ISSUE 2

 Whether accused has committed crime under section 302, 326 and 324 of Indian
Penal Code.

It is most humbly submitted that to prove the guilt of the accused under section 302
ingriedients of section 300 read with section 299 [A], under section 324 ingriedients of
section 324 read with section 319 [B] and under section 326 ingriedients of section of section
326 read with section 320 [C] needs to be proved and burden of proving that accused is
entitled to an defence[D].

[A] Accused has committed offence of murder under section 300 read with section 299
of Indian Penal code.

Section 299 of Indian Penal code defines culpable Homicide as “Whoever causes death by
doing an act with the intention of causing death, or witth the intention of causing such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge thet he is likely by such act to cause
death, commits the offence of Culpable Homicide.”1

Section 300 of Indian Penal Code says that “ Except in the cases hereinafter excepted,
culpable homicide is murder,....... 4thly- If the person committing the act knows that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probablity, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as aforesaid.2

Section 299 in defining first two categories does not deal with the knowledge whereas it does
in relation to the third.3

‘Knowledge’ is a strong word and imports a certainty and not merely a probablity. 4 It denotes
a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself
remain supine or inactive.5

1
Section 299 of Indian Penal code, 1860.
2
Section 300 of Indian Penal code, 1860.
3
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, page no.490, (Justice K.T. Thomas et. al., 34rd edition,2014).
4
Shankar Kondiba Gore v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 CrLJ 93 (Bom); Dharamvir v. State of Haryana, (1994) 2
CrLJ 1281 (P&H); Muniappan v. State of T.N., 1994 CrLJ 1309 (Mad); Nizamuddin v. State of M.P., AIR 1994
SC 1041.
5
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, page no.495, (Justice K.T. Thomas et. al., 34rd edition,2014).
Once it is established that an act was a deliberate act and was not the result of accident or
rashness or negligence, it is obvious that the offence would be culpable Homicide.6

From the facts it is evident that when Vir Bahadur was attacking those women
indiscriminately with khukuri7 (a sharp blade) he has the knowledge that by such act act he is
likely to cause death of the person attacked. It is also known from the facts that one Geeta
Mahi is killed because of his act.8

So it is proved that accused has committed Culpable homicide. Now to prove that this
culpable homicide amounts to murder one of the 4 clauses of section 300 of IPC, 1860 needs
to be proved.

Clause (c) of section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the
probablity of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate
much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that
cl. (4) of section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the
probablity of death of a person in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons
being caused from imminently dangerous act, approximates to a particular certainity. Such
knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the higher degree of probablity, the act
having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid.9

Where it clear that the act by which the death is caused is so imminently dangerous that the
accused must be presumed to have known that it would, in all probablity cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, then he is said to have committed the offence of
murder under 4thly of section 300.

The supreme court has held that although this clause is usually invoked in those cases where
there is no intention to cause the death of any particular person the clause may on its terms be
used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is

6
Afrahim Sheikh v. State, AIR 1964 SC 1263
7
Para 8, Moot compromis
8
Para 10, Moot Compromis
9
Laxminath v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2009 SC 1383; Budhi Lal v. State of Uttrakhand, AIR 2009 SC 87;
Abdul Waheed Khan and ors. V. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 2002 (6) SC 274; Augustine Saldanha v. State of
Karnataka, 2003 (10) SCC 472; Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 (9) SCC 650; Sunder Lal v. State of
Rajasthan 2007 (10) SCC 371; Ruli Ram & Anr. V. State of Haryana, 2007 (7) SCC 691.
such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.10

It can be easily ascertained from the facts that accused had the knowledge that he can kill
people by attacking them with a khukhri and also as a result o the consequences of his act
geeta mahi is dead and three others are injured.

Hence, it is clear that accused has committed offence of culpable homicide amounting to
murder which is punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal code.

[B] Accused has committed offence of voluntarrily causing hurt by dangerous weapons
or means under section 324 read with section 319 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

Hurt as under section 319 means that “Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to
any person is said to cause hurt.”11

An offence under section 324 IPC has the following essential ingredients:12
“(i) That the accused voluntarily caused hurt to another person i.e. with knowledge or
intention to cause;
(ii) That such a hurt was in exception to cases provided under Section 334;
(iii) That such hurt was caused
(a) by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which
used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause death; or
(b) by means of five or any heated substance; or (c ) by means of any poison or any corrosive
substance; or
(d) by means of any explosive substance; or
(e) by means of any substance which is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow,
or receive into the blood; or
(f) by means of any animal.”

10
Ram Prasad v. State, AIR 1968 SC 881; Dev Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 950; State of Karnataka v.
Venkatesh, AIR 1992 SC 674; Meheraj Singh v. State of U.P., (1995) 1 CrLJ 457; Satbir Singh v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 1 CrLJ 739 (P&H); Siddique v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 1690; Ram Singh v. State of U.P.
AIR 1999 SC 1754; State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, AIR 1999 SC 1776; Md. Mahiruddin v. State of Bihar, AIR
1999 SC 307; Karu Marik v. State of Bihar, 2001 CrLJ 2615 (SC); Indya Sega Valvi v. State of Maharashtra,
2001 CrLJ 4804 (Bom).
11
Section 319 of Indian Penal code, 1860.
12
Jitendrasinh Mahendrasinh Zala v.State of Gujarat, Criminal Misc.Application (for quashing & set aside
FIR/order) no. 34606 of 2016, 29/12/2016, Honourable Mr.Justice J.B.Pardiwala
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 11933 Edition, defines it as a thing with or
through which something is done or effected a means, a tool, implement, weapon. a part of
the body having special function.

The accused had knowledge that his action would cause severe injury to the person who has
been subjected to such attack. It is evident from the facts that one person(ravi kishan) has
been hurt because of accused’s act and the weapon used was khukhri (which is a sharp blade
used as weapon in Nepal).13

[C] Accused has committed offence of voluntarrily causing hurt by dangerous weapons
or means under section 326 read with section 320 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section 320 of Indian Penal Code says that, “Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt
only are designated as “grievous”:......... (Eighthly) —Any hurt which endangers life or which
causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to
follow his ordinary pursuits.”14

This clause speaks of two things: (1) any hurt which endangers life, and (2) any hurt which
causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days (a) in severe bodily pain, or (b)
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.15

And a wound may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim,
although it does not fall within any of the first seven clauses.16

To prove part 1 of this clause an injury can be said to endanger life if it is in itself that it may
put the life of injured in danger.17

And a modified offence of voluntary causing grievous hurt is mentioned in Section 326 and
its essential ingreidients are “(1) voluntarily causing a hurt i.e. with knowledge or intention to
cause, (2) hurt caused must a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have been caused
bu dangerous weapons or means.”18

13
Para 8, Moot compromis
14
Section 320 of Indian Penal code, 1860.
15
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, page no.752, (Justice K.T. Thomas et. al., 34rd edition,2014).
16
Ibid.
17
Ramla v. State, (1963) 1 CrLJ 387; A.G. Bhagwat v. U.T. Chandigarh, 1989 CrLJ 214; Queen Empress v.
Vasta chela, (1895) ILR 19 Bom 247; khair Din v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 280; Mathu Paily v. State of Kerala,
1962 (1) CrLJ 652 Ker; State (Delhi Admn) v. Mewa Singh, (1969) 71 Punj LR (D) 290; Tuna v. State of
Orissa, 1988CrLJ 524
18
Prabhu v. State of M.P., AIR 2009 SC 745
There is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that
matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per s cause any serious wound or grievous hurt
or injury has to be dertermined factually.19

The essentials of section 326 are fulfilled by Vir Bahadur as he has caused grievous hurt that
endangers life which is evident from the fact that one geeta mahi has died because of his
attack.20 The weapon used is khukhri which is sharp blade and it has caused death of one
person so it is dangerous weapon.

Hence, accused has committed offence of volunary causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapon or means under section 326 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

[D] The burden of proving that the accused is entitled to a defence lies of him

Section 105 says “Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.—When a
person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances
bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, (45 of
1860), or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same
Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the
absence of such circumstances.”

In a judgement judges P. N. Bhagwati and R. S. Sarkaria explained the scope of section 105
“Provisions of Section 105 of the Evidence Act, which are applicable in such cases, contain
what are really two kinds of burden of the accused who sets up an exception; firstly, there is
the onus laid down of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
the General exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, or, within any special exception or proviso
contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, and,
secondly, there is the burden of introducing or showing evidence which results from the last
part of the provision which says that "the Court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances". The effect of this obligatory presumption at the end of Section 105 of the
Evidence Act is that the Court must start by assuming that no facts exist which could be taken
into consideration for considering the plea of self defence as an exception to the criminal
liability which would otherwise be there.”21 So, burden to prove that vir Bhadur is entitled to
any defence lies on him and before that court must presumme that he is not entitled to such
defence.
19
State of U.P. v. Indrajeet alias Sukhatha, (2000) 7 SCC 249
20
Para 10, Moot Compromise
21
Pratap v. State of U.P., (1976) 2 SCC 798