G.R. No.

L-24294 July 15, 1974

DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo,

Zambales, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, and EDGARDO GENER, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

A clarification of the decision of this Court of May 3, 1974 is sought in a motion

filed by petitioner. Its avowed objective is to remove what for him could be a
doubt as to the effect of our decision on Civil Case No. 2984 of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan. Since a fair reading thereof — as a matter of fact even one
cursory in character could yield no other conclusion except that such pending suit
in the lower court should be dismissed, it would appear that any misgiving
entertained as to any lurking ambiguity therein is more fanciful than real. The
Motion for clarification is thus denied.

1. The judgment of the Court cannot be any clearer as to the action against
petitioner Donald Baer being against the United States government, and
therefore, covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. So it would appear
from the following paragraph in the opinion: "The solidity of the stand of petitioner
is therefore evident. What was sought by private respondent and what was
granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance
of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers
possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This
point was made clear [in the petition] in these words: 'Assuming, for purposes of
argument, that the Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry,
possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs" inside a military
base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license
issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its
rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the findings of the
Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States
Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the
boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and
operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. ... The doctrine
of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge
against the, sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it.
Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and
immediately to the most important public function of any government — defense
of the state is — equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act.'
That such an appraisal is not opposed to he interpretation of the relevant treaty
provision by our government is [evident] in [its] aforesaid manifestation and
memorandum as amicus curiae, wherein it joined petitioner for the grant of the
remedy prayed for." 1

2. Neither should there be any doubt entertained as to that portion of the opinion,
which merely reiterates the well-settled concept that what removed the case from
any judicial scrutiny is not the lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner,
who is not vested with diplomatic immunity, but his being held accountable for
action taken in pursuance of his official duty under the Military Bases Agreement
and as such, as pointed out above, beyond the power of judicial scrutiny. Thus:
"There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by
this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in
Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be
proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him
cannot be imputed to the government which he represents. Thus, after the
Military Bases Agreement, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v.
The Commander General of the Philippine Ryukus Command, both of them
being habeas corpus petitions, there was no question as to the submission to
jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of fact, in Miquiabas v. Commanding
General, the immediate release of the petitioner was ordered, it being apparent
that the general court martial appointed by respondent Commanding General
was without jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter, in the cited cases of Syquia,
Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties proceeded against were American army
commanding officers stationed in the Philippines. The insuperable obstacle to the
jurisdiction of respondent Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is
haled into court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant to treaty
provisions and thus impressed with a governmental character." 2

3. Whoever, therefore, is assigned to take the place of former respondent Judge

Tito V. Tizon cannot possibly be misled. No apprehension need be entertained
then as to the effect of our decision. Civil Case No. 2984 pending in such sala is
bereft of support in law. Its dismissal is called for. Distinguished counsel for
petitioner certainly is the last person to need counsel from this Tribunal, even if
such were proper. It is to be assumed that what needs to be done will be done
and that the Bataan Court of First Instance will act according to law and, more
specifically, to the terms of the decision rendered by us.

WHEREFORE, the motion for clarification is denied.

Zaldivar, (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.

HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI

ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D.
AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN,
MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.
MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME
P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA,
ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO
M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented
by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO B’LAAN TRIBAL FARMER’S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE’S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
intervenors.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.

IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE

CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to

comment. In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,

one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has
the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;

“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and

“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.”

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

These provisions are:

“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and

recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority
to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;

“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;

“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.”

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination.” They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioners pray for the following:

“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
series of 1998;

“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the
State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.”

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section
57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise
a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b),
5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon
join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,

Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion