PCFI v. National Telecommunications Commission Presidential Decree No. 217.

The decision sustained the petitioner’s

contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and
G.R. No. L-63318 August 18, 1984
regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the
FACTS: NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the
decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the permissive “may” and not the mandatory “shall.” The non-
approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi sermo
(SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est
revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no
August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that “there was a necessity departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons
of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the
application of the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba
the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT’s new and intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more
increased SIP rates. It is the submission of the petitioner that the SIP subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an
schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal elementary rule in statutory construction that the word “may” in a
and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required statute is permissive while the word “shall” is mandatory. The rule,
rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an
No. 217. act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent
ISSUE: intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to
admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the
when it approved the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of decree should be construed as mandatory rather than merely
respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised
implementing Presidential Decree No. 217. schedule of PLDT’s SIP. It is untimely, considering the present
economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate
defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership
HELD: among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is
annulled and set aside.
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of
respondent NTC to promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate
opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a
simple problem of statutory construction – that of Section 2 of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO Appeals fell into reversible error in granting the motion for
"reinvestigation" of private respondent.
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH
As already noted, the Court of Appeals cited Tan vs. Securities and
FACTS: Esam Gadi, a national of Saudi Arabia, was apprehended at
Exchange Commission where the Supreme Court held that the term
the Manila International Airport and subsequently detained for
"may" as used in adjective rules is only permissive and not
possession of marijuana on December 31, 1993. A case was filed
mandatory.
against him on January 3, 1994 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
116, Pasay City in violation of section 81 Article 11, of the Dangerous While Tan and the cases there cited show that the use of the term
Drugs Act. After 3 days, Esam Gadi filed an "Ex Parte Motion to "may" is indicative of an opportunity or possibility, they cannot be
Reduce Bail," from P90,000.00 to P30,000.00 but it was denied so he used to support the proposition that the five-day period under
posted bail of P90,000. section 7 of Rule 112 is not mandatory and may be disregarded at
will. The "opportunity" or "possibility" engendered by the use of the
Esam Gadi filed a motion for "reinvestigation," claiming that the
term "may" in this rule relates only to the option of filing a motion
seriousness of the offense charged warranted the grant of his motion
for preliminary investigation; it does not refer to the filing of the
and admitting that it was beyond 5-day period prescribed in Section
motion after the expiration of the five-day period. This rule grants the
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The motion was denied.
accused a right or faculty and not an obligation. In the sense that he
During the arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and challenged the is not obliged to exercise this right, this rule is permissive only; in the
court for the denial of his motion before the CA. The Court of Appeals sense that he may exercise this right only within the five-day period,
granted the petition and reversed the trial court Order denying the rule is mandatory. Put a little differently, Esam Gadi had the
reinvestigation. Citing Tan vs. Securities Exchange Commission, the option or faculty of demanding preliminary investigation; if he
Court of Appeals held that the five-day period for asking wanted to exercise that option, however, he had to exercise it within
reinvestigation was only permissive, considering the use of the word the reglementary period. Upon expiration of that period, his option
"may." The appellate court also relied on Go vs. Court of Appeals and lapsed.
held that a motion for preliminary investigation may be granted even
The denial of Esam Gadi's motion for preliminary investigation is also
if trial on the merits had begun, provided that the motion was filed
warranted by his posting of a cash bail bond without previously or
before arraignment. A Petition for Review was filed.
simultaneously demanding a preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the “motion for
All in all, Esam Gadi's demand for preliminary investigation was an
reconsideration of the accused.
afterthought merely.
RULING: Yes. Deliberating on the Petition for Review and the
Comment of private respondent, the Court finds that the Court of
SAN CARLOS MILLING V. CIR taxpayer implies that the taxpayer need not seek approval of the
Commissioner prior to its effective availment of the tax credit
FACTS:
scheme, it cannot simply credit an amount it deems as correct.
Petitioner domestic corporation had for the taxable year 1982 a total Rather, it provides two (2) remedies, that is, the excess may either be
income tax overpayment of P781, 393 reflected as creditable income refunded or credited, and, insofar as the option of tax credit is
tax. The same amount was reflected in its 1983 tax return including concerned, this right should not be construed as an absolute right
P4,470 representing 3% of 15% withholding tax on storage credits. which is available to the taxpayer at his sole option. It is our view that
Petitioner signified its intention to apply the total creditable amount tax credit under the cited provision should be construed as an
of P785,863 against its 1984 tax dues coupled with a coupled with a alternative remedy (to a refund) subject to the fulfillment of certain
comforting alternative request for a refund or tax credit of the same. requirements, i.e., prior verification and approval by the
Respondent disallowed the proferred automatic credit scheme but Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
treated the request as an ordinary claim for refund/tax credit under
Further, the cited legal provision itself employs the word "may" in the
Section 292 in relation to Section 295 of the Tax Code and accordingly
phrase "may be credited", implying that the availability of the remedy
subjected the same for verification/investigation. Petitioner filed a
of tax credit is not absolute and mandatory; it does not confer an
supplemental petition on March 11, 1986, after having unilaterally
absolute right on the taxpayer to avail of the tax credit scheme if it
effected a set-off of its creditable income tax vis a vis income tax
so chooses; neither does it impose a duty on the part of the
liabilities, earlier denied by the respondent.
government to sit back and allow an important facet of tax collection
ISSUE: to be at the sole control and discretion of the taxpayer.

Whether prior authority from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue As aptly held by this Court in In re Guarina:[6]
is necessary before a corporate taxpayer can credit excess estimated
"Whether the word 'may' in a statute is to be construed as mandatory
quarterly income taxes for the succeeding taxable year.
and imposing a duty, or merely permissive and conferring discretion,
RULING: is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the
statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of
Yes, authority of the CIR is a requisite before a corporate taxpayer the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken
can credit excess taxes paid to estimated tax liabilities. Section 7 of as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it
Revenue Regulation No. 10-77 provides that: “any excess computed can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to
and shown shall either (a) be refunded to the corporation or (b) may enact a law mandatory in character. If it can, then it should be given
be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities” a mandatory effect; if not, then it should be given its ordinary
The above rule is clear. It does not mean that reference to the permissive effect.
amount "shown" in the final adjustment return prepared by the
De Mesa vs Mencias G.R. No. L-24583 October 29, 1966 representation for the protestee whose widow and children he
sought to be declared “non suited”.
Facts: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for
the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa On June 23, 1964, without notice of the protestee and / or his legal
won the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. representative, the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. The trial
Meanwhile, the defeated candidate Argana, filed an election protest court adjudged the protestant Argana as the duly elected Mayor of
against De Mesa charging him of the perpetration of frauds, terrorism Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, and taxed the costs of
and other irregularities in certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased protestee
hand filed a counter-protest and sought to shift responsibility for De Mesa.
irregularities to the protestant and his followers. However, while the
Issue: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a
case is pending Mayor De Mesa was assassinated.
directory or mandatory compliance.
Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on
Held: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the
revision of ballots. On May 6, 1964, the court a quo required the
proceedings in the election protest filed against him, it may be stated
protestee’s widow and children to appear within 15 days from notice
as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to
in order to be substituted for the said protestee, if they so desired.
final judgment despite the death of the protestee. With the death of
They did not, however, comply. The trial court did not order the
De Mesa, however, contingency not expressly provided for by the
opposing party to procure the appointment of the legal
Revised Election Code was ushered in.
representative of the deceased litigant stated under Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules
of Court, said rules, though not generally applicable to election cases,
SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not
may however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
whenever practicable and convenient."
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the
time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the deceased protestee after the latter's widow and children had
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a failed to comply with the court order requiring their appearance to
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall be substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but instead — in
immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. derogation of the precepts of the Rule in question and in the total
. . . (Rule 3.) absence of a legal representative of the deceased protestee. It is no
argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for
Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioner on
the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is
revision of ballots, but this time, without proposing any provision for
couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory were in possession of the land as tenants of Irineo Valdeavella.
word "shall." Having been impleaded, Irineo Valdeavella alleges that he is the
owner of the land and has been in possession thereof for over fifteen
While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be
years.
resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or
directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise The court below rendered judgment in favor of the defendants
absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. holding that Irineo Valdeavella was the owner of the parcels of land
Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, in question and that, moreover, the sheriff's sale under which the
its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it plaintiff claims title to the land was irregular and void inasmuch as
one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as there had not been a sufficient levy on the lands, nor a sufficient
mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory notice of the sale. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals to this
construction. court. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals to this court.

"Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is Two errors were presented by the plaintiff and one of these is that
required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, she contended that the sale, under execution by virtue of which she
municipality or public officer with power and authority to take some claims ownership of the land, was valid.
action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the appellant can be
permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the
sustained.
execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty" (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-543). RULING: No. The levy of an execution is defined as the acts by which
an officer sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying the
command of the writ, a part or the whole of a judgment debtor's
Llenares VS Valdeavella property. In the absence of statutory provisions no special formalities
are required for a valid levy, and in regard to real property it has
FACTS: This is an action in ejectment, the plaintiff alleging that she is
usually been held sufficient if the seizure of the property is made
the owner of two parcels of land in the barrio of Wacas, municipality
known to the occupants thereof and endorsed on the writ. But it is
of Tayabas, having acquired said parcels by purchase at a sheriff's sale
otherwise where, as in this jurisdiction, the matter is regulated by
under a writ of execution issued by the justice of the peace of the
statute; there a substantial compliance with the statute is
municipality of Tayabas in a case in which she was the plaintiff and
indispensable.
the defendant Felisa Valdeavella and her now deceased husband
Zacarias Zabella were the defendants. Felisa Valdeavella contended The statutory provisions to this case, are found in sections 450 and
that she never has been in possession of the parcels as owner; that 429 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 450 states that property
she and her husband some four years prior to the filing of the answer "may be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs of
attachment." This provision while permissive in form must, NHC. He filed a case for illegal dismissal against the NHC before the
nevertheless, be regarded as mandatory. No other method of DOLE, contending that the criminal charges imputed against him are
effecting the levy is prescribed and it is an old rule that powers merely a fabrication made to harass him, as he has previously stood
through the exercise of which a person may be divested of his as witness in the theft case filed against certain officials of NHC. The
property are always strictly construed and that the provisions NLRC certified the complaint for arbitration. However, NHC
regulating the procedure in their exercise are mandatory as to the contended that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case,
essence of the thing to be done. considering that the former is a government-owned and controlled
corporation. The NLRC however countered that the (then 1973)
In the present case it is admitted by the plaintiff that notice of
constitution contemplates only those GOCCs that are created by
attachment for the execution was not filed with the registrar of deeds
special charters, which is not the case for NHC.
and that there was no copy thereof served on the defendants. It is
therefore clear that the attempted levy was not made in accordance ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code
with the provisions of the statute, and, according to the great weight or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service.
of authority, a proper levy is indispensable to a valid sale on
RULING: Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically
execution. A sale unless preceded by a valid levy, is void, and the
provides:
purchaser acquires no title.
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
There having been no sufficient levy of the execution in question, the
instrumentality of the Government, including every government-
plaintiff took no title to the property sold thereunder and the present
owned or controlled corporation. x x x"
action can therefore not be maintained.
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article
XII which stated:
National Housing Corporation vs. Benjamin Juco and the National
"A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Labor Relations Commission
Government shall be provided by law."
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute.
Presidential Decree No. 807 is unequivocal that personnel of
government-owned or controlled corporations belong to the civil
FACTS
service and are subject to civil service requirements.
Benjamin Juco was a project engineer for the National Housing
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify
Corporation when he was implicated in a case of theft and/or
the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."
malversation of public funds. Subsequently, he was terminated by
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. It means all RULING: No. The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed
possible and all, taken one by one. Of course, the decision in this case the judge to give due course to the petitioner’s application for
refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled probation; without costs.
entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by
“Previous” applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission
the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. The petition is
of a crime
hereby GRANTED. The quest-ioned decision of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of The statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not to the
the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction date of the commission of the crime. When the accused applied for
is REINSTATED. probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he
applied for probation the only conviction against him was the
Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]
judgment which was the subject of his application. Conviction does
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.
counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as
Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly Facts:
tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following
criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days. resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general
manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960.
of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of
origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the which stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall
ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In
PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160.
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager
by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary
not less than P200). The court denied the application for probation. injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
petition.

ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation.

Issue: Jose Mapa vs. Hon. Joker Arroyo

Whether or not board resolution No. 24 constitutes a removal or G.R. No. 78585; July 5, 1989
dismissal of petitioner without cause.

Held:
Facts:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March
On 1975, four contracts of sale of subdivision lots were entered by
31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term"
petitioner Jose Antonio Mapa and respondent Labrador
with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory
Development Corporation (Labrador). After petitioner’s failure to pay
scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar,
his unpaid installments, respondent sent a notarial cancellation of
the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the
the four contracts. Such certification was withheld in the demand of
term is rested in the board of directors subject to the
petitioner that respondent must comply with his contractual
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
obligation on Clause 20 to provide for lighting and water facilities to
approval of the president of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks
subdivision lot buyers. Since the petitioner did not paid the agreed
of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.
amount in full, respondent refused to accept his payment. Then,
The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction
petitioner filed a complaint that respondent neglected to meet the
that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or
minimum HSRC standard for water system, and electrical power
ambiguous, its meaning and intention of the legislative must be
supply, and to enjoin respondent to cancel his contracts. The HSRC
determined from the language employed and where there is no
dismissed the complaint by default of the petitioner on the lapse of
ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
5 years. Under P.D. No. 957, petitioner contends respondent cannot
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of rescind the said contracts since he did not cause delay on his part, it
his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on is the latter failing to perform their contractual obligations.
March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
Issue:

Whether respondent is entitled to rescind the contracts of sale with

the petitioner.
Ruling: Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese
Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.
Under Section 20 of P.D. No. 957, “every owner or developer shall
construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures ISSUE:
and other forms of development…within one year from the date of
W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous
the issuance of the license for the subdivision…fixed by the
offense with concealing and harboring.
Authority.” The Court applied the rule ad proximum antecedens fiat
relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest HELD:
antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present
case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides
improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of development," that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses its
far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in
is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the
words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. separation of one act from the other. The words in the information
Moreover, P.D. No. 957 cannot be applied since it was issued on July suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage.
12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts involved. The Court
found that the respondent has the right to rescind the contracts,
petitioner’s suspended payments on the ground of non-
development was improper since the period allowed for
respondent's obligation to undertake such development has not yet
expired. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

PEOPLE V. MARTIN

G.R. NO. L-33487 (MAY 31, 1971)

FACTS:

Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or

the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La
Union, specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court
dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense
with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other