Natres Digest Cases 9 16
Natres Digest Cases 9 16
Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676 When one of the two titles is held to be superior over the
June 30, 1971 other, one should be declared null and void and should be
ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner
Facts: of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said
party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said
The land in question is covered by two Certificates of Title, valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral
one in the name of Diego Pajomayo OCT No. 1089 issued proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title
under Free Patent and OCT No. 14034, in the name of the that had previously been issued in accordance with the
Defendant Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 provisions of the land Registration Law (Act 496).
of Malasique Cadastre.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the CFI of Pangasinan a
the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by
complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of a
virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the
parcel of land duly registered as OCT No. 1089 in the name of
government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
Diego Pajomayo; that they had acquired the land as an
therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to
inheritance from the latter; that they and their predecessor-
the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought
in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted
within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title
possession of said property in the concept of owners for a
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
period of more than 70 years until the early part of the year
provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the
1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said
expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title
property, resulting in their having suffered annual damages of
becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued
P1,100.00 for the crops of rice; mongo, corn and vegetables
in a registration proceeding.
that they failed to harvest; and P800.00 for expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs prayed that they
[Provision for reference: Section 122 of the Land Registration
be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in
Act (Act 496)]
question, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the
land and pay them the damages they have suffered.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two
certificates of title are issued to different persons covering
The defendants on the other hand alleged that they are the
the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No.
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of
14043. The defendants claim they had acquired the land
successive registration where, more than one certificate is
mentioned in by inheritance from their deceased father, and
issued over the land the person holding under the prior
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more
relies on the second certificate.
than 70 years, to the reclusion of plaintiffs; and that as
possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land
improvements worth P1,000.00. They prayed that the CASE #10
plaintiffs be ordered to pay them damages in the sum of
P500.00; and, in the alternative should judgment be rendered Lee Hong Hok v. David, G.R. No. L-30389
against them, that the plaintiffs ordered jointly and severally December 27, 1972
to pay them the sum of P1,000.00 representing the value of
the improvements they have introduced on the land. As Facts:
affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs'
action is barred by res-judicata and/or prescription and that Petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the CA affirming
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the the lower court judgment which dismissed the complaint to
case. declare null and void the Torrens Title awarded to herein
respondent, Aniano David. According to the facts, since the
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs stating that OCT No. 1089 filing of the sales application of Aniano and during all the
held by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than OCT No. 14034 proceedings in connection with said application, up to the
held by the defendants, and ordered the cancellation of actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-
defendants’ title. appellant did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
thereto. (This is fatal to them because after the registration
Issue: and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
Which of the two original certificates of title should prevail? automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496
subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under
Held:
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of
the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in
one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, "question the
indefeasible). [title] legally issued."
David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales IMPERIUM & DOMINIUM
application in accordance with which an order of award and
for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of The former is the government authority possessed by the
Lands on June 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga sovereignty, and the latter its capacity to own or acquire
Cadastre, on the basis of the order of award of the Director of property.
Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent In the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904.
No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the
Register of Deeds of Naga City to Aniano David on October Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias in these words: “… all
1959. lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant
be restored to us according as they belong to us … all the rest
Petitioners allege that they acquired ownership of the land of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
through accretion. The land in question, however, is not a dispose of as we may wish.”
private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
public character thereof for having been formed by Government" that "as to the unappropriated public lands
reclamation. constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." They continue to possess that
The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of David. character until severed therefrom by state grant. Where, as in
this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
Issues: disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable. What was held in
1. Whether or not authoritative doctrines preclude a party Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds application.
other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in
and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
land patent after one year. ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any
2. Whether or not petitioners can still assail the validity of other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property
David’s patent after one year from the issuance thereof. must be held to be public domain." For it is well-settled "that
no public land can be acquired by private persons without
Held:
any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
RTC and CA are affirmed. indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the
state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
I. Yes.
II. No.
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands,
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated:
pursuant to a void patent. "The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the
This was not done by said officers but by private parties like same in that both are against the whole world, both take the
the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of
issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registration issued is conclusive and final." Such a view has
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as been followed since then. The latest case in point is Cabacug
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after v. Lao. There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that
claiming it as their private property. decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than
In Maninang v. Consolacion, as was there categorically stated: that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free
"The fact that the grant was made by the government is patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his
law or not is a question which the government may raise, but favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." It
until it is raised by the government and set aside, the is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a indefensible.
question between the grantee and the government."
CASE #11 Ambrosia sold the subject fish pond under pacto de retro
twice, and had redeemed it twice. Subsequently, Ambrosia
Salao v. Salao, G.R. No. L-26699 legally bought the Lewa fishpond, adjoining the Calunaran
March 16, 1976 fishpond to the heirs of Santiago.
Juan died on November 1931 at the age of 80. Valentin Salao
Facts: died on 1933 at the age of 60 according to the death
certificate. But if he was 48 in 1918, he would be 63 1933.
This litigation regarding a 47 hectare fishpond located at Sitio
Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and
The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned
prescription.
extrajudicially in December 1934 between his daughters,
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Rizal had Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza. His estate
4 children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia. consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in
Manuel died. Patricio also died and was survived by his son, 1918 from his grandmother. They claim to have a 1/3 interest
Valentin Salao. in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds and that the interest
was Valentin’s share only held in trust by Ambrosia. No
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial
formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. After Valentina’s partition of Valentin’s estates however.
death, her estate was administered by Ambrosia. It was
partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 1918 Meanwhile, Juan Salao Jr. inherited his late father, Juan Salao
but notarized on May 1919, which was signed by her heirs: Sr.’s share in the fishponds, and acquired the other half
her 3 remaining children and her grandson, Valentin Salao. owned by Ambrosia when the latter donated her share in
favor of Juan Jr. before she died at age 85 in 1945. The
To each of the heirs of was a distributive share of P8,135.25. donation was registered in 1950.
Valentin Salao, then 48, was given the biggest fishpond with
an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an Plaintiff pray for the annulment of the donation and for the
area of 6,989 square meters and a riceland with a net area of reconveyance of the 1/3 portion of the Calunuran fishpond as
9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land exceeded Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share. Juan S. Salao, Jr. in
Valentin's distributive share so in the deed of partition he was his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the
directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked
arrangement, intended to avoid the fragmentation of the the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-
lands, was beneficial to Valentin. claims, he asked for moral damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses and reimbursement of the premiums
The documentary evidence proves prior to the death of which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the
Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan and Ambrosia, receivership. Juan Jr. died in 1958 at the age of 71. He was
secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six
of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare children and by the administrator of his estate.
fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga It is
also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint and the
counter-claim. The trial court found that there was no
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case. community of property among Juan Sr., Ambrosia and
Valentin when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands
Plaintiffs allege that Juan and Ambrosia had engaged in the were acquired; that the co-ownership of the legal heirs over
fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not the real properties of Valentina Ignacio only existed after her
shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs claim that death in 1914 and lasted until the partition of such properties
Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint in 1918.
venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the
properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his
those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia
fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did
theory. not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses
because their memories could not be trusted and because no
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the strong documentary evidence supported the declarations.
Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan and Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were
Ambrosia in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908. However, there can already dead. It also held that the donation made by
be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan and Ambrosia Ambrosia was valid.
secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911,
they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of Both parties appealed – the plaintiffs because their action for
their nephew, Valentin Salao. reconveyance was dismissed, and the defendants because
their counterclaim for damages was dismissed.
Issues: On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by
construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more
1. Whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for restricted sense and as contra-distinguished from a resulting
Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any
words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct
2. And if so, whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had intension to create a trust, but by the construction of equity
already prescribed. in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise
"by agreement or intention, but by operation of law."
Held:
Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
TRUSTS person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of
property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or
word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-
relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party".
trusts." A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense.
one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for
the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the
the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the
referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol
a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust.
trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or
choses in action. It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of
the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.
Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art.
1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an Nor can the Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence be relied upon
immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion
evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence." that there was no community of property during the lifetime
(Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457). "No particular words are required of Valentina Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by
for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a defendants' documentary evidence. The existence of the
trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs'
1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some Valentin Salao. But that co-ownership was not proven by any
writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily
72). proven.
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are It is incredible that the 47 hectare Calunuran fishpond would
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of be adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth.
intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by Surely, for the partition of one 145 hectares of fishponds
operation of law as matter of equity, independently of the among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication
particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are would not have sufficed.
ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts
(89 C.J.S. 722). The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more
evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative
or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496).
restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and That means that any transaction affecting the registered land
presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs,
transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure
conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest
found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code.
ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is
absence of such interest. watchful of his rights.
The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not
stated, the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is
wag notarized in 1919. The plaintiffs assert that the two no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation.
fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would
Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole
share. legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr.
The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases CASE #15
for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their
titles. There is need to remand these cases to the trial court Director of Lands v. Acme Plywood Veneer Co., Inc., G.R. No.
for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands L-73002, December 29, 1986
in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the
private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are Facts:
qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents
on said lands. The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
Issues: affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
(1) Whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
land; and square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
(2) Whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial
confirmation of title. The findings of the trial court are as follows: That Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc is a corporation duly organized in
Held:
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
Judgment is reversed. and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
that it can lawfully acquire real properties; that the land
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
subject property from the unclassified category, which is acquired by Acme on October 29, 1962, from Mariano and
beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive are cultural minorities; that the constitution of the Republic
Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place
absence of such classification, the land remains as on October 29, 1962; that the possession of the Infiels over
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered the land relinquished or sold to Acme, dates back before the
open to disposition. This should be so under time-honored Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong generation to generation until the same came into the
to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted possession of Mariano and Acer Infiel; that the possession of
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation the applicant is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to
of such patrimony. the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered
cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands from time immemorial; that the land sought to be registered
comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of public land or within the public domain; that applicant has
Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of introduced more than P45,000,000.00 pesos worth of
the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System. improvements; that the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever by the government when the Municipal Officials of
possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the
cannot ripen into private ownership. townsite from Acme.
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
not automatically render the property as alienable and Constitution. He asserts that the registration proceeding
disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the commenced on 1981, when the 1973 Constitution was
already enforced. Section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
private corporations or associations from holding alienable the decree, if not by earlier law."
lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels). Therefore, transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme. from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in
[please see Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended] 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Issue:
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically
Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in
of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
hectares corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of
Held: so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could not
The SC ruled in favor of Acme. The subject land was already acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
converted to private land by operation of law. 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that
confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has
a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not [for reference, see: cases Carino in 1909, Susi (for the Susi
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced doctrine) in 1925, and Herico in 1980]
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no
retroactive application because it had already acquired a
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
of considering possession of public land which is of the Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be
character and duration prescribed by statute as the respected.
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum
of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of
certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'.
in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were
required character and length of time; and registration instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to
conversion already affected by operation of law from the be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of
moment the required period of possession became complete. Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same employed actual fraud in procuring title over the parcels of
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid land.
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
CA affirmed the lower court.
CASE #16
Issue:
RP v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-4 04 02, March 16, 1987
Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally
Facts: be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under Section
48 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Held:
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965,
Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released The answer is in the negative.
and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land
for disposition under the Public Land Act. Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively
to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and
petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 concerning a portion their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued
of Lot No. 622 and a portion of Lot No. 324, approved by the during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens
Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register their system of registration, nullifies the title. Thus, possession of
titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
original owners thereof, whose possession of the same jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
including that of the herein Respondents, has always been and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in Torrens System.
the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years.
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a
opposition to the petition. Upon verification, however, the grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts
Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion of the being that private respondents could only be credited with 1
timberland already released by the government from the year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the
mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition. lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, when the land area
had been segregated from the forest zone and released by
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition
for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition under the Public Land Act. Neither private respondents nor
to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots
fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable
registration proceeding under Act 496. agricultural land
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are
innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that a
On May 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
petition for review of the decrees of registration under reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted
Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds title of the vendor. Without the needed verification, he
that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in
the Solicitor General for re-opening of the cadastral contemplation of law.
proceedings; that the parcels of land are portions of the
public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void,
forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or when it covers property of public domain classified as forest
about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-
have a registerable title to the land subject matter of the disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In the case at bar, it
decree the confirmation of registerable title to respondents will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the
over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not lower court counted the period of possession of private
qualify under the provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as respondents before the same were released as forest lands
amended, and that under the circumstances, respondents for disposition, which release is tantamount to qualifying the
latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-
disposable. Thus, under the foregoing rulings, even assuming
that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their
titles to said lands derived from the titles of private
respondents which were not validly issued as they cover
lands still a part of the public domain, may be cancelled.