31st BCI Respondent Edited
31st BCI Respondent Edited
2019
TC-18
Before
2019
V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS - - - - - - - II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES - - - - - - - - IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION - - - - - - - VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS - - - - - - - - VIII
QUESTIONS PRESENTED - - - - - - - - X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS - - - - - - - XI
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES - - - - - - - 1
I. WHETHER THE ACT OF MR. RAJESH FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF “RAREST OF RARE”
CASES? 1
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED WAS VITIATED BY ILLEGALITY? 2
A. CONDUCT OF COUNSEL HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE FINAL CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIAL
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
& And
AP Andhra Pradesh
All. Allahabad
Anr. Another
Bom. Bombay
Co. Company
Govt. Government
Hon`ble Honorable
Id. Ibid
Ltd. Limited
Mr. Mister
Mad. Madras
MP Madhya Pradesh
No. Number
HC High Court
Ors. Others
Pg. Page
Raj. Rajasthan
Re. Reference
Pvt. Private
SC Supreme Court
Sd/ Signed
UP Uttar Pradesh
V. Versus
Vol. Volume
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED
1. Bhagwan Tukaram Dange v. State of Maharashtra, App. (Cr.) No.1823 of 2008 (2014)
2. State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Hariram Ray, App. (Cr.) No. 545 & 628 of 2013 (2015)
5. Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 (8) Scale 339.
JOURNALS REFERRED:-
2. Crimes
4. Scale
BOOKS REFERRED:-
1. Basu D.D., Commentary of the Constitution of India, (8th ed., 2011), Vol.1. & Vol.2.
2. C. K. Takwani & M.C. Takwani, Criminal Procedure (3rd Ed., Lexis Nexis
3. Datar A.P., Datar on Constitution of India, (1st ed., 2001), Wadhwa and Co.
4. Dr. K.I. Vibhute, PSA. Pillai Criminal Law (11thEd., Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur)
5. Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, (6th ed., 2010), Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Vol.1.
7. Justice C.K. Thakkar, Encyclopaedia Law Lexicon, (Ashoka Law House, New Delhi,
2010)
9. K.D. Gaur, Commentary on the Indian Penal Code (2 nd Ed., Universal Law
10. K.D. Gaur, Criminal Law Criminology and Administration of Criminal Justice (3rd
11. Kashyap S.C., Constitution of India, (2006), Universal Law Publishing Co.
12. M.R. Mallick, R.K. Bag, A.N. Saha Criminal Reference (6thEd., Eastern Law House,
2009)
13. R. P Kathuria`s, Law of Crimes and Criminology (3rd Ed.,Vinod Publications, 2014)
14. S.C. Sarkar, P.C. Sarkar & Sudipto Sarkar, The Code Of Criminal Procedure (11 th
15. Sathe S.P., Administrative Law, (7th ed., 2004), Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa.
16. Seervai H.M., Constitutional Law of India, (4th ed., 2010), Universal Law Publishing
LEGAL DICTIONARIES:
4. Greenberg Daniel, Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, (4th ed.),
DATABASES REFERRED:-
1. http://www.scconline.com (last visited on 19th January, 2016).
2. http://www.manupatra.com(last visited on 17th January, 2016).
3. http://www.westlaw.org(last visited on 16th January, 2016).
4. http://www.indiankanoon.com(last visited on 20th January, 2016).
5. http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited on 20th January, 2016).
6. http://www.judis.nic.in (last visited on 20th January, 2016).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsels representing the petitioner have endorsed their pleadings before the
Hon`ble High Court of Maharajya under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiva in
which the Hon`ble Court has the jurisdiction.1
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments.
1
Article 226, in The Constitution Of India 1950:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person
may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon`ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarized as follows:
1. Mr. Rajesh murdered his wife in a drunken rage at his house, fled the scene and took
shelter in his friend Vicky’s house. Vicky, on learning what had happened, caught
hold of Mr. Rajesh and handed him to the police. Mr. Rajesh was tried by the
Sessions Court and convicted of offences punishable under S.302 of IPC and
sentenced to life imprisonment in 2006
2. Mr. Rajesh was sent to the central prison in Nampur. While he was there, he became
friends with his cellmate, Mr. Naresh. With time, Rajesh and Naresh became close
friends and Naresh suggested that Rajesh marry his daughter.
3. In the year 2009, Rajesh was released on bail from the prison and the marriage
between Rajesh and Naresh’s daughter was solemnized. Rajesh’s wife delivered twin
baby boys.
4. However, by the year 2012, Rajesh had started suspecting the fidelity of his wife. One
night, Rajesh, in a fit of anger, hacked his wife to death using an agricultural spade.
He then killed his two children who were sleeping.
5. According to the neighbours who rushed in, Rajesh was trying to commit suicide
when they discovered him and overpowered him.
6. The lawyer did not cross examine witnesses of the prosecution nor did he produce any
evidence on behalf of the defence. The Sessions Court sentenced Rajesh under S.302
and 303 of the IPC to death.
7. The matter was referred to a third judge of the High Court when division bench could
not come on consensus, third judge felt that there was no discretion in the matter and
confirmed the sentence of death. Mr Rajesh submitted a mercy petition to the
President of Indiva which came to be rejected in the year 2015.
8. On 11.09.2018, the black warrant for the execution of Mr Rajesh was issued by the
appropriate authority. The very next day, human rights activists from an organisation,
‘Peoples Human Rigts Association, Maharajya’ filed a Public Interest Litigation
claiming that Mr. Rajesh cannot be executed on the grounds that his trial is vitiated by
illegality and his execution would violate several provisions of the Constitution of
Indiva.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The following questions are presented before this Hon’ble court for adjudication in the
instant matter:
I. WHETHER THE ACT OF MR. RAJESH FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF „RAREST OF
RARE‟ CASES?
III. WHETHER THE DELAY IN EXECUTION OF DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES ARTICLE 21 AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. ACT OF MR. RAJESH FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF “RAREST OF RARE” CASES.
Act of Mr. Rajesh falls under the category of “rarest of rare” cases because of the nature &
circumstances of the crime and the provisions which are manner of commission of the crime,
socially abhorrent nature of the crime and such act which shocks the collective conscience of
the community.
III. DELAY IN EXECUTION OF DEATH SENTENCE NOT VIOLATES ARTICLE 21 AND IT CANNOT BE
A GROUND IN COMMUTING DEATH SENTENCE OF MR. RAJESH.
Delay cannot be a ground for commutation of death sentence because delay can only be taken
as a ground for commutation of death sentence when it is beyond prisoner’s control but in the
present case the delay has been caused by Mr. Rajesh himself.
I. ACT OF MR. RAJESH MURDERING HIS WIFE FALLS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF “RAREST
OF RARE” CASES.
1. The present act of Mr. Rajesh killing his wife and two children falls into the category of
“rarest of rare” cases. It is significant to mention that there is no hard and fast criterion of
“rarest of rare” cases and special circumstances has to be taken into consideration.2 However,
the Apex Court has, from time to time, enumerated certain factors which have to be taken
into consideration by court for putting an incident in category of “rarest of rare case” which
are: manner of commission of the crime, socially abhorrent nature of the crime and such act
which shocks the collective conscience of the community.3 In other words, it is the nature
and gravity of the crime which are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a
criminal trial.4 In the present case, act of the accused fulfils all the criterion of the doctrine of
“rarest of rare” cases.
2
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883.
3
Saibanna v. State Of Karnataka, App. (Crl.) 656 of 2004; See also: Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab,
AIR1983 SC 957.
4
Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 (8) Scale 339.
5
AIR 1983 SC 957; See also: Bachhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.
6
Sudam v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 7 SCC 125.
apply doctrine of “rarest of rare” cases.7 In the present case, accused hacked his own children
with agricultural implement which clearly establishes that his act falls under the purview of
“rarest of rare” cases.
Act of accused shocks the collective conscience of the community.
4. Killing someone is a different case but when an individual kills his wife and infant children
then such act directly affects the collective conscious of the society. Father is considered
protector of his children; he is always in the position of trust. However, in the present case
father became killer of his own infant children and cut them into pieces. Killing innocent
children is in itself an act of brutality but if father has killed his own infant children then
certainly such act shocks the collective conscious of the community. Therefore, act of
accused shocks the collective conscience of the community and falls under the purview of
cases. In such an open case, it is not possible for the defence counsel to produce even single
evidence. Consequently, non-production of the evidence by defence counsel nowhere
establishes his ineffectiveness.
8. Furthermore, defence counsel did not cross examine witnesses of the prosecution which is an
omission of the important exercise in the trial. However, in order to establish that trial
became illegal due to this, it has to be established that if counsel had performed adequately,
the result would have been different,11 which means either Mr. Rajesh would have been
acquitted or given lesser punishment. In the present case it has been already established that
matter of the accused was already an open and shut case. Thus, omission of cross
examination by defence counsel had no prejudice to the trial of Mr. Rajesh.
9. Therefore, also, non-production of the evidence by defence counsel and omission of cross
examine does not establish that conduct of counsel had adverse effect on the final conclusion
of the trial which is death sentence.
B. Decision of the Sessions Court is legal.
10. In the present case, Sessions Court convicted Mr. Rajesh under Sections 302 and 303 of IPC.
Though Section 303 is unconstitutional, it is pertinent to mention here that consideration of
Section 303 is irrelevant in present case. Sessions Court convicted him under Section 302
also which is a relevant provision here. It has been already established that matter of Mr.
Rajesh falls in the category of rarest of the rare cases, thus, even if we set aside Section 303
of IPC, still he would be sentenced to the death under Section 302 of IPC.
11. It is a settled position of law that after removing illegal provisions from the ruling of the
Court, if punishment remains same then such ruling will be valid and removed provision
would be considered mere an irregularity in the decision.12 The Code of Criminal Procedure,
like all other procedural laws, is to further ends of justice and not to frustrate it by
introduction of endless technicalities.13
12. Therefore, in present case there is no relevancy of Section 303 of IPC because even after
setting aside Section 303 from the trial, quantum of punishment remains exactly same under
Section 302 of IPC due to the nature of the crime.
C. Confirmation of death sentence by the High Court bears no illegality.
11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); See also: State of Delhi v. Mohd. Afzal Guru, 2003
VIIAD Delhi 1.
12
State of Chhattisgarh v. Hariram Ray, App. (Cr.) No. 545 & 628 of 2013 (2015); See also: Suresh Kumar Ray
v. Raju @ Rajesh Ray, 2013 CriLJ 4671.
13
William Slaney v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116.
13. In the present case, confirmation of death sentence by the High Court is completely legal in
the eyes of the law. Referred judge of the High Court, after analyzing the applied provisions
and nature of the crime, decided not to use his judicial discretion.
14. Judicial discretion can be understood through Section 366 of Cr.P.C. because High Court
confirms the death sentence under this provision referred by Sessions Court. However, if the
matter falls in any of the exceptions to the 'rarest of rare' cases, the judge may exercise its
judicial discretion while imposing life imprisonment in place of death sentence.14 Thus, if
any matter falls under the exceptions of “rarest of rare” cases, High Court judge can alter
death punishment by using his discretion or if he feels that referred case is “rarest of rare”
cases he can confirm the death sentence by deciding not to use his discretion.
15. In the present case it is clearly given that judge felt not to intervene once he analyzed the
nature of the crime and Section 302. If he would have blindly relied on the applied provisions
specifically Section 303 of IPC then it was not possible for him to analyze the nature of the
crime because this provision clearly excludes judicial discretion.
16. Therefore, it can be safely inferred that after setting aside Section 303, third judge considered
Mr. Rajesh’s matter as rarest of the rare under Section 302 of IPC and decided not to use his
judicial discretion by confirming the death sentence.
III. DELAY WAS NOT BEYOND THE CONTROL OF ACCUSED AND EXECUTION OF DEATH
SENTENCE WILL NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14 & 21.
17. It is humbly submitted before this Hon`ble court that delay was not beyond the control of
accused and execution of death sentence will not violate Article 14 & 21. The mercy petition
has been rejected as per Article 72 of COI and settled position of Law.
A. Delay was not beyond the control of accused.
18. As per the settled position of law inordinate and unexplained delay is one of the grounds of
commutation of death sentence. However, delay caused by circumstances, should be beyond
the prisoner‟s control.15 In the present case, accused waited for 15 years to be discovered by
prison authorities. In the meantime he never tried to know about his status in prison.
19. In the present case it has been claimed that accused has faced mental agony because of delay
in execution. It is given that because of the oversight of prison authorities Mr. Rajesh was not
kept in the death row cells at the prison. If he would have asked about his status from prison
authorities anytime during those 15 years, certainly prison authorities would come to know
14
Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 1357.
15
Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1.
about this oversight and would have send him in the death row cells at the prison from where
without any inordinate delay he would have been executed. However, he remained silent so
that he can save himself from execution and now petitioner on behalf of Mr. Rajesh wants to
have benefit of delay in execution.
20. Aforesaid mention submission clearly establishes that Mr. Rajesh is not honest on his part.
21. Therefore, commutation of death sentence on a ground of delay claimed by petitioner has no
significance because this delay was caused by Mr. Rajesh`s ignorance. Consequently, in the
present case, there is no applicability of Article 21 of COI because the delay was caused by
ignorance of Mr. Rajesh about his status in the prison, thus negating him to claim his right.
B. Execution of death sentence does not violate Mr. Rajesh`s fundamental right under
Article 14.
22. It has been already established that the present case was decided on the basis of Section 302
of IPC and the nature of the crime leaving no possibility to adjudge it as an exception to the
doctrine of “rarest of the rare” cases.
23. It is imperative to note that in the present case there is no relevancy of Section 303 of IPC
because after setting aside Section 303, quantum of punishment remains same under Section
302 of IPC due to the nature of the crime.
24. Since, Section 303 of IPC has not been taken into consideration while sentencing Mr. Rajesh
to death punishment, the question of violation of Mr. Rajesh`s fundamental right under
Article 14 of COI does not hold any relevance and execution of death sentence cannot be
held unconstitutional.
C. Mercy petition rejected by President of Indiva is as per Article 72 and settled
position of Law.
25. In the present case President has taken into consideration relevant materials put before him
i.e., the nature of the crime, circumstances under which the crime was committed, has applied
his mind and then only he passed the order of rejection of mercy petition, non-arbitrarily.
26. It is a settled position of law that courts can only judicially review the materials on the basis
of which mercy petition was rejected or accepted as the power of President under Article 72
of Constitution is beyond judicial scrutiny per se.16
27. The judicial trend over the years depicts that to challenge the decision of President it has to
be evident that he has not considered the relevant materials or not applied his mind. Thus, in
16
Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 3385; See also: Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India,
(2014)3 SCC 1
the present matter President has used his powers under Article 72 in an unbiased, proper and
non-arbiter manner.
28. Therefore, the above arguments clearly establish that trial was not vitiated by illegality and
the execution would not lead to violation of any provision of the Constitution of Indiva.
Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited &arguments advanced, may
this Hon`ble Principal District and Sessions Court be pleased to adjudge & declare that:
5. Petition is dismissed.
AND
Pass any other order that it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity & good conscience.
On behalf of
Sd/