Manalo v.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141297, 8 October 2001

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real
properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother
Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted
10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the
petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been
made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

RULING:

No, SC ruled that herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it
refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues
the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.
A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family.

Manalo vs CA

GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real
properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother
Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted
10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made
prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character
of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same
is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear
from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is
also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be
applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate
is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of
action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
GAYON VS GAYON

Facts:

In 1967, Pedro Gayon is the brother of Silvestre Gayon whose wife is Genoveva Gayon. Pedro filed a case against
against Silvetre and Genoveva for consolidation of ownership. Genoveva alleged that her husband, Silvestre, died long
before the institution of this case. She prayed that for the dismissal of the case because Pedro, being a brother of the
deceased Silvestre, "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint.

Issue:

Is there a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?

Held:  

Art. 222 of the Civil Code provides:

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest  efforts toward
a  compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Genoveva is plaintiff's sister-in-law. "Sisters-in-law" are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Hence, the case does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's  failure to seek
a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

GAYON VS. GAYON

FACTS:

The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon,
alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" —
whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan,
municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1,
1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the
expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached
to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff
had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that
Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale,
and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property.

In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of
this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her
deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed
her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least
P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before
filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.

ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit is tenable.

HELD:
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.

It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the same family." This
phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration
contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be
excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants
therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or
executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance
against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The
petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private
respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that
the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such
provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt
form attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC.

Version 2

Manacop v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 104875, 13 November 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The
petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private
respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that
the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

RULING:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such
provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form
attachment.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

“The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.”

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive Effect

The petition was dismissed by SC.

PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

FACTS: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a
pre-school building built thereon.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property claiming that the subject property, which is
the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario, cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living
therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUES: Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the
ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article
154 of the Family Code

RULING:
1. No. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to
be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.

2. No, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can’t be considered as a beneficiary.

Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.

In this case, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be
considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family
home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

VERSION 2 Patricio VS. Dario

G.R. NO. 170829 – 

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a
residential house and a pre-school building.
 
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038
and raffled to Branch 78.
 
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario
cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent.
ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing therein.
 

HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability
for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next
nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.