PEOPLE vs.

LAURENTE
FACTS:

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of [sic] gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest from Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings in and [sic] undetermined amount along F. Concepcion
St., Bgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, divest and carry away the said money, in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring success of their criminal act, said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle said victim with a leather belt and hit him with a blunt instrument, causing
him to sustain physical injuries which directly caused his death.
Laurente was taken into custody on 15 February 1994, but his two co-accused have remained at large. The case then proceeded as against Laurente
only.
Laurente was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under PD No. 532, and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim by the RTC Pasig.

ISSUE:
WON Laurente should be convicted of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD No. 532

HELD:

No, This Court holds that the above statements, as the lone measure by which to judge the commission of robbery, are insufficient to prove the same,
i.e., that the victim actually earned money and that these earnings were unlawfully taken by the accused. The prosecution, in this regard, failed to
discharge the burden of proof and satisfy the quantum of evidence for the robbery aspect in this case.

We declare at the outset that even granting ex gratia that the established facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that Laurente and his two co-accused
indeed committed the acts charged in the information, Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532.
The object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another — which acts constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage — thereby
disturbing the peace, order, and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.5 It is directed against acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person on Philippine highways, as defined therein, and not those committed against a
predetermined or particular victim. Accordingly, a robbery committed on a Philippine highway by persons who are not members of the proscribed
lawless elements or directed only against a specific, intended, or preconceived victim, is not a violation of P.D. No. 532.

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the ormation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by
more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be
necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art.
306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed
persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar."

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 104785 is hereby modified as to the
nature of the offense committed. As modified, accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-
principal by direct participation, of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

15. JOSE D. FILOTEO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected
criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore
imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal
delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner
Filoteo was charged in the following Information: 4
That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, two of whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the
Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry
away with them the following, to wit:
1) Postal Delivery Truck
2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers
3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers
4) Treasury Warrants
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad
in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and
Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned
amount.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was properly found guilty under PD 532?

HELD:
No, should only be Roberry by band under RPC with lighter penalty
The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532.
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band
by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not
be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by
art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los
campos para dedicarse a robar." (Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be
considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3)
persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of
"depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was duly proven in
the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to
show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. 95
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the
crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.

16. CANCERAN vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc),a security guard; and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio),
the Customer Relation Officer of Ororama Mega Center (Ororama),as its witnesses. Through their testimonies, the prosecution established that on or
about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Canceran approach one of the counters in Ororama; that Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes
of Magic Flakes for which he paid ₱1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon inspection by
Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White
Beauty Cream worth ₱28,627.20; that Canceran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he
attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he
tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.
Canceran denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser of La Tondeña, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in
Ororama to buy medicinefor his wife. On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person ofaround 20 years of age requested
him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man who gavehim ₱1,440.00 for payment of two boxes
labelled Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because he was struck by his conscience; that he denied knowing the
contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons ran
after him, and he was caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that
they took his Nokia 5110 cellular phone and cash amounting to ₱2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while a certain Amion
took his necklace.

RTC wrote that Canceran’s denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported by sufficient and convincing evidence and no
disinherited witness was presented to corroborate his claims.

ISSUE:
WON Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information.

HELD:

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated Theft" only.
As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the
indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged
with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or information and on which he was
tried.
In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only.
Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with consummated
Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so
protests.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated – these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information
In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which was "Frustrated Theft," may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, "but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent
of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x x.26 This averment, which could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge
nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed
that the charge against him was consummated theft.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 10, 2012 Decision and the March 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00559 are hereby MODIFIED, in that, the Court finds accused Jovito Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Attempted Theft.
Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term ranging from Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum,
to Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months of Prision Correccional, as maximum.

17. VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner
and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand.
Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five
(5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was
waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to
stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the
scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.8 The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25
grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.
Before the CA, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose the articles stolen.

ISSUE:
WON the crime is frustrated or consummated theft.

HELD:

The crime is consummated.

Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced."
Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is
already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our
acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all
these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this
conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada
yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

18. HERMAN MEDINA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-
207, which was involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002,he engaged the services of Medina, who is a
mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in
running condition and serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still
functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister,
instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto
shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00,
₱2,500.00, and ₱10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them on Lim’s another
vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep,
but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to
Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing her brother. The City Prosecutor found probable cause
to indict Medina.6 Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the parties during the pre-trial.8 During the trial
proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay
kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of
evidence by the defense.

ISSUE: Is Medina guilty of the crime charged?

HELD:
Yes, Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things. Intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.15 Although proof as
to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As to the
concept of "taking" –
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up
the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim.18 With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the
missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily
discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza
witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying19 or
exempting20 circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought toit from the Court of Appeals, is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).
Wherefore, Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3), Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the
crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.

19. PEOPLE vs. TANCHOCO

FACTS:
Theft becomes qualified when it is committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Private complainant Atty. Rebecca Manuel y Azanza (Rebecca) knew appellant for more than 25 years, the latter being the niece of her long-time
neighbor. During this period, Rebecca and her children established a close relationship with appellant to the point that they treated her as a member
of their family. In June 1999, Rebecca hired appellant to work in her office as legal secretary and liaison officer. One of appellant’s tasks as liaison
officer was to process the transfer of titles of Rebecca’s clients.
In the course of appellant’s employment, Rebecca noticed that the completion of the transfer of titles was taking longer than usual. Upon inquiry,
appellant attributed the delay to the cumbersome procedure of transferring titles, as well as to the fact that personnel processing the documents could
not be bribed. Rebecca took appellant’s word for it. However, appellant suddenly abandoned her job on April 18, 2001. And when Rebecca reviewed
appellant’s unfinished work, she discovered that the latter betrayed her trust and confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money
entrusted to her as payment for capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer tax and other expenses intended for the transfer of the titles of
properties from their previous owners to Rebecca’s clients.
According to Rebecca, she gave appellant ₱39,000.00 as payment for donor’s tax in connection with a Deed of Donation and Acceptance and Deed
of Partition by Donees/Co-Owners, which her client Tomas Manongsong (Tomas) paid for the partitioning of a parcel of land located in Batangas.
Upon verification from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), however, it turned out that appellant paid only ₱31,709.08. This was confirmed by the
Bank of Commerce,6 where appellant made such payment.
Appellant also received ₱20,000.00 from Tomas’s wife, Mila Manongsong, for the processing of the properties’ land titles. Appellant liquidated the
same in a handwritten statement7 in which she indicated payment of ₱10,089.45 for transfer tax under Official Receipt (OR) No. 1215709 and of
₱7,212.00 for registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bauan, Batangas under OR No. 5970738. An inquiry, however, later revealed that OR No.
1215709 was issued only for the amount of ₱50.00, representing payment for the issuance of a certified true copy of a tax declaration,8 while OR No.
5970738 was never issued per Certification9 from the same Registry of Deeds. Rebecca also found out that the documents relevant to the said
transfer of titles are still with the BIR since the amount of ₱4,936.24 had not yet been paid.
Appellant also duped Rebecca relative to the ₱105,000.00 for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes. Said taxes arose from
the sale of a house and lot covered by TCT No. (62911) T-33899-A to her client Dionisia Alviedo (Alviedo). Appellant submitted a liquidation
statement10 stating that she paid the sums of ₱81,816.00 as capital gains tax and ₱20,460.00 for documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR
Nos. 937110 and 937111, respectively. However, said bank certified that said ORs do not belong to the series of ORs issued by it.11 As a result,
Rebecca was constrained to pay these taxes with the corresponding penalties and surcharges.
Rebecca further alleged that in connection with the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes imposed on the property of another
client, Carmelita Sundian (Sundian), she gave appellant ₱120,000.00. Appellant purportedly presented a handwritten liquidation report stating that
she paid the amounts of ₱94,281.00 as capital gains tax and ₱23,571.00 as documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 71722812 and
717229.13 Appellant also stated that the balance from the money intended for processing the papers of Sundian was only ₱2,148.00.14 However,
Rebecca discovered upon verification that the receipts submitted by appellant are bogus as Equitable Bank issued a Certification15 that said ORs
were issued to different persons and for different amounts. Rebecca was again forced to refund the sum to Sundian.
The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Issue:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF QUALIFIED THEFT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.

Ruling:
"The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal
property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent
of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things."

As to the first and second elements, we quote with approval the CA’s discussion on the matter.

xxxx

Regarding x x x the prosecution’s failure to present direct evidence to prove the accused-appellant’s taking of the questioned amount, it is Our view
that the absence of direct evidence proving accused-appellant’s stealing and carrying away of the alleged Php417,922.90 from private respondent
would not matter as long as there is enough circumstantial evidence that would establish such element of ‘taking’. After all, Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence if more than one circumstance is involved,
the facts of which, inferring said circumstances have been proven, and provided that the combination of all such circumstances would suffice to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was
employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. The latter position necessarily entails trust and confidence not only because of its nature
and the functions attached to it, but also because appellant makes representations on behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties. By reason of this, all
matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant. This included the safekeeping
of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebecca’s clients. It is thus safe to assume that Rebecca
relied on appellant when it comes to the affairs of her law office as to create a high degree of trust and confidence between them. And as Rebecca
trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any
paper to evidence her receipt thereof. She also allowed appellant to liquidate the expenses incurred through mere handwritten liquidation statements
solely prepared by appellant and treated them, as well as the official receipts presented, as true and correct. It thus becomes clear that it is because of
the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent
the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed
payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence. Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebecca’s allegations against her
as well as the evidence supporting the same since what she advanced during trial were mere bare denials. The Court has "oft pronounced that x x x
denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime."47 The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebecca’s confidence in her when she
appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave
abuse of confidence. Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft.

With respect to appellant’s contention that she could not have taken the alleged amount of money until May 8, 2001 since her employment with
Rebecca lasted only until April 18, 2001, same fails to impress. The Information alleged that the crime was committed "during the period from
October 2000 to May, 2001". The word "during" simply means "at some point in the course of"48 or "throughout the course of a period of time"49
from October 2000 to May 8, 2001. In the Information, "during" should therefore be understood to mean at some point from October 2000 to May 8,
2001, and not always until May 8, 2001. Further, the period alleged in the Information, which is from October 2000 to May 8, 2001 is not distant or
far removed from the actual period of the commission of the offense, which is from October 2000 to April 17, 2001.

As to the total amount unlawfully taken by appellant, we hold that the sum of ₱407,711.68 which the trial court came up with has no basis. After a
thorough review of the records, we find as correct instead the result of the detailed computation made by the CA as to the total amount of money that
appellant stole or padded as expenses, which is only ₱248, 447.75.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01409 finding appellant Remedios
Tanchanco y Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED.

20. RINGOR vs. PEOPLE.

FACTS:

The petitioner was employed as sales clerk/agent of Peoples Consumer Store (PCS) – a merchandise distributor owned by Honesto Ibarra and
managed by Annelyn Ingan (Ingan). As PCS’s sales clerk/agent, the petitioner scouts the towns of Sinait, Badoc, Currimao, and Batac, Ilocos Sur to
look for customers, takes note of their orders, and submits the said orders to Ingan for approval. Once approved, the petitioner, together with a driver
and a helper, delivers the ordered merchandise to the customers. After delivery, the petitioner turns over the delivery receipts to Ingan. Seven days
after delivery, the petitioner would then collect the payment from their customers and remit the same to Ingan.

On March 24, 2003, the petitioner booked an order of grocery products from L.A. Currimao Store (LACS) in the amount of ₱68,622.90; the value,
however, of the delivered merchandise to LACS only amounted to ₱66,860.90 as one item in the order was not available at that time. After delivering
the merchandise to LACS, the petitioner gave a handwritten delivery receipt to Ingan.
Seven days thereafter, the petitioner informed Ingan and her brother Nestor Ibarra (Ibarra) that she lost the money she collected from LACS, claiming
that she was a victim of a robbery. Later, the petitioner claimed that she lost the amount collected from LACS in a mini bus. However, upon inquiry
by Ingan, the driver of the said mini bus said that the petitioner’s claim was impossible since they only had a few passengers then.

After the incident, the petitioner no longer reported back to work. Neither did the petitioner remit the amount she collected from LACS. Ingan alleged
that, during a meeting between her and the petitioner in a police station, in response to inquiries regarding the unremitted amount to PCS, the
petitioner stated that she no longer have the amount which she collected from LACS and that she would just have to go to jail.

On the other hand, the petitioner denied that she was a sales clerk/agent of PCS, claiming that she was merely a sales lady therein. While she
admitted that she solicited orders from prospective customers in various towns in Ilocos Sur, the petitioner alleged that she was not the only one who
received the payments from PCS’s customers. Likewise, the petitioner admitted that she delivered the merchandise to LACS, but claimed that the
latter has yet to pay for the same.

Issue:

Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in convicting the petitioner for the felony of qualified theft under
Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC.

HELD:

The petition is bereft of any merit.

The felony of theft is defined under Article 308 of the RPC, viz:
Article 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of
neither persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused
by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its
owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

On the other hand, Article 310 of the RPC reads:

Article 310. Qualified Theft.—The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis ours)

In précis, the elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC are as follows: (1) there was a taking of
personal property; (2) the said property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with
intent to gain; (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things; and (6) the taking was done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.9

All elements for the felony of qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC are present in this case.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2011 and the Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32945 are hereby AFFIRMED.

21. CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR vs. PEOPLE

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the
negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that
the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title."4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Self5 where the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased
father, Nicolas Estrellado.6 Naval paid a down payment totaling P100,000.00,7 and then asked permission from the petitioner if he could construct
his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject land.

On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered
that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the
return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these demands.

The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City8 in an Information that provides:
Issue: WON the petitioner was improperly convicted of Article316 (2) of the RPC

RULING:

The petitioner's improper conviction under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42, we resolve the substantive issue raised by the petitioner in the interest of
justice. This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among
other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information.
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which punishes "[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the
same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes the act of any person who, knowing that real
property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be
real property; (2) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be
express representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made
to the damage of another.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its caption that it is charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, alleged that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco.
Notably, it had not been alleged that the petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free
from any encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and
the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for
conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by the petitioner that the
property being sold was free from any encumbrance.

22. YONCO vs. PEOPLE

The Facts

The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual employee of the city government, Pablo Salosod,who testified that on April 16, 2005 at
around 1:30 a.m., while attending a wake at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was fetched and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany him
to the CEO. At the office garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed by petitioners Tangian and Yongco to load car
parts that petitioners considered aswaste items, the subject items of the theft, on the truck driven by Tangian. They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan
City where the materials were unloaded in front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop, Salosod allegedly saw petitioner Lañojan
giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian. On the way back, Tangian allegedly confessed to Salosod that it was Lañojan who requested that the items be
brought at the junk shop. Another employee, Rommel Ocaonilla, corroborated the testimony of Salosod.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the unloading of the items in front of the junk store, after which, Lañojan
covered the items up with a sack. The following morning, he allegedly saw Lañojan’s brother-in-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the
items inside.
Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of the city government, respectively, testified that they conducted
investigations relative to the incidentand found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan transmission,one unit boom, one Nissan I-beam, and
one differential of Tamaraw, with total valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation, they recommended tothe city legal officer the filing of the
present criminal case against the three petitioners.

The Issue
Is Yongco guilty of the crime charged?
Is there conspiracy between them?

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are bereft of merit.
Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines Qualified Theft.
It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of confidence. The accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards
and drivers with access tothe entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words,they enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their
employer (the City ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their respective duties. More so since the primary function of
the CSU is to guard the properties, including the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that makes
the theft qualified.6
Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed, petitioners hinge their plea for acquittal and supporting argument primarily
on their lack of criminal intent and the observed conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.7 Well-settled is the rule that in
conspiracy, direct proof of a previousagreement is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated.8 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would
be enough to reveal a community of criminaldesign, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.9
In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior agreement among the accused, their separate acts taken and viewed together are actually
connected and complementedeach other indicating a unity of criminal design and purpose.
Tangian’s complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from the fact, as he himself admitted, that he was the one who personally transported the stolen
items from the CEO to the junkshop. His claim that he was not aware of any irregularity in the act he performed is rendered dubious by his 16 years
of service as truck driver for the City of Iligan. To be sure, his record of service argues against his claim of ignorance of the standard protocol that a
gate pass to be issued by the CEO property custodian should first be secured before taking out items from the CEO compound, including alleged
waste materials. He should also know better than to assume that Lañojan can authorize the withdrawal of items without the requisite gate pass since
Lañojan’s duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent the same.
Similarly, Yongco’s claim of good faith is belied by his own admission that he knew of the office procedure that a gate pass is required every time
something is taken out of the CEO premises. In fact, four gate passes were given to him that morning by Lañojan, covering waste materials
withdrawn during the latter’s shift. At the very least, this should have reminded him of his duty to demand a gate pass for property leaving the CEO
premises. Neither memory lapses orlapses in the performance of his duty will explain Yongco’s failure to demand a gate pass.The only viable
explanation is that he was in connivance with other petitioners.11
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the
extent or degree of their participation.13 The guilt of one is the guilt of all. It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy—conspirators
may act separately or together in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The character and effect of conspiracy are not to
be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole—acts done to giveeffect to conspiracy may be, in
fact, wholly innocent acts.14 Applying this doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be concluded that despite Lañojan’s lack of physical
participation in hauling the items to Tangian’s truck and bringing them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All
told, there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court, affirmatory of those of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's January 21, 2013 Decision and
September 10, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

23. LLAMAS vs. CA

The antecedent facts and proceedings that led to the filing of the instant petition are pertinently narrated as follows:
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of "other forms of
swindling" in the Information,1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1978, in the municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, well knowing that
their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of Parañaque, LRC Record No. N-
26926, Case No. 4869, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all liens and
encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property for the sum of ₱12,895.00 which was paid to the accused,
to the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned amount of ₱12,895.00.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision3 on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of ₱18,085.00 each.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its
December 22, 1999 Resolution,5 the appellate court further denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review, docketed
as G.R. No. 141208.6 The Court, however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the material dates. Since it
subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000,7 the judgment of conviction became final and executory.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:
Article 316(2) of the RPC, the provision which penalizes the crime charged in the information, provides that —

Article 316. Other forms of swindling.—The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the
damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:

xxxx

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.

The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1 month and 1 day to 4
months, and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value. Here, as alleged in the information, the
value of the damage caused, or the imposable fine, is ₱12,895.00. Clearly, from a reading of the information, the jurisdiction over the criminal case
was with the RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at
the time of the filing of the information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than ₱4,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
24. PEOPLE vs. TIBAYAN

The Facts
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P. Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez,
Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Peña, and Rodney E. Villareal16 (private
complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments.
After giving their money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the
principal investment and the monthly interest earnings, respectively.17 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored,as the account was already
closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees
took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be
paid. However, the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file criminal
complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto
claimed that his signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002,he was no longer a director of TGICI. For
her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an incorporator nor a
director of TGICI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2 (a),
Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.cralawred

HELD:
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,, is committed; (b)
the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their
investment would be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under such lucrative
promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that
TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors,44 they cannot comply
with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other
accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants’ conviction from simple Estafa to Syndicated Estafa. In a criminal case, an appeal
throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court.48 Hence, accused-
appellants’ appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.49chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669,
33939, and 34398 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Estafa and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count. Accused-
appellants are further ordered to pay actual damages to each of the private complainants in the following amounts: (a) P1,500,000.00 to Hector H.
Alvarez; (b) P119,405.23 and P800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez; (c) P1,530,625.90 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan; (d) P500,000.00 to Irma
T. Ador; (e) P1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer; (f) P556,376.00 to NonitoGarlan; (g) P250,000.00 to Emelyn Gomez; (h) P118,000.00 to Judy C.
Rillon; (i) P100,000.00 to Reynaldo A. Dacon; (j) P200,000.00 to Leonida D. Jarina; (k) P250,000.00 to CristinaDela Peña; and (l) P100,000.00 to
Rodney E. Villareal.

SO ORDERED.

25. BUEBOS vs. PEOPLE

The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over
her sick child.3 She was lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four
accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut.4 When she went out, she saw the
roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled.5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s
Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able
to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running away.

ISSUE:
Was there a conspiracy in the case at bar and are they guilty of Arson?

HELD:
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.
We proceed to the crux of the petition.

Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability

Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy
was premised on speculation and conjecture.

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside
the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the
roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house
or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD
1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to
convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the
owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of
anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or
a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held
guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.28
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should
be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision
correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.

26. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.

FACTS:
At around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
(“manabla ko”).3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he
saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house
was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house,
the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air.
The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went
home to save his nephews and nieces.8 Eric also returned to his house to save his
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before
the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these findings were based on unrebutted
testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant
was guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
WON he was guilty of Arson under PD 1613?

HELD:

“Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.”
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson.
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.