Rule 130. Sec.

20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 188956 March 20, 2013

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS

SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Orders dated February 17,
20091 and July 9, 20092 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in Land Registration Case
No. N-11517.

The first Order reconsidered and recalled the Decision 3 of the RTC dated April 21, 2008, which granted the-
application for land registration of petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System. The second Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

Petitioner was "created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, 4 as amended, and was designed to
establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340."5

Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title 6 over three parcels of land located in West Bicutan,
Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later docketed as LRC Case No. N-11517
and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo.

These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by
former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998.7

The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the
petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate 8 dated August 18, 2003.

After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no oppositor registered any oppositions
after the petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an order of general default
against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.9

The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its
Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure that the
properties and assets of petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and freed of liens and
encumbrances; the subject properties were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under Presidential
Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject properties in
the concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of
the Philippines transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised control over them in the concept of owner,
and likewise assumed the obligations of an owner; petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on the
subject properties; and the subject properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.10

Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, 11 following which, the court a quo granted
the application in a Decision dated April 21, 2008. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the Petition meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS AND ORDERS the registration
of AFPRSBS’ title thereto.

As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after payment of the required fees, let the corresponding
Decree be issued in the name of Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System.
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Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration Authority, Land
Management Bureau and the Registry of Deeds, Taguig City, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.12

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 dated May 12,
2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name
and the petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its
behalf.

On June 2, 2008, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition. 14

On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued the assailed Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
the OSG on the ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the OSG’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court’s Decision of
April 21, 2008 is hereby RECONSIDERED and RECALLED, and a new one issued DISMISSING this Application
for Registration of Title for failure to prosecute.

SO ORDERED.15

The Motion for Reconsideration16 of petitioner was denied by the court a quo in the other assailed
Order17 dated July 9, 2009. Hence, this petition.

The issue to be resolved in the present case is whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground that petitioner
failed to prosecute the subject case.

We answer in the affirmative.

The reason of the court a quo in dismissing petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground of
failure to prosecute was the lack of authority on the part of Ms. Aban to testify on behalf of the petitioner.

However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only three instances
wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.–If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De Knecht v. CA:18

An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3)
if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to
prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the
filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a
qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case is not among
those grounds provided by the Rules. It had no reason to conclude that the petitioner failed to prosecute its
case. First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated
April 21, 2008 ordering the registration of petitioner’s title to the subject lots shows that the petitioner
2
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
appeared before the Court and was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that the petitioner was
able to present its evidence, and as a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor.

Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject case considering that it appeared during trial,
presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of the subject lots, and the court a
quo never held petitioner liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject case.

Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the petitioner did not fail to comply with the Rules or
any order of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the latter to this effect.

Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case,
because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute is
present. That the RTC dismissed the application for land registration of the petitioner for failure to prosecute
after the petitioner presented all its evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its favor, is
highly irregular.

At this juncture, it would be appropriate to discuss the basis of the court a quo in dismissing the petitioner’s
application for land registration for failure to prosecute – the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms.
Aban, to testify on behalf of the petitioner.

The assailed Order held as follows:

With things now stand, the Court believes that OSG was correct in observing that indeed the AFPRSBS did not
present its duly authorized representative to prosecute this case. And the records support the observation
since AFPRSBS presented only one witness – Mrs. Aban. In view of the foregoing the Court is left without
choice than to grant OSG’s motion for reconsideration. 19

However, there is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form
of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would
support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party
presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

xxxx

Cavili v. Judge Florendo20 speaks of the disqualifications:

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. 1âwphi1 Section 19 disqualifies those who
are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule
on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called.

x x x The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez,
29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the
operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Fourth
Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied.)

A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness
for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to make her
perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications described above.
3
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
The RTC clearly erred in ordering the dismissal of the subject application for land registration for failure to
prosecute because petitioner’s witness did not possess an authorization to testify on behalf of petitioner. The
court a quo also erred when it concluded that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized
representative of the petitioner. The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Verification/Certification21 of the application, and neither did they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file
the subject application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records would reveal that the application was signed
and filed by Mr. Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the
petitioner, as authorized by petitioner’s Board of Trustees.22 The authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject
application was established by a Secretary’s Certificate 23 attached to the said application. The asseveration
that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of the petitioner is thus
unfounded.

Interestingly enough, the respondent itself agrees with the petitioner that the dismissal of the subject
application by the court a quo on the ground of failure to prosecute due to lack of authority of the sole
witness of the petitioner is unfounded and without legal basis.24

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated
February 17, 2009 and July 9, 2009 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated April 21, 2008, granting the Application for Registration of Title of the petitioner is hereby REINSTATED
and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria Umali and Suzeth
Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 under an
information which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Tiaong,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a prohibited drug
to one Francisco Manalo y Arellano, without authority of law.

Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)

Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused
being a detention prisoner is entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case
against Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived until the
arrest of said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued against her is hereby ordered
reiterated.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED
TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE WHICH WERE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE

III

5
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED NEVER DISPUTED THE CLAIM
THAT SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO
MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND THAT WHICH WAS USED BY PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE
LATTER'S DRUG DEPENDENCY

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA 1, GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF MERE CONJECTURES AND NOT ON FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DID NOT
PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo, p. 49)

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:

On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and
for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre
Pangan was capable of committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre
Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the
minor was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan
asked the police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has
not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan
was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police
Department and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, covered by
Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case,
accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other
crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of
Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being
peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made
to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he
asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for
violating the dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged ( sic) before the sala of
Judge Eriberto Rosario.

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four (4)
marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of the money was
entered in the police blotter. The instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased
by him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after ( sic), Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried
marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police
investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2)
marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2)
foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search
warrant as a justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector ( sic) Street.
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali
and served the search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali were the four P5.00 bills
with serial numbers BA26943, DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in the police
blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills were the letters T which were placed by the police
investigators to further identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched ( sic) in the house was made in
the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo, containing
sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where
rice was being stored. The return of the search warrant reads as follows:

DATE: 22 April 1985

WHAT: "RAID"

6
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon

WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP

TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:

221410H Apr '85

SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI

MR. EMILIANO UMALI

PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED

Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of

Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves

TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85

WITNESSES (sic) BY:

1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal

2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan

3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion

4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino

Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Came Laboratory for
examination. Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory took the witness stand, testified and
identified the marijuana submitted to her and in a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she
gave the following findings:

Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned above gave POSITIVE result
to the tests fur marijuana.

In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp
on April 5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The Court in rendering against him disposed the case as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp" penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425
(sic); as amended otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). Let the period of detention of the accused be credited to his
sentence.

Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found in his possession on
April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to him by the accused Gloria Umali. The
defense also did not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan,
the police investigator came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which
he used and smoked resulting in his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)

The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed
reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy
7
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said
witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was
likely to tell falsehood.

However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then
facing several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
"His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material
respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)

The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were confiscated for no other
purpose than using them as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of Dangerous Drugs
Act and therefore the search warrant issued is illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be
no other plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a frame-up.

In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the evidences submitted by
the prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.

Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was charged
were never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the court a quo. She also
stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures.

However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical evidence submitted
clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's
factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage
of directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented
at the trial and is therefore better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof
(See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial court
are entitled to great weight, and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had
overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen
and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Alverez
y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the
absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are
entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can
make known their perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil
Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him
as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is
facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was
actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in
8
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony
must be accorded full credence.

Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit.1âwphi1 "Courts must be
vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort from
the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as
a frame-up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these
hazards in the administration of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA
119)

The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit. "Where marked
peso bills were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the admissibility of these
marked peso bills hinges on the legality of the arrest and search on the person of the appellant" (People v.
Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since the search is predicated on a valid search
warrant, absent any showing that such was procured maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.

Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures, hence the essential
elements of the crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.

Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a criminal offense must be
based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of witness
Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the
two (2) foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of

policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the
contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, full credence should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record
sufficiently established that Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given
and received four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing in
violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the basis of the
evidence on record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the penalty for selling
prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos
(People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of life imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

9
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 100199 January 18, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PRUDENCIO DOMINGUEZ and RODOLFO MACALISANG, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Amadeo Seno for accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Prudencio Dominguez and Rodolfo Macalisang, along with Roger C. Dominguez, were charged with the
murders of Regional Trial Court Judge Purita A. Boligor and of her brother Luther Avanceña. Prudencio and
Rodolfo were found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Judge Purita A. Boligor in the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Luther Avanceña of another
P30,000.00, jointly and severally. At the same time, the trial court dismissed the charges against Roger C.
Dominguez for lack of sufficient evidence.

In their brief, accused-appellants assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

First error — the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the prosecution's evidence,
particularly the testimony of Oscar Cagod, and basing its judgment of conviction thereon.

Second error — the trial court gravely erred in refusing to give credence to the evidence of
the accused-appellants.

Third error — the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants and
declaring them innocent of the charge against
them.1

The facts as found by the trial court may be summarized in the following manner. Sometime after 8:00
o'clock in the evening of 6 February 1986, that is, on the eve of the "snap" presidential election held on 7
February 1986, appellant Prudencio Dominguez then Mayor of the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis
Occidental and his brother Roger C. Dominguez went to visit their second cousin, Judge Purita A. Boligor.
Judge Boligor, according to the defense, was promoting the candidacy of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino, the
opposition candidate in the presidential race. Mayor Dominguez was affiliated with the " Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan" ("KBL") and was at that time working for the re-election of former President Marcos. Mayor
Dominguez and Roger arrived at Judge Boligor's house in Sinacaban in an Integrated National Police ("INP")
jeep driven by Felix Amis, a police officer detailed as security man of Mayor Dominguez. Rodolfo Macalisang,
brother-in-law of Mayor Dominguez, emerged on the leftside of the jeep, spoke briefly with the Mayor, then
stepped aside and stayed under the shadow of a citrus ( calamansi) tree. The Mayor and his brother Roger
proceeded towards Judge Boligor's house and entered that house. There they met with Judge Boligor and her
brother Luther Avanceña who was then the UNIDO Chairman in Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. About ten
(10) minutes later, Rodolfo Macalisang entered Judge Boligor's house with an M-16 armalite automatic rifle
and bursts of gunfire were heard. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Dominguez and Roger ran out of the house, got
into the jeep which had been waiting for them and sped away. Macalisang then came out of the house and
disappeared into the darkness. Judge Boligor and Luther were found inside the house, with multiple bullet
wounds in vital parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.

The prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony of Oscar Cagod who witnessed the above sequence of
events from a store across the street. The defense, for its part, attacked the credibility and the testimony of
Oscar Cagod on the following grounds:

10
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
First, Cagod was not a disinterested witness, having lived in the house of Judge Boligor for
eighteen (18) to nineteen (19) years and having treated the Judge like his own mother;

Second, Cagod waited for four (4) months after the slaying of Judge Boligor and Luther
Avanceña before he executed his sworn statement;

Third, Cagod, according to the defense, executed his sworn statement only after the police
authorities had arrested him and promised him immunity from prosecution. His testimony
therefore came from a polluted source and should be received only with utmost caution.

Fourth, Cagod had been convicted, when he was twelve (12) years old, of murder, a crime
involving moral turpitude and accordingly his testimony deserved no credence.

Last, the defense assailed the testimony of Cagod as being incredible in itself.

We consider the above objections seriatim. We must note initially, however, that Oscar Cagod, the
prosecution star witness, was slain not long after he had testified on direct examination and on cross-
examination. So far as the record here is concerned, the killer or killers of witness Oscar Cagod remain
unknown. Another prosecution witness, Diosdado Avanceña brother of the two (2) deceased victims,
mysteriously disappeared after his direct examination. He could not be recalled to testify on cross-
examination and his testimony was stricken from the records by the trial judge upon motion of the defense.

We find the first contention of appellants to be without merit. In a long line of cases, the Court has
consistently held that the relationship of a witness to a party to a case does not, by itself, impair the
credibility of the witness.2 In the instant case, assuming that Cagod had indeed treated the deceased victim
Judge Boligor like his own mother, that circumstance would only add to the weight of his testimony, since he
would then be most interested in seeing the real killers brought to justice rather than in falsely implicating
innocent persons. In People v. Uy, et al.,3 the Court explained:

. . . mere relationship to the victim need not automatically tarnish the testimony of the
witness. When there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witnesses for
testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render
their clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. On the contrary, their
natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would prevent them from implicating
persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain
immunity.4 (Emphasis supplied).

In its second argument, the defense assails witness Cagod's credibility since he waited four (4) months after
the slaying before executing his sworn statement. The sworn statement was allegedly made by Cagod after
he had been arrested by Philippine Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service ("PC-CIS") operatives and
placed under detention. The defense complains that prior thereto, Cagod had not informed anyone about
what he saw on the night of the slaying. It is settled, however, that delay on the part of witnesses in
informing the authorities of what they know about the occurrence of a crime will not, by itself, affect their
credibility, where such delay is satisfactorily explained. 5 We consider that the delay of four (4) months before
prosecution witness Cagod executed his sworn statement should not affect the credibility of his testimony.
Cagod had understandable reasons for hesitating to report to the authorities what he had seen. The accused
in the instant case were clearly powerful and influential persons in Sinacaban. Prudencio Dominguez, as
already noted, was Mayor of Sinacaban and Roger Dominguez was his brother. As Mayor, appellant
Dominguez had armed men as personal bodyguards and otherwise at his command. Appellant Rodolfo V.
Macalisang was a PC Sergeant and Civilian Home Defense Force ("CHDF") Supervisor. An alleged co-
conspirator, Isidro Macalisang, was a Lieutenant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), while Josue
Vente also an alleged co-conspirator, was a Police Sergeant and Police Station Commander of Sinacaban.
Cagod had been warned by Alfeo Lucing, a CHDF member and a follower of Mayor Dominguez, and by
appellant Macalisang himself, not to talk about the shooting, upon pain of dire consequences. 6 In People v.
Bustarde, et al,7 the Court stated that the

failure of the witness to go to the police immediately after the killing because she feared for
her life, is a factor which is entirely human and quite understandable, and should not detract
from her testimonial credit.8
11
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
In People v. Marmita, Jr.,9 the Court likewise sustained the credibility of the witness after the latter's delay in
identifying the accused was explained to have been due to fear of reprisal from the accused who was known
to be a powerful and influential person. In People v. Baring,10 witness explained that her silence immediately
after the slaying of her father was due to the fact that previous killings in the barrio had not been given
proper attention by the police authorities, and this Court ruled that her silence was understandable and did
not affect her credibility. The natural reluctance of most people to get involved in a criminal case, and to
volunteer information about a criminal case, is a mutter of judicial notice. 11 We, therefore, agree with the
trial judge when she rejected this argument of the defense, saying:

Cagod's credibility also comes under fire for the reason that it took him four months before
he executed a statement revealing what he had witnessed on February 6, 1986. As the
defense would have it, be should have gone straight-away to Boligor's son or to any member
of the Boligor household with his story. The defense points out that instead of doing so,
Cagod went away to the ABC Hall to sleep until morning. This Court, however, notes that it
was not so, for Cagod related that he rushed away to inform a cousin of Boligor, Mrs.
Candelaria Gamotin, and that before he reached her house, Alfeo Lucing, one of the Mayor's
men, followed him warning him not to tell other stories except that Boligor was dead.

That defense makes much of Cagod's conduct after the shooting of Boligor. Why did he
remain silent when everyone wanted to know who the malefactors were? Why indeed? The
defense forgets that the malefactors were not just any Tom, Dick and Harry — they were,
perhaps, the most powerful and influential men in the Municipality of Sinacaban. Alfeo
Lucing, who had shadowed Cagod, had already given stern warning. Cagod's fears later took
concrete shape when Macalisang (whose name, oddly enough, translates as "terrifying")
threatened him at gun point with dire consequences if he as much as breathe a word of the
incident. Was Cagod's conduct after the shooting natural, conforming to normal behavior?
This Court believes that his conduct was as normal as that of Mrs. Gamotin who, upon
learning of Boligor's death, is not shown to have roused up family, relatives and neighbors to
succor the Boligors — the record only shows that "they cried." Cagod's conduct was as
normal as that of Dionisio Burlat, Engracia Avanceña and Diosdado Avanceña who fled the
Boligor house and remained holed up in a neighbor's house till the following morning.
Cagod's conduct was as normal as that of neighbors who refused to succor the Boligor
household.12

As to the third contention of the defense that Cagod's testimony came from a "polluted source" because the
sworn statement had been given after his arrest and after he had been promised immunity from prosecution,
the Court notes that there was no showing that the prosecuting authorities would have included him in the
criminal information. In other words, the record is bereft of any indication that Cagod was a participant or co-
conspirator in the carrying out of the crimes. Neither was there any showing that Cagod had been promised
or granted immunity from prosecution in consideration of his executing the affidavit in question. Even if he
had been promised or granted immunity, that in itself is no indication of lack of truth or credibility in his
testimony, considering that a person already charged in court may be discharged from the information and
utilized as a state witness under certain conditions. 13The defense also assails a supplemental affidavit
executed by witness Cagod on 31 July 1986 as baseless and untrue and designed merely to reinforce the
prosecution's theory. Cagod's first affidavit lacked certain details which Cagod later supplied in a supplemental
affidavit after more clarificatory questions had been asked of him. In People v. Salvilla, 14 the Court held that
the failure of a prosecution witness to mention the taking, an essential element of the crime of robbery, in her
sworn statement did not militate against her credibility, considering that "an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries and suggestions."

In its fourth contention, the defense stresses that Oscar Cagod had been convicted of murder when he was
twelve (12) years old and insists that, therefore, Cagod's testimony "deserves no credence and must be
considered with extreme caution. 15 Initially, we note that Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as
follows:

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.

12
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
. . . [C]onviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. (Emphasis supplied).

In Cordial v. People, 16
this Court echoed the above cited provision of law stating that

even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs
of sense, they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others. 17

The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be
examined for its relevance and credibility. None of the cases cited by the appellants militates against this
proposition.18

Oscar Cagod did not dispute his prior conviction for murder when he was only twelve (12) years old. Because
of his minority, instead of being imprisoned, he was placed under the custody of Judge Boligor and her late
husband, who was then Chief of Police of Sinacaban. Cagod lived with the for eighteen (18) or nineteen (19)
years until Judge Boligor was slain. During that period of time, Cagod had no record of any bad or socially
destructive behavior. He had in fact been of much help around the Boligors' house and had in fact worked for
appellant Mayor Dominguez himself as a motorcar driver.19 His testimony was not in favor of an accused
"comrade,"20 and Oscar Cagod, moreover, was obviously not a hardened criminal. 21 Taking account of these
circumstances, the Court considers that Oscar Cagod's credibility was not put in doubt by reason alone of
conviction of a crime when he was twelve (12) years old.

In their final contention concerning the credibility of Oscar Cagod as a witness, the defense insists that the
testimony of Cagod was incredible in itself.

Cagod had testified that he was in the store across the street from Judge Boligor's house on the night of the
killing, because he had been about to get sample ballots of candidate Corazon C. Aquino from Judge Boligor;
but when he arrived at the latter's house, Judge Boligor told him to stay across the street considering that
Mayor Dominguez was coming to her house. And so Cagod was there across the street from the Boligors'
home and had an unobstructed view of the events as they unfolded outside the Boligor house which events
culminated in gunfire inside the house and the Mayor and Roger speeding away from the Boligor house on
the jeep which had waited for them and appellant Macalisang coming out of Judge Boligor's house and fading
away into the darkness while she and her brother Luther lay dead in her house.

In addition, Oscar Cagod had testified that on the afternoon of that same day, while he was at the market
place in Sinacaban, Roger Dominguez (the Mayor's brother), Josue Vente (the Police Station Commander of
Sinacaban), Lt. Isidro Macalisang of AFP and the Mayor were on the terrace of the Mayor's house fronting the
Sinacaban Public Market. Josue Vente summoned him (Cagod), and so he went up the stairs to the terrace.
As he stepped on the terrace, he heard Mayor Dominguez saying angrily: "I gave money to Purita [A. Boligor]
and Luther (Avanceña) so they will not work during election, they are hard-headed, better that these persons
are taken care of." Cagod further testified that Josue Vente ordered him to buy a pack of cigarettes and that
when he returned to the terrace with the cigarettes, he heard Mayor Dominguez say: "This is our agreement."
Later, Mayor Dominguez ordered his men to go to Barangay Sinonok to continue their election campaign
efforts and they left in four (4) motorcycles. Cagod stated that he heard the Mayor telling Roger over an
hand-held radio to follow Judge Purita Boligor and to apprise him (the Mayor) of her whereabouts
periodically.22

The defense expended a great deal of effort assailing the above testimony of Oscar Cagod concerning the
goings-on on the terrace of the Mayor's house, the basic contention being that if the accused-appellants were
indeed to plan a conspiracy, they would not have been so "stupid" as to batch it in broad day light within
public view and within hearing distance of strangers, when they could have very well gone inside the Mayor's
house. It does not seem necessary for the Court to consider in detail the arguments of the defense in this
connection. For the trial court did not interpret the above testimony of Oscar Cagod as showing conspiracy
being hatched by the appellants and their associates while on the Mayor's terrace. For the trial court ruled
that:

. . . The Mayor at that precise time [need] not have been plotting a dastardly deed. He could
have been merely expressing his disgust or anger with Boligor and Luther . . . nevertheless, .
13
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
. . this Court is convinced that he (Cagod) was telling the facts as he had actually heard and
seen them. He had no motive to testify falsely.23

The evidence of the defense included ballistics reports (Exhibits "16" and "16-A") concerning twenty-seven
(27) empty cartridges retrieved from the scene of the crime. These twenty-seven (27) empty cartridges or
shells were, according to this ballistics report, examined and compared with twenty-four (24) test cartridges
submitted by the accused appellant and said to have been fired from eight (8) M-16 armalite rifles in the
armory of the Sinacaban Police Force, including an M-16 rifle with Serial No. 162705 which allegedly was
taken by appellant Macalisang from Wilfredo Daluz, a police officer and prosecution witness. In those reports,
PC T/Sgt. Rodolfo C. Burgos, a ballistic technician who had conducted the examination, concluded that the
twenty-seven (27) empty shells retrieved from the scene of the crime had not been fired from any of the
weapons from which the twenty-four (24) test cartridges had been fired.24 According to the letter of PC Capt.
Bonfilio Dacoco, Commanding Officer of the 466th Philippine Constabulary Company, Ozamis City, dated 21
February 1986, which Sgt. Burgos read into the record during the trial, the twenty-one (21) test shells had
been fired from eight (8) long firearms of the Sinacaban Police Force. 25 The trial court, however, did not give
much weight to this ballistic report saying:

. . . Cagod's testimony that he had seen Macalisang enter and exit from the house of the
Boligor's moments before and after the shooting remains unshaken by Burgos's testimony,
especially when taken with the defense story. 26

We agree with the trial court's appraisal that the testimony of Ballistic Technician Burgos did not have the
effect of overturning the testimony of Oscar Cagod. We note that the defense had not shown that appellant
Macalisang had no access to any M-16 rifle other than the eight (8) rifles of the Sinacaban Police Force from
which the twenty-one (21) test bullets were said to have been fired. The negative allegation that Macalisang
did not use any of the eight (8) M-16 rifles, particularly the rifle with Serial No. 162705, does not logically lead
to the conclusion that Macalisang could not have used any other weapon nor does it prove that he was not
the assailant. All that the testimony of Sgt. Burgos tended to show was that the murder weapon was not
among the eight (8) rifles of the Sinacaban Police Force from which the test shells were said to have been
fired.

In addition to denying and assailing the testimony of the now deceased witness Oscar Cagod, the appellants'
raised the defense of alibi. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
it is not enough to show that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but that the
accused must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of the commission thereof. 27 In the instant case, the Mayor's argument was that when the
shooting occurred, he was already outside the house of Judge Boligor. Clearly, therefore, it was not
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. In fact, he was only a few steps away, according
to his own testimony, when Judge Boligor and her brother were felled by automatic fire. Appellant Rodolfo
Macalisang, the latter's Chief Security Officer, and as already noted, Police Supervisor of the CHDF of
Sinacaban, said that he had slept the whole night of 6 February 1986 (the eve of the "snap" presidential
election) and that he knew nothing of the murder until the next morning. 28This alibi was obviously a very
weak one, considering that Macalisang's house was not only in the same municipality but was indeed only
"about 120 meters" away from Judge Boligor's house.29

The applicable doctrine is that the defense of "alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses."30 In People v. Plandez,31 the Court stressed that:

. . . [A]libi — the much abused sanctuary of felons and which is considered as an argument
with a bad reputation, cannot prevail over positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
It is, to say the least, the weakest defense and must be taken with caution being easily
fabricated. (Emphasis supplied).

In the instant case, Cagod did not, of course, see appellant Macalisang actually shooting Judge Boligor and
her brother inside her house. But Cagod did see Macalisang enter the Boligor house with a firearm, hear
automatic gunfire and later saw him leave the same house with a firearm and melt away in the night. We
hold that in the circumstances of this case, the testimony of prosecution witness Cagod was sufficient to
produce moral certainty of guilt on the part of both appellants. Clearly, here as in most criminal cases, the
issues before this Court relate to the credibility of the witnesses, particularly of Oscar Cagod and of accused-
14
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
appellants. It is true that the trial judge who wrote the decision, Judge Ma. Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca, was not
presiding over the trial court when Oscar Cagod rendered his testimony on direct and on cross-examination.
At the same time, it was before Judge Penaco-Sitaca that the prosecution presented additional witnesses and
before whom the defense presented all its evidence, both testimonial and documentary and rested its case.
Thus, Judge Penaco-Sitaca had observed the deportment of the defense witnesses and their manner of
testifying during the trial. The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on issues of credibility
is accorded with highest respect by appellate courts. 32 We have examined carefully the record of this case
before the trial court and the briefs of both the appellants and the People and we
have found nothing to justify overturning the conclusions reached by Judge Penaco-Sitaca.

In its decision, the trial court found the presence of treachery as well as the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and abuse of superior strength. The trial court said:

. . . [The mayor] had the motive. He called the shots. He occupied a position of ascendancy
over his brother-in-law and personal security officer, Macalisang, who, on his own, would
have no motive nor criminal design against the victims. . . . Macalisang's armed entry into the
house, immediately followed by the burst of gunfire, . . . constituted a sudden, unexpected,
treacherous attack of the victims who could not have had the slightest opportunity to defend
themselves. Just as treacherous was the Mayor's entry into the house under cover of civility
and mirthful conversation.

It is very difficult to disagree with this finding of the trial court. We agree, further, that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was present, but believe that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
properly deemed absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. This modification, however, has no
effect upon the penalty properly imposable upon accused-appellants.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court dated 10 May 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED,
except that the element of abuse of superior strength is properly disregarded, and except that the indemnity
imposable is hereby, in accord with current jurisprudence, RAISED to P50,000.00 for the killing of Judge
Purita A.. Boligor and another P50,000.00 for the slaying of Luther Avanceña. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

15
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 115367 September 28, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELEUTERIO DE LEON and REYNALDO MANAYAO, accused. ELEUTERIO DE LEON, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused-appellant Eleuterio de Leon seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 finding him and his co-accused, Reynaldo Manayao,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the
victim's wife the amounts of P180,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Accused
Reynaldo Manayao chose not to appeal from the decision.

In an information filed with the trial court on 10 November 1992, the accused were charged with the crime of
murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That at or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1992, in the Municipality of
Angat, Province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with Armalite rifles and Caliber .45 pistols, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with common design, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, employing means to the [ sic]
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ambush, attack and shoot from behind Marcelino Santiago who was hit at the head while he
was driving his owner-type jeep, and as a result he died instantaneously to the prejudice and
damage of his legal heirs.

Contrary to law. 2

Accused Eleuterio de Leon was arrested on 13 April 1993,3 and afterwards, he filed a motion to fix
bail. 4 Accused Reynaldo Manayao, on the other hand, was arrested on 24 May 1993. 5

Upon their separate arraignments, 6 the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the court conducted
hearings on the motion to fix bail with the express agreement between the parties that the evidence to be
presented at such hearings would be considered as evidence on the merits of the case.7

The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano, a farmer from
Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome. The
substance of their testimony was that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of 23 August 1992 in the vicinity of the
Robal Transit Terminal in Angat, Bulacan, they saw the accused gun down Marcelino Santiago, one of the
managers of Robal Transit, while the latter was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction
that the jeep was headed, 8 while Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell
the latter something. 9

The victim's jeep had already passed Mariano when the shots were fired. Turning around, Mariano saw the
accused shooting the victim, with de Leon holding an Armalite at waist level and Manayao, a .45 caliber pistol
at shoulder height. 10 Mariano heard six shots in all. As he was only about ten meters away from the accused,
he could still see the gun barrels emitting smoke. After shooting the victim, both accused, joined by a third
male whom Mariano could not identify, left the area by leisurely walking towards an alley, which was right in
front of Mariano. Mariano immediately recognized the two accused because they were his townmates.
Mariano went home at once. It was only after the funeral that he told the wife of the victim that he knew her
husband's killers. He then gave his statement to the police. 11
16
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Chavez was on the street in front of the bus terminal and about six meters from the accused when the latter
fired at the victim. Because of fear, Chavez went inside the bus terminal, only to return to the scene of the
crime later to assist in carrying into the funeral parlor's vehicle the body of the victim, which was then
slumped sidewise in his jeep. The jeep had swerved to the sidewalk after the victim was hit. Later that day,
Chavez informed the victim's wife that he had witnessed the commission of the crime. 12

SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome, a police investigator, took down the statement of Simon Mariano on 24 August
1992. 13

Immediately after the termination of the testimony of Bartolome, the trial court orally denied the application
for bail because the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. 14 It then required the prosecution to present
its other witnesses. 15

The prosecution forthwith presented Dr. Rosauro Villarama, the Municipal Health Officer of Angat, Bulacan,
who performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Marcelino Santiago, at 11:00 a.m. of 23 August
1992. 16 He found one gunshot wound on the victim's head, the entry point being above the right ear and the
point of exit, "slightly above 3 in. front of left ear," causing a fracture and laceration. He concluded that the
cause of the victim's death was "cerebral hemorrhage, gunshot wound, head." 17 This gunshot wound was
caused by an Armalite. 18

After Dr. Villarama completed his testimony, the trial court dictated an order 19 formally denying the petition
for bail because "[s]ufficient evidence has been established to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong."

Three additional witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely, Eduardo Valencia, Chief of the
Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Angat Police Station; Senior Inspector Carlito Feliciano, Chief of
the Angat Police Station; and Mrs. Mercedes Villarama-Santiago, widow of the victim.

Valencia declared that upon receiving a report from PO3 Enriquez about a shooting incident at the bus
terminal of Sta. Maria Liner, he, together with two other companions, went to the terminal and found the jeep
of Marcelino Santiago on the right side of the road going to Bustos with the corpse of Santiago bathed in
blood. They tried to run after the assassins. Failing to catch the latter, they returned to the scene of the crime
where they found empty cartridges from an Armalite. Thereafter, they called their district office, which sent
investigators to whom Valencia turned over the empty cartridges. During the investigation, Simon Mariano
told him that the assassins were the accused herein. Valencia then prepared a spot report. At the trial, he
submitted a case folder of accused Reynaldo Manayao showing that the latter had pending cases for illegal
possession of firearms, robbery in band, extortion, and destruction of property. 20

Senior Inspector Feliciano testified on the arrest by his team of accused Reynaldo Manayao, who was
included in their order of battle, being a leader of an "organized syndicated crime group." 21

Mrs. Santiago declared that she and the victim were married in 1966 and were blessed with five children. She
believed that her husband was killed because of his having testified on the Tuesday preceding his death in a
civil case involving the lot rented by Robal Transit or because of business competition between Robal Transit
and Sta. Maria Liner. Her husband earned from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month as operations manager of
Robal Transit and as a farmer. For his burial, she spent P50,000.00 for the casket; P60,000.00 for the burial
lot; and P70,000.00 as miscellaneous expenses. She left to the discretion of the court the determination of
the monetary value of the moral shock and anxiety she suffered as a consequence of the death of her
husband. 22

The appellant interposed alibi as his defense. He presented three witnesses to corroborate his story, namely,
Elmer Tosoc, Manuel Santos, and Cezar Santos. He declared that in the morning of 23 August 1992, he was
waiting for his salary to be paid at the house of Architect Elmer Tosoc in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan. The latter
employed him as a custodian of construction materials at job sites. He did not leave the Tosoc residence at
any time on the date in question. He further claimed that prosecution witness Simon Mariano bore a grudge
against him, as he (appellant) fathered a child with Mariano's niece seven years prior and did not marry the
woman. 23

17
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
On cross-examination, the appellant admitted that Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan, was only about eight kilometers
away from Angat, Bulacan, and that it would take approximately half an hour to traverse the distance by bus
or passenger jeep. 24 He also admitted that he had known Simon Mariano for about seven years and that if
Mariano saw him during the day, Mariano could easily recognize him. 25

On 23 March 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein it gave full faith and credence
to the prosecution's evidence and declared the alibi offered by the defense to be feeble. Thus:

Alibi is not a proper defense where it is not impossible for the accused to be at the scene of
the crime and no improper motive was shown against the witnesses who identified the
accused.

Again, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses and because it was not physically impossible for said accused to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of commission considering the proximity of the place
where the accused were, hence, the defense of alibi is rejected. The testimony of the
eyewitnesses are sufficient for conviction. Mariano's and Chavez' testimonies were sufficient
to convict both accused because it was given unhesitatingly in a straight forward manner and
it was full of details which by their nature could not have been merely invented. The Court
again considered the fact that alibi is one of the weakest defense[s] an accused can invoke,
easily lending itself to concoction and embroidery. It must invariably be viewed with suspicion
and may be considered only when established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence to
be given credence. It must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at
some other place but only that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, both accused testified that they are
only about 5 minutes away from the scene of the incident and has all the time and
opportunity to perpetuate the crime.

In addition thereto, there maybe some few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution but they refer to minor details and do not in
actuality touch upon the basic aspects of the why's and where of the crime committed, thus,
credibility is not impaired. 26

As earlier adverted to, only appellant Eleuterio de Leon appealed from the decision. In his Brief, he assigns
the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING HIM GUILTY ONLY OF HOMICIDE.

We find no merit in the appeal.

In his first assigned error, the appellant invites our attention to alleged material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses.

First, he alleges that Mariano's testimony regarding the relative positions of the victim and the appellant is
contradictory. He cites Mariano's initial testimony that the two accused were behind the victim when they shot
him. Then, he proceeds to point out that under questions from the court, Mariano said that the two accused
were facing the jeep when they shot the victim; yet, the medico legal officer testified that the bullet entered
the victim's right ear, clearly showing that the assailants were on the right side of the victim. 27

18
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
This alleged inconsistency is more apparent than real for the appellant is merely confused as to the
juxtaposition of the accused and the victim. The Appellee, however, has put things and people in their proper
place and explains:

Facing the victim's jeepney does not mean that the gunwielders were right in front of the
victim's jeep and they shot the victim frontally. It only means that the gunwielders
were facing towards the jeep (not necessarily the front portion thereof) when they shot the
victim. But as the physical evidence indicates the gunwielders must [have] be[en] facing
towards the rear side of the jeep when they shot the victim as the latter was actually hit from
behind. 28

Second, the appellant calls this Court's attention to the portion of Mariano's testimony that the appellant was
more or less six to seven meters away from the victim, while Chavez testified that the appellant was
approximately twelve meters away from the victim. These estimations, the appellant concludes, are
"incredible" in light of the medico-legal officer's testimony that the gunman must have been about one meter
away when he fired the shots. 29 Such a conclusion is baseless and can only stem from a misreading of the
transcript of the stenographic notes to mislead this Court. It is based on a single clarificatory question
propounded by the lower court to the medico-legal officer, viz.,

Q One (1) meter?

A Yes, sir. 30

The appellant clearly overlooked the immediately preceding question and the corresponding answer
of the medico-legal officer which indubitably showed that the distance was more than one meter.
Thus:

Q Can you determine the distance of the gunman?

A It is possible that the gunman is more than 1 meter [away]. 31

(emphasis
supplied)

Third, the appellant points out that at first Mariano testified that he had heard six shots, but later he said that
he had heard only three shots. 32 This inconsistency was never shown to be of crucial importance as to affect
the credibility of the witness. It is to us a minor, if not trivial one.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. In fact, these
inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their credibility, for it is usual that
witnesses to a stirring event would see differently some details of a startling occurrence. Rather than discredit
the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous testimony. 33

The appellant next contends that Mariano could not have clearly seen the incident, as Mariano "was already
several meters away not to mention the fact that it was a busy street then being a Sunday and at a time
when people were on the street attending to their Sunday obligations. 34 The contemplation lacks any
semblance of substantiation. There is unrebutted evidence that the street was not bustling with activity that
fateful morning when the crime was committed. Thus:

Q Do I understand Mr. witness, that . . . the street there [sic] was a busy
street meaning that there were so many vehicles that were parked along the
highway?

xxx xxx xxx

A At that time there was [sic] none, sir.

Q Not even a Sta. Maria Liner parked along the highway?

19
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
A None, sir. 35

The appellant admitted during cross-examination that Mariano could have easily recognized him, since
Mariano and the appellant had known each other for at least seven years. 36 The veracity of the positive
identification is strengthened by the trial court's efforts to satisfy itself with the certainty of the eyewitnesses'
identification of the perpetrators of the crime as shown by the following questions it asked them and their
answers thereto:

Court: [addressing eyewitness Mariano]

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, the 2 accused both are charged with a grave offense and you are
pointing your finger at them as the culprit[s]. Since the penalty here is very
grave, you must be sure of your statement? Now, I will ask you, are you sure
that these 2 accused were the ones who shot Santiago?

A Yes, sir. 37

Court: [addressing eyewitness Chavez]

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know that if you are testifying falsely, these two (2) persons might
go to jail and taste a life sentence?

A Yes, sir.

Q You still claim that they were the killers?

A Yes, sir.

Court:

Q Walang kargo de konsiyensiya, hindi ka nagkakamali?

A Hindi po.38

Fast realizing that his cause lacks the proverbial "leg to stand on," the appellant capitalizes on Mariano's
admission that he was charged with homicide or murder before another court. He then submits that no
credence could be given to Mariano because the latter was himself accused of having killed
somebody. 39 Such a submission fails to impress us. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
except as provided for in the succeeding sections [Sections 21, 22, 23, 20, and 25], all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political
belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not
disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such
person from being presented as a witness unless otherwise provided by law. 40

The appellant's claim that Mariano bore a grudge against him because he (appellant) impregnated Mariano's
niece was not established by credible proof.

In an attempt to discredit the other eyewitness, Chavez, the appellant contends that the former "is only an
afterthought witness to shore up the sinking ship of Simon Mariano" as evidenced by the fact that he
"informed the authorities . . . only nine (9) months after the killing and was an employee of the company
owned by the victim." 41

20
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
We are not persuaded. We agree with the following counter-arguments of the Appellee, thus:

As regards Ramon Chavez, he substantially corroborated the testimony of Simon Mariano on

all significant points. The fact that he stepped forward as [an] eyewitness only after nine
months following the incident, does not per se destroy his credibility. People's natural
hesitation to get involved in cases, whether civil or criminal, is a matter of public knowledge.
Also, the fact that Ramon Chavez was a subordinate employee of the victim . . . does not
diminish his truthfulness as a witness. On the contrary, being an employee of Robal Transit,
Ramon Chavez would only be interested to punish the real wrongdoer in the murder of his
boss . . . .42

The natural reticence of most people to get involved as a witness in a criminal case is of judicial notice. Their
failure to submit to an investigation by any public authority or to execute a sworn statement does not by itself
diminish or impair their credibility. 43 We need only to reiterate here what we stated in People vs. Kyamko: 44

Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the
expectation of mankind. Human nature teaches us that people may react differently to the
same situation. One person's spontaneous or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a
horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression while other's may be cold indifference. We
have taken judicial notice of the fact that witnesses in our country are reluctant to volunteer
information to the authorities. In any event, [the witness] did in fact immediately inform the
victim's mother of the stabbing incident. This was sufficient to remove any doubt that he had
witnessed the commission of the crime.

Chavez testified that he did not go to the police because he was afraid. 45 It was only on 31 May 1993, or a
week after the arrest of accused Manayao but a day before the court started hearing the case, that he went
to see Prosecutor Alberto Vizcocho and volunteered to testify in this case. 46 Anyhow, the fact remains that he
told the victim's wife on the day the shooting incident took place that he had witnessed the killing. 47

With respect to the presence or absence of an ulterior motive, this Court has had occasion to rule that the
relation of superior and subordinate, by itself, does not constitute such ulterior motive:

[A] witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even
render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating
the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Nor is the testimony of a witness
discredited by the mere fact that he is an employee of the complainant. 48

Having now come full circle, this Court is left with no recourse but to reject the defense of alibi invoked by the
appellant.

We have time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. 49 Moreover, for
the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to
prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate
by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed. 50

In the instant case, such physical impossibility was not shown to have existed. By the appellant's own
admission, the place where he claimed to be was only about eight kilometers away from the scene of the
crime and that it would have taken only half an hour to traverse the distance by bus or passenger
jeep. 51 Such distance was not so great as to preclude his having been at the scene of the crime when the
shooting occurred.

The appellant's second assigned error must also fail. The trial court appreciated against the appellant the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and use of superior force and armed men, which are alleged in the
information. We agree in its appreciation of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend

21
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the
offended party might make. 52 As correctly contended by the Appellee:

The factual milieu of the case undeniably shows that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
attended the killing of the victim. The attack was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, with
the assailants each armed with high-powered weapons. In fine, the attack was carried out in
such a manner that the victim was totally helpless and in no position to either fight back or
escape. Moreover, in view of the fact that the assailants fired at the victim as the latter was
driving his jeep, the inescapable conclusion is that the attack was coolly and deliberately
adopted . . . to ensure its accomplishment without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the victim might put up. 53

We are in full accord with the said contention. Given the attendant circumstances, it cannot be disputed that
the appellant employed means and methods in the execution of the crime which directly and especially
insured such execution without the slightest risk to themselves, since the victim did hot have the slightest
chance to defend himself.

The trial court, however, should not have appreciated the other qualifying aggravating circumstance of "use
of superior force and armed men." In using this phrase, the trial court must have had in mind the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of (a) with the aid of armed men and (b) taking advantage of superior strength,
which are distinct from each other. 54 Taking advantage of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, i.e., it
cannot be estimated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is present. 55 There is, as
well, no factual basis for the other aggravating circumstance which, of course, presupposes the presence of
armed men other than the accused themselves.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of Branch 15 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

22
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 181539 July 24, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision1 dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision2 dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found him guilty of the crime
of robbery with homicide.

Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information:

That on or about the 10th day of February 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with another person whose true name, identity and other personal circumstances have not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
rob one RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned while said victim was inside his car having a conversation over his cellphone, the said
accused suddenly appeared and with intent to gain and by means of violence approached the said vehicle and
ordered said victim to open it and once opened thereafter stabbed the said victim with a bladed weapon
hitting him on the thorax thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, and thereupon took, stole and carried away the following, to wit:

a) Two (2) NOKIA cellular phones

b) One (1) brown leather wallet

c) Undetermined amount of cash money

d) One (1) necklace

e) One (1) men’s ring all with undetermined value, belonging to said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y
VILLA, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA.3

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned.4 After pre-trial was conducted, trial
ensued.

The prosecution established that, as shown in the medico-legal report prepared by Police Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Elizardo Daileg of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who autopsied the victim’s
cadaver, the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax." In
particular, three penetrating stab wounds were inflicted on the upper left portion of the victim’s chest,
"piercing the upper lobe of the left lung and perforating the heart." He also suffered stab wounds in the right
eye, stomach and left forearm and incised wounds in the left upper eyelid and left palm. 5

The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker at the time of his death. He was
survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, with whom he had no child. Filomena spent a total of
₱477,054.30 in funeral expenses in connection with the burial of her deceased husband. Filomena stated that
the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45 cellular phones taken away from Ramon were valued at ₱3,500.00 each,
while the necklace snatched from him was worth ₱20,000.00. 6

23
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of Mark
Almodovar:

On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Mark went out of his house to play ball in the
basketball court. He walked to the basketball court, played there, and at about 9:00 o’clock, he stopped
playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball court where there were five cars
parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular
phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man, who entered a parked car. The two male persons
who were then following the fat man then separated: one went to the left side of the fat man’s car and stood
by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle. While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite
side of the car. Mark made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, (Exhibit "L") depicting
the car and the positions of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a knife
while his companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing
the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the
fat man’s personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He
followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it
with soil. He made a drawing representing the place where he followed them (Exh. "M"). After burying the
knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a place which he described as near. While
thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He recognized him as the person who went to the left
side of the car and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin Aleman. After which,
the two men left. He decided not to follow them and went home instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock in the
evening when he arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he returned to the
scene of the incident. There were many people gathered in the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby
girl and requested her to call the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl.
They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there. He recognized and identified the face of the fat
man depicted in the picture (Exhibit "N") shown to him.

On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death threat. In the year 2003, his grandfather
died in Nueva Ecija and he attended the wake. He stayed there until his father, grandmother and another
person, whom he does not know but of the same age as that of his father, fetched him on September 12,
2003. He was taken to Antipolo where he stayed at the house of the relatives of the victim until December
10, 2003, the day he initially testified in court. There was no sign language interpreter in the said house. The
relatives of the victim gave him some money which he used to buy for two shirts, two pants and a pair of
shoes.

Before going to the basketball court which is a little farther from their house at 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he
already ate his evening meal at 6:00 o’clock. There were six of them, boys and girls playing basketball. The
basketball court was a full court but they were not playing a real game, just running and shooting. At about
8:00 o’clock, they stopped playing, they sat down and had soft drinks. After finishing his soft drink, he
urinated in the shrubbery near the five parked cars.

He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know what building in Sikatuna Bliss was
fronting the five cars that were parked near the basketball court. It was the first time that he saw the fat man
and the two male persons who wore black bonnets which covered their whole face. The fat man was already
inside his car when he was repeatedly stabbed. The fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with
the knife knocked twice on the window of the car. The window of the car was half-opened when the fat man
was immediately stabbed. The man with a gun was on the other side of the car when he fired his gun once.
He did not notice any argument between the fat man and his attacker. He kept a distance of about eight to
ten meters between him and the two men as he followed them. There were no persons around when the two
men attacked the fat man. After witnessing the stabbing, his initial reaction was to follow the culprits. He did
not call his playmates because they were still playing. In fleeing, the two male persons did not run. They just
walked fast. He had been [on] their trail for about nine minutes before they removed their bonnets. He
followed them for about thirty minutes.

When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the knife was buried under the ground.
It was 9:56 o’clock when the men took off their bonnets. The man with the knife removed the bloodstained
white t-shirt that he was wearing and, along with his bonnet, threw it away in a place he described as flowing
or running water. At about 10:00 o’clock, the two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with
the gun who drove the motorcycle. He took the same route when he walked back home. It was about 10:00

24
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
o’clock when he passed by the car of the fat man again. There were no persons when he went back to the
basketball court. Thus, he just went home to sleep and the following morning, he gave his statement to the
police.

On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit "O") showing the basketball court
(Exhibit "O-1"), the five parked cars near the place where he urinated (Exhibit "O-2"), the exact spot where
he urinated (Exhibit "O-3") and the car of the fat man (Exhibit "O-4"). When asked how he was able to see
the face of the accused, he answered that "there was light in the area which he described as near the flowing
water where the accused removed his bonnet." He stated that the light near the flowing water came from a
light bulb and the distance from the witness stand up to second door outside the courtroom represents how
far he was from the man with the knife when the latter took off his bonnet.7

Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel
Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who
has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-year
course at the Philippine Normal University with a degree in teaching special education children.8

Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2, Quezon City when
he testified. He interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident
happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk from his residence.
A road separates the billiards hall from Sikatuna Bliss.9

On that particular night, accused-appellant went to the billiards hall at around 7:00 in the evening and played
billiards against a certain Ruben. They played until around 10:00 in the evening. Just as they were finished
playing, accused-appellant’s sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived to fetch him for dinner. He went home with her. The
following morning, after having breakfast, he watched a basketball game and talked to his friends. At around
noon, while on his way back to his house, a neighbor, Vangie Barsaga, called him and informed him that
police officers came to his house looking for him. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day, he went to the
nearest police station, Camp Karingal, where he presented himself to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1, at that
time Police Officer 3, Leonardo Pasco of that station’s District Police Intelligence Unit. He asked SPO1 Pasco if
they were looking for a certain Edwin Aleman and, upon receiving a positive answer, he introduced himself.
He was informed that he was a suspect in a killing incident. He was told to stay put while they were waiting
for the alleged eyewitness to arrive. On February 13, 2003, he was twice made to join a police line-up
together with five others. In both instances, they were ordered to turn around several times and they
complied. Thereafter, he was given a spot report: re: Voluntary Surrender of Alleged Suspect in a Robbery w/
Homicide Case by a police officer and was informed that he would be turned over to the custody of the
Criminal Investigation Division of Camp Karingal.10

Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February 10, 2003 playing against Ruben
until around 10:00 in the evening was corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of Ruben, who saw
accused-appellant and Ruben playing when she went to the billiards hall twice that night to fetch
Ruben.11 Hilda, accused-appellant’s sister, also corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony that she fetched
him from the billiards hall at around 10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003. She further stated that, upon
getting home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner together and, thereafter, watched some television shows
until accused-appellant went to sleep some 30 minutes later.12

Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during the police
line-up. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one who prepared the spot report
although it was his superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark failed to identify accused-appellant
during the police line-up. Another defense witness, barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he
was with Mark on February 13, 2003 when Mark was asked to identify the robber-killer of the victim from a
line-up. According to Barrientos, a police officer made a gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of
his hand and, after viewing the persons in the line-up, Mark shook his head. The line-up was presented to
Mark twice and he shook his head in both instances. 13

After studying the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court rejected the defenses of accused-appellant for
their inherent weakness and implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed the prosecution’s evidence favorably,
particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his positive identification of accused-appellant as the one
who stabbed the victim. In particular, the trial court found Mark’s testimony simple and credible. He had no ill
25
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
motive that would make him testify falsely against accused-appellant. While there were minor inconsistencies
in his testimony, the discrepancies were inconsequential and did not affect the truthfulness of Mark’s
narration. Thus, in its Decision dated November 16, 2005, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, described and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon Jaime Birosel as follows:

1. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim;

2. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and

3. The amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIFTY-FOUR PESOS AND THIRTY
CENTAVOS (₱477,054.30) as actual damages.

He is also ordered to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (₱3,500.00) representing the value of the Nokia 3315 cellular phone, the amount of THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱3,500.00) representing the value of the S-45 Siemens cellular phone,
and the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) representing the value of the necklace, which
were all taken from the victim.

With costs against the accused.14

Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He anchored his appeal on the claim that the
trial court erred in convicting him for robbery with homicide. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at
discrediting the eyewitness, Mark.15

First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-appellant argued that,
being a deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to others as he has no formal education on sign
language, Mark is unqualified to be a witness. In fact, he was unable to give a responsive answer to some
questions propounded to him through the interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to
play in a basketball far from his house than in a nearer one.16

Second, accused-appellant asserted that Mark’s testimony was not corroborated by his alleged playmates or
by the "chubby girl" he mentioned in his testimony. Such lack of corroboration weakened Mark’s testimony. 17

Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new clothes and shoes from the
private complainant before he took the witness stand. This made his testimony highly suspicious. 18

Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime in the two
instances that he was presented to Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s alleged positive identification of
accused-appellant doubtful.19

In its Decision dated September 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals held that the contentions of accused-
appellant lacked merit.20

The Court of Appeals declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has long been recognized. The
witness may communicate his perceptions to the court through an interpreter. In this case, Mark’s testimony
was facilitated by Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter who has been teaching in the Philippine
School for the Deaf since 1990. With the help of Catinguil, the trial court determined that Mark is not mentally
deficient and that he was able to tell time, space and distance. He was able to draw and make sketches in
open court to show the relative position of things and persons as he perceived like a normal person. By using
signs and signals, he was able to recount clearly what he witnessed in the evening of February 10, 2003.
According to the appellate court, the above established Mark’s competence as a witness. 21

26
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
The Court of Appeals also found that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal
officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds in the thorax. This physical evidence is an eloquent manifestation of truth and its
evidentiary weight is far more than that of corroborative testimonies. 22

The Court of Appeals rejected as groundless accused-appellant’s imputation to Mark of improper motive or
bias. It also pointed out the irrelevance of non-identification of an accused in a police line-up. What is
important is the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime by the witness in open
court.23

Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery with homicide. It upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for
the said felony. The decretal portion of the Decision dated September 28, 2007 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
[(RTC)], National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 is
AFFIRMED.24

Accused-appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on the very same grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals.

This Court is not persuaded.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant stabbed the victim several times,
causing the latter’s death, for the purpose of depriving the victim of his personal properties, which
personalties accused-appellant took away with him before leaving the scene of the crime. The killing of the
victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore constitutes the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. This finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court is conclusive to this Court. Also, a
review of the records show that both the trial and the appellate courts did not miss, misapply or misinterpret
any relevant fact that would warrant an alteration of their identical conclusions as to the criminal
responsibility of accused-appellant.25

The Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the concerns of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant has
presented no compelling reason that would justify the reversal of his conviction.

The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that "all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses."26 A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense
of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others
but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case,
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. As this Court held in People v.
Tuangco27:

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
(3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs.
Sasota, the accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute should be
conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the method
adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party
was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted." 28

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the sanctity
of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason in ruling otherwise.

27
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the
Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf
since 1990 and possessed special education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial and the
appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that finding
exists.

Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful February 10, 2003 – the
situation of the victim who had just boarded his car; the respective positions of accused-appellant and his still
unidentified cohort vis-à-vis the victim; accused-appellant’s knock on the window of the victim’s car and the
sudden series of stabs accused-appellant inflicted upon the victim; the taking of the victim’s various personal
properties; accused-appellant’s walk away from the crime scene; and, the revelation of accused-appellant’s
identity when he finally removed the bonnet that covered his face, unaware that someone was secretly and
silently watching. In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that "despite intense and
grueling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency upon material details that could only
come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before his eyes." 29 The imperfections
or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting
testimony where the witness is a deaf-mute.30Besides they concerned material details which are neither
material nor relevant to the case. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of Mark’s
testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is material is that he positively identified
accused-appellant and personally saw what accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful night when the
incident happened. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Mark, which was affirmed by the appellate
court, deserves the highest respect of this Court.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of
the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax."31 The multiple mortal wounds inflicted on the victim
constitute physical evidence which further establish the truth of Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far
outweighs any corroborative testimony which accused-appellant requires of the prosecution. Moreover, the
settled rule is that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure the conviction
of an accused.32

The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify falsely against
accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this Court
respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter.

Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him fails. 1âwphi1 Indeed, the law
requires not simply an eyewitness account of the act of committing the crime but the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.33 Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant
in a police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police line-up is
essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court.34 Nevertheless, the records show that Mark
identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the victim in a police line-up on February 18, 200335 and,
more importantly, in open court in the course of Mark’s testimony.

In sum, the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-appellant for the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant’s crime is punishable under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is not
attended by any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. 36 Considering that no
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty imposed by the trial and the
appellate courts, reclusion perpetua, is proper.

The civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, the current amount of civil indemnity
awarded in cases of murder.37 Robbery with homicide belongs to that class of felony denominated as
"Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons" 38 under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and
the killing or death of a person is committed "by reason or on occasion of the robbery." The increase in the
amount of civil indemnity is called for as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, like murder,

28
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
involves a greater degree of criminal propensity than homicide alone where the civil indemnity awarded is
₱50,000.00.

The ₱50,000.00 imposed as moral damages is proper and conforms to recent jurisprudence.39

The reimbursement of actual damages in the total amount of ₱477,054.30 for various funeral-related
expenses is proper as it is fully supported by evidence on record. The same holds true for the payment of the
value of the items taken from the victim, namely, two cellphones at ₱3,500.00 each and the necklace at
₱20,000.00.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages
(namely, the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.40

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100
affirming the Decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found accused-appellant Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages
awarded to the heirs of the victim, which shall commence from the date of finality of this decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

29
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. L-27200 January 20, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Ibarra and Leaño for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the accused Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal convicting each of them of the crime of homicide, and sentencing Antonio
Macaspac to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, and Francisco Bustos to twelve
years and one day reclusion temporal, taking into consideration in favor of the latter the mitigating
circumstance of provocation by the deceased; further sentencing both accused to the accessories of the law,
to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of deceased in the sum of P1,00, to pay the costs of the action.

In support of his appeal Antonio Macaspac assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the lower
court in its decision, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in finding the appellant Antonio Macaspac liable beyond
a reasonable doubt, as coprincipal, for the death of Felipe del Castillo; (2) the lower court erred in not finding
the accused Antonio Macaspac's alibi proven.

Francisco Bustos, in turn, in support of his, assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court
in its decisions, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in basing its decision principally upon the testimonies of
Isabel Encarnacion ( a deaf-mute) and Laureana Yumul, and upon the following findings: "However,
immediately after the occurrence, Francisco Bustos met the Spaniard Juan T. Lechea and told him that Angel
Castillo's son had thrown stones at him in his own house. He said nothing of having been assaulted by Angel
del Castillo, Felipe del Castillo and one Delfin. Francisco Bustos made the same statement to Nicanor Garcia,
municipal president of San Pedro Macati, except that he said that it was old man Castillo, the deceased's
father, who threw stones at him. The absence of any traces of blood between Francisco Busto's house and
the place where the deceased fell, shows that the latter was wounded in the latter place. The wound below
the sternum was necessarily mortal. We doubt that the deceased could have walked one hundred fifty (150)
meters — the distance between Francisco Bustos's house and the place where he fell wounded — and
traverse that distance without leaving a trail of blood behind him." (Decision, page 4.) (2) The lower court
erred in convicting the herein defendant-appellant Francisco Bustos and sentencing him to twelve years
imprisonment reclusion temporal.

The alleged errors assigned by both of the accused in support of their respective simmer down to the single
proposition that the trial court erred in finding each of them guilty, beyond any doubt, of the crime with which
they are charged in the information.

The following facts, without contradiction, were proved at the trial:

On the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries of the lands which they
respectively occupied on the Gadalupe, Estate, Francisco Bustos and Angel del Castillo became engaged in a
dispute finally resulting in the former catching the latter by the neck. Attracted by the cries of the people,
Mariano Montemayor and his ward, Antonio Macaspac, ran to the place of the fight, Antonio Macaspac
catching hold of Francisco Bustos, and Mariano Montemayor of Angel del Castillo, thus separating the
combatants. Mariano Montemayor entertained Angel del Castillo on the street by conversing with him. Antonio
Macaspac took Francisco Bustos to the latter's house. Laureana Yumul, Angel del Castillo's wife, who was also
there went to her house, leaving her husband. On nearing her home, she heard the desperate cries of her
deaf-mute daughter, Soledad Encarnacion, who was under a mango tree gesticulating and making signs,
failing upon her knees and getting up again, without knowing what to do. Going in the direction pointed out
by her daughter, Laureana Yumul came upon her son Felipe del Castillo stretched out on the ground
wounded, expiring a few moments later. The autopsy performed by Dr. Eugenio Santos disclosed the

30
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
following wounds: A sharp wound 7 centimeters long and 4 centimeters deep on the left arm at the level of
the humero-cubital articulation, penetrating the flesh and two bones; two sharp wounds on the posterior
internal surface of the lower third of the same arm, running obliquely, and penetrating the cubitus and the
radius; and a penetrating wound below the sternum, involving the stomach, and running obliquely
downwards from left to right 8, centimeters deep. The physician was of opinion that the last wound was
necessarily fatal. (Exhibit B.)

That same night Francisco Bustos presented himself to the municipal president with a wound on his forehead,
stating that he had been stoned by someone. He was taken to the General Hospital where he was examined
and found to have a wound on his forehead and several bruises on his nose and lips, caused by a blunt
instrument which might have been a stone.
The only question of fact to determine in this appeal is: Who is or are responsible for the wounds found on
Felipe del Castillo's body, which caused death?
On this point Laureana Yumul testified to the effect that when she repaired to the place pointed out by her
deaf-mute daughter, she found her son stretched out on the ground, wounded, and she asked him who had
inflicted the wounds on him; that her son answered: "Mother, go to the municipality and report this, because
Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac have hacked me up;" that upon hearing this, should shouted for help
several times; that after the lapse of sufficient time for one to finish smoking a cigarette, her son expired;
that some time thereafter, the agents of authority arrived, but her son was already dead.
The defense impeached the veracity of this witness by means of the testimony of the municipal president,
Nicanor Garcia, and Cristino Basay, who testified that they were the first to arrive at the place where the
deceased lay and that when Laureana Yumul came up, she asked them what had happened to her son, and
who had killed him.
The court below found Laureana Yumul's testimony more credible. Taking into account the circumstances of
the case and the number of persons in the vicinity who must have gone to the place of the occurrence; it is
highly probable that some of the curious ones asked such questions without anyone taking notice of who they
were, due to the excitement of the moment; and when municipal president Nicanor Garcia and Crisostomo
Basay testified on this point at the trial months afterwards, in harking back to the events of the removal of
the body, it may be that in the midst of the confusion of thoughts they got the idea that it was the deceased's
mother who had asked them such questions. Laureana Yumul stoutly denies having asked such questions as
are attributed to her.
Aside from the ante-mortem declaration of Felipe del Castillo, as to who had inflicted the wounds that caused
his death, we have the testimony of Mariano del Castillo, the 8-year-old brother of the deceased, to the effect
that on his return from having pastured his carabaos, he saw his brother pursued by Francisco Bustos and
Antonio Macaspac, the former armed with a dagger and the latter with a bolo. As he became frightened he
ran to his house, where he met his father, Angel del Castillo, to whom he related what he had seen. When
Angel del Castillo had heard his son's story, he picked up a bolo and went in search of his son's aggressors,
but did not find them in their respective homes.
The prosecution also presented Soledad Encarnacion, deaf-mute daughter of Laureana Yumul, who was
interpreted by a teacher from the deaf and dumb school who had never taught the witness; nor had the latter
ever been to such a school. While it is true that modern pedagogy has made tremendous strides in the
instruction and education of persons so afflicted, even to the extent of enabling the blind to read by means of
the sense of touch and deaf-mutes to receive instruction through conventional signs and objects,
nevertheless, with respect to deaf-mutes, it is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know the
meaning of their signs, either from having had them taught to him, or from having acquired a knowledge of
them through frequent contact with the same. Without these circumstances, although it is possible to guess
part of what deaf-mutes mean by their signs even without having had much to do with them, still much of
what they wish to say escapes us, and in our eagerness to understand them, we resort to enjecture. It will be
seen how dangerous then in such a procedure to arrive at the truth, and above all when the life and liberty of
an accused man are at stake. This was shown in the present case, in which during the course of
interpretation, there were times when the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by such
signs as she uses, and this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been a pupil of the interpreter, nor
had the latter previously had anything to do with the former, such as would have given her an opportunity to
acquire some knowledge of the meaning of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it would not be
prudent to admit the deaf-mute's testimony as interpreted by the teacher.
The accused Francisco Bustos, testifying in his own behalf, attempted to prove that after the encounter with
Angel del Castillo, and while he was in his own house, said Angel del Castillo, accompanied by his son Felipe
del Castillo and a certain individual named Delfin, as also his wife Laureana Yumul, called upon him to come
down because he, the said Angel del Castillo, wanted to kill him; that because he did not accept the
challenge, the challenger and his companions went up into his house; that, in order to defend himself, he
31
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
picked up his dagger and with it dealt someone a blow, he knew not whom, having received a blow with a
bolo on his forehead which left him unconscious on the ground. By this the accused no doubt meant it to be
understood that the one who received the blow with the dagger was Felipe del Castillo, who was found to
have a deep wound below the sternum, which caused his death. The character of the wound on the accused
Francisco Bustos's forehead when he presented himself to the municipal president Nicanor Garcia and his
declaration that he had been stoned by someone, contradicts his own testimony. The blood stains found in
his house do not corroborate his testimony, because if Felipe del Castillo had received the fatal wound in said
accused's house, he would not have had strength enough to get to where he was found stretched out, which
is 150 meters from said house, and besides, there would have been blood stains along the trail. The said
blood stains are not incompatible with the prosecution's version, since after having been stoned by Felipe del
Castillo, when the latter was pursued by the accused, Francisco Bustos must have repaired to his house
where some of the drops of blood issuing from his forehead must have fallen.
Francisco Bustos's declaration, then, far from detracting the evidence presented by the prosecution, actually
corroborates it.
The accused Antonio Macaspac pleaded an alibi, maintaining that he was absent from Guadalupe from 6:30 in
the evening until 11:30 at night, having gone to Manila.
Taking into consideration the time when Felipe del Castillo was found wounded, which must have been
shortly before nightfall, it is not improbable that he might have left for Manila after the assault with the object
of preparing an alibi.
The wounds found on Felipe del Castillo's body, besides the stab, show that the assault upon he was made
with two kinds of weapons, one sharp-edged and the other pointed, thus corroborating the deceased's ante-
mortem declaration and witness Mariano del Castillo's testimony.
Therefore, the evidence of the alibi presented by the accused Antonio Macaspac cannot prevail over the clear
and positive proof of the prosecution concerning his participation in the assault upon Felipe del Castillo.
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively establishes the fact that on the afternoon in question the
accused Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac, on meeting Felipe del Castillo, son of Angel del Castillo, with
whom Francisco Bustos had just had a quarrel, and in which Antonio Macaspac had intervened, the said
accused pursued him; that Felipe del Castillo threw a stone at his pursuers which struck Francisco Bustos
wounding him on the forehead; that the accused continued to pursue their victim until they overtook him,
inflicting several wounds upon him as a result of which he died a few minutes later.
These acts constitute the crime of homicide as defined and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code, the
herein accused being criminally liable as principals by direct participation, and the penalty provided by the law
being reclusion temporal to its full extent.
In applying the penalty, no modifying circumstance of criminal liability can be taken into consideration,
because neither can the fact there were two aggressors be held to constitute abuse of superior strength,
since the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party does not appear of record; nor
can the fact that the deceased stoned Francisco Bustos be considered a provocation, since it does not clearly
appear that the deceased was the one who started the fight and not the one who was provoked. On the
contrary, it may be inferred from the ante-mortem declaration of Felipe del Castillo that he took to stoning
only upon being pursued by the deceased.
The virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, as recommended by the Attorney-
General sentencing the accused Francisco Bustos to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion
temporal, and confirmed in all other respects, with one-half of the costs against each of the appellants. So
ordered.

32
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

G.R. No. 130331 November 22, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON PINEDA, JR. and SONNY TUANGCO, accused.
ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY TUANGCO, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In the morning of January 4, 1995, the naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by the
Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative in Manila was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters away
from the national highway in Apalit. Her body bore multiple stab wounds and her private parts were bloodied
and showed signs of sexual abuse.

On May 18, 1995 two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco y Dizon, Nelson Pineda Jr. alias
"Jun Tattoo"1 , and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon alias "Baba" with the crimes of rape with homicide and theft.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M) states:

"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay
Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain which came as an afterthought to them after
executing their primordial intent to rape and kill victim AUREA EUGENIO, took and carried away her wrist
watch, three rings, earrings, P3,000.00 cash money and camera, the total value of which amounts to
P20,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.

The commission of this offense added ignominy to the natural effects of the crime."

whereas the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1610 (M) reads:

"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay
Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and with lewd design dragged Aurea Eugenio, reclined her in a tree, opened wide her
thighs, inserted a bottle of Pidol syrup in her vaginal canal and forcibly took turns in having sexual intercourse
with her against her will, after which, and by reason of such rape accused with intent to kill, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed several times Aurea Eugenio in her neck which caused her
death.

That the commission of this offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
use of superior strength, nighttime which was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate and insure its
commission.

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and Republic Act
No. 411."2

Adel Tuangco was arraigned on June 5, 1995; he pleaded not guilty to both charges. In the course of the trial
accused Sonny Tuangco was apprehended and also pleaded not guilty. Nelson Pineda, Jr. remains at large.

The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre Sanggalan,
a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign language, which was interpreted by a sign language expert.
The court's summation of the evidence is as follows:
33
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
"On January 3, 1995 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was inside a 'beer house' along the national
highway. He had seven (7) companions at that time. (TSN, July 10, 1995, pp. 55-57). The group consisting of
eight (8) persons including the witness arrived at the said place at day time. When nighttime came, witness
Sanggalan together with three (3) of his companions left the place and proceeded to a rice field near the
highway. (Ibid, p. 58). Sanggalan described and identified the said three (3) other persons as a) tricycle
driver with tatoos over his body and scars on his arms; b) a person with a long chin and known as 'Baba' and
c) accused Adel Tuangco. Sanggalan stepped down from the witness stand and identified accused Adel
Tuangco as one of the three (3) other persons together with whom, he went to the rice field. (Ibid, pp. 58-
59). The tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and the person with an elongated chin were not inside the
court room at the hearing of these cases on July 10, 1995. Accused Adel Tuangco and the person with
elongated chin are brothers. (Ibid, p. 60).

The group of eight (8) persons were drinking beer and gin inside the 'beer house'. When night time came,
Sanggalan, accused Adel Tuangco, the person with tatoos over his body and the one with elongated chin
proceeded to the rice field where there was a waiting shed in which they stayed for a while. Inside the
waiting shed, the person with tatoos over his body, known as 'Tatoo', and the one with elongated chin,
known as 'Baba', took Pidol cough syrup. (Ibid, pp. 61-65). They went to the rice field because they were
very drunk. (Ibid, pp. 66). The four (4) stayed at the waiting shed until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. (TSN, July
21 , 1995, p. 12).

The three, accused Adel Tuangco, 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' later left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to
follow a girl who was wearing a long hair. Through photographs of the deceased Aurea Eugenio, witness
Sanggalan identified her to be the girl whom the three followed into the rice field. (Ibid, pp. 14 and 27-28).
As soon as they caught up with the deceased, ‘Tatoo' pushed her. Adel Tuangco got hold of the shoulder bag
which the deceased Aurea Eugenio was carrying at that time. 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' then pushed Aurea against a
tree and stabbed her with a knife several times on the neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two and
also stabbed the deceased. The deceased fell down. (Ibid, pp. 15-19).

After the deceased fell down on the ground, 'Tatoo' inserted a bottle of Pidol cough syrup into her private
parts. Then 'Baba' pushed the bottle further into the private parts of the deceased. While the bottle was being
pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the deceased who at that time was still alive and resisting the assault.
Together, the three removed the blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Adel Tuangco raped the
deceased. 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' likewise successively raped Aurea in that order. (Ibid, pp. 19-23). At the time
that the three accused were raping Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan was about three and one half (3½)
meters away from them. While Adel Tuangco was raping the victim, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' were beside them.
When 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' took their respective turns in raping the victim the other two were holding her hands.
(Ibid, pp. 24-25).

After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, 'Tatoo' got her camera and cash money while 'Baba got
her ring, earrings and watch. (Ibid, pp. 25-26). After the incident, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' went to the rice field
while Adel Tuangco went to the other direction. (Ibid, p. 29). Earlier, during the incident, Adel Tuangco,
'Tatoo' and 'Baba', on two occasions, asked witness Sanggalan to leave. However, the witness merely hid
behind the grasses and trees. (Ibid, p. 30 and TSN, August 7, 1995, p. 31). When recalled to the witness
stand on January 17, 1996, Sanggalan identified accused Sonny Tuangco as the one he referred to as 'Baba'. 3

Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico legal officer at the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy of
the victim and made the following findings:

"Pallor, marked and generalized

Hematoma- 7.0 x 5.0 cms. left frontal region, head; 3.0 x 2 cms. right frontal region head; 7.0 x 6.0
cms. right auricular region; 4.0 x 2.0 cms. right palm; 3.0 x 2.0 cms., left palm 2.0 x 2.0 cms. chest;
3.0 x 2.0 cms. chin

Abrasion- 3.0 x 2.0 cms., right chin; 2.0 x 1.0 cms. right breast 2.0 x 2.0 cms. left breast.

Lacerated wound. 2.5 cms. pre-auricular area, left

34
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Stab Wounds-

1. Six (6) in number, gaping, within an area of 9.0 x 6.0 cms. located on the left side of the
neck directed medially involving the skin, blood vessels, lacerating the throat and esophagus,
with depths from 2-5 cms. One end is contused the other is sharp.

2. Three (3) in number, gaping, within an area of 6.0 x 5.0 cms. one end is contused, the
other is sharp, located on the right side of the neck; directed medially involving the skin,
blood vessels, hitting the trachea with depths from 2.4 cms.

Brain and visceral organs-very pale

Heart chambers- contain a very small amount of dark clotted blood.

Stomach- empty

Hymen- fresh lacerations on all sides with an opening of about 4.0 x 3.0 cms., massive blood clots
accumulated within vaginal canal.

Perineum- V- shaped median laceration measuring about 5.0 cms. (Exhibit "E")

Dr. Aguda explained the nature of the fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive
blood clots accumulated within the vaginal canal. He testified that these injuries were caused not only by
human penis that penetrated the hymen but by a hard foreign object like a bottle. (Ibid, p. 30). The
abrasions on the left and right breast could have been caused by human bites. (Ibid, p. 25). The stab wounds
described as gaping and the stab wounds located within the neck area were inflicted on the victim by her
assailant using a single bladed weapon. (Ibid, p. 26). It is very possible that the victim was sexually abused.
(Ibid, p. 31 ). The heart chambers of the victim contained very small amount of dark clotted blood, which
means there was not enough blood anymore in the heart as the victim suffered massive bleeding. This was
due to the nine (9) stabbed wounds inflicted on the neck of the victim. The proximate cause of death of the
deceased was severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. (Ibid, pp. 34-35). The abrasions and
hematomas on the body of the victim are indications of struggling during the sexual attack on the victim.
(Ibid, p. 34).4

Both accused denied the charges. Adel Tuangco testified that he was at home in the evening in question, a
defense which was corroborated by his common-law wife Liza Reyes Tuangco,5 by his mother, Erlinda Dizon
Tuangco6 and his sister Glessen. For his part Sonny Tuangco claimed he was alone in his house at Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan in the evening of January 3, 1995. 7

The trial court made the following findings of facts:

"From the evidence adduced in these cases, it was established that-

The victim Aurea Eugenio, single and a resident of Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Apalit Pampanga was
working as a bookkeeper in Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative located at the City of Manila.

On January 3, 1995, the first working day of the year, she reported to office bringing with her a Kodak
camera to take pictures of her officemates for souvenir. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, she told her officemates that she will go to their house in Apalit, Pampanga although she was not
scheduled to do so as it was an ordinary week day. She brought with her, the camera and the P3,000.00 cash
money to be spent on the occasion of their town fiesta. From the office, she proceeded to the terminal of
Victory Liner Bus at Caloocan City, where, at 6:00 o'clock in evening, she boarded Victory Liner Bus No. 272.

Between 7:00 and 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the bus stopped at Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Apalit,
Pampanga where the victim Aurea Eugenio alighted. From the national highway, the house of the victim was
about three hundred (300) meters away. Although lights can be seen from the said house, it was very dark
and silent on the road going to the same and coming from the highway. On either side of the road were tall
grasses and trees. On the side of the highway was a waiting shed. Inside the waiting shed were four (4)
35
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
persons. They were three (3) accused, namely, Adel Tuangco y Dizon, his brother Sonny Tuangco y Dizon
alias 'Baba' and Nelson Pineda, Jr. alias 'Jun Tattoo' and the prosecution eye witness Silvestre Sanggalan alias
'Popoy, alias 'Pipi'.

Earlier, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the three (3) accused and witness Sanggalan
were inside a 'beer house' located along the national highway at Calumpit, Bulacan, drinking beer and gin.
Together with four (4) other persons, they started their drinking spree when it was still daytime. When
nighttime came, the three (3) accused and witness Sanggalan left their companions and proceeded to a rice
field near the highway. They stayed in the waiting shed located at the opposite side of the road where the
victim Aurea Eugenio alighted. The four (4) went to the rice field because they were already drunk. While
inside the waiting shed, accused Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda took Pidol cough syrup.

The three (3) accused left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow the victim who had already
crossed the national highway and was walking towards her house. The three (3) accused asked Sanggalan to
leave. However, instead of leaving, Sanggalan hid behind the bushes and trees, thus, he was able to witness
the incident in question.

As soon as the accused caught up with the victim, Nelson Pineda, Jr. pushed her while Adel Tuangco got hold
of her shoulder bag. Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda pushed the victim Aurea Tuangco against a tree and
stabbed her several times in the neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two (2) and he also stabbed the
victim until she fell down. As the victim was lying on the ground, Nelson Pineda inserted the bottle of Pidol
cough syrup in her private parts. Sonny Tuangco further pushed the bottle into the body of the victim. While
the bottle was being pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the victim who was still alive and resisting the
assault being made against her person. Together, the three (3) accused removed the blouse, bra, skirt and
panty of Aurea Eugenio. Thereafter, Adel Tuangco, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco, in that order,
successively raped the victim. While Adel Tuangco was raping the victim, the two (2) other accused were
beside him. When Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco were taking their respective turns in raping the
victim, the two (2) other accused were holding her hands.

After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, Pineda got her camera and cash money while Sonny
Tuangco got her ring, earrings and watch. Thereafter, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco went to the rice
field while Adel Tuangco proceeded to the opposite direction.

The body of the victim was already stiff when found by witness Michael Enriquez the following day lying on
the rice field owned by his grandfather, Ignacio Enriquez. The body was lying on its back with the hands
upraised, the blouse raised upwards and naked from the waist down. The private parts of the victim had an
opening of about two (2) inches and with blood all over it.

The fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive blood clots accumulated within the
vaginal canal were caused not only by human penis that penetrated her private parts but by hard foreign
object like a bottle. The abrasions on the breast of the victim could have been caused by human bites. The
stab wounds located within the neck area of the victim were inflicted by her assailant using a single bladed
weapon. The nine (9) stab wounds in the neck induced severe hemorrhage which was the proximate cause of
the victim's death. The abrasions and hematomas on the body of the victim are indications of struggling
during the sexual attack on the victim."8

The trial court ruled that the guilt of the accused as charged was established with the required quantum of
evidence and concluded that the three accused conspired to commit the crimes charged. The accused were
sentenced as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of theft defined in Article 309 in relation to Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code and of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined in Article 335, as amended, of the same
Code and hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M), the said accused are convicted of Theft and hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum; the said accused

36
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
are likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio, jointly and severally, the
amount of P3,000.00.

2. In Criminal Case No. 95-1610(M), the aforesaid accused are convicted of two (2) special complex
crimes of Rape with Homicide and each of them is hereby sentenced to two (2) death penalties; both
of them are ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio the sum
of P105,150.00 as actual damages, and the further sums of a) P50,000.00 for the victim's death, b)
P100,000.00 as moral damages and c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a total of P200,000, in
each of the two (2) crimes which they have separately committed and each shall pay one-half (½) of
the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

The case is before this Court on automatic review.

The Public Attorney's Office submits the following assignment of errors in the appellants' brief:

"I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF SILVESTRE SANGGALAN WHO IS A DEAF-MUTE AND UNSCHOOLED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
AND THEFT."10

In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused- appellant points out that because
Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a special school for deaf-mutes, the possibility that resort
to conjectures and surmises, brought about by overzealousness to understand what his witness really wanted
to say could not be discounted. Thus, accused-appellant cites certain portions of Sanggalan's testimony which
appeared unclear, e.g., the witness admitted that the place where the incident happened was "very dark",
and he was inconsistent as to who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first to rape the victim.
Thus, his handicap prevented a truthful narration of what really transpired.

The Solicitor General prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects. He asserts that a deaf-mute is
qualified to testify, and the interpreter explained that through sign language, Sanggalan demonstrated how
Eugenio was raped and thereafter killed by appellants and Pineda, Jr. It is claimed that the inconsistencies
pointed out are minor and do not detract from the positive identification made by witness Sanggalan of the
accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects.

After a very careful examination of the evidence of record, we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction.
We find no cogent justification to disturb or set aside the finding of the trial court upholding the credibility of
the deaf-mute witness, on the following rationalization:

"This Court, cognizant of the physical handicap of the eyewitness Silvestre Sanggalan, carefully scrutinized his
testimony and noted that the same were made, on several occasions from July 10, 1995 when he was called
for the first time to testify until July 5, 1996 when he was recalled for the purpose of cross-examination on
behalf of accused Sonny Tuangco, in a candid and straightforward manner. While the Court observes minor
inconsistencies in his declarations, these are not reasons to render his testimony incredible. On the contrary,
it is well-established that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are indications that the same is
not rehearsed and all the more should be considered credible. Thus, discrepancies in minor details indicate
veracity rather than prevarication and only tend to bolster the probative value of such testimony. (People vs.
Mocasa, 229 SCRA 422).

This Court likewise evaluated very carefully, the qualifications and competence of Eva Sangco, the sign
language expert utilized by the prosecution and found the same to be sufficient to put on record with
37
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
accuracy, the declarations being made by witness Sanggalan on the witness stand. According to Eva Sangco,
sign language experts have different mode of communications. These are a) oral method b) simultaneous
method c) pantomine d) reverse interpretation e) speech reading f) natural signs and gestures and g)
interactive writings which are more on dramatization and drawing illustrations. In the interpretation of the
declarations of witness Sanggalan, Eva Sangco employed the natural homemade sign method. Eva Sangco
has undergone several trainings on this particular method. (TSN, July 21, 1995, pp. 7-8).

In its futile attempt to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan, the defense attacked his character and
present a witness in the person of Merlita Baliber to show that he is a drunkard and a drug addict. Likewise
the defense presented documentary evidence (Exh. "3") to show that Sanggalan had been accused of rape in
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Rizal. These evidence presented by the defense are
unavailing. In People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170, it was held that even a fact of prior criminal conviction
alone does not suffice to discredit a witness. And in People vs. Tanco, 218 SCRA 494, it was held that the
mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. For the
test to measure the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity to knowledge
and consistent with experience of mankind. (People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219). This Court finds it unnecessary
to reiterate the earlier discussion as to why it gives credence to the testimony of witness Sanggalan.

If at all, the evidence of the defense with respect to the character of Sanggalan substantiated the theory of
the prosecution- that these people, witness Sanggalan, and the three (3) accused were often times seen
drinking liquor and taking prohibited drugs. No less than defense witness Merlita Baliber testified that on one
occasion, she saw witness Silvestre Sanggalan and accused Nelson Pineda, Jr. going out of the 'beer house' to
join their three (3) other companions walking along the highway.1ªvvph!1 That Baliber would deny that
accused Adel Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco were among those people, is expected. For, as admitted by
Baliber, she was asked by the mother of accused Adel Tuangco and accused Sonny Tuangco to testify in
these proceedings to help the said accused. (TSN, February 7, 1996, p. 35). Then too, the demeanor by
which Baliber was testifying immediately casts doubt on her motive for taking the witness stand and renders
incredible her testimony. Thus, on several times at the witness stand, she had been observed smiling and not
candid with her declarations. (TSN, February 7, 1996, p. 13). On one occasion, after stating that Adel
Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco have nothing to do with the rape-slay of Aurea Eugenio, witness Baliber
immediately laughed. (Ibid, pp. 25-26).11

The theory of the accused-appellant that Sanggalan "could not truthfully and convincingly convey what really
transpired on that fateful night" because he had no formal schooling in a school for special persons like him
and the interpreter was not the one who had taught him is not tenable.

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. 12 Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
(3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. 13 Thus, in People vs. De Leon14 and People
vs. Sasota,15 the accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. Although in People vs.
Bustos16 the testimony of a deaf-mute was rejected, this was because there were times during his testimony
that the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by the signs she used. In the instant case,
the interpreter was a certified sign language interpreter with twenty-two (22) years teaching experience at
the Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television programs and had testified in five other previous
court proceedings. She possessed special education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial court
evaluated her competence to put on record with accuracy the declaration made by witness Sanggalan on the
witness stand, and she testified that she employed the natural or homemade sign method. 17 Needless to
stress, the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated
and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the
appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of
the particular method adopted.18 The imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellants' brief arise from the
fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-mute, but these do not
detract from the credibility of his testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is material
is that he knew personally the accused-appellants, was with them on the fateful night when the incident
happened, and had personally witnessed the rape-slay and theft three and ½ (3 ½) meters away from the
scene. He did not waver in the identification of the three accused despite rigorous cross-examination, and
positively pointed to the accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her

38
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
personal effects.19 The trial court's assessment of the credibility of Sanggalan, whose testimony was found to
be candid and straightforward, deserves the highest respect of this Court.

Moreover, the testimony of Sanggalan was corroborated by the doctor who conducted the autopsy. Dr. Aguda
testified that Eugenio had nine (9) stab wounds on the neck, fresh hymenal lacerations and massive blood
clots within the vaginal canal, caused, among others, by the entry of a hard foreign object like a bottle and
that the abrasions and hematomas on the cadaver indicated that Eugenio struggled during the assault. 20

The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused-appellants by Sanggalan, and the
attempt of the mother of the accused-appellants, Erlinda Tuangco, a sister, Glessen Tuangco, and the
common-law wife of Adel Tuangco, Liza Reyes, to corroborate such a defense must fail. Moreover, no proof
was adduced to show the physical impossibility of the accused being at the scene of the crime; the evidence
shows that the rape-slay took place in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga,
which was ten to fifteen minutes from the residence of Adel Tuangco in Frances Bukid, Calumpit,
Bulacan.21 In the case of Sonny Tuangco, who went into hiding after learning that his brother Adel was
arrested, and who stayed with a relative in Caloocan City for about one (1) year until he was apprehended by
the police authorities,22 his flight should be taken as an admission of his guilt.

We also find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of conspiracy among the accused-appellants as
rationalized by the trial court thus:

"First, they were together drinking in a pubhouse from where they proceeded to the rice field and stayed
inside a nearby waiting shed.

Second, as soon as the victim was seen walking towards her house, the three (3) accused immediately
followed her.

Third, when they caught up with the victim, they simultaneously attacked her by stabbing her neck with
bladed weapon. Thereafter, when the victim fell down, the accused aided each other in raping the victim.

Fourth, before fleeing from the scene of the crimes, the accused took the victim's cash money and personal
belongings."23
The imposable penalty for the rape with homicide is death. Pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of the Republic Act No. 7659, "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death". Because of the finding of conspiracy in the commission of
the complex crime of rape with homicide, the imposition of two death penalties upon each of the accused-
appellants is correct.24
The imposable penalty for theft is prision correcional in its minimum and medium period, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. In this case, the amount of
P3,000.00 which is the cash taken from the victim, was the only amount proven, as the value of the other
objects taken was not established. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correcional as maximum.
The civil indemnity must also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 25 Thus, the civil
indemnity ex delicto should be P100,000.00 for the victim's death. The award of exemplary damages is
justified in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, as the insertion of the bottle into
the private part of the victim caused unnecessary moral and physical pain while the victim was still alive.
Four justices of this Court, however, have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the
effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon for the crimes of
theft and rape with homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 95-1609(M) and 95-1610(M) is hereby affirmed with the
modification that the civil indemnity ex delicto is increased to P100,000.00.
Upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

39
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
G.R. No. 91116 January 24, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONARDO GERONES, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Custodio P. Cañete for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

For the rape of Liliosa Gargantilla, a mental retardate, a complaint was filed on September 10, 1986 against
Calixto Raga alias "Calix" and Leonardo Gerones alias "Nanding or Narding". The complaint was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of Palo, Leyte. After preliminary investigation, the Municipal Trial Court, finding the
existence of probable cause forwarded the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte.

An information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte charging Leonardo Gerones and
Calixto Raga with the crime of rape. The information reads:

That on or about the 30th day of August, 1986, in the Municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs, and by
means of threats and intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon which Leonardo Gerones had
provided himself for the purpose, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously dragged ( sic)
and pushed (sic) Liliosa Gargantilla to Calixto Raga who had carnal knowledge on said Liliosa
Gargantilla, against her will and consent. (p. 15, Original Records)

Both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial proceeded and a judgment of conviction was
rendered by the trial court. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds clear evidence convincing beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
LEONARDO GERONES and CALIXTO RAGA are guilty of the crime of rape and are hereby sentenced
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua and both are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Liliosa
Gargantilla the sum of P25,000.00 by way of damages. (p. 6, Decision)

From the aforementioned decision, both the accused appealed. However, only accused Gerones filed his brief.
He specifically assigns the following as error allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT, LEONARDO GERONES GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN IMPOSING UPON SAID APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND ORDERING HIM TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE LATE LILIOSA GARGANTILLA
THE SUM OF TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) BY WAY OF DAMAGES, AND ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING SAID APPELLANT INSTEAD.

It is a rule in rape cases that sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason constitutes rape.
(People v. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114 [1988]; People v. Asturias, 134 SCRA 405 [1985]). This is because while,
as in this case, the woman may be 22 years old, her mental capacity may be that of a nine or ten year old
child. Hence, she is incapable of giving consent to the sexual intercourse (People v. Sunga, 137 SCRA 131
[1985]). The necessity of proof beyond reasonable doubt of force or intimidation having been applied is
absent.

The accused-appellant contends that the complaint did not give jurisdiction to the trial court the same having
been signed by a mentally incompetent woman. Initially, a complaint was filed with the barangay captain by
Francisco Gargantilla, the victim's father. Rule 110, Section 5 also provides that in the case of a deceased or
incapacitated person, the State may initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The information filed by the
40
Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Provincial Prosecutor, the complaint initiated by the father, and the complaint filed by the offended party
herself sufficiently confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

The records show that the victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and consistently.
The trial court found Liliosa to have the mental capacity of a ten year old. We are convinced that a ten year
old girl can adequately narrate facts which show that she has been raped. Thus, the trial court observed: ". . .
In the overall, she was able to communicate that the man who is not blind and the man without eyes helped
each other in deflowering her thru force and intimidation. Her narration was crude but she managed to
communicate the traumatic incident" (p. 2, RTC Decision).

Hence, the trial court concluded:

. . . The court observed Liliosa closely when she took the witness stand and the court found that she
comprehend (sic) how the rape was done to her which in the opinion of this court is sufficient in extent. ( ibid)

The case of People v. Rizo, G.R. No. 86743, August 30, 1990 places the determination of the competency of
witnesses to testify in the hands of the trial court. As repeatedly held by this Court, the factual findings of the
trial court as to the guilt of the accused, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses' testimonies are accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge who has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses as they present the same. (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422,
December 29, 1989; People v. Ramos, 167 SCRA 476 [1988])

Moreover, while the psychiatry report states that the victim cannot be expected to be a capable witness, at
the same time it admitted that Liliosa can comprehend the nature of her acts under a limited extent. The
same report concludes that she is verbally productive although she talks in incomplete sentences at times.
What is required by the rules merely is that the witness is able to make her perception known to others.
Thus, Rule 130, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court states: "Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. . . .

Considering the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Liliosa Gargantilla is a competent witness. There
is likewise no reason to doubt her credibility as she had no motive to testify against the accused (People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989] citing People v. Ocampo, 143 SCRA [1986]). No motive can be ascribed to
complainant or to her father and step-mother other than a desire for justice and redress for a terrible wrong.
(See People v. Cayago, 158 SCRA 586 [1988]). She was a poor barrio girl with the mental capacity of a 10-
year old, inexperienced to the ways of the world. It is highly improbable that she would fabricate matters and
impute the crime unless it was true (People v. Baao, 142 SCRA 476 [1986]).

The accused further claims that the evidence presented is against its commission. The finding was that she
was negative for spermatozoa and the laceration was old.

We held in the case of People v. Paringit, G.R. No. 83947, September 13, 1990 that "the presence or absence
of traces of spermatozoa is too immaterial, since it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that
makes for rape (People v. Somera, 170 SCRA 428 [1989]).

As to the laceration, which the defense claims is old and could not have been inflicted on the date of the rape
as it appears in the Information, the same has been sufficiently explained by the findings of Dr. Perez that
"Liliosa is disoriented as to time and person." There is therefore, a great possibility that the rape was
committed earlier than the date which Liliosa has given. The absence of precision in stating the time of the
crime is understandable (People v. Fajardo, 151 SCRA 696 [1987]).

What is decisive in the rape charge is the complainant's positive identification of the accused-appellants as
the malefactors (People v. Mustacisa, 159 SCRA 227 [1987]). The victim was even able to testify that only
one actually had sexual intercourse with her and that was the blind, man while the other man who was not
blind held her and pointed a knife at her while the former was raping her.

Equally important in the consideration of the case are the subsequent actuations of the appellant and his co-
accused which constitute an admission of guilt on their part.

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Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications
Accused Raga offered marriage to the victim which the latter, however, turned down. There was likewise an
attempt to amicably settle the case for the amount of P1,500.00.

Not a few number of cases have established that an offer of marriage is considered an admission of guilt of
the accused (People v. Valdez, 150 SCRA 405 [1987]; People v. Aragona, 138 SCRA 569 [1985]).

The defense of alibi of the appellants is not worthy of belief. Gerones claims that he went to see a movie with
a friend but neither of them was able to remember the movie nor was able to narrate the same.

Raga, on the other hand, admitted that he worked for Gerones 2 days prior to the rape incident but that he
was no longer in the vicinity on August 30. This alibi does not likewise inspire belief As the Solicitor General
pointed out, if there is need for cooking the coconuts to copra the following day, he could have attended and
helped in the last phase of the work which was on August 30.

The defense put up by the accused must fail. The Court has consistently held that the alibi of the accused
that he was not at the rape scene cannot stand against the positive identifications made by the complainant
(People v. Soriano, 122 SCRA 740 [1983]; People v. Deus, 136 SCRA 660 [1985]).

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the judgment of the court a quo by finding the accused guilty of the
crime of rape and, therefore, must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with the modification that the
accused must indemnify the heirs of the late Liliosa Gargantilla, as held in recent cases, the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

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Rule 130. Sec. 20 – Witnesses; their qualifications

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