Benedicto v. Dela Rama 3 Phil.

34
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; SUSPENSION OF BOOK 1 OF THE CIVIL CODE.—Titles 4 and 12
of book 1 of the Civil Code, which deal respectively with matrimony and the register of civil status, are
not in force, they having been suspended by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
shortly after the extension of the Civil Code to this Archipelago.

SUSPENSION OF LAWS; POWER OF SPANISH GOVERNOR-GENERAL.—It Was within the

power of the governor-general of the Philippine Islands, under the Spanish regime, to suspend the
operation of a general law, such as the Civil Code.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; LAW OF 1870 NOT OPERATIVE IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.—The

Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 was never extended to the Philippine Islands, with the exception of articles
44 to 78 thereof, which were promulgated in the Archipelago in 1883.

CANON LAW; COUNCIL OF TRENT.—The canon law had no binding force outside of the church
except as to such parts thereof as by the action of the civil authorities became part of the civil law of
Spain. The decrees of the council of Trent have the force of law in Spain and determine the requisites,
form, and solemnities for the celebration of canonical marriage. Although the decrees of the council of
Trent authorize the separation by the church of husband and wife they do not state what the causes of
such separation are, and the laws of the church which do so state the causes have not the force of civil
law.

Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26

There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
“Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution.” “The family is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.” Marriage and the family are the bases of human
society throughout the civilized world. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law
considers as void “any contract for personal separation between husband and wife” and “every
extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.” Before the
new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
sanction was void.

In re Atty. Rufillo Bucana 72 SCRA 14

The Agreement (which in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the
wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man,
without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy) is
contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance
of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society
without which there could be neither civilization nor progress.

Tenchaves v. Escano, supra

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married
on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was
duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in
a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage
to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

Van Dorn v. Rommillo, supra

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Pilapil v. Somera, supra

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany.
They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court in
Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery before the
prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they
were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be
dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner.

Issue:
Is the action tenable?

Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
This is logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the
Civil Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against
petitioner is dismissed.
Garcia-Recio v. Garcia, 366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2001
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and
17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.

Goitia v. Campos – Rueda, 35 Phil. 242

The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when he has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his
own home the one having the right to the same.

People v. Zapanta, 88 Phil. 688

ADULTERY EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME. — Adultery is a crime of result and not of
tendency, as the Supreme Courts of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime
which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569).

LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS
ACTS. — True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same
person — the offended husband, the same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage,
and the same community presented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status.
But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the
crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remains
unchanged, the nexus undissolved, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.
There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as
there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED; REASON. — A second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution, otherwise the adultery by the made defendant charged in the second complaint,
should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that
his codefendant was married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against
the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the
commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that his codefendant was a
married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

DULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE OF UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR PURPOSE.

— The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p.
521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity
of appeal provision infringed upon violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provision are united ion one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In adultery, the last unity does not exist,
because the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they not do another or other
adulterous acts to consummate it.

5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND. — Even if the husband pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would
not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the
pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent, adulterous act.

Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance
of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
It is not mere sexual infidelity that constitutes the ground for legal separation. Such infidelity must
constitute adultery or concubinage as defined by the Revised Penal Code.
Munoz v Barrios, (CA) 51 OG 5247
An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention to kill
the person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful examination of the evidence produced
by appellant we cannot make up our mind to declare that the alleged maltreatments of respondent to his
wife were moved by such intent to kill. On the contrary, we share the opinion of the trial judge who
declared that said maltreatments cannot constitute attempts on the life of appellant as provided in Article
97, No.2, of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222 May 29, 1970

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date
plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of
action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law
provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.

Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 January 31, 1972

An action for legal separation is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum
persona.

Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 709 October 25, 1960

While defendant's act of cohabiting with a woman other than his wife constituted concubinage, a ground
for legal separation, nevertheless, the complaint should be dismissed, because it was not filed within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred (Art. 102, new Civil Code).

The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
the latter has not condoned or consented to the adultery or concubinage committed by the other spouse
(Art. 100, new Civil Code; and plaintiff (innocent spouse) having condoned and/or consented in writing
to the concubinage committed by the defendant husband, she is now underserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts
necessary implied forgiveness. A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after
discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the
husband.

Yangco v. Rohde, 1 Phil. 404 October 13, 1902

The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where the existence of the status is
put in issue by the pleading it can not be presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.

De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13 July 31, 1920

It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is
founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended
to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule.

Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the
theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or
where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement,
or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment
on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's
domicile.

Furthermore, the SC ruled that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which
the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction
against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the pendency of the action.
Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 July 31, 1956
"COOLING OFF" PERIOD; PURPOSE OF; CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ALIMONY AND
SUPPORT "PENDENTE LITE" MAY BE DETERMINED DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD.—
Article 103 of the Civil Code provides that "an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before
six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition." The period of six months fixed therein is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. But this
practical expedient does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article
105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to
the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be
caused.

Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, 46 SCRA 110 July 29, 1972

Ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction is not barred by the six-month statutory
suspension of trial in action for legal separation.—The court where an action for legal separation is
pending according to Article 103 of the Civil Code is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in
the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view that an
ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not be acted on. If it were otherwise,
there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however,
remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what
is set forth in Article 104 of the Code. Here there would appear to be a recognition that the question of
management of the spouses’ respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month
period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal
partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under Article 103 is thereby eased. The
parties may in the meanwhile be heard.

Lerma v. CA., 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of
the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the
conjugal partnership property. We do not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place
Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support,
not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the
pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases.
In the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least,
a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere
filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule
61, supra, which requires, among other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the court
determine provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."

Matubis v. Praxedes, supra

Facts:
In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract
wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and that they should not prosecute each other for
adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their separation. In January 1955, Zoilo
began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a
complaint for legal Separation on the ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and condonation/consent.

Issue:
1.) Did the action prescribe?
2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

Held:
1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within
one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five
years from after the date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was filed
outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to
know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint
only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the
trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b)
of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law
specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented
in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

People v. Sansano, 58 Phil. 73

The husband abandoned his wife who later live with another man. After serving her sentence for adultery,
the husband did not take her back and told her to live however she wanted to live. The husband later on
lived in Hawaii and returned after 7 years to file an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery.
The husband’s conduct warranted the inference that he had consented to the philandering of his wife.

People v. Schneckenberger, 73 Phil. 413 November 10, 1941

Prior Consent; Pardon.—The document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in
which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de acción en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos", while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that
by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.

It was said before (People vs. Guinucod), 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party
from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been
committed. This is a narrow view in no way warranted by the language, as well as the manifest policy,
of the law.

The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "The offended party cannot
institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any
case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers
to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage,
to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between
prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with
his/her dishonor; he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the
wrong. For instance, a husband who delivers his wife to another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not
more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing.
Held: That prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting
the offense.

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73)

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).

Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168 October 18, 1957

Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent,
whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of
agreement, to defend divorce proceedings

Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35 February 23, 1960

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE OF ADULTERY INDEPENDENTLY
OF CONFESSION. - Where there is evidence of the adultery independently of the defendant’s statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted, since it would not be based
on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively on defendant’s confession.

ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION MADE OUTSIDE OF COURT. - Article 101 of the new Civil
Code does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the
court.
COLLUSION MAY NOT BE INFERRED FROM CONFESSION. - Collusion may not be inferred from
the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery, desires the divorce and makes no
defense.

CONDONATION; FAILURE OF HUSBAND TO SEARCH FOR ERRING WIFE. - In the case at bar,
the wife left her husband after the latter discovered her dates with other men. Held: The failure of the
husband actively to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to
the adultery. It was not his duty to search for her.

cf. Brown v. Yambao, supra

The appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from
internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed
except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five
years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340 May 30, 1956

CUSTODY OP MlNOR CHILDREN; GlVEN TO WIFE BY HUSBAND'S PERMISSION; ITS
EFFECT.—Since petitioner merely obtained the husband's permission to bring the minor children to
Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather, petitioner obtained and has
the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. She holds it in the name, on behalf and by
authority of husband, whose agent she, in effect, is. He may, therefore, demand their return at any time,
and she is bound to comply immediately with such demand. She cannot even question his authority to
make it, although she is free to seek a review of the order or decision awarding the custody of minors to
him, and to ask that they be placed under her charge

Laperal v. Republic, 116 Phil 672

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed,
shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for
the benefit of all concerned.

Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng, 103 Phil. 255 March 29, 1958
WHERE WIFE ESTABLISHES RESIDENCE APART FROM THAT PROVIDED BY HUSBAND.—
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and
render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109) and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain
no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she
establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in Such event there is no
plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Goitia v. Campos – Rueda, supra

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January
7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside
the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it
is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion
for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage.
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either
by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation
to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In
the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54 August 11, 1921

It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. The court can only admonish the wife in its decision.

Ramirez-Cuaderno v. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505 November 28, 1964

The court CANNOT impose on the Husband and wife to live together EVEN if this is an obligation under
the NCC (even now in FC) to live together.

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice
his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination
of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his
acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or
origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or loss.

Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision
Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes
of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law;
‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’
of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it
is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that
such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.
So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that
the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

Ko et al. vs. Arambulo et al.

FACTS:
Corazon is the sister of Virginia’s husband Simeon. Corazon and Simeon have another sibling, Augusto,
who predeceased them. Virginia and the heirs of Augusto filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership
with Declaration of Nullity and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against Corazon.

The complaint alleged that Virginia and Simeon, together with Corazon and her husband Felix, acquired
the subject properties through a Deed of Cession.

They executed a Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto’s heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-
indiviso portion of the subject properties.

However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon was able to have the entire subject
properties transferred exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and Augusto’s heirs of
their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the produce of the same.

Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the subject properties. She
alleged that Simeon sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties in her favor.
Hence, Corazon became the sole owner thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the
same to her name.
During trial, it was established that Simeon and Virginia’s marriage had been on bad terms and they’ve
been living separately. The trial court was highly suspicious that Virginia would sign a deed of sale,
consenting to her husband’s decision to sell their conjugal assets to Corazon. Virginia vehemently
disowned the signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Without the conformity of Virginia, according to the trial court, Simeon cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership.

The trial court concluded, thus, that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being falsified, is not a valid instrument
to transfer the one- third share of the subject properties.

The trial court rendered a Decision (1) declaring the plaintiffs Virginia as owner of ONE-THIRD (1/3)
portion of the subject property, and the heirs of Augusto as owners of ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the
subject property, (2) cancelling the TCT’s in the name of Corazon, (3) that Corazon reimburse the
plaintiffs TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of the produce of the properties, subject matter of this case from the time
she appropriated it to herself in 1974 until such time as the 2/3 share are duly delivered to them, and (4)
to pay damages in favor of the plaintiffs.

The trial court’s Decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the parties are co-owners of the subject properties.

(2) Whether or not there was a valid sale between Corazon and Simeon.

(3) If co-ownership of the subject properties exist, whether or not the co-owners are entitled to the
recovery of their share in the subject properties.

RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.

(1) The law which governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family Code.

Proceeding, thus, to the issue of ownership, We find no reason to depart from the RTC’s ruling as
affirmed by the CA.

Augusto’s heirs own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject properties

Respondents, (Augusto’s heirs) claim one-third of the subject properties.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the the courts a quo‘s findings as to the existence and effectivity
of the Deed of Cession giving rights to Augusto’s children over the one-third portion of the subject
property.

Simeon’s heirs, which include Virginia, also own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject properties
Respondent Virginia’s claim as to the other one-third portion of the subject properties is ultimately
anchored upon the Deed of Cession.

We uphold the courts a quo‘s conclusion that one-third portion of the subject properties is indeed part of
Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal properties.

In this case, the subject properties, having been acquired during the marriage, are still presumed to belong
to Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal properties.

(2) We now proceed to determine the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Simeon in favor
of Corazon, covering one-half of the subject properties which was his purported share.

As for the one-third portion of the subject properties pertaining to Augusto’s heirs, We are one with the
CA in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void as the said portion is owned by Augusto’s heirs as
above-discussed and thus, Simeon had no right to sell the same.

It is basic that the object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. Nemo dat quod non habet,
as an ancient Latin maxim says. One cannot give what one does not have.
However, as to the one-third portion commonly-owned by Spouses Simeon and Virginia, Simeon’s
alienation of the same through sale without Virginia’s conformity is merely voidable.

Article 166 of the Old Civil Code explicitly requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership except when there is a showing that
the wife is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or in like situations.

Accordingly, without Virginia’s conformity, the Deed of Absolute Sale between Simeon and Corazon
purportedly covering one-half of the subject properties is voidable.

(3) For the share of Augusto’s heirs, the sale of the same is void as the object of such sale, not being
owned by the seller, did not exist at the time of the transaction. Being a void contract, thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the action to impugn the sale of the same is imprescriptible.

As for the share pertaining to Simeon and Virginia, We must emphasize that the governing law in this
case is the Old Civil Code. Under the said law, while the husband is prohibited from selling the
commonly-owned real property without his wife’s consent, still, such sale is not void but merely
voidable. Article 173 thereof gave Virginia the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within
ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the
marriage, only the value of the property that Simeon erroneously sold.

As far as Virginia is concerned, the Old Civil Code applies, and the CA erred in ruling that the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale is void for the lack of the wife’s conformity thereto. The 10-year prescriptive
period under Article 173 of the Old Civil Code should be applied in this case.

SUMMARY OF THE RULING:

In fine, while We uphold the courts a quo‘s findings that the parties herein are co-owners of the subject
properties.

We reverse and set aside the said courts’ ruling, ordering the cancellation of titles of the entire subject
properties and the transfer of the two-thirds portion of the same to the respondents.

While Augusto’s heirs are entitled to the recovery of their share in the subject properties, Virginia is only
entitled to demand the value of her share therefrom pursuant to Article 173 of the Old Civil Code.

Spouses Abrenica V. Law Firm of Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However,
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before
the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the
income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second
marriage.

V.da de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

(Sorry mahaba, pero this is a long case and importante yung figures, I just pasted yung sinabi ng SC and
yung pertinent provisions in the NCC, compare that with FC 104. Basically this case illustrates how FC
104 is applied - Kikoy)

The total mass of the properties should be divided between the conjugal partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each partnership. Therefore the second conjugal partnership is entitled to 46/64 of the total
mass of properties and the second conjugal partnership is entitled to 18/64. The share of the estate of
Nicolas Delizo is ½ pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership gains of the first and
second marriages which is equivalent to ½ of the whole estate. This will be distributed equally to his
children of both marriages and his widow will have a share equivalent to one child. Additionally, De
Ocampo is also entitled to ½ of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and Villasfer’s share
is equivalent to ½ of the net remainder of the first conjugal partnership therefore these would amount to
23/64 and 9/64 respectively.

Computation of Sharing:
(Whole Estate 64/64)
Share of Rosa Villasfer = 9/64 to be divided among three children
Share of Each Child of 1st marriage (3 children) = 9/64 +1/26 = 142/1664
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo = 23/64 +1/26 = 662/1664
Share of Each Child of 2nd marriage (9 children) = 1/26 = 64/1664
Whole Estate = 32/64 + 13/26 = 1664/1664

APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE:

Article 189. Whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the
same person should be carried out at the same time, in order to determine the capital of each partnership
all kinds of proof in the absence of inventories shall be admitted; and in case of doubt, the partnership
property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
the property belonging to the respective spouses.

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.

Article 185. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the
husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements.

Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

Article 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child

Ballados v. CA, November 19, 1990

Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333 February 16, 1989

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160, Civil Code).

Registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal. And there are cases where there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of
only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage
of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to
rebut the presumption.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff, 64 Phil. 115

PROPERTY RlGHTS; CONJUGAL PROPERTY; WHAT IS.—The fruits of the paraphernal property
form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership.
LIABLE FOR WHAT DEBTS.—The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but not to
the payment of the personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were
productive of some benefit to the family. (Civil Code, arts. 1385, 1386.)
WHEN RIGHT TO SHARE IN CONJUGAL PROPERTY VESTS.—The right of the husband or wife
to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage,
when the conjugal partnership is also dissolved.
ESTOPPEL.—In the enforcement of a judgment against the husband, the judgment creditor, who caused
to have certain amounts belonging to the joint bank accounts of the spouses levied on execution, can not
be said to have been intentionally and deliberately led to believe that said amounts were conjugal property
subject to all debts and obligations of the husband, only because the spouses failed to allege that said
amounts were the exclusive property of the wife, when, as a matter of fact, they claimed that, while said
amounts form part of the assets of their conjugal partnership, they could not be levied upon, because they
were not subject to the payment of the personal obligations of the husband.
Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271, February 11, 2003

Where the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New
Civil Code apply.—Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code,
the provisions of the New Civil Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
“The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage
at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses; x x x.” The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code, which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership—the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear.—Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.

PNB v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370

The conjugal partnership is liable for obligations contracted during marriage, and in default of conjugal
property, the spouses are jointly liable therefor with their private properties, unless by express stipulation,
they shall have bound themselves solidarily

Laperal v. Katigbak 10 SCRA 493

There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art.
160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the same law is
un equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the property) belongs exclusively to the
husband or the wife." And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case
where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven.

Barciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53

Retirement premium forms part of conjugal estate, absent proof to contrary.—As to the retirement
premiums totaling P9,700.00, the same is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that the
premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such
being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and
the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal
heirs.

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil. 255

PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY RlGHT OF WlFE TO RECOVER WHEN SOLD BY HUSBAND
WITHOUT HER CONSENT.—V claimed that he had purchased certain jewels from F. M, the wife of
F, claimed that such jewels were her sole and separate property, acquired from her mother; that as such
paraphernal property she exercised dominion over them; that she had the exclusive control and
management of the same; that they had not been delivered to her husband to be administered or controlled
by him; that, inasmuch as they had not been delivered to her husband to be administered by him, she
could not be deprived of them by any act of his, without her consent, and without a compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. (Arts. 1382, 1384.) Held: That M was entitled to recover from V the
possession of said jewels.

Plata v. Yatco 12 SCRA 716

The subsequent conveyance of paraphernal property does not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal
property, there being no proof that the money paid came from common or conjugal funds.

Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 320

One claiming that certain property is the separate estate of the husband, brought by him to his marriage,
must establish that fact by evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption established in article 1407
of the Civil Code that all the property of the spouses is conjugal partnership property (bienes
gananciales).
Veloso v. Martinez, supra
Facts:
1. Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of
land together with the sum of P125 per month.
2. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff
and recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff.
3. The jewels in question before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to
the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother.
4. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was
appointed as the adminsitratrix.
5. A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and gave as security
the jewelry.

Issue: whether or not jewelry is conjugal property

Held: NO
6. It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the
box where the jewelry was kept remained with the deceased.
7. Defendant now denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised
to redeem the same by paying the amount due.
8. Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her
mother. It is part of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the same.
9. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it
to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her
husband, in any manner, or for any purpose.

Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372

The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab
initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case,
the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.

Palanca v. Smith-Bell, 9 Phil. 131

When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belonging to his wife, with the consent of the
latter, the money becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are invested in the construction of a house
the building is likewise conjugal property and is liable for the debts of the husband.

Lim Queco v. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 163

The wife alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although she guaranteed repayment with
a mortgage on her parapherna executed with her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have the
management or representation of the conjugal partnership where the husband is qualified therefor, the
loan to her constituted a transaction that did not involve the community, and the creditor could seek
repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, as this Court then held, the money loaned to the
wife, as well as the property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's exclusive property.

Torela v. Torela, 93 SCRA 391

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was acquired during
the marriages.—While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above
stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was acquired during
the marriages.—While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above
stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.
PNB v. CA, 158 SCRA 435
When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata
Montemayor, widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage loan
applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted and registered
in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemaor, the
PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties
owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said
registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the
same.

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land gas a right to rely
upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispose with the need if inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The
presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it
appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was
already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing
as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The
PNB had no reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the properties mortgaged.
For all legal purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage covering said
properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the title of the mortgagor.

At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions, however, they
are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not
being a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of
the said decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of
the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering
said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all other heirs or co-owners
thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value
in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question.

Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 252

(Another long case, basically yung doctrine is, if the land is acquired through fraud the presumption that
it is part of the CPG is not applicable. Another doctrine is that the phrase “Married to_______” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the owner. - Kikoy)

From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact
that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein, Martin
Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of title has been established by evidence no
longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, on
the authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 and Stuart vs. Yatco, 18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon
written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal"
property of Lacerna and petitioner hereyn. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in
Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which arises by
implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason
that the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's marriage
to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the
presumption does not operate where there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired applies with even greater force here.
Cuenca v. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In
the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon
v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29,
1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that
the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of
Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered
the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v. Montejo, supra) The fact that these parcels
were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner
Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by
the documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto
Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights
of innocent third parties are involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Nable
Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the
presumption should also be upheld.

Dela Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

Andrade v. Tan, G.R. No. 171904 and 172017, August 7, 2013

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.—Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is
Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the
property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x
x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership,
the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted
only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

Zulueta v. Pan AM, SCRA 1

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiff’s contract of carriage with defendant, for which
plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said damages, there’re
fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The
damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or other
provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which chapter is entitled “Paraphernal
Property”. What is more if “that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses” and “that” which is purchased with the exclusive money
of the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that
which is acquired with money of conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1988)

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends
that the disputed property is paraphernal.
d. If property bought by installments FC 118
(Under NCC: Castillo v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102)

It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in 1932, the
property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate
property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said
Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only.
The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the circumstance of the sale of the fishpond in
question being made by the original owners in favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and Macaria
Pasco, is indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be deemed paraphernal or
conjugal.
Calimlim v. Fortun 129 SCRA 675 (1984)
Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.

The Court held that both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal
buildings were first constructed thereon. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was
subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to
retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code)

Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474

It has been held by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive
property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.

It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may use both the land and the building, but it does
so not is owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct.

The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be
demanded in the liquidation of the partnership

Javier v. Osmena, 34 Phil. 336

Inasmuch as "the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage coming from the
partnership property, or from that which belongs to either one of the spouses," is community property,
according to article 1401; and, further, as the law expressly provides that "the fruits of the paraphernal
property form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of the
marriage expenses" (art. 1385), hence it follows that the creditor of the husband may bring his action,
not against the paraphernal property, but against the fruits and revenues of this private property of the
wife.

This conclusion is not barred by the provision of article 1386, to wit, that "the personal obligation of the
husband cannot be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal property unless it be proven that they were
incurred for the benefit of the family." It is chiefly upon this article that appellee's whole brief is based.
Vda. De Sta. Romana v. PCIB, 118 SCRA 330
Conjugal Partnership; Unpaid purchase price of lot bought by the deceased husband in behalf of the
conjugal partnership chargeable against the partnership assets as the obligation was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.—The action filed by private respondent against the petitioner Ramon
Sta. Romana was clearly a suit to enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership. Civil Case No. 7678
arose out of the failure of Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the purchase price of a lot he bought from C.N.
Hodges presumably in behalf of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner does not deny the conjugal nature
of both Lots Nos. 1258-G and 1258-F. Indeed she bases her contention on the claim that at least Lot No.
1258-F, together with its improvements existing thereon, constitutes property of the conjugal partnership.
It may not be denied, therefore, that the liability incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable against
the conjugal partnership assets, it being undisputed that the said obligation was contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 161 [1], Civil Code.)

Inclusion of wife as party defendant in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation either
pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership in order to bind the conjugal
partnership property, not necessary; Reasons.—The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a party-
defendant in Civil Case No. 7678 is immaterial. There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against
the husband to enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal
partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by his wife. The contrary rule is prescribed in Section
4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil Code, but not the other way around, obviously
in recognition of the legal status of the husband as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art.
112, Civil Code.) There was, therefore, no need of including the petitioner as a party in Civil Case No.
7678 for the purpose of binding the conjugal partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment
that could be rendered therein.

DBP v. Adil, 161 SCRA 307 (1988)

The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: “Art. 1112.
Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right
to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation
results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.” There is no doubt that prescription
has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10, 1940. However, when respondent Confesor
executed the second promissory note on April 11,1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered
by the previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the
foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his
right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This Court had ruled in a similar
case that—"x x x when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But
a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable x x x.”
Thus, it has been held—“Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises
to pay it after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the
benefit of prescription.”

Effects of a new express promise to pay a debt.—This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt
that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is
the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but
does not discharge the debt. “A new express promise to pay a debt barred xxx will take the case from the
operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation
merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral
obligation to support a promise, to wit—a preexisting debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new
promise; the new promise upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.”
“x x x x x It is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgment as a
legal implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the
remedy (which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his
original contract.”

Conjugal Partnership; Husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership under Art. 165 of the Civil
Code.—WE disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case,
respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence
the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
Luzon Surety v. de Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)
The benefit accruing to the family must be clear and not fanciful and remote before the conjual
partnership can be held liable. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his
reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the
express terms of the provision.

BA Finance v. CA 161 SCRA 608

The fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by
the private respondent Lily

Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred
the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it
appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from
the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary
to the express provision of the Civil Code.

Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361, April 9, 2002

While Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his
wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of Manuel Abelardo and his family. Hence,
notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of Manuel Abelardo, under Art. 121 of the Family Code, he
shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153

Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon spouses may be charged against the partnership assets
even before the liquidation of the partnership.—Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or
wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability may be enforced
presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. The termination of the conjugal partnership is
not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt may still remain should be erased by the concluding
portion of Article 163 of the Civil Code which provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Reason for Article 163 of Civil Code.—The reason for Article 163 of the Civil Code is in accord with
the principle that every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable. If the fines and
indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife were to be allowed only after liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the effect would be to exempt the accused from civil liability and the heirs of the
offended party would be made to suffer still further. Article 163 of the Civil Code minimizes the
possibility that such additional liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory. In doing justice to the
heirs of the victim, no injustice is committed against the family of the offender because it is made a
condition under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 covering
primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of the children of the spouses as well as other
obligations of a preferential character are first satisfied.

Proof of requisites for applicability.—Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 of the
Civil Code are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership
is- made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity to show that the requisites for the
imposition and enforcement of the fines and indemnities against the conjugal partnership are obtaining,
should not be most exacting, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the
case may be, representing the conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its obligation
irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended party,
NCC: Ysasi v. Fernandez 23 SCRA 1079
Husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership.—The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law (Article 165, Civil Code). More, the
husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled—as of right—to joint administration (De la
Rosa vs. Barruga (unreported), L-2368, June 30, 1950). The husband may even enforce right of
possession against the wife who has taken over the administration without his consent. And, the wife
may be punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets (Perkins vs. Perkins,
57 Phil. 205, 211). She may be required to render full and complete accounting of such properties
(Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271, 281).

When wife may ask the court to remove administration of the conjugal properties from the husband.—
Of course, it is the wife’s prerogative to ask the courts to remove administration of the conjugal properties
from the husband for her protection. This, Article 167 of the Civil Code concedes, thus: “Art. 167. In
case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts,
on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of
property” (Italics supplied).

NCC: Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, 120 SCRA 628

According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of the
parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity
to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband
alone but to both spouses. The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported
by the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.) The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their
children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they
merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she
could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares 410 SCRA97, August 28, 2003

[T]here is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using the
conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that
the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her
action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly
within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period
from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a
contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action would still be within the prescribed period.

De la Cruz v. De La Cruz, 22 SCRA 333

If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's
leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same
zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife
and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of
property. This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the
remedies granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the
husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from
want. Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but
merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.

Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012

W/N a foreigner may seek reimbursement from a former spouse in a petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership?

IN THIS CASE, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed
a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728

Fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is not a determining factor of
their right to allowance under Art 188 of the Civil Code; While the Rules of Court limit allowances to
the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the Civil Code gives the surviving spouse
and his or her children without distinction.—The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right
to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo Santero.

Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the
right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired
by Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule; "Spouse" interpreted to be the
legitimate spouse, not common-law spouse.—Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law,
gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate
spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.

Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 24 SCRA 837

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.

In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be
prejudiced by the said arrangements.
Maxey v. CA, 129 SCRA 187 of NCC 144
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil
partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share
in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of this Court.

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial
precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works,
the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the
two of them.

The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman
from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual
goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing
her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.

Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present
case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was
also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of
the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of,
and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615
MARRIAGE; ILLEGAL MARRIAGES; WHEN MARRIAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY
ATTAQCKED. – Where the marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void for being in violation of
Section 29 of the Marriage Law, the marriage is subject to collateral attack in the intestate proceedings
instituted by judicial administratix for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in the conjugal property.

BURDEN OF PROOF – As a general rule, a marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
is null and void. The only exceptions are mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 29 of the
Marriage law. The burden is on the part of the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under
it.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; TERMINATION; FORFEITURE OF SHARE OF SPOUSE – Facts:

Defendant contracted two marriages. The second marriage was contracted by the first wife from the
second wife. The second marriage was contracted in 1935 when the Spanish Civil Code was still in force
and terminated in 1958 when the NCC was already in force. May the second wife invoke Article 1417
of the Spanish Civil Code and have a declaration of forfeiture of share of the husband in the conjugal
partnership having given cause for the nullity of the second marriage? Held: No, the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage terminated by the husband’s death in 1958. By that time, the Spanish
Civil Code was no longer in force.

Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315

The respondent GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of
the late Jose Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one
hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the other; and the lower court did
not commit error when it confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second
marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith. The lower court has correctly
applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the
stipulation of facts and in the decision appealed from.5 In the recent case of Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214,
June 30, 1970, 6 this Court, in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man
— a situation more or less similar to the case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz —
held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " And
with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed
by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."

Yap v. CA, 145 SCRA 229

There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the second
marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages were
celebrated. Second wife got no share in the estate of the husband only the legal wife.
Carino v. Carino, 351 SCRA 127, February 2, 2001
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”—
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration
of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.—Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to
the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of
the same married man,—x x x In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.

Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

The SC had ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.

Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
Edilberto himself admitted to the need to prove contributions in such a union wherein he quoted the
ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar in his petition where he stated that it is necessary for each of the partners
to prove his or her actual contributions to the acquisition of propery in order to be able to lay claim to
any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. Such statement is
a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other],
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.