2019

B.17.

In 2015, O, the original registered owner of a 300-square meter property covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1234, appointed F as its caretaker. A year after, while O was abroad, F
surreptitiously broke open O's safe and stole the duplicate copy of the said OCT. F then forged a Deed
of Absolute Sale and made it appear that O sold the property to him. Consequently, F was able to
have OCT No. 0-1234 cancelled and in lieu thereof, a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
4321, was issued in his name.

A few months after, F offered the property for sale to X. After conducting the required due diligence
to verify the title of F, and finding no occupant in the property during ocular inspection, X signed the
contract of sale, and thereupon, fully paid the purchase price. A few days later, X was able to obtain
TCT No. T-5678 under his name.

When O discovered F's fraudulent acts upon his return in 2017, O immediately filed a complaint for
reconveyance against F and X, principally pointing out that F merely forged his signature in the Deed
of Absolute Sale purportedly made in F's favor and thus, F could not have validly transferred the title
thereof to X. Consequently, he sought the return of the subject property to him.

(a) Will the prayer of O for the return of the subject property prosper? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that O could no longer recover the subject property in view of X's registration thereof in
his name, may a claim against the Assurance Fund pursuant to the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree be instituted? Explain. (3%)

Case Digest:

SPOUSES JOSE MANUEL and MARIA ESPERANZA RIDRUEJO STILIANOPOULOS, Petitioners

G.R. No. 224678; July 3, 2018

En Banc

PERLAS BERNABE, J.:

TOPIC: Claim against Assurance Fund; Implied Trust; Purchaser in good faith

NATURE OF THE ACTION: Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title and
Recovery of Possession

FACTS:

1
A Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. 42486, Annulment of TCT No. 52392 and TCT
No. 59654, and Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 1320 with Damages was filed by petitioners against
respondents.

Petitioners alleged that they own a 6,425-square meter property known as Lot No. 1320, as
evidenced by TCT No. 134507 in the name of Jose Manuel, who is a resident of Spain and without any
administrator of said property in the Philippines. On October 9, 1995, Anduiza caused the cancellation of
TCT No. 13450 and issuance of TCT No. 424869 in his name. Thereafter, Anduiza mortgaged Lot No.
1320 to Rowena. As a result of Anduiza's default, Rowena foreclosed the mortgage, and consequently,
caused the cancellation of TCT No. 42486 and issuance of TCT No. 52392 in her name on July 19, 2001.
On April 15, 2008, Rowena then sold Lot No. 1320 to the Co Group, resulting in the cancellation of TCT
No. 52392 and issuance of TCT No. 5965414 in the latter's name.

According to petitioners, their discovery of the aforesaid transactions only on January 28, 2008
prompted them to file a complaint for recovery of title on May 2, 2008. But such complaint was
dismissed for petitioners’ failure to allege the assessed value of Lot 1320. Thus, they filed this subject
complaint.

In their defense, Sps. Amurao and the Co Group both maintained that they purchased Lot No.
1320 in good faith and for value, and that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed,
considering that they only had ten (10) years from the issuance of TCT No. 42486 in the name of Anduiza
on October 9, 1995 within which to file a complaint for recovery of possession.

RTC, dismissed the case against Spouses Amurao and the Co Group as they were shown to be
purchasers in good faith and for value. RTC also found Anduiza guilty of fraud in causing the cancellation
of petitioners' TCT over Lot No. 1320, and thus, ordered him to pay petitioners the amount of
Php782,500.00 representing the market value of Lot No. 1320, as well as Pl0,000.00 as exemplary
damages. It also held the National Treasurer, as custodian of the Assurance Fund, subsidiarily liable to
Anduiza's monetary liability should the latter be unable to fully pay the same.

Prefatorily, the RTC characterized the subject complaint filed on March 18, 2009 as one for
reconveyance based on an implied trust, which is subject to extinctive prescription of ten (10) years
ordinarily counted from the time of the repudiation of the trust, i.e., when Anduiza registered TCT No.
42486 in his name on October 9, 1995.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration. While RD-Legazpi City and National Treasurer
moved for a partial reconsideration. But both motions were denied by the court. As such, only the
appeal of the RD-Legazpi and the National Treasurer questioning the subsidiary liability of the Assurance
Fund was elevated to the CA.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling insofar as the National Treasurer's
subsidiary liability was concerned. It held that petitioners only had six (6) years from the time Anduiza
caused the cancellation of TCT No. 13450 on October 9, 1995, or until October 9, 2001, within which to
claim compensation from the Assurance Fund. Since petitioners only filed their claim on March 18, 2009,
their claim against the Assurance Fund is already barred by prescription. Hence, this petition.

2
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners' claim against the Assurance Fund has
already been barred by prescription?

RULING:

No. The Court reinstated the decision of the RTC.

The Assurance Fund is a long-standing feature of our property registration system which is
intended “to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive
evidence of an indefeasible title to land”. Originally, claims against the Assurance Fund were governed
by Section 10154 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The language of this
provision was substantially carried over to our present "Property Registration Decree”.

In Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental v. Anglo, Sr., the Court held that "based solely on
Section 95 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the following conditions must be met: First, the individual
must sustain loss or damage, or the individual is deprived of land or any estate or interest. Second, the
individual must not be negligent. Third, the loss, damage, or deprivation is the consequence of either (a)
fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after the land's original registration, or (b) any error,
omission, mistake, or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the
registration book. And fourth, the individual must be barred or otherwise precluded under the provision
of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein.”

Anent the first ground (i.e., item a of the third condition above), it should be clarified that loss,
damage, or deprivation of land or any estate or interest therein through fraudulent registration alone is
not a valid ground to recover damages against the Assurance Fund. Section 101 of PD 1529 explicitly
provides that "the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss, damage or deprivation caused or
occasioned by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive or by any mistake in the
resurvey or subdivision of registered land resulting in the expansion of area in the certificate of title." It
is hornbook doctrine that “when a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of
property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party."

Article 1456. If Property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

However, as stated in Section 101 of PD 1529, the inability to recover from the defrauding party does
not make the Assurance Fund liable therefor.

Instead, the loss, damage or deprivation becomes compensable under the Assurance Fund when
the property has been further registered in the name of an innocent purchaser for value. This is because
in this instance, the loss, damage or deprivation are not actually caused by any breach of trust but
rather, by the operation of the Torrens system of registration which renders indefeasible the title of the
innocent purchaser for value. To note, it has been held that a mortgagee in good faith (such as Rowena)
stands as an innocent mortgagee for value with the rights of an innocent purchaser for value.

3
In sum, the Court herein holds that an action against the Assurance Fund on the ground of
"fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after the land's original registration" may be brought
only after the claimant's property is registered in the name of an innocent purchaser for value. This is
because it is only after the registration of the innocent purchaser for value's title (and not the usurper's
title which constitutes a breach of trust) can it be said that the claimant effectively "sustains loss or
damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the
land under the operation of the Torrens system." The registration of the innocent purchaser for value's
title is therefore a condition sine qua non in order to properly claim against the Assurance Fund.

Here, the Court ruled that prescription, for purposes of determining the right to bring an action
against the Assurance Fund, should be reckoned from the moment the innocent purchaser for value
registers his or her title and upon actual knowledge thereof of the original title holder/claimant. As
above-discussed, the registration of the innocent purchaser for value's title is a prerequisite for a claim
against the Assurance Fund on the ground of fraud to proceed, while actual knowledge of the
registration is tantamount to the discovery of the fraud.

The constructive notice rule holds no application insofar as reckoning the prescriptive period for
Assurance Fund cases. Instead, the six (6)-year prescriptive period under Section 102 of PD 1529 should
be counted from January 28, 2008, or the date when petitioners discovered the anomalous transactions
over their property, which included the registration of Rowena's title over the same. Thus, when they
filed their complaint on March 18, 2009, petitioners' claim against the Assurance Fund has not yet
prescribed.

2018

Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the adjoining Lot B.
Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of Lot B. Since Socorro was
allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that supported the adjoining property, Segunda
caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 50 sq. m. on Lot A's Transfer Certificate of Title,
asserting the existence of a legal easement.

a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind?

Yes. An easement for subjacent support exists. An easement for subjacent support exists when a
supported land is above and the supporting land is beneath. In this kind of easement, any stipulation or
testamentary provision allowing excavations that cause danger to an adjacent land or building shall be
void.

b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the
servient estate proper?

No, the annotation of an adverse claim on the title is not proper. It is well-settled in the case of Castro
vs. Monsod (G.R. 183719, February 2, 2011)that an annotation of the existence of the subjacent support
is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A
judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including his
successors-in-interests.

4
2017

In 1960, Rigor and Mike occupied two separate but adjacent tracts of land in Mindoro. Rigor’s tract
was classified as timber land while Mike’s was classified as agricultural land. Each of them fenced and
cultivated his own tract continuously for 30 years. In 1991, the Government declared the land
occupied by Mike as alienable and disposable, and the one cultivated by Rigor as no longer intended
for public use or public service. 
Rigor and Mike now come to you today for legal advice in asserting their right of ownership of their
respective lands based on their long possession and occupation since 1960.
(a) What are the legal consequences of the 1991 declarations of the Government respecting the
lands? Explain your answer; (29)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(a) As to the land occupied by Mike, the same remains a property of the public dominion. According to
jurisprudence, the classification of the property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public dominion, There must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dom in ion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into pat Fimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, regatas property of the public
dominion (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v Republic GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013).

As to the land occupied by. Rigor, the declaration that it is no longer intended for public use or public
service converted the same into · patrimonial property provided that such express declaration was in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or in a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President was duly authorized by law. According to jurisprudence, when public land is no longer
intended for public use, public service or for the development of the national wealth it is thereby
effectively removed from the ambit of public dominion and converted into patrimonial provided that the
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect (Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013).

b) Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth AC No. 141, in relation 10. Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title must be from June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nevertheless validly base his
assertion of the right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(6) No, because the land remains property of public dominion and, therefore, not susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. According to jurisprudence, the classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion. In order to convert the property in to patrimonial, there must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development

5
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, GR
No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013). 
Here, the declaration of the property into alienable and disposable land of the public domain in 1991 did
not convert the property into patrimonial in the absence of an express declaration of such conversion
into patrimonial in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.

(c). Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title based on
prescription as defined by the Civil Code given that, like Mike his open continuous, ‘exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation was not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and his tract of land was
timberland until the declaration in 1991. Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(c) None, because Rigor’s possession was short of the period required by the Civil Code for purposes of
acquisitive prescription which requires ten (10) years of continuous possession, if possession was in
good faith and with a just title,or thirty years, in any event. While property may be considered converted
into patrimonial because of the 1991 declaration that it is no longer intended for public use or public
service (provided that the declaration be in the form of law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect), Rigor
failed to complete the?3@year period required by law in case of extraordinary prescription Since the
property was converted into patrimonial only in 1991, the period of prescription commenced to run
beginning that year only Rigor’s possession prior to the conversion of the property Into patrimonial
cannot be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period because prescription did not
operate against the State at that time, the property then being public dominion property (Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013). Rigor may not likewise
acquire ownership by virtue of the shorter 10-year ordinary prescription because his possession was not
in good faith and without just title.

2016

VII 

Benjamin is the owner of a titled lot which is bounded on the north by the Maragondon River. An
alluvial deposit of two (2) hectares was added to the registered area. Daniel took possession of the
portion formed by accretion and claims that he has been in open, continuous and undisturbed
possession of said portion since 1923 as shown by a tax declaration. In 1958, Benjamin filed a
complaint for Quieting of Title and contends that the alluvium belongs to him as the riparian owner
and that since the allu viurn is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be
considered as registered property, Decide the case and explain. (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER

6
i will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by Benjamin, Under Article 457 of
the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The accretion however, does not
automatically become registered land. It must be brought under the Torrens system of registration by
Benjamin, the reparian owner. Since he did not, the then increment, not being registered land, was
open to acqui sition through prescription by third persons, like Daniel (Grande v. Court of  Appeals, G.R.
No. L-17652, June 30, 1962,5 SCRA 524; Cureg  v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  G.R. No, 73465,
September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313).

VIII

Joven and Juliana are the owners of a 30-hectare plantation in Cotabato, covered by a title. One day, a
group of armed men forcibly entered their house and, at gun point, forced them to sign a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Romeo. Romeo got the title from them and they were ejected from the
house and threatened not to come back or else they will be killed. The spouses went to Manila and
resided there for more than 35 years. They never went back to Cotabato for fear of their lives. Word
came to them that peace and order have been restored in their former place of residence and they
decided to reclaim their land for the benefit of their grandchildren: Joven and Juliana filed a suit for
reconveyance of their property. This was opposed by the grandson of Romeo to whom the title was
eventually transferred, on the ground of laches and prescription. Decide the case and rule on the
defenses of laches and prescription. Explain your answer. (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their property, is not barred
by prescription. Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner  shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Proof of possession by the
owner in an action for reconveyance is immaterial and inconsequential. The right to  recover possession
is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership
(Republic  v.  Mendoza,  G.R. No. 185091, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 443). The right of joven and Juliana to
recover is not barred by laches, either. Laches deals with unreasonable delay in filing the action. The
owners’ delay, if any, cannot be construed as deliberate and intentional. They were simply coerced out
of Cotabato and threatened with death if they returned, and, thus, could not have filed the action.

XIV

On February 28, 1998, Arthur filed an application for registration of title of a lot in Ternate, Cavite
before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite under Section 48(6) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA
141) for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of CA 147 requires possession counted
from June 12, 1945. Arthur presented testimonial and documentary evidence that his possession and
that of his predecessors-in interest started in 1936. The lot was declared alienable and disposable (A
and D) in 1993 based on a PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification
made by the DENR Secretary. The government opposed the application on the ground that the lot was
certified A and D only in 1993 while the application was instituted only in 1998. Arthur’s possession of
five (5) years from the date of declaration does not comply with the 30-year period required under CA
141. Should the possession of Arthur be reckoned from the date when the lot was declared A and D or
from the date of actual possession of the applicant? Explain. (5%) 

7
SUGGESTED ANSWER

Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date of his actual possession, by himself and his
predecessors-in-interest, since 1936. Under Section 48(b) of CA. 141, as amended by PD No. 1973, the
length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for “thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the applications to possession “since June 12, 1945 or earlier”. But possession is
different from classification. As held in Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587
SCRA . 172), it is only necessary that the land be already classified as A and D “at the time the application
for registration is filed” to make public the release of the property for alienation or disposition. But the
possession of Arthur even prior to the classification of the land as A and D shall be counted in
determining the period of possession.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date the Ternate lot was declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. In Zarate v. Director of Lands  (G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004), the
Supreme Court, citing the case of Bracewell  v. CA (G.R. No. 107427, January 25, 2000), ruled that
‘possession of the property prior to the classification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be
credited as part of the thirty (30) year required under Section 48(b) of CA No. 341, as amended. in Heirs
of  Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2010), the Supreme Court explained that the
possession of Arthur should be reckoned only from the date lots A and D were declared as alienable and
disposable by the State and not from the date of actual possession:Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act’used the words “lands of the public domain” or “alien able and disposable lands of the public
domain” to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified; j.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national
parks, and sands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable”
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain. Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the
land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act (Heirs of  Malabanan v. Republic,  G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013).

The basis of the 30 year open continuous and notorious possession in the concept of owner of A and D
land is extraordinary acquisitive prescription of immovable property, Lands classified as forest, mineral,
and national parks are properties of public dominion which cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. 

XVII

Macario bought a titled lot from Ramon, got the title and took possession of the lot. Since Macario did
not have the money to pay the taxes, fees and registration expenses, he was not able to register the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon advice, he merely executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and had it
annotated at the back of the title. A few  years after, he received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and
Writ of Execution.in favor of Alex. The notice, writ and certificate of sale were annotated at the back
of the title still in Ramon’s name. Alex contends that since the Affidavit of Adverse Claim is effective

8
only for 30 days from the date of its registration, then its validity has expired. Macario posits that the
annotation of his adverse claim is notice to the whole world of his purchase of the lot in question.
Who has the superior right over the disputed property–Macario or Alex? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Macario is preferred since the registration of his adverse claim was made ahead of the notice of levy and
writ of execution in favor of Alex. Macario’s adverse claim, coupled with the fact that he was in
possession of the disputed property, are circumstances which should have put Alex on constructive
notice that the property being offered to him had already been sold to another (Ching v. Enrile,  G.R. No.
156076, September 17, 2008). The contention that the adverse claim is effective only for 30 years is
puerile. in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79), the Court held that
the adverse claim does not ipso facto lose its validity since an independent action is still necessary to
render it ineffective. Until then, the adverse claim shall continue as a prior lien on the property.

2015:

IX: Jose, single, donated a house and lot to his only niece, Maria, who was of legal age and who
accepted the donation. The donation and Maria's acceptance thereof were evidenced by a Deed of
Donation. Maria then lived in the house and lot donated to her, religiously paying real estate taxes
thereon. Twelve years later, when Jose had already passed away, a woman claiming to be an
illegitimate daughter of Jose filed a complaint against Maria. Claiming rights as an heir, the woman
prayed that Maria be ordered to reconvey the house and lot to Jose's estate. In her complaint she
alleged that the notary public who notarized the Deed of Donation had an expired
notarial commission when the Deed of Donation was executed by Jose. Can Maria be made to reconvey
the property? What can she put up as a defense? (2015)

A: NO. Maria cannot be compelled to reconvey the property. The Deed of Donation was void because it was
not considered a public document. However, a void donation can trigger acquisitive prescription (Solis v. CA,
G.R. No. L-46753-54, August 25, 1989; Doliendo v. Biarnesa, G.R. No. L-2765, December 27, 1906). The void
donation has a quality of titulo colorado enough for acquisitive prescription especially since 12 years had
lapsed from the deed of donation.

XX: Mr. and Mrs. Roman and Mr. and Mrs. Cruz filed an application for registration of a parcel of land
which after due proceedings was granted by the RTC acting registration as land court. However,
before the decree of registration could be issued, the spouses Roman and the spouses Cruz sold the lot
to Juan. In the notarized deed of sale, the sellers expressly undertook to submit the deed of sale to the
land registration court so that the title to the property would be directly issued in Juan's name. (2015)

a) Is such a stipulation valid?

A: YES, because when one who is not the owner of the property sells or alienates it and later the seller or
grantor acquires title, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee (Art. 1434).

b) Distinguish a direct attack from a collateral attack on a title.

A: A direct attack on a title is one where the action filed is precisely for the purpose of pointing out the defects
in the title with a prayer that it be declared void. A collateral attack is one where the action is not instituted
for the purpose of attacking the title but the nullity of the title is raised as a defense in a different action.

c) If the title in Item XX.A is issued in the names of the original sellers, would a motion filed by Juan in
the same case to correct or amend the title in order to reflect his name as owner considered be
collateral attack?

9
A: NO, because Juan is not attacking the title but merely invoking his right as transferee. Hence, it does not
involve a collateral attack on the title.

III: The Roman Catholic Church accepted a donation of a real property located in Lipa City. A deed of
donation was executed, signed by the donor, Don Mariano, and the donee, the Church, as represented
by Fr. Damian. Before the deed could be notarized, Don Mariano died. Is the donation valid? (2014)

A: The donation is void. The donation of an immovable property must be in a public instrument in order for it
to be valid. In this case, the donor died even before the notarization of the deed of donation. Hence, it does not
satisfy the requirement of being in a public instrument for the donation to be valid.

XXII: On March 27, 1980, Cornelio filed an application for land registration involving a parcel of
agricultural land that he had bought from Isaac identified as Lot No. 2716 with an area of one (1)
hectare. During the trial, Cornelio claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
thirty (30) years. He likewise introduced in evidence a certification dated February 12, 1981 citing a
presidential declaration to the effect that on June 14, 1980, agricultural lands of the public domain,
including the subject matter of the application, were declared alienable and disposable agricultural
land.

a. If you are the judge, will you grant the application for land registration of Cornelio?
A: NO, I will not grant the application. To be entitled to registration of the parcel of land, the applicant must
show that the land being applied for is alienable land. At the time of the filing of the application, the land has
not yet been declared alienable by the state (Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005).

b. Can Cornelio acquire said agricultural land through acquisitive prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary? (2014)

A: Cornelio can acquire the land by acquisitive prescription only after it was declared part of alienable land by
the state by possession for the required number of years for ordinary prescription, ten years possession in
good faith with just title or extraordinary prescription by possession for thirty years without need of any
other condition (Art. 1134).

X: Manuel was born on 12 March 1940 in a 1000- square meter property where he grew up helping his
father, Michael, cultivate the land. Michael has lived on the property since the land was opened for
settlement at about the time of the Commonwealth government in 193 5, but for some reason never
secured any title to the property other than a tax declaration in his name. He has held the property
through the years in the concept of an owner and his stay was uncontested by others. He has also
conscientiously and continuously paid the realty taxes on the land. Michael died in 2000 and Manuel -
as Michael’s only son and heir -now wants to secure and register title to the land in his own name. He
consults you for legal advice as he wants to perfect his title to the land and secure its registration in
his name. (2013)

a. What are the laws that you need to consider in advising Manuel on how he can perfect his title
and register the land in his name? Explain the relevance of these laws to your projected course
of action.

A: I would advise Manuel to file an application for registration under Sec. 14 of Pres. Decree No. 1529, or the
Property Registration Decree (PRD), specifically Sec. 14 (1) which requires (a) that the land applied for forms
part of the alienable and disposable (A & D) portion of the public domain, and (b) that the applicant has been
in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. However, it is only necessary that the land is already declared A & D land “at
the time the application for registration is filed" (Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 180067, June 30, 2009).

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Manuel could also invoke Sec. 14 (2) of the same Decree, which allows registration through ordinary
acquisitive prescription for thirty years, provided, however, that the land is “patrimonial” in character, i.e.,
already declared by the government (a) as A & D land, and (b) no longer needed for public use or public
service (Id). Manuel could also file an application for “confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title" through
"judicial legalization under Sec. 48 (b) of CA No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA). But, as held in Malabanan,
there is no substantial difference between this provision and Sec. 14 (1), PRD. Both refer to agricultural lands
already classified us alienable and disposable at the time the application is filed, and require possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945. The only difference is that under the PRD, there already exists a title which is
to he confirmed, whereas under the PLA, the presumption is that land is still public land (Republic v. Aquino,
G.R. No. L-33983, January 27, 1983).

Manuel may also invoke “vested rights" acquired under R.A. No. 1942 dated June 2, 1957, which amended Sec.
48 (b), PLA by providing for a prescriptive period of thirty years or judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It
must only be demonstrated that possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the 30-year
period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073 on January 25, 1977. PD No. 1073 now requires
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012).
Another alternative is for Manuel to secure title through administrative proceedings under the homestead or
free patent provisions of the PLA. The title issued has the same efficacy and validity as a title issued through
judicial proceedings, but with the limitation that the land cannot be sold or disposed of within five years from
the issuance of patent (Sec. 118, CA No. 141, as amended).

b. What do you have to prove to secure Manuel's objectives and what documentation is necessary?

A: Manuel has the burden to overcome the presumption of State ownership by “well-nigh incontrovertible”
evidence (Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008). Accordingly, he must show that the land is
already classified as A & D “at the time the application for registration is filed" and that he has been in
“possession and occupation thereof" in the manner required by law since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Manuel
may tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest (Michael) by the testimony of disinterested and
knowledgeable eyewitnesses. Overt acts of possession may consist in introducing valuable improvements like
fencing the land, constructing a residential house thereon, cultivating the land and planting fruit hearing
trees, declaring the land for taxation purposes and paying realty taxes, all of which are corroborative proof of
possession. To identify the land, he must submit the tracing cloth plan or a duly-certified blueprint or
whiteprint copy thereof (Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594, November 28, 1975; Director of Lands v.
CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988).

To show the classification of the land as A & D, the application must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO certification; and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary (Republic v. Bantigue, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012). A presidential or legislative act may also be
considered.

XVI: X was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. As she was abroad, she
advised her sister Y via overseas call to sell the land and sign a contract of sale on her behalf. Y thus
sold the land to B1 on March 31, 2001 and executed a deed of absolute sale on behalf of X. B1 fully
paid the purchase price. B2, unaware of the sale of the land to B1, signified to Y his interest to buy it
but asked Y for her authority from X. Without informing X that she had sold the land to B1, Y sought X
for a written authority to sell. X e-mailed Y an authority to sell the land. Y thereafter sold the land on
May1, 2001 to B2 on monthly installment basis for two years, the first installment to be paid at the
end of May 2001. Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the
land? Explain. (2010)
A: B2 has a better title. This is not a case of double sale. Since the first sale was void. The law provides that
when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing. Otherwise, the sale shall be void (Art. 1874). The property was sold by Y to B1 without any written
authority from the owner X. Hence, the sale to B1 was void.

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