a
nine months to deny the protest.
reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner.”
The CTA held that the statute of limitations for respondent
This Court gives credence to the argument of petitioner BPI
BIR Commissioner to collect on the Assessment had not yet
that there is a distinction between a request for
prescribed. In resolving the issue of prescription, the CTA
reconsideration and a request for reinvestigation. Revenue
reasoned that—
Regulations (RR) No. 12-85, issued on 27 November 1985 by
In the case of Commissioner of Internal the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the
Revenue vs. Wyeth Suaco Laboratories, BIR Commissioner, governs the procedure for protesting an
Inc., G.R. No. 76281, September 30, 1991, assessment and distinguishes between the two types of
202 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court laid to protest, as follows—
rest the first issue. It categorically ruled that
(a)Request for reconsideration.—refers to
a “protest” is to be treated as request for
a plea for a reevaluation of an assessment
reinvestigation or reconsideration and a
on the basis of existing records without
mere request for reexamination or
need of additional evidence. It may involve
reinvestigation tolls the prescriptive period
both a question of fact or of law or both.
of the Commissioner to collect on an
assessment. . . (b)Request for reinvestigation.—refers to a
plea for reevaluation of an assessment on
The CA affirmed the decision of the CTA. Hence, the instant
the basis of newly-discovered or additional
case.
evidence that a taxpayer intends to present
Issues: in the reinvestigation. It may also involve a
question of fact or law or both.

1
It bears to emphasize that under Section 224 of the Tax Code Commissioner, as well as, the CTA and Court of Appeals, take
of 1977, as amended, the running of the prescriptive period the statement to mean that the filing alone of the request for
for collection of taxes can only be suspended by a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation can already interrupt or
reinvestigation, not a request for reconsideration. suspend the running of the prescriptive period on collection.
Undoubtedly, a reinvestigation, which entails the reception This Court therefore takes this opportunity to clarify and
and evaluation of additional evidence, will take more time qualify this statement made in the Wyeth Suaco case. While
than a reconsideration of a tax assessment, which will be it is true that, by itself, such statement would appear to be a
limited to the evidence already at hand; this justifies why the generalization of the exceptions to the statute of limitations
former can suspend the running of the statute of limitations on collection, it is best interpreted in consideration of the
on collection of the assessed tax, while the latter cannot. particular facts of the Wyeth Suaco case and previous
jurisprudence.
Add Notes as Emphasized by Atty. Lock:
The Wyeth Suaco case cannot be in conflict with the Suyoc
In the case of Wyeth Suaco, taxpayer Wyeth Suaco was
case because there are substantial differences in the factual
assessed for failing to remit withholding taxes on royalties
backgrounds of the two cases. The Suyoc case refers to a
and dividend declarations, as well as, for deficiency sales tax.
situation where there were repeated requests or positive
The BIR issued two assessments, dated 16 December 1974
acts performed by the taxpayer that convinced the BIR to
and 17 December 1974, both received by taxpayer Wyeth
delay collection of the assessed tax. This Court pronounced
Suaco on 19 December 1974. Taxpayer Wyeth Suaco, through
therein that the repeated requests or positive acts of the
its tax consultant, SGV & Co., sent to the BIR two letters,
taxpayer prevented or estopped it from setting up the
dated 17 January 1975 and 08 February 1975, protesting the
defense of prescription against the Government when the
assessments and requesting their cancellation or withdrawal
latter attempted to collect the assessed tax. In the Wyeth
on the ground that said assessments lacked factual or legal
Suaco case, taxpayer Wyeth Suaco filed a request for
basis. On 12 September 1975, the BIR Commissioner advised
reinvestigation, which was apparently granted by the BIR
taxpayer Wyeth Suaco to avail itself of the compromise
and, consequently, the prescriptive period was indeed
settlement being offered under Letter of Instruction No. 308.
suspended as provided under Section 224 of the Tax Code of
Taxpayer Wyeth Suaco manifested its conformity to paying a
1977, as amended.
compromise amount, but subject to certain conditions;
though, apparently, the said compromise amount was never To reiterate, Section 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as
paid. On 10 December 1979, the BIR Commissioner rendered amended, identifies specific circumstances when the statute
a decision reducing the assessment for deficiency of limitations on assessment and collection may be
withholding tax against taxpayer Wyeth Suaco, but interrupted or suspended, among which is a request for
maintaining the assessment for deficiency sales tax. It was at reinvestigation that is granted by the BIR Commissioner. The
this point when taxpayer Wyeth Suaco brought its case act of filing a request for reinvestigation alone does not
before the CTA to enjoin the BIR from enforcing the suspend the period; such request must be granted. The grant
assessments by reason of prescription. Although the CTA need not be express, but may be implied from the acts of the
decided in favor of taxpayer Wyeth Suaco, it was reversed by BIR Commissioner or authorized BIR officials in response to
this Court when the case was brought before it on appeal. the request for reinvestigation.
According to the decision of this Court—
This Court found in the Wyeth Suaco case that the BIR
“Settled is the rule that the prescriptive period provided by actually conducted a reinvestigation, in accordance with the
law to make a collection by distraint or levy or by a request of the taxpayer Wyeth Suaco, which resulted in the
proceeding in court is interrupted once a taxpayer requests reduction of the assessment originally issued against it.
for reinvestigation or reconsideration of the assessment. . . Taxpayer Wyeth Suaco was also aware that its request for
reinvestigation was granted, as written by its Finance
...
Manager in a letter dated 01 July 1975, addressed to the
Although the protest letters prepared by SGV & Co. in behalf Chief of the Tax Accounts Division, wherein he admitted that,
of private respondent did not categorically state or use the “[a]s we understand, the matter is now undergoing review
words “reinvestigation” and “reconsideration,” the same are and consideration by your Manufacturing Audit Division…”
to be treated as letters of reinvestigation and The statute of limitations on collection, then, started to run
reconsideration… only upon the issuance and release of the reduced
assessment.
These letters of Wyeth Suaco interrupted the running of the
five-year prescriptive period to collect the deficiency taxes. The Wyeth Suaco case, therefore, is correct in declaring that
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, after having reviewed the re the prescriptive period for collection is interrupted or
cords of Wyeth Suaco, in accordance with its request for rein suspended when the taxpayer files a request for reinvestiga-
vestigation, rendered a final assessment… It was only upon tion, provided that, as clarified and qualified herein, such
receipt by Wyeth Suaco of this final assessment that the five- request is granted by the BIR Commissioner.
year prescriptive period started to run again.”
Thus, this Court finds no compelling reason to abandon its
The foremost criticism of petitioner BPI of the Wyeth Suaco decision in the Wyeth Suaco case. It also now rules that the
decision is directed at the statement made therein that, said case is not applicable to the Petition at bar because of
“settled is the rule that the prescriptive period provided by the distinct facts involved herein. As already heretofore
law to make a collection by distraint or levy or by a determined by this Court, the protest filed by petitioner BPI
proceeding in court is interrupted once a taxpayer requests was a request for reconsideration, which merely required a
for reinvestigation or reconsideration of the assessment.” It review of existing evidence and the legal basis for the
would seem that both petitioner BPI and respondent BIR assessment. Respondent BIR Commissioner did not require,

2
neither did petitioner BPI offer, additional evidence on the because it deprives the said taxpayer of the assurance that he
matter. After petitioner BPI filed its request for will no longer be subjected to further investigation for taxes
reconsideration, there was no other communication between after the expiration of a reasonable period of time.
it and respondent BIR Commissioner or any of the authorized
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Tax Code of 1977,
representatives of the latter. There was no showing that
as amended, identifies specifically in Sections 223 and 224
petitioner BPI was informed or aware that its request for
the circumstances when the prescriptive periods for
reconsideration was granted or acted upon by the BIR.
assessing and collecting taxes could be suspended or
CASE SYLLABI: interrupted.—In order to provide even better protection to
the taxpayer against unreasonable investigation, the Tax
Taxation; Distraint; Levy; The Bureau of Internal Revenue
Code of 1977, as amended, identifies specifically in Sections
(BIR) has three years, counted from the date of actual filing
223 and 224 thereof the circumstances when the prescriptive
of the return or from the last date prescribed by law for the
periods for assessing and collecting taxes could be suspended
filing of such return, whichever comes later, to assess a
or interrupted.
national internal revenue tax or to begin a court proceeding
for the collection thereof without an assessment.—The BIR Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Paragraphs (b) and (d) of
has three years, counted from the date of actual filing of the Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the
return or from the last date prescribed by law for the filing of prescriptive periods for assessment and collection of
such return, whichever comes later, to assess a national national internal revenue taxes, respectively, could be
internal revenue tax or to begin a court proceeding for the waived by agreement.—According to paragraphs (b) and (d)
collection thereof without an assessment. In case of a false or of Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or the failure to prescriptive periods for assessment and collection of national
file any return at all, the prescriptive period for assessment of internal revenue taxes, respectively, could be waived by
the tax due shall be 10 years from discovery by the BIR of the agreement, to wit—SEC. 223. Exceptions as to period of
falsity, fraud, or omission. When the BIR validly issues an limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.—x x x (b) If
assessment, within either the three-year or ten-year period, before the expiration of the time prescribed in the preceding
whichever is appropriate, then the BIR has another three section for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner
years after the assessment within which to collect the and the taxpayer have agreed in writing to its assessment
national internal revenue tax due thereon by distraint, levy, after such time the tax may be assessed within the period
and/or court proceeding. The assessment of the tax is agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by
deemed made and the three-year period for collection of the subsequent written agreement made before the expiration of
assessed tax begins to run on the date the assessment notice the period previously agreed upon. . . . (d) Any internal
had been released, mailed or sent by the BIR to the taxpayer. revenue tax which has been assessed within the period
agreed upon as provided in paragraph (b) hereinabove may
Same; Same; Same; Statute of Limitations; Statutes; Under
be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court
Section 223(c) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, it is not
within the period agreed upon in writing before the
essential that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be fully
expiration of the three-year period. The period so agreed
executed so that it can suspend the running of the statute of
upon may be extended by subsequent written agreements
limitations on the collection of the tax.—Under Section
made before the expiration of the period previously agreed
223(c) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, it is not
upon. The agreements so described in the afore-quoted
essential that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be fully
provisions are often referred to as waivers of the statute of
executed so that it can suspend the running of the statute of
limitations. The waiver of the statute of limitations, whether
limitations on the collection of the tax. It is enough that the
on assessment or collection, should not be construed as a
proceedings have validly began or commenced and that their
waiver of the right to invoke the defense of prescription but,
execution has not been suspended by reason of the voluntary
rather, an agreement between the taxpayer and the BIR to
desistance of the respondent BIR Commissioner. Existing
extend the period to a date certain, within which the latter
jurisprudence establishes that distraint and levy proceedings
could still assess or collect taxes due. The waiver does not
are validly begun or commenced by the issuance of the
mean that the taxpayer relinquishes the right to invoke
Warrant and service thereof on the taxpayer. It is only logical
prescription unequivocally.
to require that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be, at
the very least, served upon the taxpayer in order to suspend Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RMO No. 20-90 mandates
the running of the prescriptive period for collection of an that the procedure for execution of the waiver shall be
assessed tax, because it may only be upon the service of the strictly followed, and any revenue official who fails to
Warrant that the taxpayer is informed of the denial by the comply therewith resulting in the prescription of the right to
BIR of any pending protest of the said taxpayer, and the assess and collect shall be administratively dealt with.—A
resolute intention of the BIR to collect the tax assessed. valid waiver of the statute of limitations under paragraphs (b)
and (d) of Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Though the statute of limitations
must be: (1) in writing; (2) agreed to by both the
on assessment and collection of national internal revenue
Commissioner and the taxpayer; (3) before the expiration of
taxes benefits both the Government and the taxpayer, it
the ordinary prescriptive periods for assessment and
principally intends to afford protection to the taxpayer
collection; and (4) for a definite period beyond the ordinary
against unreasonable investigation.—Though the statute of
prescriptive periods for assessment and collection. The
limitations on assessment and collection of national internal
period agreed upon can still be extended by subsequent
revenue taxes benefits both the Government and the
written agreement, provided that it is executed prior to the
taxpayer, it principally intends to afford protection to the
expiration of the first period agreed upon. The BIR had issued
taxpayer against unreasonable investigation. The indefinite
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 on 04 April
extension of the period for assessment is unreasonable

3
1990 to lay down an even more detailed procedure for the former can suspend the running of the statute of limitations
proper execution of such a waiver. RMO No. 20-90 mandates on collection of the assessed tax, while the latter cannot.
that the procedure for execution of the waiver shall be
Same; Same; Same; Same; That the BIR Commissioner must
strictly followed, and any revenue official who fails to comply
first grant the request for reinvestigation as a requirement
therewith resulting in the prescription of the right to assess
for suspension of the statute of limitations is even
and collect shall be administratively dealt with.
supported by existing jurisprudence.—That the BIR
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court had Commissioner must first grant the request for reinvestigation
consistently ruled in a number of cases that a request for as a requirement for suspension of the statute of limitations
reconsideration or reinvestigation by the taxpayer, without is even supported by existing jurisprudence. In the case of
a valid waiver of the prescriptive periods for the assessment Republic of the Philippines v. Gancayco, taxpayer Gancayco
and collection of tax, as required by the Tax Code and requested for a thorough reinvestigation of the assessment
implementing rules, will not suspend the running thereof.— against him and placed at the disposal of the Collector of
This Court had consistently ruled in a number of cases that a Internal Revenue all the evidences he had for such purpose;
request for reconsideration or reinvestigation by the yet, the Collector ignored the request, and the records and
taxpayer, without a valid waiver of the prescriptive periods documents were not at all examined. Considering the given
for the assessment and collection of tax, as required by the facts, this Court pronounced that—. . . The act of requesting a
Tax Code and implementing rules, will not suspend the reinvestigation alone does not suspend the period. The
running thereof. request should first be granted, in order to effect suspension.
(Collector vs. Suyoc Consolidated, supra; also Republic vs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Tax Code of 1977,
Ablaza, supra). Moreover, the Collector gave appellee until
as amended, also recognizes instances when the running of
April 1, 1949, within which to submit his evidence, which the
the statute of limitations on the assessment and collection
latter did one day before. There were no impediments on the
of national internal revenue taxes could be suspended, even
part of the Collector to file the collection case from April 1,
in the absence of a waiver.— The Tax Code of 1977, as
1949. . . .
amended, also recognizes instances when the running of the
statute of limitations on the assessment and collection of Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof that the
national internal revenue taxes could be suspended, even in taxpayer’s request for reinvestigation had been actually
the absence of a waiver, under Section 224 thereof, which granted shall be on respondent BIR Commissioner.—The
reads—SEC. 224. Suspension of running of statute.—The burden of proof that the taxpayer’s request for
running of the statute of limitation provided in Section[s] 203 reinvestigation had been actually granted shall be on
and 223 on the making of assessment and the beginning of respondent BIR Commissioner. The grant may be expressed
distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for collection, in in communications with the taxpayer or implied from the
respect of any deficiency, shall be suspended for the period actions of the respondent BIR Commissioner or his
during which the Commissioner is prohibited from making authorized BIR representatives in response to the request for
the assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding reinvestigation.
in court and for sixty days thereafter; when the taxpayer
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court expressly
requests for a reinvestigation which is granted by the
conceded that a mere request for reconsideration or
Commissioner; when the taxpayer cannot be located in the
reinvestigation of an assessment may not suspend the
address given by him in the return filed upon which a tax is
running of the statute of limitations. It affirmed the need for
being assessed or collected: Provided, That, if the taxpayer
a waiver of the prescriptive period in order to effect
informs the Commissioner of any change in address, the
suspension thereof.—As had been previously discussed
running of the statute of limitations will not be suspended;
herein, the statute of limitations on assessment and
when the warrant of distraint and levy is duly served upon
collection of national internal revenue taxes may be
the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a member of
suspended if the taxpayer executes a valid waiver thereof, as
his household with sufficient discretion, and no property
provided in paragraphs (b) and (d) of Section 223 of the Tax
could be located; and when the taxpayer is out of the
Code of 1977, as amended; and in specific instances
Philippines.
enumerated in Section 224 of the same Code, which include a
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 224 of the request for reinvestigation granted by the BIR Commissioner.
Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the running of the Outside of these statutory provisions, however, this Court
prescriptive period for collection of taxes can only be also recognized one other exception to the statute of
suspended by a request for reinvestigation, not a request limitations on collection of taxes in the case of Collector of
for reconsideration.—With the issuance of RR No. 12-85 on Internal Revenue v. Suyoc Consolidated Mining Co. x x x In
27 November 1985 providing the above-quoted distinctions the Suyoc case, this Court expressly conceded that a mere
between a request for reconsideration and a request for request for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
reinvestigation, the two types of protest can no longer be assessment may not suspend the running of the statute of
used interchangeably and their differences so lightly brushed limitations. It affirmed the need for a waiver of the
aside. It bears to emphasize that under Section 224 of the Tax prescriptive period in order to effect suspension thereof.
Code of 1977, as amended, the running of the prescriptive However, even without such waiver, the taxpayer may be
period for collection of taxes can only be suspended by a estopped from raising the defense of prescription because by
request for reinvestigation, not a request for reconsideration. his repeated requests or positive acts, he had induced
Undoubtedly, a reinvestigation, which entails the reception Government authorities to delay collection of the assessed
and evaluation of additional evidence, will take more time tax.
than a reconsideration of a tax assessment, which will be
Same; Same; Same; Same; The repeated requests or positive
limited to the evidence already at hand; this justifies why the
acts of the taxpayer prevented or estopped it from setting

4
up the defense of prescription against the Government The term "relevant supporting documents" should be
when the latter attempted to collect the assessed tax.—The understood as those documents necessary to support the
Wyeth Suaco case cannot be in conflict with the Suyoc case legal basis in disputing a tax assessment as determined by the
because there are substantial differences in the factual taxpayer. The BIR can only inform the taxpayer to submit
backgrounds of the two cases. The Suyoc case refers to a additional documents. The BIR cannot demand what type of
situation where there were repeated requests or positive supporting documents should be submitted.  Otherwise, a
acts performed by the taxpayer that convinced the BIR to taxpayer will be at the mercy of the BIR, which may require
delay collection of the assessed tax. This Court pronounced the production of documents that a taxpayer cannot submit.
therein that the repeated requests or positive acts of the
taxpayer prevented or estopped it from setting up the After respondent submitted its letter-reply stating that it
defense of prescription against the Government when the could not comply with the presentation of the proof of DST
latter attempted to collect the assessed tax. In the Wyeth payment, no reply was received from petitioner.
Suaco case, taxpayer Wyeth Suaco filed a request for
reinvestigation, which was apparently granted by the BIR Section 228 states that if the protest is not acted upon within
and, consequently, the prescriptive period was indeed 180 days from submission of documents, the taxpayer
suspended as provided under Section 224 of the Tax Code of adversely affected by the inaction may appeal to the CTA
1977, as amended. within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period.
Respondent, having submitted its supporting documents on
[ GR Nos. 172045-46, Jun 16, 2009 ] the same day the protest was filed, had until 31 July 2002 to
wait for petitioner's reply to its protest. On 28 August 2002 or
CIR v. FIRST EXPRESS PAWNSHOP COMPANY + within 30 days after the lapse of the 180-day period counted
from the filing of the protest as the supporting documents
Facts: were simultaneously filed, respondent filed a petition before
the CTA.
In this case, respondent received the tax assessment on 3
January 2002 and it had until 2 February 2002 to submit its Doctrine:
protest. On 1 February 2002, respondent submitted its Section 228 of the Tax Code provides:
protest and attached the GIS and Balance Sheet as of 31
December 1998. Respondent explained that it received SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. - When the
P800,000 as a deposit with the possibility of applying the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds
same as payment for the future issuance of capital stock. that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the
taxpayer of his findings: Provided, however, That a
Within 60 days from the filing of protest or until 2 April 2002, preassessment notice shall not be required in the following
respondent should submit relevant supporting documents. cases:
Respondent, having submitted the supporting documents
together with its protest, did not present additional (a) When the finding for any deficiency tax is the result of
mathematical error in the computation of the tax as
documents anymore.
appearing on the face of the return; or
(b) When a discrepancy has been determined between the
In a letter dated 12 March 2002, petitioner requested tax withheld and the amount actually remitted by the
respondent to present proof of payment of DST on withholding agent; or
subscription. In a letter-reply, respondent stated that it could (c) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or tax credit
not produce any proof of DST payment because it was not of excess creditable withholding tax for a taxable period was
required to pay DST under the law considering that the determined to have carried over and automatically applied
deposit on subscription was an advance made by its the same amount claimed against the estimated tax liabilities
stockholders for future subscription, and no stock certificates for the taxable quarter or quarters of the succeeding taxable
were issued. year; or
(d) When the excise tax due on excisable articles has not
Since respondent has not allegedly submitted any relevant been paid; or
supporting documents, petitioner now claims that the (e) When an article locally purchased or imported by an
exempt person, such as, but not limited to, vehicles, capital
assessment has become final, executory and demandable,
equipment, machineries and spare parts, has been sold,
hence, unappealable.
traded or transferred to non-exempt persons.
Issue: WON the rule on finality of assessments prescribed
under Section 228 of the Tax Code was followed. The taxpayer shall be informed in writing of the law and the
facts on which the assessment is made; otherwise, the
Ruling: NO. assessment shall be void.

We reject petitioner's view that the assessment has become Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and
final and unappealable. It cannot be said that respondent regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said
failed to submit relevant supporting documents that would notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner or
render the assessment final because when respondent his duly authorized representative shall issue an assessment
submitted its protest, respondent attached the GIS and based on his findings.
Balance Sheet. Further, petitioner cannot insist on the
submission of proof of DST payment because such document Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing
does not exist as respondent claims that it is not liable to pay, a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and
and has not paid, the DST on the deposit on subscription.
manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and

5
regulations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, opportunity to file a protest on the assessment and file an
all relevant supporting documents shall have been appeal in case of an adverse decision.
submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
However, a void FDDA does not ipso facto render the
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted assessment void. A decision differs from an assessment. An
upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission assessment becomes a disputed assessment after a taxpayer
of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the has filed its protest to the assessment. The CIR either issues a
decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals decision on the disputed assessment or fails to act on it and is
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or considered denied. The taxpayer may then appeal the
from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; decision on the disputed assessment or the inaction of the
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and CIR. As such, the FDDA is not the only means that the final tax
demandable. (Boldfacing supplied) liability of a taxpayer is fixed, which may then be appealed by
the taxpayer.
Section 228 of the Tax Code[49] provides the remedy to
dispute a tax assessment within a certain period of time. It A decision of the CIR on a disputed assessment differs from
states that an assessment may be protested by filing a the assessment itself. The invalidity of one does not
request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within 30 days necessarily result in the invalidity of the other. However the
from receipt of the assessment by the taxpayer. Within 60 FFDA issued reveals that it merely contained a table of
Liquigaz’s supposed tax liabilities, without providing any
days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting
details. The FDDA must state the facts and law on which it is
documents shall have been submitted;  otherwise, the
based to provide the taxpayer with the opportunity to file an
assessment shall become final. intelligent appeal.

[ GR Nos. 172045-46, Jun 16, 2009 ] As established, an FDDA that does not inform the taxpayer in
writing of the facts and law on which it is based renders the
decision void. Therefore, it is as if there was no decision
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. rendered by the CIR. It is tantamount to a denial by inaction
LIQUIGAZ PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. by the CIR, which may still be appealed before the CTA and
No. 215534, April 18, 2016 the assessment evaluated on the basis of the available
evidence and documents. The merits of the EWT and FBT
assessment should have been discussed and not merely
Facts: brushed aside on account of the void FDDA.

Liquigaz Philippine Corp received a copy of Letter of Authority The Court agrees that the FDDA substantially informed
(LOA) issued by the CIR authorizing investigation of all Liquigaz of its tax liabilities with regard to its WTC
internal revenue taxes for 2005. It also received a copy of the assessment. Substantial compliance with the requirement
PAN on May 20, 2008, and was assessed 23,931,708.72 PHP under Section 228 of the NIRC is permissible provided that
as deficiency tax. the tax payer would be eventually apprised in writing of the
factual and legal bases of the assessment to allow him to file
On June 25, 2008, it received a Formal Assessment Notice an effective protest against.
(FAN) together with its attached details of discrepancies for It is imperative that the FDDA contain details of the
December 31, 2005. Liquigaz filed a protest on July 25, 2008, discrepancy. Failure to do so would deprive LIquigaz
and submitted documents on September 23, 2008. It adequate opportunity to prepare an intelligent appeal. It
received the copy of FDDA on July 1, 2010 and still liable for would have no way of determining what was considered by
22,380,025.19 PHP Liquigaz filed a petition for review to the the CIR in the defenses it had raised in the protest to the FLD.
CTA division CTA division—partially granted Liquigaz’s
petition to cancel EWT and FBT assessments.
OCEANIC WIRELESS NETWORK v. CIR, GR NO. 148380, 2005-
CTA en banc-affirmed the CTA division. It is a requirement 12-09
that the taxpayer should be informed in writing of the law
and the facts on which the assessment was made applied to Facts:
the FDDA—otherwise, the assessment shall be void.
Petitioner received from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Issue: deficiency tax assessments. Petitioner filed its protest against
the tax assessments and requested a reconsideration or
W/N the assessment made by the CIR is valid cancellation of the same in a letter to the BIR Commissioner
dated April 12, 1988.
Ruling:
Acting in behalf of the BIR Commissioner, then Chief of the
Under Section 228 of the NIRC, a taxpayer shall be informed
BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division, Mr. Severino B.
in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is
Buot, reiterated the tax assessments while denying
made, otherwise, it shall be void. Again, Section 3.1.4 of RR
petitioner's request for reinvestigation... likewise requested
No. 12-99 requires that the FLD must state the facts and law
petitioner to pay the total amount of P8,644,998.71 within
on which is it is based.
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, otherwise the case shall
be referred to the Collection Enforcement Division of the BIR
Section 228 of the NIRC should not be read restrictively to
National Office for the issuance of a warrant of distraint and
limit the written notice only to the assessment itself. The
levy without further notice.The Assistant Commissioner for
written notice requirement for both the FLD and the FAN is in
Collection, acting for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
observance of due process—to afford the taxpayer adequate
issued the corresponding warrants of distraint and/or levy
and garnishment. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review

6
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to contest the issuance that issued by the Commissioner himself, if not reviewed or
of the warrants to enforce the collection of the tax revised by the latter such as in this case.
assessments.
A request for reconsideration must be made within thirty (30)
The CTA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a days from the taxpayer's receipt of the tax deficiency
decision dated September 16, 1994, declaring that said assessment, otherwise, the decision becomes final,
petition was filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period reckoned unappealable and therefore, demandable and it can no
from the time when the demand letter of January 24, 1991 by longer be contested. The Petitioner failed to avail of its right
the Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable... and Billing Division can bring the matter before the Court of Tax Appeals within
was presumably received the reglementary period upon the receipt of the demand
letter reiterating the assessed delinquent taxes and denying
Issues: its request for reconsideration which constituted th final
determination by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
 Whether or not a demand letter for tax deficiency petitioner's protest.
assessments issued and signed by a subordinate
officer who was acting in behalf of the For the Court of Tax Appeals to acquire jurisdiction, an
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is deemed final assessment must first be disputed by the taxpayer and ruled
and executory and subject to an appeal to the Court upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to warrant a
of Tax Appeals. decision from which a petition for review may be taken to the
Court of Tax Appeals.If adverse ruling has been rendered by
 Whether said demand letter indeed attained finality the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to a
despite the fact that it was issued and signed by the disputed assessment or a claim for refund or credit, the
Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division taxpayer may appeal the same within thirty (30) days after
instead of the BIR Commissioner. receipt thereof.

Ruling:
Advertising Associates, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 133
We rule in the affirmative. SCRA 765, No. L-59758. December 26, 1984

A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be Aquino, J.

considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment.
The determination on whether or not a demand letter is final Facts:
is conditioned upon the language used or the tenor of the
letter being sent to the taxpayer.The Commissioner of This case is about the liability of Advertising Associates, lnc.
Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in for P382,700.16 as 3% contractor's percentage tax on its
clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final rental income from the lease of neon signs and billboards
determination of the disputed assessment... the letter of imposed by section 191 of the Tax Code (as amended by
demand dated January 24, 1991, unquestionably constitutes
Republic Acts Nos. 1612 and 6110) on business agents and
the final action taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
independent contractors. Parenthetically, it may be noted
petitioner's request for reconsideration when it reiterated
the tax deficiency assessments due from petitioner, and that Presidential Decree No. 69, effective November 24,
requested its payment. Failure to do so would result in the 1972, added paragraph 17 to section 191 by taxing lessors of
"issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy contained a personal property.
notation indicating that petitioner's request for
reconsideration had been denied for lack of supporting The Commissioner required Advertising Associates to pay
documents.The demand letter received by petitioner verily P297,927.06 and P84,773.10 as contractor's tax for 1967-
signified a character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount
1971 and 1972, respectively, including 25% surcharge (the
to a rejection of the request for reconsideration.The
latter amount includes interest) on its income from billboards
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may delegate any power
vested upon him by law to Division Chiefs or to officials of and neon signs. The basis of the assessment is the fact that
higher rank cannot, however, delegate the four powers the taxpayer's articles of incorporation provide that its
granted to him under the National Internal Revenue Code primary purpose is to engage in general advertising business.
(NIRC) enumerated in Section 7 Advertising Associates contested the assessments in its
'letters of June 25, 1973 (for the 1967-71 deficiency taxes)
1. To recommend the promulgation of rules and and March 7, 1974 (for the 1972 deficiency). The
regulations and issue rulings of first impression or to
Commissioner reiterated the assessments in his letters of July
reverse, revoke or modify any existing ruling.
12 and September 16,1974.
2. To compromise or abate The taxpayer requested the cancellation of the assessments
in its letters of September 13 and November 21, 1974 .
3. To assign or reassign internal revenue officers the Inexplicably, for about four years there was no movement in
act of issuance of the demand letter by the Chief of the case.  Then, on March 31, 1978, the Commissioner
the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division does
resorted to the summary remedy of issuing two warrants of
not fall under any of the exceptions that have been
distraint, directing the collection enforcement division to levy
mentioned as non-delegable.
on the taxpayer's personal properties as would be sufficient
to satisfy the deficiency taxes. The warrants were served
The authority to make tax assessments may be delegated to
subordinate officers and has the same force and effect as upon the taxpayer on April 18 and May 25, 1978.

7
More than a year later, Acting Commissioner Efren I. Plana [ GR No. L-28896, Feb 17, 1988 ]
wrote a letter dated May 23, 1979 in answer to the requests
of the taxpayer for the cancellation of the assessments and CIR v. ALGUE +
the withdrawal of the warrants of distraint. Such letter
constitutes the decision on the matter. That if the taxpayer
does not agree, he may appeal to the CTA within 30 days FACTS:
from the receipt of the letter.

Advertising Associates received that letter on June 18, 1979. The record shows that on January 14, 1965, the private
Nineteen days later or on July 7, it filed its petition for review. respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in engineering,
In its resolution of August 28, 1979, the Tax Court enjoined construction and other allied activities, received a letter from
the petitioner assessing it in the total amount of P83,183.85
the enforcement of the warrants of distraint.
as delinquency income taxes for the years 1958 and 1959. On
The Tax Court did not resolve the case on the merits. It ruled January 18, 1965, Algue filed a letter of protest or request for
that the warrants of distraint were the reconsideration, which letter was stamp-received on the
Commissioner's appealable decisions.  Since Advertising same day in the office of the petitioner. On March 12, 1965, a
warrant of distraint and levy was presented to the private
Associates appealed from the decision of May 23, 1979, the
respondent, through its counsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara, Jr.,
petition for review was filed out of time. It was dismissed.
who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending
The taxpayer appealed to this Court.
protest. A search of the protest in the dockets of the case
Issue: proved fruitless. Atty. Guevara produced his file copy and
gave a photostat to BIR agent Ramon Reyes, who deferred
Whether or not the petition for review was filed on time. service of the warrant. On April 7, 1965, Atty. Guevara was
finally informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the
Held: protest and it was only then that he accepted the warrant of
distraint and levy earlier sought to be served. Sixteen days
The Court held that the petition for review was filed on time.
later, on April 23, 1965, Algue filed a petition for review of
The reviewable decision is that contained in Commissioner the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with
Plana's letter of May 23, 1979 and not the warrants of the Court of Tax Appeals.
distraint.

No amount of quibbling or sophistry can blink the fact that ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal of the private respondent
said letter, as its tenor shows, embodies the Commissioner's from the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue was
final decision within the meaning of section 7 of Republic Act made on time and in accordance with law.
No. 1125. The Commissioner said so. He even directed the
taxpayer to appeal it to the Tax Court. That was the same RULING: Yes.
situation in St. Stephen's Association and St. Stephen's
Chinese Girl's School vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 The chronology of the facts shows that the petition was filed
Phil. 314, 317-318. seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appeal may
be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or
CASE SYLLABI: ruling challenged.[7] It is true that as a rule the warrant of
distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the
Taxation; Appeals; The reviewable decision of the B.I.R. assessment"[8] and "renders hopeless a request for
Commissioner is that letter where he clearly directed the reconsideration,"[9] being "tantamount to an outright denial
taxpayer to appeal to the Tax Court, and not the warrants thereof and makes the said request deemed rejected." [10] But
of distraint and levy.—No amount of quibbling or sophistry there is a special circumstance in the case at bar that
can blink the fact that said letter, as its tenor shows, prevents application of this accepted doctrine.
embodies the Commissioner’s final decision within the
meaning of section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125. The The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent
Commissioner said so. He even directed the taxpayer to received the petitioner's notice of assessment, it filed its
appeal it to the Tax Court. That was the same situation in St. letter of protest. This was apparently not taken into account
Stephen’s Association and St. Stephen’s Chinese Girl’s School before the warrant of distraint and levy was issued; indeed,
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil. 314, 317-318. such protest could not be located in the office off the
petitioner. It was only after Atty. Guevara gave the BIR a copy
Same; Same; Same.—The directive is in consonance with this of the protest that it was, if at all, considered by the tax
Court’s dictum that the Commissioner should always indicate authorities. During the intervening period, the warrant was
to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what premature and could therefore not be served.
constitutes his final determination of the disputed
assessment. That procedure is demanded by the pressing As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted,[11] the protest
need for fair play, regularity and orderliness in administrative filed by private respondent was not pro forma and was based
action (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L- on strong legal considerations. It thus had the effect of
25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 523). suspending on January 18, 1965, when it was filed, the
reglamentary period which started on the date the
assessment was received, viz., January 14, 1965. The period
started running again only on April 7, 1965, when the private
TOPIC: ACTIONS TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF THE
respondent was definitely informed of the implied rejection
PENDING PROTEST
of the said protest and the warrant was finally served on it.
Hence, when the appeal was filed on April 23, 1965, only 20
241 Phil. 829
days of the reglementary period had been consumed.

8
[G.R. No. L-46954. July 20, 1982.] The Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to review on appeal any decision of the Collector of Internal
ELPIDIO YABES and SEVERINO YABES, Petitioners, v. THE Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments and other
HON. NAPOLEON FLOJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code.
of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Cagayan and THE For want of jurisdiction over the case, the Court of First
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Instance of Cagayan should have dismissed the complaint
filed in Civil Case No. II-7. The recommendation of the
Solicitor General that the lower court hold in abeyance any
action or proceeding in Civil Case No. II-7 until after the Court
Facts: The Government sued the heirs of Doroteo Yabes for of Tax Appeals shall have finally decided CTA Case No. 2216,
the recovery of the sum of P15,976.82 as Commercial is untenable since the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
broker’s fixed and percentage taxes for the period from 1936 case. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over all
to 1960, assessed during the deceased’s lifetime. The interlocutory matters incidental to the case and deemed
prescriptive period was extended and the enforcement of the necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or
taxes was held in abeyance by the Commissioner of Internal protect interests of the parties. Absent jurisdiction over the
Revenue upon agreement with the heirs to await the case, it would be improper for the Court of First Instance of
outcome of the Constantino case regarding the same kind of Cagayan to take cognizance over the case and act upon
tax liability which was pending in the Supreme Court. After interlocutory matters of the case, as well.
the case was decided in the government’s favor, the
collection case was filed. virtual lawlibrary
The dismissal of the complaint, however, is not sufficient. The
Taking the complaint as the final decision of the ends of justice would best be served by considering the
Commissioner on the disputed assessment against the complaint filed in Civil Case No. II-7 not only as a final notice
deceased taxpayer Doroteo Yabes, petitioners filed a petition of assessment but also as a counterclaim in CTA Case No.
for review of said disputed assessment with the Court of Tax 2216, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, as well as to
Appeals contending that their predecessor was not a expedite the settlement of the controversy between the
Commercial broker subject to the questioned tax assessment. parties. After all, the two cases involve the same parties, the
On the other hand, the Commissioner filed a motion to same subject matter, and the same issue, which is the liability
dismiss with the Court of Tax Appeals on the ground that the of the heirs of the deceased Doroteo Yabes for commercial
assessment against Doroteo Yabes had already become final, broker’s fixed and percentage taxes due from the said
executory and incontestable, and the Court of Tax Appeals deceased.
had no jurisdiction over the case. The respondent Judge set
the case for trial and therein the case and the subsequent Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Union Shipping Corp.,
motion for reconsideration of said order of denial as well as
the motion for leave to file a second motion for 185 SCRA 547(1990), G.R. No. 66160. May 21, 1990
reconsideration of the aforesaid order.

Facts:
Issue: Whether or not the assessment made by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue against the deceased The CIR assessed Yee Fong Hong, Ltd the total sum of P583,
taxpayer Doroteo Yabes has become final, executory and 155.22, as deficiency income taxes due for the years 1971
incontestable and 1972. Respondent Yee protested the assessment.

November 25, 1976 – the CIR, without ruling on the protest

Ruling: There is no reason for the Court to disagree from or by Yee, issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy, which was
reverse the Court of Tax Appeals’ conclusion that under the served on private respondent's counsel.
circumstances of this case, what may be considered as final
decision or assessment of the Commissioner is the filing of
the complaint for collection in the respondent Court of First November 27, 1976 – Yee reiterated its request for the
Instance of Cagayan, the summons of which was served on
reinvestigation of the assessment. However the CIR, again,
petitioners and that therefore the appeal with the Court of
without acting on the request for reinvestigation and
Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2216 was filed on time.
reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, filed a
The respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan can only collection suit before the CFI.
acquire jurisdiction over this case filed against the heirs of
the taxpayer if the assessment made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue bad become final and incontestable. If the January 10, 1976 – Respondent filed its Petition for Review of
contrary is established, as this Court holds it to be, the petitioner's assessment of its deficiency income taxes in
considering the aforementioned conclusion of the Court of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Tax Appeals on the finality and incontestability of the
assessment made by the Commissioner is correct, then the
Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over this case.
Petitioners received the summons in Civil Case No. II-7 of the According to the petitioner, the Court of Tax Appeals has no
respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan on January 20, jurisdiction over this case. It claims that the warrant of
1971, and petitioners filed their appeal with the Court of Tax distraint and levy is proof of the finality of an assessment and
Appeals in CTA Case No. 2216, on February 12, 1971, well is tantamount to an outright denial of a motion for
within the thirty-day prescriptive period under Section 11 of reconsideration of an assessment. Among others, petitioner
Republic Act No. 1125. contends that the warrant was issued after the respondent
filed a request for reconsideration of subject assessment,

9
thus constituting petitioner's final decision in the disputed Instance of Cagayan, the summons of which was served on
assessments. petitioners on January 20, 1971, and that therefore the
appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2216
was filed on time.
Therefore, the period to appeal to the CTA commenced from
the receipt of the warrant on November 25, 1976 so that on
January 10, 1976 when respondent corporation sought Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The Court of First Instance can
redress, it has long become final and executory. acquire jurisdiction over a claim for collection of deficiency
taxes only after the assessment made by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue has become final and unappealable; not
Issue: where there is still and pending Court of Tax Appeals case.
—The respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan can only
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over the case acquire jurisdiction over this case filed against the heirs of
the taxpayer if the assessment made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue had become final and incontestable. If the
Held. contrary is established, as this Court holds it to be,
considering the aforementioned conclusion of the Court of
Tax Appeals on the finality and incontestability of the
The CTA has jurisdiction over the case. There is no dispute assessment made by the Commissioner is correct, then the
that petitioner did not rule on private respondent's motion Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over this case.
for reconsideration but left private respondent in the dark as Petitioners received the summons in Civil Case No. II-7 of the
to which action of the Commissioner is the decision respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan on January 20,
appealable to the CTA. Had he categorically stated that he 1971, and petitioners filed their appeal with the Court of Tax
denies private respondent's motion for reconsideration and Appeals in CTA Case No. 2216, on February 12, 1971, well
that his action constitutes his final determination on the within the thirty-day prescriptive period under Section 11 of
disputed assessment, private respondent without needless Republic Act No. 1125. The Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive
difficulty would have been able to determine when his right appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal any decision of the
to appeal accrues and the resulting confusion would have Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
been avoided. Under the circumstances, the CIR, not having assessments and other matters arising under the National
clearly signified his final action on the disputed assessment, Internal Revenue Code.
legally the period to appeal has not commenced to run.

Same; Jurisdiction; Where a court has no jurisdiction

dismissal of action, not a mere suspension of proceedings,
must be made.—The recommendation of the Solicitor
General that the lower court hold in abeyance any action or
proceeding in Civil Case No. II-7 until after the Court of Tax
Appeals shall have finally decided CTA Case No. 2216, is
untenable since the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over all
interlocutory matters incidental to the case and deemed
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or
protect interests of the parties. Absent jurisdiction over the
case, it would be improper for the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan to take cognizance over the case and act upon
interlocutory matters of the case, as well.

[ GR No. 135210, Jul 11, 2001 ]

CIR v. ISABELA CULTURAL CORPORATION

MAIN POINT: A final demand letter from the Bureau of

Internal Revenue, reiterating to the taxpayer the immediate
payment of a tax deficiency assessment previously made, is
tantamount to a denial of the taxpayer's request for
CASE SYLLABI:
reconsideration. Such letter amounts to a final decision on a
Taxation; Action; The filing by the Bureau of Internal disputed assessment and is thus appealable to the Court of
Revenue of an action for collection of deficiency taxes Tax Appeals (CTA).
allegedly due from the taxpayer can be considered as the
final decision or assessment of the Commissioner of Internal FACTS: On February 23, 1990, ICC received from CIR an
assessment letter, dated February 9, 1990, demanding
Revenue.—There is no reason for Us to disagree from or
payment of the amounts of P333,196.86 and P4,897.79 as
reverse the Court of Tax Appeals’ conclusion that under the
deficiency income tax and expanded withholding tax inclusive
circumstances of this case, what may be considered as final of surcharge and interest, respectively, for the taxable period
decision or assessment of the Commissioner is the filing of from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1986.
the complaint for collection in the respondent Court of First

10
On March 22, 1990, filed with the [CIR] office on March 23,
1990, [ICC] requested x x x a reconsideration of the subject "Sec. 228. Protesting an Assessment. - x x x
assessment.
Within a period to be prescribed by implementing
Supplemental to its protest was a letter, dated April 2, 1990, rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be required
filed with the [CIR] office on April 18, 1990, to which x x x to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to
were attached certain documents supportive of its protest, as respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized
well as a Waiver of Statute of Limitation, dated April 17, representative shall issue an assessment based on
1990, where it was indicated that [petitioner] would only his findings.
have until April 5, 1991 within which to asses and collect the
taxes that may be found due from [respondent] after the re- Such assessment may be protested administratively
investigation. by filing a request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt
On February 9, 1995, [ICC] received from [CIR] a Final Notice of the assessment in such form and manner as may
Before Seizure, dated December 22, 1994. In said letter, [CIR] be prescribed by implementing rules and
demanded payment of the subject assessment within ten regulations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the
(10) days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, failure on its part protest, all relevant supporting documents shall
would constrain [petitioner] to collect the subject assessment have become final.
through summary remedies.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not
[Respondent] considered said final notice of seizure as acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days
[petitioner's] final decision. Hence, the instant petition for from submission of documents, the taxpayer
review filed with this Court on March 9, 1995. adversely affected by the decision or inaction may
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within (30) days
The CTA having rendered judgment dismissing the petition, from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse
[ICC] filed the instant petition anchored on the argument that of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period;
[CIR’s] issuance of the Final Notice Before Seizure constitutes otherwise the decision shall become final, executory
[its] decision on [respondent's] request for reinvestigation, and demandable."
which the [respondent] may appeal to the CTA."
In this case, the said period of 180 days had already lapsed
Petitioner maintains that this Final Notice was a mere when respondent filed its request for reconsideration on
reiteration of the delinquent taxpayer's obligation to pay the March 23, 1990, without any action on the part of the CIR.
taxes due. It was supposedly a mere demand that should not
have been mistaken for a decision on a protested Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that a final demand letter for
assessment. Such decision, the commissioner contends, must payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision
unequivocably indicate that it is the resolution of the on a disputed or protested assessment. In Commissioner of
taxpayer's request for reconsideration and must likewise Internal Revenue v. Ayala Securities Corporation, this Court
state the reason therefor. held:

Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the Final "The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view
Notice Before Seizure should be considered as a denial of its of the Court, is tantamount to a denial of the
request for reconsideration of the disputed assessment. The reconsideration or [respondent corporation's] x x x
Notice should be deemed as petitioner's last act, since failure protest o[f] the assessment made by the petitioner,
to comply with it would lead to the distraint and levy of considering that the said letter [was] in itself a
respondent's properties, as indicated therein. reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for the settlement of the assessment
ISSUE: Whether or not the Final Notice Before Seizure against already made, and for the immediate payment of
ICC constitutes the final decision of the CIR appealable to the the sum of P758,687.04 in spite of the vehement
CTA. protest of the respondent corporation on April 21,
1961. This certainly is a clear indication of the firm
RULING: No. The Final Notice Before Seizure cannot but be stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of
considered as the commissioner's decision disposing of the the disputed assessment, in view of the continued
request for reconsideration filed by respondent, who refusal of the respondent corporation to execute the
received no other response to its request. Not only was the waiver of the period of limitation upon the
Notice the only response received; its content and tenor assessment in question.
supported the theory that it was the CIR's final act regarding
the request for reconsideration. The very title expressly This being so, the said letter amount[ed] to a decision on a
indicated that it was a final notice prior to seizure of disputed or protested assessment and, there, the court a quo
property. The letter itself clearly stated that respondent was did not err in taking cognizance of this case.”
being given "this LAST OPPORTUNITY" to pay; otherwise, its
properties would be subjected to distraint and levy. How Similarly, in Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
then could it have been made to believe that its request for and again in CIR v. Union Shipping Corp., we ruled:
reconsideration was still pending determination, despite the
actual threat of seizure of its properties? "x x x. The letter of demand dated April 29, 1963
unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by
Furthermore, Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue the commissioner on the petitioner's several
Code states that a delinquent taxpayer may nevertheless requests for reconsideration and recomputation. In
directly appeal a disputed assessment, if its request for this letter the commissioner not only in effect
reconsideration remains unacted upon 180 days after demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of
submission thereof. We quote: P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it

11
failed to pay, the said commissioner would be ISSUE:
constrained to enforce the collection thereof by
means of the remedies provided by law. The tenor Whether the subject assessment has become final, executory
of the letter, specifically the statement regarding the and demandable due to the failure of petitioner to file an
resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicate[d] appeal before the CTA within thirty (30) days from the lapse
the final nature of the determination made by the of the One Hundred Eighty (180)-day period pursuant to
commissioner of the petitioner's deficiency franchise Section 228 of the NIRC.
tax liability."
RULING:
As in CIR v. Union Shipping, petitioner failed to rule on the
The Court decided in favor of Lascona. In RCBC v. CIR, the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent, but
Court has held that in case the Commissioner failed to act on
simply continued to demand payment of the latter's alleged
tax delinquency. Thus, the Court reiterated the dictum that the disputed assessment within the 180-day period from date
the BIR should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: (1) file a
unequivocal language what constitutes final action on a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals within 30
disputed assessment. The object of this policy is to avoid days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await
repeated requests for reconsideration by the taxpayer, the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed
thereby delaying the finality of the assessment and, assessments and appeal such final decision to the Court of
consequently, the collection of the taxes due. Furthermore, Tax Appeals within 30 days after receipt of a copy of such
the taxpayer would not be groping in the dark, speculating as decision.
to which communication or action of the BIR may be the
decision appealable to the tax court. Therefore, as in Section 228, when the law provided for the
remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did not intend to
In the instant case, the second notice received by private limit it to a single remedy of filing of an appeal after the lapse
respondent verily indicated its nature - that it was final. of the 180-day prescribed period. Precisely, when a taxpayer
Unequivocably, therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of protested an assessment, he naturally expects the CIR to
the request for reconsideration. decide either positively or negatively. A taxpayer cannot be
prejudiced if he chooses to wait for the final decision of the
CIR on the protested assessment. More so, because the law
LASCONA LAND VS. CIR GR 171251 March 05, 2012
and jurisprudence have always contemplated a scenario
FACTS: where the CIR will decide on the protested assessment. 

On March 27, 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Accordingly, considering that Lascona opted to await the final
(CIR) issued Assessment Notice No. 0000047-93-407against decision of the Commissioner on the protested assessment, it
Lascona Land Co., Inc. (Lascona) informing the latter of its then has the right to appeal such final decision to the Court
alleged deficiency income tax for the year 1993 in the by filing a petition for review within thirty days after receipt
amount of P753,266.56. of a copy of such decision or ruling, even after the expiration
of the 180-day period fixed by law for the Commissioner of
Consequently, on April 20, 1998, Lascona filed a letter Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. Thus,
protest, but was denied by Norberto R. Odulio, Officer-in- Lascona, when it filed an appeal on April 12, 1999 before the
Charge (OIC), Regional Director, Bureau of Internal Revenue, CTA, after its receipt of the Letter dated March 3,
Revenue Region No. 8, Makati City, in his Letter[ dated March 1999 on March 12, 1999, the appeal was timely made as it
3, 1999. Said letter denied the protest for the reason that the was filed within 30 days after receipt of the copy of the
case was not appealed to the CTA after the lapsed of 180 decision.
days from day of filing the said protests.
Finally, the CIR should be reminded that taxpayers cannot be
On April 12, 1999, Lascona appealed the decision before the left in quandary by its inaction on the protested
CTA and was docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 5777. Lascona assessment.  It is imperative that the taxpayers are informed
alleged that the Regional Director erred in ruling that the of its action in order that the taxpayer should then at least be
failure to appeal to the CTA within thirty (30) days from the able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time.
lapse of the 180-day period rendered the assessment final
and executory.

The CIR, however, maintained that Lascona's failure to timely RCBC vs. CIR
file an appeal with the CTA after the lapse of the 180-day
[GR No. 168498, April 24, 2007]
reglementary period provided under Section 228 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) resulted to the finality
of the assessment. On January 4, 2000, the CTA, in its
Decision, nullified the subject assessment. FACTS:

On March 3, 2000, the CTA denied the CIR's motion for RCBC received the final assessment notice on July 5, 2001. It
reconsideration for lack of merit. The CIR filed an appeal filed a protest on July 20, 2001. As the protest was not acted
before the CA. The Court of Appeals granted the CIR's upon, it filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax
petition and set aside the Decision dated January 4, 2000 of Appeals (CTA) on April 30, 2002, or more than 30 days after
the CTA and its Resolution dated March 3, 2000.  It further the lapse of the 180-day period reckoned from the
declared that the subject Assessment Notice No. 0000047- submission of complete documents. The CTA dismissed the
93-407 dated March 27, 1998 as final, executory and Petition for lack of jurisdiction since the appeal was filed out
demandable. of time.

12
Issue: WON PAGCOR filed on time, was late, or filed
prematurely.
ISSUE:

Has the action to protest the assessment judicially Ruling: Prematurely.

prescribed?
Section 3.1.5 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99,
implementing Section 228 above, provides:
HELD:

YES. The assessment has become final. The jurisdiction of the 3.1.5. Disputed Assessment. - The taxpayer or his duly
CTA has been expanded to include not only decision but also authorized representative may protest administratively
inactions and both are jurisdictional such that failure to against the aforesaid formal letter of demand and
assessment notice within thirty (30) days from date of receipt
observe either is fatal.
thereof, x x x.

x x x x
However, if there has been inaction, the taxpayer can choose
between (1) file a Petition with the CTA within 30 days from If the taxpayer fails to file a valid protest against the formal
the lapse of the 180-day period OR (2) await the final letter of demand and assessment notice within thirty (30)
decision of the CIR and appeal such decision to the CTA days from date of receipt thereof, the assessment shall
within 30 days after receipt of the decision. These options are become final, executory and demandable.
mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of
the other. Thus, if petitioner belatedly filed an action based If the protest is denied, in whole or in part, by the
Commissioner, the taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax
on inaction, it can not subsequently file another petition once
Appeals within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the
the decision comes out
said decision, otherwise, the assessment shall become final,
executory and demandable.
[ GR No. 208731, Jan 27, 2016 ]
In general, if the protest is denied, in whole or in part, by the
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. BIR + Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, the
taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty
(30) days from date of receipt of the said decision, otherwise,
Facts:
the assessment shall become final executory and
demandable: Provided, however, that if the taxpayer elevates
The CTA 1st Division and CTA En Bane both established that his protest to the Commissioner within thirty (30) days from
PAGCOR received a FAN on 17 January 2008, filed its protest date of receipt of the final decision of the Commissioner's
to the FAN addressed to RD Misajon on 24 January 2008, filed duly authorized representative, the latter's decision shall not
yet another protest addressed to the CIR on 14 August 2008, be considered final, executory and demandable, in which
and then filed a petition before the CTA on 11 March 2009. case, the protest shall be decided by the Commissioner.
There was no action on PAGCOR's protests filed on 24
January 2008 and 14 August 2008. PAGCOR would like this If the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative
Court to rule that its protest before the CIR starts a new fails to act on the taxpayer's protest within one hundred
period from which to determine the last day to file its eighty (180) days from date of submission, by the taxpayer,
petition before the CTA. of the required documents in support of his protest, the
taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty
The CIR, on the other hand, denied PAGCOR's claims of (30) days from the lapse of the said 180-day period,
exemption with the issuance of its 18 July 2011 letter. The otherwise the assessment shall become final, executory and
letter asked PAGCOR to settle its obligation of demandable.
P46,589,507.65, which consisted of tax, surcharge and
interest. PAGCOR's failure to settle its obligation would result
in the issuance of a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy and a
Following the verba legis doctrine, the law must be applied
Warrant of Garnishment.
exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. [15] A
textual reading of Section 3.1.5 gives a protesting taxpayer
In a Letter dated September 23, 2008 received on September like PAGCOR only three options:
25, 2008, [PAGCOR] was informed that the Legal Division of
Revenue Region No. 6 sustained Revenue Officer Ma. Elena 1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his
Llantada on the imposition of FBT against it based on the authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to
provisions of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 3-98 and that its the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial
protest was forwarded to the Assessment Division for further denial of the protest.
action.
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR's
On November 19, 2008, [PAGCOR] received a letter from the authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to
OIC-Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 6 (Manila), stating the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial
that its letter protest was referred to Revenue District Office denial of the protest.
No. 33 for appropriate action.
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act
On March 11, 2009, [PAGCOR] filed the instant Petition for upon the protest within 180 days from submission of the
Review alleging respondents' inaction in its protest on the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may
disputed deficiency FBT. appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-

13
day period. to collect from PAGCOR the amount of P46,589,507.65. The
CIR's denial further puts PAGCOR in a bind, because it can no
To further clarify the three options: A whole or partial denial longer amend its petition before the CTA.
by the CIR's authorized representative may be appealed to
the CIR or the CTA. A whole or partial denial by the CIR may G.R. No. 179343               January 21, 2010
be appealed to the CTA. The CIR or the CIR's authorized
representative's failure to act may be appealed to the CTA. FISHWEALTH CANNING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
There is no mention of an appeal to the CIR from the failure vs.
to act by the CIR's authorized representative. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

PAGCOR did not wait for the RD or the CIR's decision on its
DECISION
protest. PAGCOR made separate and successive filings before
the RD and the CIR before it filed its petition with the CTA.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
We shall illustrate below how PAGCOR failed to follow the
clear directive of Section 228 and Section 3.1.5.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent), by
PAGCOR's protest to the RD on 24 January 2008 was filed Letter of Authority dated May 16, 2000,1 ordered the
within the 30-day period prescribed in Section 228 and examination of the internal revenue taxes for the taxable
Section 3.1.5. The RD did not release any decision on year 1999 of Fishwealth Canning Corp. (petitioner). The
PAGCOR's protest; thus, PAGCOR was unable to make use of investigation disclosed that petitioner was liable in the
the first option as described above to justify an appeal to the amount of P2,395,826.88 representing income tax, value
CTA. The effect of the lack of decision from the RD is the added tax (VAT), withholding tax deficiencies and other
same, whether we consider PAGCOR's April 2008 submission miscellaneous deficiencies. Petitioner eventually settled
of documents[16] or not. these obligations on August 30, 2000.2

Under the third option described above, even if we grant On August 25, 2000, respondent reinvestigated petitioner’s
leeway to PAGCOR and consider its unspecified April 2008 books of accounts and other records of internal revenue
submission, PAGCOR still should have waited for the RD's taxes covering the same period for the purpose of which it
decision until 27 October 2008, or 180 days from 30 April issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to
2008. PAGCOR then had 30 days from 27 October 2008, or submit its records and books of accounts. Petitioner
until 26 November 2008, to file its petition before the CTA. requested the cancellation of the subpoena on the ground
PAGCOR, however, did not make use of the third option. that the same set of documents had previously been
PAGCOR did not file a petition before the CTA on or before 26 examined.
November 2008.
As petitioner did not heed the subpoena, respondent
Under the second option, PAGCOR ought to have waited for thereafter filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for
the RD's whole or partial denial of its protest before it filed an violation of Sections 5 (c) and 266 of the 1997 Internal
appeal before the CIR. PAGCOR rendered the second option Revenue Code, which complaint was dismissed for
moot when it formulated its own rule and chose to ignore the insufficiency of evidence.3
clear text of Section 3.1.5. PAGCOR "elevated an appeal" to
the CIR on 13 August 2008 without any decision from the RD, Respondent sent, on August 6, 2003, petitioner a Final
then filed a petition before the CTA on 11 March 2009. A Assessment Notice of income tax and VAT deficiencies
textual reading of Section 228 and Section 3.1.5 will readily totaling P67,597,336.75 for the taxable year 1999, 4 which
show that neither Section 228 nor Section 3.1.5 provides for assessment petitioner contested by letter of September 23,
the remedy of an appeal to the CIR in case of the RD's failure 2003.5
to act. The third option states that the remedy for failure to
act by the CIR or his authorized representative is to file an Respondent thereafter issued a Final Decision on Disputed
appeal to the CTA within 30 days after the lapse of 180 days Assessment dated August 2, 2005, which petitioner received
from the submission of the required supporting documents. on August 4, 2005, denying its letter of protest, apprising it of
PAGCOR clearly failed to do this. its income tax and VAT liabilities in the amounts of
"P15,396,905.24 and P63,688,434.40 [sic], respectively, for
If we consider, for the sake of argument, PAGCOR's the taxable year 1999,"6 and requesting the immediate
submission before the CIR as a separate protest and not as an payment thereof, "inclusive of penalties incident to
appeal, then such protest should be denied for having been delinquency." Respondent added that if petitioner disagreed,
filed out of time. PAGCOR only had 30 days from 17 January it may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) "within thirty
2008 within which to file its protest. This period ended on 16 (30) days from date of receipt hereof, otherwise our said
February 2008. PAGCOR filed its submission before the CIR deficiency income and value-added taxes assessments shall
on 13 August 2008. become final, executory, and demandable."7

When PAGCOR filed its petition before the CTA, it is clear that
Instead of appealing to the CTA, petitioner filed, on
PAGCOR failed to make use of any of the three options
September 1, 2005, a Letter of Reconsideration dated August
described above. A petition before the CTA may only be
31, 2005.8
made after a whole or partial denial of the protest by the
CIR or the CIR's authorized representative.  When PAGCOR
filed its petition before the CTA on 11 March 2009, there was By a Preliminary Collection Letter dated September 6, 2005,
still no denial of PAGCOR's protest by either the RD or the respondent demanded payment of petitioner’s tax
CIR. Therefore, under the first option, PAGCOR's petition liabilities,9 drawing petitioner to file on October 20, 2005 a
before the CTA had no cause of action because it was Petition for Review10 before the CTA.
prematurely filed. The CIR made an unequivocal denial of
PAGCOR's protest only on 18 July 2011, when the CIR sought In his Answer,11 respondent argued, among other things, that
the petition was filed out of time which argument the First

14
Division of the CTA upheld and accordingly dismissed the Facts:
petition.12
Following the death of former President Marcos in 1989, a
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 which was Special Tax Audit Team was created on June 27, 1990 to
denied.14 The Resolution denying its motion for conduct investigations and examinations of tax liabilities of
reconsideration was received by petitioner on October 31, the late president, his family, associates and cronies. The
2006.15 investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a
written notice of death of the decedent estate tax return and
On November 21, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1986, all in violation
before the CTA En Banc16 which, by Decision17 of July 5, 2007, of the Tax Code. Criminal charges were filed against Mrs.
held that the petition before the First Division, as well as that Marcos for violation of Secs. 82, 83 and 84, NIRC.
before it, was filed out of time.
The CIR thereby caused the preparation of the estate tax
Hence, the present petition,  petitioner arguing that the CTA return for the estate of the late president, the income returns
18

En Banc erred in holding that the petition it filed before the of the Marcos spouses for 1985 and 1986 and the income tax
CTA First Division as well as that filed before it (CTA En Banc) returns of petitioner Marcos II for 1982 to 1985. On July 26,
was filed out of time. 1991, the BIR issued deficiency estate tax assessments and
the corresponding deficiency income tax assessments. Copies
The petition is bereft of merit. of deficiency estate and income tax assessments were served
personally and constructively on August 26, 1991 and
Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that an September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Marcos. Likewise, copies of
assessment the deficiency income tax assessments against petitioner
Marcos were personally and constructively served. Formal
x x x may be protested administratively by filing a request for assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos on
reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days October 20, 1992.
from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as
may be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations. The deficiency tax assessments were not administratively
Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant protested by the Marcoses within 30 days from service
supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, thereof. Subsequently, the CIR issued a total of 30 notices to
the assessment shall become final. levy on real property against certain parcels of land and other
real property owned by Marcoses.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted
upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission Notices of sale at public auction were duly posted at the
of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the Tacloban City Hall and the public auction for the sale of 11
decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the
from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; government.
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and
demandable. (underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
an application for TRO before the CA to annul and set aside
In the case at bar, petitioner’s administrative protest was the notices of levy as well as the notice of sale and to enjoin
denied by Final Decision on Disputed Assessment dated the BIR from proceeding with the auction. The CA dismissed
August 2, 2005 issued by respondent and which petitioner the petition ruling that the deficiency assessments for the
received on August 4, 2005. Under the above-quoted Section estate and income taxes have already become final and
228 of the 1997 Tax Code, petitioner had 30 days to appeal unappealable and may thus be enforced by summary remedy
respondent’s denial of its protest to the CTA. of levying upon the real property.

Since petitioner received the denial of its administrative Issue:

protest on August 4, 2005, it had until September 3, 2005 to
Whether or not the failure to protest to the assessment
file a petition for review before the CTA Division. It filed one,
however, on October 20, 2005, hence, it was filed out of within the time prescribe by law makes deficiency tax
time. For a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the assessment final, executory, and thus, demandable
administrative protest does not toll the 30-day period to
Held:
appeal to the CTA.
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within
On petitioner’s final contention that it has a meritorious case the time required for filing the same, petitioner and other
in view of the dismissal of the above-mentioned criminal case Marcos heirs never questioned the assessment served upon
filed against it for violation of the 1997 Internal Revenue them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and prompting
Code,19 the same fails. For the criminal complaint was the BIR to collect said taxes by levying upon the properties
instituted not to demand payment, but to penalize the left by the late President Marcos.
taxpayer for violation of the Tax Code.20
The Notice of Levy upon real property were issued within the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. prescriptive period and in accordance with Sec. 222 of the
Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having become
Marcos II vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 47, G.R. No. final, executory and demandable, the same can now be
120880. June 5, 1997 collected through the summary remedy of distraint and levy
pursuant to Sec. 205 of the Tax Code.
Torres, JR., J.
CASE SYLLABI:

15
Same; Estates Taxes; The omission to file an estate tax becomes more pronounced in view of the absence of
return, and the subsequent failure to contest or appeal the sufficient attack against the actuations of government.
assessment made by the BIR is fatal, as under Section 223 of
Due Process; Equity; Where there was an opportunity to
the NIRC, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be
raise objections to government action, and such opportunity
assessed at any time within ten years after the omission,
was disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party
and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real
claiming oppression then becomes the oppressor of the
property within three years following the assessment of the
orderly functions of the government; He who comes to court
tax.—The omission to file an estate tax return, and the
must come with clean hands, otherwise he not only taints
subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made
his name, but ridicules the very structure of established
by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner’s cause, as under the
authority.—The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows
above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the
that notices of warrants of distraint and levy of sale were
tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the
furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7, 1993, and June
omission, and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy
10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
upon real property within three years following the
office at the Batasang Pambansa. We cannot therefore,
assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had
countenance petitioner’s insistence that he was denied due
become final and unappealable by the petitioner’s default as
process. Where there was an opportunity to raise objections
regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there
to government action, and such opportunity was disregarded,
is now no reason why the BIR cannot continue with the
for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression then
collection of the said tax. Any objection against the
becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of
assessment should have been pursued following the avenue
government. He who comes to court must come with clean
paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments
hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his name, but ridicules
of internal revenue taxes.
the very structure of established authority.
Same; Same; Ill-Gotten Wealth; The mere fact that the
decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does Republic vs. Ker & Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA 207, No. L-
not affect the enforcement of tax assessments over the 21609. September 29, 1966
properties indubitably included in his estate.—Petitioner Bengzon, J.
further argues that “the numerous pending court cases
questioning the late president’s ownership or interests in
several properties (both real and personal) make the total
value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, Facts:
incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time.
Thus, respondents’ assessment of the estate tax and their Ker & Co., Ltd., a domestic corporation, filed its income tax
issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and returns for the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950. In 1953 the
oppressive.” He points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan Bureau of Internal Revenue examined and audited Ker & Co.,
Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141, which were filed by the Ltd.'s returns and books of accounts and subsequently issued
government to question the ownership and interests of the notices of assessment.
late President in real and personal properties located within
and outside the Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits to On March 15, 1962, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
allege whether the properties levied upon by the BIR in the demanded payment of the aforesaid assessments together
collection of estate taxes upon the decedent’s estate were with a surcharge of 5% for late payment and interest at the
among those involved in the said cases pending in the rate of 1% monthly. Ker & Co., Ltd. refused to pay, instead in
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these its letters dated March 28, 1962 and April 10, 1962 it set up
cases are relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the defense of prescription of the Commissioner's right to
the decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth collect the tax. Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines
does not affect the enforcement of tax assessments over the filed on March 27, 1962 a complaint with the Court of First
properties indubitably included in his estate. Instance of Manila seeking collection of the aforesaid
deficiency income tax for the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and
Same; Same; Actions; Certiorari; Objections to assessments 1950. The complaint did not allege fraud in the filing of any of
should be raised by means of the ample remedies afforded the income tax returns for the years involved, nor did it pray
the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the Bureau of Internal for the payment of the corresponding 50% surcharge, but it
Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, and not via a prayed for the payment of 5% surcharge for late payment
Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave abuse of and interest of 1% per month without however specifying
discretion.—Moreover, these objections to the assessments from what date interest started to accrue.
should have been raised, considering the ample remedies
afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the Bureau of On April 14, 1962 Ker & Co., Ltd. through its counsel, Leido,
Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described Andrada, Perez & Associates, moved for the dismissal of the
earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, complaint on the ground that the court did not acquire
under the pretext of grave abuse of discretion. The course of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and that
action taken by the petitioner reflects his disregard or even plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. This motion was
repugnance of the established institutions for governance in denied and defendant filed a motion for reconsideration.
the scheme of a well-ordered society. The subject tax Resolution on said motion, however, was deferred until trial
assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, of the case on the merits.
the same can no longer be contested by means of a disguised
The CFI dismisses the claim for the collection of deficiency
protest. In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a
income taxes for 1947, but orders defendant taxpayer to pay
substitute for a lost appeal or remedy. This judicial policy
the deficiency income taxes for 1948, 1949 and 1950.

16
On February 20, 1963 the Republic of the Philippines filed a instituting a proceeding in court, and for sixty days
motion for reconsideration contending that the right of the thereafter.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect the deficiency
From March 1, 1956 when Ker & Co., Ltd. filed a petition for
assessment for 1947 has not prescribed by a lapse of merely
review in the Court of Tax Appeals contesting the legality of
five years and three months, because the taxpayer's income
the assessments in question, until the termination of its
tax return was fraudulent in which case prescription sets in
appeal in the Supreme Court, the Commissioner of Internal
ten years from October 31, 1951, the date of discovery of the
Revenue was prevented. Besides, to do so would be to
fraud, pursuant to Section 332 (a) of the Tax Codes and that
violate the judicial policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits and
the payment of delinquency interest of 1% per month should
the rule on lis pendens. 
commence from the date it fell due as indicated in the
assessment notices instead of on the date the complaint was Thus, did the taxpayer produce the effect of temporarily
filed. staying the hands of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
simply through a choice of remedy. And, if the Court were to
On March 6, 1963 Ker & Co., Ltd. also filed a motion for
sustain the taxpayer's stand, We would be encouraging
reconsideration reiterating its assertion that the Court of First
taxpayers to delay the payment of taxes in the hope of
Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over its person, and
ultimately avoiding the same. Under the circumstances, the
maintaining that since the complaint was filed nine years,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was in effect prohibited
one month and eleven days after the deficiency assessments
from collecting the tax in question. This being so, the
for 1948, 1949 and 1950 were made and since the filing of its
provisions of Section 333 of the Tax Code will apply.
petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals did not stop
the running of the period of limitations, the right of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect the tax in
question has prescribed. Part E – 6 (4) Phil. Journalists, Inc. vs. CIR (GR No. 162852,
December 16, 2004)
Issue:

1. Whether or not right of the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue to assess deficiency income tax for FACTS:
the year 1947 prescribe; and
2. Whether or not taxpayer's income tax return for
1947 was fraudulent. Petitioner was not furnished a copy of the waiver. It is to be
3. Whether or not the filing of a petition for review by noted that under RMO No. 20-90, the waiver must be
the taxpayer in the Court of Tax Appeals suspend executed in three (3) copies, the second copy of which is for
the running of the statute of limitations to collect the taxpayer. It is likewise required that the fact of receipt by
the deficiency income for the years 1948, 1949 and the taxpayer of his/her file copy be indicated in the original
1950 copy. Again, respondent failed to comply.

Held:
Thus, finding the waiver executed by the petitioner on
On the first and second issues- the Court resolves the issues September 22, 1997 to be suffering from legal infirmities,
in the negative. The Court resolved the issue without rendering the same invalid and ineffective, the Court finds
touching upon fraudulence of the return. The reason is that Assessment/Demand No. 33-1-000757-94 issued on
the complaint alleged no fraud, nor did the plaintiff present December 5, 1998 to be time-barred. Consequently, the
evidence to prove fraud. Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy issued pursuant thereto is
considered null and void.
This contention suffers from a flaw in that it fails to consider
the well-settled principle that fraud is a question of
fact6 which must be alleged and proved. Fraud is a serious
charge and, to be sustained, it must be supported by clear The petition for review was granted and the deficiency for
and convincing proof. Accordingly, fraud should have been the taxable year 1994 are declared cancelled, withdrawn and
alleged and proved in the lower court. On these premises the with no force. Lastly, the warrant of of distraint/levy was
Supreme Court therefore sustain the ruling of the lower court declared NULL and VOID.
upon the point of prescription.

In this case however, Ker & Co., Ltd. raised the defense of The respondent filed before the Court of Appeals and
prescription in the proceedings below and the Republic of the disagreed with the ruling of the CTA, to wit: Petition for
Philippines, instead of questioning the right of the defendantreview filed on 26 April 2000 with CTA was neither timely
to raise such defense, litigated on it and submitted the issuefiled nor the proper remedy. Only decisions of the BIR,
for resolution of the court. By its actuation, the Republic ofdenying the request for reconsideration or reinvestigation
the Philippines should be considered to have waived its right may be appealed to the CTA. Mere assessment notices which
to object to the setting up of such defense. have become final after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day
On the third issue the pendency of the taxpayer’s appeal toll reglementary period are not appealable. Thus, the CTA
the running of the prescriptive period. The running of the should not have entertained the petition at all.
prescriptive period to collect the tax shall be suspended for
the period during which the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is prohibited from beginning a distraint and levy or ISSUE:

17
petitioner received on November 9, 2001. The said letter
stated that a post audit review was held and it was
W/ON the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it ascertained that there was deficiency value-added and
held that the assessment in question has became final and withholding taxes due from petitioner in the amount of P
executory due to the failure of the Petitioner to protest the 292,874.16.
same.
On April 11, 2002, petitioner received a Formal Letter of
Demand dated April 3, 2002, assessing petitioner the amount
of Two Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Eight Hundred
Seventy Four Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P292,874.16.) for
RULING: deficiency value-added and withholding taxes for the taxable
year 1999.

Subsequently, Revenue District Office No. 67 sent a copy of

Yes. The CA erred in the assessment in question of becoming the Final Notice of Seizure dated May 12, 2003, which
final and executory due to the failure of the Petitioner to petitioner received on May 15, 2003, giving the latter last
protest the same opportunity to settle its deficiency tax liabilities within ten
(10) [days] from receipt thereof, otherwise respondent BIR
shall be constrained to serve and execute the Warrants of
Respondent had no power to issue an assessment beyond Distraint and/or Levy and Garnishment to enforce collection.
the three-year period under the mandatory provisions of
On February 6, 2004, petitioner received from Revenue
Section 203 of the NIRC. Such assessment should be held void
District Office No. 67 a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No.
and non-existent, otherwise, Section 203, an expression of a
67-0029-23 dated May 12, 2003 demanding payment of
public policy, would be rendered useless and nugatory.
deficiency value-added tax and withholding tax payment in
Besides, such right to assess cannot be validly granted after the amount of P292,874.16. On July 30, 2004, petitioner filed
three years since it would arise from a violation of the with the Office of respondent Commissioner a Motion for
mandatory provisions of Section 203 and would go against Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3.1.5 of Revenue
the vested right of the Petitioner to claim prescription of Regulations No. 12-99.
assessment.
On February 8, 2005, respondent Commissioner, through its
authorized representative, Revenue Regional Director of
Revenue Region 10, Legaspi City, issued a Decision denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Here the taxpayer failed to file protest and appeal to CTA on
time, since the waiver is held to be invalid, therefore the Denying that it received a Preliminary Assessment Notice
assessment is invalid; hence, further the rule that the (PAN) and claiming that it was not accorded due process,
defenses are waived which include the validity of the Metro Star filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA-
Second Division found merit in the petition of Metro Star,
assessment and prescription will not apply. Here, you can still
opined that "[w]hile there [is] a disputable presumption that
raise the defense of prescription.
a mailed letter [is] deemed received by the addressee in the
ordinary course of mail, a direct denial of the receipt of mail
shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption
Topic: E6-Assessment Becomes Final and Executory for to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
Failure to Protest/Appeal addressee."[5] It also found that there was no clear showing
that Metro Star actually received the alleged PAN, dated
GR No. 185371, Dec 08, 2010, CIR v. METRO STAR January 16, 2002. It, accordingly, ruled that the Formal Letter
SUPERAMA of Demand dated April 3, 2002, as well as the Warrant of
Distraint and/or Levy dated May 12, 2003 were void, as
Metro Star was denied due process.
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized
and existing by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the ISSUE: WON Metro Star was denied due process.
Philippines.
RULING: YES. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that
On January 26, 2001, a Letter of Authority No. 00006561 was if the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment
issued to examine petitioner's books of accounts and other from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by
accounting records for income tax and other internal revenue competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by
taxes for the taxable year 1999. Said Letter of Authority was the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to respondent
revalidated on August 10, 2001. to prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner received
the assessment in the due course of mail. The Supreme Court
For petitioner's failure to comply with several requests for has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed
the presentation of records and Subpoena Duces Tecum, received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely
[the] OIC of BIR Legal Division issued an Indorsement dated a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a
September 26, 2001 informing Revenue District Officer of direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by
Revenue Region No. 67, Legazpi City to proceed with the the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed
investigation based on the best evidence obtainable received by the addressee (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 149
preparatory to the issuance of assessment notice. SCRA 351). Thus as held by the Supreme Court in Gonzalo P.
Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 104,
On November 8, 2001, Revenue District Officer Socorro O. January 30, 1965:
Ramos-Lafuente issued a Preliminary 15-day Letter, which

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"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are the failure of the CIR to strictly comply with the requirements
(a) that the letter was properly addressed with laid down by law and its own rules is a denial of Metro Star's
postage prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once right to due process. Thus, for its failure to send the PAN
these facts are proved, the presumption is that the stating the facts and the law on which the assessment was
letter was received by the addressee as soon as it made as required by Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, the
could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary assessment made by the CIR is void.
course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to
appear, the presumption does not lie. (VI, Moran, The case of CIR v. Menguito cited by the CIR in support of its
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed, 56-57 argument that only the non-service of the FAN is fatal to the
citing Enriquez vs. Sunlife Assurance of Canada, 41 validity of an assessment, cannot apply to this case because
Phil 269)." the issue therein was the non-compliance with the provisions
of R. R. No. 12-85 which sought to interpret Section 229 of
The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to discharge the old tax law. RA No. 8424 has already amended the
its duty and present any evidence to show that Metro Star provision of Section 229 on protesting an assessment. The old
indeed received the PAN dated January 16, 2002. It could requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR's
have simply presented the registry receipt or the certification findings was changed in 1998 to informing the taxpayer of
from the postmaster that it mailed the PAN, but failed. not only the law, but also of the facts on which an
Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed to comply assessment would be made. Otherwise, the assessment itself
with the requirement of service of the PAN. It merely would be invalid. The regulation then, on the other hand,
accepted the letter of Metro Star's chairman dated April 29, simply provided that a notice be sent to the respondent in
2002, that stated that he had received the FAN dated April 3, the form prescribed, and that no consequence would ensue
2002, but not the PAN; that he was willing to pay the tax as for failure to comply with that form.
computed by the CIR; and that he just wanted to clarify some
matters with the hope of lessening its tax liability. The Court need not belabor to discuss the matter of Metro
Star's failure to file its protest, for it is well-settled that a void
This now leads to the question: Is the failure to strictly assessment bears no fruit.
comply with notice requirements prescribed under Section
228 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 and
Revenue Regulations (R.R.) No. 12-99 tantamount to a denial Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Concepcion,
of due process? Specifically, are the requirements of due
22 SCRA 1058, No. L-23912. March 15, 1968
process satisfied if only the FAN stating the computation of
tax liabilities and a demand to pay within the prescribed
period was sent to the taxpayer?
Facts:
SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. - When the
Commissioner or his duly authorized representative An assessment in the sum of P1,181.33 and P2,616.10
finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall representing estate and inheritance taxes on 50 shares of
first notify the taxpayer of his findings: provided, stock of Edward J. Nell Company issued in the names of both
however, that a preassessment notice shall not be spouses “as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and
required in the following cases: not as tenants in common” was made by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue on the ground that there was a
(e) When the article locally purchased or imported transmission to the husband of one-half share thereof upon
by an exempt person, such as, but not limited to, the death of the wife, the above shares being conjugal
vehicles, capital equipment, machineries and spare property. Jose Concepcion, as ancillary administrator of the
parts, has been sold, traded or transferred to non- estate of Mary H. Mitchell-Roberts, and Jack F. Mitchell-
exempt persons. Roberts, husband of the deceased, opposed and maintained
that there was no transmission of property since under
The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the English law, ownership of all property acquired during the
law and the facts on which the assessment is made; marriage vests in the husband, and that the shares of stock
otherwise, the assessment shall be void. were issued to the spouses “as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship and not as tenants in common. Not being
Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer agreeable to the theory entertained by the Commissioner of
must first be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes Internal Revenue, Concepcion and Mitchell-Roberts, in CTA
through the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the Case 168, appealed such a decision under RA 1125. The Court
facts and the law upon which the assessment is made. The of Tax Appeals, however and on 29 April 1957, dismissed
law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement. such an appeal as the petition for review because it was filed
To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first beyond the reglementary period of 30 days. That decision
establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the became final.
cardinal principle in administrative investigations - that
taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce On 14 June 1957, Concepcion and Mitchell-Roberts paid the
supporting evidence. taxes in question amounting to P1,181.33 (as estate tax) and
P2,616.10 (as inheritance tax), inclusive of delinquency
It is clear that the sending of a PAN to taxpayer to inform him penalties, and at the same time filed a claim for the refund of
of the assessment made is but part of the "due process said amounts. Without waiting for the decision of the
requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment," Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the claim for refund,
the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment made Concepcion and Mitchell-Roberts instituted an appeal with
by the tax authorities. The use of the word "shall" in the Court of Tax Appeals on 11 June 1959 in order to avoid
subsection 3.1.2 describes the mandatory nature of the the prescriptive period of two years provided for in Section
service of a PAN. The persuasiveness of the right to due 306 of the Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals ordered
process reaches both substantial and procedural rights and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the
inheritance and estate taxes paid in the amount of P3,797.43.

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The Commissioner filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether a taxpayer who had lost his right to dispute the
validity of an assessment, the period for appealing to the
Court of Tax Appeals having expired, as found by such Court
in a previous case in a decision now final, and who thereafter
paid under protest could then, relying on Section 306 of the
National Internal Revenue Code sue for recovery on the
ground of its illegality?

Held:

No. In Republic v. Lim Tian Teng Sons & Co., Inc.,6 the above
doctrine was reaffirmed categorically in this language:
"Taxpayer's failure to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals in
due time made the assessment in question final, executory
and demandable, And when the action was instituted on
September 2, 1958 to enforce the deficiency assessment in
question, it was already barred from disputing the
correctness of the assessment or invoking any defense that
would reopen the question of his tax liability on the merits.
Otherwise, the period of thirty days for appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals would make little sense." Once the matter has
reached the stage of finality in view of the failure to appeal, it
logically follows, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, in Morales v. Collector of Internal Revenue, that it
"could no longer be reopened through the expedient of an
appeal from the denial of petitioner's request for cancellation
of the warrant of distraint and levy."

In the same way then that the expedient of an appeal from a

denial of a tax request for cancellation of warrant of distraint
and levy cannot be utilized for the purpose of testing the
legality of an assessment, which had become conclusive and
binding on the taxpayer, there being no appeal, the
procedure set forth in Section 306 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is not available to revive the right to contest
the validity of an assessment once the same had been
irretrievably lost not only by the failure to appeal but likewise
by the lapse of the reglementary period within which to
appeal could have been taken. Clearly then, the liability of
respondent Concepcion as an ancillary administrator of the
estate of the deceased wife and of respondent Mitchell-
Roberts as the husband for the amount of P1, 181.33 as
estate tax and P2,616.10 as inheritance tax was beyond
question. Having paid the same, respondents are clearly
devoid of any legal right to sue for recovery.

NOTE

Where a taxpayer seeking a refund of estate and inheritance

taxes whose request is denied and whose appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals was dismissed for being filed out of time, sues
anew to recover such taxes, already paid under protest, his
action is devoid of merit. For in the same way that the
expedient of an appeal from a denial of a tax request for
cancellation of warrant of distraint and levy cannot be
utilized to test the legality of an assessment which had
become conclusive and binding on the taxpayer, so is section
360 of the Tax Code not available to revive the right to
contest the validity of an assessment which had become final
for failure to appeal the same on time.

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